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CASES ON PROCEDUEB.
The Sekies.
The present volume, on Common Law Pleading, is the
third of a series of case-books which the editor hopes to
prepare for the use of law students, covering the broad
subject of Procedure. The plan contemplates separate volumes on the following special topics : — Trial Practice, Code
Pleading, Common Law Pleading, Equity Pleading and

Practice, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and Appellate
Practice.
These books are to be prepared as separate and independent treatments of the subjects to which they relate. Each
branch of procedure has its own subject-matter and its independent problems, and no advantage would result from
erasing the lines which mark its boundaries. But while this
is so, it is nevertheless important to observe that an adequate conception of any one of these branches can be formed
only by keeping constantly in mind the scope and function
of procedure as a whole. Li a very true and fundamental
sense procedure is single and indivisible.
Its aim is to
furnish a mechanism for litigation, to supply a means and
naethod for applying the law in the solution of legal controversies. One purpose runs through it all. Pleadings
are drawn to present issues for trial ; trials are had to deWhat the trial determine issues raised by the pleadings.
mands the pleadings must give. One is the counterpart of
the other. Only in view of the trial are the pleadings intelligible ; only by reference to the pleadings can the scope

And as for the reand course of the trial be determined.
lation between procedure in nisi prius and in appellate
courts, the former is moulded to meet the requirements of
the latter and the latter is based strictly upon the foundation laid by the former. Thus pleading, in its various
forms, trial practice, and appellate practice may be correctly viewed as component parts of a highly developed system designed to enable parties to successfully resort to
courts of law for the redress of grievances. Together they
furnish a complete mechanism for the administration of the
law.

(v)
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the present series of case-books upon procedure it is
proposed to develop the subject, so far as possible, in this
broad and comprehensive way. Each branch will be treated
separately, and its technical details will be fully and carefully exhibited, but at the same time it will be the definite
aim to make each volume disclose its place and purpose
as an integral part of an articulated system. In this way,
if at all, may procedure be shown in its true character, as a
logically developed and practically eflScient means for accomplishing a very important end, instead of a mass of arbitrary and technical rules. No method will work well in
the hands of those who lack an adequate perspective and
who fail to take a comprehensive view of its scope and purthe law schools are to turn out men able to meet
pose.
the exacting demands of a critical and sorely-tried public,
they must spare no effort to develop in their students a
thorough, rational and enlightened appreciation of the true
function and the basic principles of procedure. The series
here proposed is an effort to supply material to meet this

In

If

need.
EdSON

University of Michigan.

B.
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PEEFACB.
No subject is more intimately connected with the history
and development of our law than common law pleading. In
sharp contrast with the other great system of law, that
founded by the Eomans, the common law has not been the
product of legislation, but of litigation. It has grown up in
the atmosphere of courts of justice. Such a genesis would
necessarily give it a strong procedural flavor, and would
tend to emphasize remedies at the expense of rights. Procedure might therefore be expected to play a much larger
part in the development of the common law than in the development of the Roman law, and such has been the fact.
To understand common law rights one must understand
common law remedies, for the former were developed
through the latter.
Furthermore, the system of pleading developed at common law has been the foundation of all the modem codes
and statutory systems.
"Code Pleading," so-called, was
an attempt to reform the common law system. No one can
know code pleading unless he knows the system which preceded and produced it. Every statute enacted to modernize
procedure is to be interpreted in the light of the practice
which was intended to be superseded. Common law concepts and common law terms persistently survive every effort to abolish the common law system. And the reason that
the new systems cannot eliminate the old is that they grew
out of it. Ancestors cannot be abolished.
Again, no system of pleading has ever been devised that
required so dose an analysis of the theory and facts of a
case as the common law system. It was a magiiifioent discipline. It called for the best efforts of the best legal minds.
It was predicated upon the idea that the case was to be
thoroughly sifted before trial, so that the controversy should
be reduced to its lowest terms. To do this required a critical study of the case in all its bearings, and a logical and
exact statement of the results of that study. Common law
pleading offered no comfort t« the careless lawyer.
Viewing the subject, then, in this threefold aspect, it
would seem that its study should be conducted in a way to
(vii)

viii

Peefacb.

It

should be
studied as an explanation of, and a commentary upon, the
It should be
common law notions of rights and obligations.
studied as an indispensable introduction to an understanding of modem reformed systems of pleading. And it should
be studied as an accurate and logical method for the analysis of legal controversies.
The purposes to be served have determined the scheme
of treatment. Forms of action are not primarily instruments of pleadings but categories of rights. Whether trover
or trespass lies in a given case is a question of tort law,
not of pleading. Whether one may sue in special or general assumpsit is chiefly a matter of contract law. But
the rights have developed through the use of the remedies,
so that a study of these forms of action is quite necessary
to a clear appreciation not only of the history but of the
present status of the law of rights. Forms of action would
therefore seeiln to have a proper place in a study of common law pleading, and the editor has given them a careful,
though not an exhaustive, presentation.
In studying the common law system as an introduction
to the modem art of pleading and at the same time as a
logical discipline in the analysis of cases, a middle ground
must be taken between the development of basic principles
and presentation of intricate problems. The subject must be
so worked out as to make it at once practically useful and
Modern pleading, as it becomes
intellectually stimulating.
more and more simplified, departs farther and farther from
the idea that its purpose is to develop and present distinct
issues. It tends to emphasize the idea of information, and
to turn pleadings into notices. But in so doing it tends
also to relieve the practitioner from the necessity for a close
and logical analysis of his case. With the standards of precision in statement constantly falling, and with liberality
in the allowance of amendments constantly rising, the lawyer pays less and less attention to his pleading, and the
advantage of a sifting of issues before the trial, so constantly insisted upon at the common law, tends to be lost.
This growing carelessness in pleading is undoubtedly to be
regretted, and can be in no way better counteracted than
by careful instruction and exercise in the vigorous and effective analytical methods of the common law. The pleading problems which the common law lawyers devised and

bring out each of the features mentioned.

Pksfao.

ix

solved were wonderful examples of legal logic, and no better material can be found for students' use than many of
the cases which embody them. But technical refinements
tend to cover up fundamental principles.
the student
devotes too much attention to logical niceties he fails to
get hold of the broader conceptions, which are permanent
and which have maintained their integrity throughout all
the stress and turmoil of the modem revolt against procedural precedent. A proper balance must be maintained between pleading as a method of analysis and pleading as a
practical means of presenting cases for judicial decision.
This aim the editor has constantly had in mind in selecting
and arranging these cases.

If

Uiiiversity of Michigan,
Ann Arbor,
August, 1914.
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COMMON LAW PLEADING
CHAPTER L
FORMS OF ACTION.
Section

1.

The Fokmulary System.

The history of common-law procedure practically begins
with the Norman Conquest of England in 1066. Prior to
that time legal institutes were crude and ill defined. In the
great days of the Roman Law, when continental Europe
was co min g under its domination and the work of Justinian
had given it a breadth and scope and precision which succeeding centuries have done comparatively little to improve, England remained submerged in her insular ignorance.
Ancient tribal customs for the most part satisfied
the needs of her rude inhabitants who knew and cared little
for the refinements of foreign civilization. They had no
genius for legal theory or judicial administration, and paid
no more attention to lawmaking or law enforcement than
the simple demands of primitive, pastoral folk rendered
absolutely necessary. England was almost entirely unorganized, and justice was administered in a very imperfect
way through local courts.
With the coming of the Norman kings the whole situation
A strongly
underwent an almost revolutionary change.
centralized government was at once established, which undertook the task of bringing the scattered elements of Einglish society under the direct control of the king. The methWith their keen
ods used were civil rather than military.
genius for government the Norman kings understood that
the surest way to establish themselves was to guarantee
to the people adequate protection to person and property.
The private and feudal local courts had been weak. LawProcedure was slow and its
lessness went unpunished.
formalism made justice precarious and inadequate. A vig(1)
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orous judicial administration was the political need of the
time, and the new rulers of England undertook to provide it.
"The great instrument for the reconstruction of the
judicial administration was the king's writ."' This writ
was executive, not judicial. It did not issue from a court,
but was in effect a royal authorization to the king's court
Without
to adjudicate the controversy described therein.
the writ the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter
of the suit.
A characteristic feature of the writ was its description
of the nature of the Controversy. Every writ was directed
to the facts of the case in hand. The suitor stated to the
king's secretary, the chancellor, the details of his grievance, and the chancellor prepared a writ in the king's name
commanding the king's officer, the sheriff, to summon the
accused party before the king's court to show why he liad
done the acts complained of. The writ was substantially
an executive order to show cause.
Unless the aggrieved
party could obtain a writ he could prosecute no suit in
the king's court; and when he did obtain a writ it was an
executive sanction to try just the case outlined therein and
no other.
The nature and form of these original writs is well illustrated by the numerous examples given by Glanville in
his Treatise on the Laws and Customs of England.''
A
few instances will make clear how narrowly the writ circumscribed the scope of the inquiry which was to come
before the court.
"When anyone," says Glanville, "complains to the court,
concerning a debt that is due to him, and be desirous of
drawing the suit to the King's Court, he shall have the
following writ, for making the first summons:
" 'The King to the Sheriff, Health. Command N., that
justly and without delay, he render to R., one hundred
marks which he owes him, as he says, and of which he complains that he has unjustly deforced him. And, unless he
does so, summon him, by good Summoners, that he be before me or my Justices at Westminster in fifteen days from
Street on foundations of Legal Liability, 28.
Translated into English by John Beames, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn, and
D. C. Glanville was ehiei
published by John Byrne & Co., Washington,
justiciar under Henry the Second.
1.
2.
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;

it,

Pentecost, to shew wherefore he has not done it. And
have there the Snmm oners and this writ. Witness, etc' "
Suppose, however, that the case is one where the debt
is secured by the giving of pledges.
Then, Glanville tells
OS, "if the principal Debtor shall be so much reduced as
to be incapable of discharging
recourse must be had to
the Pledges and they shall be summoned by the following

Writ:

" 'The King

d

if

d

a

if

it,

if

I

a

:

to the .Sheriff, Health. Command N., that
justly and without delay, he acquit E. of the Hundred
Marks against N., for which he has become his surety, as
he says, and of which he complains he has not acquitted
him. And, unless he does so, summon him, by good Summoners, etc' "
One of the most popular writs was that known as the
Writ of Novel Disseisin, which was brought by the disseisee of land against the disseisor. It ran as follows
"The King to the Sheriff, Health. N. complains to me,
that E. has, unjustly and without a Judgment, disseised
him of his free Tenement, in such Vill, since my last Voycommand you, that
age to Normandy; and, therefore,
the aforesaid N. should make you secure of prosecuting
his claim, then, you cause the Tenement to be reseised,
and that you cause him with
with the Chattels taken on
his Chattels to be in peace, until Pentecost; and, in the
meantime, you cause twelve free and lawful men of the
neighborhood to view the Land, and their names to be imbreviated; and summon them, by good Summoners, that
they be then before me, or my justices, prepared to make
the Eecognition; and put, by gage and safe pledges, the
aforesaid E., or his Bailiff, if he be not to be found, that
he be then there to hear such E-ecognition, and have there
the Summoners and this Writ. Witness, etc."
one die seised of land in fee, and a stranger foreBut
stalls the heir and acquires seisin, the Writ of Novel Disseisin, as above set out, obviously does not apply to the
case, and another writ, fashioned to the different facts,
Writ of Mort 'Ancestor, must be used by the heir
called
to recover the land. Again, this writ was so drawn as to
apply only to the son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or
the heir did not sustain one
niece of the ancestor, and
of these relations he could not make use of the Writ of
Mort 'Ancestor, but was required to obtain a Writ of

i

Common Law Pleading.

[Chap.

1

Aiel, Besail, Tresaiel or Cosinage, depending upon the remoteness of his relationship.^
It will be seen from these illustrations that every writ
was based upon a particular set of facts, and where the
facts of two cases differed even in such details as we should
deem wholly immaterial, the cases frequently had to be prosecuted by (Afferent writs. Every writ which was drawn up
and issued in behalf of a suitor became a model to be used
in other identical cases. These precedents grew in num' '
some
ber until the Register of Writs became a volume of
Henry
in
seven hundred large pages, whereas we started
Ill's days with some fifty or sixty writs capable of filling
some ten or twelve pages."*
The development of writs measured the development of
rights, for there was no right without a remedy, and no
adequate remedy was available save by the king's writ.
At first the suitor obtained his writ through the apparent
justice of his case, but as the body of precedents grew,
the tendency became more and more marked to keep within
Accordthe scope of the actions previously authorized.
ingly if one deemed himself aggrieved by the action of another, and desired legal redress, his course was to examine
the register of writs for a precedent applicable to his case.
If he found one, it was at once issued to him on payment
none fitted his case, he was wiljiout
of the required fee.
a remedy, unless the chancellor was willing to make a new
one for him.
Doubtless this power of devising new writs, and thereby
creating rights of action, was one capable of great abuse
in the hands of an unscrupulous king or chancellor, but as
long as the catalogue of existing writs fell substantially
short of meeting the current demands of the people, the
advantages derived from the exercise of the power outweighed the injuries which flowed from its occasional arbitrary misuse. The time came, however, when it was
thought necessary to check the power of creating new writs,
and in 1258 the Provisions of Oxford prohibited the issuance of writs other than those "of course," which were the

If

Pollock If Maitland, History of English Law, 57.
Maitland, Selected Papers, 172, on The History of the Register of
Original Writs. This paper was published in 3 Harvard Law Review, 169,'
Oct. 15, 1889, and is reprinted in 2 Select Essays in Anslo-American Legal
History, pp. 549-596.
3.

i.

2
2
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writs already in the register, without the approval of executive council as well as of the king.' These provisions
were soon swept away by, the tide of political events, but
the reform which they attempted to make in the matter of
writs seemed to persist by common consent, until the writ
system became so rigid and unresponsive to the growing
needs of the time that Parlisiment found it necessary in
1285 to interfere and to expressly authorize the issuance

of new writs out of the chancery. This was the famous
statute of Westminster the Second, which provided in chap-

ter 24, that, "Whenever from henceforth it shall fortune
in the Chancery, that in one case a writ is found, and in
like case falling under like law, and requiring like remedy, is found none, the clerks of the chancery shall agree
in making the writ; or, the plaintiffs may adjourn it until
the next parliament, and let the cases be written in which
they cannot agree, and let them refer themselves until the
next parliament, by consent of men learned in the law, a
writ shall be made, lest it might happen after that the
court should long time fail to minister justice unto complainants. ' '
It will be seen that there were as many kinds of actions
at law as there were writs, and no more. All actions which
could be prosecuted under the same writ were of the same
form; action requiring different writs were of different
form. The form of action was therefore of substantial
Unless the facts of a case brought it under
importance.
one of the recognized forms there was no right of action,
for there was no writ. The writ created the right, and
conformity to some writ was the test of a prima facie
right to sue. The study of law was the study of writs.
"De Natura Brevium, Of the Nature of Writs — such is
the title of more than one well-known textbook of our mediaeval law. Legal Eemedies, Legal Procedure, these are
the aU-important topics for the student. These being mastered, a knowledge of substantive law will come of itself.
Not the nature of rights, but the nature of writs must be
his theme. The scheme of 'original writs' is the very scheleton of the Corpus juris."®
Stubbs' Select Charters, 389.
The History of the Eegister of Original Writs,
Maitland:
Papers, ilO.
5.
6.

2
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The authority conferred by the Statute of Westminster
n was not to frame entirely new writs, but new writs analagous to those already in the register. By implication the
issuance of writs in entirely new cases was prohibited.
From the standpoint of the common law this was unfortunate. It offered an opportunity for a measure of growth,
but it made no adequate provision for the enormous expansion which society was subsequently to force upon the
remedial law. Deprived of a remedy by the rigidity of
the register of writs, the litigant had no recourse but to
petition the king, and the king referred him to the "keeper
of his conscience," the chancellor. Here no arbitrary catalogue of rights restricted the power of the chancellor to
do justice, and a new "chancery jurisdiction" grew up,
as a supplement to the circumscribed jurisdiction of the
law courts. The subsequent development of the law continued along restricted

lines.

Its broad boundaries were

unalterably fixed, but within those limits there was much
to be done. It was inevitable that as the law developed into
a body of general rules, wherein immaterial variations in
facts were lost in the identity of principles, the vast and
complicated system of writs should tend to become simplified.
Those writs which were based on fundamental and
elementary states of fact would tend to gain in popularity,
and would gradually be construed to embrace the lesser
varieties of the same class. In other words, with the generalizing of the law came a corresponding generalizing of
writs, until the great catalogue of the Register of Writs
became largely obsolete.
All but a few were unusued and
forgotten. But these few which survived not only retained
in themselves all the vitality of the entire register, but lent
themselves to broader uses. Accordingly, in the final development of the common-law writs, there were less than
a dozen currently used forms of action, each founded upon
its appropriate form of writ, which collectively were deemed
to embrace all causes of action of which common-law courts
took cognizance.
These residuary forms of action have been classified into
real, personal and mixed actions, and personal actions into
actions ex delicto and ex contractu. There seems to be no
strictly real action, for Ejectment, a mixed action, has supplanted the long list of real actions which filled the major
portion of the register of writs.. Personal actions ex de-

Sec 2]
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are Trespass, Trespass on the Case, Trover, Eeplevin and Detinue, and those ex contractu are Debt, Covenant, Assumpsit and Detinue.
The nature and scope of
each of these forms of action will form the subject matter
of the remaining sections in this chapter.

licto

Section

2.

Tbespass.'

LOUBZ

V.

HAFNER.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
1

1827»

Devereux Law, 185.

The Plaintiff declared in trespass vi et armis, and on the
trial before Strange, J., offered to prove that as he was
passing with his wagon on the highway, the Defendants
Forms of Deolabation.

7.

to Person (Assault or Assault and Battery).
, in the year of our Lord
For that the said C D, on the — day of
, with force and arms, made an assault upon the said A B, to wit, at, etc,
and then and there beat, bruised and ill-treated him the said A B, insomuch
that he the said A B by means of the premises, then and there became sick,
* • * And other wrongs to the said A B then and there did, against the
I.
peace of our said lord the king, and to the damage of the said A B of
and therefore he brings his suit, etc.
Trespass

to Personalty (Be bonis asportatis).
D, on the — day of
, A. D. —, with force and
For that the said
, aforesaid, in the county of
arms, to wit, at the parish of
;-, aforesaid,
seized, took and carried away certain goods and chattels, to wit, a certain
I. of
wagon, of the said A B, of great value, to wit, of the value of
the lawful money of Great Britain, there then found and being, and converted
* * * And other wrongs to the
and disposed of the same to his own use
of our said lord the king,
against
peace
the
said A B then and there did
B,
therefore he brings his
and
of
A
damage
said
of
the
the
to
and
suit, etc.
Trespass

I.,

—

regit).
{Quare elausum
D, on, etc., with force and arms, broke and entered a
For that the said
dwelling
of the said A B, situate and being in the parisl^ of
house
certain
and then and there ejected, eipelled, put out and
in the county of
family from the possession, use, occupation and
his
A
and
said
amoved the
of the said dwelling house, and kept and continued them so
enjoyment
to wit, from
ejected, expelled, put out and amoved, for a long space of time,
for and during all that tune lost,
Whereby the said A
thence hitherto.
dwelling house, to wit,
and was deprived of the use and benefit of his said
And other wrongs to the said A B then and there did
at etc., aforesaid.
against the peace of our said lord the king, and to the damage of the said
Chitty on Pleadand therefore he brings his suit, etc. See
of

f

to Beal Property

ings, pp. 367-394.

2

^B^

I.,

B

B

,

C
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into the road (but not so as to interrupt the Plaintiff's

and commenced beating a drum for the purpose
of frightening his horses, whereupon they took fright, ran
away, and damaged the Plaintiff's wagon, etc., but the presiding Judge being of opinion that case, and not trespass,
was the proper remedy, the Defendants had a verdict. A
new trial was afterwards moved and denied, and the Plaintiff appealed.
Taylor, C. J. : All the authorities concur in the position,
that whenever the injury is committed by the immediate act
complained of, the action must be trespass ; in other words,
"if the injurious act be the immediate result of the force
originally applied by the Defendant, it is the subject of an
action of trespass vi et armis, by all the cases ancient and
modern, and that it is immaterial whether the injury be
wilful or not." Several cases are put to illustrate this
rule, as when one shooting at a mark with a bow and arrow,
and having no unlawful purpose in view, wounded a man,
it was held that trespass was the proper action. So where
a person is lawfully exercising himself in arms, and happen to wound another, the same action must be brought
(Hob. 134). In actions of trespass, the distinction has not
turned either on the lawfulness of the act from whence the
to
injury happened, or the design of the party doing
commit the injury but on the difference between immediate
injuries or consequential ones. For
the injury be done
by the act of the party himself at the time, or he be the
immediate cause of
though
happen accidentally or by
answerable in trespass
misfortune, yet he
East, 600).
It impossible to doubt from the statement in this case,
properly brought according to all the dethat the action
cisions. For
wilfulness were a necessary ingredient in
the case,
exists here, since the Defendant beat the drum
for the purpose of frightening the Plaintiff's horses. It
much stronger than the case of Scott v. Shepherd
Bl.
R. 892), for here the act was immediately injurious, without any intermediate agency. If in the case of ScoU v.
Shepherd, the injury had been done to the person upon
whom the squib first alighted,
would have resembled the
case before us, and then there would have been no grounds
for the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Blackstone. who
thought that the first act was complete, when the squib lay
on the stall where
first fell, and that the injury done tfl

it

it

it

(2

is

it

if

is

is

(3

is

it,

if

;

it,

progress)
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the Plaintiff after the squib had received two new directions, was the consequence of, and not done immediately by
the first act of the Defendant.
The nature of the act done in this case, the time and
place where it was done, a wagon and team passing the
public road, rendered it probable that injury would be the
immediate consequence, and would render the Defendant
liable in the action, though he had no views to the consequences. For though the bad intention must be alleged and
proved in a charge of felony, it is not necessary to be considered in this action. "Where a man shoots with a bow
at a mark, and Mils a man, it is not felony, and it should
be construed, that he had no intent to kill him, but when he
wounds a man although that it be against his will, he shall
the injury
be said to be a trespasser" (3 Wils. 408).
who
or
inevitable,
be
not
the
doth
the
person
done
immediate cause thereof, even by accident, misfortune, and
answerable in this action of trespass vi
against his will,

is

is

it,

If

JAMES

7

Supreme Court

V.

CALDWELLw

of

a

I

armis.

(1

Strange 596- Sir. T. Jones 205- Sir T. Eaym.
am of opinion, that upon every
422.) For these reasons,
ground of law and convenience, as well as the most manifest
justice in the particular case, the action was well brought,
and the Plaintiff on the proof offered, should have had
verdict.
Pee Cxjbiam. Judgment reversed, and new trial awarded.
et

North Carolina.

1834.

Yerger, 38.

Mr. Chief Justice Cateon delivered the opinion of the
court.
The declaration states that James, with force and arms,
drove, chased, and set his dogs upon the mare of Caldwell,
and thereby caused her to run upon and against a stake of
wood with great force and violence, so that said stake of
wood penetrated the side of the mare, of which she afterwards died.

Common Law Pleading.
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It

is moved to arrest the judgment because the facts set
forth will not support an action of trespass vi et armis;
and it is insisted, for James, that the injury of the mare
running on the"" stake was consequential, and j;_asejSQiild. onlyhe supported.
ThfiJdngaJwerfi jEEe. instruments of assault^
as much as a stone thrown from the hand would have been.
The violently chasing the mare was in itself a trespass,
if unlawful for the defendant to do so ; but the declaration
does not state this; yet the chasing of the nag forced her

onJJjfLslake^ and the injury was immediate, and proceeded
from the act of the defendant. The whole was but one act,"
as in Scott v. Shepherd, for throwing a squib.
2 "Wilson,
403. In that case one was cited much in point to the present. It is this:
a man be riding on the way, and another man striketh his horse, by which the rider falleth
and is hurt, he which is cast off his horse shall have trespass against the other. The stroke given is to the horse,
and not to the rider, but he is instantly hurt by the fall,
in consequence of the act of striking the horse. ' ' This case
rests on the ground that the defendant in committing the
trespass, used an agent — the horse ridden; but the whole
was one act, proceeding from the defendant, and immediate
in point of time. We, therefore, think this first ground
against James, the plaintiff in error.

"If

WILSON

V.

SMITH.

Supreme Court of New York.
10 Wendell,

1833.

324.

The plaintiff declared in case, setting forth in his declaration an act of the legislature, authorizing him to erect
a dam across the Genesee river in a certain specified manner, at a certain place, and that he, erect ed the dam accord(ing to the provisions of the act; that he was in the posses-^
sion and occupancy of a sawmill supplied with water from
such dam, and that the defendants, well knowing the premises, with an intent to injure and aggrieve him, on, etc., at,
etc., with axes and others tools and implements, cut and re-
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is

is

is

it

is

a

is

a

;

it

;

it

is

a

a

it,

mpyed -apart ofLtiLe timbers and ather materials composing
the dam, so that by the action of the water upon the breach
made in the dam, a great part thereof was wholly displaced
and carried away, by means whereof the plaintiff was deprived of the nse of his miU for a long time, that is to say,
from, etc., hitherto, and of the gains and profits which would
have accrued to him thereby, and was put to great expense
in repairing the dam, and was otherwise greatly injured,
etc^ The defendants pleaded the general issue. The plaintiff proved the erection of the dam, and that he owned a
sawmill supplied with water by means thereof ; that the defendants cut away some of the timbers composing the dam,
made a breach in
and that by means of the breach, the
operation of his mill was suspended for several months;
and was proceeding to show the amoimt of his damages,
when the defendants' counsel interposed an objection to
the form of the action, insisting that the plaintiff should
have brought trespass, and not case, and on that ground
moved that the plaintiff be nonsuited. The counsel for the
plaintiff contended that the action was for the disturbance
franchise, and that for such an injury the only remof
edy was case; but whether so or not, the objection to the
form of action could not be taken at the trial. The judge
nonsuited the plaintiff, who now moved for a new trial.
By the Court, Sutherland, J.: The action in this case
should have been trespass, and not tresi)ass on the case.
The ground on which the f6rm of the action was endeavored to be maintained at the trial, and also upon the argument at bar, was, that the right to erect the dam, for an
franchise,
injury to which the action was brought, was
an incorporeal hereditament; and that for an injury to
property, or right of that description, trespass will not lie.
The principle here adverted to, does not apply to the case.
a franchise;
conferred
The right to erect the dam
an incorporeal
by the legislature, the sovereign power
innot a franchise, nor
right; but the dam itself
ferry, or to erect a bridge,
corporeal. The right to keep
particular river or lake by steam, may be
or to navigate
a franchise but the bridge itself, or the boats and machinery employed in the ferry, or the navigation of the river,
Supmay, notwithstanding, be the subjects of trespa-ss.
alleged in this case to have been
pose the outrage which
committed on the plaintiff's dam, had been committed upon

12
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Cayuga Bridge, or the steam boat navigating that lake,
or the ferry boats between Albany and Greenbush, or Albany and Troy; can there be a doubt that the individuals
who perpetrated the act would be liable as trespassers to
the individuals or companies to whom the bridge or boats
belonged? ^Sgi_faras tiie incorporeal right is invaded, the
re dress is ly an acKon lon the case." But when visible, tangi-"
TTe^j&OEDQre al proper ty is inHred. if the injury be direct,
immediate and wilful, trespass is the,^prpper form of action, although that property may be connected with, or be^
the means by which an incorporeal right, is enjoyed.
I did not understand the counsel for the plaintiff to deny,
that independently of this particular feature of the case,
The evithe action might and should have been trespass.
dence certainly shows a very clear case of direct and immediate injury, from the wilful and intentional act of
the defendants ; and in such a case I consider it well settled
This subject was very
that the action must be trespass.
elaborately considered by this court in Percival v. HicTcey,
18 Johns. E. 257, where all the leading cases were referred
The case of Leame v. .Bray, 3 East, 593,
to and analyzed.
was considered as establishing the true doctrine ; and there,
as in Percival v. 'Rickey, it was held, that where the injury
is the immediate and direct result of the force originally
applied or directed by the defendant, trespass is the proper
remedy, whether the injury was wilful or not. In both of
those cases it was the result of negligence only, and yet the
the

actions were sustained. Scott v. Shepherd, 3 "WUl. 411, 2 Bl.
892, S. C. Ogle v. Barnes, 8 Term R. 198. 6 id. 128. 5 id.
649. 1 Strange, 596, 636. Hob. 134. Peake's N. P. 107. 1
Term R. 569. 1 Camp. 497. 5 Bos. & Pull. 117, 446. 1 ib. 472.
Mr. Chitty states the rule correctly, as apprehend, 1 Chitty's PI. 127; he says, in case of injuries arising from driving carriages or navigating ships, etc., if the injury were
immediate, and be stated in the declaration to have been
wilfully committed, or appear to have been so on the trial,
the remedy must be trespass ; but if the injury was attributable to negligence, though it were immediate, the party injured has an election either to treat the negligence of the
defendant as the cause of action, and to declare in case
or to consider the the act itself as the injury, and to declare in trespass.

R.

I

'
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The cases already referred to support this distinction.
It was also taken in this court in Blin v. Campbell, 14
Johns. R. 432, and was recognized by Judge Spencer, in
delivering the opinion of the court, in Percival v. Mickey.
In this case the iajury was direct and immediate, and the

evidence showed it to have been wilfully committed, and
according to the authorities referred to, trespass only
would lie in such a case. In trespass all the consequential damages may be recovered under a per quod, so that
there is no necessity for departing from the appropriate
form of action. The only remaining question is, whether this
objection to the form of the action could be taken upon the
trial. Leame v. Bray, 3 East, 593, is a direct authority
for the position that the objection may be taken at the
trial; in that case, as in this, it was taken at the trial, and
the plaintiff was nonsuited on that ground alone, and on
the motion to set aside the nonsuit, no objection was
started, that it was not ground of nonsuit if the action was
in fact misconceived.
The real objection is, that the evidence does not sustain the action, and that is in all cases
ground of nonsuit. In Ogle v. Barnes, 8 Term E. 191, 2,
which was an action on the case, Lawrence, J., says, if it
had appeared in evidence in this case that the defendants
had wilfully done the act, the plaintiff must have 'been nonsidted. It is in truth a variance between the declaration
and the proof.
Motion for a new trial denied.^
In

J.

L. 308, plaintiff sued in trespass
Osborne v. Butcher (1857) 26 N.
defen da n t ha d- sh ut - up, blocked- .up^,.,obstrueted,
and rendered
i^aasaljfe- a -certain -byroad^^ttien. Jise JU^3^6 plaS)iff.2/JZTJ.e3Mufrisaid :
'"The gravamen is the obstruction of a byroad, and thereby depriving the
plaintiff of its use. The obstructing and blocking up of the road may have
been direct, immediate, vrilful and forcible, but that was not to, or upon
the land of the plaintiff or to his possession; it was not direct and immediate
The injury to him was the depriving him of the use of th«
as to him.
It was indirect and consequential,
byroad by reason of such obstruction.
and therefore the Bubjact of aa action on the ease, and not of trespass."
8.

beeause

"t hg
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THE ST. LOUIS, VANDALIA AND TERRE HAUTE
RAILROAD COMPANY v. THE TOWN OF
SUMMIT.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.
3

Baker,

J.

Illinois Appellate,

1878.

155.

This is an action of tresp ass quare clmsum

.jfre^ri^^ prosecuted
T he'^ocMs in q uo

by the appellee against the appellant.
Cumber-,
is„that_£aTt of the NatignaL or

road that i8_ iQcaied^in .the township ^pf. Summit,- in
EffiughanL-county.
The case was submitted to a jury at the September term,
1877, of the Effingham Circuit Court, and a verdict was
returned into court finding the appellant guilty and assess—*•-..,
ing the damages at $2,000.
lai^d,.

The first question that arises upon this record is as to
whiethfi£^iJie-plaintiff,Ml.O.¥^^Jia'd~such possessionof the locus
in quo as would .enable it to maintain trespass.
"°"
The gist of the action of trespass, quare clav^wn f regit,
iRjJTS.ipj"^ toth^? p"Ppg',gRi'^n; and the general rule is that
wit^QHt ..aclaiai passession^.trespass canjao]rT)e_. supp^EedT
The English doctrine, is that as to real property, there is_

32

c

e

,

is

,^.

is

no such constructive possession as will enable the plamSfi"
to support this action. 1 Chit. PI. 176, 177, and notes.*
With na the^^Ie is relg,:^^
and when the plaintiff
the.
no adverse
awnex and the lands are unoccupied, or there
possession tr spass an be ^maintained.
ifean v. Uomstock~

lU. 173; Smith et at. v. WunlerUcJcei al.,
"There is

70

111.

426.i«

9.

distinction, between personal and real property.
In the first case we have seen that the general
the possession, sufficient to enable the owner to support
property draws to
the trespass, though he has never been in possession; but in the case of land
and other real property, there is no such constructive possession, and unless tht
plaintiff had the actual possession at the time when the injury was comChitty on Pleading (Ed. of 1809)
mitted, he cannot support this aption."
a material

right of the owner:

1

it

as to the

rule

was tersely
40,

as

stated

follows:

in Smith v. Wilson (1834),
Dev.
"The plaintiff having failed to sh»ii

4

The

Battle L. (N. C.)

1

176.
10.

that he had any title to the land, when the supposed trespass was eommitted, therefore, failed to show a constructive possession; then the eouii
was certainly right, in stating to the plaintiff, that he could not proceed
without showing an actual possessioB of the locus in quo the trespasa wai
alleged to hav<i been eommitted."

Forms of Action.
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The title to the National road being in the State, and^ot
wn
inI the to
Sunu"—
is clear'TEaORgrs" Clan he no connit.
'~~ of' ■"'III'"
—y -' it
^-,
m
strucuve_ possession m the town, upon the principle that
the possession" follow s thejtitle when there is no adverse
possession.
Tl^etown, through its commissioner of highways, had mer^^jEhe "care and superintendence of the road,
and the duty imposed upon it of keeping^it in repair, etc.
The only evidence in the case tending in the least to show
actual possession in the plaintiff, was the testimony of several witnesses, who stated that the National road through
Summit township had been worked by the_jf;pad labor in
jfjigt- t.own,af I'Pi «sjr>thftr highways were worked. We do not
gnderstand that ms was such possession as would sus■
.te,in the action of tresTgsiss'gmre' clausum f regit,-hi fact,-it
was a mere pefTormance' of the duty imposed by statute
upon the town authorities to keep the highways ia repair.
•

•

•

The judgment of the court below is reversed

and the

cause remanded.
MS:PM:!:^&^anjd

remanded.^^

U. Possession of the surface and subsoil may be in different persons, as
where the mayor and aldermen of the borough of Derby had exclusive possession of the surface of a close for the purpose of pasturage during the
season, but it was held that the plaintiffs, who held the >fee, retained possession of the subsoil, so that they could maintain trespass guare clausum
fregit for cutting into and digging holes in the subsoiL Cox t. Glue
B. 533.
(1848), 5

a

SMITH

V.

WUNDEELICH.

Sv/preme Court of Illinois.
70

Illinois,

1873,

426.

Mr. Justice Mo-AiiLisTEB delivered the opinion of the
Court:
This was trespass qitare clcmsum fregit, by appellees

against appellants. The cause of action declared on, was
an ouster of plaintiffs, by defendants, from a certain shop
on Madison street, Chicago, wherein plaintiffs, as partners, then were, and for some time previously had been,
carrying on the business of shoemakers. The ouster was

Common Law Pleading.

16

[Chap.

1

set out as occurring December 11, 1871, with a contimumdo
to time of commencement of suit. The suit was brought
January 27, 1872. The plaintiffs, on the trial, gave evidence tending to show that they held the premises under a
verbal lease from Dunne, one of the defendants, and that
their term extended until May 1st, 1872 ; also gave evidence,
against the defendants' objections of the difference between the actual rental value of the premises, and what
they were to pay as rent, down to the first day of May,
1872 ; also gave evidence tending to show prospective profits in their business to that time.
By the first instruction given for plaintiffs, the court directed the jury that, if they found, from the evidence, that
plaintiffs had a verbal lease of the premises to the first
day of May, 1872, and were wrongfully ousted therefrom
by the acts of the defendants, then the latter were liable,
and the damages should be; first, the difference between
the rental value of the premises, as appears from the evidence, from the time they were so ousted, and the amount
plaintiffs were to pay as rent until May 1st, 1872; second,
any loss sustained by them in their business, shown, by the
evidence, as the necessary consequence of being deprived
of the premises, after the time when the jury shall believe,
from the evidence, the plaintiffs were ousted.
To the giving of this instruction defendants excepted,
and now assign it for error.
There is no evidence tending to show that, after the
Glister was consummated, they made any lawful re-entry,
or brought any action of forcible entry and detainer, to
recover possession ; but, on the contrary, they brought this
action to recover for the ouster, before their term ex-

pired.

*

•

*

To maintain

trespass to real property, the plaintiff
must have the actual possession, by himself or his servant,
at the time when the injury was committed. The only exception to this rule is, where the plaintiff is owner, and the
lands are unoccupied, or there is no adverse possession. 1
Chit. PI. 177, and cases in notes ; Sedg. on Dam. 134 ; Deem
V. Comstock, 32 111. 173. The gist of the action is, the injury to the possession.
It follows, from the above rule, that if the trespass
amount to an ouster of the plaintiff, he can recover dam-
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ages only for the trespass itself, or first entry; for though
every subsequent wrongful act is a continuance of the trespass, yet, to enable the plaintiff to recover damages for
these acts, there must be a re-entry. 1 Chit. PI. 177 ; Sedgwick on Dam. 135; Addison on Torts, 304. "A disseizee
may have trespass against the disseizor, for the disseizin
itself, because he was then in possession ; but not for an injury after the disseizin, until he hath gained possession by
re-entry, and then he may support this action for an intermediate damage." Taylor on Landlord and T., sec. 783.
See, also, Blac. Com., book 3, p. 210.
In Monchton v. PasMey, 2 Ld. Eaym. 974, s. o. 2 Salk.
638, Lord Holt said:
"As to the case of an entry with
ouster, it may be set forth specially in the count or not.
with a continuando or diversis diehtis et vicibits, between
such a day and such a day; but then you must prove that
the plaintiff re-entered before the action brought, or else
you can not assign the mesne trespass ; for, by the ouster,
the defendant had got the plaintiff's possession, and he
can not be a trespasser to the plaintiff; but when the plaintiff re-enters, the possession is in him ab initio, and he
shall have the mesne profits."
In Case v. Shepherd, 2 Johns. Cases, 27, the court say:
"The only question, therefore, is, as to the extent of the
damages to be recovered, or whether the defendant is to
be made responsible for the consequential damages of the
ouster. In this case, the trespass is laid with a continuando ; but the distinction as to the amount of damages to be
recovered in this case is this: After an ouster, you can
only recover for the simple trespass, or the first entry ; for
though, when there is an ouster, every subsequent act is a
continuance of the trespass, yet, in order to entitle the
plaintiff to recover damages for the subsequent acts, there
must be a re-entry; but, after a re-entry, he may lay his
action with a continuando, and recover mesne profits, as
well as damage for the ouster. 1 Ld. Ryam. 692; 6 Slak.
639; 2 Ld. Raym. 974; 1 Leon. 302, 319; 13 Coke, 600; Menvil's Case, 3 Blac. Com. 210; Co. Litt. 257. The present
suit was commenced before any re-entry by the plaintiff.
He is, therefore, entitled to recover damages for the first
''
entry only, or single trespass, and not for the crops.
See, also. Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. 507 ; Rowland v. RowSunderland —C. L. P. 2

Common Law Fleadinq,

18

Icmd, 8

E.

(Ham.) Ohio R.; Shields v. Henderson,

[(J hap,
1

1

Lit. (Ky.).

239.

In Allen

court say:
"Now, a disseizee can not maintain trespass for the wrong
done after the disseizin, and before a re-entry ; for the freehold is in the disseizor all the time after the disseizin, excepting in cases where the estate of the disseizee shall have
v.

Thayer,

17

Mass.

E.

300, the

it

if

it

it,

determined so that he could not re-enter ; as, where he was
tenant for years, and his. term expired, or was tenant per
auter vie, and the cestm qui vie died."
In the case at bar, the plaintiff's term had not expired,
and did not expire until several months after this suit was
brought. There was ample time for them to have brought
an action of forcible entry and detainer, and thus have
regained possession. That done, the law, by a kind of jtis
postliminii, or right of reprisal, would regard the possession as having been all along in them (3 Blac. Com. 210) ;
and then, after the expiration of their term, bringing this
suit, they would be entitled to recover, as mesne profits, the
value of their lease or term ; for, as a general rule, the annual value of the land is the measure of mesne profits.
Adams on Ejec. 391; Sedg. on Dam. 124. The theory on
which such recovery could be had would be, that the trespass was continued to the end of the term.
The plaintiff not having re-entered, and their lease not
expiring until many months after the ouster, they were not,
upon the principle of the authorities cited, entitled to recover mesne profits from the ouster to the end of their
term, but must be confined to the ouster itself, or the single
trespass. They, of course, are entitled to recover for all
the necessary and natural consequences of that act, in view
of all the circumstances belonging to
including such loss
as they sustained by breaking up their business, if
was
thereby broken up, and
circumstances of aggravation are
shown, which render
impossible to apply any fixed rule
of law, the jury have the power to give exemplary damages,
to be graduated with reference to the motives which actuated the defendants, and the manner in which the act complained of was committed. Sherman v. Dutch, 16 111. 283.

The judgment of the court below will be reversed and

the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.
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GELSTON.

Supreme Court of New York.
13

1816.

Johnson, 141.

[This was an action of trespass brought against David

collector of the, port ,g£,JN'ew_York, and another,
for the^seiziirT'oF'the vessel I'Am^erican Eagle.'' A, libel
was filed against her on the ground t hat she had be_en fitted
out t o commit , hostiliti^a. upon the slEaJSEZaCaTforeigii
esta te with which tjjifi TTwitf^d Statpg was then at peace, but
upon a trial in the District Court the uSfiL-sgas -di«Bai -ssed-..
and the ^u£t ordered restitution of the .yessel to the plain-,
SffTTier owne r. The plaintiff then_hr.aught,-this^-action..iof
^'
^mages . J
iSpencee, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The bill
of exceptions taken at the trial, presents two points for the
consideration of the Court :
1.
Was therfi-suflScieiltevidence
of property in the plain..-™.-~^.-....-.,..^.„..,.-~.^.-„-,
._....,...
Gelston,

i

tiff? * * *
With respect to the first point, the bill of exceptions
states, that the plaintiff gave in evidence, that, at the time
of the seizure of the ship American Eagle, by the defendants, she was in the actual, full and peaceable possession
of the plaintiff; and that, on the acquittal of the vessel in
the District Court, it was decreed that she should be restored to the plaintiff, the claimant of the vessel in that
Court; and the plaintiff then gave in evidence the proceedings in the District Court, by which the above facts fully
In this stage of the cause, and after the plainappeared.

tiff

had proved the seizure of the ship by the defendants,
and her value, a motion was made by the defendants' counsel, that the plaintiff should be non-suited, on the ground
that there was not sufiScient evidence to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, no right or title having been shown in the
plaintiff to the ship. We are of opinion that the motion
a general an,d
for a nonsuit was correctly overruled.
undeniable mincittle^tbat- possession is a sufficient title to
the plamtiff in an action of trespa ss, vi et armis, against

Itj£
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(1 East's Rep. 244. 3 Burr. 1563. Willes's
The
Rep. 221. Esp. Dig. 403. Gould's edit, part 2. 289.)
^nder of an article may maintain trespass against any
person TmtJ4 ifi.r£iaJLo:gaier ; and a person having jin illegal^
possession may support tliis action against any person_
QtESriteB*- the. true owneir ^(l Chitty's P1.~168."2 Saund.
47. d.) If these principles are applied to this case, it will
appear, at once, that the evidence of the plaintiff's right
to the ship was very ample.
dnnr.

For

these reasons we are of opinion that the motion for
a new trial must be 'refused, and that the plaintiff have

judgment on the verdict.

rjW gCTff ni'? far the

ROCKER

V.

f

lain^'^ff,

i^.

PERKINS.

Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
6 Mackey, 379.

This was an action of trespass.

1888.

The declaration alleged

that the /ififendarLts^it]l~fO'Jt't'CSH'!l.arms,
etc., "wrongfuUv
seized .a-eer.tam. colt of the plaintiff of tHe value, of $15il^
and then and there carried away the same and converted
and disposed of the same to their own jis.e,.". toTTthe damage

'of

plaintiff $250,
The defendants, Perkins and West, pleaded not guilty.
the

On cross-examination the plaintiff was asked whether
he_ b.ad-not sold. pijqx-Aq., the . J9th of .IJovember, to oaeTh^fld^J? Plitt, certain of his goods and chattels and re-^
ceived a consideration therefor.
He replied that fie had""
executed such a bill of sale, but that it wasjnerely as security for ,a..deht of .$500--dufi Mc^tiili, Tfiat possession^
of the property had not been transferred to Mr! Plitt, but
that he had been permitted by said _Plittto retain said
goods andj^iatte]^ including the colt4n_c|ui^Qn, witjTffie
understajttding^ that if he should fail to pay s aid debt ^ha,,^
j(Plitt) migH tate possession, of the, said colt and the other
• *""^
goods, and chattels mentioned in the bill of saTeT""'

FoBMs

Sec. 2]

Action.

OF

21

Mr. Chief Justice Bingham delivered the opinion of the
Court:
The only question hefore us is whether or not in the

s

is

is

,

,

\

is.

case of a sale such as was shown to have been made here,
the plaintiff parted with his property in the colt in such
a manner as that the allegation in the declaration that the
colt was the colt of the plaintiff is supported by the evidence. In other words, if the plaintiff's possession was
by virtue of his arrangement with Plitt, that he should
keep the colt until the maturity of the debt, when, if he
failed 'to pay, Plitt was to take possession, .were these facta
sufficient to support the averment of ownership in the
declaration? The position of the defense is that if the
plaintiff had onlj a special ownership of the colt, such as
the rigET^f possession under the agreement with Plitt,
then in order to recover he must allege such ownership in
his declaration, and prove it upon the triah We are satisfied that there is no authority sustaining that view of the
law. It is a well settled rule of pleading that it
siifficient
,in this class, of actions simply to allege ownership in the
pjaiotiff ^nd then any proof of ownership which gill upport the action of trespass wiU be sufficient under such an
The meje right of
allegation to" entitle him to recover.
sufficient to mjaintain the action against every"
possession
one but the owner, and the^jjlegation that the plaintiff
well made out bymefely^proving iSsTigEr of
the owner

is

"

possession."

--«--«.-,

"""~

^

hj

a

mbseiguent sale and delivery of-property injured
trespass htts
13.
effect, in depriving^ the party who had possession at, the time, of the
tr^pata, of his right to sue. .^OTuton t. Willard (1830), 10 Pick. (Mass.)
no

I6B.

61

J.:

Appeals

v.

MANKIN.

of

Supreme Court

of

DICKINSON

West Virginia.

1906.

West Virginia, 429.

G. Dickinson brought an action of
trespass quare clcmswm regit against Crocket Mankin and
P. S. Burkholder to recover dania.ge8 for "entering upon a

John

f

Brannon,
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tract of land claimed.,^ by.^Pi<j|in§Qn and cutting timber.
thereon. The defendants pleaded two pleas, one not guilty,

is
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&
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a
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r
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it,
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is
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it
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I
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is

is

f

o

is

'to

the other liberum tenementum. A trial before a jury was
had resulting in a verdict for the defendants, on which
judgment was rendered for them, and .Dickinson brings the
case to this Court
pXthia Court
^The defendants challenge the
' • jurisdiction
•
•
to entertain the writ of error.
But can the plaintiff sustain his writ of err or on the.
ground jE22t~is a wntroyersy cOnemTmrg"1;1tle^^
aries of land? The case of Greathouse v. Sapp, 26 "W. Va.
show that such action of trespass does not
87, is decisive
involve title or boundaries of land so as to give a writ of
error under that clause of the constitution granting a writ
of error in suits involving title or boundary of land, though
the record show that title and boundary were in fact in
question in it. But in that case the only plea was not
Unthe plea
UberumA enementMm.
guilty, while here
the
der that case we must concede that where the plea
general issue, not guilty, there can be no appeal under this_
the plea of liberum tenementum.
^ead. In this case there
Whilst all the books mention this plea, its long history
somewhat obscure, and the decisions touching its application are very numerous, and somewhat conflicting, in
am enabled to say
both England and America. So far as
has been very little used in the Virginias, and the abvery little known. Yet there
struce learning touching
much law book authority on it. Early , in JZirpniaitJiEai.
held to^ be a good plea. Mcmgwm v. Flowers,
Munf. 205.
full
In the sixth volume of Robinson's Practice, 780,
history of the plea. Once
was used only where the plainvery
declaration
was
in its description of the
general
tiff's
and this plea performed the oflSce
land, not specifying
more definite
of compelling a novel assignment, that is,
description but long since the plea has performed a wider
So we find
stated in 21 Ency. P.
function.
Prac., 840,
stated
that
the
effect
where
of the plea "is to con-^
plaint
flie
had
possession
iff
of the close named^
f^ss that_
?~complainBd
the a£
Of ang^hait
g]PT^T-^iTF"^^^~^^^^^""^^^^^
by ffi defenda nt as set forth, but
sni2h».ad;jma«£QHlffiitted
to avoid the trespass by averring a right to enter and aci.
as alle^3^' "The plea in legal effect jijtinlfe pos session in
the plaintiff such as would enab le him to m aintaS' he ao-
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tion against a wrong-doer , and assert s a freehold in the
"defendant, witn ngJit to immediate possession as against
t&e^plaj5tiffr^ J'orf Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 115 Hi. 177.
"The plea of liberum tenementum admits the fact that the
plaintiff was in possession of the close described in the
declaration ; and that the defendant did the act complained
of ; raising on ly the quest ion whether the cloaft described
was the defendant's frfifihnld nr not..--.And his title must be
proved either, ^_deed of other documentary evidence, or
by an ajgtual, ad v erse and exclusive^^ossession for twenty
jpars^; inasmucL as, under this issue, he undertakes to show
a title in himself, which shall do away with the presumption arising from the plaintiff's possession."
2 Greenleaf
on Evidence, section 626. So it seems that this plea raifies
the question of tit le aij d hmmdary . "WTiat is the effect of
verdict and judgment when the plea is in? It would seem
that it would be conclusive upon the title. If so Dickinson's right to the land he claims would be concluded in this
case, and this being so his suit involved title and he would
be entitled to a writ of error.
Investigation of the effect
of verdict and judgment upon such plea will show a woeful
conflict of authority upon it. Van Fleet's Former Adjudication, section 404, says: "If the title to land is put in
issue and determined in an action of trespass, q. cl. jr., it is
concluded in Colorado, Illinois, New Hampshire, New York,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and in the courts
of the United States, England, and New South "Wales,
while the contrary is true in Massachusetts and Michigan."
An investigation of the cases on the subject produces much
doubt. It will so appear from Van Fleet in his further
Van Fleet cites Pennsylvania for the rule of
discussion.
finality; but McKnigU v. Bell, 135 Pa. St. 358, distinctly
holds that a judgment upon such plea, when the only plea,
is conclusive in a second action wherein the freehold is
attempted to be put in controversy; yet such judgment is
not conclusive of the title in a subsequent ejectment, especially when the plea of liberum tenementum was accompanied by a plea of not guilty, although it be shown that the
only dispute on the first trial was as to title. Elson v.
Com^tock, 150 111. 303, 37 N. E. 207, holds such judgment
a finality on title, if it appear from the record or be shown
by oral testimony that the title was actually triecL See

24
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Herman on Estop., section 281 ; White v. Chase, 128 Mass.
158; Bigelow Estop. 98. Now, the record in this case, including all the evidence, shows ttat J^,g^jn,^,MilBda**®*^
.were in controvjexsy in this suit, ^nd Jherefore itmi^jgjjlass,plausibly idaJIlQM.ih^tLj^,3se_.is„on^^ involving JiJig,.,aaflU
It is difficult to tell what rule should be laid
vfeoujidajai.
down. In Arnold v. Arnold, 17 Pick. 4, the court denied
the finality of a judgment upon such a plea. It said that a
judgment upon an issue of soil and freehold was not conclusive in a writ of right. It said that the plea of soil and
freehold, meaning ^jfi^m,^ tenementumj^ would be siip^
ported by defendant proving an estate for his life, or that
in a writ of right the property was in question. The court
said that the §£tipn..QjLtrespass quare clausum fregtt and
th^ various ..x,^3|sja|;,.ente£jjBgcronly" the right of "posses8ionjffid-.antry^nd do not conclude as to tElfflSr£ngE!r
A tenant can sustain trespass against his landlord unlawfully entering upon his possession, and yet it would not be
thought that tbe landlord would lose his title. Still in answer
to this it may be said with success that the true matter of
contest could be proven by parol, and thus prevent the loss
of the landlord's title. I might pursue the many decisions
upon this subject elsewhere, with the result only of producing confusion, not enlightenment. T dnnbt whether such a
judfrmeut wnnlrl bfi a bar to the wrif, nf rig-bt fnrmprlv nsgd
in Virgin ia tn try f^-^ tt^ot-^ ^i^^t, ^'^'^ y^^y ^'^'^ ^illf, to
And I doubt to-day whether it could so operate
land.
against an action of ejectment which now, with us, is a real
action performing the functions formerly performed by
the writ of right. The one relates to the possession, is a
possessory action; the other touches the very right and
title. We all know, as was said in Greathouse v. Sapp,
above, that trespass is to recover mere damages for invation of land, or rather invasion of possession, not to recover
land. No writ of possession can issue under a judgment
in an action of trespass. An appeal lies in an action of
unlawful detainer, which is an element of title. Not so in
trespass. It bears only indire(^,tlv, -^bej) jt Tnu4 h^ar Ar^
xeefer-i m title to give jurisdiction under this head . Cook
V. Dcmgherty, 99 Va, 5yU; McUiaugherty vTWorgcm, 36 W.
Va. 192. See Barret v. Coal Co., 51 W. Va. 420. * * •
We may say that this case does not tou^ title or,.bQTindary
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as to give that writ, and we dismiss it for want of juria'
lictron, and decide nothing' of the merits oTtEeTase;

*

BO

Eeversed.^*
14
In KimbaU y. Hilton (1898), 92 Ma. 214, it was held that the gist
of the action was invasion of a rightful possession, and
title becomes important only in its effect upon the right of possession. Hence the judgment,
where defendant pleads title, does not settle the title, for
the defendant may
have the titie and yet the plaintiff have the right of
possession.
Why Trespass Lies Only foe Violation op
Possession.
"For centuries
it has been common learning that the action of trespass vi et armis Ues only
where there is a wrongful invasion
of possession.
The conception of
trespass, so far as it concerns injuries to personal or real property, embodies
the idea of the violation of possessory right as well as the idea of forceful
Hence if one who has acquired a lawful possession of the propdamage.
erty of another does damage to it he is not liable in an action of trespass
though the application of force be direct and immediate.
If there is any
one principle upon which the common law seems to have committed itself
fully and unequivocally it is upon this principle that the wrong of trespass 'is predicated upon the idea of the violation of possessory right. Trespass will not lie imless the right of possession be somehow violated or
invaded.

"Now why should this be truef
Is this principle grounded in
the very nature of this action of trespass, or is it an artificial and accidental
rule? Why cannot trespass be maintained against any one who does violent
injury to the property of another, without regard to the question whether
the one or the other has the legal possession of the property? Why is not
the bailee of chattels or the lessee of land liable in trespass where he
forcefully damages the chattels of his bailor or commits waste upon the
The question is one deserving attention.
premises of his landlord?
' '
The explanation of the rule is to be found, as might be expected, in certain facts of legal history. The action of trespass was in its origin a
criminal action, and hence it would not lie for an act which did not constitute
a breach of the peace or manifestly tend to a breach of the peace.
This was
the very ground on which the King's Bench assumed jurisdiction over the
In the light of this idea it is easy to see how the law arrived at
wrong.
the proposition that only those acts which involve a violation of possessory
right are trespasses.
"The principle that

the action of trespass is maintainable
only against
possession manifests itself in various aspects. In regard
to real property we note this consequence, to-wit, that if land is in the
possession of a lessee or of a tenant, and a stranger does an injury to the
premises, the lessee or the tenant is the person who is entitled to maintain
The landlord or remainderman must seek redress
trespass against the stranger.
in some other remedy, such as the action of case. He cannot maintain trespass, because the tort-feasor has not violated his possession, but that of the
'Only the person who has the possession in fact of the real proptenant.
erty to which an injury has been done can maintain an action of trespass
quare clausum.'
the field of personal property the doctrine that trespass lies only at
the instance of one whose possessory right is violated manifests itself in the
early rule that the action of trespass is available only against the imor those who are so connected with the wrongful act
mediate wrong-doer
In the case of an asportation of
as to be liable as principals with him.
chattels the remedy could not be used against a 'third hand,' that is,
3 Street on
against one who got the goods from the original tort-feasor."
one

who violates

"In

Foundations of Legal Liability,

234.
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EEYNOLDS

v.

1

Casb.^»

CLARKE.

Court of King's Bench.
1

[Chap.

1725.

Strange, 634.

Trespass for entering the plaintiff's yardj^ and, fixing a
spout there, per quod the water came into the yard and
rotted the Myalls of the plaintiff's house.
[The defendant pleaded not guilty as to all, except entering the house and yard and fixing the spout on his own
house; and as to that he justified, for that T. S. being
seized in fee as well of the plaintiff's as of the defendant's
house, which was adjoining to the yard belonging to the
defendant's house, by indenture conveyed the house and
yard to the plaintiff, with an exception in the deed of the
free use of the yard, etc., to the said T. S. and to all the
15.

DiCLABATION

IN CASE.

"For that whereas the said C D heretofore, to-wit, on, etc. (any day just
before the injury was committed) and from thenee, for a long space of time,
to-wit, until, and at the time of the damage and injuiy to the said A B as
hereinafter
mentioned, to-wit, at, etc.
(the venue is transitory) wrongfully and injuriously did keep a certain dog, he the said
D, during all that
that the said dog then was used and accustomed to
time, well knowing
attack and bite mankind, to-wit, at, etc., aforesaid, and which said dog
afterwards, and whilst the said C D so kept the same as aforesaid, to-wit,
on, etc., aforesaid, at, etc., aforesaid, did attack and bite the said A B and
did then and there greatly lacerate, hurt and wound one of the legs of him
the said A B. And thereby he, the said A B, then and there became and
was sick, sore, lame and disordered and so remained, and continued for a
long space of time, to wit, for the space of six months then nexi following,
during all which time he the said A B thereby suffered and underwent
great pain, and was thereby then and there hindered and prevented from
performing and transacting his lawful affairs and business, by him during
that time to be performed and transacted;
and also, by means of the
premises, he, the said A B, was thereby then and there put to great expense, costs and charges, in the whole amounting to a large sum of money,
I. in and about endeavoring to be cured of said
to wit, the sum of
and
wounds, sickness, lameness and disorder, so occasioned as aforesaid,
hath been, and is, by means of the premises, otherwise greatly injured and
To the damage of the said A B of
damnified, to wit, at, etc. aforesaid.
I. and therefore he brings his suit, etc."
2 Chitty on Pleading, 238.
Distinction between Trespass

on the Case and the General Action
Case.
Mr. Street, in his Foundations of Legal Liabiliay (chap.
XVIII), points out the fact that actions on the case were merely actions
"in consimili casu" with the various formed actions provided for in the
register of writs, and only such as were "in consimili casu" with trespass
He says:
"We
should technically be referred to as trespass on the case.
are bound to add that the authorities do not make the explicit distinction
which is here drawn between trespass on the case and the general action on
the case, and in the books the expressions 'trespass on the case' and 'action

ON

THE
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tenants and occupiers of the defendant's house, which house
was afterwards conveyed to the defendant; and averred
that the spout so fixed was necessary for the use of the
defendant's house, and so justified hy virtue of that ex•
•
•
ception. Demurrer to this plea.
The counsel for
•
•
•
the defendant
insisted, that the plaintiff was mistaken in his action, because trespass would not lie for fixing a spout in his own house; but that if the plaintiff had
any damage thereby, he ought to bring an action on the
ease to recover what he was damnified, for he had a license
.to enter the yard, and could not be a trespasser for entering and fixing the spout on his own house.]**
on the case,' or simply 'case,' are used interchangeably.
The propriety of
the distinction cannot, however, be doubted; neither can there be any donbt
that the authorities themselves point to the distinction in that vagne and
obscure way which is indicative of inadequate analysis.
In truth, if we
push analysis far enough we shall perceive that under this head of trespass
on the case, or action on the case, have been grouped together a number
of really different remedies which have only the feature in common that
they are all derived by an identical process of extension from the several
distinct common-law remedies.
Just as there is a specific action on the
ease in the nature of trespass
(trespass on the ease), so there are such
specific actions as the action on the case in the nature of deceit, the action
on the ease in the nature of waste, the action on the case in the nature
of nuisance, the action on the case in the nature of detinue (trover). And
in addition to these specific forms of ease there is, as was indicated above,
the general residuary action which lies to recover redress for wrongs for
•
»
•
which no specific remedy existed.
"The various actions on the case are formless actions based on legal
In conformity with common modes of speech we should speak in
duty.
the singular, and say that the action on the case is a formless action based
•
•
•
is the great residuary remedy in the
directly on legal duty.
field of tort, just as indebitatus assumpsit is the residuary remedy in the
Wherever the law upon a particular state of facts imfield of contract.
poses a pure legal duty, as distinguished from a contractual duty, the action
on the case lies to enforce that duty or to recover damages for its breach
•
•
•
In the evolution
provided no other form of action is available.
of the common-law remedies the action on the case has served to keep remedy
conception of right, and to the
abreast with the expanding
measurably
existence of this remedy is largely to be attributed whatever truth is to be
In as much as
found in the ancient legal maxim ubi jus ibi remedium.
the action on the case is a formless action and is founded directly on legal
duty, an attempt to assign limits to its scope would be as vain as an
The limits of legal liability
attempt to define the limits of legal liability.
are being constantly extended with the growth of society, and as long as
law
there exists any sort of equilibrium between substantive and remedial
•
•
•
the scope of the action on the ease must be likewise extended.
regard to its substance it may be observed that the writ in actions
on the case contains merely a recital of the facts which constitute the basLi
This recital is substantially repeated or perhaps abridged
of the action.
It is, of course, from the circumstance that the siinple
in the declaration.
thus set forth in the pleading, that the action derives
are
facts of the case
its name. The action on the case is a formless action based on the particular

It

"In

facts of the case."
16.
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The portion inclosed in brackets is taken
272.
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and
FoBTEscuB, J.: Trespass is a_4i0sseeg«i?y--a6tion,
The difference
does this invade the plaintiff's possession?
between trespass and case is, that in trespass the plaintiff
complains of an immediate wrong, and in case, of a wrong
*
*
•
that is a consequence of another act.
Chief Justice. We must keep up the boundaries of
action, otherwise we shall introduce the utmost confusion;
.if the action in the first instance be unlawful, trespass willlie; but if the act is prima facie lawful (as it was in this^
but,
_case) and the prejudice to another is not immediate,
consequential, it must be an action upon the case; and this .
*
*
*
is the distinction.
Trespass will not lie for procuring
FoETESouE, J.:
another to beat me; if a man throws a log into the highmay maintain trespass,
way, and in that act it hits me,
because it is an immediate wrong; but if as it lies there I
must bring an acand receive an injury,
stum,ble over
tion upon the case because
only prejudicial in consecould have no action at all.
quence, for which originally
is

The distinction

certainly right; this

is

J.:

is

Eeynolds,

I

;

it

I

it,

I

a

.

;

a

it

only injurious in its consequence, for
isjoot pretended^
that the bare fixing
spout was
cause of action, without
the falling of any water the right of action did not accrue
till the water actually descended, and therefore this shouldhave been an action upon the case..
Pbb Cubiam. Judgment for defendant.

V.

LONDON AND NORTHWESTERN

RAILWAY COMPANY.

4

Court

of

SHAEROD

Exchequer.

Exchequer,

1848.

580.

Parke, B.

#

*

#

*

*

»

#

g

h

*

'

#

#
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Trespass for driving a railway engine with great force
and violance against and over thV'ptaaBrttff ^^' gepTliy
— Plea :^bt
means whereof they were killed.
'
'
"' guilty!;
We are of opinion in this case that an action
of trespass will not_ lie against the Company, the defendants.
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The immediate act which caused the damage to the plain-

tiff's cattle,^was an impact of

a machine, which was under
the control of a .rational agent, the servant of the defendants; not so much so indeed as a horse, or carriage drawn
by horses, or propelled by mechanical power along an ordinary highway, would be, in which cases both the direction
_and the speed of the machine are under goyerriment, but
still in such a degree as to make the cases similar for the
purpose of deciding the present question. We may treat
the case, then, as if the damage had been done by an ordinary carriage drawn by horses; and, it being now settled
that an action of trespass will lie against a corporation, we
may consider, for the present purpose, the defendants as
^onejiatural person, and Jhejcarriagejinder the care of his
servants^ Now, the law is well established, on the one
hand, that, whenever the injury done to the plaintiff results from immediate
force of the defendant himself,
whether intentionally or not, the plaintiff may bring an action of trespass ; on the other, that if the act be that of the
.servant, and be, negligent, np,t wilful, case is the only remedy
against the master. The maxim "Qui facit per alium facii
per se" fenders the master liable for all the negligent acts
of the servant in the course of his employment; but that
liability does not make the direct act of the servant the direct act of the master. Trespass will not lie against him;
case will, in effect, for employing a careless servant, but
not trespass, unless, as was said by the Court in Morley v.
Gains ford, 2 H. Bl. 442, the act was done "hy his corro"
mand; that is, unless either the particular act which constitutes the trespass is ordered to be done by the principal,
or some act which comprises it; or some act which leads
by a physical necessity to the act complained of. The former is the case, when one, as servant, is ordered to enter
a close to try a right or otherwise; the latter, when such
a case occurs as Gregory v. Piper, 9 B. & C. 591, where
rubbish, ordered to be removed, from a natural necessity
fell on the plaintiff's soil; but, when the act is that of the
servant in perfonmng his duly to his master, the rule of
law we consider to be, that case is the only remedy against
the master, and then only is maintainable when that act is
negligent or improper; and this rule applies to all cases
where the carriage or cattle of a master is placed in the
care and under the management of a servant, a rational
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if

is

it,

agent. The agent's direct act or trespass is not the direct
act of the master. Each blow of the whip, whether skilful and careful or not, is not the blow of the master; it is
we think, be
the voluntary act of the servant; nor can
reasonably said that all the acts done in the skilful and
careful conduct of the carriage are those of the master, for
which he
responsible in an action of trespass, to the same
extent as
he had given them himself, because he has
impliedly ordered them; but those that are careless and
unskilful were not, for he has given no order, except to use

skill and care.
Our opinion is, that, in all cases where
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master gives
carriage, or animal, or
the direction and control over
only rechattel, to another rational agent, the master
skill
or care
want
of
for
sponsible in an action on the case,
of the agent,— no more consequently, this action cannot be
supported.
"We should observe, that, though the master in this case
taken to have ordered the driver of the engine to prodid not follow as
necessary conseceed at great speed,
would impinge on the plaintiff's cattle. It
quence that
the driver had seen the cattle
might not have happened,
sooner, or the cattle had heard the engine, and got out of
tresthe way. The act, therefore, cannot be treated as
was, by necessary implication,
pass, on the ground that
ordered to be done by the defendants — ^the principle on
which the case of Gregory v. Piper was decided. Thisjsjthesimple _case of an act done by the servant in the course of _
his emplqyinent, not specifically ordered by the master;
and though the injury by such an act be direct so far as_
'relates, to ihe servant, we have recently held that a master
would not be responsible in trespass: Gordon v. Rolt,
Ante," p. 363.
If in the present case the plaintiff's cattle had a right
to be on the railway, the plaintiff has a remedy, by an action on the case against the Company for causing the engine to be driven in such
way as to injure that right for
the defendants are bound to see that their carriages did
not travel at such
speed as to make
impossible to avoid
other persons,- who had a lawful right to be there.
If the cattle were altogether wrong-doers, there has been
no neglect or misconduct for which the defendants are responsible.
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cattle had an excuse for being there, as if they had
escaped through defect of fences which the Company should
have kept up, the cattle were not wrong-doers, they had
no right to be there; and their damage is a consequent
damage from the wrong of the defendants in letting their
fences be incomplete or out of repair, and may be recovered accordingly in an action ^in_tiie case.
Rtde absolute.

PERCIVAL

V.

HICKEY.

Siipreme Court of New York.
18 Johnson,,

1820.

257.

This was an action of trespass, for running down the
-Vessel i)ftib.e defendant at sea, tried before Mb. Justice
Yates at the New York Sittings, in April, 1819. * • •
Spencer, C. J.: The verdict of the jury was for the
plaintifE ; and agreeably to an intimation from the judge,
that if they found for the plaintiff, they should state the
gronnds of their verdict, they SiMQdijJhat the disaster was
the result of gross negligence in the defendant.
Among
tiie points taken, on the motion for a new trial, it has been
strenuously urged by the defendant's counsel, that the action should have been case, and not Ixeapass
This point
is open to the defendaS^ because in the progress of the
trial, a motion was made for a nonsuit, after the plaintiff
had gone through with his evidence, on that ground.
We must consider, after the finding of the jury, that the
injury done, by running down the plaintiff's vessel, was
not designed, or intentional.; but that it proceeded from the
^eJendajgrs negligence, as captain and commanding officer
of the Atalania. We are bound, also, to consider the negligence as a personal one, imputable to the acts and omissions of the defendant; and that these acts and omissions
were gross and palpable.
That the force by which the plaintiff's vessel was destroyed, was the immediate cause of her destruction, proceeding from the collision, cannot be doubted; and then
ihe Question arises, whether, if such an act, producdnj? the
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and directly, be the result of .negligence, and not of a wilful intention, the action ought to be
trespass^ or ca^e. In the case of Leame v. Bray, (3 East,
'593) all tlie ^authorities and preceding cases bearing on
this question, were reviewed. That was trespass, charging
the defendant with having drove and struck a single horse
chaise which the defendant was driving along the highway,
with such great force and violence upon and against the
plaintiff's curricle, which his servant was driving, that by
means thereof, the servant was thrown out, and the horses
ran away with the curricle; and the plaintiff, to preserve
his life, jumped and fell from the same, and fractured his
collar Jaone. It appeared in evidence, that the accident
happened on a dark night, owing to the defendant's driving his carriage on the wrong side of the road, the parties
not being able to see each other, and that if the defendant
had kept the right side of the road, there was ample room
for the carriages to pass without injury, but it did not appear that blame was imputable to the defendant in any
other respect; and on an objection, that the injury happened from negligence, and was not wilful, and that the
proper action was case, and not trespass vi et armis, the
plaintiff was nonsuited. After argument, the nonsuit was
set aside by the unanimous opinion of the court.
Lord
Ellenbobough said, the true criterion seemed to be, according to what Lord Ch. J. De Gbey said, in Scott v. Shepard (3 WUs. 411, S. C. 2 Bl. Rep. 892), whether the plaintiff received an injury by force from the defendant; that
if jttie injurious act be the, immediate result of the force
originaIly~applied by "the defendant, and the plaintiff be
injured by
the subject of an action of trespass vi et
armis, by all the cases both ancient and modem that
was
immaierial,, whether the injiiry be wilful or not; • * *
GSose, J., expressed himself very decidedly; he observed,
that in looking into all the cases from the year-book in the
21 H, Vn down to the latest decision on the subject, he
found the principle to be, that
the injury be done by the
act of the party himself at the time, or he be the immediate
cause of
though
happen accidentally, or by misfortune, yet he
answerable in trespass.
Le Blanc, J.,
equally explicit. He says, "In all the books, the invariable
principle to be collected is, that where the injury
immediate on the act done, there trespass lies but where
not
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immediate on the act done, butjconseqiiential, then the remedy is in case." * • • The case~6f 'Covel v. Laming,
(1 Camp. N. P. Rep. 497) which was subsequent to the
case of Leame v. Bray, was an action of trespass for running the defendant's ship against the plaintiff's.
It appeared, that when the accident happened, the defendant
stood at the hebn, and that he wished to steer clear of the
plaintiff, and if he was to blame, it was through ignorance
and unskilfulness.
On the objection that trespass would
not lie. Lord Ellenboeough, confirmed the doctrine he
had delivered in Leame v. Bray, and said, it made no difference that the parties were sailing on shipboard.
The
defendant was at the helm, and guided the motions of his
vessel. The winds and the waves were only instrumental
in carrying her along in the direction which he communicated; the force, therefore, proceeded from him, and the
injury the plaintiff sustained was the immediate effect of
that force; and the plaintiff had a verdict.

The Court of Common Pleas have, undoubtedly, questioned the correctness of the decision m Leame v. Bray,
*
* *
*In BUrm v.
though they have not overruled it.
Campbell, (14 Johns. Eep. 432) the plaintiff sued in an
action on the case, and it appeared that the defendant, being a trooper, had wounded the plaintiff's leg, by negligently firing a pistol. We held, that if the injury is attributable to negligence, though it were immediate, the party
injured has his election, either to treat the negligence of
the defendant as the cause of action, and declare in case,
or to consider the act itself as the injury, and to declare in
The rule is laid down in the same manner in 1
trespass.
Chitty PI. 127, and is warranted by the cases he cites.
am perfectly satisfied, from a review of the cases, that
if the defendant is liable at all, this action is appropriate,
jLnd^ that^it^ ought toL have been trespass rather than case,
AS the injury was immediate, and from gross negligence.^''
[Motion for a new trial allowed on other grounds.]

I

That trespass will lie for a direct though unintentional injury:
17.
Welch V. Durand (1869), 36 Conn. 182; Brown t. Kendall (1850), 6 Cush.
(Mass.) 292.
Sunderland — C

U

P. S
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THE PULLMAN PALACE CAR COMPANY.
Sttpreme Court of Illinois.
106

1883.

lUinois, 222.

Mr. Justice Mulkey delivered the opinion of the Court:
This was an action on the case, brought by Luke Nevin,
the plaintiff in error, in the circuit court of McLean county,
Palace Car Company, the defendant
in error, for refusing to permit him to occupy a sleeping
berth in one of its cars, which had been assigned to him, and
which he was ready and offered to pay for. The circuit
court sustained a general demurrer to the declaration, and
the plaintiff elected to stand by his declaration, judgment
against the Pullman

was entered against him for costs, which, on appeal, was
afiSrmed by the Appellate Court for the Third District, and
the plaintiff in error brings the record here for review.
The declaration, omitting mere formal averments and
unnecessary verbiage, charges, in substance, that the plaintiff, on the 4th day of August, 1881, at Dubuque, Iowa, purchased of the Illinois Central Eailroad Company, for his
niece, wife and himself, respectively, three first-class passenger tickets over that company's railway, from Dubuque,
Iowa, to Chicago, this State; that having provided himself with these tickets, he, together with his wife and niece,
about ten o'clock of the night of that day, and just before
the train from Dubuque to Chicago started out, entered a
sleeping car called "Kalamazoo," belongiag to and constituting a part of said train, which said sleeping car was
then in the possession and under control of the defendant;
that upon entering the car he engaged of the conductor of
said car two lower berths, at one dollar and fifty cents each ;
that the conductor thereupon assigned one berth to his
niece, and one to plaintiff and his wife, promising to have
them made up a little later in the night; that he and his
wife took seats in the berth assigned to them, and remained
sitting up, in an orderly manner, until about twelve o 'clock,
frequently, in the meantime, requesting the conductor to
have the berths made up, so they could retire to rest, and
at the same time tendering to him the price agreed to be
paid therefor ; that on the arrival of the train at Lena, this
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State, about the hour just stated, plaintiff temporarily
left his seat, and stepped out on the platform of the sleeper,

intending to retxirn immediately to his berth, when the conductor instantly closed and secured the outer doors of said
sleeper, and thereby prevented him from again entering
the same ; that plaintiff endeavored to open said doors and
re-enter said car, and frequently requested the conductor
to permit him to do so, but that said conductor, instead
of complying with his request, removed his satchel, coats
and shoes from the berth so assigned to him and his wife,
to another car, and ejected the latter from said sleeper, by
means of which plaintiff was compelled to take and occupy
a seat in a common passenger car on said train till its
arrival in Chicago, by reason of which plaintiff was deprived of his rest and sleep, in consequence of which "he
became exceedingly weary and sick, and was greatly humiliated," etc.; that his expulsion from his berth in the manner stated was done willfully and maliciously, and that the
only reason assigned by the conductor for refusing the price
of the berths was, "that they were not made up."
It is not claimed or pretended, as we understand counsel, that the facts alleged in the declaration do not show
a good cause of action, but the claim rather is, that they
disclose a right to recover in assumpsit, and not in case, —
or, in other words, the contention is, that the plaintiff has
misconceived his action; that the only wrong complained
of consists of a breach of an express contract, and therefore the action should have been brought in form of ex
contractu, and not in form ex delicto, as it was.
*

*

*

Is it

true, as a universal proposition, that this
form of action wiU not lie in any case where the conduct
complained of is a direct breach of an express contract?
Certainly not. A simple illustration will demonstrate the
fallacy of such a position. Suppose A contracts with B
to keep the latter 's horse for an indefinite period at fifty
cents a day, the horse to be returned to B on demand, and
A, after having been paid all charges for the keep of the
horse, should refuse to re-deliver him to B, on demand, no
one, in such a case, would question for a moment the right of
B to maintain an action of trover against A for the horse,
which is one species of the action on the case, — and yet,
in the case supposed, the refusal of A to redeliver the
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horse, the real cause of action is, in the strictest sense of
the term, a direct breach of the special contract between
the parties. * * *
It is a familiar doctrine that case will lie for a mere
nonfeasance
against
persons exercising certain public
trades or employments, where no contractual relation exists between them and the plaintiff, as, where a common
carrier, having the requisite means of transportation, refuses to carry goods or passengers. Chitty, in discussing
this matter, in his work on Pleadings, says: "There are,
however, some particular instances of persons exercising
certain public trades or employments, who are bound by
law to do what is required of them in the course of their
employments without aid of express contract, and are in
return entitled to a recompense, and may, therefore, be
sued in case, as for a breach of duty in refusing to exercise
their callings,— as, where a common carrier, having conveniences, refuses to carry goods, being tendered satisfaction for the carriage; or an inn-keeper to receive a guest,
having room for him ; or a smith, having materials f or
the purpose, to shoe a horse for a traveler; or a ferryman
to convey one over a common ferry, and the like." (Vol.
It clear, from the language of this author, the
136).
classes of persons enumerated are intended as mere examples of the application of the general principle stated,
and not as a limitation of the rule itself, and by a well
recognized rule of the common law the same principle
should be extended to all other trades and callings that bear
the same relation to the public as those just enumerated,,
and the fact that no precedent can be found for
entitled to but little consideration, when
clear the case
in hand falls within the principle. This
particularly
true with respect to extending as
remedy the action we
are considering, to new states, of facts, where they clearly
fall within the general principle upon which the action
To the objection there was no precedent for
maintained.
the action made on
certain occasion before Pbatt, Ch. J.
Lord
he
Camden),
reported to have said:
(afterwards
wish never to hear this objection again. The action
for a tort. Torts are infinitely various, not limited or confined, for there
nothing in nature but may be an instrument of mischief."
Indeed, the writ in case, as its very
name imports, was invented for the express purpose of giv-
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ing a remedy where none of the old forms of -writs were

*
•
•
applicable.
Since, as we have just seen, certain legal consequences
affecting the question we are considering result from the
exercise of certain public trades or employments, it becomes
important to determine, with some degree of particularity,
the true relation which the Pullman Palace Car Company
sustains to the public, and to point out, so far as we are
able, the difference between it and persons or companies
exercising public callings or employments like those above
enumerated, if indeed, any such difference exists. Like an
ordinary railway company engaged in the transportation
of freight and passengers, this company transacts its entire business, so far as it relates to this case, over the various railways in this and other States. Like railway companies it exercises special privileges and franchises granted
to it by the State, and its business is transacted almost
*
*
*
In what
exclusively with the traveling public.
respect, then, does this company differ in its relation to
the public, so far as the present inquiry is concerned, from
No difference has been
an ordinary railway company?
pointed out by counsel, and we are confident none can be.
*

•

*
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If, then, this company owes any duties to the community
by reason of its relation to the public, as we hold it does,
manifestly one of them is, that it shall treat all persons
whose patronage it has solicited with fairness, and without
unjust discrimination. When, therefore, a passenger, who,
under the rules of the company, is entitled to a berth upon
payment of the usual fare, and to whom no personal objection attkches, enters the company's sleeping car at a
proper time for the purpose of procuring accommodations,
and in an orderly and respectful manner applies for a berth,
offering or tendering the customary price therefor, the comhas a vacant one
provided
pany is bound to furnish
*
*
Holding then, as we do, where
at its disposal.
the duty of the
there are sleeping berths not engaged,
or
of the custender
upon the payment
company,
tomary price, to furnish them to applicants when properly
follows the defendcalled for by unobjectionable persons,
ant was not justifiable in refusing to let the plaintiff have
well settled the fact there
one for himself and wife, and
was a special contract between the company and the plain-
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tiff, upon which an action of assumpsit might have been
maintained, does not at all affect the right to recover in
the present form of action, which is founded upon the defendant's common-law liability, as above stated.
But outside of this view, of the soundness of which we
have no doubt, the same result may be reached by a somewhat different process, though the principle, perhaps, is the
same in both cases. Let us assume, then, for the purposes
of the argument, the defendant owes to the public no common-law duties in the absence of any contract reMting to
its business. It would then follow the defendant is under
no obligation to the plaintiff, except such as grew out of
the contract entered into between them. But it does not
follow that all the duties growing out of the contract on
either side must have been expressly stipulated for. On the
contrary, nothing is better settled than that in many contracts, especially those which establish peculiar relations
between the parties, as, those of confidence and trust, the
law silently annexes certain conditions, and imposes mutual

obligations and duties, which are not all, in express terms,
provided for in the contract, yet, in contemplation of law,
they are nevertheless regarded as a part of the contract,
and the nonperformance of them may, in an action on the
contract, be assigned* as a breach thereof.
But while assiimpsit will certainly lie for a breach of these implied duties, it is equally well settled that case will lie also. Strictly
speaking, these dutifes arise ex lege out of the relation
created by the contract. As familiar illustrations of this
class of contracts, which give rise to an almost infiinite variety of implied duties and obligations, may be mentioned
those between client and attorney, physician and patient,
carrier and shipper, and, in short, every species of bailment.
In all these and analogous cases it is conceded case is a concurrent remedy with assumpsit for a breach of implied
duties growing out of any of these relations.
Now, when we look at the contract between the plaintiff
and defendant, the character of the business of the company, the subject matter of the contract, the relations of
the parties with respect to such subject matter, and all the
circumstances attending the transaction, can it be doubted
for a moment that the contract falls within the same class
of contracts as those between carrier and passenger, and
the like ? Can it be questioned that upon assigning the two
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berths to the plaintiff upon the terms which he agreed to
and offered to comply with, and which the company agreed
to accept, the contract thus made at once became obligatory
and binding upon the parties, and that it established a special relation between them, such as that between carrier
and passenger, and the like, to which the law, of its own
force, annexed certain implied obligations and duties, to be
respectively observed and performed by the parties towards each other? Clearly not. What were some of these
implied duties? On the part of the plaintiff, he impliedly
agreed to conduct himself in a quiet and orderly manner,
to take due and proper care of the berths while in his possession, and surrender the same at the end of his journey in
as good condition as when assigned to him, necessary wear
On the part of the company it was impliedly
excepted.
stipulated that it would use all reasonable and proper means
within its power to preserve order and decorum in the
sleeper during the journey, and especially during sleeping
hours, and that it would furnish and keep on hand such
supplies and conveniences as are usually found in like sleepers, and are necessary to the health and comfort of passengers, and also that it would permit the plaintiff to quietly
and peacefully occupy the berth engaged by him during the
journey, and not expel him or his wife from the car or
such berth, or otherwise attempt to interfere with its proper
use and enjoyment, so long as he and his wife demeaned
themselves with propriety. None of these duties were, or
ever are, expressly stipulated for by one engaging a sleeping berth, for the simple reason the law always implies
them from the relation of the parties created by the contract securing a berth; and for a breach of any of these
implied duties, it is clear, as already shown, case is a concurrent remedy with assumpsit, and, indeed, is always the
more appropriate remedy where matters of aggravation
are relied on as an element of damage. It is clear, in the
present case the defendant utterly disregarded its duty in
not making up the berth of the plaintiff, and in not permitting him and his wife to occupy it through the night,
and in expelling them from the car, and for this it must
be held liable.
In view here expressed is believed to be in consonance
with the general principles of the law, and is clearly sustained by some of the best considered cases, both English
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and American. Burnett v. Lynch, 5 Bam. & Cress. 589;
11 Eng. Com. Law, 597; Hancock v. Coffin, 21 Eng. Com.
Law, 318; DicJcson v. CUfton, 2 Wils. 319; Boorman v.
Brown, 3 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 525. In this last case, Chief
Justice TiNDAL, in delivering the judgment in the Exchequer Chamber, entered into an extended review of the
''
The
authorities, and in summing up used this language :
the
conthat
principle in all these cases would seem to be,
tract creates a duty, and the neglect to perform that duty,
or the nonfeasance, is a ground of action upon a tort," —
and this case was affirmed on appeal to the House of Lords.
In this case. Lord Campbbix, in deliv(11 CI. & Fin. 44)
think
ering the judgment in the House of Lords, says:
the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber is right,
for you can not confine the right of recovery merely to
those cases where there is an employment without any
But wherever there is a contract, and
special contract.
something to be done in the course of the employmnt which
is the subject of that contract, if there is a breach of the
duty in the course of that employment the plaintiff may
This, subject to
recover, either in tort or in contract."
the limitation hereafter to be stated, we regard as the true
rule on the subject.
It is often, and indeed generally, stated, the action lies
only for the breach of a common-law duty, and this we believe to be strictly true ; yet there is some confusion in the
cases as to what is meant by a common-law duty, growing
out of the fact that it sometimes arises without the intervention of a contract and sometimes with
and in the latoften said, as in the case last cited, "the conter case
tract creates the duty," and while this
true and accucertain sense, yet when we attempt to derate enough in
fine with precision just when the action will lie and when
will not, the statement
not sufficiently definite, for
conceded
the
law
makes
must be
the duty of every one
to perform his contract, and
clear case will not lie
for the breach of every duty created by contract.
one
contracts to deliver to another a load of wood, or pay
specific sum of money on a given day, and fails to do so,
an action on the contract alone will lie — and yet
manifest, in the case supposed, there has been
breach of duty
created by the contract. We think
more accurate, therecase
lies only for the breach of such duties
fore, to say, that
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as the law implies from the existing relations of the parties, whether such relations have been established with or
without the aid of a contract; but if created by contract,
it is no objection to the action that the performance of
the duty in question has been expressly stipulated for, if it
would have existed by reason of such relations without such
stipulation. This is well illustrated by the case put in the
early part of this opinion, where B let his horse to A, to
be kept at a stipulated price per day, and returned on demand. Now, in that case, by the mere delivery of the horse,
to be kept at the price agreed upon, the law implied or imposed the duty of returning him upon demand, without any
agreement to that effect, and the duty being thus implied
by law, independently of the express stipulation for its performance, case clearly would lie for its breach.
The general principle seems to be this : Where the duty
for whose breaxih the action is brought would not be implied
by law by reason of the relations of the parties, whether
such relations arose out of a contract or not, and its existence depends solely upon the fact that it has been expressly
stipulated for, the remedy is in contract, and not in tort —
when otherwise, case is an appropriate remedy. Of course,
assumpsit is a concurrent remedy with case, in all cases
where there is an express or implied contract.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed, and
the cause remanded, with directions to that court to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and remand the
cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
views here expressed.
Judgment reversed.

DALTON

v.

FAVOUR.

Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire.

1826.

3 New Hampshire, 465.

Favour, <m the
-TEes2asB_oii^tibe case, for that the said
27th September, llS^tXlX^BLvmgm KsTiands a firelock,
highly ^axged with powder, and a great quantity of wadding, so exceedingly carelessly managed his said firelock,
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that he discharged its contents into the foot of the plaintiff ;
put to great pain, etc.
whereby he was
•
"•^'--^

-■#■■#

•

'

«

•

•„

#.., #_

•

•

Mr. Chief Justice Richardson delivered the opinion of
the court.

The principles, upon which the decision of this case must
depend, are well settled in the books.
In all cases, where the injury is done with force^^d^^vEQ,'
gpdiafelyTBy "lEhe "acll of the "defendant, trespass may be
maintained.
1 Chitty's PI. 122.— 3 East. 593, Leame v.
—
Bray. 19 Johns. 381. — 18 Ditto, 257, Percivai v. Eickey.
And in every case, where the injury is the immediate
jeffectjof the defendant's act, and is stated in {he declara^
tion, or appears upon the trial, to have been wilfully done,
the remedy njusLiifi. trespass. 1 Chitty PI. 127. — 8 D. & E.
188, Ogle v. Barnes. — 6 D. & E. 128. And Savingnac v.
Boome, 6 D. & E. 125.— 5 D. & E. 648, Day v. Edwards.
But where the damage or injury ensues, not directly from
the act of the defendant, the remedy must be case. 1 Chitty

PI.

126.

.In all cases,_ where the injury is attributable to negligence, although it were the immediate effect of the defend-

ant's actftEe'pa.rty injured has an election, either to treat
the negligence of the defendant as the cause of action, and
declare in case; or to consider the act itself as the cause
of the injury, and declare in trespass. 1 Chitty's PI. 127. —
5 Bos. & Puller, 117, Rogers v. Imbleton. — 3 Burrows,
1560.— 5 B. & P. 447, note.— 3 East 600 and 601.— 8 D & E.
188, Ogle v. Barnes. — 14 Johns. 432, Bliss v. Campbell,
where it was decided, that case might be maintained for
wounding the plaintiff's leg by negligently firing a pistol.
1 Bos. & Puller, 472, Turner v. Hawkins.
In the case now before us, it did not appear, that the
injury was wilfully done, but it was the consequence of
great carelessness. This is an instance then, where either
trespass or case haay be maintained

and there must be
Judgment on the verdict.^'
;

here pointed out was not clearly observed in Case
distinction
2 Ohio, 169.
The court there criticized the doctrine that
be an election between trespass and case, on the ground
there
between the two forms of action.
that it would destroy the distinction
Such a rule, says the court, amounts to this, that the plaintiff "may take
up an entire, connected transaction by parts, and rely on as much of it as
•
•
•
wiU answer his purpose, to th« exclusion of the residue.
'W^ere
18.

T.

The

Mark

(182^)
could ever
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permitted,
can mot conceive of any trespass that taaj not be sued
the form of case.
What are the ordinary concomitants of a severe
battery t They are pain, bodily and mental — incapacity for business —^the
expense of medical aid, and disgrace in the public estimation.
under
the pretense of waiving the immediate injury, which is pain, the party may
go for the consequentutl damage, which is the incapacity for business, expense, etc, it will be a matter of but little moment whether he sue in
trespass or in case, as the only difference in the result would be the portion
of damage that might be allowed for the pain inflicted."
The weakness
of this criticism is that the court confuses the items of damage with the
wrongful acts. Assuming that a battery results from negligence, there are
two wrongful acts, the negligence which results in the battery and the
battery itself. Either one of these wrongful acts may be sued upon as the
basis of liability.
the former is employed, the injuries — all of them,
not merely the pain — are only an indirect result; while if the latter is
The
therefrom.
employed, these injuries result directly and immediately
damages might be the same in both forms of action, but the foimdation
of the liability would be different in each. See Johnson v. Castleman (1834)
10 Wend.
2 Dana (Ky.) 374; Wilson v. Smith (1833)
(N. T.) S24.

thia

for in

If

If

Cases in Which an Election is Permitted.
Prosecution.
JIalicious
If the malice and falsehood be put forward
as the gravamen the action may be case, while if the arrest or other act
of trespass be counted upon as the gist of the action, trespass will lie:
Morris v. Scott (1839) 21 Wend. (N. T.) 281; Hays v. Younglove (1847)
7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 545.
If the taking is the ground of the action trespass is proper,
Conversion.
but the conversion may be counted upon as disclosing an action in case
Claflin v. WUcox (1846) 18 Vt. 605.
(trover),
If the action is based on loss of services it is case, but if
Seduction.
the defendant illegally enters the premises of the plaintiff to accomplish
the act, this entry may be made the ground of an action of trespass quare
Mercer v. Walmsley (1820) 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 27; Sargent v.
clausum:
5 Cow.
(N. Y.) 117; Parker v. Meek (1855) 3 Sneed
(1825)
29.
(Tenn.)
It seems to have been commop practice to employ
Criminal Conversation.
either trespass or case, though the reason for allowing trespass does not
Woodward v. Walton (1807) 2 Bos. & PuL
appear to be very satisfactory:
Townsend
v.
Haney
N. B. 476;
(1821) 1 McCord L. (S. C.) 206; Macfadzen
6 East, 387.
V. Olivant (1805)
KeUy V. Lett (1851) 13 Ired. L. (N. C.) 50, has an interesting discussion
of the right to elect between trespass and case, and suggests that this right
is an indulgence granted on account of the difficulty in tracing the dividing
line between the two forms of actions.
Synopsis op Cases in Which Teespass on the Case Will Lie.
have before remarked that an action upon the case was a remedy
by the common law, but that it appears to have existed only in a
limited form, and to a certain prescribed extent, until the statute of WestIn its most comprehensive signification it includes assumpsit
minster 2.
time, when
as well as an action in form ex delicto; but at the present
an
an action on the case is mentioned, it is usually understood to mean
•
•
•
,
action in form ex delicto.
t
"Actions on the case are founded on the common law, or upon acts of
parliament, and lie generally to recover damages for torts not committed
force, where
with force, actual or implied; or having been occasioned by
but
immediate,
not
was
injury
the
or
the matter affected was not tangible,
was only in reversion;
in
the
property
interest
the
where
or
consequential;
[4 T. B. 489; 7 T. B. 9.J
in all which cases trespass is not sustainable.
rights of persons, or to
relative
or
absolute
the
are,
to
nature
Torts of this
real
property, corporeal
or
to
personal property in possession or reversion,
may be either
injuries
These
revexsioB.
or
in
possession
or incorporeal,
ought to
defendaat
the
by nonfeasance, or the omission of 9om« act which
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1

perform; or by misfeasance, being the improper performance of some act
which might lawfully be donej or by malfeasance, the doing what the
defendant ought not to do; and these respective torts are commonly the
performance or omission of some act contrary to the general obligation
of the law, or the particular rights and duties of the parties, or of some
express or implied contract between them.
"Case is the proper remedy for an injury to the alsolute rights of persons
not immediate, but consequential [11 Mass. 137; 2 Dana (Ky.) 378; 18
Johns. (N. T.) 257; 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 381; Harper (S. C.) 43; 1 Marsh.
(Ky.) 194; 6 Call (Va.) 44]; as for keeping mischievous animals, having
notice of their propensity [16 Conn. 200; 23 Wend. (N. T.) 254; 7 Ala.
160; 15 Yt. 404], or for special damage arising from a public nuisance
[Willes, 71 to 75; 11 East, 60; 3 Vt. 521; 6 Dowl. & EyL 275]. But if
the injury were immediate, as if the defendant incited his dog to bite
another, or let loose a dangerous animal; or if in the act of throwing a
log into a pubHe street, it hurt the plaintiff; or if an injury be committed
by cattle to land; the action should be trespass.
Also, whenever an injury
to a person is occasioned by regular process of a Court of competent
jurisdiction, though maliciously adopted, ease is the proper remedy, and
trespass is not sustainable [3 T. E. 185; 1 T. E. 535; 3 Esp. 135; 11 East,
297;

Campb.

295;

(N. T.)

269].

1

2

Chit.

304;

2

Conn.

700;

11

Mass.

500;

6

Oreenl.

(Me.) 421; 3 Gill & Johns. (Md.) 377; 6 Wend. (N. T.) 382]; as for a
malicious arrest; or for malicious prosecution of a criminal charge before
a magistrate or otherwise [Chit. Eep. 304],
If the proceeding be maUcious
and unfounded, though it were instituted by a Court having no jurisdiction,
case may be supported, or trespass [2 Wiis. 302; 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 545].
Formerly it was usual in these instances, where several persons combined
in the prosecution, to proceed by writ of conspiracy, but the action on
If,
the case is now the usual remedy [1 Saimd. 228; 6 Watts (Pa.) 304].
on the other hand, the proceeding complained of were irregular, the remedy
in general must be trespass; and therefore, where a justice of the peace
maliciously and irregularly granted a warrant against a person fpr felony,
without any information upon oath, it was decided that the remedy against
the justice should have been trespass and not case [2 T. E. 225; 2 Chit. Eep.
304; 12 Serg. & E. (Pa.) 210; 6 Munf. (Va.) 27; Hardin (Ky.) 490;
7

Cow.

"Case,

•

•

•

remedy, where the right affected
was not tangible, and consequently could not be affected by force, as reputation and health, the injuries to which are always remediable by action on
It is also the only remedy against
the case; as, libels, or verbal slander.
sheriffs, justices, especially after convictions quashed, or other of&cers acting
ministerially and not judicially, for refusing bail or to receive an examination upon the statute of hue and cry, etc. [1 Leon. 323] ; and case lies
or for want of
treatment,
against surgeons, agents, etc., for improper
skill or care; though assumpsit is also sustainable [8 East, 348].
"Actions for injuries to the relative rights of persons, as for seducing or
harboring wives, enticing away or harboring apprentices or servants, are
properly in case; though it is now usual, and perhaps more correct, to
declare in trespass vi et armis and contra pacem, for criminal conversation
and for debauching daughters and servants [2 New Eep. 476] 2 M. & Sel.
436] ; yet as the consequent loss of society or service is the ground of
action, the plaintiff is still at liberty to declare in case [5 East, 39; 5
GreenL (Me.) 446; 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 578; 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 79; 8 Serg.
& E. (Pa.) 36; 5 Harr. &
(Md.) 27; 8 Conn. 130; 4 Cow. (N. Y.)
412].

•

as we have seen, is also the proper

•

•

J.

"For injuries to personal property not committed with force or not
immediate, or where the plaintiff's right thereto is in reversion [3 Campb.
It lies against attorneys or other agents
187], case is the proper remedy.
for negligence or other breach of duty or misfeasance in the conduct of
a cause, or other business [15 Mass. 316; 8 Mass. 51; 11 Johns. (N. Y.)
479], etc., though it has been more usual to declare against them in
And though we have seen that assumpsit is the
assumpsit [6 East, 333].
usual remedy for neglect or breach of duty against bailees; m against

,
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e«rriers, wharfingers, and others having the use or care of
personal property,
whose liability is founded on the common law as well as
on the contract;
yet it IS clear that they are also liable in case for am
injury , resulting
from their neglect or breach of duty in the course of their
'employ [2 B.
°*! *> B- * C- 8681.
For any misfeasance by a party in a trade
Vi.
which he professes, the law gives an action on the case
to the party
agrieved against him ; as if a smith in shoeing my horse prick him, and other
like cases
Saund. 312, a].
And it seems that though there be an
express contract,
still if a common-law duty results from the facts, the
party may be sued in tort for any negligence or misfeasance in the execution
of the contract [2 Wils. 319; 5 B. & C. 605; 8 D. & E. 378; 2 Chit.
* •
•

fl

Eep. 1].

"With regard to nonfeasance, or the neglect to perform the contract,
not even an action of assumpsit, much less an action upon the case, can
be maintained, if no consideration existed and be stated in the declaration,
»
•
»
to give validity to the defendant's alleged obligation to do the act.
There are, however, some particular instances of persons exercising certain
public trades or employments who are bound by law to do what is required
of them in the course of their employments, without the aid of an express contract, and are in return entitled to a recompense, and may therefore be sued in
ease, as for a breach of duty in refusing to exercise their callings.
As
where a common carrier, having convenience, refuses to carry goods, being
tendered satisfaction for the carriage; or an innkeeper to receive a guest,
having room for him; or a smith, having materials for the purpose, to shoe
the horse of a traveller; or a ferryman to convey one over a common ferry,
•
*
•
Saund. 312, c. note 2; 5 T. E. 149].
and the like
"Case is necessarily the form of action to be adopted for deceitfully
representing a person to be fit to be trusted or other deceit, independently
of and without relation to any contract betwee:p the parties [2 East, 22;
73; 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 226].
3 T. E. 51; 4 Bing.
And for fraudulent
not introduced into a written contract between the parties,
representations
case is the proper
respecting the subject matter of the representations,
•
•
•
remedy, if any [4 Campb. 22; 3 Caines (N. Y.) 216].
goods
be obtained
on credit through a fraudulent contract, the proper remedy
is case or trover, at least before the expiration of the credit; for if before
that time he sue in assumpsit for goods sold, he recognizes or affirms the
contract and may be successfully met by the objection that the credit has
* * •
not expired [9 B. & C. 59].
"This action also lies for the rescue or pound breach of cattle, or
goods distrained for rent or damage feasant; or for the rescue of a person
arrested on mesne process; or for an excessive levy on a fieri facias [9 B.' &
G. 840]; and against sheriffs, etc., for escapes, on mesne or final process;
•
* • case also lies for not delivering letters, etc.
[3 Wils. 443] ; and
against a witness for not obejring a writ of subpoena [Dougl. 556; 9 East,
473 ; 13 East, 17, n. c] ; and for infringing the copyright of a book, print,
single sheet of music, or other work [11 East, 244; 1 Campb. 94, 98],
and for the infringement of a patent, and for obstructing the proprietor of
tithes from entering on land to take them away [2 New Eep. 466]. For injury
to any personal property in reversion, trespass or trover cannot be supported;
»
•
•
and case is the only remedy [7 T. E. 9; 3 Campb. 187].
"With respect to injuries to real property corporeal, where the injury was
immediate, and committed on land, etc., in the possession of the plaintiff,
the remedy is trespass [1 Ld. Eaym. 188] ; but for nonfeasance, as for not
carrying away tithes; or where the injury is not immediate but consequential,
as for placing a spout near the plaintiff's land, so that water afterwards
ran thereon, or for causing water to run from the defendant's land to that
of the plaintiff. [Str. 634; Ld. Eaym. 1399; 2 Burr. 1114]; or where the
plaintiff's property is only in reversion, and not in possession, the action
should be in case [8 Pick. (Mass.) 235; 2 Greenl. (Me.) 8; 7 Conn. 328;
11 Mass. 520; 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 511; 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 468; 2 N. H. 430;
•
•
•
3 N. H. 103],
"We may remember that trespass cannot in general be supported where
or the estate therein is incorporeal.
th« matter affected is not substantial,

\\
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Case therefore is the proper remedy for disturbance of cominon of pasture,
turbary, or estovers. * * • So case is the proper form of action for
obstructing a private way [14 Johns. (N. Y.) 383; 7 Har. & J. (Md.) 67],
or a public way, per quod the plaintiff was delayed on his journey, and obliged
to take a more oireuitoua route [9 Moore, 489], or sustained some other
special damage [5 Blackf. (Ind.) 35].
So case is the proper remedy for
•
•
•
disturbing a party in the possession of a pew in a church;
"Case is in general the remedy for disturbing a party in the enjoyment
of an easement \5 B. & A. 361 ; "s B. & C. 221 ; 7 D. & E. 783 ; 8 B. & C.
288; 2 Vt. 68], and it may be maintained in that instance, although the
right to the easement were conferred by a written agreement, which is
stated in the declaration, and which stipulates for the enjoyment of the
easement [3 Wils. 348; 6 B. & C. 273; 9 D. & E. 265].
It lies for disturbance, obstruction, or other injuries, to ofSces, franchises, ferries, markets,
tolls, or for not grinding at an ancient mill, etc. [11 East, 576, note].
#

»

«

"An

action on the case is frequently given by the express provisions of
•
•
•
to a party aggrieved.
"The declaration in an action on the case ought not in general to state
the injury to have been committed vi et armis, nor should it conclude
contra pacem; in which respects it principally differs from the declaration
In trespass. In other points the form of the declaration depends on the
particular circumstances on which the action Is founded, and consequently
there is greater variety in this than any other form of action. • • •."
1 Chitty on Pleading (11th Am. Ed.) 132-145.
Another very full and interesting catalogue of the cases where this form
of action has been used may be found in Comyn's Digest, Tit. Actions on
the Case.
some statute

op Statutb Abolishing Distinction Betvteen Trespass and Case.
'The statute does away with the technical distinction between the two
rights and liabilities
forms of action, but does not affect the substantial
of parties, so as to operate to give any other remedy for acts done than

"

Effect

before existed.' We understand the statute to accomplish these objects and
distinction between the two forms of
these only; to abolish the technical
action so that you may join counts in trespass with counts in case, and
may call your action trespass or case — it is wholly immaterial which — and
may sue out your writ in either form of action, and may then count in
But your count, if in
either trespass or case, or both, at your option.
all the elements of a good count in case, or if in
case, must contain
The change
trespass, must contain the elements of a count in trespass.
goes only to the matter of the form of action, and does not change subNor do we understand that this statute
stantial right, and liabilities.
repeals that old and more than well settled principle, that in all actions
Where a declaration is
the proofs must correspond with the allegations.
filed showing a good cause of action in either trespass or case, it is wholly
immaterial whether you call your action trespass or case, but such facts
must be alleged as show a legal cause of action in the one form or the
other, and the facts that are alleged in the pleading must be supported
the declaration is in trespass quare clausum fregit, then
by the proofs.
there must be a possession in order to support it— either actual, or in case
the premises are vacant and unoccupied, a constructive possession that folSt. Louis, Vandalia and Terre Haute E. E.
lows ownership and title."
Co. (1878) 3 111. App. 155, 160.
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SYMONDS.

Stiperior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire.
1 New Hampshire, 289.

Trover for

1818.

The cause was tried here at the last
May term upon the general issue, when it appeared in evidence that the mare once belonged t^ one Ezra— E!laj44«¥s ;
that Ziba Hunjiogtog, a. deputy shfirjf Fj h aving an execution
in his han^s in favour of P. Noyes again st Fland ers for
about 30 dollars debt and costs, on the 30th day of June,
1817. seized the mare upon the execution; that Flander s,
being desirous to procure time to_ja, isPi Tn oilfiy .jl^'^ P"?"
c ecution,
and thereby prevent the sale of the mare,
ntington
Hu
to delay the sale , to which Huntingrequ ested
ton^jOia^hMrMeuudixefilS^byJLQjKfiJio grant Flanders any
indulgence not inconsistent with the safety of the debt^ as
sent ed : H untington t ook the mare into his po ssession, and
delivered her for safe keeping to the plaintiff, who gave
Huntington h is promises in writin g to return her on demand ,
■
foole kept ihe"mare untST tE'e'Sth of August,~18177'when
she was attached as the property o f Flayt(;leytq hv the -dQ-_
fendantj,aiioiher"'de pu{y's her!S7on''m esne process in favour
of A. "W". Mor se ag ainslTFIanHers^ and is now helin5y ~the'
defend ant by virtue^^ ^TEir SQ;a chme nt. It did not app^W
that the mare was ever in p ossession of Flanders after
had ever adIJ]lIlii2lgt£ai-&da<i3- herj nor tlSH^ fiunEngton ""
upo
n the execution .
ve rtised her for sale
a mare .

19.

Declaration in

Teovek.

For that whereas- the said A B heretofore, to wit, on, etc., at, etc.,
was lawfully possessed, as of his own property, of certain goods and chattels, to wit, twenty tables, twenty chairs, etc. (specifying the goods, and
describing each as generally as possible, omitting the quality, as "mahogany,
BUver," etc.), of great value, to wit, of the value of — I, of lawful money of
And being so possessed thereof, he, the said A B, afterGreat Britain.
wards, to wit, on the day and year first above-mentioned, at, etc., aforesaid,
casually lost the said goods and chattels out of his possession; and the
came
at, etc., aforesaid,
same afterwards, to wit, on, etc., last aforesaid,
Yet the said C D, well
to the possession of the said C. D by finding.
knowing the said goods and chattels to be the property of the said A B,
and of right to belong and appertain to hina, but contriving, and fraudulently
intending, craftily and subtly to deceive and defraud the said A B in
this behalf, hath not yet delivered the said goods and chattels, or any or
either of them, or any part thereof, to the said A B, although often requested so to do, and hath hitherto wholly refused so to do, and afterwards,
to wit, on, etc., aforesaid, at, etc., aforesaid converted and disposed of tha
To the damage, etc. 2 Chitty on
said goods and chattels to his own use.
Pleading,

323.
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verdict for the plaintifF^ and assessed the damages at 30 dollars.
William Smith for the defendant, moved the court to
grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against
law. He contended that the mare having bee n delivered
to the plaintiff me rely for safe keeping, he was torETwSThe jury returned

a

sidered as the m ere" sefvaiitltf the sheriff Wi thoulJ^l'g^
intefesf in her, and SEerefo r e not entitled to maintain the
vr
j,ction,_ Ludden vrLeaviV,9M^^s7^e^T'T01^T'^^
Leland, 9 Mass. Eep. 265; Commonwealth v. Morse, 14
Mass. Eep, 217.

-

RiCHAEDsoN, C. J. : On behalf of the defendant it is contended, that Poole has not a suflScient interest in the^hattel in question to enable him to maintain this action, and
several decisions in the supreme court of Massachusetts
are relied upon as directly in point; and it is not to be
doubted, that, if those decisions were correct, this objection must prevail. But the decisions in this state have been
* *
*
different.
No authority is cited by the court in
Massachusetts in support of their decision ; nor is it recollected that the determination here was supported by authorities.
We have therefore felt it to be our duty to reconsider the question, and endeavour by a careful examination of the adjudged cases which bear upon the point to
ascertain what the real law of the case is.
No man can TnaiutaJTi trespass, t,rnvfir, nr r eplevin for
personal chattels without either an absol ute or special property in -the {ynnrfsT ^ndTalso possession?^ '~nBut"%is possession may be either actual or constructive . Thus an executor is by construction of law possessed of the goods of the~
tgsiatai;, and may maintain trover for them, although he
has never been in the actual possession of them. So where
one had wreck by prescription or grant, and another took
it away, trespass or trover lay before seizure. And if A.
in London gives J. S. his goods in York, and another takes
them away before J. S. obtains actual possession,
S. may

J,

Trover is technically one of the forms of trespass on the case:
Hull v.
Southworth
(1830) 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 265; Harper v. Scott (1896) 63 111.
App. 401; Smith v. Grove (1848) 12 Mo. 51.
Trover by a tenant in common.
20.
Where three persons were joint finders
of coins buried in the earth, each was entitled to possession of one-third
of the coins, and since the whole was capable of ready division into three
equal parts, one could maintain trover against another for the conversion
of his share.
Weeks v. Hackett (1908) 104 Me. 264.

*
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maintain trespass or trover. So if the owner deliver his
goods to a carrier or other bailee, although in. such case
another has the actual possession, still the owner has by
construction of law a sufficient possession to maintain trover
or trespass.
This constructive possession is not founded
on the mere right of property, but upon the right of possession. For if he, who has the absolute property, has not also

the right of possess ion, he can have no con stTnetlTe"posses^"
Thus where ttie owner of goods let them for"a yeaF
_s^ion^
and they were taken away by a third person within the
year, it has been held that he could maintain neither trespass nor trover.^* This constructive possession in one is by
no means inconsistent with an actual poslM gJlOffilg uifothe r.
in many ca'ses^eHEeFEe, who hasTBe actual, or he, wUo Eas
the constructive possession, may maintain trespass, trover,
or replevin ; but a judgment in favour of one wiU be a bar
to an action in favour of the other. In some cases he who
has only a special property, may have a constructive possession.
Thus a factor, to whom goods have been consigned, but U ave never~OeM"riecierved, has Mefr a ooMtfiiclf^"
"""
ive possession, t^t he can^'S Spfln Tr^^
A special property in goods may m'some'cases be founded
Thus he, who finds goods, which
upon mere possession.^'*
special
have been lost, has a
property in them, because
~

21.
"One who has merely a lien upon chattels, without any right to their
A landlord canposseBsion, cannot maintain trover for their conversion.
not maintain trover for the conversion of agricultural products, by reason
of his statutory Uen on them for rent." — Dekle v. Calhoun (1910) 60 Fla.
To the same effect see Parker v. Lisbon First Nat. Bank (1892) 3
.53.
N. D. 87; Baker v. Seavey (1895) 163 Mass. 522; Owens v. Weedman

(1876)

82

IlL

409.

of personal property carries with it the presumption
of title and enables the possessor to maintain trover against any one except
Stevens v. Gordon
the rightful owner:
(1895) 87 Me. 564; Duncan v.
Spear (1833) 11 Wend.
(N. T.) 54; Barker v. Dement (1850) 9 Gill.
(Md.) 7; Armory v. Delamirie (1768) 1 Str. 505; Magee v. Scott (1851)
8 Cush. (Mass.) 148; Burke v. Savage
(1866) 13 Allen (Mass.) 408; Bartlett V. Hoyt (1854) 29 N. H. 317; Jones v. Sinclair (1820) 2 N. H. 319;
Knapp V. Winchester (1839) 11 Vt. 351; Gunzburger t. Bosenthal (1910)
226 Pa. St. 300.
"When it is said that the plaintiff in trover must have had, at the time
of the conversion, the right to the property, and also a right of possession,
nothing more can be intended than this: that the right of which he complains
he has been deprived must have been either a right actually in possession
or a right immediately to take possession; it is not enough that it be merely
If,
a right of action or a right to take possession at some future day.
shows that property in his possession has been taken
then,' the plaintiff
and converted, he shows prima facie his right to maintain the suit."—
2 Cooley on Torts (3rd ed., 1906) 851.
Sunderland— 0. L. P. 4
22.
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Thus too, where goods
possession is evidence of title.
were stolen from a stage coach, it was held, that they were
well alleged in the indictment to be of the goods or chattels
of the stage coachman, although he was the mere servant
of the owner of the coach, and not answerable for the
goods.
A special property may also be founded upon a responsibility for, or an interest in, the possession of chattels.
Thus he, to whom goo ds"are delivered merely io Keep and
redeliver upon recfu est, £as"a speciaf prop""erty intllMr'"^"
H. 7. 14 PI. 23, Imere'it is said the pwnTTLM'oIEen been
decided. Jones on Bailment, 112.
sThat a sherif fj who ^^"- seize d goods upon mesne pro .ges^or upon execution, an agister of cattle, a carrier, faotor, consignee, pawnee, trustee, etc., have a speci al ^ro jgz^
grty, admits no_douM^ 11 H. 4. 17 PI. 39; 48 ii:%~25Fl
ST^BaunarSTiTjohn. 195; 12 John. 403.
But ajTiere_sftrv ant has not a ST>ecial property^ in go.Qds^
*
•
*
Thus~~wEef6~a-servanrwas employSd^n-a^Sop
merely to sell goods, he was held not to have a special
property in them. Nor has a shepherd, who is employed
to tend sheep, any property in the sheep. The reason is ,
because the law considers the goods and the sbeep as mufiji
in the actual possession of the owner, as if the servSiFwere
not with them, and the servant i s not resp onsible for them.
the goods or sheep are taken away by a stranger, it is no
injury to the servant, because he has no interest in the possession. 1?pt if " gfiry^^t i^^dftHakfts g pecially to be aecountable for goods committed to his custody, he at once
'Exchanges iEhg~ghara "cf^nrf~a"'mBrg"s6rvant for~that of a
baiIeej,^mLhas aTspecial propeYtyr-"'
Thus it seems tnat any person, "who has an absolute or a
special property, in a personal chattel, and a right to reduce it to immediate possession, has in law such a possession as will enable him to maintain an action to vindicate
his right of possession, and this is what the law denominates a constructive possession. And any individual, who
has a particular interest in the possession of such chattel,
whether such interest be founded upon the evidence of
title which possession affords, as iu the case of a finder
of lost goods, or on a right to use of the chattel, as in the
case of a hirer, etc., or on some responsibility for
as in
the case of sheriff, etc., has what the law denominates
a

it,
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special property, and may maintain an actioii, wlienever
that special property is unlawfully invaded.'**
It now remains to compare the facts in the case before
as with these principles.
Huntington having seized the
^areupon execution, delivered her to Poole and took his
promise in wfitmg^ to redeliver her on demand. Did this,
TOntract imp os e^ any responsib ility upon Poole? That it_
The extent of his responsibility
^djisjQot_to]^2doubted;
IS immaterial.
It is enough that he was responsible for
the safe-keeping and redelivery of the mare. This according to the principles to be deduced from the books gave
him a sufficient interest in the possession to enable him to
maintain this action. But it is said that Huntington had a
special property in the mare ; that two persons cannot have
severally a special property in a chattel, and that therefore,
Poole would not have a special property in her. It is for
those who hold this doctrine to shew why two may not have
severally, a special interest ia a chattel as well as two may
have severally one the general and the other a special property in it at the same time. The reason is certainly not
It is true that there are butJmL species
very obvious.
property in a chattel absol ute and-sp.eciaL: butit by no
means f ollows fromttis that two cannot, have severally
a speciaT"prop^t y^ in it. Theje can beJbul.one__abaQllite
seems to us very clear that several
_ownerof a chjifterbut
per sons m ay have_severally a special i nterest in it. Thus~
m the present case, when HiinHngton had sSze3 the mare
he immediately became responsible both to the debtor and
creditor, and thereby acquired a special property in her,
and when he delivered her to Poole for safe-keeping, he
did not part with his special property ; but the moment that
Poole became responsible for the safe-keeping and redelivery of her, he also acquired a special property in her,
perfectly subordinate to an d not at all i ncxunsistent with,
then the mare was
the specia rproperty of Huntingto n.
an injury both to
it
was
defendant,
the
takinTiy
"unlawfully
Huntington and to Poole, and either may maintain an action; but a judgment in favour of one will be a good ba^ to an action" by the i?ther. ~7Ia5ders had the general prop-

jjf

lt

If

Intent to convert, and Jcnowledge of ibe plaiatiff's rights, are im23.
Tfeo essence
of the action is the actual
material in an action of trover.
Pease v. Smith (1875) 61
the
over
property:
with
dominion
interference

N. T.

477.
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erty. but not the right of possess ion; he could therefore
maintain no action,
Huntington's rtghfTtf~actiDir"was
"ToriMM upM^HTspmal property and right of possession;
Poole
upon his special property and actual possession.
Poole
to be considered
mere servant, he must be
held responsible to Huntington only as a servant. For
would be repugnant to every principle of justice to hold
him responsible as
bailee while we allow him only the
not reof
mere servant
rights
mere servant. But
Poole
sponsible for goods forcibly taken from him, and
would
to be considered as employed in that character
seem to be a good defence to any action Huntington may
bring against him, that the mare was taken by force from
him by the debtor or any other person without his fault.
But this would undoubtedly be contrary to the understanding of the parties and might defeat the very object of the
therefore the opinion of the court that the
contract. It
su
jjjintijFbadj. fficient interest in the mare to enable him
to_ mainta inlSLis action, and thus this objeHi^Tcamiot^re-
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BILEY

v.

~

THE BOSTON WATER POWER COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court
11

of

vail.

Massachusetts.

1853.

Gushing, 11.

Trover for three hundred and ninety-four square of dirt,
sand, and gravel. The defendants pleaded separately. At
the trial in the court of common pleas, before Wells, J. C,

la

a

it

appeared that the Water Power Company had contracted
with the other defendants, Dalrymple and Lennon, to fill
parcel of flats owned by the company, at a certain
up
price per foot. In executing this contract, said Dalrymple and Lennon, purchased earth of different persons by the
load, delivered at the filling ground; and there was evidence that some earth had been taken from the plaint
their consent," andsQl dJiy-4be-4j:espasg£ia-tfl
^d without
The defendants,
iJalryniple and Lennon at the ground.
Dalrymple and Lennon, requested thejudge to instruct the
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jury that the earth was real estate, and therefore this action could not be maintained.
But the judge instructed

them that as soon as the earth was unlawfully severed
from the freehold by the persons who sold it to Dalrymple
and Lennon, it became personal property in their hands,
and that this action might be maintained.
They also requested the judge to instruct the jury that by bringing an
action of trover, the plaintiffs waived the trespass to the
land, and thereby adopted the act, by which the property
came into possession of the vendors ; and therefore that the
plaintiffs could not maintain an action against bona fide
purchasers, not having notice of the trespass.
But the
judge instructed the jury that this action could be maintained against bona fide purchasers without notice of trespass.
The defendants further requested the judge to instruct
the jury that, if the earth came to the possession of the
defendants as bona fide purchasers, not having notice of
the trespass, the plaintiffs must prove a demand on them
before the commencement of the action and refusal to deliver. But the judge instructed them, that if, without knowing of the trespass, Dalrymple and Lennon purchased the
earth bona fide, and paid a full equivalent for it to the trespassers, and directed them to tip it up on the filling ground,
they would be liable in this action for value of earth at the
filling ground, and no demand or refusal would be neces*

sary. •
Dewey, J. : It is certainly true that for an injury to his
real estate, the party cannot maintain trover. That form
of action is appropriate exclusively to the recovery of damages for the unlawful conversion of personal property! But
whether the three
this being granted, the further inquiry
ninety-four
of
earth
severed from the
squares
and
hundred
land of plaintiffs, and removed from the same and sold to
the defendants, and used by them, was at the time of such
purchase by the defendants, and use of the same, still
part of the realty, and retained unchanged its character
as such, or whether by the act of separation in fact, and
has not changed
distant place,
a removal of the earth to
of personal
removed
to
that
earth
so
the character of the
very well settled that
property. It seems to us that
—
severed from the land as, in the familiar case
whatever
part of the
of standing timber trees — such trees being
is

a

^if

is

it

a

it

a

is,

•
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realty, are cut down, they cease to be real estate and J)eBut this transmutation, whileTt cEanges
■CO flie yiJiS Q^^.
the character of the property in this respect, does not
change its ownership.
It would not do so if cut down by
the owner of land, and not any more so, by being cut down
by a person entering unlawfully upon the land and making the severance. It is the actual severance that changes
the property from real to personal, and that irrespective of
its being done with, or without, the consent of the owner
of the land. And in this respect we see no distinction between removing living trees, deriving their nourishment
from the earth, and the removal of a portion of the earth
itself.
It is next objected that the plaintiffs, by bringing this
action of trover, and waiving their action of trespass quare
clausum have adopted and sanctioned the origin al-act-of
trespass, and therefore cannot maintain this action against
one who purchased the earth hong fide of thetr espassers .
We do not perceive that any such waiver appears^ It is
true that the plaintiffs have not elected to institute an
action of trespass quare clausum against the original wrongdoers.

who have the
property of
plainHffs~waffiournght, nothing is w aived ;
any trespass upon t^ jBlaintiffs''''fatBd,
not
commit
did
they
and n o action could juye_b£eB^mai ntained against-thesfe defendants therefor^
Their first connection with the plaintiffs' proper^ was after it had been severed from the
realty, and the only mode of enforcing a claim against
them for the value of the same is by a personal action. If
the plaintiffs have not this remedy, they are remediless as
to any recovery against those who have received and converted to their own use their property. Take the case of
valuable timber trees, cut down and carried away from the
Is the owner of the
land, and sold by a mere trespasser.
same deprived of all remedy against any person who may
have received these timber trees by purchase from the trespasser? He is so, unless trover will He; for trespass quare
cloMSum will not lie against such purchaser.
It is further contended that if the defendants were bona
fide purchasers, and without notice of the trespass, th e"
plaintif fs must pj ovft a rlpmfnirl rm the, flgfendants and~r
refusal by them to deliver before the comm^cement of the"
—
action. The court ruled upon this pOiilt, if Siich purchase
But__aa.4;egards_th^se_defendants,
the

Sec. 4]
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was made in the manner above stated, yet if they received
the earth from the trespassers by a purchase for their own
use, and directed that the same be deposited on the filling
ground, they would be liable without any such demand and
refusal.
This ruling may be fully supported upon the
ground of a conversion in fact of the earth, and the impracticability of a redelivery of the earth after it had become thus intermingled with the soil of the land on which
it was placed, and had become a part of the solid earth.
Whenever there has beenan_actuja.l conver sion, ^ir_wb.enit is evi"^Vef"mejropgtv has~EeeTr^us aj^^
dencejaf a conyersioh which sup er sedes]^e^ncessity_of_aiiy
dgmaoid.
This view is to us a satisfactory answer to the
objection here urged, that there was no proof of demand.
•

•

•

Exceptions overrvled?*
Trover for stone, trees, grain or other property severed from the realty
not lie against a party who is in actual possession at the time of
the severance, the reason being that it is impoUtie to suffer him to be
harassed with a separate action for each stone or tree or bushel of grain
consumed on the premises instead of having the matter settled at once by
Wright v. Guier (1840) 9 Watts (Pa.)
an action to recover the possession:
172.
Other cases base the rule on the ground that the chattel, immediately
upon severance, becomes at once the property of the party in possession
Branch v. Morrison (1858) 6 Jones L. (N. G.) 16.
who severed it:
is believed that all conversions may
When a demand is necessary.
By a wrongful taking; 2. By
1.
be divided into four distinct classes:
an illegal assumption of ownership; 3. By an illegal user or misuser; and 4.
In the first three named classes, there is no
By a wrongful detention.
necessity for a demand and refusal, as the evidence arising from the
In the latter
acts of the defendant, is sufficient to prove the conversion.
class alone is such evidence [of demand and refusal] to be required, as
of a chattel furnishes no evidence of a disposition
the mere detention
to convert it to the holder's own use, or divest the true owner of his
property.' And to like effect are the cases of Haas v. Taylor, 80 Ala. 459,
and BoUing v. Kirby, 90 Ala. 215; 24 Am. St. Eep. 789. "—Strauss v.
"Demand and refusal are evidence of eonSchwab (1894) 104 Ala. 669.
the
version when the defendant is in such a condition, that he can deliver
v.
DybaU,
Bruner
2
GUm.
342;
v.
Howe,
property if he wiU.
(Johnson
6 Hill,
42 lU. 35; Hiort v. Bott, L. B., 9 Exch. 86; Hawkins v. Hoffman,
MaUory,
v.
Co.
Yards
Stock
Union
586 41 Am. Dec. 767 and notes)."—
"The sole object of a
554.
157
Co. (1895)
11^
Son & Zimmerman
into an unlawful one,
lawful
possession
demand [is] to turn an otherwise
by reason of a refusal to comply with it, and thus to supply evidence of a
eosversien."— Pease v. imith (1875) «1 N. Y. 477.
24.

will

" 'It
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NEILEE

V.

KELLEY.

Sttpreme Court of Permsyhxmia.
69

J.
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^
1871,

Peuiisylvania State, 403.

This was an action of trover to recover
damages for the conversion of certain railroad stocks and
Sharswood,

:

below ,
bonds alleged to have been ^ld_bj_the defenda
nts
as ais>ledffe-e^u?ollateraLja ecunty f^^he li a^gaiaiitlSIj^jlfiJttt,
^or^dfihtg_owingby the plai fltiff-te-feem.
The first assignment of error is, that the- court below
This
erred in overruling the demurrer to the declaration.
declaration was undoubtedly, as to part of it, defective in
substance, and had that part of it alone been demurred to,^
it must either have been amended or judgment entered for.
the defendants for so much of the plaintiff's demand. It
alleged the conversion of "70 shares of the Sunbury and
Erie Eailway Company of the par value of $100 each; 43
and 75/100 shares of the Alton, Terre Haute and St. Louis
was
Eailroad Company of the par value of $100 each."
decided by this court in Bewail v. The Lomcaster Bank, 17
S. & E. 285, that trover does not lie to recover damages
for shares of bank stock, and the same principle, of course,
applies to all other corporation stocks, Mr. Justice Huston said: "Though trover might lie for a certificate of
stock as it does tor a bond or a deed, yet it will not lie for
.100 shares of bank stock any more than it would for a de bt
or a right of entry\
A share of stock is an mcorporeaL
"
intangible thing. It
a right to a certain proportion of
— never realized except
corporation
tftB" ca.'pi Lai" Stock of a
upon the dissolution and winding up of the corporation —
with the right to receive, in the mean time, such profits
as may be made and declared in the shape of dividends.
Trover can no more be maintained for ^are_of tb£-capitaJ
corporatio n than
^tock of
can for the interest of jt^partneri n comffl rotanE imi^- The two cases are precisely

it

a

g

a

'

a

is
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An exception to this rule exists in cases where a corporation wrong25.
fully refuses to make
transfer of its stock upon the books of the company
upon due request of the assignee. This is held to be a conversion of the
stock by the corporation and a suit in trover may be maintained against it
Lewis V. BidweU Electric Co. (1908) 141 lU. App. 33; Cook on Corporations,
603.
Marshall on Corporations,
576: Clark

Sea 4]
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nr wrif.i ng wTiif.li is the e-gk.
j^p.e of ownership is a. tan adblft corporeal thing —^the subjjefitjTotjjri ly of prope rty hnf. nf -p nssPHaint L — tliff right tc
which is essential in trover. Thus a bond or promissory
note may be the subieet of thp fl-fitinn hnt not the debt ol
which it is the evidence. The other things mentioned ir
tbe declaration do not fall within this objection.
"Foui
bonds made by the Philadelphia & Erie Eailroad Company,
of $1000 each ; four bonds made by the Philadelphia & Eric
Railroad Company guaranteed by the Peimsylvania Central Railroad Company, of $1,000 each."" • • •
analogous.

"Rut, ihp. rlnm-imPT\i

Money which is earmarked or which is otherwise specifically capable
26.
of identification, may be the subject of an action of trover: Weeks v. Hacketi
(1908) 104 Me. 264; Eoyce, Allen & Co. v. Oakes (1897) 20 E. I. 252;
lasigi V. Shea (1889) US Mass. 538; Ken^in t. Balhatchett (1909) 147 lU
App. 661.

DAVIS

v.

HURT.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
114

^
1896.

Alabama, 146.

Upon the introduction of all the evidence, the court of its
"If the jury
own motion, instructed the jury as follows:
believe from the evidence that the cotton in controversy
was stored with the defendants as wa rehonaeman for a rejyard , and the said defendants, upon demand, failed to de_
^"t^" ^ "r t" afcount for its absence, th en the de"Ijvg^said
Tendants are liable in this action to the plaintiff for the
value of the cottdn and interest thereon from the time of
To the giving of this part of the court's
such demand."
general charge the defendants duly excepted.

•

•

•

C. J.: ."Warehousemen are of the class of
bailees bound to ordina rydi ligence, and, of co nsequence,
li able only j^ii-kia£S~J3.ce urring from the w ant of ordinfiry care. When, however, npnr^ rlftmanrl made, the bailee
fails to deli ver goods entrusted to his care, or does not account for tEe failure to make delivery, prima fazie negli-imputed to him ; and the burden of proving
^ence will be

Beickell,
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loss without the want of ordinary care devolves upon hiiii ^
Seals V. Edmonson, 71 Ala. 509 ; Prince v. Ala. State Pair.
106 Ala. 340; Claflvn v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260; s. c. 31 Am.
Rep. 467; Boies v. H. & N. H. R. R. Co., 37 Conn. 272; s. c.
9 Am, Rep. 347.
The rule is founded in necessity, and
upon the presumption that a party who, from his situation,
has peculiar, if not exclusive knowledge of facts, if they
the bailee, to whose
exist, is best able to prove them.
possession, control and care, goods are entrusted, will not
account for the failure, or refusal to deliver them on demand of the bailor, the presumption is not violent that he
has been wanting in diligence, or that he may have wrongfully converted, or may wrohgfully detain them. Or if
there be injury to, or loss of them during the bailment, it
is but just, that he be required to show the circumstances,
acquitting himself of the want of diligence it was his duty
to bestow.
When the baUee fails to return the goods, on demand,
the principal has an election of remedies; he may sue in
assumpsit for a breach of contract, or in case for negligence , or if there has been a conversion of the goods, in
trover for the conversion. Story on Bailments, sees. 191269 ; Salt Springs Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 48 N. Y. 492 ;
s. c. 8 Am. Rep. 564; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 70 N. Y'. 410;
s. c. 26 Am. Rep. 608.
The gist of the action of trover
is the conversion; the right of property may reside in the
plaintiff, entitling him to pursue other remedies, but trover
cannot be pursued without evidence of a conversion of the
goods. Glaze v. McMillion, 7 Port. 279; Conner v. Allen,
33 Ala. 516; Boiling v. Kirhy, 90 Ala. 215. In Connor v.'
Allen, supra, it was said by Rice, C. J.: "Trover is one
of the actions the boundaries of which are distinctly marked
and carefully preserved by the Code. A conversion is now,
as it has ever been, the gist of that action, and without
the plaintiff cannot recover, whatever else he
proof of
may prove, or whatever may be his right of recovery in
another form of action."
And he adopts the definition
conversion given by Mr. Greenleaf:
or description of
"A conversion in the sense of the law of trover, consists
either in the appropriation of the thing to the party's own
use and beneficial enjoyment, or in its destruction, or in
in exclusion or defiance of the
exercising dominion over

it,

a

it,

If
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plaintiff's right, or in withholding the possession from the
plaintiff, under a claim of title inconsistent with his own,"
2 Greenl. Ev., sec. 642.
In Glase v. McMUUon, sv/pra, it
was said:

"It

is believed that all conversions may be divided into four distinct classes : 1. By a wrongful taking.
2. By an illegal assumption of ownership.
3. By an illegal user or misuser. 4. By a wrongful detention."
In
Boiling v. Kirhy, supra, there was a very full examination
of the authorities, and discussion of the essential elements
or facts which must concur to constitute conversion in the
sense of the law of trover, by McClellan, J. ; and the result
declared was, that "conversion upon which recovery in
trover may be had, must be a positive, tortious act. Nonfeasance or neglect of legal duty, mere failure to perform
an act obligatory by contract, or by which property is lost
to the owner will not support the action." The case is republished, with elaborate and instructive annotation by Mr.
Freeman, 24 Am. St. Eep. 789-819. In Ala. & Tenn. Rivers
R. R. Co. V. Kidd, 35 Ala. 209, it was held, that "trover
will not lie for a bare nondelivery of goods by a warehouseman, unless they are in his possession, and he refused to deliver them on demand." In Abraham & Bra.
V. Nunn, 42 Ala. 51, it was held, that trover would not lie
against a warehouseman, for the conversion of goods taken
from his possession by an armed force, without negligence
or complicity on his part. In Salt Springs Nat. Bank v.
Wheeler, supra, the defendant had received for acceptance
certain biUs of exchange, and at the demand of the person entrusting them to him, failed to return them, saying
he could not find them, and might have torn them up with
papers he considered of no value; it was held, he was not
liable in trover, there being no evidence of a-vnhmtary or
intentional deatruction or _loss of th ^Jbiifa-s though he was
liable upon his implied promise to present the bills for acceptance, and if not accepted or paid, to give notice to the
plaintiff.
Without pursuing further an examination of authorities,
it may safely be said, that a mere failu re by a bailee on,
demand made, to _deliycL goods whir^Ti havo^ been entrust ed
'to'him; is not a conversion w hifb win suppo rt an action _of
Jrbver,"lf'Iie~ seH~ u2_no_ titlehostil e_to_or inconsisteTit with
Hetttle oi the ba ler^ or^iias not appropriated fe em to his
own use, or the use of a third person, or exercised ovef~

i

i
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them a dominion inconsistent with the baihnent. All that
oan be fairly predicated bf the facts found in the record,
is the mere "failure to deliver the cotton upon the demand
of the plaintiff; possession of it not remaining with the
defendant. There was no denial of the title of the plaintiff,
nor a dominion exercised over the cotton inconsistent with
the terms of the bailment, no evidence of a conversion of
appropriation of ft to their own use, or to the use of any
third person by the defendants. The failure to deliver, unexplained, raises a presumption of negligence against them,
and may involve them in a liability for a breach of the
contract of bailment, or for negligence in the performance
of the duty springing from the contract, but it is not the
to
conversion, the positive, tortious act, indispensable
maintain trover. From this view, it results there was error
in the instruction given voluntarily by the court below.
•

•

•

Let the judgment be reversed, and the cause remanded
for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion.*^
Corwertmg to another's use.
27.
"This court has held that in an action
of trover, it is no defense that the defendant acted as the agent or serrant
of another who himself was a wrong-doer.
McPheters v. Page, 83 Me. 234.
And it is there held that if he has exercised a dominion over personal chattels
in exclusion, or in defiance of, or inconsistent with, the owner's right, that in
law is a conversion, whether it be for his own or for another person's use.
Kimball v. Billings, 55 Me. 147, 151; Freeman v. Underwood, 66 Me. 229,
233.
The same doctrine is laid down in other jurisdictions': WiUiams v.
Merle, 11 Wend. 80; Coles v. Clark, 3 Cush. 399; Gilmore v. Newton, 9
Allen, 171; Courtis v. Cane, 32 Vt. 232. In some of these cases it has been
held that an auctioneer, or broker, who sells property for one who has no
title, and pays over to his employer the proceeds, with no knowledge of the
defect of title or want of authority, is held to be liable for its conversion
to the real owner. Eobinson t. Bird, 158 Mass. 357, 360." — ^Wing v. Milli
ken (1898) 01 Me. 387.

BRADLEY

v.

DAVIS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

1/
1836.

14 Maine, 44.

This was an action of trespass f or taking and carrying

away a harness of the value of $30, alleged to be the property of the plaintiff. The plaintiff -introduced testimony
to show, that the harne ss originallv belonge d t.n mift ff^mR-
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son, who sold it to ih<^. plaintiff; fliaf the harness remained
- in the possession
of Jameson, who was authorized by the,
laintifF to sell it for hina^ that Jameson agreed with the
S efendant to sell him thei harness on condition that he
should pay ten dollars in cash on the Monday following,
and secure the payment of the residue ; that the defendant
then took the harness , pr omising to return it the ToUowing
Monday, if he did not before that time paylhe money and
give the security ; and that n either was done ; that the agent
of the plaintiff did not sell the harne ss, or give the defendant any permission to keep
un less payment was made
"and security given. H also proved, that the efendant
afterwards sold the harness to another person . * * *
Weston, C. J., who tried the action, instructed the jury,
that trover would have been the more appropriate remedy
but that,
Jameson had made no sale and had reserved
to the plaintiff, whom he represented, the possession on
the Monday following his interview with the defendant,
the plaintiff was entitled to immediate possession on Monday, and that the sale and transfer afterwards by the deThe verdict
fendant, might be regarded as a trespass.
was for the plaintiff, and was to be set aside
the jury
were erroneously instructed.
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Weston, C J.
The general property in the harness being in the plaintiff, drew atter it sucn a constructive posmaintain trespass,
ession in him as would enable him
The bailee being answerable to the
ptrrflrff*^^
against
may
also
owner,
bring trespass; and the right to
general
maintain
attaches in him, who first brings the action.
But a party shall not be charged as a trespasser for goods,
which he received by delivery from the owner. Williams,
Saund., 47, note
says, that
in his notes to Saunders,
lawful or excusable, trespass cannot
where the taking
be supported but the owner must bring trover. And such
Burrow,
was the opinion of the court in Cooper v. Chitty,
T. E., 475. In ex parte
20, and in Smith et al. v. Miller,
Lefroy, 320, Lord Chancellor
Schoales
Chamberlain,
Redesdale says, that trespass cannot be brought for goods
that were lawfully delivered.
^If^ party comes ixi tJie possession of goods lawful ly,
or any^ aiT jbapqaent unlawful conversion oi them, the^ ptrover. An'd this action will lie, where
propnate remedy
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will, fo r the unlawful taking is a conversion. But
Wilhams, in the nofelbefbre cifM, says, that the
of this proposition is not tru e.
been ingeniously argued by" the counsel for the
plaintiff, that any act is a trespass, in relation to the goods
of another, for which there is no justification or excuse.
But the remedy for every such act, is not trespass vi et
armis. That would be confounding all distinction between
trespass and trover. Every unlawful conversion, is without justification or excuse.
If a man hires a horse to use
two days, and he continues to use him the third day, it
could hardly be contended that trespass would lie; although
such use would be unlawful; and the owner would be entitled to the immediate possession. Yet being the general
owner, and as such having a constructive possession, he
might undoubtedly maintain trespass against a stranger,
who should presume to use the horse on the third day. The
ground of distinction is, that the taking by the stranger
would be tortious from the first. If A permits his goods
to remain with B for his own use, and B delivers them to
C to carry to another place, trespass does not lie by A
against C. 6 Comyn, Trespass D. The reason is, that B
had the goods by delivery from the owner.
In the Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Coke, 146, it was resolved,
that whoever abuses an authority or license derived from
the law, becomes thereby a trespasser ah initio but that it
is otherwise, where the license or authority is derived from
a party. And Baron Comyn deduces from that case the
the general principle that, if a man has licen^e^oj^^mthority
from tKe plafntiff himself, trespl[s"s does""^^ot lie jigain3t_
trespass
oergeant
converse
It has

"jmT

though he abuses Eis~~1icense"~'^~' m isfeasance."" 6
Comyn, Trespass D.
The opinion of the court, is, that upon the facts in the
case an action of trespass cannot be supported.
Verdict set aside?^
"Trover will lie for a temporary^ as well as for a permanent eonver28.
sion. The return of the property, either before or after suit brought, may
be shown in mitigation, and will often reduce the damages to a nominal
sum.
When it is apparent that the value of the chattel did not, furnish the
rule of damages, and that the judgment is for less than the value, there is
no ground for regarding the recovery of judgment as a voluntary sale of the
chattel by the plaintiff, nor its satisfaction as a compulsory purchase of the
In such a case, neither the rendition nor the
chattel by the defendant.
satisfaction
of the judgment transfers the property in the chattel to th«

Sea 5]

Forms op Action.

63

defendant Barb v. Pish, 8 Blackf. 841; Sedgwick on Damages, 5th ed., 575;
WiLLEs, J., in Bnnsmead v. Harrison, L. B.; 6 C. P. 584, p. 588:— see, also,
Lacon v. Barnard, Croke (Car.) 35; Field T.
Jellious. S Leviiis. 124."—
Dearth v. Speaeer

(1872)

52

N. H.

Section

213.

5.

WILLIAMSON

Replevin.'*

EINGGOLD.

V.

United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia,
1830.

4

Crunch, 39.

Mr. CMef Justice Ckanch delivered the opinion of tiie

court.

Mr. Justice Thurston, dissenting.
This is a replevin for the plaintiff's goods, taken on a
fieri facias, against John Wells, Jr., at the suit of Thomas
Carberry, issued out of this Court.

"It

3

2

1;

is

3

is

2

2,

I.,

29.
Declabation in Eeplevin.
For that the said
D on the
day
of
A. D.
in the parish of
, in the county of
, in a certain
dwelling house there, took the goods and chattels, to wit,
, of him the said
A B of great value, to wit, of the value of
and unjustly detained tha
same against sureties and pledges, until, etc., wherefore the said A B saith,
that he is injured, and hath sustained damage to the value of
and
therefore he brings his suit, etc.
Chitty on Pleading, 364.
Bespecting this form Chitty says in the notes thereto:
"The venue in this
action
local, and the place is material and traversable."
"The action
of replevin requires more certainty in the description of the place, where the
distress was taken, than that of trespass, the place being material and
traversable. " " This is the proper form, when the cattle have been replevied.
is not necessary in replevin in the
K. 10."
Com. Dig. Pleader,
detinuit, which
now the usual form of action, to state the price or value
aliter, if the
Saund. 320, n.
of the cattle or goods; see the reason,
K. io."
declaration be in the detinet, Com. Dig. Pleader,
The reason suggested in Saunders, supra, is "because if the plaintiff
obtains a verdict, he is only entitled to damages for the wrongful taking and
costs, but not to the value of the goods taken, as he is in trespass, for they
were delivered to him when replevied."
"In the action of replevin the question of value does not arise as an
issue.
The title and right of possession are the matters to be determined
in the suit. The law will not, however, permit a person to take persona]
property from another by this process of replevin, until the officer serving
the writ has taken a bond to the defendant, with sureties in double ths
▼atee of the goods to be replevied, conditioned to pay the damages and costs,
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Mr. Morfit, for the defendant, has moved the court for
a return of the goods under the Act of Assembly of Maryland, 1875, ch. 80, sec 14 (and also for a venditioni exponas,) because the goods were, as it is said, in the custody
of the law, and therefore could not lawfully be replevied
whether the plaintiff in replevin was, or was not, the owner
of the goods at the time of the taking, and whether they were
taken by the marshal out of the actual possession of the
plaintiff in replevin, or out of the actual possession of
Wells, the debtor in the execution.
It is understood to be admitted in argument, that the
goods were the property of the plaintiff in replevin, at the
time of the taking by the defendant, and that the defendant
took them to satisfy the execution against Wells.
The motion for a return, upon the ground, that goods in
the custody of the law are not to be replevied, is, in effect,
a motion to quash the replevin; for if the return should
be ordered, it must be without bond; and such an order
would be of course, if the plaintiff in replevin were the
debtor in the writ of fieri facias; for the law, in that respect, is well settled in this country as well as in England.
But it is not well settled, either there or here, that a
man cannot maintain replevin for his goods taken out of
his actual or constructive possession by an officer, to satisfy
an execution against a third person. In some of the States
it is well settled that he can. But in Maryland, the Court
of Appeals has lately delivered a solemn opinion, that he
and also to return and restore the same goods and chattels in like good
order and condition as when taken, in ease such shall be the final judgment.
The value of the goods mal&s no part of the declaration necessarily.
It is only Important as Hxing the amount of the penal sum In the bond,
which the ofaeer is to require." — Thomas v. Spofford (1859) 46 Me. 408.
Eeplevin in the Detinuit and Detinet.
"The writ of replevin is quod cepit
averia et in juste detinet contra vadios et plegios; to which writ the sheriff
There you go on in the replevin only for damages
returns replegiari feci.
for the caption, and then in the count you recite the writ in the detinuit, and
count in the detinuit for damages; — and though the writ be taken out in the
detinet, yet when the sheriff hath returned replegiari feci upon it, that
return is a warrant to recite the writ in the detinuit; for if the writ was
recited in the detinet, and the count was in the detinuit, it would be a
variance for which the judgment may be arrested, or the defendant might have
demurred. But where the sheriff does not replevy the beasts, there you must
recite the writ in the detinet, and count in the detinet also, because the
beasts are not delivered; and there you recover as well the value of the
Lord Chief Baron Gilbeasts in damages, as damages for the detention."
bert on The Law of Distress and Bepleviii, 144.
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cannot, in the case of Cromwell v. Owens, 7 Har. & Johns.
60, 61.

In England, it will be found that every case adduced in
support of the rule, that replevin will not lie for goods in
the custody of the law, are oases where the plaintiff in replevin was the debtor himself.
It is said to be a rule founded upon the policy of the law ;
and the reason given by Gilbert on Replevins, 161, in the
very passage relied upon in support of the rule, is, that
"it would be troubling the execution awarded, if the party
on whom the money was to be levied should fetch back the
goods by a replevin; and, therefore, they construe such endeavors to be a contempt of their jurisdiction; and upon
that account commit the offender."
Goods seized and held by a trespasser, cannot, surely, be
said to be in custody of the law, except as against the trespasser himself, when they are seized in execution. The
policy of the law refuses him the right to question the validity of the judgment, or to deny his interest in the property, by any means that would defeat or delay the execution; but it does not refuse a third person the means of

protecting his rights from illegal violation.
The general rule is, that replevin will lie wherever tresThere is,
pass will lie for taking the plaintiff's goods.
however, this difference between trespass and replevin,
that trespass will lie upon possession alone ; but replevin requires property in the plaintiff. All that is necessary to
support the action, is property in the plaintiff, either general or special, and a wrongful taking from the plaintiff's
possession, either actual or constructive.
The idea suggested by Blackstone, and repeated by several other elementary writers,* that replevin will only lie
for goods taken by distress, has no foundation.
have not found it supported by a single adjudged case.
On the contrary, the cases are abundant, from the time of
the Year Books to the present moment, in which replevin
has been supported for goods not taken by distress. Blackstone, (3 Com. 145, b.) says, "The wrongful taking of goods
being thus most clearly an injury, the next consideration
is, what remedy the law of England has given for it. And
this is, in the first place, the restitution of the goods themselves, so wrongfully taken, with damages for the loss siis-

I

a

li. P.

6
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tained by such unjust invasion ; which is effected by action

of replevin."

"This

obtains only in one instance of an unlawful tak-

ing, that of a wrongful distress."
For this assertion, he cites no authority whatever; and
it is believed none can be found.
Baron Gilbert, whose Treatise upon the Law of Eeplevins
was published some years before Blackstone's Commentaries, defines the writ of replevin thus: "A replevin is a
justicial writ to the sheriff, complaining of an unjust taking and detention of goods or chattels, commanding the
sheriff to deliver back the same to the owner, upon security
given to make out the injustice of such taking, or else to
return the goods and chattels." Gilbert on Eeplevins, 58.
Sellon, vol. 2, p. 153, following Blackstone, says, "Eeplevin
is a remedy grounded upon a distress; for goods are only
replevisable when they have been taken by way of distress.
But he cites no authority, except Co. Lit. 145, which gives
no countenance to such a doctrine. It only shows that replevin is the proper remedy in cases of distress for rent;
but not that replevin will not lie for goods not distrained."

In an action of replevin, neither the writ nor the declaration says anything of the goods being taken as a distress.
The injury complained of is, that the defendant took and
unjustly detains the plaintiff's goods, not that he took
them for any particular purpose.
In the case of Shannon v. Shannon, 1 Sch. & Lefroy, 327
Lord Eedesdalb says, "Mr. Justice Blackstone's definition
of the action of replevin is certainly too narrow. Many
old authorities will be found (in the books) of replevin
being brought where there was no distress." "It is an action founded on a taking, and the right which the party
from whom the goods were taken has to have them restored
to him, until the question of title to the goods is determined."
In the case of Meany v. Head, 1 Mason, 322, Mr. Justice
Story said: "At common law, a writ of replevin never
lies, unless there has been a tortious taking, either originally or by construction of law, by some act which makes
tiie party a trespasser ah initio."
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It

is admitted, on all hands, that "property in the defendant," or even "in a stranger," is a good plea-^"
It
follows, therefore, that when the property is taken by the
defendant, from the possession of the plaintiff, under the
claiaa of title, replevin is the proper action to try that title.
But the plaintiff in replevin cannot be supposed to know,
before hand, what pretence the defendant may set up as an
excuse for the taking; and whether that excuse be true or
not cannot be known until the trial, so that it cannot be
said, in any case where the taking of the plaintiff's goods
has been from the possession of the plaintiff himself, that
replevin will not lie. It is true, that in many such cases of
taking, replevin cannot be maintained, because, upon the
trial, it may turn out that the taking was lawful ; but still,
in those cases, replevin is the proper action to try the lawfulness of the taking, and the court will not quash the writ
before that question is decided, unless the writ shall have
been issued under such circumtances, as to be a contempt
of the court. GUbert on Keplevins, 161.
This happens when the improper interference of one of
the parties in the cause obstructs the execution of the judgment of the court.
In such a case, it is considered as a
constructive contempt.
The general rule, then, is clearly established, that replevin wiU lie for every wrongful taking of the plaintiff's
goods out of his possession.
But there is said to be an exception to this general rule,
and that is, where the goods are in the custody of the law.

In England, under

the statute of Marlbridge, (53 H. 3,
the application for a replevin is to be made to the
sheriff himself, who has the goods in his possession, under
the fieri facias, and who, if a third person claims the propc. 21,)

Outstanding Title as a Defense. "To entitle a plaintiff to recover
so.
in an action of replevin, he must establish his right to the possession of the
This he may do by proving that he was in actual and
property replevied.
he had no such
undisputed possession when defendant took the property.
he bases his right to recover upon proof
possession, he must prove title.
of title, defendant may defeat his recovery by proving title in a third person.
Nicholson v. Dyer, 45 Mich. 610; Upham v. Caldwell, 100 Mich. 264. If,
however, the property was taken from the actual and undisputed possession of
plaintiff, defendant cannot defeat recovery by proving title in a third perBon.
He must in that case prove that he himself has a title superior to that
of the plaintiff.
Eose v. Eaton, 77 Mich. 255; Conely v. Dudley, 111 Mich.
122; Van Baalen v. Dean, 27 Mich. 106. "— Sanf ord v. Millikin (1906) 144

If

Mich.

311.

If
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if

it

4

if

it,

erty, has the power of summoning a jury of inquest to in(Dalton, 146; Gilquire to whom the property belongs.
bert on Execution, 21, cited in Farr v. Newman, 4 T. K.
If, upon that inquest, it be found for the third
633.)
person, the sheriff will restore it to him, and be justified in
his return of nulla bona upon the fieri facias, so that the
If the
whole purpose of replevin is thereby answered.
jury should find that it is the property of the debtor, he
may go on to sell
and the finding will mitigate damagee,
in an action of trespass,
the goods seized should happen
T. R. 633.
not to be the defendant's. Farr v. Newman,
has not been the practice of the
But, in this county,
marshal to summon a jury to try the question of property;
he has any doubt, he may require a bond of indemnity
from the plaintiff. If the marshal here has no power to
summon a jury to inquire of the property, justice seems
to require that the owner should have his writ of replevin,
there be no positive rule of law to the contrary.

if

**********

The general rule, as before observed, is, that replevin
will lie wherever trespass will lie for taking the plaintiff's
goods.

2

if

The facts necessary to maintain the suit, are, property
in the plaintiff, either general or special, and a wrongful
taking of the goods out of the plaintiff's possession, either
actual or constructive.
The possession must be such as
would maintain trespass. If the original taking be lawful,
the possession never was in the plaintiff, an unjust
or
detention alone will not maintain replevin, {Gardner v.
Wheat. Selwyn, 896,) unless
Campbell, 15 Johns. 401;
4

1

a

attended by some act which would make the defendant
Bac.
trespasser ab initio. Meany v. Read,
Mason, 322

I

;

Ab. Eeplevin, F,
am aware of the cases of Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass.
Rep. 359, and Baker v. Fales, 16 Id. 147, but am not satisfied that they can be supported upon priuciples of common
law, however correct they may be, under the statutes of
Massaxihusetts.
a

is

it

Being of opinion that
general principle of the
common law, that replevin can be maintained in all cases
where the plaintiff's goods have been wrongfuUy taken
from his possession, and that the exception of goods taken
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in execution applies only to the debtor himself, I think that
the motion to quash the replevin, on the ground that the
goods were in the custody of the law when the replevin was
served, and also the motion for a venditioni exponas, ought
to be overruled.

BAKER

V.

FALES.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
16 Massachusetts,

1819.

146.

This was a writ of replevin, dated April 9th,

1819,

in which

the plaintiffs, as "deacons of the first church in Dedham,
which church is connected and associated with the first parish in said Dedham in public religious worship," allege the
taking and unlawful detaining of certain property belonging to them in their said capacity, by the defendant on the
day of the purchase of their writ.
The defendant pleads in abatement of the writ, that on
the 14th of November, 1818, at, etc., he also was a deacon
of the same first church, and that the goods mentioned in
the plaintiffs' writ, came lawfully into his possession as
such deacon, and as the proper person to have, possess, and
keep the same; and that the same goods were never, until
after the service of the writ, in the possession of the plaintiffs; and this, etc.; wherefore he prays judgment of the
writ, that the same may be quashed, and for his costs, and
for a return.
To this plea the plaintiffs demur generally, and the defendant joins in the demurrer.
The plaintiffs sue in their capacity of deaPutnam,
:
cons of a church, to recover specifically the goods which
belong, as they offer to prove, to the church ; and which the
defendant has taken and unjustly detained.

J.

The objection most insisted on is, that there has not been
a tortious taking; that the goods came into the defendant's
possession as deacon of the church, and as the proper person to hold them; and as there has been at most but a
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wrongful detention, that the writ of replevin should be
quashed.

But what is to be considered as an unlawful taking? Is
case of taking vi et armis? Or may one
be considered
constructively taking goods, who came
lawfully into possession, but keeps them from the owner
against right?
Now, I hold that he who will not redeliver goods to the
owner, but abuses the , trust, is answerable either in replevin for the goods specifically, or in trover for damages ;
and that it is at the election of the owner, and not of the
tort-feasor, which of these remedies shall be applied. For
otherwise it would be in the power of one to take advantage
of his own wrong; and the party injured might never reIt has been
cover a complete satisfaction for the injury.
decided accordingly, when the eminent Chief Justice Parsons presided in this court and gave the opinion, that, as
a general principle, the owner of a chattel may take it by
replevin from a person, whose possession is unlawful, unless it is in the custody of the law, or unless it has been
taken by replevin from him by the party in possession.
Conformably to this, the same great judge afterwards held
that the consignor might maintain trover or replevin
against a shipmaster, who stopped short of the port of delivery without reason, and refused to proceed thither. That
was a case where the goods came lawfully into the hands
of the defendant, by delivery for a special purpose ; and he
neglecting to perform the trust, the owner was permitted
to recover the goods specifically, or the damages, at his

it confined to a

election.

The cases, which have been cited by the counsel for the
defendant from the decisions of the Supreme Court of New
York, have, from the unfeigned respect we feel for that
tribunal, been examined with attention. In the first [Pangburn V. Patridgf, 7 Johns. 140], it was decided that replevin was not to be confined to cases of distress ; but would
*
•
*
lie for any unlawful taking.
The next case [Hopkins V. HopJcins, 10 Johns. 369] was replevin for taking
The defendant justified the taking
the plaintiff's sheep.
them damage feasant. The plaintiff replied that the defendant abused the distress afterwards, so as to make him a
trespasser ab initio. The abuse consisted in impounding

Sec 5]

Forms of Action.

71

the sheep, before the damages had been ascertained by the
fence-viewers; which was required by the statute of New
York, and had been so decided in the case of SacJcrider v.
M'Donaid, 10 Johns. 253. And the court were clearly for
the plaintiff. Chief Justice Kent, in delivering the opinion, stated that the action of replevin is grounded on a
tortious taking (which as a general remark is certainly
true), and that where a defendant in replevin has abused
a license of the law, he shall be considered a trespasser ab
initio, as he would be if the action were trespass. And the
chief justice proceeds to cite Fitz. N. B. 69, and 8 Co. 146,
where a party is not to be adjudged a trespasser ah initio,
but is liable in replevin merely for the unlawful detention. "As if a man take cattle damage feasant, and the
other tender sufficient amends, and he refuses to deliver
them back; if he sue replevin, he shall recover damages
only for the detention, and not for the taking, for that was

lawful."

It

has been contended for the defendant, that in the case
last cited, the defendant became a trespasser ab initio, because he abused a license of the law; and so the original
taking was to be considered as tortious ; and thus this case
is to be reconciled to the general doctrine requiring a tortious taking to enable the plaintiff to maintain replevin.

I

is

is

is

a

if,

do not perceive how the distinction between the
abuse of the license of the law, and the license of the party,
will be very material. The rule is very well stated in 12
Edw. 4, 8 pi. 20, "Where a man does a thing by the authority of the law, and afterwards misdemeans himself, his
first act shall not be tortious." In a subsequent case, 21
Edw. 4, 19, Pigot (who was a counsellor) contended that
there was no difference between the license of the law and
of the party; but the court adhered to it.
To apply the rule to the case at bar; the goods came to
the defendant's hands by the license of the law, or of the
by departy. Suppose by the license of the law; then
trespasser ab initio,
taining them unjustly, he becomes
to maintain his replevin on the ground of
the plaintiff
an original tortious taking. But suppose they came to the
hands of the defendant by the license of the church, which
to be punished only so far as
the party, then he
in effect
From that time only he bohe has abused the authority.

Now,
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not from the begiiming; but, as I^ord
Coke expresses it in the case above cited, "he shall be
punished for his abuse of it." The distinction, therefore,
goes only to the damages to be recovered.
comes a trespasser,

It is

said in Com. Dig. Pleader 3, K. 12, that the d,efendant may plead bailment to him by the plaintiff, for which
detinue lies, and not replevin.
The chief baron cites no
authority for this. His own is of great weight. We remark, however, that detinue is an action which has fallen
The misinto disuse. In this state it is never brought.
chiefs aad perjuries, arising from the wager of law allowed
in that action, were among the many strong reasons for
substituting the action of trover. And besides, the remedy
was incomplete ; for while it purported to permit the plaintiffs to recover his goods specifically, the very object of the
suit was defeated by the conditional judgment; which, at
the election of the defendant, allowed him to keep the goods,
if he chose to pay the price.

The argument from inconvenience has been much pressed

upon this occasion. It has been argued that, under color
of a replevin, every man may have his house stripped of
his family pictures, and be completely robbed of his goods
under color of law.
That would indeed be a great abuse of legal process, requiring exemplary punishment. But what good thing is not
liable to be abused? On the other hand, the inconvenience
would be intolerable, if the action would not lie to recover
specifically the goods, which should be unjustly withheld.
Suppose that one should send his ship to be repaired; if
the shipwright should afterwards think it better for him to
keep her, or to send her freighting on his own account,
must the owner submit to the change of property against
his consent? Shall he be obliged to accept a judgment for
the damages, which may never be paid? And so of a thousand things, the value of which cannot be fuUy compensated by money. Take, for example, a chronometer or other
instrument of rare and curious workmanship, or a picture,
or a manuscript, unlawfully detained.
But the argument from inconvenience, which had so great
an influence upon the Lord Redesdale, has no application
here. If, indeed, a replevin was a judicial writ, or grant-
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able only at the discretion of the court, it might be necessary
to consider that question. But as it is issued, like aU other
original writs, upon the demand of the plaintiff, it is not
in the power of the court to prevent any of the inconveniences, which are anticipated from the abuse of the process.
All that can be done is to punish such abuse, when it occurs, as is done in other like cases. A plaintiff in replevin
can always set forth a sufficient cause of action; and upon
giving the security required by law, he has a right to have
the goods delivered to him.
the writ were abated, the
defendant would have the same difficulty in regaining his
goods, as he would have if he defeated the plaintiff upon
the merits.
The statute of 1789, c 25, seems to proceed upon these
principles, authorizing a replevin for goods taken, detained, or attached; adopting the common law, where they
are taken or detained; and extending the remedy, where
they are attached.
Upon the whole matter, we are satisfied that the plaintiffs may well maintain this action, and that the defendant
must therefore answer over.
Respondeas ouster awarded.'^

If

31. Largely a Statvtory Action.
"The action of replevin is not, strictly
ipeaking, a eonunon-law action, but mainly, if not entirely, of statutory origin
and of a peculiar nature.
See 3 Blackstone's Com., p. 146-151."— Corbett v.
Pond (1897) 10 App. Cas. D. 0. 17.
Meplevin aa an action in rem. "The action of replevin is regulated by
•
•
•
These provisions clearly show
statute, Gen. Laws E. I. cap. 272.
in
that the action of replevin
this State is so far a proceeding in rem that
unless the re» has actually been taken possession of by the officer there is no
•
•
•
ease before the court, and hence nothing to try.
There is no provision which allows the jury to find for the plaintiff in the value of the
They can only find damages for the unlawful taking and
goods replevied.
•
•
•
But the plaintiff 's counsel contends that the action
detention.
will lie simply on a writ of summons and without any taking of the propIn support of this very novel contention
erty by the sheriff as commanded.
in this State he cites a number of authorities from other States, in several
But as the action is everyof which such a proceeding has been sustained.
where regulated by statute, and as the statutes of no two States, so far as
we have examined them, are alike, but very little aid can be obtained from
For instance, take the statute of Michigan on
the decisions thereunder.

If

the goods and chatIt provides, among other things, that : '
replevin.
tels specified in any writ of replevin shall not be found or shall not be
delivered to the plaintiff, he may proceed in the action for the recovery of the
(10,660).
Comp. Laws of Michigan, 1897
same or the value thereof.'
[Other statutes similar to that of Michigan are cited: Wis. Stat., 1898, $
2859; Kan. Eev. 1901, % 4619; Laws of Del., Bev. Code, 1852, as amended,
1893, pp. 793-5; Ark. Stet, Eev. 1894, $ 6397; Pomeroy v. Trimper, 8 Allen
(Mass.) 398]— Warren v. Leiter (1902) 24 E. I. 36.
"Beplevvn it a purely potsetsory remedy. It eontemplates the situation
where property being in the peaceful possesBion of A is seized by B. The
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original possession of A justifies the presumption, ordinarily indulged by
the law in favor of possession, that A is the owner, or at least is entitled
as against a trespasser to be treated as such.
The law therefore gives the
writ of replevin to A, by which he recovers the property pending the settlement of the controverted right.
"Now when replevin is extended beyond these limits and is used to
recover property wrongfully detained, it at once becomes
an anomalous
remedy and goes against the presumption of law that one having lawful
possession has also prima facie title.
Still, in a number of American jurisdictions this is permitted, either as a result of judicial decision or by
* * • In most jurisdictions such extension of the remedy has
statute.
been accomplished
by statute.
will be observed that the adoption of the doctrine that replevin will
lie for any unlawful detention operates at once to destroy its distinctive
character as a~{insseesory- action.
The remedy thereby comes to be founded
on property as well as possession. The issue of ownership in the defendant
is therefore no longer a collateral issue and is available as matter of defense
It results that though the plea non cepit
at the trial of the replevin suit.
admits property in the plaintiff, such plea may be joined with a special plea
of property in the defendant or other person." 3 Street on Foundations

"It

of

Le^

Liability,

220.

MILLEE

V.

ADSIT.

Court for the Correction of Errors of New York.

1836.

16 Wendell, 335.

Error from the Supreme Court. Miller brought an action of replevin against Adsit in the Rensselaer common
pleas, in September, 1828, and declared for the taking and
*
*
•
detention of two horses. The defendant pleaded.
3. That the property in the horses was in Jacob Coon, and
that they were levied upon, on the 2nd June, 1828, by the
defendant as a constable by virtue of an execution issued
on a justice's judgment rendered on the the 16th May, 1828,
in favor of one E. R. Ball against Jacob Coon for fifty-one
dollars and seventeen cents. To * * * the third plea
[plaintiff] put in two replications: * * * 2. That on
the 9th May, 1828, one Eliza Coon recovered a judgment
in a justice's court by confession against Jacob Coon for
two hundred and one dollars and twelve cents, upon which
an execution was issued and delivered to one Solyman
Coon, a constable, who, on the same ninth day of May,
levied upon the horses in question, and advertised the same
to be sold at public vendue on the twelfth day of June then
next ; that the plaintiff in this suit became the receiptor of
the said property, and agreed to deliver the same to the

Sea 5]

FoEMs of ActnoN.

75

constable, Solyman Coon, on the twelfth day. of June, or
whenever same should be demanded, and then and there
took the horses into his custody and possession, and retained the same in his possession until the tenth day of
June, when they were seized and taken away by the defend•
•
*
ant. To
the second replication * * * [defendant] rejoined that he did not seize and take the horses from
the possession of the plaintiff, concluding to the country.
On trial in the common pleas the existence of the judgments and executions as set forth in the pleadings was admitted, and it was also admitted that, on the thirteenth day
of May, Solyman Coon levied upon the horses in question
by virtue of the execution in favor of Eliza Coon, and took
from the plaintiff in this cause an instrument in writing
whereby the plaintiff acknowledged to have received the
horses from Solyman Coon, and agreed to redeliver them
to htm on the twenty-eighth day of June, or pay the debt
and costs demandable under the execution in favor of Eliza
Coon. It was proved by the testimony of Jacob Coon, that
the plaintiff in this cause, MiUer, after having receipted the
property, requested him to take the horses and keep them,
using them enough to pay for their pasturage, as he, the
plaintiff, had no pasture for them; and that the plaintiff
had the right to take them from him whenever he pleased.
That he accordingly took the horses, and they were in his
employment when they were taken by the defendant on the
third day of June. At the time of the taking, the plaintiff
was not present; he resided on an adjoining farm; and the
defendant was informed of the previous levy, and of the
circumstances under which the property was situated. The
defendant moved for a nonsuit on the ground that the
plaintiff being a bare receiptor of the property in question,
had no such interest in it as would enable him to maintain
the action of replevin. The common pleas granted the non*
*
*
The plaintiff sued out a writ of error, resuit.
moving the record into the supreme court, where the following judgment was rendered : the judgment of the common pleas to be reversed, and venire de novo to issue in the
cause, the costs to abide the event thereof, unless the defendant before the next teim of the common pleas remit
to the plaintLff so much of the amount found by the jury
as to reduce the same to the sum of fifty-one dollars and
seventeen cents with interest of that sum and constable's
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fees on the execution in favor of Ball; and in case he so
remit, then that the judgment be affirmed without costs.
The defendant entered a remittitur accordingly, and took
judgment for the balance. Whereupon the plaintiff removed the record into this court by writ of error.

By the Chancellor. In this case, the plaintiff brought
an action of replevin for a span of horses which belonged
to Jacob Coon, and which were taken by the defendant
from the actual possession of Coon, on an execution against
him. The general question, whether the receiptor of goods,
taken ia execution, has such a special property ia the goods
as will enable him to maintain an action of replevin, or
any other action in his own name, against a mere wrongdoer, who takes the goods out of his actual possession, was
have
the one principally discussed upon the argument.
no doubt whatever as to the right of the receiptor to bring
an action of trespass in such a case in his own name, in
which he may recover whatever damages he wiU be liable
for to the officer to whom the receipt is given. Any possession, even without right, is sufficient to maintain an action
of trespass against a mere stranger who, without any pretence of claim from or under the real owner, violates such
possession; but the law appears to be settled, that to maintain replevin, the plaintiff must not only have the possession, but he must also have either a general or special property in the goods replevied. Hence, it has always been held
that a plea of property in a stranger was a good plea,
either in abatement or in bar, in an action of replevin. It
was so decided by the supreme court of this state in the
case of Harrison v. Mcintosh, 1 Johns. E. 384, and such has
been the established rule of law upon the subject for more
than a century.
See Bacon's Case, Cro. Eliz. 475; Presgrave V. Sanders, 1 Salk. Rep. 5; Com. Dig. Tit. Pleader,
3 K. 11, 12.
Either a general or a special property iu the
goods is therefore necessary to entitle the party from
whom they are taken to maintain replevin, although the
bare possession is sufficient to maintain trespass for a violation of such possession. Judges have sometimes said that
replevin will lie in all cases where an action of trespass
could be brought for taking the goods. Those expressions,
however, wiU upon examination be found to relate to, the
manner of taking which is necessary to sustain the action,

I
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and not the ownership, which is required in the one case
bnt not in the other. Previous to the revised statutes,
therefor, the possession and tortious taking of the property, must have been such that an action of trespass could
have been maintaiaed against the defendant ; and in addition to that, the plaintiff must also have had such a general
or special property in ^ the goods as would have entitled
him to recover in trover for a conversion of such goods by
the defendant.
Either a general or a special property in
goods, however, is sufficient to maintain an action of replevin against a wrong-doer if the goods are taken from the
possession of the plaintiff.
Whether the receiptor of goods taken on execution, or
any other bailee or mere depositary of goods, who has no
lien thereon or any other interest therein than what arises
from his liability to the officer or owner for the safe keeping and return of the goods, has such an interest therein as
will entitle him to maintain either replevin or trover for
the taking of the goods from his possession by a mere
stranger, claiming no right under the general owner or the
officer, is a question which does not appear to be very well
settled in this country. The cases cited upon the argument show that different opinions prevail in the states of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New
York on this subject; and the same difference of opinion
appears to have existed in England at a former period.
The case referred to by Sir William Jones from the year
books, 21 Hen. 7. 14 b., appears to be one in which an aotion of replevin was sustained by such a bailee, for the taking of the goods out of his possession; but Mr. Justice
Stoby in his learned commentary upon the law of bailments supposes that the case in the year books was either
misreported, or that it was overruled by the case oi Eartop
He
V. Eoare, 3 Atk. Bep. 39, and other English cases.
therefore arrives at the conclusion that the d-^ctrine generally maintained by the better authorities is that a depositary has no property whatever in the deposit, but a
am
Story on Bail. 72. Sec. 93. * * *
custody only.
*
*
*
inclined to think, however,
that the receiptor who
has become answerable to the officer for the absolute return of the goods seized on execution, has such an interest
therein as to enable him to protect his possession against
a mere wrong-doer, by any of the usual remedies allowed to

I
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a possessor of goods having a special property therein,
so long as the receiptor actually retains that possession
himself. But if he suffers the goods to remain in the hands
of the general owner, or redelivers them to him to be kept,

resort to an action of replevin, which requires
possession as weU as property to sustain it. I can imagine
a case in which two distinct parties may each have a special interest in goods which belong to a third person as the
general owner. Where the actual possession, however, is
in such general owner, I cannot conceive of a case in which
the law would give a constructive possession to two other
distinct parties at the same instant, so as to authorize both
to bring separate actions of replevin at the same time, for
If the actual posa violation of their several possessions.
session is in the judgment debtor, the general owner, the
constructive possession at the time of taking the goods
from him must be either in the receiptor or in the oflScer,
* *
but cannot be separately in each. *
As property seized upon execution is in the custody of
the law until it is sold, or the execution is otherwise satisfied, the officer cannot legally do any act which shall have
the effect to divest him of the constructive possession
thereof and the right to reduce it into his immediate possession, so that if a second execution is put iato his hands
no new levy is necessary to give the creditor an immediate
lien upon the property. In the present case, therefore, as
the second execution was levied upon the property in the
actual possession of Jacob Coon, the general owner, and the
constructive possession was in the officer who had levied
upon it by virtue of the first execution. Miller, the receiptor, had not such a possession, coupled with his special
interest in the preservation of the property, as to authorize
him to bring an action of replevin, and thus to defeat the
lien of the last execution. If he sustained any injury by
the second levy, or was likely to sustain any on account of
his liability upon the receipt; he might either have brought
an action of replevin in the name of the officer who had
the constructive possession, or an acEon upon the case in
his own name. So that in one way or the other, his rights
would have been fully protected without defeating the
rights of the junior creditor as to the surplus, if any there
he cannot

should be.

*

*

*
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I

think the plaintiff in the present case was
properly nonsuited upon the trial; and that the judgment
should therefore be affirmed.
By Senator Maison. • • •

It was objected on the argument, that the horses being
taken from Jacob Coon's possession, they were not taken
from the possession of the receiptor, and so the receiptor
could not maintain replevin. The evidence is, that Coon
kept the horses for the receiptor, who had a right to take
them away when he pleased. They were constructively in
possession of the receiptor, and such constructive possession is sufficient to maintain trespass or replevin. Burrows
V. Stoddard, 3 Conn. Eep. 160. Clark v. Skinner, 20 Johns.
R. 469. Notwithstanding the horses were in the possession
of Coon, they were still in the custody of the law, Hartwell
V. Bissel, 17 Johns. E. 128; they were in the legal posses•
•
sion of the receiptor. •
In

the affirmative

—the President of

the Senate, and Sen-

ators Armstrong, J. Beardsley, Beckwith, Downing, Fox,
Griffin, J. P. Jones, Lacey, Lawyer, Loomis, Lounsberry,
Mack, Maison, Powers, Spraker. — 16.
In the negative — The Chancellor, and Senators Hunter,
Gansevoort, Tracy, Wager, Willes. — 6.^*

32.
EiOHT Need not be Good Against the World. "To entitle him [the
plaintiflf] to the possession, it is not necessary that he should be the owner,
or that he should be entitled to the possession as against all others. It is
sufficient if he is entitled to the possession as against the person who takes
it from him": Sprague v. Clark (1868) 41 Vt. 10.
The right to possession must be a legal right; an equitable right is not
Fisher v. Alston (1904) 186 Mass. 549.
sufficient:
"Eeplevin lies for such a taking as will sustain an action of trespass de
bonis asportatis":
Chapman v. Andrews (1829) 3 Wend. (N. T.) 242.

Eeplevin a Possbssoky Action.

"That replevin
merely is obvious

is a remedy designed to protect the right of possession
from the fact that a possessory right only is sufficient to
maintain it. Thus if the beasts of another are agisting upon my land and
shall have replevin against a stranger who taies them. Hence
manuring it,
also it follows that in any ease the baUee may sue in replevin against one who
seizes the chattels out of his possession.
"It was, indeed, customary in ancient times to say that it is necessary for
the plaintifE in the replevin to have property in the goods sought to be
replevied, and cases where the bailee maintained replevin were explained by
saying that the bailee has a special property which wUl sustain the writ. But
in truth, what the older writers call a special property is nothing more than
the right of possession, and this is all that is necessary to support replevin
when the property has been in the first instance wrongfully taken from the
Accordingly, 'ownership cannot b« tried on this writ' The
person suing.
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replevin writ in tenns commands the sherifif to replevy the goods of the
plaintiff which have been taken and unlawfully detained by the defendant.
It confers no authority on the sheriff to deliver to the plaintiff any
goods belonging to the defendant.
Neither does it confer on the sheriff
any jurisdiction to try a controverted question of title. Hence when the
defendant asserted ownership of the property which was sought to be replevied, the sheriff's power terminated
and the replevin
was thereby

blocked.

•

•

•

"The

recognition of the general principle that the defendant could defeat
the action merely by claiming ownership and without proof certainly rendered
the action of replevin a little hazardous.
In the latter part of the fourteenth
century, the difficulty was largely removed by the invention of the writ for
the trial of property
This writ authorized the
probanda).
{de propriete
immediate trial of the right of property, and the fate of the replevin suit was
•
•
»
made to depend upon the' result.
"The writ de propriete, it will be observed, could be had only at the
instance of one named as a party in the writ of replevin.
Consequently if
the beasts of a stranger are taken in replevin, he cannot have a writ for the
trial of the property.
Street on Foundations of Legal Liability, 213.
^
Beplevm does not lie to determine an adverse claim to property in plaintiff's possession. "The action of replevin (under our statute at least) is
peculiarly a possessory action; and its primary object is to enable the plaintiff
to obtain the actual
wrongfully detained from
possession of property
•
* Why
•
him by the defendant at the time the action is brought.
bring
the action to obtain the possession, if the plaintiff has it already without
suit f A mere claim to the right of possession by another can not give the
right to maintain replevin, while the plaintiff has the possession in fact. An
action of replevin is not in the nature of a bill quia timet." — ^Hickey v.
Hinsdale (1863) 12 Mich. 99.

"3

Both Paeties Actors in Ebplevin.

"In

this action of replevin, differently from all other actions at comBoth are plaintiffs and both are demon law, both parties are actors.
This is the logical result of the fact that under the peculiar
fendants.
operation of this action there is practically a recovery by the original plaintLff, when he files his declaration, affidavit and undertaking, as required by
the statute, and thereupon sues out his writ. For thereafter it is incumbent
upon him only to prove his title to the property in controversy, and upon
proof of such title satisfactory to the jury, he recovers only a nominal
judgment, that is, for costs and usually nominal damages, for in the possession of the property he has already the substantial fruits of judgment;
while upon the defendant it is incumbent not only to overcome the plaintiff's
claim of title, but likewise to prove the valup of the property and his own
right to have it returned to him; and the judgment, if he succeeds, is not
such a judgment as would be rendered in other cases — a judgment merely
that he go without day and recover his costs —but a substantial judgment
for the recovery of the property, for the value of it if it has been eloigned,
and for damages for the unlawful seizure. In fact, it may be said that
ordinarily in the action of replevin the only substantial judgment is that
which is authorized to be rendered for the defendant in the event that he
prevails in the suit.
is very evident, therefore, that in this suit the defendant is greatly
* * • It is not competent
more the actor than is the original plaintiff.
for the plaintiff, in an action of replevin, as it is in other actions, to discontinue or dismiss his suit or voluntarily to withdraw from it, without the
consent of the defendant, after the property has been delivered to him
under the writ, unless he returns the property taken or makes good to the
And this is for the
defendant the loss sustained by him by the taking.
reason that, after the property has been seized and delivered to the plaintiff, the defendant becomes the virtual plaintiff in the case. This is elementary
Jones v. Coneannon, 3 T. E.
law; and it is the natural dictate of justice.
661; Barrett v. Forrester, 1 Johns. Cases, 247." — Oorbett v. Pond (1897)
10 App. Cas. D.
17.
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1861,

New Hampshire, 37.

This was an action of detinue, brouglit to recover

a honse
and barn alleged to be tbe property of the plaintiff, and situated on the land of the defendant, in Farmington, in said
county, all of which is fully set forth in the plaintiff's

declaration, which is as follows:
"In a plea of detinue for that whereas the plaintiff heretofore, to wit, on the first day of July, 1856, at Farmington
aforesaid, was lawfully possessed of a certain house and a
certain bam, both situated on the land of the said Daniel
Dame, being the house built by the plaintiff in the year
1842, said house being about thirty-six feet long and about
twenty-six feet wide, and of the value of $200, situated between the house of Eleazer Eand and the house now owned
by Benjamin Chesley, on the left hand side of the road
leading from the Bay road, so called, to the Ten Rod road,
so called, as one goes toward the Ten Eod road, as of his
own house and barn, and being so possessed, the said plaintiff afterwards, to wit, on the third day of July, 1856, casually lost the same out of his possession, which thereafterward, to wit, on the same day, came into the hands and possession of the said Daniel Dame, by finding ; and the plaintiff further saith, that although the said Daniel Dame well
knew that the said house and barn were the proper house
and barn of the plaintiff, and although requested by the
said plaintiff, to wit, at said Farmington, on the nineteenth
day of May, 1860, to deliver the same to the plaintiff, yet
the said Daniel Dame hath not delivered up the said house
and bam to the plaintiff, but wholly refuses so to do, and
stm unlawfully detains the same."
To this declaration the defendant filed a general demurrer, and the pllaintiff joined ia demurrer; and the question of law was reserved.
Sargent, J.: The only question here raised is whether
It is
in this State an action of detinue can be maintained.
c. L. p.

6
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claimed by tlie defendant that this form of action was never
introduced into this State, or if it ever has been used or authorized here, that it has from recent entire disuse become
obsolete so that it can not now be maintained.
This action was early held to be an appropriate remedy
in a certain class of cases. It would seem that the original
distinction between replevin and detinue was very similar
to that between trespass and trover. Trespass de bonis
asportatis was brought, not to recover the identical thing
taken, but damages for the illegal taking and loss of the
same, when such taking was unjust and tmlawful, while
trover was brought for the unjust detention and conversion of property where the original taking was lawful and

proper.
So replevin was originally brought to recover the possession of a chattel in specie when the original taking was
wrongful, and detinue to recover the article in specie when
3 Black. Com. 144-152.
the original taking was lawful.
Hence we find that the form of the declaration in trover
and detinue are similar, it being alleged in both that the
property came to the hands and possession of the defendant by finding.
To be sure Blackstone says that replevin
can be maintained only in one instance of an unlawful tak3 Black. Com.
ing, to wit, that of an unlawful distress.
145. However, this may have been in early times, when
personal property was of but small consequence, and when
legal remedies were mainly if not solely sought to acquire
possession of real estate, or to enforce some right connected therewith, or to collect the rents chargeable there-"
on, yet in modem times it is held that the law is otherwise,
and numerous authorities of the greatest weight lay it
down that this action lies in all cases of illegal taking.
Chitty says, by replevin the owner of goods unjustly
taken and detained from him, may recover possession thereof. It is principally used in cases of distress, but it seems
that it may be brought in any case where the owner has
goods taken from him by another. 1 Chit. PI. 162. And
again, "It has been said that replevin lies only in one instance of an unlawful taking: namely, that of an unlawful distress of cattle, damage feasant, or of chattels for
rent in arrears ; but as before observed, it appears that this
action is not thus limited, and if goods be taken illegally,
though not as a distress, replevin may be supported."
1
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Chit. PI. 164, and authorities cited. 2 Saund. PI. & Ev.
760; 2 Wheat. Selw. N. P. 1194. Keplevin was generally a
coextensive remedy with trespass de bonis asportatis.
Pangburn v. Patridge, 7 Johns. 143, and authorities cited.
Thompson v. Button, 14 Johns. 87.
There is one exception stated by Blackstone (vol. 3, 151),
where he says, "If distrain another's cattle damage feas-

I

ant, and before they are impounded he tenders me sufficient amends, now, though the original taking was lawful,
my subsequent detainment of them, after tender of amends,
is wrongful, and he shall have an action of replevin against
me to recover them," • * •
With this single exception the common-law rule is believed to be uniform that repleviii does not lie unless the
original takiag was unlawful in fact, or made so in law
by relation, xmder such circumstances as would have made
the taking a trespass ab initio. Our statute makes other
exceptions.
Kimball v. Adams, 3 N. H. 182. To sustain
these views, see, in addition, Com. Dig., Eeplevin, A; Buller's N. P. 52; 3 Wooddeson's Lectures, 219; 2 Eolle's
Abr, 441; Lord Eedesdale in Ex parte Mason, 1 Sch. &
Lef. 322, note; and also in Ex parte GhoAnberlain, 1 Sch.
& Lef. 322 ; and in Shannon v. Shannon, 1 Sch, & Lef. 324 ; 7
Johns. 140; Story's PL 422, note; Osgood v. Green, 30 N.
H. 210; Gardner v. Campbell, 15 Johns. 401.
But we find in different States that these actions have
been generally regulated by statute and made to apply often
to very different uses and purposes from those for which
To be sure we find in all
they were originally designed.
the States, perhaps, the actions of trespass and trover
.retained, trover being generally extended in practice, so
as to cover all cases of wrongful detention and conversion,
without regard to the fact as to whether the original taking were legal or illegal ; but we find that the actions of replevin and detinue have met with very unequal favor in
the different States.
In Massachusetts, it has been held that replevin may be
maintained in all cases of wrongful detention of the plaintiff's goods, although the original taking may have been
justifiable. Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359; Baker v.
Fales, 16 Mass. 147; Marston v. Baldwin, 17 Mass. 606;
and in that State, too, it is held that detinue is obsolete.
Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 154; Colby's Prac, and Howes'
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in Massachusetts,

so
been
upon the conunon law, have

is

it it

it
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it if
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is
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is

it,
is

as they claim to rest
often
and so seriously questioned, and are opposed by
BO
such an overwhelming weight of authority, both English and
American, that they may well be considered as having very
little weight upon the question. See argument of Webster
and Metcalf, in Baker v. Fales (page 148), and authorities
cited; and, also the numerous notes by the editor, and authorities cited upon this case of Baker v. Fales, in the recent editions of Massachusetts Eeports; and particularly,
note 23, upon the action of detinue. See, also, Wheat. Selw.
N. P. 1194, and note and authorities.
But it is said that these decisions in Massachusetts are
authorized by their statute ; and if that were so, they would
stand well enough, whether they accord with the common
*
*
law or not. *
Judge Story also seems to doubt whether th'ese decisions ,
Ln Massachusetts can stand even upon the statute of that
State, and he does not hesitate to pronounce their doctrines
as innovations upon the common law (Story's PI. 442,
Qote), where, in speaking of the doctrine that replevin may
be maintained for goods unlawfully det3,ined, although there
may have been no tortious taking, he says, "this innovation
on the common law, whether attributable to the statute or
to the construction given to
to be regretted.
The
altered. It is no longer an unlawful
gist of the action
but
an
nolawful
detention. The general issue, non
taking,
can hardly be overruled as a good plea in
cepit, though
no
replevin, has ceased to be a logical defense; indeed
more to the purpose than nil debet, in assumpsit. It unsettles former decisions, unless some exceptions are set up
without any other reason than a desire to avoid overruling former cases. Thus,
was formerly held that replevin would not lie on
bailment by the plaintiff; but
replevin will lie in all oases of unlawful detention, then
may be maintained in many cases of bailment; and, lastly,
has destroyed the analogy between the actions of trespass
and replevin, where
existed before."
In Pennsylvania, was decided at an early day that replevin would lie wherever one man claimed goods ia the
possession of another, no matter how the possession was
acquired. But in that State the action of replevin
authorized and regulated only by statute. Wallace v. Law-
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And the law continnes the same.
Stmghton v. RappcUo, 3 S. & E. 562 ; Keite v. Boyd, 16 S.
& E. 300. There could of course be little necessity for the
action of detinue in that case.
In Virginia, it has been held that at common law, replevin lay in all cases where goods were unlawfully taken.
And this was the law in that State till 1823, when an act
of the legislature confined the writ to the case of distress
for rent. Vaiden v. BeU, 3 Eandolph, 448. In that State
we find the action of detinue in very common use, as it is
believed to be in all the southern and some of the western
remtce,

1

Dall.

157.

States.

In

New York, previous to their Eevised Statutes, they
adhered strictly to the common-law distinction between replevin and detinue and both actions were used. See 7
Johns. 140; 10 Johns. 373; 14 Johns. 87, and 15 Johns.
402, before cited, which were cases of replevin; and Todd
V. CrooJcshanks, 3 Johns. 432, which was detinue.
But by
their Eevised Statutes (vol. 2, 553), the action of detinue
was abolished, and the action of replevin was made,, by
express provision of law, to cover the same ground, or
nearly so, that detinue had before covered.
But in North Carolina, on the other hand, it is held that
detinue lies in every case in which the property is wrongfully detained, without regard to the flianner in which the
Johnson v. Preston, Camdefendant acquired possession.
464,
eron & Norwood,
It is said ia 3 Black. Com. 151, that there is one disadvantage which attends this action (detinue) : namely, that
the defendant is herein permitted to wage his law, that is,
to exculpate himself by oath, and thereby defeat the plaintiff in his remedy, and that for this reason the action itself is much disused, and has given place to the action of
trover. See, also, Bac. Abr., Detinue. But the 3 and 4 Wm.
IV, ch. 42, sec. 13, abolished the wage of law in all cases ;
since which, this action has been much in use in England,
and is said to be a very advantageous remedy, especially
where it is material to embrace in the same action with a
count in detiaue, another count in debt, for a money de1 Chit. PI. 121 and 125.
mand as due upon a contract.
It does not seem to be clearly settled upon authority,
whether the action of detinue should be confined to those
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oases where the possession was at first rightful, and only
the detention wrongful, or whether that remedy, like trover,
should be extended to all cases where the detention is wrong-

ful, without rgard to the quality of the original possession. The earlier authorities all favor the former view.
Lord Coke says, ' ' that detinue lyeth where any man comes
Coke Litt. 286, b.
to goods either by delivery or finding."
Blackstone lays down this rule, that in order to maintain
detinue the first point to be proved is, that the defendant
came lawfully into possession of the goods, as either by
delivery to him or by finding them. 3 Bl. Com. 151. Bac.
Ab., Detinue; Wheat. Selw. N. P. 665.
But it is said by Chitty (1 Chit. PI. 123) that it is a
common doctrine in the books, that this action can not be
supported if the defendant took the goods tortiously; but
he pronounces the reasoning upon which that opinion is
founded as fallacious, and holds that it may be maintained
in any case where the detention was wrongful, without regard to the manner in which the defendant acquired possession. And whUe there would seem to be no good reason
for enlarging the remedy by replevin, any more than there
is that of trespass de bonis; yet it may well admit of a
quaere whether, as a matter of convenience in practice, and
not inconsistently with principle, the action of detinue
should not be so far enlarged beyond its original limits, as
to keep pace with its kindred action of trover.
is alleged that detinue has never been used or authorized in this State, and that replevin, trespass, and
trover, afford ample remedies for all cases and classes of
injuries. But trespass and trover are no substitute for detinue, for they only give damages for the goods taken or converted, without giving the party any chance to recover the
In regard to replevin, we understand
chattel m specie.
that the common law is in force here, and that this action
only lies in case of a wrongful taking in fact, or by intendment of law with the single common-law exception of
cases of cattle taken damage feasant, when amends are

Jt

tendered before impounding, and other exceptions made by
our statute in case of animals impounded, where it is held
that it lies for a wrongful detention as well as a wrongful
•
* *
taking.
In accordance with these views is the form of the writ
prescribed by law in tiie action of replevin (Rev. Stat.,
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ch. 182, sec. 14; Comp. Laws 464), commanding tlie sheriff
to replevy the goods belonging to A. P., of, etc., "wrongfully taken and detained," as it is said, etc. It would seem
that this form embraces the common law, as nearly as may
be, as stated in the English cases, replevin there being
held to be the proper remedy in cases where property has
been wrongfully taken and detained, whether as a distress

or in any other way.

Eeplevin then does not encroach upon the common-law
ground of detinue, but leaves all that ground for the application of that remedy. It is only when replevin is carried beyond the conamon-law limit, as in Massachusetts, by
the court, and as it is in some States, as in New York, by
statute, that it can be said at aU to supersede the necessity
of detinue as a remedy where the original taking was la!wful, and it is desired to recover the thing detained, in specie.
Nor do we find our statutes silent concerning the action

of detinue.

*

*

*

It would seem that detinue was a remedy as fully recognized by our laws, and provided for as specifically as any
of the other forms of personal actions. Nor is its place
superseded by any other form of action.
There are also
and
sufficient reasons when it should be used, even if
good
it were a concurrent remedy with replevin. In the latter,
the plaintiff resumes the property in the first instance, and
if he does not prevail, he must pay the defendant the value
of the property, as by our practice there is no judgment for
a return.
Bell v. Bartlett, 7 N. H. 188. But in detinue,
though the claim be to recover the specific chattel, yet it is
not taken from the hands of the defendant till the right is
determined, and the plaintiff takes his property on his
execution. No bonds are required.
Detinue may also be joined with debt in the same declaration, which, in a large class of cases, is a decided advantage. It may also be brought for several articles, part of
which are in existence, and can be recovered, and a part of
which may have been converted, conveyed away, or destroyed; as the judgment in detinue is in the alternative,
first, that the plaintiff do recover the goods in question
specifically; or, secondly, if the plaintiff can not have the
goods, that he recover the value thereof, and his damages

for the detention.
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The jury must therefore find the value not only of aU
the goods in the aggregate, but of each article separately,
so that the plaintiff may have all that can be found of his
property in specie, and for the balance, whatever it may
prove to be, he may recover his damages, and this all in
one suit and by a single judgment and execution. 1 Wheat.
Selw. N. P. 667 ; Saund. PI. and Ev., ante.
The difference in the course of proceedings, in the two
cases (replevin and detinue), results naturally from the different injuries for the redress of which tiiese remedies
were invented. Where the taking was illegal and wrongful, the redress was by replevin, in which the possession
of the property was immediately returned to the party from
whom it had been thus wrongfully taken; and the parties
were then left to determine their several rights. But where
the possession was legally and rightfully obtained, as by
a bailment, or a finding, but the further detention was
claimed to be wrongful, the plaintiff was not allowed to
take the property in any summary manner from the hands
of the defendant, to whom, perhaps, he had himself committed it; but he must first try his title and establish his
right, and if he proved the detention to be wrongful, he
then recovered his goods.
We think, then, that there are sufficient grounds, both
upon the statute and upon authority and reason, as well
as convenience, for holding that detinue in this State can
be maintained.

The demurrer is overruled.

Section

7.

Ejectment."

JACKSON, EX DEM. LOUX

v.

Supreme Court of New York.
9

1812.

Johnson, 298.

This was an action of,£Jjgctment,
_sjp,iL

BUEL.

to recover the posses-

of part, of lot number ninety-four, in the township of

33.
Declakation in Ejectment.
"Eiehard Roe was attached to answer
John Doe of a plea, wherefore he the said Richard Eoe, with force and
arms, etc., entered into the manor of
, in the county of
, with the
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Ulysses.
The cause was tried at the Seneca circuit, in
June, 1812, before Mr. Justice Spbncee.
The plaintiff produced in evidence a patent tpJSendrick
{jOux, one of the lessors, date d_the_8 th of July, 1790, for
alsoa ^deedlf m- the
^e whole. ^f^ lot.. jiumhfiX^mneix^^
Jeremiah
Van Eensselaer, to whom it had
Bam^JotXrom
"Been awarded, to Eobert M 'Dowel, dated the 24th'of April,
JTZ22rriSPDowel was dead, and "the other lessors were,,hi^„,
"heirs at 1^.
The defendan t gave in evidence a^deed, dated the 30th of

for ten acres,
^A^iljJ.797, from^'Dpwd^to^^
part of the lot number ninety-four, containing a reservation
in the words following, to wit, "Excepting and reserving
to the said Robert M 'Dowel, his heirs and assigns, for ever,
the right and privilege, without any fee or reward, of erect_mg_and.buiWmg a dam on the back of the creek, near or at

the place where "tEe~eagtline ofTEe' above graSIed premises
crosses said creek, along the west bank of said creek, about
twenty rods, or near where the miU-seat is, to occupy and
possess the aforesaid premises, without any let, hindrance
or molestation from the said party of the second part, his
aforesaid, which is not expired, and ejected him the eaid John Doe, out of
his said farm, and other wrongs to the said John Doe then and there did,
to the great damap^e of the said John Doe, and against the peace of our
said lord the king; wherefore the said John Doe saith that he is injured, and
hath sustained damage to the value of 50 I. and therefore he brings his suit,
rights, members and appurtenances thereunto belonging, which A B (this is to
be the person who is the real plaintiff, and who had the legal estate and
the right of possession at the time of the supposed demise) had demised
to the said John Doe, for a term which is not yet expired, and ejected him
from his said farm; and other wrongs to the said John Doe, then did, to
the great damage of the said John Doe, and against the peace of our lord
the now Idng, etc.— and thereupon the said John Doe, by B. i? his attorney,
day of
complains, that whereas the said A B on the
(care must
be taken to insert some day after the lessor's right of entry commenced) in
year of the reign of our said lord the king, at the parish aforesaid,
the
in the county aforesaid, had demised the said tenements, with the appurtenances
to the said John Doe, to have, and to hold the same to the said John Doe,
day
and his assigns, from the
(this is usually the day before that
year aforesaid, for, and during, and unto the
of the demise) in the
full end and term of —r- (it is usual to insert seven years if the demise be
recent, but a sufllcient number of years should be inserted so as certainly
to extend beyond the time when final judgment may be obtained) years, from
— By virtue of
thence next ensuing, and fully to be completed and ended.
which said demise, the said John Doe entered into the said tenements, with the
appurtenances, and became and was thereof possessed, for the said term, so
And the said John Doe, being so
to him thereof granted, as aforesaid.
day
thereof possessed, the said Biehard Boe, afterwards, to wit, on the
been
after
the
have
to
be
stated
should
or
ouster
ejectment
of
(the
year aforesaid, with force
commencement of the supposed demise) in the
and arms, etc, entered into the said tenements, with the appurtenances, in
\

v
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heirs or assigns, agreeably to the express condition conThe deed
tained in the foregoing clause and reservation."
of John Smith to the defendant, for the said ten acres of
land was also read in evidence. It was proved that the ^e^^
fendant was in possession of the whole ten acres, and that
"the delendiSrTaifflS'am' extehdedT twenty rfour^linKs on_ the
land of lEeTessbrs of the plaintiff. In 1811, Pelton, one of
the lessors, req uested the defendant t o let him ent e r on the
"premilel^nd bnild a dam on the creek, according to the
reservation in M 'Dowel's deed to Smith, which was refused
by the jief endant. A verdict was taken"" for' the plaintiff ,
subject to the opinion of the court. And the que§ ;tion was,
.j^hjettier,jjnder the j'ud^ent, poss ession c ould be taken of _
the,4irfiiQis£S.xeserved in. the'^eeH3rQmlMiESSCS..&aiJth,
or only of the premises in th e possession o f the defendant,
"^n^" hSt
inciud[^Tn"^ffie ten acres.
"
Ter^Cueiam. The lessor of ^he plaintiff is entitled to
recover the possession of the defendant, extending beyond
the ten acres. This is admitted by the case; but the great
point is, wl]^ther the right reserved in the deed oi^ erecting
John Doe was so interested, in manner, and for the term
foot of the declaration, a notice to appear must be subscribed

the said

which

etc.
(At the
as follows:)

"Mr.

C I) [The tenant in actual possession.]
am informed that you are in possession of, or claim title to, the
premises in this declaration of ejectment mentioned, or to some part thereof,
and
being sued in this action as a casual ejector only, and having no
term, in his
claim or title to the same, do advise you to appear in next
majesty's court of king's bench, wheresoever, etc., by some attorney of that
court, and then and there, by rule of the same court, to cause yourself to
shall suffer judgment therein to
be made defendant in my stead, otherwise,
be entered against me by default, and you will be turned out of possession.
.
, A. D.
day of
Dated this

"I

I

I

"Tours,

etc.,

"EiOHARD Bob."

Pleading, 394-397.
in this declaration are largely fietitioas.
As said by Lord
Mansfield in Fairclaim v. Shamtitle (1762) 3 Burr. 1294, "An ejectment is
In form,
an ingenious fiction, for the trial of titles to the possession of land.
it is a trick between two, to dispossess a third by a sham suit and judgment.
The artifice would be criminal, unless the court converted it into a fair trial
with the proper party."
The occasion for the development of this fictitious form of action was the
The ancient methoda
lack of a satisfactory, direct method of trying titles.
and
were formal, cumbersome, costly and slow. .In the reigns of Edward
a new writ was invented called ejectione firmae (ejectment from
Edward
the farm), in the nature of a writ of trespass, which, through later development, gave a termor a remedy against any person who ousted him, from his
term, by a judgment to recover the term and a writ of possession thereupon.
This was a rapid and summary remedy. And it involved the title of the
termor, for to prove his right the lessee had to establish the title of his lessor.
Now if the existence of a term made the determination of title x>OBsible
2

Chitty

on

The allegations

III

II
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ar building a dam on the^bank

of the creek at the place
specified, be sucE an Interest as that
an^eclffiSSTl^ffl^le
for. it. -The exceptionTurtlier states that the granfor, etc.,
is to occupy and possess the aforesaid premises without
any let, etc. It is evident that an interest in the soil was
reservei^t Jthfi-^y-fin-place, not only for erecting the 4ajn,
but for occupying an d possessing it. There can be no doubt
but that this interest would be considered a tenement, within the decisions under the English settlement law; for it
has been held that a right of pasturag e, of a dairy, of a
rabbit wa rren, and of ajfisherj;, ^rried, such an'mterest in
Ihe langr as~Io . create- a -tenemeni. (1 Term Eep. 358, 2
Term Kep. 451, 3 Term Rep. 772, 4 Term Eep. 671.) In
one of the cases, Ashhuest, J. said that a fishery was a tenement, and recoverable in ejectment; and in another of
them Lord Kekyon held that a praecipe would lie for a
free warren, though the party has no further interest in
the land than to enter and use the animals ; and if a praecipe
will lie a fortiori an ejectment, which requires much less
certainty, will lie. In Mellington v. GoodUttle (And. 106)
it was decided in error, that an ejectment would lie for a
beast or cattlegate which was a right of common for a
beast; and in that case the court admitted that an ejectment
this simple and direct action, it soon occurred to the ingenioua
of that day that they might make a term to order for the sole purAccordingly, if
pose of using it as a basis of trying the title to the land.
A claimed title to a tenement which was in the possession of B, all A, the
claimant, had to do was to lease it to C, hare C ejected by B, the occupant,
and then have C resort to this acti on of eie ctione firmae to recover his term.
C proved his title to the term by showing "A 's title to the land, and if C
The action
recovered the term A'b title to the land was thereby established.
was wholly in A's interest, and after it was over C merely dropped out of
through
lawyers

sight.
A and C entered upon the land and A
The method employed was simple.
then and there sealed and delivered the lease to G. A then departed, leaving
The right of
C upon the land until the occupant should find and eject him.
But this method involved trouble with the occuaction was then complete.
A brought two friends with him, one
pant, which resulted in an innovation.
to receive the lease and the other to do the ejecting, so that the action was
a feigned controversy between A's two friends. The friend who received the
lease was plaintiff, and the other friend, called the casual ejector, became
Naturally the casual ejector, being a mere agent of
defendant in the action.
A, would suffer default,- which enabled C to obtain a judgment establiflhilig
A'b right to the land without giving the real occupant amy opportunity to
defend his own title. Accordingly, tl e courts refused to try these actions
unless notice was given to the occupant, as shewn in the form above quoted

from Chitty.
In this proceeding the lessee and the casual ejector were real persons. But
later Lord Chief Justice Eollb simplified the procedure by allowing them to
became fictitious. John Doe, plaintiff, a fictitious person, alleges a ficti*ion«
leaae «f the land to himself from the real adverse claimant, a fictitious entry
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would lie for a common appurtenant.
^TTienever a right
tandljE*.
ofjentry exists , and the in ter est is
sp itiaLiiiQaafl^

d^eUverg4*„M.figgMMLmll ^m aiilsu^„an m,.^lon canjie
-^^teresTwaTreserved by the deed in question.
The lessor oi the plaintiir is, accordingly, entiued to re^
cover, as well the premises reserved, as the other land
encroached upon by the defendant.**
by himself, and a fictitious ouster during the term hj Richard Roe, the defendant, another fictitious person. A notice is then delivered to the real
occupant in possession purporting to come from Richard Roe, adyisiug the
occupant to appear and defend the action.
The occupant is permitted hj the
court to defend on condition that he will admit the fictitious allegations of
This leaves as the only issue to be tried, the right
lease, entry and ouster.
of the adverse claimant to make a lease. The adverse claimant and the
occupant thus try out the question of the former's right to make a valid
lease of the premises, and so the title is determined.
The parties to the
action were the two fictitious persons, and they were given any names the
pleader chose, as Doe and Roe, (Burr. 1996) Holdfast and Thrustout,
(6 T.
R. 223), Peaceable and Troublesome,
(Barn. 172), Fairelaim and Shamtitle, (Burr. 1290).
The cases were entitled so as to designate the true
parties, as Doe on the demise of Bromfield v. Smith (6 East 530) which
might be contracted to read Doe ex dem. Bromfield v. Smith; or it might
read Doe ex dem, Bromfield v. Roe, not indicating the real defendant.
See Adams on Ejectment, 1-16; Perry on Common Law Pleading, 93-99.
34.
But where a lease granted the privilege ' ' of putting a carding
machine at the mills of John Van Den Bergh, ' ' and "to fix the machine at
the wheel or shaft now built for a pulling-mUl at the place aforesaid ' ' and ' ' to
build a shop for a carding machine," but the exact location had not been
fixed and could not be described by metes and bounds, ejectment was held not
to Ue, for the sheriff could not deliver possession. —Jackson v. May (1819)
16

John*. (N. Y.)

184.

COLSTON

V.

McVAY.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
1

A. K. Marshall,

1818

251.

The Chiep Justice delivered the opinion of the court
The only question in this case is, can the defendant^ in
an action of ejectment, defea t the re cS:g^ of ..the plaiaBST"^
JiX-s howing a grant from" the comm onwealth to a stranger,~~
elder than~that under ^^
the plaintiffde^^TEeTessoFof
~.~
—
rives ti tle?
The court" below decided the question in the affirmative ;
and we have no hesitation in affirming the decision to be
correct. ThaLthere cannot, at. the -sam*. time, -be --two-iir^^

— —
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„5°t2E§-advgrse righits„Qf enfaxJO-the sam e land, is a pmno_jltum_HdiiGh.. is -intuitively evident, and -whicli neither admits nor requires proof to support it; and it is a point no
less incontrovertible, l^at the elder grant transfaTR tn thp
grantee a right ofjgcitij.
If, therefore, there be a grant
to a stranger, elder ttian that under which the lessor of
the plaintiff derives title, it results, as an inevitable consequence, that he cannot have a right of en.iry, and„mthaat
_ a right of entry ,nEe"caimbT recover .Ht.jmjactiQn of ejectjEnest,. Whether the defendant holds under the elder grant
«. or noti can. niake- no difference,
for.it is a settled- doctrine
that the lessor of the p laintiff in eie_ctment must recover
on the strengt h of his own title, and not on iftyg-weakness of
his adversary 's.°'

35.
Posseision is prima facie evidence of the right of property, so that
a defendant in possession has a prima facie title, which can be overcome only
by some higher title. This may consist of a valid documentary chain of title
from the government, or it may consist of mere prior possession, for as against
a mere possessor, prior peaceable possession is better evidence of title and
therefore a good title.— Doe v. West (1821) 1 Blackf. (tnd.) 133.

PEESIDENT, RECORDER AND TRUSTEES OF THE
CITY OF CINCINNATI v. LESSEE OF
EDWARD WHITE.
Supreme Court of the United States.
6

1832.

Peters, 431.

Mr. Justice THOMPsojr delivered the opinion of the court.
The ejectment in this case was brought by Edward White,
who is also the defendant in error, to recover possession
of a small lot of ground in the dty of Cincinnati, lying in
that part of the city usually denominated the Common. To
a right understanding of the question upon which the opinion of the court rests, it wiU be stiffident to state generally,
that on the 15th of October in the year IZSS, John Cleyes
Symmes e ntered into a contract with the then board,of_
treasury rundertEe direSSonloFcbngress, for the purchase
of a large tract of land, then a wilderness, including that
where the city of Cincinnati now stands. Some negotiations
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relative to the payments for the land delayed the consummation of the contract for several years. But on the 30th
of September, JL794, a patent was issued conveyiny to
Symmes and his associates^- the l and contracted fo r; and
as Symmes was the only person named in the patent, Jilig.
.ifi g. was of course vested in him. ___
Before the issuing of the patent, however, and, as the
witnesses say, in the year 1788, Mathias Penman purchased
_Qf Svmmes a p art of the tract included jn^ttejpatent, and^
That
embracing the ianxj-seherfecm Cincinnati jiow stauj^s.
in the same year, Denman sold, one- third of his purchase
to Israel Ludlow, and one-t hird.to : Robert Patterson. These
Three persons, Denman, Ludlow and Patterson, being the
equitable own^s of the land iimJ£^J»JaJafeJiaafl^.iiafiU.
granted},^proceeded in January, 1789 ,^_to lay out the town.
""A plan was made and approved of "By all the proprietors;
and according to which the ground lying between Front
street and the river, and so located a s to include the premises in question, was set apart as a^common, for the use
lind benefit of the town' for e ver, reserving only the right
of a fei x3^;_ajid_no Jotsjggre^laid ouFbhThe^ land thus"
ded"
icated as a common, „„^

—

-—

plain tiff made title to the premises in
* * *
In March, ^1795,
question undCT_Matiiias Denman.
his
was
an equitable
only
DgjUaaaJLCOnveyed
interestTwhich
interest in the lands so located to Joel Williams ; and on
the 14th of February, JSOO,^ John Cleves Svuinie s conveyed
lo Joel Williams in fee, certain lands described m the deed
which included the premises in question; and on the 16th
of April^^ 1800, Joel Williams co nveyed to John Daily the
lot now in question. And the less or of tJie plaintiff^ by
sundry mesne conveyances, deduces a title to me jpremises""
^■The-.IeB5.QiLof _the

to himself.

And it is very satisfactorily proved, that Joel Williams,
from whom the lessor of the plaintiff deduces his title, well,
understood, when he purchased of Denman, and for some
years before, that this ground had been dedicated as a public common by the proprietors. The original plat, exhibiting this ground as a common, was delivered to him at the
time of the purchase. And when he afterwards, in the year
1800, took a deed from Symmes, he must, according to the
evidence in the case, have known, that he was a mere trustee.

•
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holding only the naked fee. And^j^roio. th^^jiotodftty of
the fact, that these^rounds vj&re-laid ppen ajad jiged as a
commo n ;. it is fairly to be_ _presiimed. jths^^alJLjlihsequent
purchasers had full knowledge ,.ftf. the fact
But it is contended that the lessor of the plaintiff had
shown the legal title to the premises in question in himself, which is enough to entitle him to recover at law; and
that the defendants' remedy, if any they have, is in a court
of equity. And such was substantially the opinion of the
circuit court, in the fourth instruction asked by the plaintiff, and given by the court, viz., "that if the said proprietors did appropriate said ground, having no title thereto,
and afterwards acquired an equitable title only, that equitable title could not enure so as to vest a legal title in the
city or citizens, and enable them to defend themselves in
an action of ejectment brought against them by a person
holding the legal title.
We do not accede to this doctrine. For should it be admitted.. that the mere naked fej was in the lesspr of the
plaintiff, it by no means follows that he is entitled to recover possession of the. common in. an .action xjf eject"ment.

TEs

is a possessory action, and tlifi...plaijiliff,„to entitle
himself to recover, must have the right of possession ; and
whatever takes away tMFn^L^p,as.ses sionr w ilT^prive
Adams's Eject. SST"
him jof the "remedy by .ej^imfint,
^tarkie, part 4, 506, 507.
This is the rule laid down by Lord Mansfield in Atkins
An ejectment, says he, is a posV. Horde, 1 Burr. 119.
sessory remedy, and only competent where the lessor of
the plaintiff may enter; and every plaintiff in ejectment
must show a right of posaeiaaion a s well a s M .property.
And in the case of Doe v. Staple, 2 Durn. and East, 684,""
it was held, that although an outstanding satisfied term
may be presumed to be surrendered, yet an unsatisfied
term, raised for the purpose of securing an annuity, cannot, during the life of the annuitant ; and may be set up as a
bar to the heir at law, even though he claim only subject
to the charge. Thereby dearly showing the plaintiff must
have, not only the legal title but a clear present right to
the possession of the premises ; or he cannot recover in an
action of ejectment. And in the case of Doe v. Jackson, 2
Dowl. and Ryl. 523, Bailey, Justice, says, "an action of

.

Common Law Pleading.

96

[Chap.

1

ejectment, which from first to last is a fictitious remedy,
is founded on the principle, that the tenant in possession
is a wrqng-doer; and unless he is so at the time the action
is brought, the plaintiff cannot recover."
then it is indispensable that the lessor of the plaintiff
should show a right of possession in himself, and that the
defendants are wrong-doers; it is diflScult to perceive on
what grounds this action can be sustained.
The later authorities in England which have been referred to, leave it at least questionable, whether the doc-

If

trine of Lord Mansfield in the case of Goodtitle v. Alker
(1 Burr. 143), "that ejectment will lie by the owner of the
soU for land, which is subject to a passage over it as the
king's highway;" would be sustained at the present day at
Westminster Hall. It was not even at that day considered
a settled point, for the counsel on the argument (page 140)
referred to a case, said to have been decided by Lord Habdwicke; in which he held that no possession could be delivered of the soU of a highway, and therefore no ejectment

would lie for it.
This doctrine of Lord Mansfield has crept into m6st of
our elementary treatises on the action of ejectment, and has
apparently, in some instances, been incidentally sanctioned
by judges. But we are not aware of its having been adopted
in any other case where it was the direct point in judgment. No such case was referred to on the argument, and
none has fallen under our notice. There are, however, several cases in the supreme court of errors of Connecticut,
where the contrary doctrine has been asserted and sustained by reasons much more satisfactory than those upon
which the case in Burrow is made to rest. Stiles v. Curtis,
4 Day, 328 ; Peck v. Smith, 1 Conn. Rep. 103.
But if we look at the action of ejectment on principle, '
and inquire what is its object, it cannot be sustained on
It is to recover possession of the
any rational ground.
land in question; and the judgment, if carried into execution, must be followed by delivery of possession to the lessor of the plaintiff.
The purpose for which the action is brought, is not to
try the mere abstract right to the soil, but to obtain actual
possession; ^ejg£ixJhing_to whi^J^^ plaintiff can-harve—
_,no^j^clusiye__or priyate_ rigEF^This would be utterly io*-

jronsisient. wilijJie..admi^

That right con-
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sists in the nninterrupted enjoyment of the possession. The
two rights are therefore incompatible with each other, and
cannot stand together.
The lessor of the plaintiff seeks
specific relief, and to be put into the actual possession of
the land. The very fruit of his action, therefore, if he avails
himself of
will subject him to an indictment for
nuisance; the private right of possession being in direct hostility with the easement, or use to which the public are entitled; and as to the plf?i-nt.ifF'g tn^jTig popssg§iO-B subject to
the ^easement,
utterly impracticable.
It
well "said"
'byTHrT JusS^~SMTSTfrtBe'cai^e"of Stiles v. Curtis, supra,
that the execution of
judgment in such case, involves as
great an inconsistency as to issue an habere facias possessionem of certaia premises to A., subject to the possession
of B. It
said, cases may exist where this action ought
to be sustained for the public benefit, as where erections
are placed on the highway, obstructing the public use. But
what benefit would result from this to the public? It would
not remove the nuisance.
The effect of a recovery would
only be to substitute another offender against the public
right, but would not abate the nuisance. That must be done
by another proceeding.
It said in the case in Burrow, that an ejectment could
_bejKi^inta^©d-beeau8eHjpespa:s^"W0TiM" lie. But this certainly does not follow. The object and effect of the recovThe one
to obtain posses"eritifc! are tamrely different.
inconsistent with the enjoyment
sion of the land, which
to recover damages
of the public right; and the other
in
with
the
possession, which
merely, and not to interfere
the
perfect harmony with the public right. So, also,
fee
supposed to remain in the original owner, cases may
special action on the case
arise where perhaps waste or
to such owner. . But
injury
for
private
may be sustained
these are actions perfectly- consistent with the^public right.
"1guF"a
into
anjl^on^^l^
rec(^er^in

tioB7Ts.directly jiefmgnaidJuLJkSL publip^right.

a

Upon the whole, the opinion of the court is, that the
judgment must be reversed, and the cause sent back with
ventre de novo?^
directions to issue

L. P.

7

C'

a

t

it

^l<s

jvj]i_iiot ^support ejectm ent. "That the plaintiff
A n equitable
36.
legal title to the premises in himself,
in eJeCfEffieSfmust in all'"casMprove
at the time of the demise laid in the declaration, and that evidence of an
egyitable estate will not be sufficient for a recovery, are principles so elementary
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and 80 familuu* to the profession as to render unnecessary the citation of
authority in support of them. Such authority may, however, be seen in the
cases of Goodtitle y. Jones, 7 T. B. 49; of Doe v. Wroot, 5 East, 132; and of
Eoe V. Head, 8 T. B. 118.
Thisleg2yi_titlg_^the_.plaiBMff must e8taUish.fi)lliai; —~.
upon „a eoanected ^Qciu^crfjcHain^^l'i^deBc^
of sufficient duration to warrant the legal .concl}i!3iQn of the existence of foeh
written title. — Fenn t. Holme (1858) 21 How^ (tl. S.) 481.

QOODEIGHT

ON

THE DEMISE OF BALCH

Court of King's Bench.
7

v.

RICH.

1797.

Term Reports, 327.

^Ejsctment .for thirty acres of land, twenty acres of
meadow, and twenty acres of pasture, with the appurtenances, situate in the parishes of Over Stowey and Nether
Stowey, in the county of Somerset. The defendants pleaded
the general issue, and ^ntered int o the common consent
sjcule_asjtfinajits,-.^ The cause was tried" hef of e Mrl" Justice
BuLLEB, at Taunton, when a verdict was found for the
plaintiff, subject to the opinion of this Court on the following case. Jhe lessor of the plaintiff proved his title to
certain lands in the parishes mentioned in the declaration
of ejectment, which lands were called Clutsome's, Dunscombe's, Landsey's Breach, Griddle's Breach, and the G^jre
Piatt, which were the premises in question. The defendants proved that they were not, nor ever had been in possession of any part of the premises in question. The only
joint reserved at the trial was whether the defendants
af jLer. enteringlinJOEi jsojoditianal- rule -xm^^^ be jeermitted
to proye^ that they neither.were or had been in possession
of the premises, which .the. plaintiff hy tii^evidence_haid_
entitled himself to. If such proof on the part of the defendants were admissible, a nonsuit was to be entered ; otherwise
the verdict was to stand.

Lord Kbnyon, Ch.

J.:

This has certainly been vexata
questio; when I went the circuit as counsel, the case in
Buller's Ni. Pri., in which it was said "If there be but one
defendant as tenant in possession, the plaintiff need not
prove him in possession," was supposed to be law; and
when a case afterwards came on before me on the Home
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I

ruled accordingly, not thinking it necessary to
prove the defendant in possession. But I was never called
on to consider the question accurately till now; and when
we consider the reason of the thing, it seems wonderful
that any question could seriously have arisen upon this
subject. On the trial of an ejectment two parties come to
litigate the title to an estate, the person claiming, and the
person who is supposed to withhold improperly, the possession ; but as soon as it turns out that the latter is not in

_posse.ssion,-j.L-seems- to me that-the- cause is- ill constituted
The proceedings in ejectment
^^betweea. those J^^QperS-ons.

were instituted in order to try who is entitled to the possession of an estate on title : when the declaration is delivered the lessor of the plaintiff claims in general terms so
many acres of land, so many messuages, etc., which communicates but little intelligence to the person served with
the declaration.
the latter happen to be in possession of
any land falling within the description in the declaration,
he must defend in order to preserve his own right; then it
would be unjust that a verdict should be found against him
though he can prove a title to every acre of land in the
parish of which he was ever in possession; and yet this is
*
*
*
the consequence of the plaintiff's argument.
This
point, however, came under the consideration of the Court
in the case reported in Wilson,_ where it, was, holdeU-..tiiat^
the plainti ff must prove the defendant in possession; and
*
*
•
^^5ttnfc~^hat"ffiSrcase was properly ^4gQidfi4f

If

I

When the plaintiff is in possession to may, in proper cases, resort to a
to quiet title. Such a proceeding is authorized in equity to
protect the owner of the legal title from being disturbed in his possession
or harassed by suits in regard to his title, and can be availed of only by the
person out of possession
owner of the legal title who is in possession.
cannot maintain such a bill, whether his title is legal or equitable; for if his
title is legal, his remedy at law, by action of ejectment, is plain, adequate
and complete; and if Ms title is equitable, he must acquire the legal title,
and then bring ejectment. "—Frost v. Spitley (1886) 121 IT. 8. 552, 556.
lands are unoccupied, an action of ejectment may be brought, on the
theory of constructive possession, against a party out of possession claiming
title, if such claim is accompanied by acts of ownership, such as enclosure,
cultivation, and the like.— Gamer v. Marshall (1858) 5 Cal. 268, 271. Statutes
See Converse v. Dunn (1897)
frequently authorize ejectment in such cases.
166 lU. 25; G«odman t. Neater (1887) 61 liieh. 662.
37.
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"A

If

CaMMON

100

Law Pleading.

Section

1

Deb t."

8.

BULLAED

[Chap.

V.

BELL.

Circuit Court of the United States for the First District.
1817.

1

{Tlaiiitiffjas the

Mason, 243.

had prehank,
for payment and payment had
sented-to the issuing,
beenjefused. _He the n brought thi s acti on in deb t against
h^^eider^Ahan^

Declabations in Debt. On specialty.
"For that whereas the said
heretofore, to wit, on, etc. at,^ etc. demised to the said C D, a certain
message, land and premises, with the appurtenances, situate, ete. to have, to
hold the same to the said C D, for a certain term of years, to wit, for and
during, and until the full end and term of twenty-one years, then next
ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended, yielding and paying therefor,
^ I. of lawful,
during the said term, to the said A B, the yearly rent of
ete. at the four most usual feasts, or days of payment in the year, that is to
By \irtue of which said demise, the said
say, ete. by even and equal portions.
C D entered into the said demised premises, with the appurtenances, and was
possessed thereof from thenceforth, until and upon the feast of St. Michael
the Archangel, A. D. 1806, when a large sum of money, to wit, the sum of
Z. of the rent aforesaid, for the space of
then elapsed, became and
was due and payable from the said C D to the said A B, and still is in arrear
and unpaid to the said A B. to wit, at, etc. aforesaid.
Whereby an action
hath accrued to the said A B, to demand and have of and from the said
t. parcel of the said sum
above demanded; Tet
D, the said sum of
D, although often requested so to do, hath not as yet paid the said
the said
But
I. above demanded, or any part thereof, to the said A B.
sum of
To the
he to do this hath hitherto wholly refused, and still doth refuse.
I. and therefore he brings his suit, etc."
2
damage of the said A B of
38.

A B

Chitty

on

Pleading,

144,

172.

"For that whereas, the said C D on, etc. at, etc. was
On simple contract.
I. of lawful money of Great
indebted to the said A B in the sum of
Britain for the work and labor, care and diligence of the said A B, before
that time done, performed and bestowed, by him the said A B and his
servants, and with his horses, carts and carriages, in and about the business
D, and for the said C D, and at his special instance and
of the said
request, to be paid by the said C D to the said A B, when he the said C D
requested, whereby and by reason of the
should be thereunto afterwards
said last-mentioned sum of money being and remaining wholly unpaid, an
action hath accrued to the said A B to demand and have of and from the
I. parcel of the said sum above demanded.
said C D, the said sum of
Yet the said C D, although often requested so to do,, hath not yet paid the
I. above demanded, or any part thereof, to the said A B.
said sum of
But he to do this hath hitherto wholly refused, and still doth refuse. To the
1, and therefore he brings his suit, etc."
2
damage of the said A B of
Chitty on Pleadings, 32, 142, 144.
Compare this form, which is a common count in debt, with the common
The common counts in debt corrrapond closely to. thosfl,
counts in assumpsit.
in os&tLmpsit, beiitg baaed upon goods sold and delivered, work and labor dona,
money lent, money paid, money had and received, account stated, etc
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original stockholder of the bank,
ander a staiute^wEieh decliared that upon the refusal of 'a
bank to pay any of its own bills upon presentment^ the
the defendant, who was an

Obioim and Scops

or thb Action of Debt.

"The action of debt is certainly the broadest of the contractnal TijmnAim
and is perhaps the broadfist of all t^ia e ommon^ISwTRTtiariiflH
; that, in t^i hqj/
it can be used to obtain satisfaction of duties of more diversity than any other
By nature debt is an aptioTi nf contract, but it is also the normal
action.
remedy upon duties created bT eustom or record, and is therefore broader
than the field of pure contractual
In other words, it is a remedy
duty.
nDon Quasi-contractual as w nll aa I'nT itTay.t"'^^ flutifia . • • •
"its nature ca,n perhaps best be defined by saying that the action of debt '
lies tn flnfnTPn lagr^] <lnfy I'Togtpfi bv p.f(fi tra i-.t.j hy eustom Or bv record.
The
sole limitation upon such legal duty is the requirement that the duty be one
for papnent of a sum certain of m^oney or for the delivery of an ascertained
Daht tVinp . we may saVp lies to '"
amount of pondera ble nr mfta.Rm-aMa .»Wn.tffl1p.
recover money or chattels due and made certain in amount by nontraet, by '
'^
5——
'euBtom, W bir reeofar
"The duty to return a borrowed implement of husbandry, or a specified
amount of barley consumed by the borrower, was placed in the same legal
* * Before long, however,
category as the duty to return a loan of money.
to
these
and
as
this
Uw
ideas,
the
began
separate
progressed the action of debt
split up into two forms, the action of debt in ths debet et de.tinet being used
for the recovery of money debts and for the recovery of a specified amount of
ponderable or measurable chattel s, while debt in the detinei was used tor tlie
This latter form of action gradually acquired a
recovery of specific chattels.
The recognition
distinct character, being known by the name of detinue.
of detinue as a separate action thus narrnwed the sco pe of debt proper (in
the debet et detinet) to the limit s indicated in the definition above pven.
modem times the money debt has become by far the most conspicuous
and important form of the simple contract debt, but in legal theory there has
been no severance between tj^a rt\mie,j an/l Phatf^l flj;]jt.- They are enforced
by the same form of action; and after all, money is only ^ipp Hoff. nf i;,h^t"* "* Une who dffed money or chattels was
m wTnTigrfniiv
coTi^^siv^d
_tel. •
withholding from tne creditor property which belonged to such creditor:
and he was" not viewed merely as being Douna by the obligation of law to
In other words, the debt, whether of money or chattels,
make compensation.
•
•
•
As in the writ of right
was vievyqd as a real and substantive thing .
: and the writ of debt has been
for 1o»»/l tTia g^tinn was ha«ed OT^ ownership
'
'
The analogy between debt and the
aptly called the writ of right for mone y.
further circumstance that in both
in
the
shown
is
for
land
action
proprietary
there might be trial by battle; but the offer of proof by battle has not actually
•
•
•
been found in actions of debt.
feature of debt which doomed the action to obsolescence so soon as
assumpsit could be used in its stead, was found in the fact that the defendAll simple debts were subject to this mode of
ant could wage his law.
'defense, but the speclaTt yand debts of record were not . When the right of the
in
defendant to wage his law was indirectly taken away by the decision
in
be
used
as^ttOTPsif.
to
which
in
Blade's Case, (4 Coke 92,
1602)
permitted
as
miTi.T iiT^nT. -^pin .lp^ts|) the old practitioners looked upon the innovation
* "When the wager of law became obsolete m
*
•
a great hardship.
debt
gave some indications of a power to recover
century,
eighteenth
the
•
•
»
By statute in 1833 the wager of law was
some of its lost ground.
•
•
•
But it was too late to bring the action back into
totally abolished.
a common fate
frequent use, for a few years later all forms of action shared
, .
Acts.
Procedure
the
of
upon the passage
wager of law never gained
America, it should be observed,• the
•
•
J,he action , of debt, in,
recognition as a legal mode of defense.
the
limitBt ilOTlfl ITTirnPftrt . lipim
country has not therefore been_hgjniBgJs4 ^7

'

"In

"A

"In

to

^ ^^wager

ftfttfonj
'eSko. Xi.

of law ."

jaL

3
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stockholders of the bank should be jointly and severally
liable to the holders of the bUls for the payment thereof.]"

Stoby,

J.:

•

•

•

And this brings us to the second question, whether debt
lies in this case; a question which, though purely technical,
goes to the very marrow of this cause ; for under existing ^
circumstances, if the plaintiff Jiaa. not this reme dy, he is
probably barred^ol. every _fijtbex, by ..lapse of time.
Many cases have been stated at the argument, in which
an action of debt will lie. It is said, that it will lie upon
express and implied contracts, and upon legal liabilities.
This is certainly true ; but it is true to a limited extent only;
for it will not lie upon all simple contracts, nor upon all
legal liabilities. It will not, for instance, lie upon a mere
simple contract to indemnify a party, or to do any other act
or thing, except to pay money or deliver goods.
_ Jn. respect to liabilitiesjpxjights,6j:eated by Statate,-where^
no specific action is given, debt is oftgft. a .proper,,but_is
by no means a universal remedy. It is very correctly laid
down by Chief Baron Comtn, that upon every Statute made
for the remedy of any injury, mischief, or grievance, an
action lies by the party grieved, either by the express words
of the Statute or by implication ; and that such action shall
be a recompense to the party. But the actibn here spoken
of is not any one specific remedy; but an action adapted
to the nature of the case, and moulded according to the
forms and distinctions of the common law. It may be an
action of debt, or assumpsit, or trespass, or case, as the
particular nature of the wrong or injury may require. For
instance. Lord Coke informs us, that upon the Statute of
Magna Charta, which enacts, that no free man shall be arrested or imprisoned, etc., unless by the law of the land,
if any be imprisoned contrary to law, he may have an action founded upon this Statute. No person can suppose,
that debt or assumpsit would here be a proper form of action ; but the proper remedy would be an action of trespass,
or (as Lord Coke seems also to intimate) a special action
of the case. • * * So upon the Statute of Hue and
Cry, which makes the hundred "answerable for the robberies done and the damages,"
39.

Synopsis

of the faetB by
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an action on the case, and

editor.
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not an action of debt, lies for the party grieved; for the
cause sounds properly in damages. And the same rule applies to o ther Statutes^ jdierfi thfi p.nmpftnHatinTi (^pppnrla on
unliquidated damages.^ On the other hand, on the Statute
of 2 Edw. eTcET 13, which gives a forfeiture of the treble
value for not duly setting forth tithes, debt has been held
to lie. • • • And eases may arise under a Statute, in
which the parties may have divers remedies. For instance,
by the Statutes of New Hampshire and Massachusetts,
towns are obliged to support paupers having settlements
therein; and are compellable, in certain cases, to pay the
expenses incurred by other towns on account of such pauAptinns nf >;t,<?,g7/w.pm£.,Ti:pnTi-ttigga afa-faiiog ^t-a very
pers.
freguent; and (assuming that corporations have a capacity
to make a promise) there -cannot be a doubt, that the action
well liea; for_^p Sta tutes creat a^a jjirect and JjomedAate lia\ahi^-qn£is.i.MX, contraahh- But there can be as little doubt,
that an action of debt will lie in the same case, as the claim
is for a determinate sum of money, arising from a legal
and direct duty, if the Statute do not point to any other
form of action.
The result of this examination instructs us, that the action to be pursued to enforce a statutable right, obligation,
or remedy for a grievance, is not necessarily debt, but depends upon the subject-matter and nature of the provisions
of the Statute; and that it is not suflBcient, in the present
case, for the defendant to establish affirmatively, that an
action of assumpsit or case might well lie; but negatively,
that an action of debt will not,
The principal ground, upon which it is argued, that debt

^

will not lie in this

case, is, .that_this is a c ollateral liability, created by Statute;. and that, by "analbgy to the rule"
„of law, that debt jdll, not. lifi^on any collateral undertaking
by contract, it will n ot lie in jthis case, wblchis^ua^ ex ~conJracftZ , Byjthe arTcient Common Law, all matters of peras binding only in the light^ sonal contract were considered
of debts ; aiid~the pjily^means of recovery in a Court was
by an action aCjiahi;. And the legal notion of a debt was, ye
~¥'dufy, created by the Common Law upon some good consideration, moving immediately between and for the benefit of both parties ; such as upon a borrowing, a sale, a lending, a hiring, or a deposit. In short, contracts of debt were
(as Lord C. J. Vaughan declares) deemed reciprocal grants.
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Lord Chief Baron Comtn lays it down as a general proposition, that '' debt lies up on every express contract to pay
a stun

certamtll . Mr. Justice Blackstone asserts the same

is

j

it

e

a

.

:;

is

a

a

.is

doctrine in still more precise terms. "Any contract (says _
he), whereby a determinate sum of money becomes due to.,
any person, and is not paid, but reitiains in action, merely,
contract,fl£..debt." "The true "test is, therefore, whether
the sum to be recoyered has upon the contract itself,
legal
certainty. Following, therefore, the principle of the old decisions, we may well hold, that debt does not lie upon any
collateral undertaking, where the sum to be recoyered
uncertain,, and „sjDiimda. merely in damages- -fBut whenever
the law, upon any undertaking, whether. direct or coUat,detejpninate, sum, which,
eral, giyes the party a, title to
big
absol ute du by the rules applied to the con^.
hftfiOTinfts
tract,
should seem, that an action of de bt must,_ upon_
admitted ^^mcijgles, "be lield to lie. „ EdeeS, an action of
debt against a pleHge^ or collateral secur ity, eg nomme,

is

is

it
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lWs_oJ41al]^K~t!onm^
form oX-the w rit against lEeiS. It was, to be sure, necessary, that the engagenient should be under seal, or be bindsum certain (though Fitzherbert
ing by custom for
seemed to think otherwise)
yet this was because, by the
law of the land, the engagement was otherwise not binding,
but was void as
niide pact. It does not seem to me an
over-straining of the old doctrine, to apply
to any cases
of collateral undertakings, in respect to which the law now
pronounces, that the parties to the contract are bound to
sum certain. For iapay, not unliquidated damages, but
stance, the Miga.gsmSBL of an ^ndoxaecxcLa ,bilL, o r, note
merely collateral ;_ye upon the default of the maker or
acceptor,
clearly liable by law to pay to the ho lder a
determinate sum, the very sum stated in the bill or note.
It
duty, created by^lEe'^enslom'WmirSEants, which
a part of the law of the land.
It would be a violation of
the first principles of law, for the Court to direct, or the
can be
jury to give, less sum to the holder. How then
correctly held, that debt does not lie by the holder against
profess myself unable to
the endorser in such a case,
must say with Lord Loughboeotjgh, that
comprehend.
promise
.camiot devise a substantial reason, why
not i3i£aQlB£-a_debtiaBd:ffihx.
..£a^mQiifiyjaQt.peEfQxnaad.dQea.
should not be recoverable, eo nomine, as a debt" If,
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to be resisted,"

it will become our duty to bow to them, however unsatis^^9i9^.tiiey m^y he. But when we find, that this doctrine
rests mainly on a case ia Hadres, which was decided at a

time, when the law relative to negotiable instruments was
very little understood, and which has been recently overtamed by an unanimous decision of the Supreme Court;
and_whfiB_itJias_-been decided, that an action of debt lies
HzJhepayee pf a bill of exchange against the drawer, whose
gTJg«g^"1^Pt-^s <;iertainly_collateral,
am npfe
own, tiiat
ffiithout^ope, that the law will, on this subject, be followed
out upon its genuine and rational principles. If, therefore,
the present case were to be considered exactly like the case
of an endorser of a note, am not quite prepared to admit,
that an action of debt could not be sustained.
But we may weU leave that point to be decided, when it
shall arise ; for this is not the case of a collateral contract,
created by an endorsement.
It may have some analogy to
and so
has to an absolute guaranty or suretyship.
This
iability created, not merely by the act of the
Statute. The act of
parties,15ut by the express terms of
said corporation shall, at
incorporation provides, "that
any time hereafter, divide their stock, previous to the payment of aU their biUs, or shall refuse or neglect to pay any
of their bills, when presented for payment in the usual
manner, the original stockholders, their successors, and assigns, and the members of such corporation, shall, in their
private capacities, be jointly and severally liable to the
holder of any bill or bills, issued by the said corporation
agree at once to the
for the payment thereof," etc., etc.
position, that the bills of the bank are to be considered
originally as the debts of the corporation, and not of the
corporators; and, except from some special provision by
Statute, the latter cannot be made answerable for the acts
or debts of the former. They are altogether in law distinct
persons, and capable of contract with each other. But the
corporators are not strangers to the corporation. ^J3n the.
con trary, the law contem plates a privity between them and,
piioty. ha^s- created an obligation on the corpou|3o nJfaat
rators, under cerjtaicLcircumstances, to4jay.tha-debts of the
N othing can be^bg tter settl ed, than that an
jnnTn[^pra.t\q-n.
debjlies
for a duty, created by the common.iawr
action of
must lie, where the duty
or by aatoBCU.
fortiori
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Mr. Justice Blackstone says, "that
created by Statute.
every person is bound, and hath virtually agreed to pay
such particular sums of money, as are charged on him by
the sentence, or assessed by the interpretation of the law.
Whatever, therefore, the law orders any one to E:ay:»jtliat_
becomes ihstantly a debt, which he hath beforehand joonttracted to discharge." Without placing any reliance upon
this refined notion of contract, it cannot be doubted, that
the learned judge has expressed the true doctrine of the
"
law. ^atever i s enjoined by a Statut e to be done, creates
.a duty^a the paHyTtt^BJcgj^jg^Tou n^^
whole theory and practice of political and civil obligations
rests upon the principle. When, therefore, a Statute declares, -that-j uder cerT;ain. circumstances, a atn^.l^h^Jder in
a bank shall pay the ^debt due f rom th e, bank, ag^^j^ageLSit:,
gumstances occur, it creates a direc t and immediate oblia a.'
tion to pay it. The consideration may be'Sillat.eral or not ;
but it is not a subject-matter of inquiry. And to deny, that
it is a duty on the stockholder to pay the money, is to
deny the authority of the Statute itself ; for a duty is nothing more than a dvil obligation to perform that, which the
law enjoins. ^Here, then, the law has declared ^ that the
stockholders shall be liable to pay a specific sum, joid it
i mpose s^ on IJiem a duty so to do. How; then can the Court
say, thatjiebt dqjes lifitlSs:;S?*^^~^'^J? js .a^^jlij. on the
def endanLAa pav tiie-plaintiff a determinate siun of money?
There is no room, under this view of the case, for entertaining any question as to collateral undertakings. J^he law
has created a direct liability^ a liability as direct and cogent, as though the ^arty had bound himself under seal
to pay the amou nt ; in which case debt would undoubtedly
Jie:_The law esteems tHFan obligation created by the highest kind of specialty.
Indeed, if debt would not lie in this
There is
case, it is inconceivable, how assumpsit could.
no pretence of any express promise ; and if a promise is to
be implied, it must be because there exists a legal liability,
independent of any promise sufficient to sustain one. Now,
the very action of a collateral undertaking is, that there
exists no legal liability, independent of the promise to create
a duty.
And if there exists a duty sufficient to raisea_,
promise, then it is sufficient to sustein an action of jdepT
Upon the most mature reflection,
am of opuiioriPthat an
~~ ~
action of d ebt well lies in this case!

I
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COLT.

United States Circuit Court for the District of
Pennsylvania.

1818.

Peters' Circuit Court Reports,

145.

This was an actio n, oi_debt,„ brought upo n an embargo
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_bond, in tke-DisixJet-Court^-to- J-ttna,-lg1 1 ; and the declarar..
tinn -demanded twenty thousand dollars, which the defendant was alleged to ow;e and detain. It then recited the embargo law, laying the breach, by the defendant; ' Syhereby
the Uni te d St ate s are en titled to demand a sum, notjexceeding twenty thousand dollars, and not less than one thousand dollars, viz;., twentyHt;housan"a dolIarsT^* ""Which" it
averred to be due toi;he plMnttgFana~d:etgiiiH3~'fromi±rem
by the defendan t. UponlitrTfefrefnjfeardgdr'IM'nury f oTind"
a verdict for four thousand dollars.
The defendant took
out a writ of error, returnable at April sessions, 1812, of
the Circuit Court; and the case now came on for decision.
:
Washington,
The question in this case
whether
the action
maintainable. The objection to the action of
debt, where the penalty isjuncertain is, that this action cSa"
only be brought to recover a specific sum of money, , the.,
gm pjint. of w hiC'h
ascerteined.
It said, fhat the very
sum demanded, must "Be" proved ;'and on demand for thirty
pounds, you can no more recover twenty pounds, than you
can
demand for a cow. Blackstone says that
horse, on
sum of money due, by
debt, in its legal acceptation,
fixed
certain and express agreement; where the quantity
valuation
to
settle
and does not depend on any subsequent
it; and for nonpayment, the proper remedy
the action
verbally
of debt, to recover the specific sum due. So if
certain price for certain goods, and fail in
agree to pay
a determinate
the performance, this action lies; for this
contract ^Eutjf agree for_no_settied^j)rice, debt will not
liej_but_ oDly^_a_speciaLaHion iin_JJi£_xiaiEran3""ffiis~ action
now generally brought, except in cases of contracts under
seal, in preference to the action of debt; because, in this
latter action, the plaintiff must prove the whole debt he
one single
claims, or recover nothing at all. For the debt
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of action, fixed and determined; and which, if the
proof varies from the claim, cannot be loojked upon, as
the same contract of which performance is demanded. If
I sue for thirty pounds, I am not at liberty to prove a debt
of twenty pounds, and recover a verdict thereon ; for I fail
in the proof of that contract, which my action has alleged
cause

to be specific and determinate. ^But indebitatus assumpsi t
is not brought to compel a specific performance of the con^tmct

;

but j.aJiO'ecdLV.ei.JdanmgfiS^forn'te^^

;

and.Jlie damages beipg indeterminate, will adapt themselves^
to ..the truth of the case, as it may be proved; for if any
""
'

' "

bejgroved, it is sufScient. .'?'"
V T£e doctrine laid down by this writer, appears to be much
too general and unqualified; although, to a certain extent,
it is unquestionably correct. Debt is certainly a sum of
money due by contract, and it most frequently is due by
a certain and express agreement, which also fixes the sum,
independent of any extrinsic circumstances. But, it is not
essential, that the contract should be express, or that it
Bhould,fix the precise amount of tt^ sim to be paid. T)flbtr
may arise on an implied c ontract, ^s,, for. the balan ce of an
account s tated; to recover J}ja£k, money .whixjh a bailiff had"
"gajdjaoreihaii he had received; and in a variety of^ other
cases, where, the law, by implication,, raises a contract to
pay._3 Com. Dig. 365. The sum may not be fixed by the
contract, but may depend upon something extrinsic, which
may be averred; as a promise to pay so much money as
plaintiff shall expend in repairing a ship, may be sued in
this form of action ; the plaintiff averring that he did expend
a certain sum.
2 Bac. 20.
So, on promise by d-efendant,
to pay his proportion of the expenses of defending a suit,
in which defendant was interested, with an averment that
plaintiff had expended so much, and that defendant's proportion amounted to so much. 3 Levy, 429. go i^jt acil n-n
of debt may be brought for goods sold to defftTida.Tit, , fnr-s a.
muchas!l]ie;g-wexe..jsxLd
2 Com. Dig. 365. ^So debt will
EJaToruse and occupation, _where there is only an implied ,
contract, and no preciseRum agT^p'^'-"f>QT^
6 T. K. 63.
states,
that debt will lie for an
Wooddeson, 3d vol. 95.
indeterminatp dpTnand^ wTninVi rn fly rftadilv be rednced to a""
certainty. In Emery v. Fell, 2 Term Eeports, 28, in which
there~Wa:s a declaration in debt, containing a number of
counts for goods sold and delivered, work and labour, money

_^debt
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laid out and expended, and money had and received; the
Court, on a special dermirrer, sustained the action, although
it was objected that it did not appear that the demand was
certain, and because no contract of sale was stated in the
declaration.
But the Court took no notice of the first objection, and avoided the second, by implying a contract of
sale, from the words which stated a sale. These case s proga,
_that_debl,ma^~Ji£Lmakiiained.japnn^an
implied^^ as weJl as
upon an express contract ; although no precise sum is agreed
upon. __But the doctrine stated' by Lord Mansfield, in the
case of Walker v. Witter, Douglass 6, is conclusive upon
this point. He lays it down, that debt may be brought f or
a sum^ap^le_of_bemgj,scertained, though ,nfit, ascertained

it,

at the time the actign^wasjarpught.
Ashuest and Bulleb
say, that whenever indebitatus assumpsit is^^mainjtgiiiable,
dfibias_als.o. In this case two points were also made by the
defendant's counsel; first, that on the plea of nil debet, the
plaintiff could not have judgment, because debt could not
be maintained on a foreign judgment; and secondly, that
on the plea of niel tiel record, judgment could not be entered for the plaintiff, because the judgment in Jamaica
was not on record. The court were in favour of the defendant, on the second point, and against him in the first; by
deciding, that the debt could be maintained on a foreign
judgment, because, indebitatus assumpsit might; and that
the uncertainty of the debt demanded in the declaration,
was no objection to the bringing of an action of debt. The
decision therefore given upon that point, was upon the very
point, on which the cause turned. But, independent of the
opinion given in this case, is it not true, to use the words of
BuLLEE, "that all the old cases show, that whenever indebitatus assumpsit is maintainable, debt also lies." The subject is very satisfactorily explained by Lord ■Loughborough, in the case of Rudder v. Price, 1 H. Bl. 550, which
was an action of debt, brought on a promissory note payable by installments, before the last day of payment was
past ; in which the court, yielding to the weight of authordecided;
ity, rather than to the reason which governed
that the action could not be supported, because the contract
being entire, would admit of but one action which could not
be brought until the last payment had become due, although
But his
vndehitaius assumpsit might have been brought.
lordship was led to inquire into the ancient forms of action
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on contracts ; and he states, that in ancient timqs, debt was
the common action for goods sold, and for work and labour
done. Where assumpsit was brought, it was not a general
indebitatm assumpsit; for it was not brought merely on
a promise, but a special damage for a nonfeasance, by
which a special action arose to the plaintiff. The action of
assumpsit, to recover general damages for the nonperformance of a contract, was first introduced by Blade's Case,
which course was afterwards followed.
In the case of
Bvisleu
that
till Blade's
Witter,
Walker v.
also stated,
Case, 4 Co. 92, b, a notion prevailed, that on a simple contract for a certain sum, the action must be debt ; but it was
held in that case, that the plaintiff might bring assumpsit,
or debt at his election.
Thus it appear s,-ihat. in all .cases of contracts, un less a
s pecia l,.damage was stated, the primitive action wasIdSJE^I
and that the . action of indebita his as sumpsit su cceededi_
principally,
presume, to ayoidthe wager of. l^aw; which^iji_
Blade's Case, was one of . the^jmain arguments, _urged^by..
allnw iri the introduction
the defendant's counsel, a.yf^,i];i
of the a ction of ^a;SS;MM£g^^; as
;^reby deprivgd-lilg. de.-fenSant of _his_ privilege of jvrageriiig_his Jaw._.,.BiiLLEK
YeeEos" therefore to have "Been well warranted in the case of
Walker v. Witter, in saying: that all the old cases show,
that where indebitatus assumpsit will lie, debt will lie. The
same doctrine
supported by the case of Emery v. Fell,
T. E. 30, which was an action of debt, in which all the
counts of indebitatus assumpsit are stated; where the objection to the doctrine was made and overruled. So in the
case of Harris v. Jameson,
T. R. 557, Ashubst refers with
approbation, to the opinion delivered in the case of Walker
That debt may be brought for foreign money,
V. Witter.
the value of which the jury are to find, had been decided
before the case of Walker v. Witter; as appears by the
case of Rands v. Peck, Cro. Jac. 618, and in Draper v. Rastal, the same action was brought, though in different ways,
for current money, being the value of the foreign.
Comyn in his Digest, Tit. Debt, p. 366, where he enumerates the cases in which debt will not lie, states no exception
to the rule that where indebitatus assumpsit will lie, debt
will lie, but one for the interest of money due upon a loan.
But the reason of that,
explained by Lord Loughbob-,
OUGH in the case of Rudder v. Price; who states, that unis
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the case of Cooh v. Whorwoo d, upon a c ovenant to pay a
stipulated sum of instalments, it the plamtilt brought as-~
^^^^JalESrffie^^Tsf "failure, he was entitled lorecovef
the :vrh.oIa.^]am. in damages ; because he could not in that
,f orm ji£, auction, _any more thajij.n the actipn of de bt, sup Until that decision,
, port two actions on an entire contract.
the only difference between deB't smd assumpsit in such a
case, was, that the former would not be brought, until after the last instalment was due; and in the latter, though
it might be brought after the first failure, yet the plaintiff
might recover the whole, because he could not maintain
a second action on the same contract.

I

proceed with the doctrine of Judge Blackstone before stated. After stating what constitutes debt, he observes, "that the remedy is an action of debt to recover
the special sum due." -It. is .Qhs£rxahle,. that he^doe_s upt
.§ay,- that thft plaintifF ia to rpicnver the fium dtmi,anded^j_
- his dedajation-;-«»d"B^Ta«i;.soii,-wiJl..d,env....b 3it that he is to
recover thc speciaJ-Sunu.diia.'"
After stating what constitutes a debt, and prescribing the
remedy, Judge Blackstone proceeds to the evidence and
recovery; and says, "the plaintiff niust prove the whole.
f-ovpr nnthiTigL"
On this acrjpM bp f-laims, nr he can re
commonly,
count he adds "thg_afiiictii>o£-as*iM»^*ii-i3-most
brong'bt; h^^'s-nRQ i-" i^^f, it t? pT'ftiffi,e'"t if tihftr^"^^^^'^ prove
fiTiy debt to bf^-fh-t^ to esable.~-him.ta. recover the sum, so
" If this writer merely means to say,
rrflYP'^j ^'" '^fiT^q^^Qg
that where a special contract is laid in the declaration, it
must be proved as laid ; the doctrine will not be controverted.
debt be brought o n a written agreement, the con tract
with
produced m evidence,'°mustTOrrespOTi5, maU^^
that stated in the ,dM§gStfem;:;-aini":iagjaSan^^
be
.fatal to the plaintiff's recovery. Such too is the law in all
special actions in tlie case ; but if Judge Blackstone meant
to say, that in every case, where debt is brought on a
simple contract, the plaintiff must prove the whole debt as
"St aime d by Lh u de cl gratroii:rgr~tBaOre .can recover hothing•5el3"opSosedJ)v every decision, .ancient &nd modern
The
old cases before mentioned, in which debt was brought and
sustained, are all cases, where it is impossible to suppose
that the sum stated in the declaration, was or could in every
instance be proved ; any more, than it is, or can be proved,
They are in fact,
in actions of indebitatus assumpsit.
of
indebitatus assumpactions substantially like to actions

If
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sit in the form of action for debt. The action of d ebt for
foreign money, is and can be for no determinate sum; be^.
cause the value must be found by the jury, either upon the
trial of the issue, or upon a writ of inquiry, where there
is judgment by default._
The case of Sanders v. Mark, is debt for an uncertain
sum, in which the debt claimed, was for fifteen pounds eighteen shillings and six pence, and the defendant's proportion of the whole sum, was averred to be fifteen pounds
eighteen shillings and eight pence ; yet the action was supported. This is plainly a case, where the sum due could not
be certainly averred; because the yearly value of the defendant's property might not be known to the plaintiff,
and could only be ascertained, with certainty, by the jury.
In the case of Walker v. Witter, Lord Mansfield is^ express
upon this point. Hp sayp, ^/lat debt may be brought for-a
sumL capable of^ being ascertained, though not ascertained
at thetime of Jbnnging;the7actr6h7"and~Ee" adds, "that it is
^not necessary that the plaintiff, should recover the exact
In the case of Rudder v. Price, Lord
sum_demanded.
LoTJGHBOEouGH, who has shed more light upon this subject
than any other judge, says : that long before Blade's Case,
the "demand in an action of debt must have been a thin g
cert ain" i n its nature, yet, it was by no means necessary,
th at the "a mount should be set jajfl£_so. precisely, that less
could not Jj£.ig£Q2Jei:e^. ' '
In short, if before Blade's Case, debt was the common
action for goods sold, and work done, it is more obvious,
that it was not thought necessa,ry to state the amount due,
with such precision, as that less could not be recovered;
for in those cases, as the same judge observes, "the sum
•due was to be ascertained by a jury, and was given in the
But yet the demand was for a thing
form of damages."
certain in its nature ; that is, it was capable of being ascertained, though not ascertained, or perhaps capable of being so, when the action was brought. Whence the opinion
arose, that in an action of debt on a simple contract, the
cannot ascertain. It certainly
whole sum must be proved,
was not, and could not be the doctrine prior to Blade's
Case ; and it is clear, that it was not countenanced by that
case. However, let the opinion have originated how it
might,- Lord Loughborough in the above case, denominates
it an erroneous opinion, and says, that it has been some
time since corrected.

I
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the case of M'Quillen v. Coxe, the sum demanded was
five thousand pounds ; which was fifty more than appeared
to be due by the different sums. The objection was made
on a special demurrer, that the declaration demanded more
than appeared^ by the plaintiff's own showing to be due.
The court did not notice the alleged variance between the
writ and declaration, or the misrecital of the writ ; but overrer, because the plaintiff might,
_ ruled the demur
in_an action of debt on a simpl e contract, prove and recover a less
"'
- -— ^
— -sum than he de majoided m~t he writ.
Trom tEislast expression it might be supposed, that the
court meant to distinguish between the sum demanded by
the writ, and that demanded by the declaration; but this
could not have been the ease, because the sum demanded
by the writ, and that demanded by the declaration was the
There was, in fact, no
same; viz., five thousand pounds.
variance; for, though the declaration recites the writ, yet
the sum demanded, and which the declaration declared to
be the sum which the defendant owed and detained, was the
same sum as that mentioned in the writ; and the objection
stated in the special demurrer, was made to the variance,
between the sum demanded by the declaration, and the sum
alleged to be due.
The distinction taken in the case of Ingledon v. Cripps,
Salk. 659, runs through aU the above cases, and appears to
be perfectly rational ; viz., J^at_whe re debt is br ought on a
covenant, t o pay a su m certain, any variance of the s um in
the deed'^Op ji^^'"^^ . Butrj 'p^>'<^tp the deed relates to matter
of f actextriusic, fee-re,-thQugh_the plaintiff_dfijQianScL more
tEanis due, he may enter a remitter for the b alance . -TJiis
s hows^jJ^aL-debt. may bfiT)foug£t_for more than is due, and
that the jurymaj give less ; or of tiiey give more than is
duej the^erroj: may.,ttS_£2JI§cted by s, remitter.
Thus stands the doctrine in relation to the action of debt
on contracts ; and
debt will lie^on a contract, where the
sum demanded is iTnp,firt.a.i-n, jt wnufd RfiPTri~" t.n fojlnw, tliTrt
itwould iiB for ft-ponaltv m'von W stntnte. which isuncertimu jind dependent uoon the amoun t to be^assessed by a
lury. For, when they have assessed
the sum so ^ed
This however
becomes the amount of the penalty given.
stands upon stronger ground than mere analogy. The point
expressly decided in the case of Pemherton v. Shelton,
Cro. Jac. 498. That was an action of debt brought upon
G L. p.
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the first section of the statute, 2 Ed. 6. ch. 13 ; which gives
the treble value of the title due, for not setting them out.
The declaration claimed thirty-three pounds, as the treble
value ; and in settrag forth the value of the tithes, the whole
amount appeared to be more than one-third of the sum demanded; so that the plaintiff claimed less than the penalty
given by the statute. Upon nil debet pleaded, the jury
found for the plaintiff twenty pounds, and a motion was
made in arrest of judgment, for the reason above mentioned. The court overruled the motion, upon the ground
afterwards laid down in the case of Ingledon v. Cripps.
They held, that-there. was-^-difference when the aetion^of
debt is grounded on, _ a specialty, or contract, which is ^
sum uncertain ; or upon a statute, whicli gives a certaia.sum-_
for the penalty; and where it is grounded on a demand,
jE ^n the sxun is uncertain, being such as shal l be given by
^he jury.~T!n the formSFT^ was agreedT that "0ie plaintiff
cannot demand less than the sum agreed to be paid or given
by the statute ; but in the latter, it is said, that if the declaration varies from the real sum, it is not material ; for he shall
not recover according to his demand in the declaration,
but according to the verdict and judgment, which may be
given for the plaiatiff. It cannot be said, that this doctrine
was laid down in consequence of the court considering this
as a statutory action, to which it was necessary to accommodate tiie recovery, by changing general principles of law
applicable to other cases ; for it will appear, by a reference
to the statute, that it prescribes no remedy for enforcing
the penalty; and that debt was brought upon the commonlaw principle, that where a statute gives a penalty, debt
may be brought to recover it. In this case the statute gives
the action of debt, and
cannot perceive in what other
form, than this one which has been adopted, the declaration
could have been drawn. Had it claimed the smallest sum,
it might have been less than the jury might hav6 thought
the United States entitled to recover; and yet, judgment
could not have been given for more.
know of no precedent for a declaration in debt, claiming- no precise~sum,^
to be due and detained, nor any jgrincigle of Jaw, which
find
would sanction such a form. On the other hand^
abundant authority for saying, that the demand of one s umj_
does not prev6irlriairTecirp^mt7-t?fTrBii m^
it is
dimimshed by extrinsic cifcimastances.'
Rule discharged.

I
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MOOEE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

1855.

3 Sneed, 145.

Mr. Justice Caeuthees delivered the opinion of the

court:

This was an action of debt, brought upo n an inatmrnfint

by the ^ffinflant in
in thesewordsT
'
'Dne James Hunter, eight
good bar iron, at..6i 4 cents a
ceived of him, this 24tlL-.day:
exec ute d

ihf.

irii.e.gt^.t.A

of. the

-plaintiJQF,.

.

Msdred doUars, paya.bl6 in
it being for value re-

pound,

of April, 1841.

"Witness my

hand and seal.

"Bobert Crockett.

( Seal.)"

Verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, for the
balance unpaid of the ^S OO^and interest.
Motions for a
new trial and in arrest of judgment overruled, and appeal
in error to this court.
Several questions have been made and argued for a reversal.

It is

contended that debt is not the proper action, Jmt.,
\i
hfift-p p-nypTiflnt.
Much vexation and perplexity have existed in the courts, here and elsewhere, in
relation to the right form of action in cases of this kind.
1.

jTiai:

*

*

gbnn1fl.1ifl.vft

«

But we think the action was well brought, according to
ou r decided cases . There certainly is some appearSce'of
conflict in the cases, which it would be useless now to atWe understand the true rule in relatempt to reconcile.
tion to these property jsaateacts to be tSlOEjTTefilffie: conJacact,jjp«Euits-facfi^pr in its term s, furnishes the means of
ascertainJDg the e xact amount ^ue f^r spe cific artic le s or
servi c^es, debt, wSJUSa^ Langtfee v7~Walker S Polk, 6
Humph. 336; Marrigcm v. Page, 4 id. 247, 1 Meigs' Dig.
If the contract before us be tested by this rule there
can be no difficulty.
The obligation is for $800, payable in
bar iron at 6^ cts. per pound. There is no uncertainty
"
^^fi^ 'i'jTftjparitity~f>f iron is 1,280 pounds, and its value
is fixed by tTiFcontrmrt;; it can neithCT^be infirCaor less ; there
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is nothing to test by proof; no room for the exercise of
discretion iii„ffiIiasfissi5(Sr of. damages. . It would J)ft differentif the.-Contract were for 1,280 pounds of iron. Then
the recovery would be in damages to be ascertained by a
jury, upon proof of its value on the day due. So, if the contract were for a horse, so much wheat, com, or pork, the
recovery would be in damages, or, as it is sometimes expressed, "sound in damages." ^In such cases debt will not
lie. But in all t hese ^cases, if _ the price of the artic le.^
..£s£dJJiJitajefiiy;ract^ or if the contract be for a sum certain
"to be paid," or "which may be paid," or "payaHe" in
any kind of property, debt may be brought, because the
sum to be recovered is certainly fixed by the parties to the
contract, for a failure to pay the property, and there is no
a jury were Jlq^
room for the assessment of damages.
the verdict.
or
the
court
would
set
aside
find
less,
more,
'
The numerous cases maintaining this position are referred"
'
to and digested m 1 Meigs Dig. 413. Upon first principles,
as laid down in the elementary books, the proposition is
equally clear. 3 Bla. Com. 154; 1 Chit. 100; 2 Bac. Abr.
279, Jihja principle is, that where the amount to be recovered
is specifican3 fixedf, and does not depend upon any
debt may be brought. But ,
valuation or assessment to fix
or speciific" articles or performance of
where
contract
!juch'arli=~
,^exvi£eajlo.es_npjL.6pec.iJy.lEe~valWl^^
cles or services, but the same has to be ascertained by a
resort to extraneous evideuBS^by lire tribunal before^wliich
suit
brought, the action cannot be debt.

f

Finding no error in the judgment,

we

aprm

it,

is

a

it,

Jf

40

a

In Butcher v. Carlile (1855) 12 Leigh (Va.) 520, wiU be found
discussion of the proper form of action in these property contracts, in
which statements are made which are somewhat at variance with those above
given, but the niceties of the subject are of comparatively slight importance
and do not seem to call for an extended treatment here.
The theory under
which debt may be sustained, as presented in the case givem above, seems
satisfactory and in harmony with the general theory of the action.
40.
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1887,

Michigan, 668.

J. : In this

plaintiffs sued defendants in an action of covenant for the vioIaEon of the terms
of an agreement which was executed without any actual
seal or scroll, but which was declared to be the act of the
parties, in witness whereof they thereunto set their hands
and seals» -The court below held that the action of covenant
was properly brought, and judgment was rendered upon
the verdict of the jury for damages shown.
It is claimed now by defendants that, the agreegient, not
_bging agtually sealed, assumpsit was the only action permissible; and assumpsit being bajred in six years, while
covenant is^not barred untU ten years, the distinction is
material and vital in the present case, where more than six
case the

ygars had expired.
We have no statutory definition either of a covenant or
of the action of covenant. We must therefore go back to
Declaration in Covenant. "For that whereas, heretofore, to wit,
— day of
, A. D. — , at, etc. by a certain
indenture then and
made between the said A B of the one part, and the said C D of

41.
on the

there
of which said indenture sealed with the
the other part (the counterpart
seal of the said C D, the said A B now brings here into court, the date
whereof is the day and year aforesaid), the said A B did demise, lease,
D, his executors, administrators and
set and to farm let unto the said
assigns, a certain messuage or dwelling house, etc. situate, etc. to have and
to hold the said messuage or dwelling house, etc. with the appurtenances,
and assigns, from the —
unto the said C D, his executors, administrators,
years thence
^y of
, then last past, to the full end and term of
Yielding and paying
next ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended.
therefor yearly and every year, to the said A B, his heirs or assigns, the
at the four most
quarterly,
I. payable
clear yearly rent or sum of
usual feasts or days of payment of rent in the year (that is to say), on the
25th day of March, the 24th day of June, the 29th day of September and
the 25th day of December, in each and every year, by even and equal portions.
And the said C D did thereby for himself, his executors, administrators and
assigns, covenant, promise and agree, to and with the said A B, his heirs
and assigns, that he the said C D, his executors, administrators or assigns,
should and would well and truly pay, or cause to be paid, to the said A B,
I. at the several
his heirs or assigns, the said yearly rent or sum of
As by the said indenture reference being heredays and times aforesaid.
other things) more fully and at large appear.
unto had will (amongst
By virtue of which said demise, the said C D afterwards, to wit, on, etc
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tiie common law. It is claimed by defendants that a covenant is an instrument nnder seal, and that the action of
covenant is confined to sealed instruments.
This was generally so at common law, but the definition
is not accurate in the order of statement. Covenant at common law is an action upon a deed. It is only because a
deed at common law recLuireda seal that covenant has been
declared to lie upon a covenant or agreement under seal.
It is the question whether the instrument was a deed or not
that governs. All sealed instruments are deeds. But even
at common law a party could be held sometimes where he
had not affixed his own seal at^ all.. Thus the lessee in a
king's patent might be sued for covenant broken, although
he sealed no counterpart, because boimd by his acceptance.
''
'
Com. Dig. Covenant, ' Al. And in a lease to two persons,
one onlj;.,pf_whom sealed.^the. counterpart, , the same doctrine was laid down. Id., Co. Litt. 231a. Several other
cases are put in Comyn to the same effect. Implied covenants, before our statutes on the subject, came under this
rule.
In Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium, 146 A, where the writ
of covenant is explained, it is said that by the custom of
London covenant would lie ■v^ithout deedi And the same
customary exception appears to have existed elsewhere.
Com. Dig. Id.
It is declared by our statute (How. Stat. Par. 7778) that
no bond, deed of conveyance, or other contract in writing,
entered into and upon all and singulaT the said demised premises, with the
appurtenances, and became and was possessed
thereof, for the said term
BO to him thereof granted as aforesaid.
And although the said A B hath
always, from the time of making the said indenture, hitherto well and truly
performed, fulfilled and kept, according to the tenor and effect, true intent
and meaning of the said indenture, to wit, at, etc. aforesaid.
Yet protesting
that the said G D hath not performed, fulfilled or kept, anything in the
said indenture contained on his part and behalf, to be performed, fulfilled
and kept, according to the. tenor and effect, true intent and meaning thereof,
the said A B saith, that after the making of the said indenture, and during
the said term thereby granted, to wit, on, etc. at, etc. aforesaid, a large
I. of the rent aforesaid," for
sum of money, to wit, the sum of
years and a half of the said term then elapsed, became, and was, and still is
in arrear and unpaid, to the said A B, contrary to the tenor and effect, true
intent and meaning of the said indenture, and of the said covenant of the
said C D, by him in that behalf, so made as aforesaid, to wit, at, etc.
Ajid so the said A B in fact saith, that the said G D (although
aforesaid.
often requested so to do) hath not kept his said covenant so by him made
as aforesaid, but hath broken the same, and to keep the same with the
said A B hath hitherto wholly neglected and refused, and still doth neglect
I. and therefore he
and refuse, to the damage of the said A B of
brings his suit, etc" 2 Chitty on Pleading, 192.
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signed by any party, Ms agent or attorney, shall be deemed
invalid for want of a seal or scroll afiixed thereto by such

party.

At

common law the seal alone was the test of the
existence of a deed. Our statutes contemplate a signature
as equally necessary.
The statute just referred to indicates that some other thing than a seal may be cpnsidered,
and this can only be th e intention, of the parties as found
in the instrument itself, and the purpose it was intended
to serve.
There can be no doubt what the agreement before us
means. It uses the word "covenant" throughout to indicate what agreement the parties were making, which involved the sale and conveyance of lands when paid for. It
was provided that the covenants should bind the heirs of
the respective parties, as well as their representatives : and
it recited that the parties thereunto set their hands and
seals.
This language, and the whole contract taken together,
cannot be construed as intending anything else than what
would have been an agreement under seal or deed at common law. It is apparent that the failure to seal was inIt is the precise case intended by the statute,
advertent.
where an instrument purporting to be a deed is not sealed.
There is no ambiguity in the expressed intention.
The statute is in harmony with tlie general policy of our
law, which does not require any particular method of sealing, and permits anythingio be called a seal which is adoptfid-far-that-purpose. It does not put specialties and simple
contracts on the same footing, but it allows parties who
intend to make specialties to have their intent carried out.
In a case so plain as the one before us, there is no occasion
for prolonged discussion. The paper purports to be a deed,
and is a deed.

The judgmeMmitst, be. affirmed.*'^
History and Scope or the Action. "Covenant lies to recover dam fo r t.hn hrasiph nf n. fj^silpA promise (covenant) to do some particuJar
■aoli
'^venant lies when a man covenants with another by deed to do
something and does it not; or that he has done it, when it is not done.'
This remedy is the exact analogue of assumvsit.
[Com. Dig. Covenant.]
the only difference between the two actions being ttiat the latter action
lies for the breach of a simple promise , while covenant is maint ainable
42.

ages

'If" ^

^ specialt y.
must not be imagined that the requirement of a seal distinguished
The first covenxmts wera
the engagement of covenant in its early stages.

"^)^

"It
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mffrelT promises to do or to refrain from doin p; a. p aTticnl ^.r thiTipr- gnri
the engagement was Based
simply upon the agreement or convention of
the minds of the respective parties.
Neither a consideration, nor a writing,
nor a seal was deemed to be a material requisite in its make-up. Such being
the broad notion at first embodied in the covenant, it is to be surmised that
the king 's courts would be rather
slow in admitting its legal validity.
•
•
•
Such we find to have been the case.
' '
The writ was undoubtedly originally confined to covenants concerning
tenements.
It was the chief, if not S" '° roTnofly nt fViA l assflq aa ngr^inBt
his lessor, and was strictly an action upon a lease.
From the tenor of the
writ it would be surmised that specific performance of the covenant was
always granted; but evidently this could only be done when the covenant
coLcerned realty or specific chattels. Where the covenant was in fact capable
of being specifically enforced, either movables or immovables could be
recovered.
Where the covenant was purely personal, only damages could
be awarded;
for the king's court it seems, did not exercise that power of
personal coercion which at a later period was exercised by the court of
chancery.
' '

Although the plaintiff in a writ of covenant might recover speeifle
property where such was the subject-matter
of the covenant, it did not
follow that the action was a proprietary TBTnedy like detinue, or possessQ rg_^
like the assizes.
It was conceived to be founded purely on the obligation
created by the contract .
' '
Bracton, writing near the middle of the thirteenth century, observed that
the covenant was then acquiring some sort of standing in the king's courts.
It would have been impossible in his day to lay down any general principle
by which the validity of a particular covenant could be determined; for
no general limitation as regards either the form or the subject-matter
of
All that he could safely
the engagement had as yet been imposed upon it.
»
•
•
say was that the courts might enforce a covenant as a matter of favor.
' '
The principle that the covenant must be in writing under seal was
This rule first appeared, of
settled by the close nf the reign f>f TJIdward T.
How must the plaintitf in the writ
as a mere rule of evidence.
course,
Is the secta sufficient, or must there be a writing?
prove hifl covenantf
Uood reasons for an affirmative answer to this latter question can liO
doubt be given.
The secta as a mode of proof was rapidly falling into
disrepute.
[See Thayer on The Older Modes of Trial, 5 Harvard Law;
Eeview, 47 et seq., showing that the secta were merely supporters of the
plaintiff's case in advance of any answer of the defendant, to give it
preliminary standing, and were not proof -witnesses. — Ed.l Jury in' the
As a consequence legal machinery was wholly
modern sense there was none.
unequal to the task of sifting human testimony and arriving at the truth
Truly it would have been a
concerning a disputed verbal agreement.
dangerous innovation had the king's courts decided in Edward's day to
Considerations
of this nature were
meddle with all sorts of covenants.
decisive, and accordingly the courts imposed the condition that the covenant
must appear in a sufficiently solemn form to preclude dispute as to the terms
of the promise. Thereafter the making of a contract in this form required
technical learning and the service of a clerk.
' '
of a writing (and in this period writing meant a sea led
311ig re quiremRTit
hp riTily
instrumen )
ffriTiiiifa pn that has ever been imposed on~~ the covenant ' ' 3 Street on Foundations ot Legal Liability, 114-118.
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Supreme Court of Alabama.
6
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Porter,

1837,

201.

Action of covenant. Plaintiffs declared against defendant, in a plea of covenant broken; for that, whereas, on a
day certain, by an indenture made between the plaintiffs
of the one part, and the defendant of the other part, (which
indenture, sealed with the seals of the said parties, the
plaintiffs brought into court) the said plaintiffs, in consideration of a large sum of money, to be paid as thereinafter
mentioned, agreed with defendant, that James Wheeler and
Levi C. M'Cormick, should, within the space of five months,
from the first day of April then next, erect and build two
three-story brick buildings, to be located at the corner of
Dauphin and St. Joseph streets, in the city of Mobile, according to a plan drawn by Thomas Ellison, (which the
plaintiffs brought into court) — the said buildings to be
completed according to a certain description of dimensions,
by specifications, and of materials, therein particularly set
forth. * * * In consideration whereof, the defendant
covenanted and promised to and with the plaintiffs, well
and truly to pay or cause to be paid, to the said Wbeeler
and M'Cormick, the sum of eight thousand and six hundred
dollars, in the manner and at the periods following, to wit :
two thousand dollars, on putting up the joists of the second floor; two thousand, as soon as the buildings should
be covered; and two thousand and three hundred as soon
as the buildings should be completed, according to the

stipulations. * * *
And plaintiffs, in fact said, that said Wheeler and
M'Cormick did build and finish the said two three-story
brick buildings at the place described, according to the
drawing and plan by the specifications, of the dimensions,
and of the materials set forth in the indenture, (except as
would be thereinafter mentioned) the whole work being of
materials of good quality, and suitable condition, executed
in a faithful workman-like manner, and in full conformity
with the said stipulations. But at divers times, previous to
the first day of September, eighteen hundred and thirty-
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1

five, the said "Wheeler and M'Connick, did, at the special
request of the said defendant, ma^e divers alterations in
the said plan, to wit, in the hangings of the windows, in
paving the kitchens, in the making of extra windows, and
of fansashes for doors, and other alterations and deviations from said indenture.
And the said defendant did,
after the said first day of September, order the lower story
of the said buildings to be finished for the purpose of a public house, closets to, be made, the windows of the third stories to be cased, and the apartments thereof to be finished,
lathed and plastered, together with other improvements not
provided for by the said indenture — all of which the said
Wheeler and M'Cormick performed.
And the plaintiffs averred, that the said Wheeler and
M'Cormick did complete said buildings (including the additions aforesaid) in faithful and substantial compliance
with the stipulations of said indenture, as soon as they
could be completed, after the said first day of September,
to wit, on or before the first day of December, thereafter;
and the defendant received them, and was then, .and had
been, for a long time, in the full possession and enjoyment
of them, and of the rents and profits arising therefrom,.
Yet defendant had not paid said last mentioned sum of
twenty-three hundred dollars, last above mentioned.
Defendant craved oyer of the said supposed covenant,
and it was read to him, and he demurred to the declaration
*
•
*
generally, etc.
•

••••*«•*•

And afterwards, to wit, at June term, eighteen hundred
and thirty-six, came the parties, and the demurrer of said
defendant, to the plaintiffs' declaration being understood
by the court, it was considered by the court, that the de*
*
*
murrer should be overruled.
Several questions were raised in the
CoLLrEB, C. J.:
circuit court, upon the demurrers to the declaration and
pleas, which were so disposed of, as to make it necessary
for an issue of fact to be tried by the jury, who found a
verdict for the plaintiffs, on which judgment was rendered.
At the trial, a biU of exceptions was taken by the defendant
below, who prosecutes a writ of error to this court, and
assigns the judgment on the demurrers, and the decision
of the court excepted to, as causes for reversal.
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shall only consider the sufficiency of the declaration,
which presents the question, whether an action of covenant will lie upon an agreement under seal, (to perform
certain work) which has heen modified, or the time of performance enlarged by parol.
Covenant can only be maintained upon a writing under
seal. If a contract be unattested by a seal, or is unwritten,
the action by which redress can be had, for a nonperformance, is debt or assumpsit, or either, according to the subIf new terms are introduced into a contract,
ject-matter.
other duties imposed, or another day provided for its consummation, it is clear, that the original contract does not
remain unimpaired, so that an action would lie for a breach
of its stipulations. —If then, no action could be maintained
upon the original contract, when thus modified, we think
it foUows, that the present action is misconceived. For
"We

though the modifications, are set out in the declaration, yet
they are to be shown by parol, and can not, according to
the premises, we have assumed, be made the basis, either
in whole or in part of an action of covenant.
The case of Litler v. Holland, 3 T. B. 590, was an action
of covenant, upon an agreement under seal, to build two
houses by a certain day. It appeared on the trial, that the
time of performance was enlarged by parol, and that the
houses were built within the enlarged time. This evidence,
it was held, did not support the allegation in the declaration, and the plaintiff was nonsuited.

In Philips

Rose, 8 Johns. 392, the plaintiff agreed
to build an oil mill within a prescribed time, which was enlarged by parol, and the work completed within the enlarged time. The court held that evidence of the enlargeAnd in Jewell et
ment would not support the declaration.
al. V. Schroeppel, 4 Cow. 565, the court consider the law
as settled, "that the plaintiffs, inasmuch as they had not
performed, within the time stipulated, by the original contract, could not recover upon the covenants contained in
it They could not, in such an action, give evidence of an
et al. v.

extension of the time."

In Langworthy

Wend. 587, the Supreme Court
of New York reaffirm the previous decisions of that court,
on the point, and consider it as beyond doubt, that a parol
agreement to enlarge the time for the performance of covev.

Smith,

2
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nants, is good; and that by an enlargement, the remedy
upon the covenant itself, is lost, and must be sought upon
the agreement enlarging the time of the performance.
In the case at bar, the declaration shows that the contract was so materially varied, and the labor of the defendants so greatly increased, that they could not perform it
untU several months after the expiration of the day therefor appointed. It will, therefore, follow that the action
cannot be maintained, and that the plaintiffs must resort
to their remedy upon the parol agreement; making the
covenant, so far as material, inducement to the action.
'The judgment is reversed.

TAYLOR

V.

WILSON.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
5

1844.

Iredell Law, 214.

This was an action- of covenant on the following instrument executed by the defendant's testator to the plaintiff:

"To all to whom these presents shall come: I, William
Wilson, of the county of Northampton, and State of North
Carolina ; Know ye that I, the said William Wilson, for,
and in consideration
of the natural love and affection
which I have and bear unto my friend, Richard W. Taylor,
of the county and State aforesaid, and for divers other

good causes and considerations me hereunto moving, have
given and granted, and by the presents do give and grant
unto the said Richard W. Taylor, to take effect after my
death, the sum of five hundred dollars, to have, hold and
enjoy all and singular the said sum of five hundred dollars
aforesaid, unto the said Richard W. Taylor, his executors,
administrators and assigns, to the proper use and behoof
of him the said Richard W. Taylor, his executors, administrators and assigns forever. And I, the said William
Wilson, all and singular the aforesaid smn of five hundred
dollars, to take effect at my death aforesaid, to the said
Richard W. Taylor, his executors, administrators and assigns against all persons whatsoever, shall and will warrant and forever defend by these presents. In witness
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whereof, etc.

Dated the 23d of January, 1837, and signed
and sealed bj William Wilson.
The said Wilson died sometime before this snit was
brought, having made a will in which he appointed an executor, who refused to qualify, whereupon the defendant
was appointed administratrix with the wiU annexed. On
the trial it was urged, that no recovery could be had on the
instrument in question. The jury, under the instructions
of the court, returned a verdict_fgrj^,e_plaiiitiff.
Judgment having been rendered pursuant to this verdict, the
defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Daniel, J.: * * * Secondly, it is said, that debt and
not covenant is the proper remedy, if it is to be considered
as a contract for money. The answer we give is, that debt
and covenant are concurrent remedies for the recovery of
any money demand, when there is an express or implied
contract in any instrument under seal to pay it; but in^eneraJ, debt is the preferable remedy, as in that form of action the judgment is final in the first instance, if the defendant do not plead ; see 2 Stephens N. P. 1057. The judgment must be affirmed.*^
Judgment affirmed.
not, tlip aaeient rale.
Pollock and Maitland, speaking of
this action, say that aftRr tho Hfntnf w nf AVnles. 1284. a
of
the development
limitation ' ' soon becomes apparent, and it is a very curious one. The action
Qf_CQsenant c annot be employed for the recovery of a debt, even though
•
•
•
The
the existence of the debt is a.ttested by a sealed instrumen t.
TpasnTi
m\e,
actioTi
ia
a.
a
has
law is economica l: the tact that
m^n
fnr_nrit
giving him anothe r. ' ' 9. History nf English Lavr, 217,
"Strange as it may seem,
And Ames, in his History of Assumpsit, says:
43.

This

W3.H

covenant was not the normal remedy upon a covenant to pay a defini te
Such a covenant being regarded as a gran t
amount of money "j phattflla.
of the "inTlpy /^T <.iiottq]f|^ d ebt was the a ppropriate action , tor tneir recovery.
The writer has discovered no ease in which a plaintiff succeeded in an
action of covenant, where the claim was for a sum certain, antecedent
to the seventeenth century; but in an action of debt upon such a claim,
in the Queen's Bench, in 1585. 'it was holden by the court that an action
nf cnveTiftn t lay upon it, an YfP^^ a" in ifitiQ" "f "lebt, at the election of
[Anon., 3 Leon. 119.] The same right of election was conthe plaintiff .'
that the
eeded by the court in two eases in 1609. in terms which indicate
2 Harvard Law B ev. 66.
privilege was of recent introduction

."
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ASSTIMPSIT.**

Special Assumpsit.**

CALDBECK

v.

SIMANTON.

SupremS Court of Vermont.
82

Vermont,

1908.

69.

_Ca§fijEQiLfal§£„waxranty:.
Plea, the general issue. Trial
by jury at the June Term, 1907, Caledonia County,
Miles, J., presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant excepted. During the trial^ before the
plaintiff rested, and again at the close of all the evidence,
the defendant moved to dismiss the case because the action is founded on contract, and the writ^was issugd-as. a
44.
"This action is so called from the word Assumpsit, which, wten the
pleadings were in Latin, was always inserted in the declaration as descriptive of the defendant's undertaking.
It may be defined to be an action
for the recovery of damages for the nonperformance of a parol or simple
contract, or, in other words, a contract not under seal nor of record, circumstances which distinguish this remedy from others; for the action of
debt is, in legal consideration, for the recovery of a debt eo nomine, and
in numero, and is most frequently brought upon a deed, and the action
of covenant, though in form for the recovery of damages, can only be
supported by a contract under seal.
Assumpsit, however, is not sustainable
unless there have been an express contract or unless the law will imply a
contract." 1 Chitty on Pleading (6th London Ed.) 98.
45.
Declaration in Special Assumpsit. "For that whereas, heretofore,
to wit, on, etc. at, etc. in consideration that the said A B being then and
there sole and unmarried, at the special instance and request of the said
C D, had then and there undertaken, and faithfully promised ^he said
D
to marry him the said C D, he the said CD undertook, and then and there
faithfully promised the said A B to marry her the said A B, and the said
A B avers, that she, confiding in the said last-mentioned promise and undertaking of the said C D, hath always from thence hitherto remained and
continued, and still is, sole and unmarried, and hath been, for and dming
all the time last aforesaid, and still is, ready and willing to marry him
the said C D, to wit, at, etc. aforesaid, and although a reasonable time
D to marry the ' said A B hath elapsed since the making
for the said
of the said last-mentioned promise and undertaking last aforesaid.
And
although the said A B, after the making of the said last-mentioned promise
and undertaking of the said
D, to wit; on, etc. at, etc. aforesaid, requested
D to marry her the said A B, yet the said C D not regarding
the said
his last-mentioned promise and undertaking, but contriving, and fraudulently
intending craftUy and subtly to deceive and defraud the said A B in this
respect, did not, nor would, at the said tinae when he was so requested,
as last aforesaid, or at any time before or afterwards, marry the said A B,
but on the contrary thereof, he the said C D at the said time when he was
wholly refused then or ever to marry her
so requested as last aforesaid,
To the damage, etc." 2 Chitty on
the said A B, to wit, at, etc. alforesaid.

Pleading,

91.
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cae^^s^auiiJM. defendant's body .arrested thereon. The
motion was overruled, and the defendant excepted.
MuNSON, J. : The plaintiff declares in substance that he
JbaTgBinedjdih--lhe-€«fend^^
purchase of a .dia.'mond, and that the defendant sold him the diamond for a
certain price by "falsely and jradulently -warranting" it
to be a_pfir fect s tone^ wheaT in fact it was not a perfect
stone, but defective in certain respects stated ; and that the
defendant thereby "falsely and fraudulently deceived
him." The service was by arrest, and the case stands on a
motion to dismiss.
The defendant argues that no scienter
is alleged, that the d eclaration is in case for a breach^of
warrantyj^and there could be no recovery, without proving
£Ee~warranty, and that this conclusively determines that
•
""the action is founded on coiitract. , • *
•

•**♦*#•••

Personal actions are either for breaches ofjeontract, or
for wrongs unconnected with contract; gssimipsit being in
the first class, and case in the second. CMtty 97. The original action on the'case, permitted in suits for which the established forms were not adapted, was not similar to the
present action of assumpsit, but resembled rather the present form of a declaration in case for a tort. Chitty 99.
It was_atJirRt difficulLtajdiatingHish ,q>s sump sit from case ;
and the early decisions in actions on warranties were made
before the boundary between the two remedies was well
defined. Note to Chandelor v. Lopus, 1 Smith Lead. Cas.
178.
The practice of .declaring mtortfpr warranty broken
originated in this early period; and the remedy tiien
adopted continued in almost exclusive use until the middle
of the eigSteStrcentury." As late as 1778, Lord Mansfield considered an action of assumpsit for a breach of
warranty so peculiar that he reserved the question of its
sufficiency; and this method of declaring was then authoritatively sanctioned. Stuart v. Wilhins, 1 Doug. 17.^ Since_
th en assumpsit and case have been recognized as concurrent remedies foTJite&cM'^T^^'s^&^i^T '^wllU^^
3 Vt 53; 19 Enc. PI. and
son;j'E&:st.^m^,'^WmmvrBucli,
Pr. 82 and cases cited.

Closely connected with the sujbject of warranty is that
The twO grOUnds
j^f ^P.PP.\i q,pTTriiri7^1fr-pt. rppresftnt.flt.iririg
of liability are entirely distinct, but both may be developed
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by one aflSrmation. The evidence may make the affirmation
•
*
*
either a deceit or a warranty or both.

The recognition

of assumpsit and case as concurrent
remedies for breach of warranty, and the decision in Williamson V. Allison regarding the scienter, have led to the
adoption of forms confessedly designed to enable the plaintiff to recover for a breach of warranty or for deceit, as the
A short declaration,, framed in this
case might develop.
was
double aspect,
used in Beeman v. Buch, 3 Vt. 53, 21
Am. Dec. 571 ; Vail v. Strong, 10 Vt. 457 ; West v. Emery,
17 Vt. 583, 44 Am. Dec. 356; Goodenough v. Snow, 27 Vt.
This declaration,
720 ; and Pinney v. Andrus, 41 Vt. 631.
given in full in the case first cited, avers that the defendant
deceitfully sold the property by warranting it to be as de*
*
*
This
scribed, ''well knowing" it to be otherwise.
form was followed in Harlow v. Green, 34 Vt. 379, and was
apparently the basis of the declaration in Whitton v. Goddard, 36 Vt. 730. The direct allegation of knowledge contained in the phxaaa- "Fell knowing" QX-itS-fiipiKal^it, is
ordinarily employed in dec larations which clajm_a recovery
on the ground. jof_deceit,_ and its_ absence from ■^ dec lar a,tion used iereis the basis-of4he defendant's claim.

But the precise question has

been adjudged in this State,
In Foster v. Caldwithout
consideration.
although
special
well's Est., 18 Vt. 176, the declaration alleged in substance
that the deceased sold the plaintiff a number of sheep by
falsely and fraudulently warranting them to be sound when
in fact they were diseased, and that the deceased deceived
the plaintiff in the sale; but there was no allegation that
The verdict
the deceased knew the sheep were unsound.
taken was in tort, and the court allowed it to be amended,
after the panel was dismissed, by striking out the words
"is guilty," and inserting the words "did assume ajid promise." In sustaining the action it was said: "There is no/
alleg aiion-of a scienter in the declaration, and consequently
»
*
*
for a deceit, notwitUthere can be no recovery
standing the declaration is, in form, in case for a false wap

ranty."

The phraseology of our standard forms reflects the indefiniteness of distinction which prevailed in the formative

_.
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period of the common law, and this is true to some extent
of the language of commentators comparatively modem.
Blackstone, writing about 1758, after speaking of the
beating of another and the taking of another's goods as
trespasses, proceeds:
"So also, nonperformance of promises or undertakings is a trespass, upon which an action of
trespass on the case in assumpsit is grounded." The subject may be briefly reviewed and further elucidated in the
words of the note to Chandelor v. Lopus, 2 Smith's Lead.
Cas. 187, Am. ed. 1847, where it is said in connection with
a consideration of Williamson v. Allison and kindred cases :
"Originally actions upon breaches of warranty, as well as
of all other promises, were substantially, as well as nominally, actions on the case, which went upon the ground of
deceit, and set forth the undertaking of the defendant, and
the consideration by which it was supported, for the purpose of establishing a fraud on his part, and a consequent
legal injury to the plaintiff.
But in modern times the distinction between asswmpsit and case has become as well established as that between trespass and covenant, and it is
not easy to see why it should be disregarded m the single
instance of actions such as those we have just been considering." It may also be said that there is no plainer distinction in the law than that between breach of warranty
and deceit; and the law .BCLjnQre-Jja plies deceit from a
brea ch of warranty than it does from a breach of covenant
for CTle or from tlie~nonperf ormance . of , a , contract oT
iuretyship.
The" difference between assumpsit and case as remedies
for wrongs of this character was comparatively of little
importance when our earliest cases upon the subject were
decided. The subsequent abolishment of imprisonment for
debt has introduced an element which cannot be ignored in
reviewing the subject at this date. It is not necessary to
consider further the construction, technicalities and classification of the different forms employed, nor to anticipate
the questions of practice that may arise in connection with
their use. It is enough to say that if a plaintiff wishes to
proceed by arrest he must allege a case that entitles him to
arrest. That right cannot be given by mere form or classiThe test must be in the nature of the action as
fication.
determined by i^substance . It is said in Beema/n v. Buck,
'Fnr53r2r~Am. Uec sVl, that assumpsit is supported by
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is

is

is

it

is

and that
proof of the sale, a warranty, and the breach of
more
If
the
required in tort.
declaration in tori
nothing
requires the same and only the same proof as the one in
assumpsit,
manifestly a declaration in tort only in
name. The declaration before us
so framed that nothing
more
required.
It discloses a varranty false, in Jact,
hutjiot J.alse to. the knowledge of the warrantor. If the
plamtiff..recQyers upon this declaratioii-it..will .be. aol^j^fe:^
force of the cont ract. Proof of fra ud was not pertinentjfl._
the issue presented.

JMdgM§Viij'^VJ^TlMi~
nrrit dismissed.*"
■

niation~i0~dismi&s^-

stistamedi- oneL-

3

it

2

46.
The delictual origin of assumpsit has been demonstrated by several
writers: "The gist of the action," says Ames in his History of Assumpsit,
Harv. L. R. 14, was "the deceit in breaking a promise on the faith of
which the plaintiff had been induced to part with his money or other property." It was merely an action on the case for deceit, and only by slow
Street on Foundations
degrees did
develop into a non-tortious action. — See
The declaration in assumpsit decribes the action
of Legal Liability, 178.
as "trespass on the case upon promises. —Carrol v. Green (1875) 92 U. S,
513.

Supreme

Court
10

of

y

THOMPSON

V.

FRENC H.

Tennessee.

1837.

Terger, 453.

is

is

^

Mr, Justice Ttjrley delivered the opinion of the court.
an action of^ebt broug ht by the defendant in
Th
error^ to recover compensation for services rendered the

is

a

a

a

a

general superinplaintiff's intestate in his lifetime, as
tendent of his property and busiaess. The declaration contains the indebitatus count for work and labor done, and
quantum meruit for the same services. The
count upon
pleas are nil debet and the statute of limitations. The jury
found verdict for the defendant in error, upon which th?e
court gave judgment, and to reverse which this writ of error
prosecuted.

The proof shows abundantly that Wm. P. French, the
plaintiff in the circuit court, was assiduously engaged is
attention to the business of Thomas Hopkins, the intestate,
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it

s
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a

o

is

.j

is

g

is

e

H

is

is

a

a

r

it

a

is

1

p

.;<

almost continually from tlie year 1821 to the year 1836, but
jgithont a,Tiy SEgci al contrac t as to the amount or nature of'
the compensationT;o be given therefor, and out of this the
first cause of error is assigned, viz., that the action of debt
■^ not the proper remedy, because, 1st, the,
damages beia&.
uncertain,
the
proper
is assumpremedy
3filiaHida±£iand
sit, and not debt; and, 2nd, the action is not_m aintain able
against an administrator upon the simple~contract or"ES"
"
'^
mtes^ate, by the pnneiple's ofThe~'common law.
That the "actions of debt and indebitatus assvm ysit axe
c oncurrent remedies in case of simple contracts for the payment of money, either express or implied, has been so repeatedly held that itTs deemed "unnecessary to enter into
an examination of the authorities in support of the proposition, and we are satisfied with a reference to the case of
Hickman v. Searcy's Executor, 9 Terg. 47, where this point
is expressly so adjudicated by this court.
That indebitatus assumpsit is a proper remedy to re- .
cover compensation for work and labor done cannot be denied — indeed (if the action of debt be not proper), it is
the only remedy where the amount of compensation has not
been ascertained by express agreement, for no special count
in assumpsit can be framed upon a promise arising by implication of law. The special counts in assumpsit are given
to recover damages for the nonperformance of contracts
speciall y entere d into, and whether the consideration be
executed or executory makes no difference.
The conimon
counts are founded on express or implied promises to pay
money in consideration of a pre rodenL and tJxisLlng -dgbt ,
and in general the consideration mus t have be6ry.e:^cute"d
not eXecuLury, and thti plaIiLliff~must have been .entitled to
ayment in m oneyT
Chit. PI. 373. So^that the indebitatus count m assumpsit
no more the proper remedy to
nliquidated
recover u
damages arising from the nonperspecial contract than w ould be the action
formance ,of
of debt. /But
said that the action of debt^will only
certain, or
fo
sum which
capable of bein readily
redi j^ced to certain ty This, as a general principle,
true
but, extended_t the length to whichit
sought to be carried, would be entirely subversive of the action of debt as
remedy upon impjg_cont racts, where the amount to be paid
has not been ascertained by express agreement, or would
inake the right to use
depend, not upon legal principles,
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but upon the nature and character of the proof to be adduced upon the trial, and the ease or difficulty with which
the value of services performed or the goods delivered
It is not denied that the
could be ascertained thereby.
action will lie for goods, wares, and merchandise sold and
delivered, and for work and labor done, although there be
no express agreement as to the amount to be paid. This
court cannot, therefore, say that the test is the difSculty of
ascertaining the value of the goods sold and delivered, and
the work and labor done, because they may be of a kind and
character about which men may well differ in opinion.
It is not to be denied that there is some confusion produced in the books, relative to the use of this action, by the
" eo nomine" ''in numero,"
employment of such terms as
and "unliquidated damages."
But it is well settled that,
although a specific sum must be demanded in the declaration, a less mav be re covered, and that althou^[hJn^l cases
of _goods, war ea._a nd merch andiSfilaaH- and -delivered, andof w ork and labor do ne, where the law implies the promise
because the consideration is executed, the damages are of
But
necessity unliquidated, yet the action is maintainable.
this confusion is produced either by loose use of the phrases
By " eo_
or by giving them an improper construction.
and "Ju^numero" is only meant that a specific
^^^omine"
sum IS sou^t jbo be recovered which is imprope rly^detained,
~
and that_^e actiondo es not S Q i m i^ ^"Ti- daTnaq-n s as-4Qea the
a ction^ assumpsW rJ^s drawing the proper line oF"3e^
marcation between 'them, as applicable to contracts of the
character under consideration. By the word§_" unliquidated
damag es" is manifestly meant (if there be any meahing in
'what is most unquestionably a very loose use of words)
such d amages as are sustained by the nonperform ance of
an executory contra ct, which cannot be considered as a
m oney de mand, and the amount of which may depend upon
such a v ariety of g onsidg£g fioPS a nd circumstances as to
render it exceedingly , diSeuIt to 15e ascertained. To illustrate it by an example, suppose a contract for the building
of a house, which is not performed, or performed in a manner different from the contract, the damages sustained are
"unliquidated," and such as are not readily reduced to a
certainty, and for which neither indebitatus assumpsii nor
debt will lie.
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The principle, then, established by ns is this:
mt in
ail cases where -the- consideration has been executed, and
where therQ_ is an express or implied pronjise to pay in
money the value thereof, indebitatus assumpsit or debt is
the proper remedy. But that in all those cases where the
consideration is not executed, or, if it be, and the promise to
be performed in consideration thereof is not to pay in money,
but to do some othe T,J3ams,.Jb3L J^either indebitatus as'
sumpsit no..dftbt_5all lie and that the remedy is by a special
action on the case.

Upon the whole, we think there is no error in the rendition of the judgment in the court below, and direct its affirmance.

jment affirmed.

NORTH

V.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
37 Connecticut,

y

^

NICHOLS.

1870.

375.

«^^

^

^Assumpsit for rent of leas.ed premises; brought to the
'Superior Court in Fairfield county, and tried to the jury,
* * *
on the general issue, before Gbangeb,

J.

Pabk, J. :
The action was brought to recover the rent of certain
premises situated in the city of New York, from the first
day of July, 1867, to the first day of October of the same
year. The rent had accrued by virtue of a certain Jease of
the premises in writing, under seal.- in which there were
mutual covenants to be performed by the parties thereto,
and executed by the defendants, as the party of the second
part, and one John H. Glover as the party of the first part.
*

*

*

This contract prescribes the amount of rent to

be

paid,

and the times when payment should be made, and if the defendant failed to pay the rent in controversy he faUed to
pay it according to the terms of the written lease.
this is so the plaintiff cannot sustain his action of
assumpsit, for that action wiU not lie where .Jiie_sa!iafi_fl£
action ariggsnipop-ar-cOTrtfacf under seal -

If

t
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1

Judge Swift, in the first volume of his Digest, on the
574th page, eays, in commenting upon the action of assumpsit, "It will not lie upon contracts under seal, or by record,
which distinguishes it from debt and covenant."
This is
saying, in other words, that assumpsit will not lie where
the subject-matter in controversy arises upon a contract under seal. So, also, upon the 417th page, he says that " where i
there is a deed under seal, containing a cov&nant to pay the
rent, the action must be either covenant or debt. ' ' This is
So also upon the
precisely the case under consideration.
"
576th page, he says,
Where ^a party has a ^gcuiitj_Qf_a^igh^_nature,Jie~rDjistJgundJds_a«$ioh thereon; and as the
law has prescribed different forms of action on different
securities, assumpsit cannot be supported where there has
been an express promise under seal or of record; but the
party must proceed in debt or covenant where the contract
is under seal." The following authorities are equally explicit and to the same effect. 1 Chitty on Pleading, 98, 344;
Barry v. Ryan, 4 Gray, 523 ; Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush., 337 ;
Codm<m v. Jenkins, 14 Mass. 93.

V

BOSTON INDIA EUBBEE FACTOEY v. HOIT.
Supreme Court of Vermont.
14

92.

p

is^

judicial jjouj
.4s5MiM|wi,Lupojiua4Mdgmefflt-jQil4iie.supj:em^
of Massachusetts. .. The defendant demurred to the declaration and the county court adjudged it insufficient.
Theplaintiffs excepted.
EedfieijD, J. : The only question to be determined in this
case
wh£i3l£i-^n^ aatinn, .of jissumpsit wiU lie ja on the ,
judgment oi-a court xjfTreCOTd" of one of the states in the_
American Union._^
.^t a long_sett led rule of the common law, that such ac^
tion wdll4ieiapDiLA_for^gajjuigmeftt.
Thii
almost the.
only rule, which can be considered as satisfactorily settled
in the English courts, in regard to foreign judgments.
is

is

,

Vermont,

1842.
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For although it appear by

the record of the foreign court,
that the court had jurisdiction both of the subject-matter
in controversy, and of the person of the defendant, and that
the proceedings were in all respects regular, yet all this
Diay _be_, contradicted JajL-jQral evidence, addressed to the
jury, and the effect of the adjudication depend upon the
opinion entertained by the jury, upon these points.
So
that the proper form of action is assumpsit, or debt on simple contract, where, under the plea of non a ssiirnvsit. ov .nil
debet, any of these (questions may be -raised-and. submitted
*
*
*
^~to the jury, under the charge of the court.

And it is equally plain why assumpsit, or debt on simple contract, would not be appropriate to the case of a
domestic judgment. In declarin g upon a domestic judg-__
ment, we count upon TE.Q~evtc[mce and„not upon tha^con'
tract. The regular statement of the debet and detinet is
Indeed necessary, but is only an inference from the statement of the record, which precedes, and is not strictly traversable, under the general issue. That goes to the premises and not the inference, or conclusion. The same is true
in declaring upon specialties, and in all cases where the
evidence itself is made profert of, as in the case of letters
testamentary, of specialties, and of records. Tn such cRaea ,
Jhe general issue denies the existence of the evidence, as
non esT factum and nul tiel record. And aIthough,~in the
case of specialties, the fact is determined by the jury, yet '
in that case the issue is narrowed to the single fact "of the
existence of the evidence. So in the case of domestic judgments, the rnqui ry' is not whether the court mad e such a
__Judgment, and whetherj;]iey Md lj«isdl&f lOn^aLitijeLi^^iSL
""luiSr of lEeparties, and took regTilar proceedings, but
—whether there is sucb record7~asTEardecrared^JipuMi,™aS3^"'
this question is det ermined by the court upon in spection of
the record or the exemplification, and this exclusive^^of^l^
But in the case of a foreign jutj gTnpnt^ tha
"^o^feeas- proof.
declaration is upon the contract, and not _upon_the reaord^
or evidence^ ^. ^o Drofert of the record, in such case, need
be made, and if made, will be treated as surplusage.
have gone thus minutely
Walker v. Witter, Doug. K. 1.
into the distinctions between foreign and domestic judgments in order to show the reason why assumpsit wiU lie
in the case of the former, and not in that of the latter.

J

J

I
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It only remains

to determine to which of these classes the
apprecase now under consideration properly belongs.
hend there can be but one opinion upon this subject, if we
regard the constitution and legislation of the United States,
and especially the decisions of the United States supreme
court in regard to the matter. The provision of the United
States Constitution is (Art. IV, Sec. 1), "Full_fai^_aauicredit shall be given in each state to the pftbiifi- acts, refiz™
*
ords, and judicial proceedings of eveiy other state. ^
These cases fully settled the doctrine that the judgment declared upon in this case
record, conse quentlv the dec- _
laration upon
must Jia upon the record^ i.'e. th PfVidencB^
and not, as in the case of
for eign judgment, upon the
contract; that the declaration should be^companied with
a prof ert of the record, or an exemplification thereof, which
will be verified only by inspection of the court, on the plea
of nul tiel record. * * * "VV^e think md tiel record
the
only general issue, and that being the case, an action of
assimipsit- cannot be— maiBtaJBed-a mon such judgment.
*

_*

a

is

a

p,

it

is

'_'

I

'

Judgment affirmed.

(h) general Assumpsit. *'^

X

,

King's Bench.

4

Court

of

_SLAI1E.'S CASE,

1602,

CoJce, 92b.

a

t

John Blade brought an action on he case in the King's
Bench against Humphrey Morley (which plea began Hil.
38 Eliz. Eot. 305), and declared, that whereas the plaintiff,
10th of November, 36 Eliz., was possessed of
close of land
in Haliburton, in the county of Devon, called Eack Park,
containing by estimation eight acres for the term of divers
,

,

,

I.

,

C

C

,

C

47.
Declabations in General Assumpsit. Indeiitatus Assumpsit.
"For
D on the — day of
that whereas the said
in the year of our Lord
in the county of
at
was indebted to the said A B in the
sum of
of the lawful money of Great Britain, for divers goods,
wares, and merchandise, by the said A B before that time sold and delivered
D, and at his special instance and request, and being so
to the said
D in consideration thereof, afterwards, to wit, on the
indebted, he the said
aforesaid, undertook and then and
day and year last aforesaid, in
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years then and yet to come, and being so possessed, tlie
plaintiff the said 10th day of November, the said close had
so-wed with wheat and rye, which wheat and rye, 8 Maii,
37 Eliz., were grown into blades, the defendant, in consideration that the plaintiff, at the special instance and request of the said Humphrey, had bargained and sold to him
the said blades of wheat and rye growing upon the said
close (the tithes due to the rector, etc., excepted) assumed
^Sd ^promised the plaintiff to pay him 161. at the Feast of .
St. John the Baptist then to cbtae : and for the""Hon payme nt
thereof at the said Feast of St. John Baptist, the plaintiff
brought the said action : the defendant pleaded non assumpsit modo et forma; and on the trial of this issue the jurors
gave a special verdict, sc. that the defendant bought of
the plaintiff _the- wheat and rye inblades growing upon the
there faithfully promised the said A B to pay him the said last-mentioned
sum of money, when he the said C D should be thereunto afterwards
requested.
''
Nevertheless the said C D, not regarding his said promise and undertaking, but contriving and fraudulently intending, craftily and subtly to
deceive and defraud the said A B, in this behalf, ~hath not as yet paid the
said sum of money, or any part thereof, to the said A B, although often
D to pay him the same hath hitherto
requested so to do. But the said
To the
wholly neglected and refused, and still doth neglect and refuse.
I. and therefore he brings his suit, etc."
damage of the said A B of
2 Chitty on Pleadings, pp. 5, 16, 44.
the action be brought for work and labor, use and occupation, money
lent, money paid, money had and received, etc., the same form is used,
substituting such allegation for the one used above. But in the count for
money had and received no request need be alleged.
"For that whereas the said C D on the — day of
Quantum valebant.
Lord
, at
, in the county of
, in conof
our
in
the
year
,
sideration that the said A B, at the special instance and request of the said
C D, had before that time sold and delivered divers goods, wares and
merchandise, to the said C D, he the said C D undertook and then and there
faithfully promised to said A B to pay him so much money as the lastmentioned goods, wares and merchandise, at the time of the said sale and
delivery thereof, were reasonably worth, when he the said C D should be
And' the said A B avers that the lastthereunto afterwards requested.
mentioned goods, wares and merchandise, at the time of the said sale and
I. of lawful money
delivery thereof were reasonably worth the sum of
of Great Britain, to wit, at, etc. aforesaid, whereof the said C D afterwards,
to wit, on, etc. aforesaid, there had notice.
"Nevertheless the said C D, not regarding his said promise and undertaking, but contriving and fraudulently intending, craftily and subtly to
deceive and defraud the said A B, in this behalf, hath not as yet paid
the said sum of money, or any part thereof, to the said A B, although often
D to pay him the same hath hitherto
requested so to do. But the said
To the
doth neglect and refuse.
and
still
and
refused,
wholly neglected
I. and therefore he brings his suit, etc."
damage of the said A B of
2 Chitty on Pleading, pp. 6, 16, 44.
.
■ e
y.
Same as quantum valebant, except that it is for work
Quantum meruit.
B to pay him so much money as he
and labor, and allege a promise to
2 Chitty on Pleadtherefor reasonably deserved to have of the said

If

"A
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said close as is aforesaid, prout in the said declaration is
alleged, and further found, that between the plaintiff and
the defendant there was no other promise or assumpjiQn_
but only the said bargain; and against the"maintenance of
this action divers "objecGTons were made by John Dodderidge of counsel with the defendant. 1. That the plaintiff
upon this bargain might have ordinary remedy by action
of _debt, which is an action formed in the register, and therefore he should not have an action on the case, which is an
extraordinary action, and not limited within any certain
form in the register. • * * And as t6 these objections,
the Courts of King^s Bench and Common Pleas were divided; for the Justices of the King's Bench held, that the
action (notwithstanding such objections) was maintainable,
and the Court of Common Pleas held the contrary. And
for the honour of the law, and for the quiet of the subject
in the appeasing of such diversity of opinions {quia nil in
lege vitolerabilins est eandem rem diverso jure censeri)
the case was openly argued before all the Justices of England, and Barons of the Exchequer, sc. Sir John Popham,
Knt. C. J. of England, Sir Edm. Anderson, Knt. C. J. of
the Common Pleas, Sir W. Periam, Chief Baron of the
Exchequer, Clark, Gawdy, Walmesley, Fenner, KingsmiiIl, Savil, Waeburton, and Yelverton, in the Exchequer
Chamber, by the Queen's Attorney-General for the plaintiff, and by John Dodderidge for tlio defendant, and at another time the case was argued at Serjeant's Inn, before
all the said justices and Barons, by the Attorney-General
for the plaintiff,' and by Francis Bacon for the defendant,
and after many conferences between the justices and Barons, it was resolved, that the action was maintainable, and
And in this case
that the plaintiff should have judgment.
although
1,
were
That
resolved:
an action
points
these
of, debt lies upon, the contrac t^ yet tbe b argainor may Jiave
an action onjbecasc, or an action of debt at his election
*
*
*
3,
was
and that for three reasdiis"6T causes.
resolved, that every contract executory imports jn, itsel f an^
assumpsit, for. jwhBn^ one., agrees Jto^ pay money, or, to dfc.
liver anything^ thereby he assumes or promises to, pay, or
deliver
and therefore when one sells any goods to anotner, and agrees to deliver them at a day to come, and
the other in consideration thereof agrees to pay so much ,
day, in that case both parties may have
money at such
a

it,

jt
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debt, or an action on the case on assumpsit, for
an^ction
~tEe niutuarexecutory agreenaent of both parties imports in
itself reciprocal actions upon the case, as well as actions
of debt, and therewith agrees the judgment in Reed and
Norwood's case, PI. Com. 128^ 4. It was resolved, that
the plaintiff,iiLthis acti^a. on the case o n gggttwiPgi^ should
not recover only damages for the speoaT loss (iTlUry
be)
which he had, but also for the whole debt, so that a recov-JIXJSr.!barjnJbia.adiQn-a]iQ^d ^^^ ^ood bar in an action
of debt_brou£hi^upon Jhe^SBume contract; so vice versa, a
recovery or bar in an„,ajction_o.f debt, Is a good bar in an
action oh the case on assumpsit.
Vide 12 E. 4. 13 a. 2 E.
3. 14. (32) 33 H. 8. Action sur le Case. Br. 105. • • • ^s

"In

the early actions upon a promis n tn p-iv n iIpH it T ras necessary
show that the prninlsn was ma'de "after the debt was created ^
['For
he promises at the time of the contract,
then debt lies on this [promise]
and not assumpsit; but if he promises after the contract then action lies
•
•
* In Blade's Case
on the assumpsit.' — ^Dalison, 84, pi. 35, 14, Eliz.]
w^l-^t^uspJl
■tha qn^pt'f?"
whftthftr the action of assumpsit coulfi hfl mainlined npoD a fiimpln (\ph% vyithont proof of a subsequent express promise
The argument in Norwood v. Read had contained the suggestion that 'every
contract executory is an assumpsit in itself.'
This view was now accepted,
and, after full argument
before all the judges of England and barons
of the Exchequer, it was held in the King's Bench t hat assumvsit will lie
out proof of a promise .
This holding proceeds
_ upon any simple debt
"on the idea that the creation of a simple debt can be viewed in a double
duty on which debt will lie,_
aspect, viz., (1) as originating a contractual
and ( 2) as importing a promise on wnieh assumpsit yftn Ka jpairttavnart
will De noted that prior to tnis decision the express promise to pay
a debt, made after the creation of the debt, was considered as being supof the legal duty to pay the precedent debt.
ported by the consideration
The necessity for appealing to this exceptional sort of consideration
arose
from the fact that when a man prbmises to pay an existing debt he incurs
no present detriment, and hence consideration in the ordinary sense is absent.
Slade's Case abrogated the need for relying upon the consideration of legal
duty, for the promise which was now implied is raised by implication of
Hence such implied promise
law at the very moment the debt is created.
is supported by the consideration
(quid pro quo) which originates in debt.
Accordingly this exceptional type of consideration, of which only a momentary
Prior to
glimpse has been caught, disappeared almost entirely from view.
Slade's Case an implied consideration was used to support an actual promise;
now the law raised an implied promise upon a real consideration.
"Slade's Case marks an important epoch in the history of English
contract law but no event in legal history is more likely to be misinterpreted.
*
*
*
It is therefore of the utmost importance that the real significance
of the decision should not escape us. To this end we must here lay the
proper emphasis upon the distinction between the conception of contractual
debt and that conception of
the common-law
which underlies
obligation
contractual obligation which is found in the assumptual promise.
"An idea, we take it, almost universally prevails to the effect that our law
•
•
•
of contract is underlaid by some single conception.
"Our law of contract is unshakably planted upon two conceptions instead
of one. The idea of contractual d "tT i"ip"SBfl hy law, wb'"** was thfi ^"'t— It
conce pti on of contract
reveale5~in the cnmmo n la yf, ntnTtmlif nhirlriR
has n6t been supplanted; it has only been in a measure obscured by the
jofldem conception of the obligation of a promise.
48.
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UTt ia t.rpa t\\pt t.hfl antinj of (jpht wa.a jj^gyl^nwRfl up iti ttift apl^inn of
assumysitf nii(1 Slado's Case marks the point at which this fivpnt nc.mirr^^.fl.
But — and here is the whole import of that decision — the point involved
It was necessary that jsimple contract law
was one -of remedy purely.
should be enti iely freed from the meshes of the actionof debt.
The only
way to aceomplish this was for the courts to hold that npoh the creation
of a simple debt the law raises an implied promise such as will supp ort,
""
assumysyT.
Tae result was that, t.ha gpfipp nf aobt-"
ine step was taten.
as a remedy upon siropjo cnnt rapta practically disappeared, its plang haiiigy
AaXkUi hyiniXebi tatus assum^ sjij___But though the action
disappeared, the—
The suppercession
conception Of liaDiiity whiclT undSlies the debt did not.
of the action of debt resulted of necessity in an occultation of the conception
of liability which underlies the debt, but did not destroy that conception.
"Still, from Slade's Case until this good day there has been more or
in the minds of legal thinkers between the conceptions of
less confusion
hy law and the cnnceptjnp nf tliA nhligatif^n
nf
i»nT^^Tg>.tng1 /^^^ty impf)pf-f|
Men
The older notion has been almost entirely overlooked.
promise.
nave talked about the implied promise, which is nominally the foundation
of the action of indebitatus assumpsit, until they have actually come to
think that the same conception is here presented to view as in the ordinary
But the distinction is fundamental and must
engagement by actual promise.
As we shall hereafter perceive, the sole clue to a proper
be preserved.
understanding of the quasi-contracts is found in the ancient and indestructible
A thing constantly to be
conception of contractual duty imposed by law.
borne in mind by the student of modern contract law is that in dealing
wi th the mysterious iTn pliprl promise, he is really in contact with tl lflimplied promise is purely a remedial fiction."
Isunple debt in disguise.
The
"
Ji (Street on ii'oundations of Legal ijiaouity, oi-oo.
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V.

NORTHERN ASSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
75

1903.

Vermont, 441.

Stafpoed, J.: The plaintiff is seeking to recover upon
a fire, insurance ^policy; and the ease stands upon a deThe
murrery to each of the six counts of his declaration.
first and seeond a,re intended as genera,l counts in assump'stt; neither is claimed to_. be good^as,a^£pecial.£Q]j]lt.-^We
think it clear that at common law neither would be good
as a general count, because it discloses an express promise as the indispensable basis of recovery. The allegations
of fact, aside from the promise, are not such that the law

raises therefrom an implied promise. Although the existence of an express promise in a special contract does not
prevent a recovery upon a promise implied by law,' when
the contract has been fully performed on the part of the
plaintiff, and nothing remains to be done on the part_of
the defendant except to pay., money, it is always nece ssary
that what has been done on the part^of the plaintiff should
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of itself to raise an implied promise. In the
presenfcage-tLe jFacte aside Troin the prdffiiSB; viz., the
plaintiff's ownership .of, the property, its destruction by
.fire withoui his fault —even the payment of premiums — do
^jiotjcaise-an-implied. promise by the defendant to pay — it
,

be suffident

is only the fact that it promised, upon certain conditions,
pay, that ma,kes it liable. Consequently, at common law,

to,

the promise, the Conditions, and the_Julfillment^qf _ th^jaefl.ditionSj must be set forth— in other words the count must
Jbfi- sp.ecial. . See the notes' to Cutter v. Powell, 2 Smith^
Lead. Cas. 8, and the^ admirable account of the action of
assumpsit in Perry's Common-Law Pleading, 82-89.*»

^

49.
But an action in general assumpsit will lie to recover back premiums
paid under a policy of insurance when by reason of fraud, want or failure
of consideration, wrongful repudiation of the contract by the insurer, or
other cause, the law raises an implied contract to repay.
See 2 Cooley:
Briefs on the Law of Insurance, 1037 — 1062.
The same doctrine appUea

to

contracts

generally.

MOSES

V.

MACFERLAN.

Court of King's Bench.
2

Burrow,

1760.

1005.

Lord Majtsfield delivered the resolution of the Court in
this case; which stood for their opinion, "whether the
plaintiff could recover against the defendant, in the present form of action (an acti on upon the case, for money had
and_receiv ed to the plaintiff's use) ; or whether he should

"Beobliged~to bring~a special action upon the contract and
agreement between th.em.'i
It was ajti action upon the case, brought in this Court by
the now plaintiff, Moses, against the now defendant Macferlan (heretofore plaintiff in the Court of Conscience,
against the same Moses now plaintiff here), for money had
and received to the use of Moses the now plaintiff in this

Court.
The case, as it came out upon evidence and without dispute, at Nisi Prius before Lord Mansfield at Guildhall,
was as follows;
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;

'

'

;
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was clearly proved, that the now plaintiff, Moses, had
ind orsed to t he now defendajalMacierlan, tour Bo Veral-pr om.issory notes, madeToTSoses himself by "^Cg^Chapman Jacob for 30s. each, for value recei?efl, bearing date 7th November, 1758; and that this was done, in order to enable
the now defendant Macferlan to recover the money in his
own name, against Chapman Jacob. But previous to the
now plaintiff's indorsing these notes, Macferlan assured
him ' ' that sucbJbisJjidQJ&eme.afc--shoul d be of nojprejudice
'
^ hiin ;" andthere was an flpjTeeTnent Ri3 7 iedn5y~T3^ferI an, whereby he (amongst other things ) expressly agree^l,
"that M oses should not he_ liable jtot, the pa yment of the
money or any part of_rt2_aud that he should not be prej"uSiced, or~be~putTo^ny costs, or any way suffer, by reason
of such his indorsement." Notwithstanding which express
condition and agreement, and contrary thereto, the present defendant Macferlan summoned the present plaintiff
Moses into the Court of Conscience (23 Geo. 2, c. 33), upon
each of these four notes, as the indorser thereof respectively, by four separate summonses. Whereupon Moses (by
one Smith who attended the Court of Conscience at their
second Court, as solicitor for him and on his behalf), tendered the said indemnity to the Court of Conscience, upon
the first of said four causes; and offered to give evidence
and of the said agreement,- by way of defense for
of
Moses in that Court. But the Court of Conscience rejected
this defense, and refused to receive any evidence in proof
of this agreement of indemnity, thinking that they had no
and gave judgment against Moses, upon
power to judge
the mere foot of his indorsement (which he himself did not
at all dispute), without hearing his witnesses about the
that he should not be liable
for the commisagreement
sioners held this agreement to be no sufifcient bar to the
suit in their Court; and consequently decree for the plaintiff in that Court, upon the undisputed indorsement made by
Moses. This decree was actually pronounced, in only one
of the four causes there depending; but MosesXagent (Gliding. tJbii.-OpiiU£n ..^l^exomraisgiiaaer^- to -bi?, as flhnv-fi^mpn-__
tioned)-, paid the money into J;hai.GQUi:t^..upoB~alL4h«s_£our
notes and,it was-taken out of Court byJJia-now.J}efendanT
Macferlan (the then plaintiff, in that Court), by or3er of
the commissioners.
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this matter appearing upon evidence before Lord
Mansfield at Nisi Prius at Guildhall, there was no doubt
but that, upon the merits, the plaintiff was entitled to the
money; and accordingly, a verdict was there found for
Moses, the plaintiff in this Court for 61. (the whole sum
paid into the Court of Conscience) ; but subject to the opinion of the Court, upon this question, '^^whether the money
couMJlfi-Efi£iXEeE©d--in-tiie-pr-esent
lorm of action, or whether .
by
an actiojoi^ brought' upon the special
it must be recovered
~~
'*
agreeme nt only.
Lord, Mansfieuj now delivered their unanimous opinion,
in favour of the present acti on.
There was no" doubt at the trial, but that upon the merits
the plaintiff was entitled to the money; and the jury accordingly found a verdict for the 61. subject to the opinion
of the court upon this question, "whether the money might
be recovered by this form of action," or "must be by an

action upon the special agreement only."
Many other objections, besides that which arose at the
trial, have since been made to the propriety of this action
in the present case.
The first objection is, " that an action of debt woul d not
lie here ; and no assumpsit will lie, where an action_of jiebt.
jnay nntJhi^ brmight^' ' some sayings at Nisi Prius, reported
by note takers who did not understand the force of what
was said, are quoted in support of that proposition. But
there is no f oundatioiL lojC-it., _
It is much more plausible to say, "that where debt lies,
And
an action upon the case ought not to be brought."
that was the point relied upon in Blade's Case; but the rule
" that an action of.
then settled and followed ever since is,
assumpsit mLLJifi-^inaaany-casfia.^ whfiXftuiebOies^^
''
many, w^fixa. it^jdoea. nxit Jie.
A main inducement, originally, for encouraging actions
of assumpsit was, * Mj©^4a]je_away the wager of Jaw;" and
that might give rise to loose expressions, as if the action
was confined to cases only where that reason held.

— ' ' 'T'h a.t

lies, exceptupon
SJi g^LCfigJ-Or implied^eoiitract; -but here it is impossible to
presume any contract to refund money, which the defendant
recovered by an adverse suit."
ppfimTtjj^jjf*^^-^'

"H

■

n n ff.s.mmp.si^
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Answer. If the defendant be under an obligation, from.
the ties of natural justice, to refund, tlie law implies a ^
deht, and gives this action, founded in" We equity of plaintiff 's case, as it were upon a contract {"quasi ex contractu," ^
as the Eoman law expresses it).
This species of assumpsit ("for money had and received
to the plaintiff's use"), lies in numberless instances, for
money the defendant has received from a third person;
which he claims title to, in opposition to the plaintiff's
right; and which he had, by law, authority to receive from
such third person.
'
Third nhjfip.t.inTi.— -Wbere mnuey ba.H he:eTi recover ed- bv
the judgment -of. a Xlo-urt-haYing- competent jurisdiction, the
can never be brought over again by a new action^"
"'matter
Answer. It is most clear, "that the merits of a judgment can never be overhaled by an original suit, either
at law or in equity."
Till the judgment is set aside, or
to
reversed, it is conclusive, as to the subject-matter of
all intents and purposes.
But the ground of this action
consistent with the judgment of the Court of Conscience
admits the commissioners did right. They decreed upon the indorsement of the
notes by the plaintiff; which indorsement
not now disputed. The ground upon which this action proceeds, was

a

a

I

is

a

if

a

is

;

is

no defence against that sentence.
enough for us, that the commissioners adjudged
It
"they had no cognizance of such collateral matter." We
can not correct an error in their proceedings and ought to
done by
final jurisdiction, to be right,
suppose what
But we think, "the commissioners did right, in refusing to
go into such collateral matter."
Otherwise, by way of defence against
promissory note for 30s. they might go into
agreements and transactions of a great value; and
they
decreed payment of the note, their judgment might indirectly conclude the balance of large account.
The ground of this action
not "that the judgment was
wrong;" but, "that (for a reason which the now plain;
tiff could not avail himself of against that judgment), the
defendant ought not in justice to keep the money." And
at Guildhall,
declared very particularly, "that- the merquestion, determined by the commissioners, where
its of
they had jurisdiction, never could be brought over again,
in any shape whatsoever."
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Money may be recovered by a rigbt and legal judgment ;
and yet tbe iniquity of keeping that money may be manifest, upon grounds wbicb could not be used by way of defence against the judgment.
Suppose an indorsee of a promissory note, having received payment from drawer (or maker) of
sues and
recovers the same money from the indorser who knew

a

:

is

a

is

is

;

it

is

it

is

a

it

is

is

;

a

a

nothing of such payment.
man recovers upon a policy for a ship preSuppose
sumed to be lost, which afterwards comes home; or upon
the life of a man presumed to be dead, who afterwards
representation of risque deemed to be
appears or upon
fair, which comes out afterwards to be grossly fraudulent.
no occasion to go further for the admission
But there
"that unquestionably, an action might be brought upon the
decisive answer to any objection from the
agreement,"
For
the same thing, as to the force and
judgment.
just equally affected by
validity of the judgment, and
the action, whether the plaintiff brings
upon the equity
of his case arising out of the agreement, that the defendant
may refund the money he received or upon the agreement
itself, that besides refunding the money, he may pay the
costs and expenses the plaintiff was put to.
This brings the whole to the question saved at Nisi Prius,
"viz., whether the plaintiff may elect to sue by this form
of action, for the money only; or must be turned round,
to bring an action upon the agreement."
One great benefit, which arises to suitors from the nature
of this action, is, that the plaintiff need not state the special circumstances from which he concludes "that, ex aequo
et bono, the money received by the defendant, ought to be
deemed as belonging to him:" he may declare generally,
"that the money was received to his use:" and make out
his case, at the trial.
the most
This equally beneficial to the defendant. It
favourable way in which he can be sued: he can be liable
no further than the money he has received; and against
that, may go into every equitable defence, upon the general
issue; he may claim every equitable allowance; he may
release without pleading it; in short, he may deprove
fend himself by every thing which shews that the plaintiff
ex aequo et bono,
not entitled to the whole of his demand,
or to any part of it.

146

Common Law Pleadiitq.

[Chap.

1

If the plaintiff elects

to proceed in this favorable way, it
is a bar to his bringing another action upon the agreement ;
though he might recover more upon the agreement, than he
can by this form of action. Therefore, if the question was
open to be argued upon principles at large, there seems to
be no reason or utility in confining the plaintiff to an action
upon the special agreement only.

**********

This kind of equitable action, to recover back money,
which ought not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and
therefore much encouraged. It lies only for money which
ex aequo et bono, the defendant ought to refund ; it does not
lie for money paid by the plaintiff, which is claimed of him
as payable in point of honor and honesty, although it could
not have been recovered from him by any course of law;
as in payment of a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations, or contracted during his infancy, or to the extent of
principal and legal interest upon an usurious contract, or,
for money fairly lost at play; because in all these cases,
the defendant may retain it with a safe conscience, though
But it lies
by positive law he was barred from recovering.
for money paid by mistake ; or upon a consideration which
happens to fail; or for money got through imposition (express or implied) ; or extortion; or oppression; or an undue
advantage taken of the plaintiff's situation, contrary to
laws made for the protection of persons under those circumstances.
In one word, the gist of this kind of action, is that the
defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by
the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money.
Therefore we are all of us of opinion that the plaintiff
might elect to wave any demand upon the foot joJf. the -indemnity, for the costs he "had been put to; and. bring" this
action, to recover the 61. which the defendant got and kept
"

from him iniquitously.
Bule i^ That the "^ostjeg^ejielwer^^

""

^"^"^
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

1827.

Pickering, 285.

5

Assumpsit upon a promissory note, for goods sold and
"delivered, and for money had and received.. The case came
before the Conrt upon an agreed statement of facts.
The cause of action upon which the count for goods sold
was founded, was, that the defendant had entered upon the
_^plaintiff's land -and_cu.t„aiuL- carried away a quantity of
And the question was argued (in writ^Ftiite oak. timber.
ing) wheth er the plaintiff could waive the tort, and sue in
assumpsit, it not appearing that the timber had been sold

J^the

defendant.

*

•

•

Paekee, C. J.: The plaintiff declares in assumpsit, and
By the agreeone count is for goods sold and delivered.
ment it appears, that the only ground for supporting this
count is, that the defendant cut and took away certain trees
from land claimed by the plaintiff, and for the purpose of
the argument, actually owned by him.
The proper action
would undoubtedly be trespass for the injury to the land,
o r trover f or the treesJ^TBuT^e plaintiff contends that he
hasTn^t to waive the tort, and charge the defendant >
with the trees as sold to him. Upon examination of the
authorities cited, which are well summed up and commented upon by Stbong, J., in the opinion of the Court of
Common Pleas, we are satisfied that tiie plaintiff cannot
maintain this po'sitidn.*
T£ere is no contr act express o r_
implied between the parties, and~theTer&re an action~eic
contractu will not lie. The whole extent of the doctrine,
"as gathered from the books, seems to be, that one whose (j
goods have been taken from him or detained unlawfully,
whereby he has a right to an action of trespass or trover,
mav ^f the wroug-do fir spll ^^'^ crnnt^s. gnrl rpp.pivp ihfi^money ,.
wai ve, the tort, affii^ the sale, and have an action for money
had and received for the proceeds . No case can be shown
y^laefej^umpsii as tor ^^M. mid la in fflch case, except
iFFe against the executor of the wrong-doer, the tort being i

J
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extinguislied by the death, and, no other remedy but a sswmpsit against the executor remaining. _ Such was the case of
Eambly v. Trott, Cowp. 371, referred to in Judge Stbong's
opinion.""

50.
Accord: Miller v. King (1880) 67 Ala. 575; Cragg v. Arendale (1901)
113 Ga. 181; Johnston v. Salisbury (1871) 61 111. 316; Quimby v. Lowell
(1897) 89 Me. 547; Lyon v. Clark (1902) 129 Mich. 381; Knapp v. Hobbs
563; Winchell
(1871) 50 N. H. 476; Whipple v. Stephens (1904) 25 E.
V. Noyes (1851) 23 Vt. 303; Bowman v. Browning (1856) 17 Ark. 599.
In
a note to Jones v. Hoar (text, supra) the opinion of Strong, J., rendered
below in the Common Pleas, is set' out, analysing the English cases and

L

showing that this was probably the English rule.
On the contrary,
A number of courts take the view that even though
there has been no sale of the goods tortioiisly taken, an implied assumpsit
may nevertheless arise, but it is an assumpsit for goods sold, not for money
had and received.
Thus, in Terry v. Hunger (1890) 121 N. Y. 161, the
court said:
the wrong-doer has not sold the property, but still retains it, the
plaintiff has the right to waive the tort and proceed upon an impjied
contract of sale to the wrong-doer himself, and, in such event, he is not
charged as for money had and received by him to the use of the plaintiff.
The contract implied is one to pay the value of the property, as if it had
been sold to the wrong-doer by the owner. ' '
In accord with this latter view are Isaacs v. Hermann (1873) 49 Miss.
449; Moore v. Eichardson
(1902) 68 N. J. L. 305; Kirkman v. Philip's
Heirs (1872) 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 222; Gordon v. Bruner (1872) 49 Mo. 570;
Galvin v. MacMin. & Mill Co. (1894) 14 Mont. 508; Chittenden v. Pratt
(1891) 89 Cal. 178; Braithwaite v. Akin (1893) 3 N. D. 365; Norden v.
Jones (1873) 33 Wis. 600; Deysher v. TriebeL (1870) 64 Pa. St. 383; Bees
& Sons Co. V. Western Exposition Society (1910) 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 381.

"If

■■■:-<

\ PAEKER

&

SON v. CLEMONS.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
80

J.:

1908.

Vermont, 521.

..^As sv/inpsit

with com mon counts.

Plea, general issue. It appeared by an agreea statement of facts
that the defendan t was manae;er nf a telephone company,
and was engaged^ wit.Ti an aRsia tant. in wiri ng-aJbusiaessblockJBJEairJBaxea ; that while so engaged the assistant..
-in th e def^idantls-ahsfincairQ m the room. accid entalbz-Qjgeri.
turned a ;i ar of chemical fluid ; that the fluid ran out, leaked
ihrough the floor into~ t^IpTaintig^s jewelry stnrej aSSlSI
Tyx/Ee,

Juredjrarbus_artHes t^^

defendant was not employed by the telephone company, but was in charge of the
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work at the request of the son of the owner of the block,
and the assistant was also employed by him. When the
plaintiff discovered the injury to his goods he sent for the
^fendant, showed them to him, and informed him that part
of them would fiaveTo be sent away to be repaired.
The
defendant then promised thft plaintifF that. Tip ^m2l(^ jga^ijaxm
the amount of the damage when he ascertained wha t it.
jseas.. 'I'he plaintiff had the goods repaired, showed the bUl
therefor to the defendant, who at first agreed to pay
but
afterwards refused to pay
unless the owner of th block
would pay one-half, which the latter would not do.

is
:

a

is

6

if

it

is

it

is

is

1

i

;

t

The plaintiff contends hat the count for an aocount state dwill lie but we_ think that his demand does, noti
"fall xotTTvirnETm' f^ftfrriitinn of an account. It was said by
Chief Justice Shaw in W^iIweTflTJ WWar3^ Mete. (Mass.)
some
216, that the primary idea of account, computatio,
matter of debt and credit, or demands in the nature of debt
reimplies that one
and credit between parties; that
sponsible to another for money or other things, either on
the score of contract, or of some fiduciary relation. It
doubtless true, however, that
would be sufficient to come
within the definition
the accoimts were aU on one side,
provided the amount were agreed to by the parties. Langdon V. Roane's Adm'r,
Ala. 518, 41 Am. Dec. 60, and
The
form
note.
adopted by Chitty, and ever since followed,
that "the defendant accounted with the plaintiff of and
concerning divers sums of money before then due from the
defendant to the plaintiff, and then in arrear and unpaid,
and that upon such accounting the defendant was found
to be in arrear to the plaintiff in
named sum, and that,
being so found in arrear and indebted, the defendant in consideration thereof undertook and faithfully promised," etc.,
and the allegation of the breach in this, as in the other common counts,
"Yet the defendant, not regarding his said
*

*

*

bath not, although often requested, as
yet paid said sum of money," etc. Bouvier defines "ao*
*
count stated" as an agreed balance of account.
We also refer to some of the earlier authorities. It
said in
Saund. PI.
Ev. (5th Ed.), page 47, in respect to
must be proved that the
recovery upon this count, that
account was "of money or a debt." It
also there said
that an account stated does not alter the nature of the origi&

is

it

a

1

is

*

promis,es,
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nal debt. It was held in Enowles v. Mitchell, 13 East, 249,
that an admission by the defendant that a certain sum was
agreed to be paid to the plaintiff for the sale of standing
trees, made after the trees had been felled and taken away
by the defendant, would support a count upon an account
stated. It was decided m Whitehead v. Howard, 5 Moore,
105, cited in Saunders, that a recovery could not be had
upon this count because there was no existing antecedent
debt dufe'from the defendant to the plaintiff. Wllks v. JW=~'
the
neg(m',2 Atk. 251 ; Peacock v. Harris, 10 East, 106.
defendant in the present case was primarily liable to the
plaintiff, it was in an action of trespass on the case for a
tort. Th6 damages consequent upon the wrongful act were
not a proper subject of book account, and were not treated
as such by the plaintiff. He paid for the repairs, and took
receipted bills for such payments.

If

Bradley v. Phillips' 52 Vt. 517, is distinguishable from the
present case. There the parties, being owners of adjoining lands, each had cut logs over the line on the other's
land. They settled by an agreement that each should pay
it,

the other at specified rates for the logs taken, and the plaintiff had paid the defendant. But the latter, though having
and
taken the property and having promised to pay for
having induced the plaintiff to pay for what he had taken,

a

t

if

refused to pay the plaintiff. The court held that the question was one purely of contract, that the defendant's agreement was to pay the plaintiff for what logs he had taken,
that nothing remained for him to do but pay over the
money, and that the plaintiff could recover upon the common counts. The defendant's liability was the same as
he had bought the logs and promised to pay the plaintiff
for them. The parties, in legal effect, waived their respective claims for torts, settled their claims, and promised to pay each other the sums agreed upon for the logs
each had taken, whereupon each became the other's debtor.
— Tti tbfi cagfi ^before us the defendan did, not becomej^e)
plaintiffis debtor, and, upon the uthoijtieg, hejjannoFre^
cover upon the ,count.^£uL.an accnuntr st,a.t,ed>.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
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Illinois,

L^
1862.

378.

Brown and Hollingsworth sued Walker in assumpsit.
The declaration contained the common counts only. • * *
Bkeesb, J.: The record sEows, that the contract under
which this work was done was a sealed.„c.Qjitract. The parties agree that the work was commenced and prosecuted
nnder^this contract, and ffie price fixed by it was fourteen
himdred dollars.
The defendants, after performing jbhe work under .thia
agreement, now abg^on,it, and bring this, suit upon jan implied promise in law, -to recover the value of the services
^
rendered, and the jury, under the instruction of the court,
_Jiave assessed their damages to eighteen hundred and forty
^dolIarSj being four hundred and forty dollars "Eoofe than
the ratable price as expressed
the contract, and under
and for which it was performed.
"The question for our consideration comes upon the refusal of the court to give the following instruction asked
for by the plaintiff in error : "If the jury believe, from the
evidence, that the plaintiffs entered into a contract in writing, and under seal, with Thomas Shergold and others — the
contract read in evidence — and performed the work sued
for under said contract, then the jury wUl find for the de-

ij

fendant.

''

This refusal is the error now insisted upon. This instruction, like the second and fourth, T^jch the court umdified, presents, substantially, the question; Whether the conJtract under which the_.work was perf orfii'ed is to. govern the
We have no doubt, in rearemedy and right of recovery.
son and on authority, the, con&act . ihust govern ; and so
believing, the modificatioM'' of the second and fourth instructions, and the refusal to give the one here copied, were
erroneous.
As in physics, two solid bodies cannot occupy the same
space at the same time, so in law and common sense, there
cannot be an express and an implied contract for the same
thing, existing at the same time. This is an axiomatic truth.
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It

is only when parties do not expressly agree, that the
~~ '
— — ~->",
law interposes and raises a promise."
The error in this whole proceeding arises npon the assumption, that the plaintiff in error might become liable,
under the implication of law, that he should pay the reasonable worth of services, beneficial to him, bestowed upon
bis property, with his knowledge and acquiescence, notwithstanding such services were rendered imder an express
agreement with another person.
,Jsja__express contract, executory in its provisions, must
totally . exclude jiny sugh inipliqation. One party agreed;
in consideration of the other to pay, to render the service;
the other, in consideration of the promise to render the
service, agrees to pay. One is the consideration and motive for the other, and each equally excludes any other consideration, motive, or promise.

In

it

a

is

a

if

7

4

it,

the case of Cutler, Adm'x, v. Powell, 6 T. R. 324, Lord
Kenyon, C. Jv, said, "That where parties have come to
an express contract none can be implied, has prevailed so
long as to be reduced to an axiom in the law. . Here the
defendant expressly promised to pay the intestate thirty
guineas, provided he proceeded, continued and, did his duty
as second mate in the ship from Jamaica to Liverpool;"
and AsHUEST, J., said, "It has been argued, however, that
the plaintiff may now recover on a quantum meruit, but
she had no right to desert the agreement; for, wherever
there is an express contract, the parties must be guided by
it; and one party cannot relinquish or abide by
as
may suit his advantage."
The whole current of authorities seems to bear in this
direction. We have examined some of them. Young v. Paxton,
Cranch, 229; Raymond et al. v. Barnard, 12 Johns.
Mass.
374, and cases there cited; Whitney v. Sullivan,
109; Robertson v. Lynch, 18 Johns. 456.
work
This case shows,
in fact done under
special
plaintiff
the
cannot
contract,
recover
under
a
quantum
/:
meruit. In this case, the work was done under a special
party assuming to act for the plaincontract made with
tiff in error, and the recovery must be had on that contract.

When the contract has been performed, the plaintiff may
recover on simple contract the price of the service, under
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an indebitatus assumpsit, but the contract mnst regulate
the amount of the recovery.
Ba/nh of Colvmbia v. Patterson's Adm'r, 7 Cranch, 299; Holmes v. Stummel, 24 111.
370.

This distinction,

form of the remedy upon executed or executory contracts, is fully laid down and recognized, and is perfectly consistent with the principle excluding implication when express contracts exist. James et al.
V. Cotton, 20 Eng. C. L. Eep. 129 ; KimbaU v. Tucker et
al., 10 Mass. 195; Londregon v. Crowley, 12 Conn. 561;
Charles v. Dana, 14 Maine, 383; Mead v. Degolger, '16
Wend. 63.7; and numerous other authorities might be cited
to the same effect.
It follows then, that suit must be
brought against the parties to this contract.
They have
made it m the form that suited them best, and that must
be the ground of action, and measure of relief. Parker v.
as to the

Emery, 28 Maine, 494.
The reason of the rule is plain. Parties are bound by
their agreement, and therefore there is ho ground for implying a promise when there is an express contract. _.The
The defendants seem to have
^ ^tract must b e sued on.

misconceivea me doctrine.
Although the contract may be a subsisting unexecuted]
contract, and on that account requires a suit on the instru- 1
ment itself, ;^et_ thej right to JDnxiS„JMddMaJMs-ussuma)^it .
[
for money due nFVn^gyfiftjijerl ffnnt.ra/'.t, dng8-Ti"^ .ggji!i[g.„
the party to set asid5lS£lcontra&t. and, sue on a gucmtum
meruit. It is a question as to the form of the action. But
whether it be a general count on an indebitatus assumpsit,
or a special count on the contract itself, the parties to the
contract must be the parties to the suit, and be controlled
by its provisions.
For the reasons given, the judgment of the court below
is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
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LONDEEGON
Supreme Court of

v.

CEOWLET.

Errors of

12 Connecticut,

This was an action nf

[Ch.ap. 1

Connecticut.

1638.

558.

n^.<iufr{jis j,t.

TTip declaration

con-

tained three counts. The first, was special, alleging, that
on the 24th of February, 1837, by a certain agreement made
by and between the plaintiff and defendant , it was agreed..
, ,tha.t^ the .^ilainiiff- should-bmld. a jaei±ain-..additiQii..JtSL the
dwelling ,ho,Ma of the defendant, in the city of^New Haven,
__
according to the particulars and in the manner following,
•
•
*
that the defendant then andthere agreed w ith
viz.,
„the pkintiff,- to pay Jh^imib£IiafQr,ih£.aximjaf.fifty-:five. dollars. „ TEis^bnnt then proceeded to allege the perfnrmflnpft
on the plaintiff's part, and a breach on the part of the de-

fendani— ,
The second corqit jwas indebitatus assumpsit £iXL,woxk
and labour ; and the third, a quantum meruit.
Waite, J. : The defendant in fflis case claims, that if the
work was performed under a special contract, variant from
Ihatstated in the~5rsFcouirrm th"e''3"ecIlTaSon, the plaintiff
cannot recover, either upon the first count, by reason of
the variance, or upon the others, because th ey are ge neral.
The rule upon this subject is very correctly sKf'eci"l!rf'M'r!
Chitty, one of the most accurate of the elementary writers
upon law. "With respaci to dfibtg for work and lab.aur
U I'o a rule that however special
..^v nfl^pr :pajiBQ.Tinl gpr\nf>pg^

if it

it,

was not under seal^ and the Terms' of it
_have.been performed bii the" plainti^^ part^ and the re^muneration was to be in mbney^ it is not necessary to declare specially, and the cohimon indebitdius count is sufficient", 1 Chitt. Plead. 332." And it is also settled, that the'
plaintiff is entitled to recover on the general count, where
the work has been performed, although he had declared on
a special agreement, and failed in the proof. 3 Stark. Evid.,
In the case of Alcorn v. West1762. 1 Selw. N. P. 82.
brooh, 1 WUs. 117, Dennison, J., says, if a man agrees to
in this
build for another a house, and aftei-wards builds
ckse he has two ways of declaring, either upon the original
executory agreement, as to be performed in future, or upon
the agreement,
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indebitatus assumpsit or qiumtum meruit, where the
house is actually built and the agreement executed. 1 Selw.
N. P. 83.
GiBBs, C. J., in the case of Rohson v. Godfrey et al., said:
have always understood the rule to be, that unless there
be something in the terms of the special agreement, which
either by express stipulation or necessary intendment, precludes iiie plaintiff from recovering for work and labour
generally, he is entitled after the contract has been executed, to maintaia an action for work and labour done generally. It is every day's experience that a party may recover on the general counts for work and labour done under a special contract."
1 Holt's N. P. Ca. 236. S. C. 1
Stark. Eep. 275, 277.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
The Bank of Columbia v. Paterson, say: "We take it to
be incontrovertibly settled, tTiat i'"d^^f'^M!Sm„On^:i.m^'^'i-t- will
lie to recoyerthe_ stipulated pricg, iiu&„.onjgk,^peciaL contract, riot undei- seal,^ where the contract has been completejy executed ; aud that it is not in such case necessary
to d^are.upon the special contract. ' ' 7 Cranch, 299. And
again, in the case of The Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Company V. Knapp et al., after repeating the rule as laid down
in the preceding case, they add: "Whether this doctrine
be considered as established, by the adjudications of this
court, or the sanction of other courts, it is equally clear,
that no principle involved in the action of assumpsit, can
''
9 Peters,
be maintained, by a greater force of authority.
the

"I

566.

These authorities shew, most conclusively, that, upon
well established principles of the common law, if the plaintiff has performed the work, according to the terms of the
contract, he may recover upon the general counts for work
and labour done; and that the addition of a special count
setting forth a contract different in terms from the one
proved, will not affect his right to recover upon the general counts.
It has, however, been supposed, that the decision in the
case of Russell v. South Briain Society, 9 Conn. Kep. 508,
conflicts with the law of this case. But upon an examination of the two cases, it will be found, that they are materially different, and are decided upon different principles. There the plaintiff had subscribed to a fund for the

d^fij^N Law Pleading.

156''

[Chap. 1

support of the gospel minisny, which was to be managed
by the society, in a certain specific manner. The plaintiff
paid the amount of his subscription; and the fund was re-

1

is

it

it,

ceived by the society, and managed hj them, for a number
of years, until the principal part was lost, by the failure of
a bank. The plaintiff then brought his action against the
society, and having failed to prove those counts in his
declaration which set forth the contract made by the society, claimed to recover back the money paid; under the
general count for money had and received. The court decided, that the plaintiff could not recover, upon the ground
that the contract had not been rescinded by the defendant,
The court did
but remained- an open subsisting contract.
not intend to establish any new principle, but expressly referred to a rule well settled, and to a decision of Lord Mansfield, and to a subsequent decision of the court of King's
Bench in support of it. The rule that governed in that
'
case, is thus stated by Mr. Chitty :
'Mh££&- a. pa gaaantJiaaffig^.
a
which
been
put an end to; as
on
has
contract,
Jbeen
wherej^tiher by the terms of the contract it was left in.
and he does so, or where
"TEF plaintiff 's power to rescind
"
the defendant- afterwards assents to its. being rescinded, the.
general count may be supported; but if the contract COH::^
'
tinue open, as
technically termed, he can only recover-.
Chitt. Plead.
'damages, and must declare specially."
342.

The same rule was explicitly recognized, by the supreme
court of the United States, in the case cited from Peters'
They there say, that there can be no doubt that
reports.
where the special £ontract remains open, the plaintiff's

a

a

a

is

it

is

on the contract, __ahd he must' declare specially/
remedy
well settled principle,
"They afterwards add: "And
plaintiff-iQayrthat when a„fifiaia:aaJt.has been performed,
recover on the general, counts."
They thus recognize both rules as well settled and undoubted, and not at all inconsistent with each other.
The court, in the case cited from Connecticut reports,
were of opinion that, as the money was paid upon a contract that remained open and unrescinded, the plaintiff was
entitled only to damages for the nonfulfilment of that contract; and must, therefore, declare specially. In the case
under consideration, the plaintiff having performed his contract, seeks to recover a compensation for his services—
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debt due from the defendant for the labour performed.
And
if he actually performed the labour according to the contract, there is nothing to prevent his recovering upon the
general counts.

It

is also claimed by the defendant, that the plaintiff
could only recover upon the quanivmi meruit count, if the
work was done under a contract different from that stated
in the special count. If this were so, it is difficult to see
how that would furnish any ground for a new trial, as the
jury have found a verdict upon that count in favour of the
plaintiff; and it does not appear from the motion, that
damages have been assessed differently from what they
would have been, had the verdict upon both the other counts
been in favour of the defendant.
But the rule upon this
subject is, that under an indebitatus count the plaintiff may
recover what mav be que him , althougjbL,JakJ;;^e;^flg;;]^riT^
And wb^rp tEaFcouht is inserted, the
-■vjr3,S
agreed i;)pmi.
quantum merv/it count is generally unnecessary.
1 Chitt.
Plead., 337.

It

has been further said, that the court should have
.charged the jury, that if the work was left unfinished, the
plaintiff could not recover upon either count. This, we
think, sufficiently appears from the chal?ge stated in the
motion. The instruction is, that if the work had been done
under a special contract, and had not been co^ipleted according to the contract, or the contract had not been fulfilled on the part of the plaintiff, he could not recover upon
either count. Clearly nothing more could be necessary.
For these reasons, we think there ought to be no new
trial; and so we advise the superior court.
In this opinion the other Judges concurred.
New trial not to be granted.'^^
u

General assumpsit will not lie in such cases where the expresa contract
void by statute: Cashin t. PUt«r (1912) 168 Mick 38&

51.
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^

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
79

1

1887,

Maine, 351.

Foster, J. : * • * It appears that th e., plainti ff, on
January 24, 1871, gave his negotiable pro missory note "for
atr. fufihft,
$209 to Harrison Dor^,~'gua5^g^iaS oF Eoselia
of the'^eTenaiht, payable, on. the -first- day of. January:,

ij

The defendant had obtained letters of guardiansMP
in an adjomlng-ettti'iit^ iirwhich she resided, and with whom
Eosetta was at that time living; and, soon after the note
18737'

.

to the plaintiff that she was the
lawful guardian of Bosetta Dorr, and as snnh was Ipigally
authorJ2edJo_eflll£dLSaid_n£te, whereupon the plaintiff .gaid%e:3JSendantlthe sum of $231.21, the amount then estimated to be due upon the note. At the same time, and in
consideration^ thereof , the defendant, agreed in writing to
"Tuny" inHSnnify and save the plaintiff harmless^ in conse"quence of his paying the note to her. Suit waF aTterw'aj ds''
oommjnced Jby ike andjOEsee of iha-note. The case was tried:
an^ carried to the full court. Finally, judgment was rendered against this plaintiff for the amount of the note, and
interest thereon from that date.
Dorr v. Davis, 76 Me.
301.
After judgment was rendered against him this plaintiff paid the amount of
together with costs of suit, to
the plaintiff in that action, and now seeks to recover the
sum thus paid, amounting to $479, from the defendant in
this suit. * * *
Nor do we think that the objection of the defendant
tenable, that, there being
written contract of indemnity,
the plaintiff must declare specially upon such contract, and
will not be allowed to introduce proof in support of his
claim under the general count for money paid.
The obone of form, and does not touch the real merits
jection
of the case. Still,
rests on sound legal principles,
the duty of the court to give effect to it Tf I'a nT^Hnnht^
is

it

it

if

is

a

is

it,

became due, represented

thaty~wh^Fe-4te-4iax±ifia_ha2S--

it

is

made an express contract, the law wiil not ^i^y one. But
this rule
not inflexible, and, like most generaTruIes, Ts
to,
subject
£as"Been"EiI3That, "where
excsaptionsi.l Thus

1

JgdiLike„geiifiiaLxulajQ£-law.
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the special contract is not under seal, the plaintiff has his
option, under some circumstances, either to declare on the
implied promise, or to set out the special contract in his
declaration.
Tousey v. Preston, 1 Conn. 175, An actiou
Jor TTinnpy had and received wiU lie on a^iami§SQiX.aate.
or bill of exchange, a nd _ggt_there are express contracts.
Pitkin V. Frink, 8 Mete. (Mass.') 12 Hens cKeTv: Mahler,
3 Denio (N. T.) 428.
It is also a reasonable and well-recognized principle of law, settled by numerous decided cases,
that where there is an express contract of indeT| mitVj and
by its terms it containa..i ijal,hlag,more .than, the kw. would
imply, it is optional, with the plaiatifflQaled.axain general
indebitatus assumpsit for money paid, or upon the special contract.
This question arose in Gihbs v. Bryamt, 1 Pick. (Mass.)
118, where a written promise of indemnity had been given
to the plaintiff by the defendant; and, upon objection by
the defendant that there was a special agreement which
ought to have been declared on, the court say : * * This objection cannot avail the defendant because the written contract produced contained nothing more than what the law
would imply. The right of action rests upon the payment
of money for the use of the defendant. The law raises a
promise, and the plaintiff may make use of his written
there is anything in the
contract or not, as he pleased.
written promise to contradict the implication of law, the de* *
"On this branch of the case,
fendant may show it. " *
then, we hold that the action is well maintained, notwithstanding the existence of the special contract of indemnity,
and the omission to set it out in the declaration; and the
objection that the action should have been brought on the
The following
express contract is therefore overruled."
cases sustain the same principle:
Colhurn v. Pomeroy, 44
N. H. 23; Rushworth v. Moore, 36 N. H. 195; White v.
Leroux, 1 Moody & M. 347, 22 E. C. L. 331; Williamson
V. Henley, 6 Bing. 299, 19 E. C. L. 89 ; Povmal v. Ferrand,
6 Bam. & C. 439, 13 E. C. L. 232, 233; Keyes v. Stone,
5 Mass. 394.
The relation of the present parties in reference to the note upon which the indemnity was given, was
such as would in law raise an implied duty or obligation of
indemnity as strong as where a receiptor, upon request, had
delivered up property to the owner against whom suits had
The defendant in the one case had no
been commenced.

f

If
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right to the property; in the other, no right to the money
conor note; and tho^ontract o£ indemnity in bo^
tained no more . than, the law, woujd^ imply.
The plaintiff alleges that he has paid so much money for
the use of the defendant.
To sustain this allegation it is
necessary for him to show that the jnoney was paid at the
"The redefendant's request, either express or implied.

6

&

is

I

is

r

is

:

'

;

2

is

&

\

*

*

a

is

is

;

constitute
quest to pay, and the payment according to
the debt and- whether the request be direct, as where the
party
expressly desired by the defendant to pay, or indirect, where he
placed by him under liability to pay, and
*
does pay, makes no difference.
^ In every case,
therefore, in which there has been a payment of-Wioney by
fhe plaintiff to ..aJthixd. party at jiha, request jcxfLthe. defendant, express or implied, on a promise, express or implied,
to repay the amount, tHs fofirroJ^actIra.JLS mam
Brittain v. Lloyd, 14 Mees.
W. 773. And the doctrine of
that where the plaintiff shows that he, either
the courts
by compulsion of law, or to relieve himself from liability,
has paid money which the defendant ought to have paid,
this count will be sustained.
Greenl. Ev., sec. 114 Nichols V. Buchnam, 117 Mass. 491. In such case, said Lord
Tenteeden, C. J. jjj, am. of the opinion lhat.Jie-is-entitled
to recove upon the general principle that qne__man who
bound by law to
"compelled to pay money which, another
"pay,Js.jentitled to be reimbursed by the latter; and think
that money paid under such circumstances may be considered-as jnoney paid to the use of the person who.
so bound
C, 439, 13 E. O.J
tOjpa;y-it" .Pownal v. F errand,
Barn.
231.

*

•

L.

*

^o^

$479,

and

interest thereon

di

e

igm n for •plaifij^^
Judgment
froni the date M the writ.

Supreme Judicial Court

v.

of

FITZGERALD

ALLEN.

Massachusetts.

128 Massachusetts,

Contract in three counts.

1880.

232.

The first count was on a writd

of which the plaintiff agree to
lay all the concrete required on "Section A" of the~SBd=-^
ten contract, by the terms

Forms of Action.
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bury Eiver conduit for the sum of seventy-five cents per
cubic yard, and to furnisb all tools and labor necessary to
do the work ; th e defendant s agreecHo furmshjtiia,naateri^i.s
for the work. Ajybich was in be done according to the plans

and specifications for "Section A," and to the full satisX9£^Qft'^£-iIl£L£llgiBefii:&.,and inspectors and ^tim. acceptQ^nf the Boat-oTi Wai.fir "Rnajfj ; any work not done to
^JiQS
their satisfaction to be taken up and relaid at the expense
of the plaintiff; the first full month's estimate to be held
by the defendants as security for the faithful performance
of the work; and the defendants reserved the right to cancel the contract, if so ordered by the engineer.
The second
count was on an account annexed for extra work done unThe third count was o n a qauntum mer uit
_^er the,GOitfcBaet.
:^QE_w:ork-jdane-xindar the eentpaefe -iip to ibg-ferrg-wke'n it
jSEas.-cancelkd_b3L.the jMiendaata.,--At the trial in the Superior Court, before Putnam, J.,
plaintiff
not claim.-tQ.jecQy^r. on the first_count.
^^he
'"""
It appeared in evidence that the defendants had contracted with the city of Boston to build "Section A" of
the Sudbury River conduit, and the work covered by the
plaintiff's contract was a portion thereof; that by the contract with the city the defendants were bound to build the
section to the entire acceptance of the Boston Water Board,
and to take up and rebuild any part of
at their own
expense, that might be directed by the. board at any time
before the final acceptance by them, and the city retained
fifteen per cent, of the contract price to secure performance; that the first month's estimate of work done under
the plaintiff's contract amounted to $192, and this sum had
been retained by the defendants under the provisions of
the ontract until th work should be accepted by the Water
'"Board, which had"neyer yet been done that the engineer
l&ad ordered the discharge of the plaintiff, ' because he was
"not sat isfigQ-WltK his work-' and that the section Jiad not
been completed,' and, by' the terms" of . the. JJ^endants .con-^
was not to be accepted u ntil the whole
trac with the city,
-—ot It was completed.
"
¥he ef en daatsTontgnded that the action could not be
maintained upon the quantvAn meruit, or not until the
whole work was completed and accepted by the Boston
Water Board; and that in any case they were entitled to
retain the amount of the first month's estimate until the
d

—

'

t

it

[

;'

.

c

e

it,

j^

c. L. p.

n
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whole woi-k was completed and passed upon by the "Water

Board.
The judge instructed the jury to find the whole amount
due the plaintiff, aud deduct therefrom $192, the amount
due for the first month's work. The jury found, that, af-

tract itself.
The rule laid down in Mayward v. Leonard,

7

a

a

it,

it/

ter deducting the $192, there was due to the plaintiff $111.78 ;
they also found, specially, that the value of the work and
materials furnished by the plaintiff before his discharge
was worth the amount claimed. The plaintiff alleged exceptions to the above ruling.
It was agreed that, if the plaintiff was entitled to recover
on the third count, and the riding of the judge directing
the jury to deduct the amount of the first month's estimate
was incorrect, the verdict of the jury should be amended
and stand for the sum of $303.78.
LoED, J. : It was error in the presiding judge to direct
the $192 to be deducted from the value of the labor and
The plaintiff commenced to work under a writmaterials.
ten contrac^T" and, while that contract was in force, lri"S*rights, remedies and liabilities were all to be^ determined
by the terms of that contract; but, when that coatraetwas
upon ttie I
_whollx terminated, his rights would depend
"mode in, which it was' terminated. """It SoayTSve^en termi-/
nated by his voluntary refusal to continue to perform
or by the absolute prohibition of the defendants to permit
him to perform
or by his absolute inability, by act of
God or otherwise, to continue its performance, or by the
mutual consent of the parties, or by
termination, as in
this case, under
power reserved by the terms of the con-

Pick.

181,

has been constantly recognized by this court, and has been
approved as often as recognized, as founded in right and
equity. Hayward v. Leonard was followed by Smith v.
Pick. 178, Moulton v. Trash,
Lowell Meeting-House,
Met. 577, Snow v. Ware, 13 Met. 42, and Atkins v. Barnstable, 97 Mass. 428. The result of the cases is, that.,,
terjninat&d™ by any mean& other
the spe^aLjontract
"
ffianT^e voluntary refusal of the plaintiff to perform flie^me u pon"~"Ms-- part and. he-4ei<^:datrnras actually receive benefir^om thgig faTTr''perfaFmea""wdrmkterials-Jur-^
'nished.by_jthe plaintiff,~the value of such labor and -m-ateri-jivsntumjmeimt,
aTs may be .reeoyered~upon a count upon
t

a

d

,

j

is

if

9

8

-
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in which casft thfi a,rit, na,1 benefit whiclijhg^defeiidant, re^ei ve s frnm -tlip nl ain tiff is to be paid .hv^ in3epenaently
'_jlib£-lerB^-of-ili,a fiontrafit The contract itself is at an
Its stipulations are as if they had not existed. But
end.
this does not imply that the contract may not be put in
evidence, and its terms referred to, upon the question of
the real value to the defendant of the plaintiff's labor and
materials.
If the time of performance is extended very
far beyond the time fixed by the contract, if the materials
fumisbed are of a very different quality from tbat provided for by the contract, these facts have necessarily a
bearing upon the real value of the services and labor. The
original contract price, too, is an important element in determining the value of the labor and materials; and the
proportion in value which the work done bears to the whole
value of the contract labor and materials is also important
in determining the quantum meruit.

It

j

follows that, upon the authorities in this Commonwealth, the plaintiff -wns pr i tit1pd -tQ. r £aQ .ej:-wha.t. ^under all
t.Tift pirqimptgnnpc nf iha naat^ iii'g
labor.-aiid.ma±firial§ jgre
as
And,
we
understand
that no objection
.acfaiall^tJiEXlEth.
was made by either party to the rules which the presiding
judge laid down to guide the jury in determining the value
of the labor and materials, there was no other error in the
trial than the deduction of the $192 ; and, by the agreement
of the parties, as it appears by the bill of exceptions, the
verdict is to be amended by the addition of that sum, and
judgment is to be entered fpr the, amount of the amended
yerdict.^

Judgment

accordingly.^'^

Eecovery may he in excess of contract price.
52.
This necessarily follows
from the theory of the action upon a quantum meruit.
An excellent statement of the argument is found in Philadelphia v. Tripple (1911) 230 Pa.
St. 480, as follows:
"Let it be assumed that, in an extreme case, a builder
has actually expended in the course of his work a sum in excess of the

If

under such circumcontract price and has not yet completed performance.
the builder finis'hes his work, the owner, upon paying the contract
stances,
price, wiU receive the benefit of a large expenditure actually made, in return
for the payment of a smaller sum of money. This result, which may well
involve a hardship upon the builder, is made necessary by a proper regard
The owner has made a valid
for the contractual
rights of the owner.
contract, and this contract must be protected and enforced even if the builder
suffers.
"Let it be supposed, however, that the owner, who finds himself in this
position of advantage, voluntarUy puts an end to his contract rights in
This in legal' effect he does if he himself breaks the contract
the premises.
The situation
or discharges the builder from his obligation to perform it.
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which then presents itself is one in which the builder has in good faith
expended money in the course of work done for the benefit of the owner,
and has, in the absence of contract, an equitable claim to be reimbursed.
The owner, on the other hand, has deprived himself of the legal right
which would have sufficed to defeat the equity. ■He accordingly stands defenseless in the presence of the builder's claim.
* • * How can the
plaintiff 's claim for disbursements actually made
be met by the limitation contained
in a contract, tmless the defendant
retains the right to enforce the contract?^
And how can it be contended
that the defendant retains such a right when the contract has been disIt may well be that a plaintiff, upon defendant's
charged by his own act?
breach may offer the discharged contract as evidence of the value of that
for which he is seeking recovery. The plaintiff in such a case has not broken
the contract; he may fairly contend that its terms are at least an admission
But where
by the defendant which the jury should take into consideration.
the defendant undertakes to limit the plaintiff's recovery by treating the
contract price as a limitation upon such recovery, he is asserting a right
under the very contract which he himself has discharged."
chapter V, for a full discussion of the
See Keener on Quasi-contracts,
liabOity in general assumpsit when he is himself
question of defendant's
in default under a contract.

"

VILES

BAERE

V.

&

MONTPELIER TRACTION

POWER COMPANY.

i

Supreme Court of Vermont.

&

^

1906.

79 Verm,ont, 311.

J.: In June, 1897, the plaintiff and the deinto a written contract by the terms of
entered
fendant
which the_ plaintiff a greed to furnish, every day in the
to the deyear fQiLa.4ieiiQiLaLjfo£_jMrs,""el£fiJii^^
.jeadant . sufficient for the ope rat ion of its el ectric railway
between Moni^ener~aiid Barre, and the defendant agreed
to pay for such power at a price named, in monthly instaUHasblton,

^nentsi,

—

'

~"

'

'■"'—■'^

--.-.,

The contract provided that the„plainiiff_jhquld^not be
resppiisijble to the defendant for damage resulting toTf
"from interruptions to its traffic. .Qnjts_electric_ railways
_came.dl by -fire, flood, _tempest, riots, or a public enemy."
It appeared that in 1899^' ffom'August 19 to September
1, inclusive, the plaintiff during some portions of each day
but one, failed to furnish the amount of power which under
his contract he was bo^ind to furnish, and it further appeared that during said days the defendant availed itself
of power furnished, for the purpose of operating its road
when it could, but that in consequence of the shortage oi
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power the operation of the road was from time to time
necessarily suspended, and the defendant's cars were at a
standstill.
September first the defendant sent the plaintiff a written
notice stating that on account of the plaintiff's breach of
the contract in failing to furnish the power therein provided for, the defendant, after the delivery of the notice,
woul d treat..th£ L,cantra.nt. as ended and would neither take,
lor pay fo r any more power under the contract. It
appeared that this notice was received by the plaintiff in
the morning of September second, and that thereafter no
power was taken by the defendant from the plaintiff.
All the power taken by the company up to July 1, 1899,
had been paid for, and in this case, which is a consolidation
of two suits, recovery was sought for the power furnished
on and after that date.
The plaintiff had fallen short of compliance with the contract. He could, therefore, recover, if at all, only upon such
a showing as would entitle him to recover qucmtum meruit.
The plaintiff, subject to objection and exception, introduced
evidence tending to show that his failure to fulfill the contract was not wilful, but that it resulted while he was endeavoring in entire good faith to perform according to the
His plan t was operated by
exact terms of the contract.
and,
some of tha evidence''"ol^gecfe'3.~"ttr tended
water power,
to Rhow L-thathis4a&«:e"Wa&-the
result of an extraordinary
and unforese "'", flT'n''''^^r— It appeared that he had other patrons besides the defendant, and some of the evidence objected to tended to show that the wants of these patrons
were not allowed to hinder him in his endeavors to supply
the defendant; in other words, that he gave the defendant
a preference over his other patrons. Some of the evidence
objected to was to the point that after the shortage occurred
or became imminent an auxiliary steam power could
not have been established in time to relieve the situation.
All this evidence was rightly admitted. Though the plaintiff had broken his contract, he had furnished poAver which
the defendant had taken and used. In the nature of things
there could be no rescission.

the circumstances of the case, if the plaintiff could
satis^ the jury that he had endeavored in entire good faith
fulfill the contract to the letter, then he was enittled to

^In

lb
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'B.

gumtwm meruit x&cov^IY^ iaiilea§uiiug.,9a»ouiit«o£-. damage
of contract was
resulting tojthe. defendant from the"^breach
,. ,™.„,-,™„
.

Buch as to prevent such recovery.

I!B«WVia»"»»''iw

a

;

it
it
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is

a

is

is

;

;

;

;

:
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a
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a

:

'
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is

a
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The common-law rule which "sometimes worked hardships undeserved and unsalutary has been somewhat relaxed, but good faith in endeavoring to perform fully and
case
exactly
essential to
quantum meruit recovery in
like this. In such
case, unless the party in default has
in good faith endeavored to accomplish full performance
he deserves nothing.
To hold otherwise would be to encourage
disregard of contract obligations; while so to
hold
to enforce the law of contracts as rightly underno better definition than that
stood, for of this law there
The law of contract
of Sir Frederick Pollock who says
more or
may be described as the endeavor of the state,
less imperfect one, by the nature of the case, to establish
a positive sanction for the expectation of good faith which
has grown up in the mutual dealings of men of average
right mindedness."
WiUiston's Wald's Pollock on Contracts,
The evolution and establishment in this State of the rule
which now obtains here in
case such as the plaintiff's evidence tended to make, may be sufficiently traced through
the following cases
Dyer v. Jones,
Vt. 205 Oilman v.
Ball, 11 Vt. 510; Fenton v. Clark, 11 Vt. 557; Ripley v.
Chapman, 13 Vt. 268; Barker v. Troy and Boston R. B.
Co., 27 Vt. 780 Brackett v. Morse, 23 Vt. 557 Hubbard v.
Belden, 27 Vt. 645 Swift v. Harrim,an, 30 Vt. 608 Bragg
V. Bradford, 33 Vt. 3»; Eddy v. Clement, 38 Vt. 486.
Some of the cases cited above speak of substantial performance as an element of recovery; but as
pointed out
in Drew v. Goodhue, 74 Vt. 437, 52 Atl. 971, the phrase
"substantial performance"
used in two senses. That
double and so a confusing use
has
made altogether
clear by the opinion in Manning v. School District, 124
Wis. 84, 102 N. W. 356. In some of the cases
means full
performance according to the fair intent of the contract,
and permits recovery on the contract without recoupment.
But as used in the cases relevant to the question here,
means something distinctly short of full performance, as
the facts of the cases show, and includes such performance
as was in this case shown to have been rendered down to
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elected to treat the contract

Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1, a case which arose in the
District of Columbia, is analogous to this. That was a
case of failure to perform all the undertakings of an entire contract. The court held that though the failure was
in consequence of great and unforeseen difficulties the plaintiff below was not excused from doing what he had undertaken to do ; but the court were of opinion that he was
entitled to recover subject to the defendant's right to recoup, a right which had been denied in the trial court. The
court further expresses itself upon several questions not
necessary to the decision but likely to arise on a new trial
of that case. What is thus said is in harmony with the
doctrines which the court of this State has from time to
time applied.
The court say that recovery cannot be had
by one who has wilfully left a contract unfinished; that
good faith is essential to recovery by one who has not fully
performed ; that the suit in case of incomplete performance
should be not on the special contract but on the common
counts in indebitatus assumpsit, but that nevertheless the
contract should be produced on trial.
Finally the court
"There
is
great
conflict
and
confusion
in the ausay:
thorities upon this subject. The propositions we have
laid down are reasonable and just and they are entertained
by a preponderance of the best considered adjudications."
A lengthy note to Hayward v. Leonard, 19 Am. Dec. 272,
recognizes the conflict and confusion of authorities, many
of which are reviewed, but in closing the note Mr. Freeman
"This doctrine seems to be recognized and to be
says:
growing in favor — ^where under a special contract a party
has in good faith bestowed some labor or parted with some
articles to the benefit of another who has as a matter of fact
enjoyed the benefit of the labor or the articles, whether
voluntarily or involuntarily, and where the incomplete performance has not been the result of the party's own provoking or of causes which he might with ordinary diligence
have provided against, the one receiving the benefit must
pay therefor." What is said in the above quotation about
liability in case of the involuntary enjoyment of a benefit
is a matter to be considered when occasion for its coneideration arises; but here the matter of the involuntary
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The defendant
enjoyment of a benefit is not involved.
voluntarily took and used the power for which the plaintiff
seeks to recover pay.
•

In

**•••***•

argument in this court counsel for the defendant treat
the case largely as if it were an action on the special contract. They point to the facts that the contract was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff and that the plaintiff
introduced evidence tending to show the reasons why the
contract was not fully complied with. But in order to a
quantuvn, meruit recovery the contract and these reasons
were needed in the case. Jto»Jio „s,ta,te of the evidence~co«ld
the plaintiff d£serv.e J;o-reGover more than the contracLpiice
fioT powe£furnished, and he was bound to show whyjtehad
^not fully performed according to the terms of the contract
in order that the question of his good faith in endeavo-nng
fully to perform might be determined.
Fully to meet the objection to the form of the action it
should be said that a technical quantum meruit count is
not necessary to a recovery quantum mermi.^^^jjch-a^ift;^
coveix.nL3.y bahad under the- common -counts in -m^eibUaiMS^
assum^it. 1 Chit. PI. 337; 2 Saunders, William's Ed.
122a, n. 2.

The case was tried upon the correct theory that since
the plaintiff in any view of the evidence had broken his
contract, the defendant was entitled to recoup its damages
resulting from the plaintiff's breach. In connection with
its evidence on the question of such damages the defendant
made an offer which, in substance, was an offer to show
that in consequence of the failure of the plaintiff to furnish power according to the contract during the period
from August 11 to September 1 inclusive, it suffered a loss
of patronage and so of earnings during the month of September. Evidence under the offer was excluded, and we
think that its exclusion was substantial error. The damage offered to be shown was such as might naturally result
from the cause to which the defendant would attribute it

and the defendant was entitled if it could to introduce eviTh g defenda nt had a
dence which came up to its offer.
right to the same latitude in showingits_d£
purpose of recoupment:iiHt^it;^uH^
to recover damages for a breachoOhf
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Van Epps v. Harrison, 40 Am. Dec. 314, and this being so,
the evidence offered as above stated should have been re-

tjeived.

•

•••••••»•

J^tdgment-rev-ersed -and cause remanded.'*
In the note to Hayward v. Leonard (1828) 7 Pick.
53.
(Mass.) 181,
in 19 American Decisions, 272, referred to in this case, Mr. Freeman says:
'I There is, perhaps, no more vexatious question in the adjustment of the
rights of parties to contracts than in determining what, if any, compensation should be paid to one who, in pursuance of the terms of a special
contract, has parted with some value, or bestowed some, labor to the benefit
of another, but has failed to comply with the requirements on which he
has engaged that payment
therefor shall depend.
By the strict rule of
the common law, where one had contracted to deliver certain described
articles within a certain period, and payment was not to be made until
the entire delivery,
or to serve another for a specified time for a compensation for the whole period to be paid at its close, or to perform
labor and furnish materials
of a stipulated quality and quantity, to be
paid for at the completion of the work, it was a settled rule that the full
performance on the one part was a condition
precedent to the right to
recover for the services performed or articles furnished.
For a part perThis was said to be of the nature
formance no recovery could be had.
of entire contracts, that he who asked any benefit under them must first
The rigor of this rule has been
show that he himself was not in default.
much relaxed in different States of the Union, though in many it is still
strictly enforced. A tendency, however, is observable in recent adjudications
to administer an equitable relief to parties, rather than to hold them to
the very letter of their engagements."
chapter IV, for a fuU discussion of the
See Keener on Quasi-Contracts,
doctrine of the right to sue in general assumpsit when the plaintiff is in
The question is largely one of substantive Iaw
default under a contract.
rather than procedure.

CHAPTER

IL

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF PLEADING.
GOULD ON PLEADING.

CHAPTER L
Pleadings are the mutual altercations of the
parties to a suit, expressed in legal form, and in civil actions reduced to writing. In a more limited sense, however, "the pleadings" (in the plural) comprehend only
Sec.

1.

those allegations, or altercations, which are subsequent to
In England, these altercations
the count, or declaration.
were anciently oral; having been offered, viva voce, by the

is

a

3.

2.

i.

a

is

:

is,

respective parties or their counsel, in open court; as is still,
generally done, in the pleadings on the part of the defendant, or prisoner in criminal prosecutions.
And hence it
in
the
in
that
Norman language,
which most of the ancient
books of the English law are written, the pleadings are freThough for centuries past,
quently denominated the parol
all pleadings, in civil actions, have been required to be
In some instances, however, the term parol
written.
still used to denote tbe entire pleadings in 'cause: As
when in an action, bronght against an infant heir, on an
obligation of his ancestor's, he prays that the parol may demur;
e. that the pleadings may be stayed, till he shall
attain full age.
The mutual altercations, which constitute the
Sec.
in
civil actions, consist of those formal allegations
pleadings
and denials, which are offered, on one side, for the purpose of maintaining the suit, and on the other, for the purpose of defeating it; and which, generally speaking, are
predicated only of matters of fact.
For pleading is, practically nothing more than
Sec.
affirming or denying, in formal and orderly manner, those
.facts, which constitute the ground of the plaintiff's demand, and of the defendant's defense. Pleading, therefore,'
consists merely in alleging matter of fact, or in denying
alleged as such by the adverse party.
what
(170)
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Sec. 4. But in the theory, or science, of pleading the
averment of facts, on either side, always presupposes some
principle, or rule of law, applicable to tiie facts alleged ; and
which when taken in connection with those facts, is claimed,
by the party pleading them to operate in his own favor.
For all rights of action, and all special defenses, result
from matter of fact and matter of law combined. And
hence, in every declaration, and in aU special pleading, some
e. some proposition consisting of matlegal proposition
ter of law), though not in general expressed in terms, by
the pleader (because the court is supposed judicially to
know it),
always, and necessarily, impUed, or — to use the
language of grammarians — ■imderstood.
For
would be obviously to no purpose, for
Sec.
either party to state facts, of which no principle of law
could be predicated in his favor. Indeed, all that a party
submits to the court, by alleging facts,
their legal operation: And for the purpose of deciding what their operation in law is, the rule of law, in virtue of which the pleader
claims the matter of fact alleged by himself, to be in his
favor, must always be tacitly supplied, or understood.
By contemplating the subject in this point of
Sec.
view, we are enabled to apprehend the striking propriety
and full import of Lord Mansfeld's remark, that "the
substantial rules of pleading are founded in strong sense,
and the soundest and closest logic." For those rules, when
considered in their proper connections and dependencies,
will be found to involve a connected, methodized body of
principles, constituting a complete and coherent system of
legal logic: A system, artificial indeed in its form and
structure but admirably adapted to the important ends of
simplicity, uniformity a/nd certainty, in the modes of ad;

6.

is

5.

it

is

(i.

.

ministering justice.

For

:

;

it

is

is

if

a

is

7.

the purpose of explaining and illustrating
this view of the subject, we may observe, that all pleading
logical process. And by analyzing a good
essentially
we take into
declaration, or any good special pleading,
necessarily supposed
view, with what
expressed, what
or implied we shall find in
the elements of a good syllogism: All good pleading being in substance a syllogistic
process; though abridged in form, like some of the syllogisms of the schools
So that not only every good declaration, but all good special pleading on either side, in each
Sec.
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successive stage of the pleadings, is essentially a good sylla
gism.
Sec. 8. Thus in an action, brought for a trespass committed upon land, the declaration may be presented in the
following form: "Against him, who has forcibly entered
have a right by law, to recover damages :
upon my land,
The defendant has forcibly entered upon my land : Therehave a right, by law, to recover damfore, against him
ages." In the example here given, the first or major proposition asserts the legal principle, on which the plaintiff
founds his claim : The second, or minor, alleges the matter
of fact, to which that principle is to be applied, in the
particular case: The conclusion is the legal inference, resulting from the law and fact together, as they appear in
the premises.
And the judgment of the court (if for the
plaintiff), is a re-affirmance of this conclusion, together with
an award, or sentence of recovery in pursuance of it.
Sec. 9. In the case now stated, the plaintiff's alleged
right of recovery may be contested, by a denial of either
of the three propositions, which constitute his declaration.
And as the denial of either of them is, in effect, a complete
denial of the plaintiff's whole claim, the defendant is not
allowed (by the rules of the common law), to deny more
"
than one of them. For if he can successfully deny any one
of them; he will, by so doing, attain every object, which
he could have proposed in denying them all.
Sec. 10. If, then, the defendant would deny the major,
or first proposition above stated, which consists of matter
of law, he mugt do
called an issue
by tendering what
in law which
merely a technical denial of some legal
proposition, or supposed rule of law. The minor or second
proposition in the declaration— as
consists only of mat—
ter of fact must be denied,
at all, by what the law denominates an issue m fact; or, more strictly speaking, by
the legal mode of
tendering an issue in fact —which
denying by plea, what has been alleged, as a matter of fact,
on the other side. But assuming the major to be correct
in principle, and the minor true in point of fact (upon which
supposition neither of them can be successsfuUy denied)
the conclusion must inevitably follow, unless the defendant
can repel
e. some disby alleging some new matter,
and
inconsistent with
tinct collateral fact), which
which therefore hy consequence implies a denial of it:

I

it,

is

(i.

it,

;
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There being no form of direct negation, in which the condnsion can be distinctly answered.
Sec. 11. Let it be supposed, then that in the case just
stated by way of example, the plaintiff's premises are both
undeniable ; but that he has released his cause of action to
the defendant, and that the release is the particular fact,
or new matter, upon which the defendant relies, for defeating the suit. Under these circumstances, the defendant's
plea, or defense, if reduced to a syllogistic form, will stand
thus: "If he, upon whose land
have forcibly entered,
releases to me his right of action for such entry; he has
thenceforth no right by law to recover damages for it,
against me. But the plaintiff has released to me his right
of action, for my entry upon his land: Therefore he has,
by law, no right to recover damages for that cause, against
me."
To this defense the plaintiff has now, in his
Sec. 12.
turn, a right to reply, by denying either of the three propositions advanced by the defendant.
But if he admits both
as we are now assuming,
of the defendant's premises ; or
he cannot successfully deny either of them his suit must of
course faO, unless he can destroy the defendant's conclusion, by some new matter of fact which will be, in legal
denial of it.
effect,
Sec. 13. For the purpose then of carrying this process
one stage further, let us suppose that the release, pleaded
by the defendant, was extorted from the plaintiff by dvrthe new matter, by which the
ress; and that this fact
plaiatiff proposes to overthrow the defendant's conclusion.
The plaintiff's reply may, upon this state of facts, be re"A release extorted
solved into the following syllogism:
from me, by duress, does not in law destroy any pre-existBut the release,
ing right of mine, to recover damages;
pleaded by the defendant, was extorted from me by duress
Therefore, that release does not destroy my right by law to
recover damages against him."
"
he
Sec. 14. It
now necessary for the defendant,
persists in denying the plaintiff's claim, to contest this
reply; and this he may do, by denying either of the three
consists. But assuming, as in the
propositions, of which
preceding stages of this illustration, that neither of the
premises can be safely denied, the consequence must be,
that the plaintiff will prevail unless the defendant can, on
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his part, allege some further new matter, which may destroy the plaintiff's conclusion. And the pleading of such
new matter, of whatever facts it may consist, will contain
the elements of another syllogism — ^which the plaintiff will
be at liberty to answer, by another still; and the same
syllogistic process may lie repeated, by the parties, alternately as long as there remains new matter to be alleged on
either side.
Sec. 15.

For, that both parties may respectively

have

is

it

^if

the full benefit of pleading whatever the nature and exigencies of the case, on their respective sides, may require, it
is obvious that each must be at liberty to answer the allegations made against himself, by denying, at his election,
either of the three propositions contained in those allegations: In other words, each party must be at liberty to
deny whatever he considers as false, either in law, fact or
inference, in his adversary's pleading. Each party, therefore, had a right to allege netv matter, in any stage of the
pleadings, as long as he has occasion to answer new matter — i. e. as long as such matter is alleged against him.
And thus the right of electing between the three regular
modes of meeting his adversary's allegations, is continued
to each party, until one of the premises in the pleading
on one side, is directly denied on the other; or (to substitute
legal, for scholastic language), until the pleadings terminate in the tender of a proper issue, in law or in fact.
Sec. 16. An issue, of either kind, precludes the allegation
of further new matter on either side and thus regularly
closes the pleadings.
For before any issue can be tendered,,
both parties will necessarily have an opportunity to allege
whatever the nature of the case, on either side, may require.
And as the whole controversy, which is the subject-matter
of the pleadings, is by the issue, reduced to some one point
of fact or law; no necessary or useful purpose can be attained, by carrying the pleadings further. For the question, upon which the contest depends, is now distinctly preAnd it
sented by the issue, and ripe for determination.
only remains for the court, or the jury, to decide the point
in issue, and for the former to render judgment. If the
issue be taken upon matter of law, it is to be determined by
in general, though
upon matter of fact,
the court —
It being the
not universally, to be tried by the jury:
province of the former to decide questions of law, and of
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the latter, ordinarily, to ascertain matters of fact. And the
issue, whether in law or fact, being decided, the judgment
of the court, which is merely the sentence of the law, deduced from the facts ascertained^ must follow in favor of
that party who appears, from the whole record, entitled to

it

Sec. 17. -From this very general outUne, it will be apparent that all pleading is a logical process. And the great
object of the process is to facilitate the administration of
justice, by simplifying the grounds of controversy, and
ultimately narrowing down the contest to a single and direct aflBrmative and negative —i. e., to some definite point
of law or fact, affirmed on one side, and denied on the
other.
Sec. 18. By special pleading, is meant the allegation of
special or neiv matter, as distinguished from a direct denial of matter previously alleged on the opposite side.
Sec. 19. The matter of fact, which, in the preceding illustration, constitutes the subject of the minor proposition,
is, in the established forms of pleading, always expressly
Since the facts, upon which the complaint or dealleged:
fense is f oimded, are supposed to be unknown to the judges.
The conclusion, or third proposition, in the syllogistic process, is also expressed, in the existing mode of pleading,
either by the demand, which the plaintiff makes of damages, debt, or other thing, on the one hand, or by the defendant's prayer of jvdgment against the plaintiff, on the
other. For it cannot appear, from facts stated alone, what
benefit the pleader proposes to claim from them; and he
can, therefore, derive from them no advantage which he
does not claim from them, in his pleading.
Sec. 20. But as has been already suggested, the principle, or rule of law, of which we have represented the major
proposition to consist (and which, according to ancient
usage, was, ia certain cases always recited, or formally
alleged by the pleader), is now, in general, not actually expressed in the pleadings, in any form. For the judges,
whose province it is to decide upon the legal sufficiency of
aU pleadings, are presumed to know judicially, what the
law, upon any given or alleged state of facts, is : And the
nature of the facts, actually alleged on either side, taken in
connection with the demand laid in the declaration, and
with the prayer of jvdgment, in the subsequent pleadings,
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will, in every case, and with perfect certainty, indicate
the supposed rule of law upon which the pleader relies, as
his major proposition. And in this manner, that proposition, though not expressed in terms, is necessarily understood and tacitly supplied.
Sec. 21. Thus, in the example already given, of a declaration in trespass, the plaintiff, in alleging that the defendant has forcibly entered upon his land, and demanding
damages for that cause, assumes and tacitly asserts the general principle, that he, upon whose land such an entry has
been made, has a right by law to recover damages against
him who made it. For unless that principle of law were
tacitly supplied, or presupposed, the averment of the defendant's entry, and the demand of damages, which follows it in the declaration, would be altogether unmeaning
and nugatory: Since no right of action could result from
the defendant's act, if no such legal principle existed. —
And this principle, or the proposition which would express
as clearly indicated by the matter of fact alleged, and
the demand made in the declaration, and may therefore be

if
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^i.

is

of

a

of

is

a

is

a

of

a

it

and applied, as
had been expressly and formally stated.
Sec. 22. The object, thus far proposed, has been to exhibit
general analysis of the law of pleading, considered
as
principles. And though the schoscience, or system
lastic terms and forms, which have been introduced for
this purpose, are unknown in the established language and
practice of pleading; yet the essential properties and the
results of the preceding syllogistic process, though differently expressed, are in effect the same as those of the less
scholastic modes of pleading, adopted by the common law.
Thus, an issue in law which, in the foregoing
Sec. 23.
called
denial
the major proposition of the
analysis
adverse party,
described in legal language, as an admisthe facts alleged by that party, but
their
sion
denial
operation in his favor. These different terms however express, in effect, one and the same thing — or rather, the
operation thus differently described, is essentially one and
the same.
Sec. 24. Thus also, the new, or special matter, which
in the foregoing analysis
called a denial of the adverse
party's conclusion, is, in legal language, denominated matter of avoidance — e., matter which, admitting both of
as easily apprehended
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the other party's premises, avoids or repels, in the particular case in question, the consequence, or inference, which
would otherwise result from them. And that inference
is, universally, the syllogistic conclusion in the adverse
party's pleading, if his pleading be reduced to a syllogism.
It is therefore manifest, that matter of avoidance, and matter which, in the syllogistic formula, goes in denial of the
adverse party's conclusion, are in substance one and the

thing.

same

CAMPBELL

V.

WALKEE.

Superior Court of Delaware.
1

1910,

Boyce, 580.

Mr. Justice Wool<ley delivered the opinion of the court.
The first count of the declaration charges that "the defendant, so negligently and carelessly operated and ran his
automobile over and along one of the public roads of New
Castle County * * * while the said plaintiff was then
and there traveling along the said public road, riding in a
vehicle drawn by a horse which was drawn then and there
with due care and caution, * * * and that by reason of
the said negligent and careless running of the said automobile the said vehicle was struck from the rear by the said
automobile and by means of the said collision the said plaintiff was thrown out of the said vehicle, ' ' and injured. To this
count, the defendant demurred specially, stating several

of demurrer.
The substance of the count is, that the defendant so negligently, and carelessly operated his automobile that it
struck the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle, and by reason of
the coUision she was injured.
The substance of the demurrer is that the count does not show the facts and circumstances of the collision with a particularity sufficient
to enable the defendant to know what the plaintiff proposes
to prove, and that the count does not contain an allegation
of negligence sufficient to apprise him of the acts of neglicauses

a

L. P.
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that it calls upon him to defend. The issue of law
raised by the demurrer, therefore, is whether the first
count of the declaration is such a specification of the facts
gence

and circumstances which constitute the plaintiff's cause of
action as requires an answer by the defendant.
It has been long and firmly established in Delaware, that
the rules and principles of common-law pleading as they
existed at the time of our independence, excepting so far
as they may have been changed or modified by constitution,
or statutory provision, constitute the system of pleading
employed by the courts of this State.
{Donahoe v. Star
Pub. Co., 3 Penn. 545.) As elementary principles of that
system, it was announced in the very first of our State reports, that "The object of pleading is to reduce the controversy to certain and precise issues of law and fact, on
which, as containing the pretensions or claims of the parties, the opinion of the court and jury may be taken, and
a decision had in accordance with the principles of justice" [State V. Collins, 1 Harr. 216), and further that
"Pleadings are designed not only to put in issue single
points, but to apprise the parties of what they are to come
prepared to try." {Beading's Heirs v. State, 1 Hair. 190,
192). Pleadings, therefore, possess a double function and
are designed, first, to ascertain and present the real points
in controversy, so that the minds of the Court and jury
may not be drawn off upon matters immaterial, irrelevant
and unimportant to the true issue {Easton v. Jones, 1
Harr. 433, note A, 436), and second, to acquaint the opposing party with the facts that are intended to be proved in
support of the issue tendered. With respect to the latter
function of pleading, it has uniformly been held from the
cases in 1 Harrington to Ev/nter v. P. B. & W. B. B. Co.,
in 1 Boyce, that while the plaintiff is not required to make
a detailed and minute statement of the circumstances of
the cause of axjtion, he must nevertheless set forth in his
declaration the facts upon which he bases his action with
a particularity and certainty that will reasonably inform the
defendant what he proposes to prove at the trial, in order
that the defendant may have a fair opportunity to meet
and controvert those facts in defense. Any other rule would
defeat rather than promote this object of pleading, and
would make a declaration an instrument to conceal rather
than to disclose facts.

Chap. 2]

The Nature and Purpose of Pleading.

179

The principles of pleading,

a

it

a

it,

consisting, as it is said, oi
rules founded upon good sense and formed for the furtherance of justice {State v. Hort, 2 Harr. 152, 156; Easton v.
Jones, 1 Harr. 433, note A, 436), work no hardships in requiring a plaintiff to disclose the acts for which he calls
upon another to respond in damages, nor are they unfair
to a plaintiff, who complains of the acts of another, and
who therefore should show of what acts he complains, in
requiring that those acts should not be concealed by language that is vague or by terms that are general.
On the
contrary, the rules of pleading require, thiat the time, place
and circumstances of the matter in action, so far as relied
on and within the knowledge of the party, must be specified
with a fullness and fairness that will reasonably apprise
the opposing party of what he is required to meet.
A declaration is defined to be "the specification i^ methodical and legal form of the circumstances which constitute
the plaintiff's cause of action."
(Chitty's PI. 240, 231).
In making the specification of circumstances contemplated
by the definition, it is held, as general rules, that (1) it is
not sufficient to state a mere conclusion of law, nor (2) is it
sufficient to state the result or conclusion of fact, arising
from circumstances not set forth in the declaration, and
(3) that it is not sufficient to make a general statement of
facts which admits of almost any proof to sustain it. {King
V. W. (& N. C. E. By. Co., 1 Penn. 452; Jones v. Peoples'
By, Co., 4 Penn. 201; Riedel v. W. C. By. Co., 5 Penn. 572.)
When stripped of its formal language, the one fact stated,
in the first count of the declaration is, that the defendant's
automobile struck or came into collision with the plaintiff's
vehicle and the one thing charged to the defendant is, that
the collision occurred by reason of the defendant's negliThe one
gent and careless running of the automobile.
thing of which the defendant is certainly informed by this
averment is the fact of collision, and the one thing for which
he is held accountable is the cause of the collision.
While an averment of the fact of a collision, without
may
stating the particular act of negligence that caused
be sufficient in those exceptional cases where by reason of
high
the relation of the parties, the law places upon one
duty to prevent injury to another, or where the act itself
cannot be held that
bespeaks the negligence of its cause,
from the mere statement of the fact of collision upon
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highway, between wayfarers with equal rights and duties,
the law will infer the collision to have been the result of
negligence, or the negligence to have been that of the defendant, in such cases the fact of collision is not the cause
of action but the acts of negligence that caused the fact
of collision, constitute the cause of action. It therefore devolves upon the plaintiff, in holding the defendant accountable for the fact of collision, which may have been the result of inevitable accident or of one of many negligent acts
of either party, to disclose to the defendant the cause of
the collision and to state the acts that contributed to its
The expression — "so negligently and careoccurrence.
''
lessly operated and ran his automobile, — states no fact or
circumstance that fastens upon the defendant the negligence which must be shown to entitle the plaintiff to recover,iand is clearly within two of the objections before
stated, m that it is a statement of a conclusion of fact, arising from acts or circumstances not set forth in the declaration, and it is a statement so general as to admit almost any
*
*
proof to sustain it. ^*
*
*
*
The demurrer to the first count of the declaration is therefore sustained.

CHAPTER ra.
DEMURRERS.'^
Section

HAVENS

1.

NAitrEE op Demtjebbb.

HAETFOED AND NEW HAVEN
EAILEOAD COMPANY.

V.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
28 Connecticut,

1859.

69.

[Action for injuries sustained by plaintiff while a passenger on defendant's cars. Plaintiff alleged that his trunk
was damaged through the negligence of defendant's servants, and he himself was personally injured through a
wrongful attempt on the part of said servants to eject him
from the train. The defendant demurred generally to the
declaration; the demurrer was overruled and a hearing in
damages was had, and a large amount of evidence was introduced.
Counsel for plaintiff thereupon claimed that
all the facts properly alleged in the declaration were admitted by the demurrer, and that none of the evidence inconsistent therewith should be considered.] •"*
Ellswoeth, J. : * * * From the finding of the superior
court, although it is unnecessarily lengthy and complicated,
FOEMS OP Demurrers.
General Demurrer.
"And the said C D by
his attorney, comes and defends the wrong and injury, when, etc.,
and says, that the said declaration
and the matters therein contained in
manner and form as the same are above stated and set forth, are not
BufiScient
in law for the said A B to have and maintain his aforesaid
action thereof against him, the said C D, and that he the said
D i«
not bound by the law of the land to answer the same, and this he is ready
to verify; wherefore, for want of a sufficient declaration
in this behalf,
the said C D prays .iudgment, and that the said A B may be barred from
having or maintaining his aforesaid action thereof against him, etc."
Special Demurrer:
Proceed as in the above form for a general demurrei
to the end and then add the following, "And the said C D according to
the form of the statute in such case made and provided, states, and shows
to the court here, the following causes of demurrer to the said declaration,
that is to say, that, etc. (here state the particular causes, and concludes thus:)
And also that the said declaration is in other respects uncertain, informal,
and insuficient, etc."
2 Chitty
on Pleading, 678.
55.
Condensed statement of facts by the editor.
54.
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bringing up, as it does well nigh the whole case, facts as

well as law, we can discover the main question in dispute,
and in order to make an end of this protracted controversy,
we will pass over the formal objections to the motion, and
direct our attention to the principal question thus presented, deciding it in accordance with what we understand
to be the law as laid down in the books.
It appears from the motion, that if the court could but
consider aU the testimony which had been received (and
without objection), touching the character, cause and extent of the plaintiff's injuries, for which he brought suit,
the plaintiff, in the opinion of the court, would be entitled
to recover nominal damages and nothing more; or, in other
words, that upon the entire proof he did not appear to
have made out a substantial cause of action against the
defendants, for their not carrying him safely and carefully
from New Haven to Middletown. But if the demurrer was
to be held to exclude certain material parts- of the evidence
from the consideration of the court because the contrary
was conclusively admitted by the demurrer, then the defendants were liable for substantial damages, to be fixed
by a consideration of other and distinct facts. This is the
language of the court: "And if the operation of the demurrer, is such that the defendants can be permitted to
show that the resistance of the plaintiff essentially contributed to the original injury, and also the other faqts
which were shown, and the court should be of opinion, upon
the facts so shown, that such resistance was unjustifiable,
and should reduce the damages to substantially nominal
find for the plaintiff to recover, and
asdamages, then
the
at
damages
sess
$100."
We all of us agree, that, under the circumstances, the
plaintiff's resistance, after the conductor had in vain several times demanded his ticket, according to the general
and proper usage of the company, was inexcusable and unjustifiable; and that if all the circumstances . can be taken
into account, the defendants' servants are to be regarded
as having done no more, in attempting to remove the plaintiff from the car, then they had a right to do. But it is
claimed on the part of the plaintiff, that, after the demurrer, the character, causes and circumstances of the injuries
complained of are not fully open to inquiry. To this poini
•
•
•
then will direct my attention.

I

I

I
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Let us consider then the main question of the case, the
nature and consequences of a demurrer to the declaration
in case or trespass, or in torts generally.
We will then
endeavor to apply the doctrine to the case on trial.
It cannot be necessary to multiply very greatly authorities on this point, since, properly understood, they are all
one way —^both those read by the defendants' counsel and
those cited on the the other side — ^with one exception, in
the case of the latter, which will be noticed in its place.
Gould, in his treatise on Pleading, p. 46, sec. 43, says,
"A demurrer to the declaration is not classed among pleas
to the action, not only because it may be taken as well to
any other part of the pleadings as to the declaration, but
also because it neither aflSrms nor denies any matter of
fact, and is not therefore regarded as strictly a plea of
any class, but rather an excuse for not pleading,"
So on
page 460, "To demur is to rest or pause." And again, "A
demurrer merely advances a legal proposition — it forms an
issue in law; admitting the facts, so far as well pleaded,
for the purpose of taking the opinion of the court, preliminarily, its language is, allowing all that is alleged to be
true, there is not anything that calls for an answer, plea
or defense."
this is indeed true of the declaration or
of a plea, then it is advisable, all will admit, that the question of law be settled in the first instance, for thereby a
protracted and expensive trial of fact may be avoided, even
though in many cases relief may be had by motion in arrest
or motion in error. The admission by demurrer is never,
am confident, a rule of evidence; nor is it so considered
or treated, beyond this, that it necessarily follows from a
judgment on the demurrer that there is a cause or some
cause of action, but precisely what, and of how great extent, does not appear; and without additional proof the
plaintiff will recover only nominal damages. The rule is
modified in actions on notes, bills of exchange, and the like,
but even here the amount due is not conceded by the demurrer, but the note or bill must be produced, that the real
debt may appear, while the execution of the instrument is
not denied. But in actions of trespass, trespass on the case,
and kindred open actions, nothing is admitted beyond a
cause or some cause of action, and if particular damages
are not proved after judgment on demurrer, default or
nil dicit, the plaintiff never takes more than nominal dam^iec.

If
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Archbold, in his treatise on Practice (vol. 2, p. 10), says:
•'Judgment upon demurrer is interlocutory or final in the
same manner and in the same cases as judgment by default is interlocutory in assumpsit, covenant, trespass, case,
and replevin, where the sole object of the action is damages; while in debt and in ejectment, damages not being
the principal object of the action, and those usually recoverable not being of sufficient consequence to warrant the
expense of executing a writ of inquiry, the plaintiff usually
So on page
signs final judgment in the first instance."
31: "A writ of inquiry is a judicial writ directed to the
sheriff, stating the former proceedings, and then saying,
'because it is unknown what damages the plaintiff hath
sustained, you are commanded, by the oath of twelve honest and .lawful men of your county, diligently to inquire
after the same, and return the inquisition into court.' "
As the inquest is merely to inform the conscience of the
court, the court may itself inquire and assess the damages,
as is always done in this state.
Bruce v. Rawlins, 3 Wils.
2
Hewett
Wils.
62;
372-374; Goiad v. Eamv. Mantell,
61,
mersly, 4 Taunt. 148 ; 1 Doug. 216, note. In actions on bills
and notes, the inquiry is often referred to a master or pro2 Saund. 107, note; Napier v. Shneider, 12
thonotary.
East. 420 ; Govld v. Hammersly, supra. But when the computation of damages is not a mere calculation, the court
will not refer it to the master or prothonotary, but the plaintiff must proceed regularly with his writ of inquiry. When
some difficult point of law is likely to arise in the course
of the inquiry or where the facts are important, the court
will let the writ of inquiry be executed before the chief
justice or a judge of assize. 1 Sellon's Prac. 344. Arch-

bold again says (p. 38), "In trespass or any other action
where the damage actually sustained by the plaintiff is the
measure of damages to be given by the jury, if the plaintiff do not prove the nature of the injury and the amount
of the damages sustained by him, the jury always give
nominal damages only."
Like views are to be found in 3 Chitty's General Practice, 672; 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, title "Demurrer;"
1 Chitty's Pleading, 654; BLagham on Judgments, 2, 36;
Saunders' Pleading and Evidence, 953, and 3 Stephens'
Commentaries, 639. The same doctrine is laid down in our
own decisions. In the case of Sturges v. Bush, 5 Day, 452,

Demubbeks.

Sec. 1]

185

it

is

it

it

it

if

5

&

5

is

if

it

a

if

it,

which was an action of account for certain enumerated
articles, the plaintiff was held bound to prove before the
auditors every article for which he sought damages, though
the plaintiff insisted that they had aU been admitted and
found to have been received by the defendant to account
for. The same was held in the case of Lacon v. Davenport,
16 Conn. 331. In the case of Parker v. Hotchkiss, 25 Conn.
321, it was held that a judgment between the same parties
in a former case, was evidence only of what it was necessary for the party prevailing to prove in that case, not of
what was alleged or might have been proved.
A similar
doctrine is expressed in the case of Curtis v. Chapin, 23
Conn. 399. In Pease v. Phelps, 10 Conn. 62, the court say,
"A demurrer presents only an issue in law to the court for
consideration; the jury having no concern with it; and although it is a rule of pleading that a demurrer admits facts
weU pleaded for the sole purpose of determining their legal
sufficiency, yet as a rule of evidence it was never supposed
that a demurrer admitted anything."
The same was held
Ln Tompkins v. Ashhy, 1 Mood. & Mai. 32, in which the marginal note is, "A demurrer or plea to a bill in equity does
not admit the facts charged iu
so as to be evidence
the
those facts arise in
future action
against
defendant,
Abbott, Ch. J., remarked in
between the same parties."
was nothing more than saying that,
that case, that
the
not bound to answer.
In
facts he so, the defendant
Car.
Payne, 247,
Montgomery v. Richardson,
was decided that facts demurred to in one plea cannot be used as
evidence of another plea. In Bates v. Loomis,
Wend. 134,
was held that in an action for an assault and battery,
the defendant does not plead but suffers a default, such default admits an assault and battery, but
does not admit
one on any particular day, as on the day laid in the declaraadmit any circumstances laid in the declation, nor does
ration by way of aggravation; and without proof in such
case that the injury complained of was committed by the
entitled to only nominal damdefendant, the plaintiff
ages.

a

is

The claim of the plaintiff's counsel, unless we misapprethat demurrer admits the truth of the entire
declaration for every purpose throughout the progress of
the case, or that every allegation which coidd have been
hend them,
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proved for any purpose to the jury, whether it be a part
of the gist of the action or not, is to be assumed to be absolutely true, because the jury might have found it to be true,
had they been allowed to pass upon it. This cannot be the
correct rule, upon their own authorities, and it is abundantly disproved by every book of practice in the language.
If, however, this is not their view, and they mean only that
such facts are admitted as are essential to a recovery, then
there is no important difference between them and the gentlemen on the other side, and the question becomes simply
one as to the proper application of a principle of law long
recognized and well established.
We will state a case or two to show how erroneous is the
view that a demurrer is a rule of evidence. A person is
sued in trespass for entering another's house and carrying
off articles of household furniture. The plaintiff can recover, on the general issue, by proving an entry only; or,
passing by the entry, as in the case of Holley v. Brown,
14 Conn. 255, and treating the tort as only a trespass to
personal property he can recover if he proves that the
instead
defendant took away a single article only; and
of going to the jury, the defendant had demur:fed or suffered a default, neither one of these acts specifically would
would be by a
be proved by the judgment, any more than
will not
verdict had the defendant gone to the jury; and
be pretended that this would have been the consequence of
verdict, for neither separate act was indispensable to
sued for an
recovery by the plaintiff. Again, a person
assault and battery, the pleader alleging divers special injuries, to his dress, his person, his health, etc. The plaintiff can recover upon proving only that the defendant laid
his hand violently upon him. Hence, we insist that a demurrer or default prove nothing more than this; nor even
this as a specific act; and nothing but nominal damages
will be given unless there be further proof. The same
true where there are distinct counts in the same declarasingle cause
tion. A demurrer in that case admits only
motion in arrest one good count
of action, so that on
enough, and one tortious act in that one count
enough.

I

Following out this view of the declaration,
inquire, what
as
admitted in this case by the deare we to understand
murrer? In my judgment, nothing but that the defendants
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were common carriers on the road in question, and received
the plaintiff into one of their cars to carry him with care
and safety from New Haven to Middletown, and have failed
to do it as agreed. This gives a complete cause of action.
Strike this out of the declaration, and it is by no means
certain that there is enough left to enable the plaintiff to
recover; but with this in, and the rest stricken out, there is
enough left for a good cause of action.
The wrongful
acts specified go only to the manner and special consequences of the defendants' default.
But, if we are wrong in our view, if the action is founded
in misfeasance, rather nonfeasance, and the gist of the action is the positive acts of the defendants' agents, the result will not be essentially different; for then only one of
these acts need to be proved on the general issue — the tearing the plaintiff's coat —^the putting the hand violently upon his person— the raising him from the seat — or the attempt to eject him from the car; each would sustain the
action, even in that point of view; and therefore only one
is proved by the verdict or demurrer, and not even that
May not the defendants show, on the hearing
specifically.
in damages, notwithstanding the demurrer, that the plaintiff's knee was not hurt at all? or if so, that it was caused
by his attempt to assail the conductor, or in his twisting
his limb under the seat in order to keep from being ejected
from the car, or in springing over the seat to avoid the conductor?
so, and the injury to the knee may be denied
and disproved, the manner and degree in which it is claimed
to have been done by the defendants may be disproved ; for
the greater includes the less, and the proof of the manner
may weU show, as it did in this case, that the plaintiff
himself was the author of this particular injury ; and were
it true that the defendants, by plea, could have set up such
misconduct of the plaintiff in bar of the action, which we
by no means concede, stiU, the entire proof being before
the court, and it appearing that there had been no negligence, misconduct or fault in the defendants, it would be
strange indeed for the court to adjudge the defendants to
pay the plaintiff damages brought upon himself by his unpardonable contumacy and violence, when it is not found
that the particular injury to the knee was caused by the
defendants' agents at alL

If
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Nor does it follow from the demurrer that the character
of the scuffle in the car, when the plaintiff set the rules
of the company at defiance, cannot be known and judged
of and made the rule of right between the parties. It cannot be so. The demurrer cannot be allowed to clothe the
acts of the defendants' agents (supposing them to be improper) with a character or quality which will not allow of
a full examination of them on their merits, or which inv>st
exonerate the plaintiff contrary to the justice of the case,
and contrary to what would have been the result in a trial
on the general issue.
We advise judgment for onfe hundred dollars damages.
concurred.
In this opinion, Binman, and McCubdy,
Sanford, J., dissented. Stores, C. J., being disqualified
by interest, did not sit.
Judgment for $100 damages.

JJ.,

McALISTEE

v.

CLARK.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

1866.

33 Connecticut, 253.

Action of debt, brought under the provisions of a by-law
of the city of New Haven for the prevention of nuisances,
by the city treasurer, to recover a penalty of fifty dollars.
This cause came before this court, at its preceding term in
this county, upon a reservation for advice upon the "sufficiency of the declaration, to which the defendant had demurred. {Bee ante, "page 91.) After this court had advised
that judgment upon that issue be rendered for the plaintiff,
but before judgment had been in fact entered up in the
superior court in conformity to this advice, the defendant
made a motion to the superior court to allow him to withdraw his demurrer and plead the general issue. This motion the court denied, and gave judgment for the plaintiff
for the full amount of the penalty. The defendant claimed
on the question of damages, and offered evidence to prove,
that the plaintiff was entitled to no damages, or at most to
nominal damages only, but this evidence was excluded by
the court as inadmissible.
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HlNMAN, C. J.: * • *
The penalty fixed in the by-law for the offense charged
against the defendant is fifty dollars precisely. It can be
no more nor less than that sum. The defendant, however,
claims that on the assessment of damages, when a demurrer
is overruled, the damages are always nominal, unless the
actual damages are proved. That this is so in cases where
the damages may vary from a nominal sum to the amount
in the declaration, according as the proof may show that
the plaintiff is entitled to one sum or another, is no doubt
true. And in cases of this sort, as the demurrer admits only
a cause of action, and does not admit any aggravated circumstances though charged in the declaration, the plaintiff will recover only nominal damages, unless he shows
what the actual damages were. But in a case like this, for
a precise penalty given by a by-law, there is no room for
nominal damages; an admission of a cause of action is an
admission that the damages must be assessed at the precise
amount of the penalty.
We advise the superior court that there is no error in
the judgment complained of, and that a new trial should
not be granted.

COLUMBIAN GRANITE COMPANY v. W.
SEND & COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Vermont.
74

Taft, C.

C. TOWN-

1902,

Vermont, 183.

J.:

The defendant undertakes to impeach the
officer's return, which is good on its face, by a plea in abatement, which is demurred to.
Nothing is better settled than that an officer's return
is conclusive between the parties, except in a proceeding to
set it aside.

Yatter v. Pitkm S Miller,

72

Vt.

255, 47

Atl..

Mr. Gould says that a defendant cannot falsify such
a return by plea in abatement, but must resort to his remedy against the officer, if it be false. Gould's PI. c V, §
787.

135.
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A demurrer admits only such facts as are well pleaded,
and therefore never admits an allegation that the pleadings
show the party is estopped to make, for such allegation is
not weU pleaded. Gould's PI. Ch. IX, § 25. Hence, the
facts here alleged in contradiction of the return, not being
well pleaded, are not admitted by the demurrer and cannot be considered.
Judgment affirmed and cause remcmded.

FRAZIEE

V.

THOMAS.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
6

1844.

Alabama, 169.

The declaration has three counts; the first is trover for
50 bags of cotton ; and the other two are in case for removing a quantity of cotton grown upon land leased by the
the plaintiff to one Barron, without paying or tendering
the plaintiff, the amount -due for the rent. The last count
set out the use and occupation of the premises by Barron,
the growing of the cotton upon the land, its liability to pay
the rent and its removal by the defendant, whereby the rent
was lost.

It

also avers that the cotton was subject to a
lien of the plaintiff, and that by the removal, this lien was
lost. The other count in case is similar to this, but there
is no specific allegation of a lien. Both were demurred to,
and overruled as insufficient.
The defendant had a verdict on an issue to. the count in
trover, and the plaintiff prosecutes this writ of error, and
here assigns the judgment sustaining the demurrer as cause
for reversal.
GOLDTHWAITE,

It is

J.

:

*

*

*

supposed, however, that the demurrer ought not
to have been sustained, because the count contains an express averment, that the plaintiff has a lien on the cotton
carried away by the defendant, and as this fact is admitted
by the demurrer, the taking must be considered as wrongful. This view is not admissible, because the existence of
a lien is a conclusion of the law from certain facts, and
2.
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these are necessary to be stated in order that a judgment
may be formed with respect to the existence of the lien.
the precedent matter should be rejected, the count could
not be sustained on the assertion that the plaintiff had a
lien upon the cotton. "Whether we consider the assertion
that there was a lien as predicated on the facts stated, or as
standing alone, the count is alike defective.

If

Judgment affirmed.

GRAHAM'S CASE.
Court of Claims of the United States.
1

1865.

Court of Claims, 183.

a

a

it

is

;

it,

Losing, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The case comes up on demurrer to the petition, which
states that the petitioner was a laborer in the office of the
Commissioner of Public Buildings, being one of the offices
of the Department of the Interior, and was in the employment of the government in the city of Washington.
, That by a joint resolution of Congress,
No. 18, approved
August 18, 1856 (11 U. S. L. 145), it was provided that all
laborers in the employment of the government in the executive departments and on the public grounds in the city
of Washington shall receive an annual salary of six hundred dollars each from and after July 1, 1856.
And he avers that he has been paid only four hundred
and thirty-eight dollars per annum, and he claims the difference between that sum and six hundred dollars per annum for eight years and one quarter, being one thousand
three hundred and thirty-six dollars and fifty cents.
The demurrer in this case is not on file, and no copy
of
either written or printed, can be found but enough
shown by the arguments of counsel on
of its purport
file, and the statements of the Deputy Solicitor, to enable
raised.
the court to decide the question
It was special demurrer, and specified for cause that
menial service in taking
the petitioner was employed in
care of the water-closets in the Capitol, and that his compensation was specified in the act of appropriation of August 18, 1856, ch. 162, 11 U. S. L. 116, at $438 per annum.
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fact not stated in the petition, viz., that
the petitioner had charge of the water-closets in the Capthey should have
itol; and if the defendants relied on
and given the petitioner an opportunity to trapleaded
verse it. The demurrer, therefore,
bad, and the cause
specifies cannot be considered under it.
a

MORGAN

10

of

Supreme Court

V.

it

is

it,

it,

This states

DYER.

New Torh.

1813,

Johnson, 161.

9

;

9

it, a

it

it

is

it

is

if

he
Peb Citeiam. The proper course for the plaintiff,
wishes to avail himself of the objection, that the plea was
aside, and not
by motion to set
not pleaded in season,
On demurrer, this court are to judge, from
by demurrer.
the plea itself, whether
sound in form or substance, and
not whether
was put in within the regular time for pleading such
plea. It rests in the discretion of the court to
receive
or not, even after more than one continuance
between the time that the matter of the plea arose, and the
coming in of the plea, and this discretion will be governed
by circumstances extrinsic, and which cannot appear on the
face of the plea. (Bancker v. Ash,
Johns. Rep. 250 MorJohns. Rep. 255.)
gan V. Dyer,

Supreme Court
12

V.

McGregor.

of

AMORY

New York.

1815,

Johiison, 287.

[This was an action on the case for negligence in the
transportation of goods, and in his declaration the plaintiff alleged that on the 21st day of July, 1812, he caused
certain goods to be shipped on board defendant's ship at
Liverpool, in Great Britain, to be carried by the defendant
to New Orleans; that defendant, in consideration of cer-

Demtjrrebs.

Sec. 1]

193

a

a

is

it

3

it

is

it

it

if,

tain freight, nndertook and promised to safely carry and
deliver the goods ; that defendant did not safely carry and
• deliver them,
but by reason of his negligence the goods
were totally lost. To the declaration there was a general
"
demurrer.]
Peb Cubiam. This case comes before the court on a general demurrer to the declaration.
And the ground upon
which it has been attempted to support the demurrer is, that
the day laid in the declaration is during the existence of
hostilities between this country and Great Britain; and
that, of course, the contract set forth in the declaration is
void, being contrary to the laws of the United States. Without giving any opinion upon the validity of the contract,
was made at the time laid in the declarain point of fact,
sufficient, in this case, to say, that the day being
tion,
immaterial, the plaintiff would not be obliged to prove the
Nothing
contract to have been made on the day laid.
appears upon the face of the declaration, showing the congeneral rule, that
tract to be illegal or void. And
party cannot demur, unless the objection appears on the
face of the pleadings. And so are all the cases referred
to, and relied upon, by the defendant's counsel. In CheetJohns. Eep. 42 and Waring v. Yates, 10
liam V. Lewis,^''
appears, from the declaration, when the
Johns. Eep. 119,
suit was commenced and that the cause of action arose afThe plaintiff must, therefore, have judgment,
terwards.
with leave to the defendant, however, to plead to the declaration.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
Condensed statement of facts bj the editor.
In Cheetham v. Lewis the court said: "B7 the record in the present
appears that the action must have been commenced as early as
case,
the second Monday in November term, 1803, and that the cause of action
The action
did not arise until the 18th of November, in the same term.
to have been commenced before the cause of action
appears, therefore,
Though generally, the day may not be
accrued.
Tidd's Prae. 368.)
material, yet this must always be understood with this liinitation, that
be laid to be before the commencement of the suit."

a

L. P.

it

(1

it

56.
57.

It
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KENNON

BROTHER

WESTERN UNION
TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
&

v.

'Supreme Court of Alabama.
92

McClellait,

[Chap. 3

J.:

1890.

Alabama, 399.

As we construe the amended cotmts of

that the plaintiffs
through their agents in New York made a contract with
the defendant to transmit a message from the agents to
their principals at Salem, Alabama, with diligence and dispatch for a reward then and there paid by the agents for
the principals, and subsequently repaid by the latter to the
former; and that the defendant violated said contract in
that it missent the message and failed to transmit and deliver it to plaintiffs for several days after it received the
same for transmission and should have transmitted and delivered it. On the contract thus alleged, these plaintiffs
the complaint, they each sufficiently aver

may sue, and, if the evidence develops that they were disclosed to the telegraph company as the principals in the
contract, they may recover against the defendant.
G. C.
S 8. S. By. Co. V. Levy, 43 Am. Eep. 278 ; Hookness v. W.
U. T. Co.] 5 Am. St. 672 ; West v. W. V. T. Co., 7 Am. St.
520; W. U. T. Co. v. Broesche, 13 Am: St. 843; Daugherty
V. A.U. Tel. Co., 75 Ala. 168.
The breach alleged entitles the plaintiffs to recover at
least the reward paid by or for them for the transmission
of the message, and, eliminating this element, they would
still be entitled to recover nominal damages. W. U. Tel.
Co. V. Way, 83 Ala. 542, 562-3 ; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 518; Daugherty v. A. U. Tel. Co., 75 Ala.
168, 171.

It follows that whether the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the damages alleged to have resulted to them from the
decline in the price of cotton between the time the dispatch
should have been delivered to them and the time at which
they ordered the sale of one thousand bales, the averment
being that the order would have been given upon the instant
of receiving the message, and was delayed three days in
consequence of its nonreceipt, or not, the demurrers to the
amended complaint should have been overruled.
Not only
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do those demurrers fail as a matter of law to answer the
whole complaint so as to raise any question as to the right
thereunder to recover nominal damages and the price of the
message, except in so far as to assert what we have determined to he the untenable proposition that the aotioiji proceeds in the names of the wrong parties, but they are confessedly addressed only "to so much of each of said counts,
respectively, as seeks a recovery beyond the price of the
telegram."
Causes cannot be determined by piecemeal on
demurrer. The pleader must answer the whole complaint
and for all purposes when he resorts to this mode of defense. When the cause of action is sufficiently stated to authorize a recovery, in this form of action counting on a
single breach of contract, of any damages, a partial defense,
going to a denial of the right to recover a part of the damages claimed, must be availed of and effectuated by motion
to strike out the objectionable averments, or by objections
to the evidence, and through instructions to the jury. Daugherty v. A. U. Tel. Co., 75 Ala. 168. • • •
The court erred in sustaining the demurrers to the amended complaint, and In rendering final judgment against
Said judgment is reversed and the cause replaintiffs.
manded.'*
58.
But where a pleading contains distinct matters, divisible in their
nature, as where several breaches are assigned in a count of a declaration,
or several defenses combined in one plea, the demurrer may go to any one
of the entire and distinct parts.
Douglass v. Satterlee
(1814) 11 Johna,
11
East,
565.
Lyon
Powdiek
v.
16;
(1809)
(N. Y.)

STILE

V.

FINCH.

Court of King's Bench.
CroJce's Charles

I,

1635,

381.

Action for words ; and declares, they were spoken 2 Car.
1.
The defendant pleaded not guilty; and it was found
against him.
Adam moved in arrest of judgment, that the action ia
brought for words spoken six years before the action comrnenced : so that by the statute of limitations he was barred
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of this action; and therefore the court ought not to give
judgment upon this verdict for the plaintiff.
Jones and Berkley held, that the plaintiff ought to have
judgment, because the defendant hath not pleaded the statute ; for there may be divers causes, that he could not bring
the action before this time, viz., that he was in prison, or
within age, or beyond seas, or that he had sued the defendant to outlawry, and the defendant had reversed the outlawry, and this action brought within a year' after the reversing of the outlawry (as in truth the case was) ; for then
the action is weU brought.
But Adam moved, that he should have then shewn it in
his declaration.
But it was adjudged for the plaintiff. **•
59.
And the rule is the same whether the bar of the statute appears
from the declaration or from the evidence given at the trial. If not pleaded
by the defendant it cannot be availed of. Brickett v. Davis (1838^ 21 Pick.

404;

2 Saund.

63,

note 6.

TOWNSEND

V.

JEMISON.

Supreme Court of the United States.
7

1849.

Howard, 706.

Mr. Justice Woodbtjey delivered the opinion of the court.

The original action in this case was a-sswrnpsit. Though
the declaration contained several counts, some on a special
promise and some for money paid and received, it was indorsed on the original summons, that the action was
"brought to recover the sum of $4,000 and interest at 10
per cent., paid for defendant, from 27th of January, 1840,
to Mississippi Union Bank," etc., etc.
There was a demurrer and other pleadings as to this declaration, which it is not necessary to repeat, as leave was
given to amend throughout; and on the 6th of December,
1842, a new declaration was filed, consisting of three special counts and the usual money counts, all of which must
of course be for the original cause of action.
On the 9th of December, 1842, the defendant pleaded the
general issue of non assumpsit to the whole declaration;
and, for further plea to the three special counts, averred.
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that the suit was brought to charge him for the debt of
John B. Jones, and for no other purpose, and that, there
being no evidence of his promise in writing, the suit was
barred by the statute of frauds and perjuries. To this the
plaintiff replied, that the suit was not so brought, but on
original promises made by the defendant. The latter filed
a general demurrer to this replication.
On the 12th of December the general issue joined as to
the whole declaration appears to have been tried, and a
verdict returned for $3,451.88, for which sum, at the same
term, judgment was rendered and execution issued.
Nothing further took place till June 5, 1845, when this
writ of error was brought to reverse the judgment, assigning as the ground for
that the demurrer to the replication should first have been disposed of, and that the statute of frauds pleaded in the preceding plea was a full defense to the matters alleged by the original plaintiff.
*
•
The leading inquiry, then,
enough appears in all the proceedings here to render
probable that
the issue, in law no less than in fact, was in some way
disposed of, though this
not, eo nomine, mentioned in
the record. Assuredly,
usual in this country, as a matter of practice, when there
an issue of fact and another
of law in the same action, to have the question of law heard
and decided first. Green v. Dulaney,
Munf., 518; MuU
drow V. McLellcmd,
Litt.
Co. Litt. 72 a; Com. Dig.,
Pleader, Demurrer, 22. The 28th rule for the circuit courts
accords with this, by directing that, in such cases, "the demurrer shall, unless the court shall otherwise, for good
cause, direct, be first argued and determined," because
decision on that,
one way, that
in favor of the demurrer, will frequently dispose of the whole cause, and
supersede the expense and ijecessity of a jury trial of the
other issue, as well as give an opportunity to move for an
amendment.
Tidd,
Bac. Abr., Pleas and Pleading, No.
Pr. 476; Duhery v. Paige,
T. B. 394. Yet this course
matter of sound discretion in the court rather than
being
of fixed or inflexible right,
cannot always be absolutely
See 28th Rule, ante, and
presumed to have been pursued.
cases before cited;
But as
T. E. 394; Saund. 80, n.
usual, and the defendant in this case did not file any exthere had been a refusal by the court to decide
ception, as
first on the demurrer, the presumption does not seem so
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strong that there had been a refusal or neglect to do
as that the demurrer had been waived by the defendant,
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the fact that the defendWhat fortifies these views
demurrer by the plainjoinder
never
a
to
his
procured
ant
special plea, and
tiff. As he interposed this defense in
would be material
filed the demurrer to the replication,
wanting decision on them, to get the pleadings
<Jr him,
finished. He should have moved for a joinder, or got a rule
Chit. PI. 628), and should likewise have moved
for one
final judgment
desired, before
for decision on them,
It true that some books
was rendered on the verdict.
the duty of the plaintiff to join in
appear to consider
has been tendered by the defendant.
demurrer soon after
believed, generally depends on a positive rule
But this,
of court, which may exist, to require it. 33d Eule of PracHow. 43 William's Case, Skintice for Courts of Equity,
ner, 217. And without such rule, as in this case, he may
motion to amend,
need and take time to decide on making
before joining; and the harshest penalty proper for delay
in the joinder would seem to be, that the demurrer may
be considered, when requested by the party making
Lev. 222 Skinthough no formal joinder has taken place.
then
to obtain
217.
The
omission
of
the
defendant,
ner,
Chit. 647;
joinder, to which he was by law entitled
Barnes, 143), the omission to add one himself, which
Taunt. 164, and
Ark. 180), and
sometimes permissible
decision without any joinder, as
the omission to request
he may after much delay (Skinner, 217), all appear on the
waiver of decision on the
record, and look not only like
demurrer by the defendant, but neglect of his own duties
on the subject. A waiver of a demurrer often takes place,
Tidd, Pr. 710
East, 135
and is, by law, permissible.
Bibb. (Ky.) 12; Burr. 321;
St. 1181. Quilihet renwrirThe want of a decitiare potest jure pro se introducto.
sion would, in this aspect of the subject, seem to be by his
own consent; and consensus tollit errfirem. The course of
the defendant appears to have been, practically and subnot formally, an abandonment of
stantially,
wish for
decision
on
the
See
demurrer.
cases
of this
any separate
kind. Wright et al. v. EoUingsworth,
Pet. 165 Bac. Abr.,
Error,, K.,
Vaiden v. Bell,
Rand. (Va.) 448; Patrick v.
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Conrad, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 613; 2 Id. 227; Casky v.
January, Hard. (Ky.) 539. As a plea of the general issue,
while a demurrer is pending undisposed of, is considered
a waiver of it Gohh v. Ingalls, 1 111. 180.
•
•
•
It strengthens these conclusions, that the original
defendant seems to have long acquiesced in what he now
excepts to — that he does not appear to have asked for a
decision on the demurrer, to have made any complaint at
the time of the demurrer not being decided, to have filed any
motion about
offered any bill of exceptions, or even
brought any writ of error, till after the lapse of nearly
three years.
So much as to the waiver of the demurrer.
the demurrer was not, in truth, waived or withdrawn
But
by the defendant, or cannot be now so considered, from
all which appears on the record, the presumption from all
evident, that the demurrer and special plea were actually

it

decided on by the court, and the omission to enter
on the
record may be cured by the statute of jeofails. Such a decision would have been its ordinary and proper course of
proceeding.
•

•

We think that the judgment below must be af-

firmed.

HALE

V.

Supreme Court
22

LAWEENCE.
of

•

New Jersey.

1849,

New Jersey Law, 72.

is

"It

is

These were actions in trespass, brought in this court.
The defendant in each of these causes, having pleaded
specially in justification of the alleged trespass, the plaintiff demurred to the plea. The demurrer was overruled by
this court, and judgment rendered for the defendant.
The
cause having been removed into the court of errors and
appeals, the judgment below was there reversed, at October term, 1848, and the record remitted to this court. The
entry of the judgment and the remittitur
in the following
words:
ordered and adjudged, that the said plea of
the said defendant, in manner and form aforesaid by him
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above pleaded, and matters therein contained, is not sufficient in law to bar or preclude the said plaintiffs from having or maintaining their aforesaid action against him, the
said defendant. And it is further ordered and adjudged,
that the record and proceedings therein be remitted to the
said Supreme Court, to the end that the said court may
proceed therein according to law. On filing the remittitur
in this court on the first day of November, in October term,
1848, the following rule was entered on the part of the
plaintiffs:
"On reading and filing remittiturs from the
court of errors and appeals in the above causes, respectively, it is ordered, that a writ of inquiry, to ascertain the
plaintiff's damages, issue in said causes, respectively, imless the defendant amend his plea within thirty days after
notice of this rule. ' ' On the 30th of November, the defendant filed, in each case, the general issue and two special
pleas in bar. The plaintiff, after the expiration of thirty
days, sued out a writ of inquiry, treating the pleas filed by
the defendant as a nullity. The defendant now moved that,
the pleas so filed do stand as pleas of record duly filed in
the said suits, and that the order of this court for writ of
inquiry, and the proceedings thereon, be vacated and set
aside.
The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the court.
The material question is, whether the defendant is entitled to plead anew, or is limited to an amendment of tiie
plea originally filed. Upon the solution of this question may
depend, at least to some extent, the regularity and validity
shall consider the defendant's
of the order of this court.
claim to this indulgence, and the power of this court to
independent of the rule itself, and of all the extragrant
circumstances
which, upon the argument, were relied
neous
upon as affecting the rights of the parties.
filed
Upon general principles, wherever a demurrer
in good faith or for the purpose of settling a question of
law involved in the controversy, justice requires that, upon
the decision of that point of law, either party should be
permitted to amend his pleadings, in such mode as to present for determination the substantial cause of action, or
not
the real ground of defense. The object of pleading
to defeat, but to advance the ends of justice; not to destroy,
but to protect the substantial rights of parties. In accordance with this clear and obvious principle, courts of justice

is

is

it,

I
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have manifested great and increasing liberality in allowing
amendments after demurrer. By the ancient practice, indeed, no amendment was permitted after demurrer without
consent, upon the principle, that where a party had staked
his rights upon a point of law, he was bound to abide by
his election.
In delivering the opinion of the court in
Bramah v. Roberts (1 Bing. N. C. 481), Tindal, C. J.,
said, "The law of Westminster Hall,
believe ever siuce
it stood in the place in which it now stands, has been, that
if a party thinks proper to rest his defense or his case upon
a point of law raised upon the record, he must either stand
or fall upon the point raised." And when the strictness
of the ancient rule began to relax, it was gradually and with
reluctant steps. It was at first required that the amendment should be made only while the pleadings were in paper,
before the argument of the demurrer, next before the opinion of the court had been pronounced, and at length, before
the judgment had been rendered.
In modem practice,
however, it is well settled, in accordance with sound principle, that amendments may be made even after judgment
upon demurrer, whenever the substantial ends of justice
Such is the law of this court. The subrequire it.
ject was fully and ably investigated by Chief Justice HornBLowEB on more than one occasion, and settled by the unanimous judgment of the court.
'Leave to amend, it is true, is not a matter of right, but
Where, howrests in the sound discretion of the court.
ever, the demurrer appears to have been filed in good faith,
and there has been no verdict upon an issue of fact, leave
to amend is granted very much as a matter of course,
wherever it is material to the cause of action or to a substantial defense.
In the present case the defendant justified under authority of a statute, which in its terms, at least, was a clear
authority for the commission of the alleged trespass. The
plea was filed in good faith. It was held by this court a
valid bar to the action. There has been no affection of
delay on the part of the defendant; on the contrary, very
unusual concessions have been made on his part to expedite the cause. Under these circumstances had the demurrer been sustained, and the plea adjudged insufficient by
this court, the court by its well-settled and uniform course
of practice would have permitted the defendant to plead

I
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anew, either by amending the plea demurred to, or by adding such new pleas as might be deemed material to the defense.

But have the court the power, in the present position of
the case, to order an amendment? The single issue between
the parties was upon a general demurrer to the defendant's
plea in bar. This court overruled the demurrer, and gave
judgment for the defendant; upon writ of error that judgThe power
ment was reversed, and the record remitted.
of this court now to permit an amendment depends upon
the character of the judgment rendered in the court above.
Upon a demurrer to a plea in law, or to any other pleading in chief, the judgment is final; final,
mean, not as
from a judgment interlocutory, but
contradistinguished
final, as it is conclusive of the question at issue. And in
this sense the judgment is equally final, whether it be for
the plaintiff or for the defendant, or for or against the demurrant. Its conclusive effect cannot be avoided, except
The principle is
by opening or avoiding the judgment.
Gotjld:
thus clearly stated by Judge
"When the demurrer
is joined on any of the pleadings in chief, as on the declaration, plea in bar, or other pleading which goes to the
action, the judgment is final, i. e., if for the plaintiff, it is
quod recuperat, if for the defendant, it is quod eat sine die.
So that on demurrer to any of the pleadings which go to
the action, the judgment for either party is the same as
it would have been on an issue in fact joined upon the same
pleading, and found in favor of the same party. Gould's
PI. 477, § 42. See, also, Ferrers v. Arden, Cro. Eliz. 668 ;
S. C. 6, Coke, 7; Hitchin v. Campbell, 2 Wm. Bl. B. 831;
Baa Ab., Pleas & Pleadings, 1, 13; 2 Arch. Prec. 298-9.
And upon error brought from a judgment upon demurrer, regularly the judgment is in like manner final and
conclusive. If error be brought by the plaintiff below, and
the judgment be affirmed, it is simply a judgment of affirmance. If it be reversed, the court of error shall give such
judgment as the court below ought to have given. The regular judgment of the court of errors in such case would be,
that the judgment below be reversed; that the plaintiff
recover his debt or damages, and that the record be remitted, to be proceeded in according to law.
the action
were debt, the judgment would be technically a final judg-
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ment, not interlocutory; and no remittitur would be necessary, except for the purpose of having execution. But the
judgment of the court of errors upon a demurrer, in an
action sounding in damages, though interlocutory merely,
is equally as conclusive upon this court and upon the rights
of the parties as if the action were debt, the judgment final,
and no writ of inquiry needed.
It is true that courts may and do permit pleadings to
be amended after judgment upon demurrer. But this end
is attained either by not permitting the rule for judgment
to be entered, or if entered, by vacating
or by treating
the pleading and the judgment upon
as
nullity, and in
theory at least,
not in fact, striking
from the record.
The court may thus deal with its own judgment, but by
what authority shall
thus deal with the judgment of anam aware that in The TJtica Ins. Co. v.
other tribunal?
Scott,
Cowen, 606, the Supreme Court of the state of New
York held that an amendment might be made upon
remittitur after judgment in error upon a demurrer. "With
due submission to that learned tribunal,
am unable to assent to the conclusion of the court, or to the reasons upon
founded.
The court of errors in that case had
which
not only reversed the judgment below, but had rendered
judgment for the plaintiff upon the demurrer
Cowen,
It
must
be
that
the
case
admitted,
an
therefore,
727).
authority directly in point in support of the broad position, that this court may amend, even after judgment on
demurrer in the court above . But, so far as
am aware,
will be seen (say the
solitary one.
the authority
court), by consulting the authorities, that courts have of
late not confined themselves to cases where proceedings may
be said to be in paper, but they have been guided by the
question, whether substantial justice requires the amendthe proceedings
ment, at whatever stage
may be
broad.
certainly
The
last
too
It
proposition
moved."
admits, at least, of some qualifications, one of which,
apthe very case under consideration.
It can only
prehend,
be predicated with truth of proceedings before the same
court while they remain sub potestate legis. The authorihave been able to consult them, do
ties, at least so far as
not show that an inferior tribunal has the power to vacate
superior tribunal, in order to
or avoid the judgment of
let in an amendment of pleadings.
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Upon a reversal of judgment npon demurrer,
the court of errors may at their discretion, permit the pleadings to be amended, or they may remit the proceedings to
Of the
be amended at the discretion of the court below.
amendments
such
power of the court of errors to permit
after reversal upon error, there can be no doubt. The judgment below being reversed, there can be no objection in
point of principle to the amendment, and there are authorities to support the practice. Hall v. Snowhill, 2 Green, 21 ;
Pease v. Morgan, 7 John, R. 468; Stokes v. Campbell, 5
•

•

Cowen, 21.

What, then, was the judgment of the court of errors!
By the remittitur, it appears that the entry of the judgment

"It

in the minutes is as follows:
is ordered and adjudged,
that the said plea of the said defendant, in manner and
form aforesaid by him above pleaded, and the matters therein contained, are not sufficient in law to bar or preclude the
said plaintiffs from having or maintaining their aforesaid
action against him, the said defendant; and it is further
ordered and adjudged, that the record and proceedings
therein be remitted to the said Supreme Court, to the end
that the said Supreme Court may proceed therein according to law." * * * The court of errors, as we have
seen, may, after reversal, either have rendered judgment
upon the demurrer in favor of the plaintiff, thereby barring all amendments, or they may have simply remitted the
record to this court, designedly leaving the judgment open,
to permit this court to order an amendment or not, at their
discretion. In the absence of any information to be derived
from the entry,
cannot pronounce the omission a clerical
error ; but am bound to conclude that no final judgment was
pronounced, or designed to be pronounced, by the court
above, but that the matter was left open for the further
action of this court. This view of the case is supported by
the fact, that it is in accordance with a very usual, if not
general practice of the court of errors of this state. It is
strongly corroborated, moreover, by the fact, that the counsel of the plaintiff in error, upon the return of the remittitur, ruled the attorney of the defendant to amend his
plea, which would not have been done if the court above
had rendered judgment for the plaintiff.

I
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I am,

therefore, of opinion that the defendant is entitled
to leave to plead anew, and that the pleas already
filed do
stand as the pleas in this cause, without prejudice
to any
question that may be raised touching their validity.
The

motion is granted upon the payment by the defendant of
the plaintiff's costs upon the demurrer in this court,
and
also in the court of errors, I am further of opinion that
the rule entered in the minutes of this court, at the term of
October, 1848, for a writ of inquiry, was improvidently
entered, and must, together with the writ of inquiry, and
aU proceedings thereon, be vacated and set aside, with
costs. Let rules be entered accordingly.*®
60.
The rule is the same whether the demurrer he general or special.
This was decided in State of Maine v. Peek
(1872) 60 Me. 498, where
the court said:
"Every special demurrer includes a general one, for under
the former 'the party may, on the argument, not only take advantage of the
faults which his demurrer specifies, but, also, of all' such objections in substance, as regarding the very right of the cause, as the law does not require
to be particularly set down.' Stephan on PI. 141, 142; Bouvier's Law Diet.,
In one just as much as in the other the party has his option
'Demurrer.'
•
•
•
to plead or demur, and must be equally bound by his election.
A
special demurrer raises a question of law just as much as a general one,
and there is no exception to the rule as laid down, that where there is
an issue of law upon a, plea 'which goes to the action' thp judsment wUl

b«

final."

TROW

V.

MESSER.

Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
32

1855.

New Hampshire, 361.

The action was assumpsit, brought by Messer to recover
of Trow the sum of $18 ; being one half the expense of dividing and building a partition fence between the parties
in Springfield, in the county of Sullivan. The defendant

filed a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of' the court,
alleging in substance that the cause of action accrued in
Sulliyan county; that less than $13.33 was due, if anything,
and therefore the case was within the jurisdiction of a
justice of the peace in that county, and not within the jurisdiction of the common pleas for this county. The defendant was described in the writ as of Sunapee, and the
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plaintiff of New-London. The plaintiff demurred specially
for causes assigned, and prayed judgment that the defend-

The court sustained the deant might answer further.
murrer, and thereupon judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff for $18 debt, and $10.83 costs, upon which execution issued, which has been collected of the defendant.
The error assigned was, that judgment had been rendered
for the plaintiff for debt and costs, whereas by the law of
the land it ought to have been that the defendant answer
further.
Burke, for the plaintiff in error.
In the original action the judgment should have been respondeat ouster, instead of being that the plaintiff recover
his damages and costs. The authorities relied upon are
Whitford v. Flanders, 14 N. H. 371; Barker v. Forest, 1
Strange, 532 ; Bowen v. Shapcott, 1 East, 542.
FowLEE, J. : The authorities are clear, distinct and uniform, that the judgment for the plaintiff, in an issue of law,
lipon a demurrer to a plea in abatement, must be that the
defendant answer over, and not that the plaintiff recover
damages and costs. The reason is, because every man shaU
not be presumed to know the matter of law, which he leaves
Howe's Practice, 215; 2
to the judgment of the court.
Saunders, 210, g. n. 3; Eichorn v. LeMaitre, 2 Wils. 367
Onslow V. Smith, 2 B. & P. 388.
•

•••••••••

Judgment reversed.

CUSHMAN

V.

SAVAGE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
20

Illinois,

1858,

330.

Bbebse, J,: In this ease there was a plea in abatement
of the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff residing in La
Salle, and the defendant in the county of Cass. To the
plea the plaintiff demurred, and it was overruled, and the
court granted plaintiff leave io reply.
This was erroneous. After a demurrer to a plea in abatement has been overruled, it is not regular for the court
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to grant leave to reply; for a judgment for the
defendant,
on such a plea, whether it be on an issue of fact or of
law,
is, that the writ be quashed. Tidd's Practice, 642; 1 Ch.
PI. 501; Motherell v. Beavers, 2 Gilm. 69; McKmney v.
Pennoyer et al., 1 Scam. 319; Eddy et al. v. Brady, 16 111.

The case will be remanded to the circuit court of La
SaUe, with instructions to abate the writ.
Judgment reversed.

TYLER

V.

HAND.

Supreme Court of the United States.
7

1849.

Howard, 572.

Mr. Justice Wayne delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit was brought upon ten bonds payable to Martin

a

it,

Van Buren, President of the United States, and his successors in ofSce, for the use of orphan children provided for in
the nineteenth article of the treaty with the Choctaw Indians of September, 1830.
The principal and interest due upon the bonds are demanded, and the plaintiff in the action, John Tyler, sues
as successor of Martin Van Buren and trustee for the orphan children.
The defendants have demurred to the plaintiff's declara^
tion, pursuing the usual form of a general demurrer, and
have added thereto several special causes of demurrer.
There is a joinder in demurrer. Upon these pleadings,
the court below sustained the demurrer of the defendants.
It is that judgment which is now before this court by the
writ of error.
In our opinion, there is error in the judgment. We shall
with an order to the court below to enter up
reverse
final judgment for the plaintiff.

Having disposed of the fourth and fifth special causes of
demurrer, we will now inquire, in their order, whether or
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This cannot justify the judgment, because
case the plaintiff
demurring in abatement. In such
entitled to final judgment.
If the matter of abatement

is is

is

is,

not the judgment which was given can be sustained upon
either of the other alleged grounds.
The first
"That there
no sufficient averment in the
proceeding^ showing the citizenship or place of abode of
the plaintiff, or that he is, by reason of the nature of his
place of abode and citizenship, entitled by law to maintain
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extrinsic, the defendant must plead it. If intrinsic, the
of themcourt will act upon
upon motion, or notice
But
selves.
{Dockminiqite v. Davenant, Salk. 220).
does not follow, because
demurrer in abatement cannot be
available for the defendant, that
to be rejected altotendered in proper time. It
gether from the pleading,
will be received, but beiog erroneously put in,
entitled
the plaintiff to final judgment, so that for this reason the
judgment of the court below would have to be reversed.
Perhaps the best exposition of this point of pleading
that given in Furniss et al. v. Elanywhere to be found
lis cmd Allen, in
Brock. 17, by Chief Justice Makshall.
He says, "The cases quoted to show the demurrer
not
good, do not show that even in England
ought not to be
received,
tendered in proper time. In
Bac. Abr. 459,
said if a defendant demur in abatement, the court
will, notwithstanding, give a final judgment,- because there
demurrer in abatement. This does not prove
cannot be
that the demurrer shall be rejected, but that
shall be received, and that the judgment upon
shall be final.
A
judgment on a plea in abatement, or on demurrer to a plea
in abatement,
not final, but on demurrer which contains
matter in abatement
shall be final, because
demurrer
of
the
partake
cannot
character of
plea in abatement.
Salk., 220,
quoted by Bacon, and
to the same purport,
indeed in the same words.
These cases show that a demurrer, being in its own nature
plea to the action and beplea to the action, shall not be considing even in form
plea in abatement though the special cause alered as
leged for demurring be matter of abatement. This court
will disregard these special causes, and, considering the
demurrer independently of them, will decide upon
as
they had not been inserted in it." And then the Chief Justice adds, in respect to the particular case then in hand, that
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"these cases go far to show that the court would overrule
the demurrer, and decide the cause against
the party demurring, not that it should be expunged from the pleadmgs

"

Section

2.

Genebal and Special Dbmtteebbs.

ANONYMOUS.
Court of Kings Bench.
3

1704.

Salheld, 122.

C. J, : There were special demurrers at common Imu, but they were never necessary but in cases of
duplicity, and therefore they were seldom practiced; for
as the law was then taken to be upon a special demurrer,
the party could take advantage of no other defect in- the
pleading, but to that which was specially assigned for cause

Per Holt,

of his demurring.
2.
But upon a general demurrer he might take advantage of all maimer of defects, that of duplicity only excepted; and there was no inconvenience in such practice,
for the pleadings being at bar viva voce, and the exceptions
taken ore temis, the causes of demurrer were as well known
upon a general demurrer as upon a special one; therefore
after the Eeformation, when the practice of pleading at
bar altered, the use of general demurrers stiU continued,
and thereby this public inconvenience followed, that the
Darties went on to argue a general demurrer not knowinsr
what they were to argue, and this was the occasion of making the statute 27 Eliz,, by which it is enacted, that the
causes of demurrer should be known in all cases, and this
was restorative of the common law.

au

P.

14

Common Law Pleading.

210

[Chap.

OmO AKD MISSISSIPPI EAILWAT COMPANY

THE PEOPLE

ex

Supreme Court of Illinois.
149

Illinois,

3

v.

rel.

1894,

663.

This was an action of debt, brought in the name of the
People, for the use of Wallace Van Gilder, against the Ohio
and Mississippi Eailway Company, to recover a penalty
for an alleged violation of section 68, chapter 114, of the
statute, which provides that "every railroad corporation
shall cause a bell of at least thirty pounds weight, and a
steam whistle, [to be] placed and kept on each locomotive
engine, and shall cause the same to be rung or whistled by
the engineer or fireman at the distance of at least eighty
rods from the place where the railroad crosses or intersects any public highway, and shall keep ringing or whistling untU such highway is reached."

**********

Mr. Justice Ceaig delivered the opinion of the court.
It will be observed that the demurrer in this case was
special, and while the declaration may be good in substance,

is,

*

it,
is

yet, under the rules of pleading, if it was technically defective the judgment overruling the demurrer was erroneHere it is averred that the defendant, on a certain
ous.
day, propelled a certain engine, with a certain train of cars
What time
attached thereto, across said public highway.
this
in
what
direction
day
occurred,
the
the
train was
in
running, or whether it was a freight or passenger train,
Suppose twenty or
is not disclosed by the, declaration.
thirty trains cross this highway in different directions every
day; how could the defendant know, from the averments
of the declaration, which one of the trains plaintiff would
attempt to prove had violated the law? And if it could
not ascertain this fact from the averments of the declaration, how could the company be prepared with evidence to
Chitty on Pleadmeet the charge made in the declaration?
ing (vol. 1, page 232) says: "A general statement of facts
which admits of almost any proof to sustain
objec* *
The principal rule as to the mode of
tionable.
that they must be set forth with cerstating the facts
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bainty, by wMcli terms is signified a clear and distinct statement of the facts wliich constitute the cause of action or
ground of defense, so that they may be understood by the
party who is to answer them, by the jury who are to ascertain the truth of the allegations, and by the court who are
to give judgment."
In Cook v. Scott, 1 (xilm, 333, this
court held: "The province of the declaration is to exhibit
upon the record the grounds of the plaintiff's cause of action, as well for the purpose of notifying the defendant of
the precise character of those grounds as of regulating his
own proofs." The averments in plaintiff's declaration did
not conform to the rule indicated. The plaintiff knew when
this action was instituted what kind of a train had violated
the statute, the direction it was running, and about the hour
it crossed the highway, and it is imposing no hardship
whatever upon a plaintiff to require those facts to be averred
in the declaration, so that the defendant may come prepared to meet them.

We think the declaration was defective, and the court
erred in overruling the demurrer. The judgments of the
appellate and circuit courts will be reversed, and the cause
remanded.

Judgment reversed.

SPENCER

v.

SOUTHWICK.

'Supreme Court of New York.
9

Kent, C.

J.

{absente

1812,

Johnson, 314.
Spbnceb,

J.)

delivered the opinion

of the court.
, . ..«
.
The gist of the libel consists m charging the plamtifi
with hypocrisy, and a want of fidelity in this trust, as a
senator, in effecting the incorporation of the Manhattan
company, in which he was largely and profitably interested.
The plea in justification of the charges states, that the plaina

a senator at the time

it,

of the passage of the bill, and
and was, at the time,
that he advocated and supported
largely interested in its stock, and on which he made great

tiff was

212

Common Law Pleading.

[Chap.

3

profit; that he knew that the bill contained a clause giving
power to institute a bank, and that only a very small portion of the legislature, not exceeding ten in number, knew
of that fact, and that the plaintiff had good reasons to believe that he well knew that a large majority of both houses
were totally ignorant of the fact, and that he did not disclose and make it known to the senate.
To this plea the
plaintiff put in a general demurrer, and the question is
whether the facts in the pleas are not sufficiently averred,

a

I

it,

and whether they do not amount to an answer to the whole
We cannot perceive
charge contained in the declaration.
any charge in the libel to which the plea is not a substantial
answer, provided the plaintiff's knowledge that the legislature was ignorant of a banking power lurking in the bill
be sufficiently averred.
That knowledge is averred only by way of argument and
inference, and not directly, and the plea would, therefore,
have been bad on special demurrer.
A plea should be a
But an argustatement of facts, and not of argument.
mentative plea is good on general demurrer.
(Com. Dig.
Tit. Pleader, E. 3. Bac. Abr. tit. Pleading, 1, 5 in notis).
The plaintiff's knowledge, in this case, is argumentatively
stated. Certainly to a common intent is sufficient in a special plea; and certainly even to a certain intent, according
to Mr. Justice Bullee, means that which, upon a fair and
reasonable construction, may be called certain, without recurring to possible facts; for when words are used which
will bear a natural sense, and also an artificial one, or one
to be made out by argument, or inference, the natural sense
shall prevail. (Bullee, J., in King v. Lyme, Doug. 159, and
Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. Bl. 530.) It is possible that the
plaintiff might have had good reasons to believe, and yet
not have believed; and that he might have had good reasons to believe that he well knew, and not have well known,
or even imperfectly known, the truth before him. The force
of any impression to be made upon the mind, from the
operation of good reasons to be presented to
will undoubtedly depend, in some degree, upon the character and
discipline of that mind, and the existence of passions and
biases which may impede or facilitate the progress of truth.
But cannot conceive that any person of a sound and intelligent understanding can have good reasons to believe
fact, and yet not feel and act under
that he well knows

2]
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the influence of that impression. To a common intent, and
upon a reasonable construction, that averment charges the
plaintiff with knowledge of the fact, not, indeed, directly,
but argumentatively. When a man has good reasons to
believe that he well knows a fact, it amounts io notice of
the fact sufficient to charge him with a knowledge of
and to hold him responsible, not only as
moral agent, but
in law, for the consequences of such knowledge.
The court are, accordingly, of opinion, that the defendant
entitled to judgment, with leave, nevertheless, to the
plaintiff to withdraw his demurrer and reply, on the usual
tenuB.

Judgment for the defendant.

Supreme Court
18

Lewis,

V.

of

SMITH

LATOUB.

Pennsylvania.

18S2,

Pennsylvania State, 243.

J.:
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Where the facts set forth in
declaration
or plea do not, in any form in which they may he stated,
constitute good cause of action in the one case, or a valid
defense in the other, the parties may,
they prefer that
course, contest the facts in the first place before the jury,
and afterwards call for the judgment of the court upon them
as foimd and set forth upon the record. But
the objecnot
the
substance, but go merely to the form
tions touch
in which the facts are set forth, this course cannot be pursued. He that stands upon matters of form has
slippery
he slips at the time when the law requires
footing; and
him to stand, the objection
cured by his own inattention
to the very matter which he charges upon his adversary.
It assuredly very late in the day to announce, in decision of the highest court in the state, that duplicity in
declaration, and defects of form in setting forth
good
cause of action, cannot be taken advantage of after verdict
cause for special demurrer only,
Tidd, 647,
The first
the
826.
Tidd,
verdict,
last
cured
The secby
and the
informal. But we can readily pertrue,
ond count,
formal declaration-.
ceive therein the elements from which
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containing a good cause of action miglit have been conThe defendants below are therein charged with
strued.
fraudulently obtaining goods from the plaintiff below bypretending and asserting that they would pay the value,
in a note against McMillan, which, it is in effect averred
they knew to be worthless.
After verdict, we may understand this declaration as containing the averments that the
defendants represented the note of McMillan to be good and
valuable; that they knew at the time that this representation was false ; that they intended, by means of this falsehood, to defraud the plaintiff; and that they thereby siicThese facts,
ceeded in fraudulently obtaining his goods.
properly set forth, constitute a good cause of action.

MUTUAL LIFE

MASSACHUSETTS

COMPANY

v.

KELLOGG.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
82

INSUEANCE

Illinois,

1876.

614.

Mr. Justice Dicket delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action of assumpsit, by Walter B. Kellogg,
upon a life insurance policy issued to Henry H. Kellogg
on July 27, 1868, insuring the life of Henry for the term

years (beginning at noon of the day of the date of
the policy), in the amount of $1000, payable 90 days after
proof and notice that he had attaiaed the age of 45 years,
or died prior to attaining that age; the sum insured in the
latter contingency being for the benefit of "Walter, the father of the assured. The policy is set out in haec verba in
the bill of exceptions.

of

•

23

Judgment by default was entered at the return term.
•

•

After this, and before the assessment of damages, the
defendant, by attorney, appeared and moved to set aside
The motion was overruled, and, on the asthe default
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sessment of damages, the policy of insurance, only, was
given in evidence, and to this defendant objected, and excepted to the ruling of the court in receiving the same in
evidence. The court assessed the damages at $1,009. Defendant then moved in arrest of judgment.
This motion
was overruled and final judgment entered for damages and
costs, and defendant appealed to this court.
•

••• ••••••

Appellant contends that the declaration is defective for

want of an averment of an unconditional promise to pay
In declarations in assumpsit, where the instrumoney.
ment sued upon does not contain an unconditional promise
to pay money, the pleader, usually, after stating the conditional undertaking, the happening of the condition, proceeds to say that defendant thereby became liable to pay,
and thereupon "undertook and promised," etc., but this is
a mere matter of form, and the failure to do so cannot be
questioned upon general demurrer or motion in arrest, or
on error. It is sufficient, except on special demurrer, that
the pleader has stated distinctly that which, if proven, will
sustain the action. This is done in this case. The making
of the policy, the conditions of contract, the performance
of all conditions he is bound to show were performed, and
the happening of the contingencies upon which defendant
becomes liable to pay, and the failure of defendant to so
pay, are all set out in this declaration.
We cannot commend this declaration as a model of artistic pleading, but its imperfections are not such as to re•
•
•
quire a reversal of this judgment.

EOACH

V.

SCOGIN.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.
2

J.,

1840.

Arkansas, 128.

delivered the opinion of the court.
The only question presented for the consideration of this
court is as to the correctness of the decision of the court
below in sustaining the demurrer.

Dickinson,

216
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The defendant in this instance has wholly disregarded
the 60th sect;ion of the Rev. Ark. Stat, p. 627, under thp head
of Practice at Law, which requires that when any demurrer
shall be filed in any action, and issue joined thereon, the
court shall proceed and give judgment according as the
very right of the cause and matter ia law shall appear,
without regarding any defect or other imperfection in the
process or pleading, so that sufficient appear in the pleadings to enable the court to give judgment according to the
very right of the cause, unless such defect or imperfection
be specially expressed in the demurrer;*^ therefore, upon
the principles decided at the present term of this court, in
the case of Davis v. Gibson, 2 Ark. 115, we must consider
it a general demurrer, and the only question presented

for our decision is, whether the plaintiff has stated and
set forth a sufficient cause of action to be legally entitled to
The declaration contains two counts, and each
a recovery.
one is founded on a promissory note executed on the first
day of February, 1839, to the plaintiff, by which the -defendant acknowledges himself to owe said plaintiff the sum
of three hundred and thirty dollars and eighty-four cents
in good cash notes, and alleging that the same remain due
and wholly unpaid by the defendant. These facts are sufficient in law to entitle the plaintiff to a recovery and are
pleaded in the declaration with sufficient certainty; while
the defendant has omitted to state in his demurrer in what
respect the declaration is defective or imperfect, and unless such defect or imperfection is so stated and set forth,
this court is not authorized to regard it.
Wherefore, the opinion of this court is, that the judgment of the court below in sustaining the demurrer to the
61.
This is a substantial re-enactment of the statute 27 Eliz. Cap. V, $ 1,
which provided "That from henceforth, after demurrer joined and entered
in any action or suit in any court of record within this realm, the judges
shall proceed and give judgment according as the very right and cause of
the matter in law shall appear to them, without regarding any imperfection,
defect or want of form in any writ, return, plaint, declaration,
or other
pleading, process, or course of proceeding whatsoever, except those only
which the party demurring shall specially and particularly set down and
and that no judgment to be given
express together with his demurrer;
shall be reversed by any writ of error, for any such imperfection,
defect
or want of form as is aforesaid, except such only as is before excepted."
This statute of 27th Elizabeth was given so technical a construction, in
the matter of what should be deemed substance and what form (see Heard
Hob. 232) that another statute, 4 Ann. Cap. XVI,
V. Baskerville,
1, was
enacted wherein it was provided that a number of defects, previously held
to be matters of substance, should thenceforth b« deemed matters of foia
only.

J
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plaintiff's

declaration is erroneons, and that the same
onght to be reversed with costs, and this case be remanded
to the Hempsted Circuit Court for further proceedings to
be had therein, not inconsistent with this opinion.

BRADBUEY

v.

TARBOX.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
95

1901,

Maine, 519.

Emery, J.: This action was begun December 14, 1900.
While it was pending the defendant obtained a certificate
of discharge from his debts from a state court of insolvency, January 14, 1901. • • * The defendant filed a special plea in bar after withdrawing all other pleas by consent. This special plea, therefore, is the only plea filed and
its sufficiency is challenged by a demurrer.
By electing to make his defense in this manner the defendant subjected himself to the rules governing special
pleas in bar and was bound to make his special plea conform
to those rules. They apply with as much strictness to a
special plea of a discharge iu insolvency as to any other
special plea. Frary v. Dakin, 7 Johns. 75; Frost v. Tibbetts, 30 Maine, 188. The plea must state facts and not

of law.

It

must show affirmatively, by
allegations of fact within itself, that the discharge is valid,
that it is granted by a court having jurisdiction and upon
due proceedings, and that it bars the debt sued for. All
such as would
these allegations must be issuable, that
traversed.
present an issue of fact for a jury
Tried by this rule this plea seems faulty in one respect
at least. The discharge does not bar the debt sued for
debt created by the fraud or embezzlement
the latter was
of the insolvent, or was for necessaries furnished to the
debtor, or his family, within thirty days of the commenceThe plea should have distinctly alment of proceedings.
leged that the debt sued for was not created by either circumstance. Frost V. Tibbetts, 30 Maine, 188. As to this,
that the debt sued for "ia
the only allegation in the plea
by said chapter 70, R. S., excepted from
not debt which

is

a

is

a

if

if

is,

mere conclusions
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the operation of the defendant's discharge in insolvency."
This is a statement of a conclusion of law, not an allegation

of fact. A traverse of that statement would not present
an issue of fact for the jury. What debts the statute exempts from the discharge is a question of law. Whether
a debt was created by fraud, or was for necessaries, is a
question of fact, but it must be alleged and traversed as a
question of fact before it can be tried by a jury.
In Frost v. Tibbetts, supra, 30 Maine, 188, the plea described the plaintiff's claim and averred that it was barred
by the discharge. On a general demurrer to the plea the
defendant argued that this allegation negatived the debt
The court, however, adbeing one of the excepted classes.
judged it to be insufficient for that purpose. The language
used in this plea is no more than a paraphrase of that in
Frost V. Tibbetts. It means no more than that the discharge barred the debt— a mere conclusion of law.
As held in Frost v. Tibbetts, the general demurrer reaches
tliis fault, it being a lack of necessary allegation. Though
the plaintiff is said to have "demurred specially," his
demurrer was general as well as special and is available as
Chitty's PI. (16th Am. Ed.) 696; Burnet v. Bisco,
such.
4 Johns. 235.
The fault may seem very technical, but it
is a fault under the rules, and as it has been exposed by
demurrer it must be corrected. This the defendant can do
upon the payment of costs from the time the demurrer was
filed.
Exceptions sustained. Demurrer sustained.

BROWN

V.

JONES.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
10

Gill and Johnson,

1839.

334.

[This was an action of debt, brought by Jones, as administrator of Peter Earther, deceased, upon a writing obligatory wherein defendant's intestate acknowledged himself
indebted to the said Peter Earther in the sum of one hundred pounds current and lawful money of Pennsylvania.
The defendant filed a special demurrer to the declaration,
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on the sole ground that the plaintiff had not made sufficient
proi'ert of his letters of administration. The court overruled the demurrer. Appellant argued that this demurrer
should have been sustained not only upon the ground specified therein but also upon two other grounds, not specified.
The court of appeals held that the demurrer was not well
taken on the ground specified, and then proceeded to discuss one of the grounds not specified, as follows:]"''
Stephen, J. : "We think that the third objection is fatal
to the plaintiff's right of recovery.
Upon that point (the
second point of the appellant in his statement), upon the
authorities adduced, there seems to be no ground to doubt.
It was essentially necessary to aver in the declaration, the
value of the Pennsylvania money, for which the suit was
brought. Our courts cannot take notice judicially of the
value of foreign coin; and therefore, where such a suit is
brought for a foreign currency, the value ought to be
averred in the declaration, or the defect will be fatal on
general demurrer, the office of which the special demurrer
performed in this case, as well as that for which it was
This principle of pleading, and
designed by the pleader.

the necessity for such an averment, were fully sustained
by the authorities referred to in the course of the argument. We, therefore, think that the judgment of the court
below was erroneous, and ought to be reversed.
Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded.
62.

Condensed statement

of facts by the editor.

HUMPHEEY

V.

WHITTEN.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
17

1849.

Alabama, 30.

Trover by the defendant against the plaintiff in error
for the conversion of a horse. The defendant was declared

against by the name of James Humphreys and filed as a
plea "that he now is and always was called and known by
the name of James Humphrey, and not James Humphreys,
as by the plaintiff's writ is supposed: wherefore he prays
judgment of said writ that the same be quashed." To this
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plea, which was sworn to by the defendant, the plaintiff
demurred, and the court sustained the demurrer. The ruling of the court is now assigned as error.
•

J.

••*

In spelling

*•**••

and in sound there is a perceptible difference between the names of Humphreys and Humphrey. They are different names. The plea in this respect
is therefore good. But the plea concludes neither with a
It denies the surname,
verification, nor to the country.
Humphreys, by which the defendant is sued, and avers his
true surname to be Humphrey. This last is new matter,
and, of course, the plea should have concluded with a
verification, in order that the plaintiff might have an opportunity to answer it. 1 Saunders' E. 103, n. 1; Service v.
Eeermance, 1 Johns. R. 90.
The plaintiff below filed a
general demurrer to this plea, and it was sustained by the
circuit court. It does not appear upon what ground it was
sustained, but it is sufficient that there is a good ground,
Our statutes relative to
the omission of the verification.
amendments and special demurrers have produced no
change of the law in respect of this question, but it stands
Although there were special demuras at common law.
rers at common law, they were rarely used and never necessary except in cases of duplicity. The statute, 27 Eliz. c. 5,
rendered it necessary to demur specially when the party
desired advantage of any imperfection, defect or want of
form, in any writ, plaint, etc. Then came the statute of
4 Ann. c. 16, par. 1, which rendered a special demurrer
necessary in relation to various causes, which were still
regarded as matters of substance. This statute, among
other things, rendered it necessary to demur specially for
want of the averment or verification in question. But these
statutes did not extend to pleas in abatement. It was never
necessary to demur specially to them. 1 Tidd's Practice,
695-6, ninth edition. By our statute of 1807, it became necessary here to demur specially for any defect or want of
form in writs, declarations, or other pleading, etc. Clay's
Dig. 321, par. 50. The want of the necessary verification
in concluding a plea in bar, could only be taken advantage
of since this statute, I presume, by a special demurrer.
But the act of 1824 takes away all special demurrers.
Clay's Dig. 334, par. 118. It says "no demurrer shall
have any other effect th9,n that of a general demurrer,"

Parsons,

:
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presttme there is no mode now of taking advantage of
an error of this kind, in a plea in bar. But this is not the
case here in relation to a plea in abatement,, any more than
in England, for it has been held by this court that our statutes do not extend to pleas in abatement, or, at least, that
the last-mentioned act does not. Casey v. Cleveland et al.,
7 Porter, 445.
"We have no hesitation in concluding that
pleas in abatement are not affected by these statutes and
that they are left as at common law when a special demurrer was never necessary, unless in cases of duplicity.
Let the judgment be affirmed."*
63.
Form of demurrer to plea in abatement. Same as in the form previously shown, except that in place of the words "not sufficient in law for
the sftid A B to have and maintain his aforesaid action thereof against him
the said
the following words are used, "not luffieient in law t» quash
2 Chitt7 on Pleading, 679.
tha said writ."

CD,"

Section

3.

Joint

BEOWN

and Sbvbbaii Demthibebs.
V.

DUCHESNE.

Circuit Court of the United States for the First Circuit.
1854.

2
CtTRTis,

J.:

Curtis, 97.

This is an action on the case for the viola-

The defendant pleaded the general
issue and two special pleas. The plaintiff demurred, commencing his demurrer as follows: "And the said plaintiff
says that the several pleas by the said Duchesne, in manner and form aforesaid pleaded, and the matters therein
contained, are insufficient to bar the plaintiff," etc., in the
usual form of a demurrer. And he assigns several causes
of demurrer specially. Without regard to the defects of
form specially pointed out, if this demurrer is taken to all
the pleas, and any one is found good, the demurrer must
There is certainly one good plea, for the
be overruled.
general issue, in the usual form, is upon the record. And
it is clear the demurrer covers all tiae pleas. It applies
in terms to the several pleas, which means all the several
pleas. There is a settled form of replying to one or more
tion of a patent right.
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pleas to the exclusion of others, which is "as to the said
plea hy the said defendant secondly, or secondly and
thirdly above pleaded," etc. When not thus restricted,
the legal intendment is, that all are included in the answer
made to them.
The demurrer must be overruled.'^
v. Darrington
This is the well-settled American rule:
64.
Chamberlain
(1837) 4 Port. (Ala.) 515; McKay v. Triebele (1858) 6 Fla. 21; Knapp
Co. V. Eoss (1899) 181 lU. 392; Hay v. CoUins (1903) 118 Ga. 243; Martin
V. Williams (1816) 13 Johns. (N. T.) 264; United States v. Girault (1850)
11 How.
(U. S.) 22; Nat. Exchange Bank v. Abell (1872) 63 Me. 346.
The same rule is adhered to in states which have adopted the code system
of pleading:
Jensen v. Dorr (1911) 159 Cal. 742; Sykes v. Kruse (1911)
49 Colo. 560; Jenkins v. Nat. Bank (1911) 19 Ida. 290; Frederick v. Koons
(1907) 40 Ind. App. 421; Emmerson v. Botkin (1910) 26 Okla. 218 j Peterson
T. Lumber Co, (1911) 62 Wash. 189.

EAILWAY COMPANY
EAILWAY COMMISSIONEES.

SOUTHEASTEEN

Court of Appeal.
6

v.

THE

1881.

Law Reports, Queen's Bench Division,

586.

The defendants demurred to a declaration in prohibition,
in which the plaintiffs, the South Eastern Eailway Company, prayed a writ to prohibit the defendants, the Eailway Commissioners, from further proceeding in any way
in the matter of an application which had been made to
the commissioners by the corporation of Hastings, under
the Eailway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c.
31), and the Eailway sEegulation Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict.
c. 48), for an order enjoining the plaintiffs, first, to enlarge the Hastings station, and to provide better booking
office, waiting room, refreshment room, and general accommodation therein ; secondly, to lengthen and deepen the
existing platforms of the station, and to provide additional
platforms ; thirdly to provide better warehouse accommodation for goods at the station; fourthly, to provide cattle
pens at the station, and additional sidings for cattle
trucks; and, fifthly, to enlarge the platforms of the St.
Leonards station and to provide the said station with a
new approach by a direct route.
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The maiority of the Queen's Bench Division
(CocKBURN, C. J., and Manisty, J., Lush, J., dissenting),
held that the Eailway Commissioners had no jurisdiction
to entertain the application and to make the orders proposed, and accordingly judgment on the demurrer was given
for the plaintiffs in prohibition.

Lord Selboene, L. C: The order of the Queen's Bench
Division which is appealed from in this case, by overruling generally the demurrer of the Eailway Commissioners
to the declaration in prohibition of the South Eastern Railway Company, has affirmed the incompetency in point of
law of the commissioners to order the company (upon an

application by the corporation of Hastings) to execute certain improvements of, or connected with, their stations at
Hastings and St. Leonards.
•

•

*

I

should have been prepared to allow the demurrer ia part and to overrule it in part, if had thought
either that this conclusion was rendered technically necessary by the statements and prayer of the declaration in
prohibition, or that upon the whole facts, appearing by the
declaration and admitted by the demurrer, it was a course
open to the court and practically convenient for the purposes of justice. But the declaration, according to its true
construction, seems to me to challenge altogether the jurisdiction of the Eailway Commissioners to take any cognizance of the complaint of the corporation of Hastings. It
begins by saying that the commissioners "wrongfully assumed jurisdiction to hear and determine the application,
notwithstanding the protest of the railway company that
they had no jurisdiction to hear or determine the said application, or any part thereof," and, after stating in extenso the judgment pronounced by the commissioners on
on the 18th of May, 1878, and the application itself and the
concludes by asking for a writ
company's answer to
to prohibit the commissioners and every of them "from
further proceeding in any way touching the premises afore" do not think that this form of declarasaid before them.
gentechnically necessary for the court, on
tion makes
eral demurrer by the defendants in prohibition, to do more
than say that the commissioners either have or have not jurisdiction over the matter brought before them by the com-

it

a

it

I

it,

I
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plaint of the corporation of Hastings; If, on tjie face of
the complaint, they had no jurisdiction over any part of
that matter the demurrer must, of course, be overruled.
If there were some matters in that complaint over which
they had, and others over which they had not jurisdiction,
the dem,urrer ought to be partly allowed and partly overruled. But if (which is my own view) they had jurisdiction^
over the whole matter of the complaint as summed up in
the 7th and 14th paragraphs, then I think that they ought
to be permitted to deal with that whole matter, by making
some order upon it which (as yet) they have not done, and
that it cannot be technically wrong upon such a record to
allow the demurrer generally.
•

•** ••••••
I

agree in the judgment just deC. J. :
livered by the Lord Chancellor.

Lord

CoLEBrooE,

Beett, L.

J.

*

•

««• ••••••
*

*

* *

That where an inferior court acts within its jurispart, but exceeds as to part, a prohibition,
diction
though moved for^ as to the whole, may issue as to the part
in excess, seems to have been early decided: see Comyn's
Digest Prohibition (F. 17), and Lush v. Webb, 1 Sid. 251;
and Buller's Nisi Prius, p. 218, b. It seems to follow that,
after declaration in prohibition and traverse, and trial, the
judgment might be to prohibit as to part and to award a
consultation or otherwise give judgment for the defendant
in prohibition as to the rest. This being so, the question
is raised as to what is the proper judgment on a demurrer
If the deto the whole of a declaration in prohibition.
murrer is to the whole declaration, and part of the declaration be good and part bad, should the judgment on demurrer be absolutely in favor of the plaintiff, or for the plain•

as to

as to the good and for the defendant as to the bad?
There has been a difference of judicial opinion. The origin

tiff

a

it,

it,

of the dispute is described witii the usual learning of Mr.
Sergeant Manning, in the note to Hinde v. Gray, 1 Man. &
G. 201, and it is there suggested that the doctrine of overruling a demurrer as too large, and therefore giving judgment absolutely in favour of a pleading admitted to be
but bad as to another
good as to one separate part of
was
novel doctrine, and was contrary
separate part of
to the older decisions. This note, written in 1840, changed
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the opinion of Paekb, B., as expressed by Tn'm in 1838, in
BoydeU v. Jones, 4 M. & "W. 451. For in 1842, in Briscoe
V. Hill, 10 M. & W. 741, he said, "With respect to the subject of a demurrer being too large, there is a very learned
note of my Brother Manning, which, in my opinion, is entitled to considerable weight." "The question is," he says,
after describing the practice, "is that practice right or not,
or ought not the court on such demurrer to give judgment
on the whole record according to the truth?
thiok the
observations in that note are entitled to considerable weight,
am inclined to think the practice has been wrong,
and
and that the judgment on demurrer should be given on the
whole record, according to the truth."
In 1845, in Slade
"There is an able
V. Emvley, 13 M. & W. 761, he said:
note of my Brother Manning in the case of Einde v. Gray,
1 M. & G. 201, which tends strongly to shew that the practice of overruling demurrers as being too large is incorrect, and that the court ought to give judgment on the whole
And in Dawson v.
record, according to the truth."
Wrench, 3 Ex. 365, he said, "formerly if a demurrer was
too large, the court gave judgment generally against the
party demurring. That rule was imported from courts of
equity but is incorrect with respect to courts of law, as
pointed out by my Brother Manning in a note to the case
of Einde v. Gray, 1 M. & G. 201. The higher justice of
this latter view of Paekb, B., seems obvious. The futility
of the intermediate practice cannot be better exemplified
than by the description of the result of it given by Paekb,
B., in BoydeU v. Jones, 4 M. & W. 451. The later view of
Pabke, B., is shewn in the note by Sergeant Manning to be
in accordance with the ancient decisions of the common
am of opinion that the later view of Paeke,
law courts.
B., is correct, and that upon a demurrer to the whole of a
pleading which contains allegations capable of being separated, some of, which allegations are correct and some incorrect, the judgment on the demurrer should be distributed, and should be in favour of the good and against the
evil pleading. The judgment on the demurrer in the present case should therefore be against the demurrer as to all
the different orders but two, and in favour of the demurrer
•
•
•
as to entertaining .the complaint as to two.

I

I

I

•

a

L. P.

15

••• •••«••
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JONEa

Supreme Court of Georgia.
88 Georgia,

1891,

308.

LxTMPKiN, J,: May brought his action of libel against
Jones and the Merchants Bank of Atlanta, for damages
to his credit and standing as a business man, by reason
of a certain draft being protested for nonpayment by said
Jones who was a notary public and also an employee and
agent of the bank. The defendants joined in a demurrer
to the declaration on the grounds that there was no cause
of action set out as for a libel; that there was no cause of
action set out as for a wrongful protest ; and that the bank
was not liable for the acts of Jones under the allegations
in the declaration. The judgment on this demurrer recites
that the plaintiff's attorney disclaimed in open court any
claim for damages for a wrongful protest, but advised the
court that the declaration was intended to be a claim for
damages as for libel only. Whereupon the court sustained
the demurrer and dismissed the case, because the declara-^
tion contained no legal cause of action. This is the error
complained of.
•

••*

**••••

No doubt as against Jones a cause of action is sufficiently
set out. The declaration distinctly alleges that the charges
in the protest were false, fraudulent, and malicious, and
•
n-ade in reference to the plaintiff's trade. * *

But

Bank no cause of action
The plaintiff's theory is that, as Jones, the
is set out.
notary public, was also an employee and agent of the bank,
"the action of defendant Jones in the matter, he acting
under the authority of defendant bank, is the action of
said bank." This is all the allegation touching the bank's
liability. Although there is conflict in the cases, the prevailing and better holding seems to be that a bank is not
liable for the negligence or misconduct of a notary employed by it to protest negotiable paper. The reason is that
the notary is not a mere agent or servant of the bank, but
is a public officer sworn to discharge his duties properly.
2.

as against the Merchants
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He is under a higher control than that of a private principal. He owes duties, to the public which must be the supreme law of his conduct. Consequently when he acts in his
ofiBcial capacity, the bank no longer has control over him and
cannot direct how his duties shall be done. If he is guilty
of misfeasance in the performance of an official act, the
bank is not liable. * • *
The case stands thus.

The declaration, which is good
as to one defendant and bad as to the other, is jointly demurred to by both. What ought to have been the judgment
on this demurrer? The general rule
a pleading which
demurred to as a whole,
good in part, will stand, and
the demurrer be overruled. McLaren v. Steapp,
Kelly,
376; Eazleliurst v. Savatmah R. B., 43 Ga, 13; Fmney v.
Cadwallader, 55 Ga. 75; ^ast Borne Town Co. v. Nagle,
58 Ga. 474; Lowe v. Burke, 79 Ga. 164.
While this rule
applies chiefly to the contents or subject-matter of the
pleading,
extends also to parties who unite in
demurrer. Where joint defendants unite in
general demurrer to the declaration,
a cause of action
set out as
to either, the demurrer must be overruled.
This applies to
actions ex contractu.
Woodbury v. Sachrider,
Abb. Pr.
402 Phillips v. Eagadon, 12 How. Pr. 17 Estep v. Burke,
19 Ind. 87 Shore v. Taylor, 46 Ind. 345 Wilkerson v. Bust,
57 Ind. 172; Webster v. Titbits, 19 Wis. 461; Willard v.
Beas, 26 Wis. 540; McGonigal v. Colter, 32 Wis. 614;
Walker v. Popper,
Utah, 96. To complaint for land.
People, etc., v. Mayor, etc., 28 Barb. 240. 17 How. Pr. 56.
To an action in tort. Dunn v. Gibson,
Neb. 513. There
some authority for
different rule in equity, namely that
the demurrer may be sustained as to one defendant and
overruled as to another. Wooden v. Morris, H. W. Green
(N. J.), Qb; Bartow v. Smith, Walk. Ch. (Mich.) 394; Dan.
Ch. Pr. 584; Story's Eq. PI., par. 445. These authorities
rest upon the opinion of Lord Eldon in Mayor, etc., v. Levy,
Ves. 403, which does not decide the point, as he held the
Lord Eldon's
demurrer good as to all the defendants.
followed in a well-written opinion in Wood v. Olney,
view
Under the
Nev. 109, which was an action on contract.
applied also to procode system, the rule first stated
ceedings of an equitable nature. Eldridge v. Bell, 12 How.
Pr. 547 Teter v. Hinders, 19 Ind. 93 Morbach v. The State.
;

;
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Ind. 308; Owen v. Cooper, 46 Ind. 524; Eichbredt v. Aitgermawn, 80 Ind. 208 ; Sanders v. Farrell, 83 Ind. 28 ; Pomeroy on Eem., par. 577. But there is no authority for sustaining such a demurrer as a whole. The court, it seems,
will not, without an application for that purpose, amend or
split up a joint demurrer so as to make the separate demurrer of each defendant, and then search the declaration
in turn to find whether a cause of action is set out against
each. But in order to prevail, the demurrer must be good
as to all joining in it. The court need not of its own motion
34

render two judgments upon it.
It follows that the court errfed in sustaining the demurrer
to the entire declaration, the same setting out a cause of
•
•
*
Judgment reversed,
action as to one defendant.
with direction.

Sectioit 4.

Effect of

Dbmubeeb in Opening the Recom>.
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V.

BEACEY.

Constitutional Court of South Carolina.
1

1802.

Breva/rd Law, 191.

Geimke, J.: This appears to be a case where the plaintiff has put himself on the judgment of the court, there
being no issue to the country, and wherein he prays the
court to reverse the circuit decision, as to the propriety of
the pleading ; acknowledging that he had committed a fault,
but insisting, that as defendant had been faulty before him,
the court should have looked for the first fault ; and if found
in defendants, that the judgment should have been for the
plaintiff. Upon this, two questions arise : 1. Whether the
court wiU, on demurrer, look to the first fault, and give
•
*
•
judgment accordingly.
As to the first point have no doubt that on demurrer
the court will look through the whole proceedings, and
wherever the first fault arises, there they will lay their
finger, and give judgment against such of the parties as
shall have committed it. 2 Wils. 150, is to this point; and

I
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Str. 302; and Doug. 91; where Btjtlbb,

J., said it was
to
necessary
look beyond the plea, which was clearly bad.
And the reason of this course of proceeding in the court
is fundamentally right; for should they, in the first instance, rectify the last fault, they must then hear another
motion to set the preceding one to rights also; by which
mode half a dozen questions might be made on the propriety
of proceedings, only one of which might be determined at
any one court. This would be the means of lengthening out
an issue to an unreasonable length of time, and to the very
great delay of justice. Whereas by the rule laid down
above, that the court will look for the first fault, and give
judgment accordingly, all the subsequent defective proceedings are at once, and by one single decision, set at naught,
and dismissed.
2

EYAN

v.

MAT.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
14

J.

Illinois,

1858,

49.

Canton,
:
This action was brought upon a note payar
ble to the bank, by Eyan, surviving assignee of the bank,
in whom the legal title was vested by the assignment and
several acts of the legislature. The defendant filed a plea
in abatement, which states in substance, that Ryan was not
the assignee of the bank, and had no legal interest in the
note sued on, because he with others had, by a certain deed
of indenture, conveyed and transferred the note to William
Thomas. To this plea a replication was filed, averring that
Ryan did not by indorsement on the note assign it to
Thomas, so as to vest the legal title in him. To this replication a demurrer was filed, which was sustained by the
circuit court, and judgment rendered for the defendant on
the plea in abatement. The defense set up by the plea, was
certainly not answered by the replication, and if the plea
was good, the replication was undoubtedly bad. The plea
states, that Ryan assigned the note to Thomas by a separate instrument. This statement is not denied by the rep-
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lication, but that avers, that Ryan did not assign it by inThe plea in our opinion was insuffidorsement thereon.
cient. It did not show that the legal title to the note had
passed out of Kyan. By our statutes the l6gal title to a
note cannot be transferred by a separate instrument in writing. The statute says that the note, bond, bill, etc., "shall
be assignable by indorsement thereon, under the hand or
hands of such person or persons, and of his, her or their
assignee or assignees in the same manner as bills of exchange are, so as absolutely to vest the property thereof
in each and every assignee or assignees successively." This
is the mode pointed out by the statute, and it must be pursued in order to vest a right of action in the assignee of
a note. The plea, therefore, did not show that the legal
The detitle had passed from the plaintiff to Thomas.
murrer should have been carried back to the plea.
But the defendant insists that the declaration was also
bad, because the time had elapsed within which the assignees were required to wind up the affairs of the bank;
and that hence the rights of the plaintiff, as assignee, had
ceased. This question we are not at liberty now to investigate. It is a general rule, that a demurrer must be carried
This
back and sustained to the first defective pleading.
rule does not apply, so as to carry a demurrer behind a
plea in abatement. If the plea is bad, the judgment must
be respondeat ouster. In stating the exceptions to the general rule, that a demurrer must be sustained to the first

defective pleading, Mr. Stephen says: "First, if the plaintiff demur to a plea in abatement, and the court decide
against the plea, they will give judgment of respondeat
ouster, without regard to any defects in the declaration."
Stephens' Plead. 144. This rule was applied in Rich v.
Pilkington, Carthews, R. 171, and in Ha-strop v. Hastings,
1 Salk. 212.
When we consider the peculiar character of a plea in
Unlike other pleas, a
abatement, the reason is obvious.
plea in abatement does not profess to answer the declaration, or defeat the cause of action. It goes only to the
writ. It would be inconsistent with all sound rules of pleading, to carry a demurrer to one pleading back to another,
to which it did not profess to be an answer, and with which
it had no connection. Dean v. Boyd, 9 Dana, 179; Crawford V. Slade, 9 Alabama, 887. The demurrer should have
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sustained to the plea in abatement, and a judgment
rendered, that the defendant answer over.
The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, and
been

the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

LEE

V.

FOLLENSBY.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
Vermont, 35.

83

Haseltok,

J.

:

•

The defendants

1909,
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•
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contend that the demurrers to the secand
third
ond
pleas should have been overruled, whether
such pleas be good or bad, on the ground that the plaintiff's
declaration is bad for misjoinder of counts, and that a demurrer reaches back through the pleadings and fastens
upon the first substantial defect.
Since the second and third pleas are held bad, this claim
is for consideration ; but the rule invoked only requires that
the court should follow the pleadings back through their
course, and since neither the second plea nor the third undertakes to answer the declaration as a whole, but since
each such plea is directed to a specific count, the question
of misjoinder of counts is not reached by going back
through the record.
The principle is that a bad pleading is sufficient if that
which it undertakes to answer is bad, and so if a plea
undertakes to answer only a single count in a declaration,
a demurrer to such plea cannot bring in question the sufficiency of the declaration as a whole. If, for instance, a defendant filed a demurrer to one count of a declaration and
a plea to another count, and such plea is demurred to by
the plaintiff, neither the defendant's demurrer nor the
plaintiff's raises the question of misjoinder of counts.
In Hooker v. Smith, 19 Vt. 151, 47 Am. Dec. 679, the declaration was in three counts. To the defendant's second
and third counts the plaintiff filed a replication which was
demurred to. In argument on the demurrer reference was
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made to a defect in the first count of the declaration, but
the Supreme Court held that the sufficiency of that count
was not brought in question by a demurrer to a plea which
went to the second and third counts.
In Black v. Howard, 50 Vt. 27, the declaration was in several counts, and the plea, which went to the whole declaration, was demurred to. Since the plea went to the whole
declaration the court considered the question of misjoinder
of counts, and as to a claimed defect in the third count,
held, that, if it existed, it was not reached. Judge BabBETT, who delivered the opinion, and the reporter, now the
Chief Judge, carefully pointed out that the plea demurred
to went simply to the declaration as a whole. In Gould's

Pleading, Hamilton's Ed. 454, it is tersely said: "A demurrer, however, in opening a record, opens only that
branch which it terminates."

WILLIAMS

V.

MOORE.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
32

1658,

Alabama, 506.

[Williams, describing himself as administrator de bonis
non of the estate of Peter Wyatt, deceased, sued Moore
in detinue for personal property, declaring on his own individual title. The action was commenced in March, 1852.
The defendant pleaded three pleas: 1st, non dettnet; 2nd,
the three-year statute of limitations ; 3rd, the six-year statute of limitations; 4th, ne unques administrator. To the
2nd, 3rd and 4th pleas the plaintiff replied that Mary Wyatt
and William Mock had been granted letters of administration on said estate in 1833, that they had sold the property,
described in the declaration, to- defendant without any order
from the court, and that they were removed in March, 1852,
and plaintiff was thereupon appointed administrator de
bonis non. The court sustained a demurrer to this repliThe three-year statute of limitations applied to
cation.
actions on open accounts; the six-year statute applied to
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of personal prop-

J.: (1-2) The replication of the plaintiff was
clearly bad. It was no answer to the plea of the statute
of limitations of six years, which was a good plea. The
suit was by the plaintiff in his individual capacity. George
V. English, 30 Ala. 582; Agee v. Williams, 30 Ala, 636;
Crimm v. Crawford, 29 Ala. 623; Rambo v. Wyatt's Adm'r,
29 Ala. 510,
The replication is framed upon the idea, that
the action is by the plaintiff in his representative character,
and signally fails to aver anything which would avoid the
application of the statute of limitations to the plaintiff's
individual suit. It follows, that if we look to the plaintiff's
replication alone, we are bound to decide, that the court
committed no error in sustaining the demurrer to it.
(3) Is the case changed by the fact, that the court did
not visit the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's replication upon his own defective pleading? A. We think not.
The replication is put in as an answer to three pleas, two
of which were bad, and one good. A bad replication is
good enough for a bad plea; and hence, though the issue of
law is joined upon the bad replication, the judgment must
be against the defendant upon the defective plea. Gould's
Pleading, 474, par. 37. But we think a bad replication is
not good enough for one good plea and two bad ones. If
the court had looked back through the record for defects
in the antecedent pleading, and visited its condemnation
upon them as they were found, it would have given judgment against the defendant upon the two bad pleas, and
would have been compelled at last to sustain the demurrer
to the replication, because it was no answer to the remaining good plea. Thus it follows, that the sustaining of the
demurrer to the replication, even though the court had done
as the plaintiff contends it ought to have done, would have
been iuevitable, and the judgment would necessarily have
been precisely as it was against the plaintiff upon his refusal to answer over after sustaining the demurrer to his
In any point of view, the result which the
replication.
court attained was correct; and, therefore, the judgment is
Walker,

affirmed.
65.
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aLUBURN AND OWASCO CANAL COMPANY

LEITCH

Supreme Court of New York.
4

3

t.

1847,

Denio, 65.

Demurrer to a replication. The declaration Tvas in assumpsit for the recovery of certain instalments due upon
shares of the capital stock of the plaintiff corporation,
subscribed for by the defendant. Pleas, 1. Non assumpsit.
Eeplication to the second plea, set2. Nul tiel corporation.
out
the
ting
act incorporating the plaintiff, together with
certain acts amending and continuing that act. The defendant demurred to the replication, and the plaintiff joined in
demurrer.

By

Beonson, C.

J. :

The defendant insists that
the declaration is bad on general demurrer.
[The chief
the court,

justice then examined the pleadings, and came to the conclusion that the declaration was substantially defective;
and then proceeded as follows:]
But it is said, that as
the defendant pleaded non assumpsit as well as nul
tiel corporation, he cannot upon this demurrer go back,
and attack the declaration; and several cases have been
cited to sustain that position.
But it will be found on examination that the point has never been directly and necessarily adjudged. The doctrine was first started in Wheeler
V. Curtis, 11 Wend. 653, and was there supposed to result
from the well-established rule, that the defendant cannot
both plead and demur to the same count. It was said that
the defendant should not be allowed to do indirectly, what
he would have no right to do directly.
But the question
whether the declaration was good or bad was not decided.
The cause went off upon other grounds ; and the point in
question was not necessarily settled. In Dearborn v. Kent,
14 Wend. 183, the dictum in the first case was repeated ; but
it was expressly held that the declaration was suflBcient ; so
that it was wholly unnecessary to inquire whether the defendant was at liberty to make the question or not. Russell V. Rogers, 15 Wend. 351, is the next case; and there
it was not decided whether the declaration was good or bad.
It was apparently good; so that the point in question did
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not necessarily arise. In Miller v. Maxwell, 16 Wend. 9,
this doctrine was mentioned for the last time; and the same
learned judge who first started
went
great way towards knocking
on the head. In that case the defendant pleaded the general issue, and two special pleas. The
plaintiff demurred to the special pleas, and they were adjudged bad; but the defendant was allowed to go back
and attack the declaration and judgment was given against
the plaintiff for the insufficiency of that pleading.
Now,
although the learned judge who delivered the opinion of the
court took a distinction between
defect in the declaration
which would not be cured by verdict, and one which could
only be reached by
demurrer, the principle of that case
directly opposed to the dicta which had preceded it.
It quite clear that the defendant cannot both plead and
demur to the same count. And
equally clear, that at
the common law, he could not have two pleas to the same
count. Indeed the two things, though stated in different
words, are only parts of one common law rule, to wit, that

if

is

•

it

;

;

(2

is

it

5

4

the defendant cannot make two answers to the same pleading. The statute of and Anne, ch. 16, was made to remallowed the defendant, with
edy this inconvenience; and
court,
of
the
to
as many several matters
plead
leave
the
as he should think necessary for his defense. With us,
E. S. 352, par.
no longer necessary.
leave of the court
the
may both
not
that
defendant
say
The statute does
9.)
plead and demur; and consequently he cannot make two
such answers. But he may plead two or more pleas some
of which may terminate in issues of fact, to be tried by a
jury while others may result in issues of law, to be determined by the court. And whenever we come to a demurrer,
be to the plea, replication, rejoinder, or still furwhether
to give judgment against the party
onward,
the rule
ther
the fault be
who committed the first fault in pleading,
such as would make the pleading bad on general demurrer.
This rule has always prevailed. It was the rule prior to the
statute of Anne; and to say that the defendant, because

two pleas, one of which results in a demurrer,
cannot go baclt and attack the declaration, would be to deprive him of a portion of the privilege which the legislature intended to confer. He cannot plead and demur at the
same time, because the common law forbids it; and the
statute does not allow it. But he may plead two pleas and
;

he pleads
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he takes the right mth all its legitimate consequence^;
that whenever there comes a demurrer upon
one of which
either of the two lines of pleading, he may run hack upon
that line to see which party committed the first fault; and
against that party judgment will he rendered. Aside from

it

kiad.

Judgment for the defendant.'^
Contras

Moore

McLenaaa (1898)

171

v. Leseur (1851) 18 Ala. 606; Supreme Lodge v.
417; Wade v. Doyle (1880) 17 Pla. 522.

111.

McFADDEN
Supreme Court
20

v.

FOETIEE.

of

66.

a

is

a

it

I

it

is

I

I

I

;

a

9,

I

it

a

is

the dicta in question, there
not a shadow of authority,
either here or in England, for
different doctrine.
Although
seems that no case upon this point has found
its way into the books,
well remember that since the
has been sevdecision in Miller v. Maxwell, 16 Wend.
eral times announced from the bench, that in case like this
the defendant was at liberty to go back and attack the declaration and
think the point has been more than once
know that the late Mr. Justice Cowan
directly decided.
did myself;
entertained and expressed that opinion, as
would
also the opinion of my present associates^
and
if
was
mere dictum,
npt lightly overrule so much as
of the nature of a rule of property, and had stood long
not
question of that
enough to become one. But this

Illinois.

Illinois,

1858.

509.

is

is

a
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a

a

a

:

a proceeding by scire facias to foreThis
Beeese, J.
•
•
*
mortgage.
close
The defendant filed three pleas, and to one of them, the
third, there was a demurrer, which was sustained, and leave
given to amend; and to this amended plea there was also
demurrer, which was also sustained.
The errors assigned question the correctness of these
decisions.
The proceeding by scire facias to foreclose
mortgage,
considered both as
proceeding in rem, and the writ
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process and declaration, and defects therein can be reached
by demurrer. Marshal v. Maury, 1 Scam. 231.
The defect in the writ is very apparent. It does not run
in the name of "The People of the state of Illinois," as
the constitution declares all writs and process shall run.
The writ is void on its face, and the objection can be raised
by general demurrer, though it would be more proper to
reach it by motion to quash.

It is urged by the appellant that the demurrer to the
amended plea should be carried back to the declaration.
•

•

•

1

;

is

it,

As a general rule, when the declaration or scire facias
is so defective that the judgment would be arrested, the
demurrer would be carried back to
and judgment given
against the party committing the first error. But in this
case the judgment would not be arrested on account of the
imperfection of the writ, for appearance and pleading cure
the rule even in the case of void prothe defect and this
Scam. 250.
cess like tiiis. Easton v. Altum,

4

Supreme Court

Sajffold,

J.:

•

V.

of

CUMMINS

GEAY.

Alabama.

1833,

Stewart and Porter, 397.
*

*

a

if

a

it

;

is

it

;

a

The counsel for the plaintiff does not deny the general
plea may reach the declarademurrer to
principle that
contended, the circumstances of the defendtion but
ant having demurred to the declaration; of his demurrer
having been overruled; and of his having pleaded over,
creates an exception to the rule that,.the circuit court havwas
ing once passed on the sufficiency of the declaration,
succeeding term, to
incompetent for the same tribunal, at
reverse the decision; also, that the defendant having submitted to the first decision, he thereby waived. the defect,
any, in the declaration, and could not afterwards, claim any

Common Law Pleading.

238

[Chap.

3

it

a

it

a

a

a

it,

is

a

a

;

;

is

;

a

;

a

it,

benefit from it; and that to adjudge it insufficient, on the
demurrer to his several bad pleas, is to give him an advantage for his own wrong.
The principle is conceived to be well settled, that a demurrer to any part of the pleading may refer to the first
error, and when filed by the plaintiff, to the plea, it may be
visited on his own declaration, if defective and insufficient.
The position is equally correct, that a party who lias acquiesced in a decision, by pleading over, amending the pleading, or otherwise varying the state of record in conformity to the decision, will be considered to have waived that
question, and cannot afterwards claim a revision of
in
the same form, either in the same, or in the appellate court.
But the same question may subsequently arise, in
different form, and require an independent-adjudication
may
so happen, where
special plea, containing matter which
would be good, under the general issue, has been overruled
on-demurrer, and the defendant offers evidence of the same
defense under the general issue or,
may be so, where
motion, in arrest of judgment
made, on the same objection to the declaration, for which a demurrer has been overruled ^'' and on the same principle, the supposed insufficiency of this declaration, was subject to an independent
consideration, on the demurrer to the pleas the same principle of decision, in either form, would produce
similar
effect.
Many defects in declaration may be cured, by pleading
to the merits, either before or after a demurrer.
So far as
this effect has been produced, the plaintiff
entitled to
the benefit of
whenever the question subsequently recurs,
whether on
second demurrer, on
motion in arrest of
judgment, or in error. Where, however, the declaration
does not contain a substantial cause of action, the insufficiencies cannot be cured by
plea to the merits.

2

&

a

^

1

67.
Accord:
Turnpike Co. v. Yates (1901) 108 Tenn. 428; Field V.
Bibb. (Ky.) 160; Grif^ v. The Justices Y1855) 17
Slaughter
(1808)
6a. 96.
But the orthodox rule seems to have been that when once a demurrei
has been filed and overruled, no objection can be argued on
motion in
arrest of judgment which might have been argued on the demurrer
ChiAlton Ry. Co. v. Clausen, (1898) 173 111. 100;
cago
Tidd's Practice *918
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THIED NATIONAL BANK.

Sttpreme Court of lUinois.
64

Illinois,

1871.

528.

[This was an action of assumpsit on four promissory
notes. To the declaration a general demurrer was inter-

posed and overruled. The general issue was then pleaded
together with a special plea, and after a demurrer had been
put in to the special plea and sustained, the cause went to
the jury on the general issue. Verdict and judgment for
plaintiff, from which defendant appeals.] '*
Mr, Justice Beeesb delivered the opinion of the court.

is

a

it

(&

a

a

a

it,

Some question is made between the parties as to the right
to carry a demurrer to a plea back upon the declaration.
Where the general issue has not been pleaded, a demurrer
to a special plea can, usually, be carried back to the declaration, and the judgment of the court had upon the declaration, and if that is bad, judgment will be rendered against
on the principle that judgment will be rendered against
the party committing the first error in pleading.
It has been oftentimes ruled by this court that, where
demurrer has been overruled and the general issue
demurrer to special plea cannot be carried back
pleaded,
Wear v. Jacksonville
Savannah B.
the
declaration.
upon
B. Co., 24 lU. 593.
The court was called upon ,to review this doctrine in
Wilson, for the use, etc., v. Myrick, 26 ib. 34, and said,
we are now prepared to adhere to the rule laid down in the
above case as being well supported by authority and most
consistent with the philosophy of pleading; and further
will not sussaid, if the declaration be so defective that
motain a judgment, that may be taken advantage of on
tion in arrest of judgment or on error.
that you cannol
The "philosophy" of the doctrine
plead and demur to the same pleading at the same time. The
same doctrine was announced in Schofield v. Settley et aZ.,
31 ib. 515; Ward v. Stout, 32 ib. 399.
68.

Condensed

statement

of facts by the i^tor.
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In a previous case {Brawner v. Lomax, 23 ib. 443), where
this point arose, the court said the record would present a
strange appearance,
after
demurrer to the declaration
has been overruled and the general issue pleaded,
demurrer tt)
defective plea should be carried back to the
declaration.
The record would not look well with
general demurrer to a declaration overruled, and then carried
back over the general issue, when filed to
defective special
plea.
But of innate and substantial defects in the declaration,
advantage can always be taken by motion in arrest of judgment or on error, as was said in Wilson v. Myrick, supra.^^
Compare, in this connection, Fish v. Farwell (1896) 160 HI. 236,
where the court said:
"The rule is, that the court will not carry
demurrer to replications back to pleas when a demurrer to such pleas has
The party pleading over waives his demurrer and
already been overruled.
admits the sufficiency of the pleas.
We do
(Steams v. Cope, 109 111. 340.)
not understand the case of Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 115 lU. 17T,
It merely holds that if, at any time before trial,
to abrogate this rule.
the court becomes satisfied that an erroneous ruling has been made with
respect to the sufficiency of a pleading, it has power to set aside the order
But here it
manifest that
made in regard thereto and correct the error.
the court never became satisfied an erroneous ruling had been made in
respect to the pleas, and therefore there was no occasion for exercising
And besides this, no application was made by apthe power in question.
pellants to the court for leave to withdraw their replication or to set aside
It
not the practice of the eourts to
the order overruling the demurrers.
give to parties that which they do not ask."
69.
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,
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CHAPTER IV.

THE DECLARATION.
Section

1.

(a)

CEOOK

Fobmaij Pabib.

The Venue.
V.

PITCHEE.

Cotui of Appeals of Maryland.
61

1883,

Maryland, 510,

EoBiNsoN, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The declaration contains two counts:
First count for
obstructing a right of way belonging to the plaintiff; and
the second for obstructing a highway used by the plaintiff
in going to and coming from the post office, markets, school,
and hauling the produce from his farm, in consequence of
which he was obliged to use a longer and more circuito'ws
road. The way or road thus alleged to have been obstructed
lies in Baltimore County, and the venue is laid and the
suit is brought in the court of common pleas of Baltimore
City.
The first question arising on the demurrer, is whether
the plaintiff had a right to sue the defendant in Baltimore
City — and this depends upon whether the cause of action is
local or transitory 1
In the earlier history of the law, the plaintiff, it is well
known, was required in all actions to state with the utmost
certainly, not merely the county, but the particular district
or hundred, within which the cause of action had arisen.
This was necessary in order that the sheriff might summon
as jurors, persons from the immediate neighborhood, who
were presumed to be acquainted with the nature of the
transaction, which they were called upon to try, and who
were liable to be attained, if they rendered a wrong verdict. This was soon found, however, to be extremely iaC.

L. P.

16

(2415

242
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convenient, especially in mixed transactions wHicli might
happen partly in one place, and partly in another, and
local and transitory
hence arose the distinction between
actions. If the cause of action could only have arisen in a
particular place, the action is local, and the suit must be
brought in the county or place in which it arose. Actions
for damages to real property, actions on the case for nuisances, or for the obstruction of one's right of way are
according to all authorities local.
On the other hand, actions for injuries to the person or
to personal property, actions on contracts, and in fact all
actions founded on transactions, which might have taken
place anywhere, are transitory. Mostyn v. Fdbrigas, Cowp.

Mayor, etc., of Berwick v. Ewart, 2 W. Black. 1036;
Com. Dig. Action, N. 12.
Where the action is local, and the suit is brought in
another place, the proper mode of taking advantage of the
defect is by demurrer, and unless the defendant demurs,
the defect will be cured by the Statute of Jeofails, 16 & 17
Car. II. This was decided in The Mayor, etc., of London
admit
V. Cole, 7 T. E. 588, in which Geose, J., said:
that where an action of covenant is brought on a privity
of estate, and not of contract, the action must be brought
in the county where the land lies ; if it be not brought 'there,
the defendant must take advantage of it before verdict,
otherwise the defect is cured by the Stat. Car. 11."
And again in Mayor, etc., of Berwick v. Ewart, 2 W.
Black. 1070, where the cause of action arose in Berwickupon-Tweed, and the venue was laid in Middlesex, to which
the defendant filed a general demurrer, Db Geey, Chief Justice, said: "It is admitted that actions properly local must
be laid in the proper counties; otherwise it is ground of
demnrrer."
The distinction between local and transitory actions still
•
*
*
j^^ action for obstructing
exists in this State.
a way or highway being local, the suit must be brought in
the county where the road lies, and the demurrer ought to
161;

"I

have been sustained.

The Dbclabatioit.
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1774,

Cowper, 161.

Lord Mansfield : This is an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, for an assault and false imprisonment ; and part of the complaint made being for banishing him from the island of Minorca to Carthagena in
Spain, it was necessary for the plaintiff, in his declaration,
to take notice of the real place where the cause of action
arose; therefore, he has stated it to be in Minorca; with a
videlicet, at London, in the parish of St. Mary le Bow, in
the ward of Cheap.
Had it not been for that particular
requisite, he might have stated it to have been in the county
of Middlesex. To this declaration the defendant put in two

First, "not guilty;" secondly, that he was Govpleas.
ernor of Minorca by letters patent from the Crown; that
the plaintiff was raising a sedition and mutiny; and that
in consequence of such sedition and mutiny, he did imprison him, and send him out of the island; which as governor, being invested with all the privileges, rights, etc., of
governor, he alleges he had a right to do. To this plea the
plaintiff does not demur, nor does he deny that it would be
a justification in case it were true ; but he denies the truth
of the fact, and puts in issue whether the fact of the plea
is true. The plea avers that the assault for which the action was brought arose in the island of Minorca, out of the
realm of England and nowhere else. To this the plaintiff
has made no new assignment, and therefore by his replication he admits the locality of the cause in action.
The next objection which has been made, is a general objection, with regard to the matter arising abroad; namely,
that as the cause of action arose abroad, it cannot be tried
here in England.
There is a formal and a substantial distinction as to the
state then as different things ; the sublocality of trails.
stantial distinction is, where the proceeding is vn rem, and
where the effect of the judgment cannot be had, if it is
laid in the wrong place. That is the case of aU ejectments,

I
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where possession is to be delivered by the sheriff of the
county ; and as trials in England are in particular counties,
the officers are county officers ; therefore, the judgment could
not have effect, if the action was not laid in the proper
county.
"With regard to matters that arise out of the realm, there,
*
*
*
Sd
is a substantial distinction of locality too;
forin
a
estate
to
an
if an action were brought relative
eign country, where the question was a matter of title only,
and not of damages, there might be a solid distinction of
locality.
But there is likewise a formal distinction, which arises
from the mode or trial ; for trials in England being by jury,
and the kingdom being divided into counties, and each county considered as a separate district or principality, it is
absolutely necessary that there should be some county
where the action is brought in particular, that there may be
a process to the sheriff of that county, to bring a jury from
/thence to try it. This matter of form goes to all cases that
arise abroad; but the law makes a distinction between transitory actions and local actions.
the matter which is
the cause of a transitory action arises within the realm,
it may be laid in any county, the place is not material;
and if an imprisonment in Middlesex it may be laid in Surrey, and though proved to be done in Middlesex, the place
not berag material, it does not at all prevent the plaintiff
recovering damages ; the place of transitory actions is never
material, except where by particular acts of Parliament
it is made so ; as in the case of the churchwardens and constables, and other cases which require the action to be
brought in the county. The parties, upon sufficient ground,
have an opportunity of applying to the court in time to
change the venue ; but if they go to trial without
that
So all actions of a transitory nature that
no objection.
arise abroiad may be laid as happening in an English Counabsolutely necty. But there are occasions which make
essary to state in the declaration, that the cause of action
really happened abroad; as in the case of specialties, where
If the declaration states
the date must be set forth.
specialty to have been made at Westminster in Middlesex,
and upon producing the deed,
bears date at Bengal, the
action
such a variance between the
gone; because
deed and the declaration as makes
difappear to be
a

it

is

it

is

it

a

it

is

it,

If
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ferent instniment, • • • If the true date or description
of the bond is not stated, it is a variance. But the law
has in that case invented a fiction ; and has said, the party
shall first set out the description truly, and then give a venue
only for form, and for the sake of trial, by a videlicet, in
the county of Middlesex, or any other county.
But no
judge ever thought that when the declaration said in Fort
St. George, viz., in Cheapside, that the plaintiff meant it
was in Cheapside.
It is a fiction of form; every country
has its forms, which are invented for the furtherance of
justice; and it is a certain rule, that a fiction of law shall
never be contradicted so as to defeat the end for which it

was invented, but for every other purpose it may be contradicted. Now the fiction invented in these cases is barely
for the mode of trial; to every other purpose, therefore,
it shall be contradicted, but not for the purpose of saying
the cause shall not be tried. So in the case that was long
agitated and finally determined some years ago, upon a fiction of the teste of writs taken out in the vacation, which
bear date as of the last day of the term, it was held, that
the fiction shall not be contradicted so as to invalidate the
writ, by averring that it issued on a day in the vacation ;
because the fiction was invented for the furtherance of justice, and to make the writ appear right in form. But where
the true time of suing out a latitat is material, as on a plea
of non assumpsit infra sex annos, there it may be shewn
that the latitat was sued out after six years notwithstanding
*
•
*
Therefore the whole amounts to this;
the teste.
that where the action is substantially such a one as the court
can hold -plea of, as the mode of trial is by jury, and as the
jury must be called together by process directed to the
sheriff of the county; matter of form is added to the fic^
tion, to say it is in that county, and then the whole inquiry
is, whether it is an action that ought to be maintained. But
can it be doubted that actions may be maintained here, not
only upon contracts, which follow the persons, but for injuries done by subject to subject; especially for injuries
where the whole that is prayed is a reparation in damages,
or satisfaction to be made by process against the person or
his effects, within the jurisdiction of the court? We know it
was embarrassed a great
is within every day's experience.
while to find out whether the counsel for the plaintiff really

I
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meant to make a question of it. In sea batteries the plaintiff
often lays the injury to have been done in Middlesex, and
then proves it to be done a thousand leagues distant on the
other side of the Atlantic. There are cases of offenses on
the high seas, where it is of necessity to lay in the declaration, that it was done upon the high seas ; as the taking a
ship. There is a case of that sort occurs to my memory;
the reason
remember it is, because there was a question
There likewise was an action of
about the jurisdiction.
that kind before Lord Chief Justice Lee, and another bequoted that determination, to shew,
fore me, in which
that when the Lord Commissioners of Prizes have given
judgment, that is conclusive in the action; and likewise when they have given judgment, it is conclusive
as to the costs, whether tiiey have given costs or not. It is
necessary in such actions to state in the declaration, that
the ship was taken, or seized on the high seas, videlicet,
in Cheapside. But it cannot be seriously contended that
the judge and jury who try the cause, fancy the ship is
sailing in Cheapside; no, the plain sense of it is, that as
an action lies in England for the ship which was taken on
the high seas, Cheapside is named as a venue; which is
saying no more than that the party prays the action may
be tried in London. But if a party were at liberty to offer
reasons of fact contrary to the truth of the case, there
•
•
♦
would be no end of the embarrassment.
But as
to transitory actions, there is not a colour of doubt but
that every action that is transitory may be laid in any
county in England, though the matter arises beyond the
seas; and when it is absolutely necessary to lay the truth
of the case in the declaration, there is a fiction of law to
assist you, and you shaU not make use of the truth of the
case against that fiction, but you may make use of it to
am clearly of opinion not only
every other purpose.
against the objections made, but that there does not appear a question upon which the objections could arise.
Tlie three other judges concurred.

I

I

I

Per Cur. Jvdgmewt

affirmed.
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V.

MATTHEWS.

Court of King's Bench.
4

247

1792,

Term Reports, 503.

This was an action of trespass for entering the plaintiff's dwelling house in Canada, and expelling him; there
was another count for taking his goods ; but as there was
no proof to support the second count, the only question
was, whether an action of trespass could be brought in
this country for the injury stated in the first count. Lord
Keityon, at the trial, was clearly of opinion that the cause
of action stated in that count was local ; and as the plaintiff
^

could not support the second count, he was nonsuited.
Erskine now moved to set aside that nonsuit ; observing,
that this was not an action to recover the land, but merely
a personal action to recover a satisfaction in damages,
which was transitory, and might be tried here. In a case of
a similar nature, Lord Mansfield was of opinion that the
action might be tried in this country.
It was an action
brought against Captain Gambler, for pulling down, by
order of Admiral Boscawen, the houses of some settlers,
upon the coasts of Nova Scotia, who supplied the sailors

with spirituous liquors. In another case Lord Mansfield
himself mentioned this, and said, "The objection was taken
to the count for pulling down the houses; and the case of
Skinner and the East India Company was cited in support
On the other side they produced, from
of the objection.
a manuscript note, a case before Lord Ch. J. Eyre, where
And I overruled the objection
he overruled the objection.
that the reparation here was
namely,
principle,
this
upon
personal, and for damages ; and that otherwise there would
be a failure of justice; for it was upon the coast of Nova
Scotia, where there were no regular courts of judicature;
but if there had been, Captain Gambler might never go
there again ; and therefore the reason of locality in such an
action in England did not hold." But Lord Kenyon, Ch.
J., said, that the contrary had been held in a case in the
common pleas ; that where the action is on the reality, it is
local.
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J.

:
It is now too late for us to inquire wiietlier
BuLLEB,
it were wise or politic to make a distinction between transitory and local actions ; it is sufficient for the courts that the
law has settled the distinction, and that an action qiiare
clausum f regit is local. We may try actions here which are
in their nature transitory, though arising out of a transaction abroad, but not such as are in their nature local.

Rule refused.^"
70.
Tenue a* Belated to Jurisdiction.
This question received a thorough
investigation
by the House of Lords in British South Africa Co. v. ComThat was an action brought
panhia de Mozambique (1893) 18 A. C. 631.
by the plaintiff in England for trespass to lands situated in South Africa.
The question was whether the English court had jurisdiction to try the action.
Lord Hekschell, delivering the principal , opinion, said :
It is,
think,
important to observe that the distinction between local and transitory actions
depended on the nature of the matters involved and not on the place at which
the trial had to take place. It was not called a local action because the venue
was local, or a transitory action because the venue might be laid in any
fV)mity, but the venue was local or transitory according as the action was
•
•
•
local or transitory.
The rule that in local actions the venue must
be local did not, where the cause of action arose in this country, touch the
jurisdiction of the courts, but only determined the particular manner in
which the jurisdiction should be exercised; but where the matter complained
of was local and arose outside the realm, the refusal to adjudicate upon it
was in fact a refusal to exercise jurisdiction, and
cannot think that the
courts would have failed to find a remedy if they had regarded the matter
as one within their jurisdiction, and which it was proper for them to adjudicate
''
upon.
And after quoting Bullee, J., in Doulson v. Matthews, Lord Herschell
continued:
saying that we may not try actions here arising out of.
transactions abroad which are in their nature local,
do not think that the
learned judge was referring to the mere technical difficulty of their being no
venue in this country in which these transactions
could be laid, but to the
fact that our Courts did not exercise jurisdiction in matters arising abroad
'which were in their nature locaL'

"

I

I

"In

I

"

(h)

PUGH

Entitling.''^
V.

ROBINSON.

Court of King's Bench.
1

1786.

Term Reports, 116.

This was an action on promises by bill.
which was entitled generally

The declaration
of Michaelmas term, stated

71.
The declaration should be entitled in both
Stephan on Pleading (Tyler's Ed.) 383; 1 Chitty
it was not the practice to entitle it in the name of
the parties being apparent from the commencement

the
on

court

and

Pleading,

term. —

261.
But
the names of

the cause,
of the declaration.
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the promises, and the breach thereof, to have been made
on the seventh of November, 1785.
To this declaration there was a special demnrrer; and
the causes assigned were, "For that the said declaration
appears to be exhibited, and is entitled, of Michaelmas term
generally, whereby it has relation to, and must be deemed
a declaration of, the first day of that term; whereas the
said several promises, in the said declaration mentioned,
are all of them therein laid to have been made by the said
Eichard (the defendant), and the said several causes of
action therein also mentioned to have arisen, on the seventh
day of November in the year of our Lord, 1785 ; which said
seventh day of November was a day after the first day of
that same Michaelmas term, wherein the said Mary (plaintiff) hath declared against him, the said Richard, and
whereof the said declaration is so generally entitled as
aforesaid. And also for that the said declaration, by the
memorandum thereof, appears to have been exhibited before any of the causes of action of the said Mary therein
mentioned appear to have accrued, etc."
, Law, in
support of the demurrer, contended, that the
day of maMng the promises mentioned in the declaration
must be consistent with the memorandum ; but it appears on
this declaration that the cause of action accrued subsequent
to the time of filing of the bill. Filing a bill generally of
such a term relates to the first day of that term. And there
being no fraction of a day in judicial proceedings, the filing
of the bill must relate to the first instant of that day ; here,
then, this bill must be taken to have been filed on the first
instant of the 7th November; and even admitting that the
promise was made on the same instant of tliat day, yet
the breach must necessarily be subsequent to it in point of
time. Though, on motions in arrest of judgment, and on
trials at nisi prius, the court will enquire when the bill was
actually filed, yet they will not on demurrer where such
inquiry is precluded. He cited 2 Lev. 141, 176. Pull. N.
P. 137. Lord Porchester's case, Tr. 23, Geo. 3, B. R.
Shepherd, contra, admitted that, if it appeared that the
cause of action arose after the filing of the bill, the declaration was informal. But though in this case it refers to
the 7th of November, which was the first day of the term,
yet the term, for the purpose of delivering the declaration,
cannot be considered to commence till the sitting of the
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court. This is evident on adverting to the ancient practice of the court, when the parties declared ore tenus, which
was minuted by the prothonotary ; but on account of the
great increase of business the present mode of delivering
the declaration in writing was substituted in lieu of it. It
is, therefore, clear that this declaration cannot be supposed to have been delivered before the sitting of the court ;
for till that time, by the old practice, the parties could
not have declared ore tenus. And though the law does
not in general allow of fractions of a day, yet the court
will take notice of their usual time of sitting; before which
time the contract might have been made and broken; and
then the declaration may well be supported.
Symons cmd

Low, Sty.

72.

AsHTJEST, J.: The court ought to make any intendment
against a mere captious objection. We must resort to the
old practice of declaring ore tenus; and by reference to
that, we find that the declaration could not have been delivered till the sitting of the court. And then it is as probable that the promise was made before the declaration as

afterwards.
Demurrer overruled; but the court gave the defendant
leave to amend, on payment of costs.^*

"It

72.
has been the practice, when the cause of action would admit,
to entitle the declaration
(whether by bill or original) generally of the
term in which the writ is returnable." — 1 Chitty on Pleading, 263.
is
the clear and undoubted practice of the court that the declaration should
have been delivered as of the term when the writ was returnable.
According to the ancient practice the declaration was actually delivered in the
same term; it was only in case of the plaintiff that the time of actual
delivery was enlarged; but still it must be considered as delivered nunc pro
tMnc."— Smith v. MuUer (1790) 3 T. E. 624.
Compare Stephan on Pleading (Tyler's Ed.) 383, that "the term of which
any pleading is entitled is usually that in which it ia actually filed or

"It

delivered."

PAUL

v.

GRAVES.

Supreme Court of New York.
5

Entitling of narr.

1830,

Wendell, 76.

The cause of action in this case arose
on a promissory note due in February, 1830. The suit was
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commenced by filing a declaration in the office of one of the
clerks of the court, in pursuance of the statute, 2 R. L.
347, par. 1, on the 13th March, 1830. The declaration was
entitled, "As of January term, in the year of our Lord
•
•
•
one thousand eight hundred and thirty."

J.

L. Wendell, for plaintiff.

The declaration must be entitled of some term, and when filed in vacation it must necessarily be as of the preceding term. It cannot be special
as of a particular day, as when the cause of action arises
in term, because it would be incongruous to say, "Of January term, that is to say, the 13th day of March, in the
term of January, etc.," when March is not term time, but
is in vacation. In analogy to the filing of a bill against an
attorney or other officer of the court, the declaration, though
filed in vacation, may be entitled as of the preceding term.
Pleas and subsequent pleadings in a cause, although received in vacation, are always entered on the record as of
the preceding term; so a judgment by confession, entered
in vacation, is in like manner entered on the roll.
•

••*****«#

By the Court, Makcy,

J. It

appears to me indispensable
that the declaration should be entitled specially, as when
the cause of action accrues on a particular day in terms
notwithstanding that it be filed in vacation; and although
it may seem incongruous to entitle a declaration as of a
particular day in term, when in fact the day of the filing is
not in term, yet to preserve the regularity of legal proceedings, and at the same time carry into effect the provisions
of the revised statutes on this subject, such course is unWhere, therefore, as in this case, the cause
avoidable.
of action accrues in vacation, and the declaration is filed
before the next term, it should be entitled as of the preceding, term; as, for instance, "Of January term, to wit,
the thirteenth day of March, in the term of January, in the
year, etc." Unless this course be adopted, the consequence
will be that the record when made up, will on its face be
erroneous; it will purport to be a record in a suit com•
•
•
menced previous to the cause of action accruing.
:
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The Commencement?*

Chittt: What is termed the 'Commencement of
declaration
follows the verme in the margin, and prethe
cedes the more circumstcmtial statement of the cause of action. It contains a statement:
1st. Of the names of the
to
the
and
if
sue
or be sued id another
suit,
parties
they
right, or in a political capacity (as executors, assignees, or
qui tarn, etc.), of the character or right in respect of which
they are parties to the suit. 2d. Of the mode in which
the defendant has been brought into court ; and 3d. A brief
recital of the /orw of action to be proceeded in. It is
obvious that, independently of express regulation or precedent, some introduction to the substantial statement of the
cause of action would be necessary, and the commencement
adopted in practice is useful, as pointing out that the defendant is duly in court to answer the complaint, and concisely intimating the character in which the parties sue or
are sued, and the nature of the action, by which the parties
interested in the pleadings are enabled more readily to direct their attention to the subsequent parts of the dieclaration. 1 Ghitty on Pleading, 285,
Joseph

Form of Commencement in the King's Bench.
"Middlesex, (to wit) A B complains of C D, being in the custody of the
marshal of the marshalsea of our lord the now kisg, before the king himEelf, of a plea of trespass on the case, etc. For that whereas, etc."
Form of Commencement in the Common Fleas.
"Middlesex, (to wit) C D was attached to answer A B of a plea of
trespass on the case, etc., and thereupon the said A B, by E F, his attorney,
complains, for that whereas, etc. ' '
Form of Commencement in the Exchequer.
"Middlesex, (to wit) A B, a debtor to our sovereign lord the now king,
cometh before the barons of his majesty's Exchequer, on
the
day
of
, in the same term, by E F, his attorney, and complains by bill against
C D, present here in court the same day, of a plea of trespass on the case,
etc., for that whereas, etc." — 2 Chitty on Pleading, 2-4.
73.

(d)
Joseph

The Conclusion.

Chittt:

The declaration in personal and mixed
actions should conclude to the damage of the plaintiff; unless in scire facias and in penal actions at the suit of a
common informer; in the latter case, the plaintiff's right
to the penalty did not accrue till the bringing of the action, and he cannot have sustained any damage by a previous detention of the penalty, it is not proper to conclude
ad damnum. In an action by husband and wife for a bat-
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fcery, etc., of the vsdfe, or whenever the wife
joined in the action, the declaration should
damnum ipsorum ; and when the plaintiff sues
administrator, or assignee of a bankrupt, it
state that he was injured as such executor, etc.
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is properly

conclude ad
as executor,
is usual to
In debt the
object of the action being to recover a sum of money eo
nomine, the damages are generally nomraal.
But in assumpsit, covenant, case, replevin, trespass and other actions for the recovery of damages, the sum in the conclusion of the declaration must be sufficient to cover the real
demand ; for in general the plaintiff cannot recover greater
damages than he has declared for, and laid in the conclusion of his declaration ; and if judgment be given for more,
it is error, and a court of error cannot reduce the sum \ to
If, therefore, the
the amount stated in the declaration.
verdict be for more than the damages laid in the declaration, a remittitur should be entered as to the surplus before

judgment. * • •
In point of form the usual conclusion ia the King's Bench,
I. and therefore
is "to the damage of the said A B of
he brings his suit," etc. In the common pleas, the conclusion is, "Wherefore the said A B saith that he is injured
and hath sustained damage to the value (or 'amount') of
I. and therefore he brings his suit," etc. In the Exchequer, the form runs, "To the damage of the said A B
I. whereby he is the less able to satisfy our said
of
lord and king, the debts which he owes his said majesty at
his Exchequer, and therefore he brings his suit," etc. By
the above words suit or secta {a seqii,endo) were anciently
understood the witnesses or followers of the plaintiff, for in
former times the law would not put the defendant to the
trouble of answering the charge till the plaintiff had made
out at least a probable case. But the actual production of
the suit, the secta, or followers, is now antiquated, though
the form of it still continues. 1 CMtty qjx Pleading, 397.
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Acnow,

WILLIAMSON

Court of Queen's Bench.

1594,

Croke's Elizabeth, 325.

Error of

The
in debt upon an obligation.
error assigned was that the teste of the writ was 15 September, 32 Eliz. returnable Octab. Michaelis, and the money
was due at Mich. 32 Eliz. and so after the teste, and before
the return of the writ; and this appeared by the condition,
which was entered in haec verba. And for this cause, ala judgment

though the judgment was after verdict, so that if there had
been no original it had been good, yet it being brought before cause of action, the judgment was reversed: and it is
not aided by the statute of 18 Eliz. c. 14:.''*
This was tlie time when suit was deemed commenced in the common
74.
not at the date
pleas, but in the king's bench suit was deemed commenced,
of the writ, since the writ was frequently based upon a fictitious trespass
for the sole purpose of giving the court a usurped jurisdiction, but at the
time of fiUng the declaration (called there the bUl). —^Foster t. Bonner (1776)
Cowp. iSi.

SLATER

V.

FEHLBEEG.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
24 Rhode

1903.

Island, 574.

(1) TiLLiNGHAST, J. : There is a fatal variance between
the writ and declaration in this case, and hence we are
of opinion that the action must be dismissed.
The form of action set out in the writ is trespass on the
case ; while that set out in the declaration is trespass.
(2) Our staute relating to amendments is not sufficiently
broad to enable the court to permit the form of action to be
changed. Wilcox v. Sherman, 2 E. I. 540; Thayer v. Farrell,'ll E. I. 305; Barnes v. Mowry, ib. 422; Bowling v.

Clarke,
Wilson

13
V.

R. I. 650 ; Vaill v. Town Council, IS E. I. 405
Ry. Co., ib. 598; see also Hobbs v. Ray, ib. 84.

;
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(3) As a variance like the one in question may be taken
advantage of at any stage of the case, the mere fact that the
general issue and other pleas were filed by the defendants
before taking the objection is immaterial. Rathbun v. By.
Co., 19, E. I. 463.
The case is remanded to the common pleas division, with
direction to dismiss it.^*
J5. "Anciently it was the practice in all actions to repeat the whole
original writ in the declaration; and if a material variance appeared between
the writ and the declaration,
the defendant might take adv/antage of it,
either by motion in arrest of judgment, writ of error, plea in abatement, or
demurrer.
Cro. Eliz. 829, Norton v. Palmer; Ibid. 185; Edwards v. Watkin;
Ibid. 198; Berkenhead v. Nuthall; Ibid. 330; Haselop t. Chaplin; 2 Leetw.
But this practice was altered by a rule of the court
1181; Gins v. Dams.
of C. B. A. D. 1654, by which, it was ordered, that in future ' declarations, in
actions upon the case, and general statutes, other than debt, should not
repeat the original writ, but only the nature of the action; as that the
defendant was attached to answer the plaintiff in a plea of trespass on the
case, or in a plea of trespass and contempt against the form of the statute.'
And it should seem, that even in trespass vi et armis in the common pleas,
or commenced by original in the king's bench, it would now be deemed sufficient to state in the declaration, that the defendant was attached to answer
the plaintiff in a plea of trespass, without setting forth the writ; at least this
has been held sufficient on a general demurrer as far back as 2nd of William
should think would at
and Mary, Carth. 108, Lambert v. Thurston, and
this day be held good on a special demurrer. Tor this short recital is intended
only as an intimation to the court of the nature of the action." — Sergeant
WiUiams' note to Bedman v. Edolph, 1 Saund. 318.

I

STABLES

V.

ASHLEY.

Court of Common Pleas.
1

A

1797.

Bosanquet & Puller, 49.

rule was obtained by Shepherd, Serjt., on a former
day, to shew cause why the proceedings in this action should
A quare clausum f regit
not be set aside for irregularity.
having been sued out by the plaintiffs against Ashley, Frost,
and Grignon, and Ashley's attorney served with a copy of
the process, he searched the Fijazer's Book, and found a
memorandum of a warrant of attorney in the action against
all three, and accordingly on the 3d of May entered one
joint appearance for them, though he had authority from
Ashley only; on the 4th of May he was served with a notice of declaration; on the 5th he took it out of the ofiice,
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and found that Ashley was the only one of the three declared against.
Le Blanc, Serjt., for the plaintiffs, contended, 1st, that
as it was not a bailable process, the proceedings were regular, and cited Yardly v. Burgess, 4 T. R. 697, in the note,
and Spencer v. Scott decided in this term; 2d, that if there
were any irregularity, it had been waived by the defendant's taking the declaration out of the office; and 3d, that
the defendant's attorney was equally irregular with plaintiffs, having entered a joint appearance for all three, when
authorized by one only.
Shepherd, contra, insisted, . that the writ and appearance
being joint, and the declaration several, there was no process to warrant it; that the case of Spencer v. Scott went
upon the possibility of the additional defendant's being a
fictitious person like John Doe, but here the service included all three; that taking a declaration out of the office
is a waiver if irregularity in the process, because the defendant is acquainted with that before he goes to the office,
but not of irregularity in the declaration, for he must take
out that before he can ascertain whether it be irregular or
not; he added, that by the present mode of proceeding the
revenue would be defrauded.
Pee Cxjbiam. The attorney has taken upon himself to
enter an appearance for three, haAdng an authority from
one only; the court therefore, if necessary, might cure the
whole irregularity by setting aside the appearance as to
two of the defendants, and letting it stand for Ashley only.
Unless we found ourselves bound by the strictest authorities, we would not countenance such an objection as this;
but the practice seems against this objection; the distinction is between process bailable and not bailable; in the
latter a declaration may be delivered against one, though
any number be mentioned in the writ, and no inconvenience
can result from it; we wUl not distinguish between John
Doe and a real defendant, in order to raise an objection.
Bute discharged without costs.
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V.

JENKINS,

Court of Common Pleas.
1

A

clausum
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1799.

Bosanquet & Puller, 383.

fregit

having issued against the defendant at
the snit of T. Rogers and F. Barber, a summons was made
out in the sheriff's oflSce at the suit of T. Rogers only, and
served on the defendant; to which he entered an appearance; on discovery of the mistake, another summons was
made out at the suit of both plaintiffs, and served on the
defendant, but not till four days after the writ was returnable ; to this no appearance was entered ; a declaration was
afterwards delivered in the name of both plaintiffs, and
judgment was signed for want of a plea. Le Blanc, Serjt,
having on a former day obtained a rule nisi for setting
aside this judgment for irregularity,
Runnington, Serjt., now shewed cause, and contended,
1st, that any irregularity in the service of the process was
waived by appearance. 2nd, that the variance was immaterial, it having been determined in Holly v. Tipping, C. B.
3, Wils. 61, that if a plaintiff arrest a defendant in his own
right, he may declare against him as executor if he will
waive Ms bail, and in Lloyd v. Williams, C. B. 3, WUs. 141,
2 Black. 722, S. C, that a plaintiff who has sued out a
capias in his own name, may declare qui tarn.
Sed per Eyke, C. J. : The defendant has appeared to a
suit commenced against him by T. Rogers, and now he is
declared against by T. Rogers and F. Barber. The question is, whether the declaration be warranted by any process? It is a very different case where a plaintiff sues out
a writ as executor, to which the defendant appears ; for in
such case the defendant is before the court, at the suit of
the person named in the writ, whether that person declare
in his own right, or in auier droit.""^ The defendant in this
case has never been called upon to answer F. Barber, who
cannot therefore require him to put in a plea.
Per Curiam. Rule absolute.
But if the writ designates the plaintiff in a special character, as
76.
executor or qui tarn or assignee, the declaration must be in the same character
— Canning v. Davis (1769) 4 Burr.
and cannot be by the plaintiff generally.
2417; Delves v. Strange (1795) 6 T. R. 158; Turing v. Jones (1793) 5
T. E. 402.
C. L. P. 17
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COYLE

V.

COTLE,

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
26

[Chap. 4

1856.

New Jersey La/w, 132.

certiorari to a justice of the peace, brought
to review the proceedings and judgment in an action of
d ?bt, in which the administrator of James Coyle, deceased,
The sumV as plaintiff, and Patrick Coyle was defendant.
a book
was
for
The demand filed
1 ions was for thirty dollars.
On the reI .ccount and interest, amounting in all to $100.
turn day of the summons, the plaintiff appeared, and the
jlefendant sent word that he wished an adjournment, which'
• ms granted.
On the adjourned day the parties appeared,
and a further adjournment was granted at the plaintiff's
request. On the last adjourned day the plaintiff appeared;
the cause proceeded to trial in the absence of the defendant,
and judgment was entered for the plaintiff for $100 debt,
The reason chiefly relied on for reversal
besides costs.

This was

a

was, that the summons was for $30, and the demand and
judgment for more than that amount.
Potts, J.: If on the return day of the summons, or at
any adjourned day subsequetly, in case the defendant had
never appeared to the action, the cause had been tried, and
judgment entered in his absence, there is no doubt the variance between the summons and state of demand would have
been fatal; because in such case the plaintiff proceeds at
his peril, and to maintain his judgment, must show that
all his proceedings are regular. A defendant summoned
to answer to a demand of $30, may declrae appearing to
the suit, for the very reason that he is satisfied he justly
owes that amount, and is wUling the plaintiff should take
Jiis judgment for the sum demanded ; but it would be a gross
Vrong to him if the plaintiff could summon him into court
to answer to a demand for a sum he does not deny that he
Owes, and then turn round and demand, and recover in his
absence, a much larger sum against him. The 13th section
of the act constituting courts for the trial of small causes
(Nix. Dig. 393), in expressly directing that the justice shall
enter in the body of the summons the sum demanded, and
endorse the same on the writ, and in providing that if the
defendant shall pay the same and costs without any further proceedings, the constable shall receive the same, and
that his receipt shall be a fuU discharge from such debt,
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is,

etc., shows very clearly that it was the design of the legislature that the real debt claimed should be inserted in the
process.
But the defendant's difficulty in this case
that he did
appear before the justice on the return day of summons.

The purpose of the writ was to bring the defendant into
court, and he came. The purpose of the state of demand
was to apprise him of the particulars of the demand, and
he took no exception to the variance.
He subsequently appeared on the day to which the case was first adjourned,
and the plaintiff then obtained a further adjournment; and
finally the defendant suffered the cause to be tried in his
absence. He cannot now go behind these proceedings and
interpose the objection that the summons and state of demand varied in amount.
The judgment must be affirmed.''''
2

77.
Accord:—y^eli v. Hubbard (1850) 11 111. 573 (action of debt);
Holmes v. Budd (1860) 11 Iowa, 186.
In Dabneys v. Knapp (1845)
Gratt. (Va.) 354, the variance between
$500 named in the writ and $600 named in the declaration was held immaterial where the jury found a verdict on default for $455.16. The action
was assumpsit.

Court

Law Reports,

of

BEAD

V.

BKOWN.

Appeal.

22 Queen's

1888.

Bench Division, 138.

:

I

a

it

a

& I.

a

Appeal from an order made by Sir James Hannen at
chambers directing the issue of
writ of prohibition.
The action was commenced in the mayor's court by the
plaintiff as assignee of a debt of 16 13 s. 4:d., the price of
firm of Brown
Co. to the defendant.
goods supplied by
The sale and delivery of the goods appeared to have taken
place respectively in Surrey, without the juridiction of the
was alleged by the plaintiff that the
mayor's court, but
vendors had executed an absolute assignment of the debt
place within the jurisdicin his favor at 71 Fleet Street,
tion of the mayor's court, and that he had given the defendant express notice in writing of the assignment so executed.
Pollock, B.
am of opinion that this appeal should
The expressions "cause of action," and "pari
be allowed.

[Chap, 4
Common Law Pleading.
of the cause of action" have long been judicially defined
as meaning respectively the material facts and any maneed only refer
terial fact in the case for the plaintiff.
to the judgment of Paeke, B., in BucTcley v. Hann, 5 Exch.
43, and to that of the present Master of Rolls in Coolce v.
Gill, L. E. 8 C. P. 116. Here the fact of the assignment of
the debt is a material fact in the case for the plaintiff, and
therefore a part of the cause of action.
260

'

I

*******

The defendant appealed.
Lord EsHEE, M. R. : The question which we have to decide is whether any part of the cause of action arose in the
city; if it did, then upon the proper construction of the
Mayor's Court Act, the mayor's court had jurisdiction to
try the case. What is the real meaning of the phrase "a
cause of action arising in the city?" It has been defined
in Cooke v. Gill, L. R. 8 C. P. 107, to be this: every fact

which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of
the court.
It does not comprise every piece of evidence
which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which
is necessary to be proved. It has been suggested today in
cannot asargument that this definition is too broad, but
sent to this, and think that the definition is right. If that
is so, the question arises whether the plaintiff, in order
to be entitled to succeed in his action, would not be bound
to prove the assignment to him of the debt; not merely
whether he would be bound to prove it in an action in the
mayor 's court, but whether he would be bound to prove it in
any court in which he might sue, and whether an allegation of the assignment might not have been traversed by
cannot bring myself to entertain a doubt
the defendant.
that the assignment is a fact which the defendant might
traverse and if that be so, the plaintiff would be bound to
prove it.

I

I

I

Fey, L.

J. I am

of the same opinion.

Everything which,
if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to
judgment, must be part of the cause of action. If the plaintiff in the present case were to fail at the trial to prove the
assignment he could not succeed ; therefore part of his cause
of action did arise in the city.
:

Appeal dismissed.
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SOUTH FLOEIDA TELEGRAPH COMPANY
MALONEY.
Supreme Court of Florida.
LiDDON, C.

34

J.:

Florida,

v.

1894.

338.

to

1

is

is

8

&

it

1

pT'

The theory upon which the plaintiffs below evidently
brought their suit was that the defendant owed to them, as
a portion of the general public, the duty to transmit telegrams from Tampa to Key West, both places being in the
State of Florida. It is an elementary principle in the law
of pleading, that the declaration upon which a plaintiff
ffnrnds his ri ^TTF nf recn very Trmst. nllfis^'ft ftyprvJ[ajTt|J|hai;ja^
ftmilH cm PTpnTdi-ng, S 7,
esse ntial to ,hia-ri^^ "t fl^'tinn.
160!
When the plaintiff's right consists of an obligation
of the defendant to observe some particular duty, whether
founded upon some contract between the parties, or on the
obligation of law arising out of the defendant's particular
character or situation, the declaration must specifically
state the nature of such duty. The statement must set out
distinctly the circumstances which create the liability of
the defendant.' This statement may be concise and brief,
Chitty on Pleading
but must be specific and definite.
12
Roberts,
East, 89. If the
v.
(16th Ed.), p. 397; Max
declaration does not comply with these requirements,
must go down before a demurrer. Louisville, New Albany
Chicago By. Go. v. Corps, 124 Ind. 427, 24 N. E. Eep.
L, R. A. 636. Tested by these principles the declara1046,
fatally defective. TlTpjjp(^,1flrat.inn c;'nr\.
tion in this case
there any allegation
tains three co unts. In none of them
show that it wa^st&e duty of the defendant _ q_ transmit

it

;

it

;

it

is

no
the message set out in each f>f said cmrnta^JTbRrfi
allegation that defendant owned or operated any telegraph
line; that such line extended from Tampa to Key West;
was engaged in the business of transmitting mesthat
sages by telegraph or electric wire for reward paid to them
held itself out to the public as so doing or that
or that
had any facilities for sending telegraphic messages from
Tampa to Key West; or was engaged in the business of so
doing. SubsfflTitiallv all that is allegfid ia. that the defend,ant was a corporation under the name of the South Florida
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npo]ograpTi nnmpqTij ^ that One of the T)laintiff3_ at Tampa
act within the scope of the ir TmaineRa,"
gesired them
and transmit •fce^ mes sage to the oth er plai ntiff at Key
West, and wa8l'ea,dy_and willing to pay therefor7"and d emanded that they t ransmit the messa ge as aforesa id.

V^,

It

the implication of the declaration that the defendant had an office at Tampa. These statements imply
no liability of defendant for refusing to transmit the message. True, the defendant appears to be a corporation, and
its corporate name would indicate that it was organized
for the purpose of operating a telegraph line and transmitting messages thereby, but it does not follow that it had
completed its line or begun business, and the simple fast
of theorganization of a j!orporation for that purpose doe s
seems^hy

~^tj32Qli^Iir^a^ construct^^^
busi ness, make it liable for refusing t^ transmit a messa ge
offered it forl&ansmission.^ • * •
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, with directions to sustain the demurrer to the declaration, with
leave to the plaintiffs to amend if they desire to do so.

no WELL

V.

YOUNG.

Court of King's Bench.
5

1826.

Barnwall & Creswell, 259.

[Action against an attorney for negligence in investigating the validity of certain mortgages as security for a loan,
whereby the plaintiff suffered a loss of interest on the loan.
Defendant pleaded not gTiilty and the six-year statute' of
limitations. On the trial it appeared that the act of the defendant occurred more than six years before action brought,
but that it was not discovered until a date within six years
prior to action brought, at which date a loss for the first
time occurred.
Verdict for the defendant.
Plaintiff obtained a rule nisi for a new trial on the ground, that the
statute of limitations ran not from the time when the insufficient security was taken, but from the time when the
loss accrued.]"
73.

Cojujensed statement of facts

by the editw.
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Batlet, J. : This is a case of no difficulty whatever. The
only question is, what is the cause of action disclosed in
this declaration? It appears to me that the misconduct of
the defendant is the gist of the action. If the allegation
of special damage had been wholly omitted, the plaintiff
would have been entitled to a verdict for nominal damages.
The plaintiff in this action is entitled to recover a compensation in damages for the injury resulting to him from the
misconduct of the defendant.
The special damage resulted
from that misconduct; but it constituted part only of the
injury sustained by the plaintiff, and it is not of itself a
cause of action. The declaration is framed so as to shew
that the misconduct of the defendant is the cause of action.
It states that the plaintiff had contracted to lend 3000i. at
interest, to be secured by a warrant of attorney and mortgages of specific property there described, provided the
warrant of attorney and the mortgages should turn out to
be a valid and sufficient security for the same ; that the plaintiff retained the defendant (he being an attorney) to ascertain whether they would be a sufficient security ; and that
it became the duty of the defendant to use due care and diligence to ascertain whether they would be so or not. It then
states, that the defendant did not use due care and diligence
in that respect, but omitted so to do ; and, on the contrary,
represented to the plaintiff that the warrant of attorney
and mortgages would be a sufficient security, whereupon
the plaintiff advanced the money ; and that the warrant of
attorney and mortgages were not a sufficient security, but
Now, if the dewere invalid and insufficient securities.
cause
of action is
sufficient
a
claration had stopped there,
There is an acceptance of the retainer by the dertated.
fendant, a duty resulting therefrom, and a breach of that
duty. But the declaration goes on to state: "By reason
whereof the plaintiff has wholly lost the interest due on the
sum of 3000Z. and is likely wholly to lose the said principal
Now, does the introduction of that allegasum of 3000Z."
tion vary the easel In an action for words which are actionable in themselves, a special damage is frequently alleged in the declaration, although it is not the ground of
the action, and the plaintiff may recover without proving
the special damage. In such case the allegation of special
damages is a mere explanation of the manner in which the
conduct of the defendant bag become injurious to the plain-
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So in this case, the purpose for which the allegation
is introduced, is precisely similar. Where, indeed, words
are not actionable of themselves, but become so by reason
of the consequential damage, then it must be alleged and
proved; because it constitutes the cause of action. In an
action of assumpsit, the statute of limitations begins to
run not from the time when the damage results from the
breach of the promise, but the time when the breach of
promise takes place. The case of Short v. McCarthy, 3 B.
& A. 626, which is very analogous to the present, is an; authority in point. There the declaration in assumpsit stated
as a breach of the promise, that the defendant did not diligently and sufficiently make a search at the bank of England to ascertain whether certain stock was standing in the
name of certain persons, the defendant having been employed as an attorney so to do. The omission to search took
place more than six years before action brought, although
it was not discovered by the plaintiff till within the six
years. The statute of limitations having been pleaded, it
was held, that upon this form of declaration the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover on the ground that the cause of
action accrued at the time of the breach of duty or promise
by the defendant, and not at the time of its discovery by the
plaintiff; and that the statute began to run from the time
when the defendant ought to have made the search, which
it was his duty to do. It appears to me that there is not
any substantial distinction between an action of assumpsit
founded upon a promise which the law implies, that a party
will do that which he is legally liable to perform, and an
action on the case which is founded expressly upon a breach
of duty. Whatever be the form of action, the breach of
duty is substantially the cause of action. That being so,
the cause of action accrued at the time when the defendant
in this case took the bad and insuflScient security, that was
more than six years before the commencement of the action,
which was consequently barred by the statute of limitations. The rule for a new trial must therefore be discharged.
am of opinion that the statute of limitaHoLEOYD, J. :
tions is a complete bar to this action. The cause of action
is the misconduct or negligence of the attorney. The statute of limitations is a bar to the original cause of action,
and to all the consequential damages resulting from it^

tiff.

I
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unless, indeed, it can be shewn that those damages, or any
part of them, constitute a new cause of action which accrued
within six years.
think it makes no difference in this respect, whether the plaintiff elects to bring an action of assumpsit founded upon a breach of promise, or a special
action on the case founded upon a breach of duty. The
breach of promise or of duty took place as soon as the defendant took the insuflScient security. Whether the plaintiff, therefore, elect to sue in one form of action or another,
the cause of action, which in either form is substantially
the same, accrued at the same moment of time. The
breach of duty, therefore, constituting a cause of action,
it follows that the statute of limitations is a bar to this action, unless the special damage alleged in the declaration
constitute a new cause of action. Fetter v. Beat, 1 Salk.
11, is an authority to shew, that the special damage alleged
in this case does not constitute any fresh ground of action,
but that it is merely the measure of the damage which results from the original cause of action. There the declaration stated that the defendant beat the plaintiff's head
against the ground, and that he brought an action of assault
and battery for that and recovered; and that since the recovery by reason of the same battery, a piece of his skull
had come out. The defendant pleaded in bar the recovery
mentioned in the declaration; and averred it to be for the
same assault and battery. The plaintiff demurred, and it
was urged that this subsequent damages was a new matter
which could not be given in evidence in the first action, when
it was not known ; and it was compared to the case of a nuisance, where every new dropping is a new act. But Holt,
C. J., said, ''Every new dropping is a new nuisance, but
here is not a new battery, and in trespass the grievousness
or consequence of the battery is not the ground of the action, but the measure of the damages, which the jury must
be supposed to have considered at the trial." So, here the
loss of interest does not constitute a fresh ground of action, but a mere measure of damages. There is no new
misconduct or negligence of the attorney, and consequently
there is no new cause of action. What is said by Holt, C.
J., explains the principle of the decision in GUlon v. Boddington, 1 E. & M. 161 ; there, although the excavation was
made in the life of the father, it was contiaued after his
death, gnd after the title of the remainderman had accrued.

I
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The continuance of the excavation was a continuing nuisance, and constituted a new cause of action. It was, therefore, properly decided in that case, that the remainderman
was entitled to recover damages for an injury to him arising
from the falling of a wall after the death of his father,
but here there was no new misconduct of the attorney. As
the consequences of the battery in Fetter v. Beal, did not
constitute a fresh ground of action, so the consequential
damage resulting from the misconduct of the attorney of
this case does not constitute any new ground of action. In
this case Lord Holt was of opinion that the jury upon the
trial in the first action must have taken into their consideration not merely the actual loss which the plaintiff had
then sustained, but the probable loss which the plaintiff
was likely to suffer in consequence of the injury. So here,
if the action had been brought immediately after the insufficient security had been taken, the jury would have been
bound to give damages for the probable loss which the
plaintiff was likely to sustain from the invalidity of the security. It appears to me, therefore, that the subsequent
special damage alleged ia this declaration did not constitute
any fresh cause of action. That beiiig so, the cause of action did not accrue within six years, and the rule, therefore,
must be discharged.
LiTTLEDALE, J., coucurred.
Bayley, J., referred to Brown v. Howard, 2 B. & B. 73.
Rule discharged.''*
"The object of compelling a party in his declaration, to lay a founda79.
tion for the recovery of special damages, which do not necessarily arise from
the act complained of, is, to prevent the surprise, which might otherwise ensue
to the defendant, on the trial."— Barnum t. Vandusen (1844) 16 Conn. 200,
205.

STEVENS

V.

LOCKWOOD.

Supreme Court of New York.
13 Wendell,

Error from

1835.

644.

the "Washington common pleas. Lockwood
sued Stevens in a justice's court, and declared in asv/mpsii
for goods sold and delivered, specifying one barrel of soaf
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and 108 fords. The defendant pleaded the general issue,
and gave notice that he would prove on the trial that, in
a former suit against him the plaintiff declared on and
brought in an account of which his demand now presented
formed a part, and which could not be separated from the
residue of the demand then presented. On the trial, the
plaintiff proved his demand for the fowls. The defendant
then proved the former suit, which was in assumpsit, and
that two items of the plaintiff's demand on that trial were
as follows: "lot of fowls, $8.00; 3/4 BU. soap, $3.25;"
which items were entered in an account book of the defendant, which was produced in evidence on the trial of that
cause, and contained the following other items of credit to
the plaintiff, viz., "1828, balance on the note with Atwood,
44/100; rent of house, $48; rent of house, $9; fixing bedstead, 50/100; ride to Granville, 25/100; one day's work,
$1.25; wood, 98 feet, $1.77;" making a total of $123.46, and
which account was admitted by the defendant.
On the
debit side of the account, there were twenty-three items
charged by the defendant against the plaintiff, amounting
to $104.03, all of which were admitted by the plaintiff, except one charge of $45, which was the only matter in dispute on that trial. By the defendant's account book thus
produced, it appeared that the first charges were made in
July, 1828, and from that time at various dates up to January, 1830; the charges for the fowls and soap were made
in July, 1829. Before the cause was submitted, the plaintiff withdrew the two items for fowls and soap from the
consideration of the jury who tried the cause, and who
found a verdict for the plaintiff, for $35.39. The counsel
for the plaintiff stated on the second trial that the two
items for fowls and soap were withdrawn on the first trial,
so that the verdict should not exceed the jurisdiction of
the justice. After hearing these proofs, the justice rendered judgment for the plaintiff for nine dollars damages,
and costs of suit. On certiorari, the common pleas affirmed
the justice's judgment, and the defendant sued out a writ of

error.

J,

: It is difficult to distinguish
the Court, Savage, Ch.
this case from Guernsey v. Carver, 8 Wendell, 492. There
the plaintiff's account consisted of seven items of merchandise sold and delivered between the 20th July and 27th
August, 1828 — amount, $2.35. The defendant pleaded a

By
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former suit, and prevailed before the justice. In the common pleas of Monroe, upon appeal, it appeared that the
plaintiff had an account against the defendant of twenty articles of merchandise between the 4th June and 27th August,
1828 — amount between $5 and $6 ; that of the first trial, he
proved items from 4th June to 19th July. The defendant
The second suit was for
pleaded a tender and prevailed.
items between the 20th July and 27th August. It was assumed that the first trial was after the whole account had
accrued. The court decided, that in a running account,
where no special contract was entered into, each separate
delivery formed a separate cause of action, and that separate suits might be brought for each. This court reversed
the judgment, considering the amount one entire and indivisible demand, putting it upon the principle of previous
cases.
Mr. Justice Nelson says, the whole amount being
due when the first suit was brought, it should be viewed in
the light of an entire demand, incapable of division for the
This has been followed since. It
purpose of prosecution.
is true, that the case particularly referred to, of Miller v.
Covert, 1 Wendell, 487, arose upon a contract to deliver three
tons of hay. The hay was delivered in separate parcels;
but the contract was one. Such also were the cases of Far-

rington v. Payne,

Johns. R. 432, Smith v. Jones, 15 Id.
229, and Willard v. Sperry, 16 id. 121.
The case of Philips v. Berwick, 16 Johns. R. 136, illustrates the distinction between suits for separate and distinct causes of action, and a second suit oij the same identical account, though for different items. The action was for
work and labor performed before the 8th of March, 1817.
The defendant showed that in September, 1817, the plaintiff
recovered against him for work and labor, laid in the declaration to have been done on the 8th of March, 1817. The
court of common pleas of Montgomery County held it conclusive for the defendant, and nonsuited the plaintiff. This
court reversed the judgment, on the ground that the plaintiff might show that the work, etc., was entirely different
from that, for which he had recovered in the former, suit,
and performed under a distinct contract.
Mr. Justice
15

Spencee says, that there is no case or dictum which requires
several and distinct causes of action to be joined in one
suit. The plaintiff may elect to sue upon them separately,
and it is no objection that they belong to the same family
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of causes, provided their identity is not the same. He distinguishes the cases then before the court from Markhqm
V. Middleton, 2 Str. 1259, which was for an apothecary's
bill for 333^., which the court considered an entire demand;
and it was so considered by Lord Kenyon, in speaking of it.
The rule laid down in Guernsey v. Carver, is in accordance
with the case Markham v. Middleton, and with good sense,
and not opposed at all to the principle in Philips v. Berwick. It is applicable to this case. Although this is not
a merchant's account, it is one continuous account; and, in
the meaning of the preceding cases, indivisible. One suit,
and only one, should be sustained. Upon a contrary principle, a separate suit might be brought for every separate
item of an account ; and twenty, or more, might be brought
where only one was necessary.
Judgment reversed.

Section

Necessary Allegations.

3.

(a)

GRAY

V.

Time.

SIDELINGER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
72

1881.

Maine, 114.

On exceptions to the ruling of the court in overruling the

is,

defendant's demurrer.
Walton, J. : This is an action to recover damages for
an alleged libel upon the plaintiff.
The action is before
the law court on demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration.
The plaintiff says that the jiefendant wrote to the commissioner of pensions representing that the plaintiff was not
injured in the service of the United States,' whereby he was
prevented from obtaining a pension; but he has omitted to
state when the supposed letter was written, or when it was
sent to the commissioner; and this omission is urged as
one ground for sustaining the demurrer. "In personal actions," says Mr. Stephen, "the pleadings must allege the
the day, month, and year, when each travergtime, that
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" Stephen on Pleading, 292. And such
able fact occurred.
is the adjudicated law of this State. Pkutt v. Jones, 59
Maine, 232; Gilmore v. Mathetvs, 67 Maine, 517. And see
1

Chitty, 257.
Exceptions sustained.*^

80.
An impossible day is the same as no day at all, and lays the pleading
open to a special demurrer: — ^Eing v. Roxbrough
(1832) 2 Comp. & J. 418.
Merely to allege that an act took place "heretofore" is not sufficient: —
Andrews v. Thayer (1873) 40 Conn. 156.
Nor is a pleading sufficiently
certain as to time when it alleges an act as occurring "the day and year
aforesaid," when there are several days previously mentioned: — Haven v.
Shaw (1852) 23 N. J. L. 309.
Time which is matter of description of an instrument,
as its date, is
material and must be proved as laid: — Streeter v. Streeter (1867) 43 IlL
155.

Phillips says: — "Upon the subject of variance, a distinction is now fully
established between allegations of matter of substance, and allegations of
matter of description.
The former require to be substantially
proved; the
latter must be literally proved.
Thus, if the declaration
states, that on
such a day the defendant drew a bill of exchange, without alleging that
it bore date on that day, the day in the declaration is immaterial.
But, if
it be alleged, that the defendant made his bill of exchange bearing date
on a particular day, and the date of the bill is different,
it will be a
substantial variance:" — Phillips on Evidence, Bk. 2, p. 1.
A time alleged in one pleading should regularly Je followed in subsequent
pleadings, as where the plaintiff alleged a trespass on a certain day the
defendant should justify as of the same day, even though this is not the
true date, for otherwise there would be a discrepancy in respect to time on
the face of the record.
But if a deviation is necessary, as when defendant
pleads justification by legal process bearing date after the date mentioned
in the declaration, then the true date, differing from that laid by the plaintiff, may be alleged, but in such cases the defendant should either traverse
the time or allege that the trespass justified is the same as that complained
of in the declaration. — Gould on Pleading, ch.
§§ 73-79.
"But in pleading any matter of discharge; as a release— accord and satisfaction — a prior judgment or award, deciding the matter in controversy —
payment, or tender of a pre-existing debt, or any other defense, operating as
a discharge or extinguishment of any prior liability — the defendant is never
•
»
»
Since all
required to follow the day mentioned in the declaration.
matter of discharge must, from its nature, have accrued
to the
subsequently
'
creation of the duty or liability upon which the action is founded.
It is
therefore manifest, that in pleading any matter of discharge, the defendant
not only may, but (to make his plea sufficient) must, state the defense as
having accrued after the cause of action arose." — Gould on Pleading, chap.

Ill,

Ill,

$

82.

BEOOK

V.

BISHOP.

Court of Queen's Bench.
2

Lord Raymond,

1702.

823.

Trespass. The plaintiff declared, that the defendant the
second of April broke and entered the plaintiff's close, et
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6,

;

a

is

is

it,

herbam suam pedibus ambulando conculcavit et consumpsit,
necnon arbores suas, viz., decern popndos, etc., succidit cepit
et asportavit, trcmsgressiones praedictas a praedicto secundo die Aprilis diversis diebus et vicibus itsque the twentyeighth of the said month of April continucmdo. Upon not
guilty pleaded, verdict was given for the plaintiff, and entire
damages. Upon which Mr. Branthwaite for the defendant
moved in arrest of judgment, that the cutting of the trees
could not be laid with a continuoMdo ; and therefore entire
damages being given, the jury shall be intended to have
given for that as well as for the other trespasses. And
therefore judgment ought to be arrested, because no damages ought to have been given for that. And Holt, Chief
Justice, said, that it was time that this exception should be
settled; and that in order to effect
they would consider
deliberate conjudgment
and
after
among themselves,
give
And afterwards at another day Holt,
sideration had.
Chief Justice, declared, that they were all of opinion, that
the plaintiff ought to have his judgment, because they held
the continuando as to the trees to be void, because the cutting of trees does not lie in continuance; and then they
would intend, that no part of the damages was given for
it; but the continuando shall be applied to the trepasses
that lie in continuance. And as to the objection, that the
plaintiff at the trial, perhaps, gave evidence of cutting at
several days, by reason of the continuando; he answered,
that that shall not be intended, since in point of law only
evidence of one cutting could be given, for the continuando
void. The proper way to declare, where a man will
give evidence of several trespasses, which do not lie in
to say, that the defendant diversis diebus
continuance,
inter such a day and such day cut divers trees and then
he may give evidence of a cutting upon any of the days
between the days mentioned in the declaration. See 21
Hen.
43. Judgment for the plaintiff.
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(b)

DUYCKINCK

V.

Place.

CLINTON MUTUAL
COMPANY.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
23

[Chap. 4

INSURANCE
1852.

New Jersey Law, 279.

This cause was heard before the Chief Justice and Justices Nevius and Ogden, at November term, 1851, upon a
special demurrer to the declaration.
The Chief Justice. In an action of debt to recover a
judgment, the declaration avers that the judgment was recovered in the Supreme Court of New York, to wit, at Newark, in the coum,ty of Essex. The defendant demurs specially, and assigns for cause that the declaration does not
sufficiently allege where the judgment was recovered.
It is an elementary rule of all pleadings in personal
actions, that every material traversable fact must be stated
with convenient certainty of time and place. 6 Com. Dig.
48, 50, "Pleader," c. 19, 20, p. Archbold's Civ. PI. 116;
Gould's PI. Ill, § 102; 1 Chit. PI. (7th Ed.) 290, 306-7.
The declaration, we are told by high authority, is but
an amplification of the original writ, with additional circumstances of time and place. 3 Bl. Com. 293. The object
of stating the place in the declaration is twofold, viz.: 1.
To obtain convenient certainty in pleading. 2. To ascertain the venue, or place where the trial shall be had. Ordinarily the double end is attained by alleging that the cause
of action arose at some place within the county where the
venue is laid. If the action be local, and the place be truly
stated, or if the action be transitory, and there be no need
of stating where the cause of action actually arose, the introduction of the videlicet is neither necessary nor useful.
But when, in a transitory action, it becomes necessary or expedient, as matter of description or otherwise, to state
where the contract was made, or the cause of action actually
arose, and the place thus stated is out of the county in
which the venue is laid, then it is necessary to lay the venue
under a videlicet. The videlicet was in fact introduced in
the declaration, in stating the place, for the purpose of

The Declaration.

Sec. 3.]

273

avoiding a diflBculty, which was otherwise supposed to exist
under the ancient law, that the jury to try the cause must he
summoned from the vincinage or verme laid in the declaration. Stephens on Plead. 310; 1 SeUon's Pr. 245; Roberts
V. Harnage, Salk. 659; S. C. 2 Ld. Bay. 1043; 1 Com. Dig.
255, Action N. 7; Kearney v. King, 2. Bam. & Aid- 301;
Mostyin v.' Fabrigas, Cowper, 178-9.
If the place stated in this declaration, "to wit, Newark,
in the county of Essex," was designated as the place where
the judgment was rendered, the place alleged is intrinsically impossible and inconsistent with the fact to which it
relates for no judgment of the Supreme Court of New York
could be rendered there. And if the place be material, the
plaintiff must fail upon the trial, notwithstanding the use
of the videlicet. For a variance in the statement of a material fact is not aided by its being laid under a videlicet.
The averment is nevertheless regarded as positive, direct,
and traversible. 1 Chit. PI. (7th Ed.), 348, 644; 2 Saund.

E.

200, a. note 1.

If,

on the other hand, the place alleged in the declaration
was designed as a mere designation of the venue (as seems
to have been the case, from its being laid, under a videlicet) then no place is stated in the declaration where the
judgment was rendered. It is insisted, in support of the
demurrer, that this is necessary, and that it is not consistent with good pleading, in counting on a judgment, to omit
The
a statement of the place where the court was held.
practice is certainly so. The numerous precedents in the
books invaribly contain a statement of the place where the
court was held before whom the judgment was recovered ;
and the practice prevails, as well in declaring upon the
judgments of the superior courts of Westminster hall, as
upon the judgments of inferior courts of limited jurisdiction. And when the judgment is not in the same court, or
within the county where the venue is laid, the practice is
to allege that the judgment was rendered by the court of
holden at Westminster, to wit, at A, in the county of
B. 7 Went. PI. 95, 79 to 119; 2 Chit. PL (7th Ed.) 482 to
493.

record of the superior courts at Westminster, it is not necessary to state the county in which the
court is holden. It is sufficient to state it to be at Westminster. Arch. Civ. PI. 117.
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The precedents show clearly that the practice is not
founded on the idea that an action upon a judgment is a
local action. It prevails as well in declaring upon foreign,
as upon domestic judgments, and upon the judgments of
the superior courts at Westminster, as upon the judgments of inferior courts of limited jurisdiction. A practice
or form of pleading, uniform and long established, if it be
but a matter of form, involving no higher principle, should,
for the sake of certainty and uniformity, be adopted, and
not deviated from without good cause.
1 Chit. PI. (7th

Ed.) 266.
But the practice is founded in reason and propriety,

which is very apparent in its application to the supreme
courts of other States. They have not uniformly one fixed
and invariable place of meeting, as the courts at Westminster have. In some of the States, the Supreme Court
sits in districts designated by law, with separate places of
record and a prothonotary or clerk in each district. The
jurisdiction of the court within those districts may, to some
extent at least, be limited. This court certainly cannot judicially know that the Supreme Court of any other State
has general jurisdiction throughout the State, and that its
place of sitting is fixed by law and determinate.
When a
court sits in different places for different districts, and
where the territorial jurisdiction of the court varies with
the place in which its sitting is held, the propriety and
necessity (in declaring upon a judgment of ■such court)
of stating definitely the place where the court was held
when the judgment was rendered is sufficiently obvious.
In that mode only would the defendant be informed by the
declaration of the real cause of action, and enabled to avail
himself of every legitimate defense.
There must be judgment for the demurrer.^^
81.
At common law it was customary to lay a venue in the margin for
the purpose of indicating the place of trial, and, in addition, to lay a venue in
the body of the declaration as to every material allegation.
Stephen says
that the latter became an unmeaning form, the venue in the margin being
'
entirely sufficient for all practical purposes.
(Steph. PL 280.)
And there is
American authority for this view of the uFelessness of a venue in the body
of the declaration.
Eeed v. Wilson (1879) 41 N. J. L. 31.
But there is
also good authority in favor of a practice which gives convenient certainty as
to place, even though it be not traversable.
See Bean v. Avers y
^878)J 67
Me, 482.

J
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Names and Identity of Parties,

ELBEESON

v.

EICHAEDS.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
42

J. : In

1880.

New Jersey Law, 69.

an action by foreign attachment in the
court for the trial of small causes, the defendant was described in the afiSdavit, writ of attachment, state of demand,
and judgment, as Mrs. J. W. Elbertson. Her correct name
is Eebecca Louisa Elberson, and she is, and was at the time
of the suit, the wife of Joseph W. Elberson. The names
Elbertson and Elberson are so near alike that they may be
considered idem sonans, and the difference is so little that
no prejudice could come to the defendant below by the
slight change of name. The addition and suppression of
the "t" or other consonant in surnames ending with
"son," is quite common, and is not a material variance
'in pleading, though it is sometimes so estimated in families. The second objection is more material. Neither Mrs.
nor J. W. are proper Christian names. The former only
distinguishes the person named as a married woman, while
J. W. are but initials, and no name.
It must be stated, with certainty, who are the parties
to the suit, and actions, to be properly brought, must be
commenced and prosecuted in the proper Christian and
surnames of the parties. 1 Chit. PL 256; Frank v. Levie,
5 Eob. 600.
The exception is found in the statute 3 and 4 William IV.,
c. 42, § 12, which has been adopted in our state {Practice
Act, Eev., p. 853, § 28), and this enacts, in all actions upon
bills of exchange, promissory notes, or other written instruments, any of the parties to which are designated by the
initial letter or letters, or some contraction of the Christian or first name or names, it shall be sufficient to designate the person by the same initial letter, letters or contraction, instead of stating the Christian name or names in
full. This case, in attachment for a store book account, is
not within the exception.
In Miller v. Hay, 3 Exch. 14, the defendant was described
as W. D. Hay, and there was a special demurrer, assigning
ScTJDDEB,
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for causes that the defendant's name was not properly
stated, as he was described only by his surname and two
initials, without any excuse for his full Christian names not
being inserted, and without any allegation to show that he
had no Christian nanae or names, or that he was described
by initials, or had so described himself in the bill of exchange in the declaration mentioned. It was held to be an
insufficient designation of the defendant, and bad on the
face of the declaration.

V.
V.

To the like effect are some cases in our courts. Clayton
Tonkin, 4 HaJst. 252 ; Seely v. Schenck, Penn. 75 ; Wood

FitJiim,

4 Zab. 838.

There is no relaxation or change of this rule of description, in proceedings on attachment. In Locke on Attachment, p. 5, it is said that the Christian and surname of the
debtor and creditor shall be stated.

TURVIL

V.

AYNSWOETH.

Court of King's Bench.
2

Lord Raymond,

1727,

1515.

The defendant gave the plaintiff a note under his hand,
viz., London, 31 May, 1720, I promise to accept of Mr.

it,

George Turvil or his assigns 800?. South Sea stock on the
31st May, 1721, and pay him or his assigns 5600i. for the
same, witness my hand Steven Aynsworth.
The plaintiff
gave the defendant the like note, promising to transfer,
etc. And in an action brought upon this promise, the plaintiff declared, that the defendant in consideration that the
plaintiff had promised to transfer to the defendant upon
the 31st of May, 1721, 800?. in capitali fundo gubernatoris
et societatis mercatorum Magnae Britanniae negotiantium
ad maria Austrialia et alia loca Americae et pro incitatione piscationis, Anglice vocato South Sea stock, promised to accept
and pay 5600Z., etc. Upon non assumpsit
pleaded, the cause came to be tried before me last Trinity
term at Guildhall; and upon the trial the defendant's conn-
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it,

* •
•
sel took several exceptions.
3. That the plaintiff
had mistook the name of the South Sea Company for there
was no such word as Austrialia for South but the prQper
Latin word was Australia. Whereupon it was agreed, the
plaintiff should have a verdict, with liberty for the defendant to move for a new trial, if the Court of King's Bench
should be with him in any of his exceptions. * * * But
than as to the third exception, it being moved in the King's
Bench and argued by counsel on both sides, the Court was
unanimous of opinion, that the plaintiff had failed in proving his declaration ; for the evidence being of a promise to
accept South Sea stock, and the name of the corporation
being set out with an insensible and improper word, viz.,
Austrial 'instead of Austral' did not describe that corporation, and by consequence the agreement set out in the
declaration was to transfer a different stock from that
which was proved by the evidence. And they held, that
if the word 'Austrial' was rejected, as the counsel for the
that would not help the plaintiff;
plaintiff would have
for then the corporation described would be, the Governor
and Company of Merchants trading to the seas and other

a

places in America, etc., but would not be that corporation,
part of whose stock was proved to be agreed to be transnew trial
ferred, and the verdict was set aside, and
granted, February the 7th, 1727.

Court

of

POLLARD

V.

LOCK.

Queen's Bench.

1592.

J.

Eliz.,

c.

9,

Information upon the

5

Croke's Elizabeth, 267.

And

for perjury.

;

a

it

J. a

R. brought trespass against him,
declares that whereas
and he pleaded not guilty, and the plaintiff intitled himcourt roll held
feoffment of the land, he shewed
self by
was copyhold praeLocke, gent, which proved
before
Locke falso' deposuit, "that he was not steward
dict'
at that time," ubi rev era he was then steward, whereby
was
the verdict passed against him, etc. After verdict,
inalleged in arrest of judgment, that the declaration
is it

J.
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suiEcient, for here are two J. Lockes mentioned, viz., the
defendant, and J. Locke steward, and so may be intended
Locke deanother man: and when it is said praedict'
was last
him
that
refer
to
posuit, this shall be intended to
named, and not to the defendant; and every declaration
ought to be certain, and shall not be taken by intendment.
And for this cause it was adjudgment for the defendant.
Vide 10 Hen. 7 pi. 5 B. 5 Hen. 5. pi. 8. 6 Edw. D. 70.

J.

21

Hen.

7. 30

BECKER

V.

B.

GERMAN MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
68

Illinois,

1873,

412.

Per Curiam:

This was an action of assumpsit upon a
premium note, alleged in the declaration to have been executed by William Becker to the insurance company. The

it

it

;

it,

company recovered, and the defendant appealed.
On the trial in the court below, the plaintiff offered in
evidence a note signed by Wilhelm Becker. The defendant
objected to the introduction of the note in evidence, on the
ground of a variance as to the name of the maker. The
court overruled the objection and admitted the note in eviThis is assigned as error.
dence.
This court has repeatedly held that, in actions upon instruments of writing, where the alleged name of a party
thereto is apparently different from the one appearing to
the instrument when offered in evidence, the instrument
would be inadmissible in evidence, and should be rejected
on the ground of variance, unless there be an averment in
the declaration explaining the apparent inconsistency between the names, and the averment be sustained by proof;
that, to justify a finding for the plaintiff, the description of
the writing as to name in the declaration, and the instrushould correspond and be
ment offered in support of
consistent the one with the other that
is immaterial, as
to the obligation of the promise, by what name the defendant executed the writing; that he may be sued upon
by
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his true name, and any apparent variance or inconsistency
between the instrument and the name of the alleged maker,
by reason of the name in fact used, may be helped or prima
facie avoided by an averment in the declaration that the
maker executed the written promise by such name, or otherwise reconciling the apparent inconsistency.
Hurd et al v.
Culies et al, 18 111. 188; Rives v. Marrs, 25 id. 315; Curtis
V. Marrs, 29 id. 508 ; Graves v. People, 11 id. 542 ; Garrison
V. People, 21 id. 535; O'Brien v. People, 41 id. 456.
There is here a difference in the orthography and sound
of the names. We cannot hold them to be the same, unless
it be so made to appear by averment and proof.

For error in this

respect, the judgment is reversed and

the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.^^
82.
In Commonwealth v. Shearman (1853) 11 Gush. (Mass.) 546,
held that George Allen and George E. Allen could not be deemed
one and the same person without proof of identitj.

(d)

KEITH

to

was
be

Title.
V.

PRATT.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.
5

it

1844.

Arkansas, 661.

Debt in the Crawford Circuit Court, determined in October, 1843, before the Hon. R. C. S. Beown, one of the
circuit judges. Pratt sued Keith. The declaration was,
"John G. Pratt, 'surviving partner of E, Y. Baker, by attorney, complains of Nathan Keith to answer the plaintiff
in an action of debt, and the plaintiff demands of the defendant the sum of $482.48, which he owes to and unjustly
detains from him. For that whereas the defendant, on the
2d December, A. D. 1840, made his certain promissory note
in writing and delivered the same to the plaintiff, and now,
here to the court shown, and thereby promised to pay, on
demand, to Edward Y. Baker & Co., or order, $482.48,
which period hath now elapsed, and by reason of the said
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sum of $482.48 being unpaid, and by reason of a demand
for payment having been made by the plaintiff, an action
hath accrued to the plainti:lf to demand of the defendant
the said sum of $482.48, being the said sum above demanded,
yet the said defendant has not paid the said sum above
demanded or any part thereof to the plaintiff, damage
of one hundred dollars, and therefore brings his suit."
*
*
*
There was a demurrer to the declaration, because
•
*
•
the declaration contains no averment of the plaintiff's right to sue: * • *
By the Court, Sebastian, J. : The facts being admitted
by the demurrer as stated in the declaration, does the plaintiff show himself entitled to recover? The general principle in pleading is, that the declaration must set forth a title
in the plaintiffs to the thing sued for; and if no title is
sliown, the defect is fatal at every stage of the proceeding.
The plaintiff declares as "surviving partner of E. Y. Baker" and the promissory note is payable to Edward Y.
Baker & Co. There is no averment of the identity of the
payees with the plaintiff and his deceased partner, and
this connection is necessary to establish the legal title by
survivorship in the plaintiff.
This should be positively
and directly averred and not left to inference.
The facts
may all be true, and yet the plaintiff have no cause of action. Upon this ground the court erred in overruling the
demurrer.

CLAY

V.

CITY OF ST. ALBANS.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
43 West

Virginia,

1897.

539.

Bannon, J. : This was an action of trespass on the case
by M. C. Clay and Amanda Clay, his wife, against the city
of St. Albans, to recover damages for injury caused by the
flow of surface water upon a lot occupied by them resulting
in judgment against the city, which sued out this writ of
error.
The declaration is attacked on demurrer because it fails
to plead the title of the plaintiffs — not showing whether they
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claim in fee, or for life or years, in present or future esIt is plain that a declaration must have a legal certainty in all material elements. It must tell wherein and
how the plaintiff has been injured ; if in property, it must
tell what property right has been invaded. This is but the
common, basic rule of the law of pleading applicable to
declarations and other pleadings, "that pleadings must
show title," — not title in the common-speech meaning (that
is, deeds or other muniments of title), but their results;
the right flowing from them; the right, estate, or property
interest wherein party has been harmed. "When, in pleading, any right or authority is set up in respect of property, personal or real, some title to that property must, of
course, be alleged in the party, or in some other person from
whom he derives his authority. So, if a party be charged
with any liability in respect to property, his title to that
property must be alleged."
Steph. PI. 286; 4 Minor, Inst.
1182. But how is the title to be pleaded?
This is a practical question, often of perplexity. Counsel claim tha,t this
declaration should say whether the estate is in fee, for life,
for years, in remainder or reversion, as the case may be;
but I do not think so, for it is well settled that, where there
is an injury to a present estate in real or personal property, an allegation of possession by the plaintiff is a sufficient pleading of title ; and it will do to allege that personal property was "the goods and chattels of the plaintiff," or that he was "lawfully possessed of certain goods
and chattels, that is to say" (specifying them) ; and in case
of realty it will answer to say that the land was "the close
of the plaintiff," or that "he was lawfully possessed of a
certain close" or "a certain tract of land" (specifying it).
Steph. PL 286 ; McDodrill v. Lumber Co., 40 W. Va. 564,
Under such state21 S. E. 878. Standard forms show this.
ment of title any kind of right or estate in possession, fee
simple, for life, or' for years, may be shown, but not a
future estate, in other words, that mode of statement imports an immediate estate or property. This must be so, because one in possession has some kind of immediate estate
in present enjoyment, and possession is an element of title,
and prima facie evidence of good title to some kind of estate,
and possession alone will support trespass. If the estate injured is a remainder or reversion, though vested, yet not
■Rested in actual possession, you must allege such estate in'
tate.
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proper manner. In some cases it is necessary to set out the
derivation of title and the estate, as in certain pleas; but
generally hot in declarations, and not in those for injury to
property. Now, test this declaration by these principles. It
avers that Amanda Clay was "seised, and, together with the
plaintiff M. C. Clay, her husband, has been during all that
time, and still is, possessed, of a lot of land." Here is an
averment of possession, and, though it does not say of what
estate they were seised and possessed, yet it imports some
immediate, present estate, not a future one, and is good,
under the doctrine above given. Possession alone is sufficient to maintain trespass or case against a wrongrdoer.
Step. PI. 287; Wilson v. Manufacturing Co., 40 W. Va.
413, 21 S. E. 1035.«'
When a possessory title is not enough to establish a right, a superior
be shown, and the rule is that this must be alleged in its
full and precise extent. Under this general rule there are the following
particular rules:
1.
Seizin in fee simple may be alleged per se, and need not be derived.
Where seizin has already been alleged in another, the pleader must
2.
show the derivation from that other; as where the heir of a lessor sues
on a covenant in the indenture of lease, he must, after alleging that his
ancestor was seized in fee and made the lease, show how the fee passed to
himself, viz., by descent.
3.
Where a particular estate is relied upon, as an estate tail, for life or
for years, it must be derived from the last seizin in fee simple, subject to the
exception that when such particular estate is alleged by way of inducement
only, no derivation is necessary.
4.
When a party undertakes to derive his title he must, if he claims by
inheritance, show how he is heir, or if he claims by conveyance he must
show the nature of the conveyance, as by devise, feoffment, etc.
5.
Where defendant claims title to the locus in quo in trespass quare
clausum or in an avowry in replevin, a general freehold title is sufficient to
be alleged, called a plea or avowry of liberum tenementutn.
Stephan on
83.

title must then

Pleading (Tyler's Ed.)

286-296.

HIGGINS

V.

FAENSWORTH.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
48 Vermont,

1675.

512.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Wheeler, J.: The plaintiff in her declaration has set
forth that she was "possessed of a certain way and right
of way" appurtenant to her premises, that the defendant
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a

a

a

1

2

it,

it,

has obstructed it "and has thereby hindered and prevented
the plaintiff from the use of said way, by reason whereof
she has suffered great inconvenience and damage, and by
means thereof" her premises "have been greatly injured
and rendered less fit for occupation."
This is, clearly, a
declaration for an injury to a right of way in possession,
and not to one in reversion. Her evidence at the trial
showed that during the whole time covered by the declaration, the premises were in the occupation of one Hodgman
under leases of a year each, made from year to year, and
that she had no occupancy of them during that time. The
way, being appurtenant to the premises, would, while Hodgman so occupied them, belong to him and not to the plaintiff, and an obstruction of it during that time would be an
injury to his right and not to any right of hers, unless it
should be of such a permanent nature as to affect the value
of her right to the inheritance in reversion.
The right of
Hodgman to damages for an obstruction during his term,
is wholly distinct from hers for an injury to her right as
reversioner, although the same act might cause both. This
appears from Jeffer v. Gifford, 4 Burr. 2141, where it was
moved in arrest of judgment in an action for obstructing
ancient lights, for that the interest of the plaintiff was
stated to be that of a reversioner only, and if he should
recover, the tenant might also, and the defendant be subjected to double damages ; but the court held that the rights
of the tenant and reversioner were separate, and that each
should recover for any injury to his own. Also from Tinsman V. Belvidere (& Del. R. R. Co., 1 Dutch. 255, where
one count that set forth a reversionary right in the plaintiff and an injury only to the possessory right of the tenants, was held bad. In an action for an injury to a reversionary right, an interest in that right, or one large enough
belonging to the plaintiff, and
to include an interest in
must be set
an injury sufficiently permanent to affect
Chit. PI. 777,.note. In
Saund. PI. and Ev. 295;
forth.
Gushing v. Adams, 18 Pick. 110, the action was for an
injury to right similar to this, in possession, and the evidence showed the premises and way to be in possession of
The court recognized the doctrine
tenant at will merely.
reversioner could not maintain an action for an inthat
jury to the right in possession, but held that the possestenant was the possession of the landlord,
sion of such
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If

the plainand on that ground the action was sustained.
tiff's evidence in this case could he held to show that she
had to some extent received an injury to her reversionary
right, she has no declaration fdr that proof to support; and
the evidence did show that she had not the possessory right,
for an injury to which she had declared ; so that, taken all
together, it appeared that she was not entitled to maintain
the action she had bought, and the judgment of the county
coTirt was correct

Judgment affirmed.

BEISTOW

V.

WEIGHT.

Court of King's Bench.
2 Douglas,

1781.

665.

In last Hilary term, on Thursday, the 25th of January,
Lee obtained a rule to shew cause, why the verdict which
had been found for the plaintiff should not be set aside, and
a new trial granted, or a nonsuit entered.
This was an action on the case, against the defendants
as sheriff of Middlesex, on the statute of 8 Ann., c. 14, §
1 for taking the goods of one Pope in execution, in a house
let from year to year by the plaintiff to Pope, without paying or contenting him for a year's rent then due, arid of
which the defendants, before the removal of the goods, had
notice.
The declaration stated the demise as follows:
"The plaintiff, on etc., demised, to one Benjamin Pope,
a certain messuage, etc., to have and to hold unto the said
Benjamin, from the feast of St. Michael, then next following, for and during the term of one year from thence next
ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended, and so, from
year to year, for so long as it should please the plaintiff,
and the said Benjamin, yielding and paying, therefore,
yearly and every year during the said term unto the plain-^
tiff, the yearly rent or sum, etc., by four even and quarterly
payments; to wit, at the Feast of, etc."
The principal witness called on the part of the plaintiff, was Pope himself; who proved, that the plaintiff let
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tlie house to him, by parol, for a year, and that there was
no stipulation about any time or times for the payment
of the reni.
It was contended, at the trial (which came on before Lord
Mansfield, at the Sittings for Middlesex), that, as the plaintiff had laid a demise with a reservation of rent payable
quarterly, he was bound to prove it exactly as laid; and
that, having failed in that proof, he ought to be nonsuited.
His Lordship overruled the objection, being then of opinion, that enough of the demise as laid had been proved to
entitle the plaintiff to his action. The present rule was
moved for, on the ground of misdirection.

Lord Mansfield (after stating the case)

:

I am very fxee

to own, that the strong bias of my mind has always lejiued
to prevent the manifest justice of a cause from being defeated or delayed by formal slips, which arise from the inadvertence of gentlemen of the profession; becaus«i it is
extremely hard on the party to be turned round, and put to
expense, from such mistalies of the counsel or attorney he
employs. It is hard also on the profession. It was on this
ground that overruled the objection in this case; bat am
since convinced, both on the authorities which
am about
to mention, and, on the reasoning in them, that waw wrong,
and that it is better, for the sake of justice, that the strict
have always thought,
rule should in this case prevail.
and often said, that the rules of pleading are founded in
good sense. Their objects are precision and brevity. Nothing is more desirable for the court than precisiou, nor for
the parties than brevity. It is easy for a party to state his
it is founded on a deed, he need not
ground of action.
set forth more than that part which is necessary to entitle
he states Avhat is impertincLt, it is an
him to reco\er.
injury to the other party, and may be struck out, and costs
remember a case, where, in an
allowed, upon motion.
action on one covenant, the whole of a very long deed was
set forth. I'he court referred it to the Master, and all was
struck out except the covenant on which the action was
brought, and costs paid to the amount of lOOZ. When say
that the plaintiff need only set forth that part of a deed
do not mean to say thai
on which his action is founded,
is
He
is
not
bound to set forth the
necessary.
even that
material parts, letters and words. It would be sufficient to

I

I

I

I

I
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I

I
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state the suhsiance and legal effect. That is shorter, and
Here, that
not liable to misrecitals, and literal mistakes.
method might have been followed. It certainly was not necessary to allege this part of the lease that relates to the
time of payment, in order to maintain the action. But,
since it has been alleged, it was necessary to prove it. The
distinction is between that which may be rejected as surplusage (which might have been struck out on motion), and
what cannot. Where the declaration contains impertinent
matter, foreign to the cause, and which the Master, on a
reference to him, would strike out (irrelevant covenants
for instance), that will be rejected by the court, and need
not be proved. But, if the very ground of the action ia
misstated, as where you undertake to recite that part of a
deed on which the action is founded, and it is misreeited,
that will be fatal. For then, the case declared on is different
from that which is proved, and you must recover secundum
This will reconcile all the cases. In
allegata et probata.
the present instance, the plaintiff undertakes to state the
There are many authorities
lease, and states it falsely.
which go to prove this distinction.
will mention three
(which are very strong) where matter, which it was unnecessary to set forth, being stated, and not proved, the variance was held to be fatal. The first is the case of Cudlip V. Bundle, Carth. 202. There, in an action by a lessor
against his tenant, for negligently keeping his fire, by means
whereof the house was consumed, a demise to the defendant for seven years was stated in the declaration; the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff did not demise modo et
forma ; and issue being joined, it appeared, on the finding
by the jury in a special verdict, to be a lease at will. The
court agreed, that -the action would have lain against the
defendant as tenant at will ; but, as the plaintiff had stated
him to be a lessee for years, and proved him tenant at will,
the variance was held fatal, and there was judgment for the
The next is the case of Savage, qui tarn v.
defendant.
Smith, in the common pleas^ 2 Blackst. 1101. That was an
action of debt against a sheriff's officers, by an informer.
The declaration stated a judgment, and fieri facias upon
that judgment. The fieri facias was given in evidence, but
not the judgment, and the court held, that, though it might
be unnecessary to aver the judgment, yet, having been
averred, it ought to be proved ; and my Lord Chief Justice

I
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De Grey, expressly went upon tlie distinction between immaterial and impertinent averments, and said that the former must be proved, because relative to the point in question. The third case is Sliute v. Eornsey in this court,
E. 19 Geo. 3. That was an action for double rent on the
statute.
The declaration stated a lease for three years;
but, on the evidence, it appeared that the lease for three
years was void under the statute of frauds; and that the
defendant was only tenant from year to year. This was
sufficient for the purpose of the action; but a lease for
three years having been laid, and not proved, the plaintiff
was nonsuited ; and a rule for setting aside the nonsuit having been obtained, it was, upon the argument of the case,
These authorities are in point to the doctrine
discharged.
have laid down. But perhaps, notwithstanding the weight
of the cases, if that doctrine were highly detrimental, and
the setting it right would be attended with no mischief, as
it is only a mode of practice, it might deserve considerabelieve it stands right, and upon the best foottion. But
ing ; for it may prevent the stuffing of the declaration with
prolix unnecessary matter, because of the danger of failing
in the proof; and it may lead pleaders to confine themselves to state the legal effect. We are all of opinion that
the verdict should be set aside, and judgment of nonsuit
entered.
Rule made dbsohde.

I

I

EIDEE

V.

SMITH.

Court of King's Bench.
3

1790.

Term Reports, 766.

This was an action on the

case

for not repairing a pri-

The
vate road leading through the defendant's ground.
belong
and
declaration stated that the plaintiff on, etc.,
fore, was and from thence hitherto hath been and still is
possessed of a certain messuage, etc., and by reason of his
possession thereof was entitled to a certain way from the
said messuage unto, into, through and over a certain close
of the defendant, etc., unto and into the King's common
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highway, etc., and so back agaii;i, etc., from the said King's
common highway unto, into, etc., to go, pass, and repass,,
•etc., that the defendant now is and during all the time aforesaid hath been lawfully possessed of and in the said close
called, etc., and of and in divers, to "Wit, two other closes
of land in the parish of Manchester aforesaid, with the appurtenances, contiguoiTS and next adjoining to the said close,
etc., to wit, etc. And that the defendant, by reason of his
possession of the said close called, etc., and the said two
closes of land with the appurtenances, contiguous and next
adjoining thereto, during all the time aforesaid of right
ought to have maintained and repaired and still ought to
maintain and repair at his own proper costs and charges,
when and so often as the same hath been necessary, the said
v^aj leading, etc., yet that he had wrongfully and injuriously
permitted it to be ruinous and out of repair, etc., per quod,
etc.

To this declaration there was a general demurrer, and
joinder in demurrer.

J., said the distinction was between cases where
plaintiff lays a charge upon the right of the defendant,
and where the defendant himself prescribes in right of his
own estate. In the former case, the plaintiff is presumed
to be ignorant of the defendant's estate, and cannot therefore plead it; but in the latter the defendant, knowing his
own estate in right of which he claims a privilege, must set
it forth. In R. v. Sir J. Buchnall, 2 Ld. Raym. 804, Lord,
Holt said, "Where a man is obliged to make fences against
another, it is enough to say oinnes occupatores ought to repair, etc., because that lays a charge upon the right of another, which it may be he cannot particularly know. ' ' And
notwithstanding two out of the three of the judges were of
a different opinion in Holhack v. Warner, Cro. Jac. 665,
BuLLEB,

the

2

1

in

is

;

it,

yet several subsequent cases have been determined on the
In 1 Ventr. 264, there is the report of an
above distinction.
action on the case against the defendant for not repairing
a fence, where the allegation was that the tenants and occupiers of such a parcel of land adjoining the plaintiff- s
have time out of mind maintained
etc. Holt moved
arrect of judgment, "That the prescription
laid in occupiers, and not shewn their estates; and that hath been
judged naught in
Cro. 155, and
Cro. 665." But the
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court said, "It is true there have been opinions both ways;
but 'tis good thus laid, for the plaintiff is a stranger and
presumed ignorant of the estate ; but otherwise it is if the
defendant had prescribed."
So in Tenant v. Goldwin,
Salk. 360, in an action on the case for not repairing a wall
"dehuit reparare" was held sufficient. The case of Wirirford V. WoUaston, 3 Lev. 266, is also to the same effect.
Judgment for the plaintiff.

STANLEY

V.

CHAPPELL.

Supreme Court of New York.

1828.

8 Cowen, 235.

On demurrer to the declaration.
This was in debt on an
award. It began thus: "Elijah Stanley, as guardian and
security for Amanda Stanley, Dyer Stanley, etc., heirs at
law of Dyer Stanley, deceased, plaintiff in this suit, complains," etc. • * * After the commencement, the declaration described him as plaintiff simply. » * *

Curia, per Sutherland, J.: The first ground of objection to the declaration, appears to be fatal. The plaintiff
describes himself as guardian and security for Amanda
Stanley, and others ; but does not show how he is guardian
and security, or that he was specially appointed by the
court, or that those for whom he assumes to act, are infants. In 2 Saund. 117, f. note (1), it is expressly laid
down, that if an infant sues by guardian or prochein amy,
without saying, by the court here specially admitted, it is
error. He is supported by the case of Combers v. Waton,
1 Lev. 224; and in Ra/wlin's case, 4 Eep. 53, 4, it was held
that the admission of the guardian or prochein amy not being entered of record, is not material, if the appointment be
in fact made, and so averred or stated in the declaration.
(And see. Com. Dig. Plead. (2 C. 1.) 3 Mod. 236, I R. L.
416, 1 Dunl, Pr. 86, 7 et seq., Tidd's Pr. 69, 70, 71, 2 ^rchb.
Pr. 143, 4.) If the omission be error, it is fatal on demurrer.
C.

L. p.
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CUMMINGS

V.

4

EDMTTNSON.

Supretne Court of Alabama.
5

[Cliap.

1837,

Porter, 145.

Waddy Edirmnson, administrator of all and singular the
goods, chattels and credits, which were of William Edmunson, Jr., deceased, at the time of his death, left unadministered by Samuel Dean, administrator in right of his wife,
Parthena Dean, formerly Parthena Edmunson, wife of the
said William Edmunson, Jr., deceased, and administratrix,
etc., declared against Thomas Cummings in an action of

debt —for that whereas, the said defendant, theretofore, to
wit. * • * And the declaration closed in common form,
with a profert of letters of administration.

J.: It

is Urged against the declaration,
that no averment of the death of the administrator in chief,
drawn,
is to be found in any part of
and the inference
that no title to sue
shewn by the plaintiff. We find on
examination that no statement of the death of the administratrix in chief
contained in the declaration, nor does
in any wise appear, that she was removed from the administration in the estate of the intestate.
The plaintiff in the cause below, can only be entitled to
sue on the claim which is the foundation of this suit, by
virtue of his representative character, and we are unable to
perceive any distinction, so far as the necessity of allegation exists, between his and any other case of
derivative
title. An executor or administrator, must show in pleading
the death of the testator or intestate, although
may not
be necessary to prove
on the general issue;
surviving
copartner must set out the death of his partner; a joint
obligor, who sues alone, must set out the death of his coobligors— and in the case we are now considering, we cannot perceive why the same reason does not prevail, when the
suit
by an administrator de bdnis non. He claims title
under the administration, and
the administrator in chief
be not dead, he can have no title, whatever.
He may be
termed an assignee by operation of law, and there can be no

if

is

a

it

it

a

it

is

is

is

it,

GoLDTHWAiTE,

good reason urged, why he should not be obliged to state

The Declabatiok.

Sec. 3.]

291

the sole fact from which his authority as administrator
de bonis non, is to be derived.
We have not been able to ascertain if this question has
ever before been presented to any court, but all the prece^
dents sustain the principles we have laid down, and we
have no reason to doubt the justice of their application to
this particular case.

BANK OF HUNTINGTON

v.

HYSELL.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
22

Green,

J.

*

*

1883.

West Virginia, 142.
*

The declaration simply states, that
the defendant, M. L. Hysell, executed her note to the defendant, A. G White, for two hundred and fifty dollars
payable ninety days after its date at the Bank of Huntington, and that this note was endorsed by the defendant,
A. G. White. * * *
This declaration does not state, that the plaintiffs have
any interest of any sort in this note. It is true it does state,
that it was endorsed by the payee, A. G. White, but who was
the endorsee, it does not state. It fails entirely to state,
as it should have done, that the said payee, A. G. White,
thereby * ' ordered and appointed the said sum of money in
*
*
*
the said note specified to be paid to the plaintiffs."
It is true, as claimed by the counsel for the plaintiffs in
error, that the mere possession of a negotiable instrument
payable to the order of the payee and indorsed by him in
blank, is in itself sufficient evidence of his right to present
it and to demand payment thereof and bring suit thereof
if it be not paid. See Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401 ; Seaver v.
Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267. But though this be the rule of evidence, yet it in no manner modifies the rule of pleading,
which requires the plaintiff in all cases to show title. Had
the plaintiffs alleged title, they could under the rule, which
we have stated, have proved their title by the simple production of the note sued upon endorsed in blank by the
payee. But the fact, that title might be thus proven, cannot
dispense with +ba absolute necessity imposed by the rules
:
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of pleading upon the plaintiffs to allege title m themselves,
which they wholly failed to do in the declaration in this

In case of a blank indorsement the holder may either declare upon
84.
the note as indorsed to himself by the payee, or he may allege the indorsement in blank and that he is the owner and holder of the paper. — 14 Encyc.

PI. & Pr.
"When

524.

a note has passed through several successive transferees it is held
that the plaintiff may ignore all intermediate transfers not necessary to his
title, and allege a transfer by the payee directly to himself or to his
immediate indorser.
But if the plaintiff undertakes to trace Ms title
through intermediate indorsers, it is not sufficient to prove merely an indarsement of the defendant, but he must also show the subsequent indorsement
as

alleged."—

14

EncycL PL

&

Pr.

KEELEE

523.

V.

CAMPBELL.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
24

Illinois,

1860,

287.

Walkeb, J. : This was an action of assumpsit, instituted
in the court below, on an assigned note. The declaration
contained a special count on the note, and the common
counts. To the special count a demurrer was interposed,
and the general issue was pleaded to the common counts.
The court ove^rruled the demurr6r and defaulted the defendants, and assessed the damages, and rendered judgment
therefor, without in any way disposing of the issue on the
common counts. To reverse this judgment defendant prosecutes this writ of error.
The objection urged upon demurrer to the special count,
is that it only contains the simple averment that the note
described in that count, was assigned and delivered to the
plaintiff. It is only by force of the statute that the legal
title to promissory notes can be assigned, and in doing so,
it is essential that its substantial requirements should be
complied with, to have that effect. The statute provides,
that such instruments shall be assignable by indorsement
thereon, under the hand or hands of the payee, and of his
assignees in the same manner that biUs of exchange are,
so as absolutely to transfer the property thereof, in each
and every assignee successively. By the provisions of this
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enactment, the legal title to sucli an instrument, can only
be transferred to the assignee, by an indorsement on the
note itself, under the hand of the person having the legal
title. There is in this count no such averment.
the assignment had been made in writing on a separate piece of
paper, or even orally with its delivery, this averment would
have been proved.
Such a transfer would have passed the
equitable title, and yet the holder would have had no right
to maintain an action in his own name. The declaration
should have contained an averment that the indorsement
was made on the note in accordance with the requirements
of the statute, and failing in this, the demurrer was well
taken, and the court below erred in overruling it.

If

Judgment

(e)

BARKER

Authority.
V.

BRAHAM.

Court of Common Pleas.
3

reversed.

1773.

Wilson, 368.

ii

it

if

it,

Norwood, pro[The defendant Braham, by her attorney
cured the arrest of the plaintiff on a capias ad satisfaciendum, upon a judgment which did not authorize an arrest. Whereupon the plaintiff brought an action of tresPlea,
pass vi et armis against both Braham and Norwood.
not guilty.]*
*
*
*
It must
Sergeant Burland, for the plaintiff.
the aube taken that he [Norwood] has acted without
thority or process of the court, because he has not pleaded
he
he had pleaded
because
it; he did not plead
then
and
must have set forth the judgment in his plea,
would have appeared clearly to the court that he had done
wrong.

•Condensed

statement

of facts by the editor.
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A

sheriff, or his oflScers, or any acting under his or their
authority, may justify themselves by pleading the writ
only, because that is sufficient for their excuse, although
there be no judgment or record to support or warrant
such writ ; but if a stranger interposes and sets the sheriff
to do an execution, he must take care to find a record that
warrants the writ, and must plead it; so must the party
himself at whose suit such an execution is made. No
trespass can be excused but what is inevitable ; see the case
of Pars ->ns v. Lloyd, adjudged in the last term, ante, 341.
Mr. Norwood has pleaded not guUty ; he could not justify by a special plea, because there is no record to warrant a capias ad satisfaciendum against Mrs. Barker.

WASSON

V.

CANFIELD.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
6

184a.

Blackford, 406.

BLAOKroED, J.: This was an. action of trespass for an
assault and false imprisonment, brought by William C.
Canfield against Eichard Wasson, James Robb and William Madden. After the filing of the declaration, the death
of Madden was suggested, and the cause was ordered to
proceed against the other defendants. Wasson pleaded the
general issue and two special pleas. The first special plea
is to the following effect:
That at the time of the trespass, etc., the defendant was a justice of the peace, etc.,
that a felony had been committed, etc., by certain persons
making, forging, and counterfeiting, etc. (the particulars
of the offense are here set out), that on, etc., a reasonable
suspicion and belief existed that the plaintiff was guilty of
said felony, and there was reasonable ground for such suspicion and belief ; that thereupon, afterwards, etc., the defendant being a justice of the peace as aforesaid, by reason
of such felony having been* committed as aforesaid, by reason of reasonable suspicion and belief that the plaintiff
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was guilty of sucli felony, and of such reasonably ground
of suspicion and belief that the plaintiff was so guilty, commanded said Eobb to arrest the plaintiff and take him before some justice of the peace, etc.; that Eobb, in pursuance of said command, gently laid his hands on the plaintiff,
and took him before one John J. Cross, a justice of the
peace, etc. The second special plea is similar to the first,
except that it does not allege that the defendant was a justice of the peace.
Eobb also pleaded the general issue and two special pleas.
The first of his special pleas was to the following effect;
That at the time of the trespass, etc., he was a constable,
etc. ; that a felony had been committed, etc., by certain persons making, forging, and counterfeiting, etc., (the particulars of the offense are here set out) ; that afterwards, etc.,
a reasonable suspicion and belief existed that the plaintiff
was guilty of said felony, and there was reasonable ground
for such suspicion and belief; that one Eichard Wasson
and others charged the plaintiff with being guilty of said
felony, and informed this defendant, he being a constable,
etc., that the plaintiff was guilty; that afterwards, etc., this
defendant, constable aforesaid by reason of said felony
having been committed as aforesaid, and of such reasonable
suspicion and belief that the plaintiff was guilty thereof,
and of reasonable ground for such suspicion and belief, and
of said charge and information of said Wasson and others,
for the purpose of carrying the plaintiff before some justice of the peace to be dealt with, etc., gently laid his hands
on the plaintiff and took him before one John J. Cross, a
justice of the peace, etc., to be dealt with, etc. ; which is
The second special plea of this
the same trespass, etc.
defendant is similar to the first, except that it does not
allege that he was a constable.
The special pleas of both the defendants were demurred
to generally; and the demurrers were sustained.
The special pleas of Wasson are bad for this reason
if no other, that they omit to set out the ground upon which
the suspicion and belief of the plaintiff's guilt were founded.
Whether the suspicion against the plaintiff was reasonable
or not was a question of law for the Court to decide, and
the pleas should consequently have shown the cause of sus-

Mure V. Kayne, 4 Taunt, 34. The first of these
t)leas, it is true, states that the >defendant was a justice of

picion.
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that is no excuse for the omission we have

the peace, bnt

mentioned.
The special pleas of Eobb state not only that there was
a reasonable suspicion, etc., but, also, that he was informed
by Wasson and others that the plaintiff was guilty; and
the defendant is alleged in the first of these pleas to be a
constable. We think, however, that even the first of these
pleas should have gone further, and have shown that the
defendant's informant stated the facts by which he knew
or believed the plaintiff to be guilty; and that the pleas
should have set out those facts, in order that the plaintiff
could have taken the opinion of the Court on their sufficiency to raise a reasonable suspicion against him. Unless
they were sufficient for that purpose, the arrest was not authorized. Davis V. Russell, 5 Bing., 354.
The demurrers to the pleas, therefore, correctly sus•
•
•
tained.

(f)

Quantity, Quality and Value.

WIATT

V.

ESSINGTON.

Court of King's Bench.
2

Lord Raymond,

1739,

1410.

In

trespass for breaking the plaintiff's house, and taking away diversa bona et catalla of the plaintiff ibidem inventa, verdict was given for the plaintiff, and entire damages assessed; and upon Mr. Ward's motion the judgment
was arrested, for the uncertainty in the declaration, in not
specifying what the goods were, so that this recovery could
not be pleaded in bar of another action brought for the same
goods. Serjeant Darnall and Mr. Ketelby for the plaintiff.8«
"The law requires
of; as, where

greater certainty tlian the nature of the thing
an action is brought for things not subject to
distinction by number, weight or measure; as, in trespass for breaking his
close with beasts, and eating his peas, without saying how much; yet this
declaration hath been held good, because nobody can number or measure
the peas that beasts can eat," — Bacon's Abridgement, Pleas, B, 5, 5,
85.

will admit

no
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V.

NOONAB.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
50
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1878,

Vermont, 402.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
DuNTON, J. : The defendant claims that there is a fatal
variance between the contract or agreement set forth in
the declaration and the one proved on trial.
•
•
•
The declaration alleges "that the defendant
promised the plaintiff, that if she would deed to him certain land, etc., the defendant would, in consideration thereof, pay a certain debt which the plaintiff was owing to one
George E. Field * * * of the sum of, to wit, siity dollars." The declaration was supported by the testimony,
except as to the amount of the debt in question, which was
shown by the evidence to be fifty-two dollars instead of
sixty, as alleged in the declaration. The amount of the debt
being averred under a videlicet, we do not think the plaintiff was bound to prove the exact sum as laid. The purpose for which matter is so alleged is, that the party pleading it may not be strictly bound by it ; and a videlicet, when
followed by numbers or amount, often indicates that the
pleader has not attempted to state the sum with precision.
Crispin v. Williamson, 8 Taunt. 107; Bray v. Freeman, ib.
197 ; Cooper v. Blich, 4 A. & E. n. s. 915 ; 1 Chit. Pi. 313, 316.
A videlicet, however, will not avoid a variance in an allegation of material matter which is of the essence of the
contract or description, and essential to its identity. Says
Starkie: "In cases of contract, the allegations of sums,
magnitude, and duration are usually in their very nature
essential to the identity of the contract; they are therefore
descriptive, and must in general be proved as laid, unless
the mode of averment shows that the party did not profess
1
to state the sum, magnitude, number, etc., precisely."
Stark. Ev. 447; Bray v. Freeman, supra.
In this case, although the amount alleged is descriptive
of the debt in question, the mode of its averment shows that
the pleader did not attempt to state the sum precisely ; and
the debt being also described as "a certain debt the plain-
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one George E. Field," we do not think the
amount alleged so essential to the identity of the contract
as to make the variance fatal.

tiff was owing to

Judgment

affirmed.^^

In Bissel t. Drake (1821) 19 Johns. (N. T.) 66, the action was upon
86.
a note which the declaration stated under a videlicet to be a note for 180
It was
dollars.
The evidence showed that it was a note for 300 dollars.
held that the videlicet did not dispense with strict proof, but the court said: —
"Where the party is incapable of stating the date and amount of a note,
of which he is dispossessed, the law will not require him to make such statement; it will be satisfied by an allegation that the note is of great value,
to wit, of the value of a certain sum."

MONTGOMERY

&

EUFAULA EAILWAT COMPANY
V.

CULVER.

Supreme Court of Alahwma.
75

1884,

Alabama, 587.

This was an action by E. V. Culver against the Montgomery and Eufaula Railway Company, a domestic corporation, operating a railroad in this State, for the recovery of damages "for the failure to deliver certain goods,
viz., one trunk, containing one heavy set gold bracelets,
twenty-four pieces of sterling silver teaspoons, twelve
pieces (silver) table spoons, twelve pieces of dessert spoons,
one full set of Rogers table cutlery, consisting of about
fifty pieces, and clothing and personal wearing appar.el, and
also one fine coral set breastpin; which goods were received by defendant as a common carrier, to be delivered
to the plaintiff at Birmingham, Alabama, for a reward,
which defendant failed to do." The defendant demurred
to the complaint, and also to thdt part thereof "which is
in these words, to-wit, 'clothing and personal wearing apparel,' " on the ground, in substance, that said clothing and
wearing apparel were insufficiently described. The court
* *
*
overruled the demurrer.

Clopton, J. : We see no error in overruling the demurrer to the complaint for want of certainty in the descrip-
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tion of the property, which it is alleged the defendant
failed to deliver. It is described as "one trunk" containing certain articles, and among others, "clothing and personal wearing apparel." The rule as to certainty. in pleadings, as observed by Mr. Stephen, "is not so strictly construed, but that it sometimes admits the specification of
quality and quantity in a loose and general way." Accordingly, at common law, a declaration in trover for "a library of books" has been deemed good without further description; and so for "two packs of flax and two packs of
hemp," without specifying weight or quantity. Stephen
on Plead. 298-299.
Our own decisions have sustained descriptions equally wanting in details of statement. Haynes
V. Crutchfield, 7 Ala. 189; Thompson v. Pearce, 49 Ala.
210. When specific propeiiy is sued for, in an action of
detinue, a somewhat stricter rule of description is admitted
to prevail. David v. David, 66 Ala. 139."

"A

states the rule on this point as follows: —
general mode
great prolixity is thereby avoided."
And he
among other examples:
assumpsit, on a promise by the defendant to pay for all such necessaries as his friend should be provided with by the plaintiff, the plaintiff
It was moved,
aUeged that he provided necessaries amounting to such a sum.
in arrest of judgment, that the declaration was not good because he had not
shown what necessaries in particular he had provided.
But Coke, C.
said,
'this is good, as is here pleaded, for avoiding such multiplicities of reckonings.'
[Cryps v. Bayuton, 3 Bulst. 31.] * * * So, in debt on a bond,
conditioned that the defendant shall pay, from time to time, the moiety of
all such money as he shall receive, and give account of it, he pleaded generally, that he had paid the moiety of all such money, etc. Et per curiam,
'This plea of payment is good, without showing the particular sums, and
that in order to avoid stuffing the rolls with multiplicity of matter.' Also,
they agreed that, if the condition had been to pay the moiety of such money
as he should receive, without saying from time to time, the payment should
have been pleaded specially.
[Church v. Brownwick, 1 Sid. 334.]" Stephen
on Pleading (Tyler's Ed.) 318, 319.
In Smith v. Boston, Concord & Montreal Eailroad (1858) 36 N. H. 458,
there was an action of assumpsit for breach of a contract to build and complete, in a thorough and workmanlike manner, a railroad twenty miles long,
including right of way, track iron, sleepers, fencing, borrowing pits and
station buildings, and it was held that an enumeration of the particulars of
breach would tend to proUxity, so that a general statement was deemed sufficient.
87.
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Matters of Inducement and Aggravation.

RIGGS

V.

BULLINGHAM.

Coiirt of Queen's Bench.

1599.

Croke's EUzabeth, 715.
Assumpsit. Whereas lie was seized in fee of the advowson of Beckingham, in the County of Lincoln; in consideration that he, at the defendant's request, by his deed, dedisset et concessisset, to the defendant the first and next
avoidance of the said church, the defendant, 22 August, 37
Eliz. asumed to pay to the plaintiff 1001., etc. Upon non
assumpsit pleaded, it was found for the plaintiff, and damages assessed to 100?. And, after verdict, it was moved in
arrest of judgment. , * * * Secondly, the declaration is
not good; because there is not any time or place alleged
Sed non allocatur for it is
J where the grant was made.
but an inducement to the action, and therefore needs not
to be so precisely alleged. Wherefore it was adjudged for
the plaintiff. Vide 29 Eliz., Marsh v. Kavensford, ante, 59.

WABASH WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY
FRIEDMAN.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
146

Illinois,

v.

1893,

583.

Mr. Justice Craig delivered the opinion of the court:
This was an action brought by Oscar J. Friedman,
against the Wabash Western Railway Company, to recover
damages for a personal injury received on the first day of
May, 1888, while plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's line of road running from Moberly, Missouri, to
*
* »
Ottumwa, Iowa.
[Defendants' railroad ran from Moberly to Kirksville,
The
thence to Glenwood Junction, and thence to Ottumwa.
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Upon the question of variance the defendant asked the
court to instruct the jury as follows :
"The averment in plaintiff's declaration that he became
a passenger in the train of defendant at Kirksville, Missouri, to be carried from said Kirksville to Glenwood Junction, is material, and must be proved as alleged ; and if the
jury believe, from the evidence, that said plaintiff did not,
at the time in question, become a pasenger in said train of
defendant at said Kirksville to be carried to said Glenwood

Junction, then the jury will find for defendant, regardless
of all other questions in the case."
But the court refused to give the instruction as prayed,
but qualified it by adding as follows, to wit: "But if it
appear, from the evidence, that plaintiff was a passenger
on the train of the defendant between the points mentioned, traveling from a point south of said Kirksville to a
point beyond Glenwood Junction, then the averment in the
plaintiff's declaration is sufiieiently made out."
It may be said that the question involved is a technical
one, and hence not entitled to that consideration which a
court should give to a question which goes to the merits
of an action. The plaintiff had the right, when the question was raised, to amend his declaration and thus obviate
the diflBculty, but he saw proper to take another course, and
he occupies no position now to complain should the rules
of law that control in such cases be strictly enforced against
him.

But while the question involved may be regarded somewhat technical, still it will be remembered that the plain-

tiff is

seeking to recover a large sum of money, and the
defendant has the right to demand and insist that the
grounds upon which the plaintiff claims a right of recovery
should be clearly and concisely stated, and that the case
made in the declaration should be proven as laid. If a
plaintiff may allege in his declaration one ground of recovery, and on the trial prove another, a defendant never
could be prepared for trial. One great object of a declaration is to notify the defendant of the nature and character
88.
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of the plaintiff's demand, so that he may be able to prepare
for a defense ; but if one ground of action may be alleged
and another proven, a declaration would be a delusion, and
instead of affording a defendant notice of what he was
Here the
called upon to meet, it would be a deception.
plaintiff claimed that the relation of passenger and common carrier existed between him and the defendant, and
that the defendant owed him a duty growing out of that relation. In speaking of a declaration in such a case, Chitty
in his Pleadings says: "When the plaintiff's right consists in an obligation on the defendant to observe some particular duty, the declaration must state the nature of such
duty, which, we have seen, may be founded either upon a
contract between the parties, or on the obligation of law
arising out of the defendant's particular character or situation, and the defendant must prove such duty as laid, and
a variance will, as in actions on contract, be fatal." The
same author also says : "In an action on the case founded
on an express or implied contract, as, against an attorney,
agent, carrier, innkeeper or other bailee, for negligence,
etc., the declaration must .correctly state the contract, or
the particular duty or consideration from which the liability results and on which it is founded, and a variance
in the description of a contract, though in an action ex
The
delicto, may be fatal as in an action ex contractu.
declaration in such case usually begins with a statement of
the particular profession or situation of the defendant and
his retainer, and consequent duty or liability. The declaration will be defective if it does not show that by express
contract, or by implication of law, in respect to the defendant's particular character or situation, etc., stated by the
plaintiff, the defendant was bound to do or omit the act
in reference to which he is charged."
It may, however, be said, that the statement in the declaration of the point from which and to which the plaintiff
was being carried was mere inducement, and need not be
proved as laid. Upon a question of this character, Chitty
in his Pleadings (page 292) says: "In general, however,
every allegation in an inducement which is materi9,l, and
not impertinent and foreign to the cause, and which, consequently, cannot be rejected as surplusage, must be proved
as alleged, and a variance would be fatal; and, consequently, great attention to the facts is necessary in framing
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the inducement, and care must be taken not to insert anyunnecessary allegation."
If, therefore, the allegation is
to be regarded as inducement, it was necessary to prove
it as_ alleged. And at page 385 the author further says :
is also a rule, that if a necessary inducement of the
plaintiff's right, etc., even in actions for torts, relate to and
describe and be founded on a matter of contract, it is necessary to be strictly correct in stating such contract, it being matter of description. Thus, even in case against a
carrier, if the termini of the journey which was to be undertaken be misstated the variance will be fatal. Here the
allegation in the inducement relates to matter of descrip-

"It

tion."
Harris

v. Rayner, 8 Pick. 541, is a case in point. The
action was brought to recover for an injury sustained by
the oversetting of a stage coach.
The plaintiff alleged in
his declaration that he paid defendants for his passage in
their stage from Albany to Boston ten dollars, the usual
fare for said passage, and defendant, in consideration
thereof, undertook and promised carefully to transport
plaintiff in said passage from Albany to Boston. In support of the declaration plaintiff proved that he was in a
stage coach from Worcester to Boston, and that just as he
arrived at Boston the coach was overset by the carelessness
of the driver, and he was thereby injured. It was held
that the evidence did not prove the contract set out in the
declaration, and in passing upon this point the court said :
"We think there was no sufficient proof, at the trial, of the
The declaration alcontract as alleged in the declaration.
leges a contract on the part of the defendants to transport
The proof was that
the plaintiff from Albany to Boston.
the plaintiff rode in defendants' stage from Worcester te
Boston, and although this is part of the route from Albany
to Boston, yet it is part also of many other lines of travel,
so that the contract as alleged remains without proof."
In Tucker v. Cracklin, 2 Starkie, 385, and in Railroad and
Ranking Co. v. Tucker, 79 Ga. 128, actions were brought
against carriers for the loss of goods, and in each case it
was held that a variance between the proof and allegation
as to the termini of the carriage was fatal. In 3 Phillips
on Evidence, page 268, the author says: "The plaintiff
will be nonsuited if the termini of the journey are not correctly set forth," In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Sut-
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ton, 53 111. 398, the point was made that an averment in
the declaration of defendants undertaking to convey the
plaintiff from West TJrbana to Tolono is not sustained by
proof of an undertaking to convey from Champaign City
to Tolono. In disposing of the question of variance it is
said:
would appear from the testimony that West
TJrbana and Champaign City are one and the same place,
consequently there was no variance."
The averment in plaintiff's declaration that he became
and was a passenger at Kirksville to be carried to Glenwood Junction, for reward, was, in effect, a statement that
he took the defendant's train at Kirksville for Glenwood
Junction and that he had paid, or was ready to pay, his fare
from one , point to the other when called upon, whereupon
there was an implied contract on the part of the railway
company to safely carry him from one point to the other.
We think it plain that the averment in plaintiff's declaration was not sustained by proof that he became a passenger
It may be true that plaintiff
at Moberly for Ottumwa.
stated more in his declaration than he might have stated —
that he might have relied upon an allegation that he was
a passenger upon defendant's ears, being carried for reward, without stating definitely the termini of his journey
on defendant's line of road; but having gone into detail in
his allegations the law requires him to prove them as laid.
What is said in Bell v. Senneff , 83 lU. 125, is in point here :
"As a general rule a party is required to prove the averments of his pleadings as he makes them.
He may aver
more than is required, but as a general rule, he must prove
them, although unnecessarily made." In Derringo v. Rutland, 58 Vt. 128, it was held that every averment which the
pleadings make material as a descriptive part of a cause
of action must be proved as alleged, and any variance which
destroys the legal identity of the matter or thing averred
with the matter or thing proved, is fatal. In State v. Kopp,
15 N. H. 212, it is said:
is a most general rule that
no allegation which is descriptive of the identity of that
which is legally essential to the claim or charge can be
rejected." (See, also, 1 Phillips on Evidence, 709, 710;
Stephens' Pleading, p. 124, appendix.)
Here the plaintiff was bound to allege that he was a passenger on defend'
ant's train of cars for reward. This was material, and the
further averment that he became a passenger at Kirks-

"It

"It
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ville for Glen wood Junction was descriptive of the identity
of that which was legally essential. It could not be re-

jected or disregarded.
In conclusion, we think it plain, under the authorities,
that there was a variance between the proof and the declaration, and the court erred in the admission of the evidence
and in the modification of defendant's instruction.

CHAMBEELAIN

v.

GEEENFIELD.

Court of Common Pleas.
3

1772,

Wilson, 292.

London, (to wit). —Eichard Greenfield, late of London
victualler, was attached to answer William Chamberlain
in a plea, wherefore, with force and arms he broke and
entered the dwelling house of the said WUliam, situate,
standing and being at the parish of Saint Andrew Holboum, in London aforesaid, and stayed and continued
therein for a long time, and during the whole time made a
great noise, disturbance and affray therein, and wrenched
and forced open, or caused to be wrenched and forced open
the closet doors, drawers, chests, cupboards and cabinets
of the said William, and the goods and chattels of the said

William, of the value of

then and there found, tossed,
tumbled, damaged and spoiled, and then and there did other
wrongs to the said William, against the peace of His pres*
•
•
ent Majesty, etc.
And the said Richard, by Eowland Lickbarrow his attorney, cometh and defendeth the force and injury when, etc.,
and gaith, that the said declaration in the manner and form
aforesaid above made, and the matter therein contained,
are not sufficient in law for the said William to have and
maintain his said action against the said Eichard ; to which
said declaration the said Eichard hath not any need, nor
is he obliged by the law of the land to answer; and this he
is ready to verify; wherefore, for want of a sufficient declaration in this behalf, the said Eichard prays judgment if
the said Williani ought to have or maintain his said action against him. And, for causes of demurrer in law in
0. L. p. 20
500?.
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this behalf, the said Eichard, according to the form of the
statute in such case lately made and provided, shews to the
court here these causes following, to wit, for that the said
"William hath not in or by his said declaration particularly
specified the goods, chattels, wares and merchandise, by
the said declaration supposed to have been tossed, tumbled, damaged and spoiled; and for that the charge of
wrenching and forcing open the closet doors, drawers,
chests, cupboards and cabinets in the said declaration mentioned, is not alleged with sufficient certainty against the
said Richard in this, to wit: for that it is alleged that the
said Eichard wrenched and forced open or caused to be
wrenched and forced open the said closet doors, drawers,
chests, cupboards and cabinets, and for that the number of
closet doors, drawers, chests, cupboards and cabinets in the
said declaration mentioned, and thereby supposed to be
wrenched and forced open, is not specified ; and for that the
said declaration is in other respects defective, insufficient
and informal, etc.

Serjeant Wilson for the plaintiff argued. That the essential matter of fact or trespass alleged in the declaration,
and for which this action was brought, is the breaking and
entering the plaintiff's dwelling house; and that the farther description, viz., the making a noise, disturbance and
affray, the wrenching and forcing open the closet doors,
drawers, chests, cupboards and cabinets, the tossing, tumbling, damaging and spoiling the goods, etc., etc., is only laid,
by way of aggravation, and to shew how enormous the
trespass was ; and so it has been often resolved, that there
is no occasion to specify in a declaration what belongs to
the principal thing, or place trespassed upon, as the dwelling house of the plaintiff, in the present case (certainly) is ;
the closet doors, drawers, etc., etc., all belong to the house ;
to this purpose he cited 2 Salk. 642, Neiomcm v. Smith, and
643, Layton v. Grindal. , And 1 L4- Eaym. 588 cites Boroughs V. Hall, B. E. Trin., 23 Car. 2, where it was held that
trover for a ship cum armamentis was good; whereas if the
action had been brought for the guns and rigging severally,
they ought to shew what and how much; Serjeant Wilson
concluded that the breaking and entering the plaintiff's
house, was the principal ground and foundation of the present action; and all the rest are not foundations of the ao-

Sec. 3]

The Declakation.

307

tion, but matters only thrown in, to aggravate the damages; and of that opinion were the whole court, and gave
judgment for the plaintiff.

(h)

Matters Within the Knowledge of the Other Party.

GALE

V.

EEED.

Court of King's Bench.
8

1806,

East, 80.

This is an action of covenant, brought by the three plaintiffs against their late partner Eeed, for breaches of a covenant contained in an indenture, confirming and carrying into
further effect a prior indenture made between them for
the dissolution of their partnership; and which indenture,

made the 31st of January, 1804, whereupon the breaches
are assigned, is as follows: " * * * And the defendant
doth hereby for himself, his heirs, executors, etc., covenant
with the plaintiffs, their executors, etc., in manner following, viz. That he, the defendant, shall not in his lifetime
carry on the business of a ropemaker, or make cordage for
any person or persons whomsoever (except any contract
which the defendant may hereafter enter into to make
cordage, new or old, or any other articles, for government,
or any public board, and which he shall have free liberty,
from time to time, to execute and complete) * * * " The
breaches assigned were, 1st, that after the making of the indenture the defendant carried on the business of ropemaker,
and made cordage for divers and very many person other
than by virtue of any contract which the defendant had
entered into after the making of the said indenture, to make
cordage, etc., for government, contrary to his covenant.
*
•
*
The declaration assigning these breaches, in m/iking cordage for others,, and employing others, to make
cordage, the defendant, after enrolling the indenture at
large, demurred to the first breach; assigning for cause,
" that the plaintiff s had not shewn or disclosed any, and
what particular person or persons for whom the defendant
made cordage, or any and what particular quantities or
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kinds of cordage the defendant did so make for them; nor
in what manner or by what acts he carried on the said business of ropemaker, as is alleged in that breach of covenant.

Lord Ellenbokough, C, J,, delivered the opinion of the
court. After stating the pleadings as above. — It has been

contended, on part of the defendant, that the covenant on
which the breaches have been assigned is void, as being a
contract made in particular restraint of trade, without adequate consideration to the party restrained; upon the authority of Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181 and other
cases. And also, that the breaches are ill assigned in point
of form, inasmuch as the "divers other persons" alleged
to have been employed to make cordage for the defendant
(as complained of in those breaches), are generally so described, without mentioning them particularly by their
names, or stating the kinds and quantities of cordage made,
etc., as, the defendant's counsel contended ought to have
been done.
As to this objection of form, and which is the
cause specially assigned for demurrer, the answer given to
it by the plaintiff's counsel, viz., that as the facts alleged
in these breaches lie more properly in the knowledge of
the defendant, who must be presumed conusant of his own
dealings, than of the plaintiffs, there was no occasion to
state them more particularly; is in our opinion a sufficient
answer in point of law.

Profert and Oyer.

(i)

BEEBE
Supreme

V.

EEAL ESTATE BANK.

Court of Arkansas.
4

1842.

Arkansas, 124.

Debt, tried in Pulaski Circuit Court, in March, 1841, before the Hon. John J. Clendenin, one of the circuit judges.
The Real Estate Bank sued Eoswell Beebe and others, on
a note executed by them, and made no profert of the note,
The defendants demurred, for want of profert, and the de-
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murrer being overruled, judgment went for debt, and interest at ten per centum per annum, from the maturity of
the note until it should be paid. The defendants sued tiieir
writ of error.
Dickinson, J.: At common law, a party never was required to make profert of a promissory note; the reason
was, that it did not constitute the foundation of the action.
It was only evidence of the debt, and its execution was required to be proved upon the trial. Profert was given upon
sealed instruments, because they constituted the gist of the
action, and it was required to enable the defendant to plead
knowingly. Oyer was granted upon profert being made;
and, upon the making of profert, the party could then plead
a special or general plea of non est factum, or set up any
other defense which might defeat the cause of action. It
was the grade of evidence that determined the character
of the pleadings. A sealed instrument proved itself. Its
execution might be denied, but its consideration could not
be impeached.
Under our statute, the consideration of
sealed and unsealed instruments may both be inquired into,
and therefore there is a perfect equality in their grade of
The production of each proves itself, and the
evidence.
consideration for which it was given. This consideration,
in both instruments, is liable to be impeached in the same
way, but he who impeaches them must do it by plea, supported by affidavit.
It certainly cannot be pretended, that it is not necessary
to make profert of a sealed instrument under our statute.
Promissory notes carry with them the same evidence of indebtedness that sealed instruments do; and the consideration of both being disproved in the same way, then it necessarily follows, that promissory notes, as well as sealed
instruments, under our statute, should be made profert of.
This view of the case is strengthened by the words of the
act itself (Eev. St., chap. 116, sec. 65), which declares that,
when any such instrument is lost or destroyed, an allegation to that effect shall excuse the want of profert. This
positive provision, making profert unnecessary under such
circumstances, certainly implies that, in all other cases, except where the instrument is lost or destroyed, profert
should be alleged of promissory notes as well as of sealed
instroments.
Judgment

reversed.
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CHICAGO BUILDING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY V. TALBOTTEN CREAMERY COMPANY.
Supreme Court of Georgia^
106 Georgia,

1898.

84.

[This was a suit founded upon a written contract, of
which the plaintiff undertook to make profert and the defendant to demand oyer. This was done irregularly, but
was treated by the parties and by the trial court as a proper
profert and oyer. The defendant demurred to the plaintiff's petition, and the demurrer was sustained.]*'
Cobb,

J.

:

•

*

•

1. The first question to be determined is : Did the court
have a right to consider this contract in passing upon the
demurrer filed to the petition? • • * "WTiile at common
law profert was required only in cases where the party
claimed or justified under a deed, and was not necessary
where the suit or defense was founded upon an instrument
not under seal, still the rule in this State requires that profert should be made of any note or other instrument which
is the foundation of the action, whether the same be under
seal or not. Steph. Plead. 67, 437 ; Smith v. Simms, 9 Ga.
418.
It seems, therefore, that in the present case the plaintiff should have set out in his petition the substance of the
contract which is the foundation of the action, or he should
have exhibited to his petition the material parts of the
same, or made profert of it in the pleading, that is, after
referring to the contract, used the formula, "which is here
to the court shown;" and in the latter case the defendant
would have had a right to demand oyer of the instrument,
that is, that the same be filed for inspection and subject to
be treated in the after-progress of the case as embodied
in the petition itself. At common law, in all cases where
profert of an instrument was required to be made and was
made, and oyer was demanded and the instrument read in
the days of oral pleading, or filed for inspection since the
day of written pleading, the instrument which was the subject of the profert became, after the granting of oyer, a
89.
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part and parcel of the pleading which contained the profert.
Gould's Plead. (5th Ed.) 408, 409. The author also says;

"He

who is entitled to, and obtains, oyer of a deed, is not
bound to take any notice of it in his pleading.
The object
of granting it being merely to enable him to do so, at his
pleasure.
He may, however, after reciting the instrument,
verbatim, on the record, avail himself of any advantage,
which any part of it, not set out by his adversary, may afford him. The mode in which such advantage may be taken,
may be either by pleading, or demurring, as the case may
require. • * •
the instrument sued upon, or upon
which the defense is founded, is, n/pon the face of
void,
either from illegality or otherwise; or is, from any other
cause, insufficient upon the face
to maintain the deor
maud
defense founded upon
or
there
any material variance between the instrument, as recited on oyer,
and the description of
in the pleading of him who has
made profert of it; the adverse party may demur to the
pleading in which the profert
made.

it,

is

is

it

;

it

if

of

it,

If

*

•

•

E.

;

7

&

it

;

if

is

The deed, as recited,
considered as parcel of
the pleading of him who pleads it; and, consequently, has
the same effect, as
had been set out, verbatim, in his
own pleading."
Ibid. 418, 419. See also Chit. PI. 450451 Jeffery v. White, Doug. 476 Snell v. Snell,
Dow.

ress of the case.

•

•

•

is

a

a

is

a

;

&

;

is

Thacker v. State, 11 Md. 322. There
nothing in
this ruling to conflict with the decisions made in the cases of
Const. Pub. Co. V. Stegall, 97 Ga. 450, and Aug.
Sav. R.
800.
In
those
Lark,
Co. V.
Id.
cases the court attempted to
consider upon demurrer written statements of facts which
had not been made, in any way, a part of the pleadings,
and which could not become a part thereof except by an
allegation in the petition. It was in those cases held, that
upon demurrer to a petition the court could not look outside of the petition. And we so hold here the effect of the
the
ruling now made being simply that contract which
not actually set out
foundation of the action, but which
in the petition, becomes nevertheless, in contemplation of
proceeding equivalent to
law, a part of the same, when
on
one
side
and the granting of oyer
the
demand of oyer
on the other has been practically accomplished in the prog257
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Vermont, 182.

1907,

,

MuNSON, J.: The declaration alleges the breaking and
entering of the plaintiff's close, and the felling and removal of trees and underbrush there growing. The second
and third pleas disclose a defense based upon deeds given
by a cotenant of the plaintiff. The third and fourth pleas
base the defense upon a license of the cotenant. The questions are raised by a general demurrer to these pleas.
The deeds are pleaded with profert. The plaintiff craves
oyer of the deeds^ and having heard them read demurs, but
without reciting the deeds. Copies are furnished the court
on argument.
It is said in Gould's Pleading, Part 11, sec. 35, that the
object of craving oyer is that the pleader may have an
opportunity to recite the instrument, and thus avail himself, upon the face of the record, of anything in the writing
which may aid him. It is said in Chitty's Pleading, p. 432,
that if one pleading a deed and making profert omits to
state any part of it which is material to the case of his
opponent, the only way in which the latter can relieve himself is by praying oyer of the deed, and setting it out in
haec verba.
The reasons for this requirement are obvious, and especially so when the issue is presented by demurrer. A demurrer submits to the court the legal effect of what appears
upon the face of the preceding record. When the instrument is recited on oyer, it stands the same as if incorporated
in the previous pleading where profert of it is made. If
not recited, the facts contained in it are not within the
The recital is also essential to a
scope of the demurrer.
proper evidence of the issues determined, however the case
may be presented. If the instrument is not recited, but
merely handed up on argument, the case may be determined upon matters which are not contained in the record,
but appear only from a loose paper, bearing no mark that
coimects it with the case, and which may easily fail of
preservalioii m the files.
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So the deeds are not before ns, and the points depending
upon their contents will not be considered.'"
Form of Oyer, in plea of nan est factum.
the said C D, by E P his attorney, comes and
defends the wrong
ana injury, when, etc., and craves oyer of the said
supposed indenture, in
the said declaration mentioned, and it is read to him
in these words: (here
set out the indenture
verbatim) which being read and heard, the said
D
says that the said supposed indenture
is not his deed, and of this ha
puta lumself upon the country, etc.
2 Chitty on Pleadine. 461.
^
•
90.

And

•••••••••

(j) Facts

Showing Contract Liability^

(1)

The promise.

BEIDGE

V.

AUSTIN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
4 Massachusetts,

1808.

115.

This was an action pending in the county of Middlesex.
The declaration was "in a plea of the case for that the said

David at Boston, viz., at Charleston aforesaid, on the
twenty-second day of October in the year of our Lord, 1805,
in consideration that the plaintiff had made him the said
David his bailiff of one case of linens, of the value of five
hundred dollars, and had agreed to allow and pay him a
commission of five per cent, on the proceeds of the sale
thereof, promised the plaintiff to transport the same linen
to Charleston, in the state of South Carolina, at his the
said David's own risk against aU danger, excepting the
dangers of the seas, and dispose of the same to the plaintiff's best profit and advantage, and render to the plaintiff
his reasonable account thereof. Yet the said David, though
often requested, has never rendered his reasonable account
to the plaintiff touching the premises, or in any wise paid
him for said linen, to the damage," etc
Upon non assumpsit pleaded, the cause was tried, at the
sittings after the last October term at Cambridge, before
the chief justice, whose report was as follows :
On the trial, the plaintiff, to maintain the issue on his
part gave in evidence a memorandum in writing signed by
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in the

-words
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follomng— "Boston, Oct.

22,

Eeceived on board the ship Rodney, J. Hurd, bound
for Charleston, S. C, a case of linens, amounting for the
sterling cost to 84?. 5s. %d. which promise to dispose of
in Charleston for account of Nathan Bridge, and to account
and pay to him the proceeds, and takes on myself all risks,
shall charge five per
except those of the seas, for which
cent.
David Austin." And it was agreed by the parties
that the said case of linens was transported by the defendant in the said ship to Charleston, where it arrived, and
was delivered safe to him by the said Hurd.
The defendant to maintain the issue on his part, gave in
evidence that after the case of linen was delivered to him
in Charleston, he stored the same in a suitable and conven1805.

I

I

ient store there for sale; that before the same was sold,
it was stolen from the said store by some thieves, to him unknown, without any fault on his part; that he has never
been able to discover the said thieves, or to recover the said
linens or any part of them; and that the customary commissions charged by commission merchants in Charleston
for the sales of merchandise and making returns, is five
per cent, on proceeds.
On this evidence the plaintiff insisted that the defendant
was not discharged by the said larceny. The defendant insisted that he was discharged, and if he was not, that he
was entitled to another five per cent, besides that mentioned in the memorandum.
told the parties that as the merits of the cause depended on the legal construction of the written memoranwould reserve that construction for the opinion of
dum,
whole,
court ; and as there were no sales,
the
should direct
the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff, and to assess his
damages equal to the value of the linens at Boston when
shipped, deducting therefrom fiv^ per cent, commissions.
They found a verdict agreeable to the directions, and the
defendant, waiving his right to review, moves for a new
trial for the misdirection of the judge.
The cause was continued nisi; and now at this term the
opinion of the court was delivered as follows by
Paesons, C. J. : We have considered the memorandum
given in e^ddence, and are all satisfied that the construction of it is agreeable to the direction of the judge, and
that the verdict cannot be set aside for his misdirection

I

I

I

The Declabation.

Seo. 3]

315

supposed by the defendant.
Indeed the constmction, for
which the defendant contends, cannot be admitted; because
it is repugnant not only to the express words, but to the
manifest intent of the parties.
But in looking into the declaration, it clearly appears to
us that the written memorandum was not legal evidence
to prove the plaintiff's count. The allegation is, that for
five per cent, commission on the sales, the defendant promised to transport the goods to Charleston, S. C, at his own
risk against all dangers, except for the seas. The risk
of transportation, except of the seas, is the only risk the
defendant is there alleged to take on himself, when from
the memorandum he is liable to all risks, except of the seas
until he account for the proceeds. The contracts are materially different; and as a judgment La this action would
not be a bar to another action on the contract stated ia the
memorandum, the verdict must be set aside, and a new trial
granted, when the plaintiff, if he should think proper, may
move to amend on terms.

VAVASOUE

V.

ORMEOD.

Court of King's Bench,
6

1827.

Barnwell & Creswell, 430.

Declaration stated, that by a certain indenture between
the plaintiff and one J. S. (profert of which was made),
plaintiff did demise, lease, and set unto J. S., his executors,
administrators, and assigns, certain tenements, to hold, etc.,
"yielding and paying therefore the yearly rent of 160/., by
two even and equal portions Ln each and every year during
the said term, "that is to say, on, etc.," as by the said
indenture, reference thereunto being had, would more fuUy
and at large appear.
The entry of J. S. was then stated ;
hi6 assignment to the defendants, their entry, and that rent
had accrued for certain periods since. Plea, nil debet. At
the trial before Hullock, B., at the last Lancaster Spring
assizes, the reservation of rent appeared, on the production of the indenture, to be in the following words: "yielding and paying during the said term (except as hereinafter
mentioned) ;" and then the reservation was as stated in the
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In a later part of the lease was a covenant,
declaration.
that the lessor should lay out 600?. in erecting a steam enIn a still later part was a proviso, that in case the
gine.
lessee should, within three years, pay the lessor 300?., in
part discharge of the 600?. so to be laid out by the lessor,
then the rent of 160?. should be reduced to 130?. ; and that if
the remaining 300?. were paid within six years, the rent
should be reduced to 100?. No evidence of payment of any
part of the 600?. was given. It was objected by Scarlett
and Parke, on the part of the defendant, that there was a
variance. It was, they contended, clearly established, that
upon a plea of non est factum to a lease, an exception in a
reservation or covenant, not noticed, creates a variance,
although a distinct proviso, if not insisted upon, need not
be noticed (1 Saund. 234, note (2) c. 5th Edit.) ; and that
although the proviso itself in this case were a distinct one,
the exception referring to it was in the body of the- reservation, which reservation must, therefore, be read as if it had
contained the proviso in the form of an exception ; that this,
therefore, would have been a variance on a plea of non est
factum and that nil debet put in issue the execution of the
indenture stated in the declaration as much as a plea of non
est factum,. On the part of the plaintiffs it was admitted that
the reservation should be read as if it contained the proviso
in the form of an exception, but it was contended that the
distinction between a proviso and an exception did not
depend upon the mere form of expression ; and that this was
a proviso in its nature, for the event might or might not
occur ; and here it actually had not occurred. The supposed
exception was to be a nullity, except on the occurrence of
a particular event; and as that had not occurred, it was a
nullity, and was properly omitted in the recital of the
reservation set out. In instruments in general, no more
need be noticed in the declaration than that upon which the
plaintiff proposes to rely. The learned judge was of opinion that this was an exception; and that as by the terms
of the reservation the whole rent was to be paid only under
particular circumstances, such a limitation should have
been noticed; although a proviso for a distinct purpose,
as for re-entry on nonpayment, would stand on a different
The plaintiff was therefore nonsuited.
ground.
F. Pollock now moved to set aside the nonsuit, and contended, that the clause iu the subsequent part of the lease

The Declaration.

Sec. 3]

317

referred to in the reddendum was a proviso, and not an
exception, and that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to
declare upon any more of the deed than the reservation;
and it was for the defendant to show the proviso which was
in defeasance of the covenants. He cited Elliott v. Blake,
1 Lev. 88, Eotham v. The East India Company, 1 T. E. 658,
645.

Lord Tenterden, C.

J.

If

it

is

is

I

is

is

is

a

it

it

if

it

if

it,

a

it,

an act of parliament or a
private instrument contain in
first, a general clause, and
afterwards
separate and distinct clause, which has the
effect of taking out of the general clause something which
would otherwise be included in
a party reljdng upon the
general clause in pleading may set out that clause only,
without noticing the separate and distinct clause which
But
the exception itself be
operates as an exception.
incorporated in the general clause, then the party relying
must in pleading state
with the exception; and
upon
he state
as containing an absolute unconditional stipuwill be variance.
lation, wifcout noticing the exception,
not in express
This
a middle case. Here the exception
terms introduced into the reservation, but by reference only
to some subsequent matter in the instrument. The words
are "except as hereinafter mentioned." The rule here applies "verba relata inesse videntur." And the clause
thereinafter mentioned must be considered as an excepreserved;
tion in the general clause, by which the rent
and then, according to the rule above laid down, the plaintiff ought in his declaration to have stated the reservation
am of opinion
Not having done so,
and the exception.
there
no ground for
fatal,
and
that
that the variance
setting aside the nonuuit.
:

Rule refused.

9

Court

of

METZNEE

v.

BOLTON.

Exchequer.

1854.

Exchequer, 518.
a

The declaration stated that, in consideration that the
plaintiff would enter the service of the defendant as
commercial* traveller for one year, the defendant agreed to
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it,

employ the plaintiff in the capacity aforesaid, at and for
the yearly salary of 1501., and to continue him in such service for one whole year. Averments, that the plaintiff entered into the service of the defendant in the capacity and
on the terms aforesaid, and continued in such service until
a certain day before the expiration of the year.
Breach,
that although the plaintiff was ready and willing to continue in the service of the defendant, yet the defendant
wrongfully dismissed him therefrom.
Plea: Non assumpsit.
At the trial, before Maktin, B., at the London Sittings
after last Trinity term, the plaintiff was examined, and
proved that he and the defendant met at an hotel in London, when an agreement was come to between them precisely as stated in the declaration ; that he entered into the
employement, and went a journey into the west of England, after which the defendant dismissed him within the
year, upon a ground which turned out to be unfounded.
On cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted that there was
an usage in the trade in which the plaintiff was so employed, that in any yearly hiring of a traveller either party
might put an end to the employment on giving three months
notice.
It was objected on behalf of the defendant, that, under
these circumstances, if such usage was proved to exist so
generally as that it was to be considered as imported into
the contract of hiring, there would be a misdescription of
the contract, and a variance upon non assumpsit.
The
learned judge thought that the contract being for a year
was proved according to the allegation, and that the power
to determine
coming by way of defeasance of the contract, need not be noticed by the plaintiff, but must be
by the defendant.
■pleaded and proved
The plaintiff's
counsel then agreed that
should be taken as a fact that
the engagement was so determinable; and the question of
damages having been left to the jury, they found
verdict
for the plaintiff for 56Z.
A. rule nisi having been obtained to set aside the verdict,
and for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection,

Parke, B.

a

a

:

This case was argued during last term, upon
rule for a new trial of cause tried
showing cause against
before my Brother Martin. My Lord Chief Barobt, my
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Brothers Anderson, Martin, and myself were present. It
was an action of assumpsit.
(His Lordship then stated the
pleadings, facts, and ruling of the learned judge as above
set forth.)
We think that this ruling of the learned judge

cannot be supported.

It

is quite certain, that general usages are tacitly annexed to all contracts relating to the business with reference to which they are made, unless the terms of such contracts expressly or impliedly exclude them. This, therefore, must be considered as a contract for the defendant to
hire, and the plaintiff to serve for a year, determinable on
three months' notice. Whittaker v. Mason, 2 Bing. N. C.
359 ; and the question is, whether in this form of action this
power of determining the contract need be noticed by the
plaintiff in describing it. In an action of covenant on an
instrument under seal, consisting of several clauses, there
is no doubt the plaintiff may declare upon so much of the
deed as contains the covenant on which he proceeds, which
is obligatory because it is under seal ; and it is for the defendants to show the proviso, if any, which defeats it. (See
1 Saunders, 233 a, note).
So, where an interest or estate
and
is
presently,
to be divested by matter subsepasses
quent, it is enough to state the estate which vested; and
the matter defeating it must be pleaded by the party who
would take advantage of it. UgMred's Case, 7 Bep. 9 b.
But this is not either the description of a covenant under
seal, or of a vested estate or interest, but of the substance
and effect of a parol contract between the parties, and a
defeasible contract cannot correctly be described as an absolute one.

It

it

a

it

a

it

a

it

if,

is not true that the defendant undertook to employ
the plaintiff for a year in consideration of the plaintiff's
services for a year, for the true contract was, that the defendant would employ him for a year, determinable at any
'
time by three months notice, in consideration of the plaininstead of stating
tiff serving him for that time. And
had been expanded into
the contract in this short form,
statement of a contract with mutual promises, the whole
would
to be done on each side must have been stated, and
variance to allege that the contract on
have been clearly
was
the plaintiff's side was to serve for a year; because
only to serve for year unless he or the defendant chose to
by three months' notice; and so the corresdetermine
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ponding promise to employ by the defendant. The shorter
statement in the declaration in this case cannot exonerate
the plaintiff from stating the substance of the contract correctly. Had this defeasance been stated by way of plea
to this declaration, it would have been demurrable specially,
before special demurrers were abolished, on the ground
that it amounted to the general issue, because it was a
qualification of the contract itself, and therefore an argumentative denial of the contract alleged. The abolition of
special demurrers cannot make a difference in the meaning
of the words of the allegation, and a contract with a defeasance is not the same as a contract without one, consequently the variance is fatal. We think, therefore, that
the ruling cannot be supported.
My Brother Mabxin is not quite satisfied with this view
of the case, and would, we believe, decide it otherwise if
the decision depended on himself.
Rule absolute.

TEEL
Supreme

V.

YELLIS.

Court of New York.
4

Johnson,

1809,

304.

This was an action of debt, on the 8th section of the
act (24th sess. c. 87), to prevent and punish champerty and
maintenance, in which there is the following proviso : ' ' That
it shall be lawful for any person, being in lawful possession, by taking the yearly rents or profits of any lands,
tenements, or hereditaments, to buy or obtain, by any reasonable ways or means, the pretended right or title of any
other person thereto."
The declaration in this case did
not negative the proviso ; and a verdict having been found
for the plaintiff, a motion was made in arrest of judgment.
Van Ness, J. * * * The rule is this :
the proviso
furnishes matter of excuse for the defendant, it need not
be negatived in the declaration, but he must plead it. Such
is the proviso in the present case. It forms no part of the
plaintiff's title, and affords merely an excuse to the defendant, if he had come within its purview. It would be
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unnecessary to proceed further, were it not that these
cases are apparently irreconcilable, and it is desirable that
the law should be finally and correctly settled. Serjeant
Williams, in his note to 1 Saund. 262 says, "But when the
exemption is contained under the proviso to a subsequent
section or act of parliament, it is matter of defense, and,
therefore, it is not necessary to state iu the declaration, that
the defendant is not within such proviso." The only inaccuracy in this remark consists in restricting the rule to
provisos contained in a subsequent section or statute, which
was not warranted by the cases.. In Jones v. Axen, 1 Lord
Eaym. 119, Teeby, Ch. J,, with the concurrence of the rest
of the court, says, "that where an exception is incorporated
in the body of the clause, he who pleads the clause ought to
plead the exception; but when there is a clause for the
benefit of the pleader, and afterwards foUows a proviso
which is against him, he shall plead the clause, and leave
it to the adversary to show the proviso." The same distinction is adopted in the case of the King v. Bryan, 2 Str.
1101, that when the offense is brought within the enacting
clause, and the justification comes in by way of proviso or
exception, in the first case, it is a matter of defense to be
shown by the defendant; in the other case, the exception
In Spires v. Parker (1 Term, 141),
must be negatived.
that
the rule is, that anyone who will
all the judges agree,
bring an action for a penalty on an act of parliament, must
show himself entitled under the enacting clause; and if
there be a subsequent exemption, that is a matter of defense,
and the other party must show it to protect himself against
the penalty.
The court are of opinion, therefore, that the motion must
be denied.
Motion denied.

FIKE

V.

STEATTON.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
174

1911,

Alabama, 541.

[Plaintiff sued for $1,015 on account for work and labor
and for materials furnished in remodeling and improving
defendant's
c.

u

p.

21

residence.

Defendant,

in

his

third

plea,
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pleaded by way of recoupment that the work, labor and
materials were furnished under a written contract between
defendant and plaintiff which provided that the work was
to be completed and the building turned over to defendant on or before December 20, 1906, in default of which
defendant was authorized to retain out of the compensation provided for, the sum of $10 per day for every day's
delay, "delays beyond the contractor's control excepted;"
that the plaintiff did not complete and turn over the building to defendant until the latter part of July, 1907, to the
damage of the defendant of $1,000. A demurrer was filed
to this plea, on the ground, as plaintiff seems to have contended, that by failing to allege that the delay was not beyond the contractor's control, defendant failed to show
any right to damages for such delay.] ®*
Anderson, J.: When the breach of a contract is relied
upon as the gist of the action or defense, it is necessary
that the declaration or plea allege a breach; otherwise it
will be demurrable. 4 Ency. PI. & Pr. 937.
If the defendant's promise or engagement contains as a
part of it an exception which qualifies his liability, or in
certain instances renders him altogether free from liability,
the exception must be stated, though this may not be necessary when the proviso does not go to relieve from liability
under the contract entirely.
9 Cyc. 752, and cases cited
in notes 39 and 40.

Nor is it necessary for

the

plaintiff to negative a pro-

viso which would defeat his action once vested.
The borto
der line as
what conditions or provisions should be
negatived in the declaration or set up as a defense is quite
narrow, and the question is one which has given the courts
considerable difficulty in the few cases in which it has been
considered. The two leading American cases on the subject are Wilmington S Raleigh R. R. v. Robeson, 27 N. C.
391, and Freeman v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 144 Mass.
These cases seek to draw a distinction
572, 12 N. E. 372.
an
between
exception and a proviso, defining them as follows: "A 'proviso' is properly the statement of something extrinsic of the subject-matter of the contract, which
shall go in discharge of the contract, and, if it is a covenant, by way of defeasance. An 'exception' is taking some
91.

Condensed statement of facts

bj

the editor.
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part of the subject-matter of the contract out of it." A
proviso need not be stated in the declaration, for this, says
Mr. Chitty, ought to come from the other side. 1 Saunders, 334, N. 2 ; Sir Richard Eotham et al. v. East India

Term Eep., 645. In the latter case. Ashuest,
speaking of the circumstance which was omitted
in the declaration, observes:
'This, therefore, being a
circumstance, the omission of which was to defeat the plaintiff's right of action, once vested, whether called by name
a "proviso," "by way of defeasance," or a "condition
subsequent," it must in its nature be matter of defense, and
ought to be shown by the defendants.' " Wilmington Case,
supra. Our own court has often recognized a distinction
between exceptions and provisos and the necessity to negative them in indictments.
1 Mayfield, p. 447, subd. 33.
We think the true test, however, whether it be called an
"exception" or "proviso," is whether or not it is a condition precedent to liability, or whether or not it is a condition subsequent going to defeat the plaintiff's action once
vested, or if the existence or nonexistence of the condition
is essential to a breach of the contract, or merely affords
a defense for a failure to comply with same or for a breach
of same. If it is a condition precedent to a breach, but
merely justifies or excuses a breach in certain instances
or for certain causes, it is defensive matter, which need
not be negatived or set out in the declaration.
Tyson v.
Weil, 169 Ala. 558, 53 South. 912.
We think the third clause of the contract in question
was intended to indemnify the owner of the house by way
of liquidated damages against a delay in completing the
building, but exempts or relieves the contractor from liability in case the delay was beyond his control. In other
words, the proviso was intended as a defense in a certain
instance to a right of action vested upon a breach by delay,
"Every case depends
and is not a condition precedent
upon the nature of the stipulation or condition, as well as
upon the form of it."
We think the condition in question was intended to afford defensive matter to the delay by showing that it was
not within the control of the contractor — a negative averment peculiarly within his knowledge and upon whom rested
the burden of proof, and is not one upon which the plainVincent v. Rogers. 30
tiff's right of action is grounded.
Cornpany,

J., in

1
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Ala. 472 ; Gains v. State, 149 Ala. 29, 43 South. 137 ; Farrail V. State, 32 Ala. 557; 1 Greenleaf on Ev., § 74; Da/vis
V. Arnold, 143 Ala. 228, 39 South. 141; Rogers v. Brooks,
105 Ala. 549, 17 South. 97.
As above stated, the border
line between provisos and exceptions is narrow, and there
may be authorities and textbooks which would require that
this exception be set out in the declaration, but to so hold
would be illogical. If the exception had to be negatived by
the declaration, the contractor would only have to take is-

show any reasonable cause for the delay
peculiarly within his knowledge and without giving the
owner the slightest intimation by the pleading what special excuse would be brought forth. As it is, the crosscomplaint (which is recoupment plea 3) states a priiTta
facie case, and which would be made out by proof of the
delay. Then if the contractor does not deny the delay, but
confesses it and seeks to avoid
under the right given
he
and set up the facts
him by the contract,
should plead
relied upon to show that the said delay was not within his
control, and which would put the owner on notice of the
character of defense he had to meet. * ♦ • The defendant's third plea was recoupment, and was in the nature
of
cross-action, but was not defective for failing to negative that the delay complained of was beyond the control
of the plaintiff, and the trial court did not err in overruling
the demurrer to the same.

The judgment of the law and equity court

is

a

it,

it,

sue, and thus

affirmed.

Affirmed.

V.

GRAY.

King's Bench.
6

Court

of

CLARKE

1805.

East, 564.

Lord Ellenborough, C. J., on this day delivered the

judgment of the court. This was an action of assumpsit,
brought against the defendants as proprietors of the True
Briton stage coach from London to Market-Harborough, to
recover the value Of goods belonging to the plaintiff, and
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sent with the plaintiff's wife as a passenger in that coach
and lost in the course of their conveyance. The declaration was in the usual form against carriers for losses by
negligence.
The loss was admitted.
On the part of the
defendants it was given in evidence, that they had for
twelve or fourteen years past given notice by a bpard in
their coach oiBee, hanging up over the place where the
bookkeeper sat, and where places for the coach were taken,
parcels received, etc., as follows:
"Take notice, that no
more than 51. wiU be accounted for, for any goods or parcels delivered at this office, unless entered as such, and
paid for accordingly."
The goods lost were admitted to
be above the value of 51. ; and a verdict was taken for the
plaintiff, subject to the question, whether the special contract created by the terms of this notice, and by which the
responsibility of the carriers was limited, so as not to exceed the sum of 51. unless where goods were entered and
paid for as of an higher value, should have been stated in
*
»
•
the declaration.
The present case having been
argued some time ago, when my Brother Gkose was absent, and the rest of the court upon that argument, and a
subsequent consideration of the subject, entertaining considerable doubts, directed it to be argued again this term
when the court was full ; and it has accordingly been again
argued. On the part of the plaintiff, it is insisted that the
provision, "that no more than 51. should be accounted for,
unless the goods were entered and paid for accordingly,"
amounts only to a limitation of the damages to be recoverd
in the event of a breach of the contract of carriage, and
not to a qualification of the contract itself. On the part of
the defendants it is insisted, that the provision in question is a limitation of the promise itself, and varies that
responsibility for the entire value of the goods which the
custom of the realm, or the general undertaking to carry
safely, stated in the declaration, would otherwise cast upon
the carriers. That it is not to be considered as a distinct
independent proviso, but as a term and qualification annexed to and making a part of the original contract of
carriage itself. But if the obligation to carry safely do
not depend on the question of compensation to be paid in
case of loss, but be wholly collateral thereto; and if the
contract for safe carriage he equally broken by the loss of
the goods, whether the sum stipulated to be paid on that
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account be mucli or little, it cannot be said that such stipulation necessarily makes a part of the contract for safe
Indeed its operation and effect may be considcarriage.
ered as only attaching and beginning after the question of
safe carriage is at an end, by the breach of the contract
made for that purpose.
Its proper oflBce is to limit the
province of the jury in the assessment of damages for a
contract broken, and of course has no concern with it as
long as it is executory and in th^ course of its performance. It resembles in some degree the case of a covenant
in a lease not to plough ancient meadow or the like, followed
by a proviso that in case the same should be ploughed by
the tenant thereof he should pay a certain increased rent
for the same. In such case it would certainly be in the
option of the lessor to declare as for a breach of covenant
not to plough, or the lessor may declare at once for a
breach of covenant in not paying the stipulated satisfaction for such ploughing.
Both the covenant and the proviso in that case form distinct substantive parts of the same
lease, as the contract of carnage, and the limitation of the
amount of damages to be paid, in case no entry of and payment for the goods have been made, do in this. It is no
more necessary to state every part of an agreement not
under seal, each part making a distinct contract, than it is
of an agreement under seal ; it is sufficient in either case to
state so much of each as constitutes that contract, the breach
of which is complained of, prescribes the duty to be performed, and the time, manner, and other circumstances of
its performance, with tlus difference only, that in the case
of an agreement not under seal, the consideration must be
stated, and no part of the entire consideration for any
promise contained in the agreement can be omitted. In the
present case the entire consideration for the promise to
carry safely, viz., the delivery of the goods to be carried for
a reasonable reward to be therefore paid to the carriers,
is stated. This is not like the cases in Godbolt, 154 and
Aleyn, 5, to which we have been referred by the defendants' counsel. Those were cases where the defendemt, in
consideration of marriage, promised to do several things,
for the nonperformance of one of which the plaintiff brought
his action, and declared as for a promise to do one thing
In each case
only, without mentioning the other things.
of
the defendant In
the court was of opinion in favour
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the case in Aleyn judgment was for the defendant, after
a verdict for the plaintiff, "because the plaintiff ought to
have set forth the whole promise which is entire;" and in
the case in Godbolt the question seems to have arisen on the
plea of non assumpsit, which the court considered as a
good bar: "for (as is there said) the contract being entire,
if it be not a good plea, the defendant might be charged
for the several things," etc., i. e., in several actions. In
that case the marriage, and the several things agreed to be
performed on account thereof, were respectively considera^
tions for each other : the several things formed but one entire consideration in the whole for the marriage : and if all
of them were not stated, the consideration on the one side
would have been untruly, and therefore defectively stated.
But here the limitation of the carriers' responsibility is
no part of the consideration for their promise to carry
safely; the reward agreed to be paid, them being the sole
consideration for such promise on their part.
the entry
of the goods and the payment of a price for the carriage
proportioned to their value were a part of the consideration for carriage, the nonentry and nonpayment might be
pleaded in bar of the action to recover any damages for
the loss of the goods ; but if this proviso in favour of the
carriers, instead of being given in evidence by them on the
general issue, had been specially pleaded, it could not have
been pleaded as a bar to the action generally, but only as
against the plaintiff's recovering more than the sum of bl.
on account of the goods being not specially entered and
paid for according to their actual value. There are a great
variety of agreements not under seal, containing detailed
provisions regulating prices of labour, rates of hire, times,
and manner of performance, adjustment of differences, etc.,
which are every day declared upon in the general form of
a count for work and labour; and yet, upon the principle
contended for, every provision contained in such agreements regulating the duties and limiting the responsibility
of the parties in particular events, ought to be stated. To
what extent this would go, in declaring upon contracts of
affreightment in the nature of charter parties, but not being
under seal, builders ' contracts, and the like, will readUy occur to all persons conversant in the drawing of pleadings
at common law. It seems to us, therefore, that it is sufficient to state in the declaration so much of anv contract.

If
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consisting of several distinct parts, and collateral provisions, as contains the entire consideration for the act, and
the entire act which is to be done in virtue of such consideration ; and that the rest of the contract which only respects the liquidation of damages, after a right to them
has accrued by a breach of the contract, is matter proper
to be given in evidence to the jury in reduction of damages, but not necessary to be shewn to the court in the
first instance on the face of the record. If indeed the provision be of such a nature as goes in discharge of the liability of the party under the contract altogether, in case
a particular condition is not complied with, as in Clay v.
WUlan, 1 H. Black. 298, where the goods were not accounted for at all, unless properly entered and paid for,
that will not merely operate in reduction of the damages,
but in bar of the action ; and which case, therefore, appears
•
•
*
to have been rightly decided on this ground.
"W'e
are of opinion, therefore, that in the present case, the plaintiff is entitled to retain his verdict for 5Z., the limited amount
of damages recoverable under this contract. The like judgment in Marsden v. Gray and others imder similar circumstances.

(2)

The ConsideratioiL

KEAN
Supreme

V.

MITCHELL.

Court of Michigam.
13

1865.

Michigan, 207.

CooLEY, J.: Mitchell brought suit against Kean in assumpsit, and declared specially that defendant, on a day
and at a place named, "for a good and valuable consideration, then and there paid by said plaintiff to said defendant," bargained and sold to plaintiff certain goods and
chattels, and then and there, "for the consideration aforesaid, ' ' promised and agreed to deliver said goods and chattels to said plaintiff, when thereunto afterwards requested.
Breach, a neglect and refusal to deliver.
The declaration
also contained the common counts. The defendant pleaded
the general issue.
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On the trial, the defendant objected to the introduotion
of any evidence tinder the special counts, for the reason
that no consideration was set forth therein for the defendant's promise; but the court overruled the objection, and
admitted the evidence offered, and plaintiff had a verdict.
The sole question before us is whether the court was correct in this ruling.
In declaring upon simple contracts, except in those cases
where the contracts themselves import a consideration, the
rules of pleading require the consideration to be set forth.
When that which is stated is clearly insufficient or illegal,
the defendant may either demur, or move in arrest of judgment, or support a writ of error. But when the mode in
which the consideration is stated is defective, informal or
uncertain, the declaration will be bad upon special demurrer; biit after verdict, a defective statement of the consideration will be aided, provided, by a reasonable construction of the whole declaration, it sufficiently appears that
there was a consideration capable of supporting the promise. 1 Chit. PI. 300.
The consideration is required to be set forth "that the
court may see that it is of that kind and nature to sustain the promise." Lansing v. McKillip, 3 Caines, 287. It
"should be distinctly set out, that the court may judge of
it." WhitM V. Morse, 5 S. & E., 361. And the declaration should "state the whole consideration expressly and
formally, correspondent with the facts in the case, and
Hendrick v. Seeley, 6
coextensive with the contract."
Conn. 179 ; Treadway v. Nicks, 3 McCord, 122.
It is obvious that, if the plaintiff may allege, in general
terms, that there was a consideration, without specifying
in what it consists, it will be impossible for the court to
say, from the declaration, whether that which the plaintiff
considers a valid consideration is, in fact, one which will
And it has been held that to alsupport an assumpsit.
lege that the defendant, being indebted to the plaintiff in
a sum specified, in consideration thereof, promised to pay,
etc., was not sufficient to support a judgnaent by default,
because the cause or consideration upon which the debt was
founded was not set forth. Beauchamp v. Bosworth, 3
Bibb, 115. See, also, Maury v. Olive, 2 Stew. 472, where a
similar declaration was held bad on general demurrer. In
Parker v. Cra/ne, 6 Wend. 648, a declaration for that the
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defendant, in consideration that the plaintiff had, before
that time, sold and conveyed to the defendant a certain
farm, undertook and promised, etc., was held bad on demurrer to a plea, because the consideration bein^ past, it
was not alleged to have been done at the request of the
party promising. And in Goldsby v. Robertson, 1 Blackf.
247, a special verdict, which set forth the consideration in
the same form, was held insufficient to authorize a judgment.
In the present case, the declaration simply avers that the
promise was made for a good and valuable consideration.
It does not undertake to state in what that consideration
consists, and is, therefore, more clearly defective than those
in the cases cited.
it is sufficient for the party to state
generally that the defendant promised, for a valuable consee no reason why he should not be allowed
sideration,
to state, in terms but a little more general, and without
mentioning a consideration, that the defendant made a valid
contract, since a valid contract necessarily includes a sufficient consideration; and this form of declaration would
give the court quite as much information on the subject as
the other. Whether there was a consideration sufficient to
support the promise, is a conclusion of law to be drawn from
the facts ; but the pleader has omitted the facts entirely, and
averred only the conclusion of law.

If

I

But, although the allegation of consideration in this declaration would be insufficient on demurrer, or to sustain a
judgment by default, I am of the opinion that it may be
held sufficient after verdict. * * *
The judgment of the court below should be affirmed, with
costs.

FINDLEY

V.

COOLEY.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
1

Blackford,
•

*

*

J.

:

*

*

1823.

Blackford, 262.
*

The declaration is said to be defective for not
averring the consideration of the notes. The general rule
to be sure is that in simple contracts the consideration must
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be set out; but in bills of exchange by the law merchant,
and promissory notes by statute, are exceptions to the rule.
The moment our act of assembly made a promissory note
the foundation of an action, the only description of the contract necessary was that of the note itself. The note then
became the contract, and instead of being only evidence of
a debt as formerly, was constituted by force of the statute
a debt per se. So that the consideration of a note within
the statute need not be averred, any more than that of a
bond or bill of exchange. • • •

EOBERTSON

v.

LYNCH.

Supreme Court of New York.
18 Johnson, 451.

1821,

•

is

is

it,

Peb Cttbiam. On comparing the special counts with the
contract, as proved, we think that the objection as to variance was weU founded. The only proof of the terms of
the contract is to be found in the letters of the defendant of
the 15th of November, and 7th of December, 1817, in which
he offers to manufacture the plaintiff's wool into sattinets,
for 63 cents per yard, and to deliver the sattinets to the
plaintiff in New York, early the next spring; and it appears that in consequence oT those letters, the plaintiff
sent the wool to the defendant in December, 1817 ; thereby
signifying, that he acceded to the defendant's offer. The
question then is, whether the proposed agreement stated
in those letters, corresponds with either of the counts. The
special counts both charge, that in consideration that the
plaintiff had delivered wool to the defendant, the defendant
promised to manufacture it. The contract proved is, that
if the plaintiff would thereafter deliver wool at New York,
the defendant would manufacture
etc.
* * * The counts
charge an agreement to manufacture
wool which had been delivered before any contract was
to manufacture wool
made; and the agreement proved
•
•
•
whidi the plaintiff should thereafter furnish.
a variance, which ought to defeat a recovery on
There
•
•
the special counts .•*

3

(1854)

Gray (Mass.)

71.

&

3

,

3

"The difference of a shiUing only between the alleged and the aetnal
92.
defeated the plaintiff in the case of Durston v. Tuthan, cited
consideration
M.
S. 175." — Cleaves v. Lord
in
T. E. 67, and recognized as law in
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STONE
Supreme Judicial

V.

WHITE.

Court of Massachusetts.
8

[Chap, 4

1857.

Gray, 589.

BiGELOw, J. : It is very clear that the plaintiff could not
recover against the defendant Snow, upon the counts in this
writ, charging him as an original party to the note set out
in the declaration.
Upon the evidence, it appeared that
he was not a party to the note when it was made, and did
not partake in the consideration for which it was given.
He affixed his name to it several months after its date, and
while it was in the hands of the payee. His contract was
collateral to that of the signers of the note, and was in its
nature a guaranty of their promise. It was essential therefore, in order to charge the defendant upon this contract,
to prove a new and independent consideration in addition
to that on which the note was founded. Not being a surety
acting upon the same consideration with the original promisors, he could be held liable only by proof of some damage or loss to the plaintiff, or some benefit or advantage
to the defendant, as constituting a legal consideration for
his contract. Tenney v. Prince, 4 Pick. 385; Mecorney v.
Stanley, 8 Cush. 85.
It was not sufficient, therefore, to declare against the defendant as upon a promissory note, where, according to
the rules" of pleading, the mere statement of the liability
which constitutes the consideration is sufficient ; but it was
necessary, as in all cases of simple contracts, that the declaration should disclose a consideration, either of benefit
to the defendant, or of detriment to the plaintiff ; as otherwise it would appear on the face of the declaration to be
nudum pactum. 6th Amer. Ed. 321.
1 Saund. 211, note
2 ;

Jones v. Ashhurnham, 4 East, 455.

It

is a familiar rule of pleading in assumpsit, that the
consideration, which forms the basis of the contract, must
be set forth with great accuracy, as otherwise the whole
contract will be misdescribed. This rule, as already stated,
does not apply to promissory notes or bills of exchange,
which of themselves imply a consideration; but it includes
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a
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.

it

a

4

3;

;

1

is

is

is

is

is

is

it

a

is

it

it,

all other simple contracts and promises, where the plaintiff,
in order to sustain his action, is bound to prove a consideration. It is not sufficient to prove part of an entire consideration; nor is it a compliance "with the rule to omit
proof of a portion of a consideration consisting of several
things. The evidence must show neither more nor less of
the consideration than is alleged. It must be proved to the
extent alleged, otherwise the variance wiU be fatal. If the
proof exceeds the statement of the consideration, or falls
short of
equally misdescription, and does not support the declaration. Thus
has been held, that if two
good considerations are alleged, and one of them
not
proved, or
found false by the jury, the plaintiff must
fail. The only exception to this rule, as applied to contracts which do not of themselves import a consideration,
where several considerations are averred, in part good,
and in part frivolous and insufficient. In such case, the insufficient portion
treated as surplusage, and the declarasupported by proof of that part of the consideration
tion
averred in the declaration, which
good and sufficient to
Chit. PL
support the promise. Lawes on Assumpsit, 56.
321-327 Couhton v. Carr, Cro. Eliz. 848 Rawson v. Brown,
Caines, 286.
Lansing v. M'Killip,
Leon.
The application of this rule to the case at bar fully sustains the ground taken by the defendant at the trial. The
second and fourth amended counts both aver two good and
distinct considerations, either of which were sufficient to
alleged that the considerasupport promise. In each
tion of the defendant's promise was forbearance by the
plaintiff to sue the original parties to the note in compliance with an agreement to that effect, and also that the
plaintiff deposited in the hands of the defendant funds and
securities to indemnify him for his promise. The evidence
tended to prove the former of these allegations; but there
was no proof in support of the latter. Under these circumwas the duty of the judge to instruct the jury,
stances
. according to the request of the defendant, that the plaintiff
was bound to prove the whole considerations as alleged;
good ground of exception. Being
and his refusal to do so
not,
a_defect in the proof, and not in the declaration,
verdict.
the
cured
by
or
as urged by the plaintiff, aided
But although the objection was well taken by the defendstrictly technical character, and in no way
of
ant,
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affects the merits of the case ; nor was the defendant at all
prejudiced or injured by it in the trial of the case. A good
consideration for the defendant's promise was averred, and
the verdict of the jury has found that it was proved to their
An amendment striking out this part of the
satisfaction.
consideration, of which there was no .proof, will cure the
• •
•
defect, and entitle the plaintiff to hold his verdict.

BADGER

V.

BURLEIGH.

Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire.
13

1843.

New Hampshire, 507.

Assumpsit. The declaration set forth that on the second
of February, 1841, in consideration that the plaintiff would
buy of the defendant, at his request, a certain horse, at
and for the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars, the

defendant then and there promised the plaintiff that the
horse was sound, kind and manageable, and that if he did
not, upon trial made by the plaintiff, prove to be kind and
manageable, and did not suit the plaintiff, the defendant
would take him back and return the money ; that the plaintiff, confiding in the promises of the defendant, thereafterwards, on the same day, did buy the horse for the price
aforesaid. Yet the defendant did not regard his promises,
but craftily and subtly deceived the plaintiff in this, that
the horse was not kind and manageable at the time of making said promises and sale, but was unkind, and unmanageable, and in consequence thereof did not upon trial suit the
plaintiff; whereupon the plaintiff, on the 19th day of February, 1841, offered and tendered the horse to the defendant, and requested him to pay back said sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars, which the defendant refused
to do.

To prove the contract,
tiff testified that on the

a witness introduced by the plain2d day of February, 1841, as the
plaintiff,
the
and
by his direction, he went to the
of
agent
house of the defendant to purchase the horse, and told the
defendant that he had come to get the horse for the plaintiff; that the defendant, in answer to a question, said he
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would warrant the horse perfectly kind, sound, and manageable, and take him back Lf the horse did not suit the
plaintiff, and refund the money. The witness then told the
defendant he would take him on those conditions, and paid
the money.

The witness further testified that he told the defendant
horse was hurt whUe in the plaintiff's possession, the
witness would make it good; by which he meant to be understood that the plaintiff would be bound to make it good
to the defendant, and that if the plaintiff did not, the witness would pay for the injury. He said to the defendant
that if the horse was injured, he would not expect hiri to
take him back.
The defendant objected; that the contract proved did not
sustain the declaration, and moved the court to nonsuit the
plaintiff, on the ground of a variance.
The court overruled the objection, and instructed the
jury that, if believed by them, the evidence was sufficient
to sustain the declaration.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the
defendant moved for a new trial.
Paekee, C. . : The rules of pleading, in actions upon
contracts not under seal, require that the declaration should
set forth the consideration, as well as the promise founded
upon it. And if there be more than one consideration, the
whole must be alleged and proved as laid. 3 Caines' Et
But it is sufficient to state so
286, Lansing v. McKillip.
much of the contract, when it consists of several distinct
parts, as contains the entire consideration for the defendant's promise, and that part of the promise of which the
plaintiff alleges a breach. 4 Taunt. 285, Cotterill v. Cuff;
6 East, 567, Clarke v. Gray; 8 East, 7, Miles v. Sheward.
Where there are several distinct considerations for several distinct promises, not having any necessary dependence upon each other, they may be treated as several contracts, although made at the same time. But where there
is an entire consideration for several promises, constituting one contract, or several considerations applicable equally
to the several parts of the defendant's contract, the whole
of the consideration must be stated, otherwise that part of
the contract which is alleged to be broken would not, in
fact, be truly set forth. Let us enquire, then, what was the
contract on the part of the defendant, for the breach of

if the

J
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which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages, and what was
the consideration upon which the defendant entered into
that contract.
The contract, which the plaintiff alleges was hroken by
the defendant, was an engagement on the part of the defendant that the horse was sound, kind, and manageable,
and that if on trial he did not prove to be kind and manageable, and did not suit the plaintiff, he would take him
back, and return the money. The plaintiff alleges that the
horse was not kind and manageable, and in consequence
thereof did not suit him; and thereupon he offered to return him, but the defendant refused to receive him. This
was proved by the witcontract, in the express terms of
jury;
and
the
satisfaction
the
to
of
and of the breach
ness,
of
existed, there does not appear to have been any
question. So far as the case discloses, this was the entire
no
stipulation on the part of the defendant, and there
objection that the declaration does not contain sufficient
averments in this respect.
The consideration of the contract, as set forth in the
declaration, was the purchase of the horse by the plaintiff
for the sum of $125, and this
also established by the evidence.

But, at the time the contract was made, the agent who
for the plaintiff said that
the horse
was injured while the plaintiff had the possession of him,
he would make
good and again, that if injured he would
not expect the defendant to take him back. Was
necessary to state this, and to negative any injury in the declaration? It
apparent that this forms no part of the defendIf the defendant's contract had been, in
ant's promise.

if

is

it

;

it

made the purchase

;

it

it

if

terms, that he would take back the horse,
he proved not
to be sound or kind, provided he was returned uninjured,
or on condition that the damage for any injury that he had
sustained should be paid,
might have been necessary to
state that, in stating the defendant's contract, because he
would thereby have made
part and parcel of his promise. But according to the evidence, he did not promise
that he would take him back in case he was not injured.
That may have been, in point of law, a limitation of his
liability, had nothing been said upon the subject; so that
he could use any injury that might have happened by way
of defence but he placed no such limitation in terms upon
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his promise. And it seems to us equally clear, that what
was said by the plaintiff's agent upon that occasion, even
if it were construed to be an engagement of the plaintiff
himself, should not be regarded as part of the consideration for the defendant's promise. It was not part of the
equivalent for whicb the defendant parted with the horse,
and made the promise declared on, but was collateral to it.
The consideration for the sale, warranty, and agreement to
take back, was, as the declaration alleges, the purchase by
the plaintiff, and the payment of the money. What was said
about paying damages, in case of injury to the horse, and
about the defendant's not taking him back, if injured (even
if it be regarded as an agreement of the plaintiff not to
require the defendant to take the horse back, in pursuance
of his promise, in case he should be injured), related to
something which might occur subsequent to the sale, and
may well be regarded as a collateral engagement on the
part of the plaintiff, of which the defendant might avail
himself in defence, or by way of action. It may be true
that the defendant would not have sold the horse, and
made the contract he did, without such a stipulation; but
that does not prove that the stipulation was part of the
it did, every collateral engagement on
consideration.
the part of the purchaser must be so in every case; for it
may be said that without them the vender would not have
made the sale. And it may be true, that if the justice of the
this stipulation might be held to operate
case required
as a linutation, or qualification upon the defendant's agreement. But the enquiry here is, what did the vender receive, either by way of money, promises, or otherwise, as
the equivalent for the sale of the horse, and the contract
which he made and what shape did his promise take, thereupon? The equivalent received by the defendant for his
promise is one thing. The plaintiff may have made engagements respecting the subject-matter of the sale, which
;

it,

If

are quite another matter.

CLP.

Judgment on the verdict.
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(3) Performance of Conditions.

HALSEY

V.

CARPENTER

Court of King's Bench.

1615.

Croke's James, 359.
Debt upon an obligation, conditioned for the payment of
thirty pounds to H. S., J. S. and A. S. tarn cito as they
The defendant
should come to age of twenty-one years.

pleads, that he payed those sums tam cito as they came of
age; and it was thereupon demurred, because it is not
shewn when he came of age, and the certain time of the
payment.
And for this cause all the court held the plea to be Ul,
for although it be a good plea regularly, to the condition
of a bond to pursue the words of the condition, and to shew
the performance, yet Coke said, there was another rule,
that he ought to plead in certainty the time and place, and
manner of the performance of the condition, so as a certain
issue may be taken, otherwise it is not good; wherefore,
because he did not plead here in certainty, it was adjudged
for the plaintiff. And between the same parties in another
action of debt upon an obligation, the condition being for
the performance of legacies in such a will, he pleading performance generally, and not shewing the will, nor what the
legacies were, it was adjudged for the plaintiff.

EIDGWAY

V.

FOESYTH.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
7

1823,

New Jersey Law, 98.

KiEKPATEicK, C. J.: The instrument upon which this
action is founded, is the assignment of a bond given by one
Barzillai "Wright to Joshua Forsyth, the defendant. The
bond is dated January 1, 1817, and is conditioned for the
payment of $3,210, with interest, on the first day of April,
1818. The assignment is dated AprH 11, 1817, and, among
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otiter things, contain the following words, viz.: "That
will guarantee the payment of the money due and to become
due on the said bond, it being understood that the said
Jacob Ridgway, his executors, administrators, and assigns
shall, as soon as the money on the said bond shall become
due, take necessary legal steps to enforce the payment
thereof by the said Barzillai Wright, and that
am only
to be called upon in the event of his inability to pay. ' '
The plaintiff, in his declaration, avers performance of
this condition, in these words : "And the said Jacob Eidgway, in fact, saith, that as soon as the money in the said
bond or writing obligatory became due, agreeably to the
condition thereof, he, the said Jacob Ridgway, did take the
necessary legal steps to enforce the payment thereof by the
said Barssillai Wright, to wit, at Mount Holly, in the county
aforesaid, and so that he hath well and truly performed,"

I

etc,»3

It

is a rule in pleading, that the plaintiff, in his declaration, must aver everything that is necessary to maintain
his action. In all cases, therefore, where the right of action
depends upon a condition precedent, he must aver the performance of that condition, by whomsoever it is to be performed. Ughtred's case, 7 Co. 10a. The averment in the
plaintiff's declaration is in the nature of a plea of performance, and must have all the qualities of such a plea. If
the condition precedent be in the affirmative, as that the
plaintiff shall do a certain act or thing which is a mere
simple matter in pais, of which the jury are to judge, he
may plead performance generally, in the words of the condition; but if the act or thing to be done be such as necessarily iavolves in it a question of law, as to what shall or
shaU not be considered as a performance, of which the court
is to judge, then an averment of performance generally,
in the words of the condition, is not enough; but the party
must go farther, and allege, specially, what has been done,
that the court may judge whether it amounts to a performance or not. And of this our books afford many examples ; as if a condition be to levy a fine, to suffer a nonsidt,
The defendant filed three pleas in which the performance of the condi93.
tion was denied, to which pleas special demvirrers were filed, but the court
held that the pleas were really auned at the sufieiency of the deelaratJon,
And carried the demnrren back to the declaratioB.
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to rndke a bond, or release, or discharge, oi acquitta/nce,
or to perforin a vnll, etc. In these, and cases like these, the
party must aver specially, and shew to the court, in particular, what was done, so that they may judge whether
the condition has been performed or not.
The words of the condition precedent in this case are of
this nature. What are and what are not legal steps to enforce payment, is a question of law, which must be determined by the court, and can, by no form of pleading, be put
It is manifest, therefore, that the steps
upon the jury.
which have been taken to enforce the payment must be laid
before the court in pleading, otherwise they have no grounds
upon which they can possibly form a judgment.
am of opinion, therefore, that the declaration, in this
respect, is bad, and that there must be judgment for the
defendant.

I

Judgment for defendant.'*
M.

Concnning opinion of Tons,

BYRNE
Supreme

J.,

V.

omitted

McNULTY.

Court of Illinois.
7

Illinois,

1845.

424.

Tebat, J.: In March, 1841, John McNulty and Philip
Byrne, being the proprietors of adjoining lots in the city
of Galena, executed an agreement under seal, by which McNulty agreed to build a division wall between the lots, of
certain specified materials and dimensions, to be completed
during that spring or the following summer ; and Byrne, on
his part, agreed to pay McNulty in March, 1843, one-half
of the expense of building the wall. In May, 1843, McNulty instituted an action of covenant against Byrne, on
the aforementioned agreement, p,verring in his declaration
that he had well and truly performed the covenants on
his part, and had built and completed the wall according to
the directions of the agreement, and assigning as a breach
the nonpayment by Byrne of one-half of the cost of erecting the wall. There was a demurrer to the declaration,
A jury thereupon assessed the
which the court overruled.
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plaintiff's damages at the sum of

$307.93, and the court
rendered judgment on the assessment. Byrne prosecutes
an appeal, and assigns for error the decision of the circuit
court overruling the demurrer to the declaration.
There can be no doubt that the building of the wall was
a condition precedent to the payment of the money, and
that McNulty could not maintain an action on the covenant without showing the performance of the condition.
The question then arises, whether the general averment of
performance is sufficient, or whether the mode and manner of the performance should be specifically alleged. The
general rule on the subject of averment by the plaintiff, in
the action of covenant, may be briefly stated and illustrated.
Where the covenant is definite in its terms, and the act to
be done by the plaintiff is purely a matter of fact, it is not
only sufficient, but the most proper, to aver performance
in general terms, without alleging particularly how he has
performed. Thus, if the covenant be to pay money or deliver goods, an averment that the money has been paid, or
that tiie goods have been delivered, or even in more general terms, that the plaintiff has kept and performed the
covenants oh his part, will be fully sufficient. The performance is merely a question of fact, to be ascertained by the

jury from

But where the act to be done
the testimony.
necessarily involves a question of law, the general allegation wiU not suffice, but the quo modo must be pointed out
and averred. As, if the covenant be to give an acquittance,
or to execute a conveyance, the acquittance or the deed
must be set out and brought before the court, so that its
sufficiency and legal effect may be seen and determined.
This becomes a question of law, and not of fact, to be
So, where the
decided by the court, and not the jury.
alternative,
the general
covenant is indefinite, or in the
the
modo
must
be shown.
qtw
sufficient,
but
not
averment is
Com. Dig.
These distinctions run through the books.
"Pleader," C. 60, 61; 1 Chitty's PI. 357; Thomas v.

Van Ness, 4 Wend. 549 ; Glover v. Tuck, 24 do. 153. The
^^
3 Scam. 234, does
decision in the case of Davis v. Wiley,
In this

"covenanted to give the plaintiff, Wiley, a
case defendant
rods of ditching, at 62^ cents per rod, and pay him therefor
$300, on the 1st of December ensuing, and $200 in twelve months thereafter.
The plaintiff on his part covenanted to commence the work immediately, and
continue the same until completed, if weather and health permitted; but
if he should be taken sick, the defendant was to receive the ditching then
made, and wait with him until he was able to finish the remainder."
95.

job of

800
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not conflict with the rule before laid down. In that case,
the averment on the part of Wiley was not certain and
explicit as to the manner and time of its performance. The
time within which it was to be performed was subject to
contingencies, provided for in the agreement. The plaintiff
might have kept and performed his covenant up to the
bringing of the suit, and still not be entitled to recover the
price. It was proper, therefore, in that case, to require him
to point out and specify the mode and extent of the performance. Testing this case by the rule before stated, there
is no difficulty in correctly determining the question before
us. The covenant on the part of McNulty was clear and
The act to be performed by him was purely a
definite.
matter of fact. Whether he had erected the wall accoring
to the terms of the agreement, and within the time limited
therein, were simply questions of fact to be determined by
the jury from the testimony introduced on the trial by the
The declaration was sufficient, and the demurrer
parties.
was properly overruled.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs.

Judgment affirmed.

LAWSON

V.

TOWNES.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
2

1841,

Alabama, 373.

This action was brought in the Court below, by the

de-

fendants in error, against the plaintiffs in error, as guarThe guaranty is to the folantors of one Walter West.
lowing effect:
"Talladega, Nov. 22, 1836.
"Whom it may concern: We, whose names are hereto
subscribed, do recommend Walter West to be a man of
honest character; and that he wishes to procure a stock of
liquors and other articles to furnish a confectionery; and
that he will be true and responsible for any contraxjt that
And that we, the subscribers, do warrant
he may make.
Give under our hands as
such contract to be fiulfilled.

above."

(Signed by the parties.)
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The declaration charges the execution of the letter of

credit by the defendants, and its delivery to West; that he
presented it to the plaintiffs ; and that upon the faith and
credit of the guaranty, they sold him liquors and other
articles to furnish a confectionery, amounting to the sum
of three hundred and eighty-nine dollars ; that West did not
pay the debt when it became due ; that they have prosecuted
him to insolvency with due diligence; and concludes by
averring, "of all which said defendants had due notice,"
whereby, etc.
The defendants demurred to the declaration, which was
overruled by the court. • * *
Obmond, J.: The objection taken to the declaration is
that there was no sufficient notice of the acceptance of the
guarantee, and of the failure of West, to whom the letter
of credit was given, to pay the debt. It is very clear, that
the guarantors were entitled to notice that credit had been
given to West, on the faith of the guaranty, within a reasonable time afterwards, that they might know the extent
of their liability, and, if necessary, be enabled to take the
proper steps to secure themselves. As their undertaking
was not absolute, but conditional, and depending on the
failure of the principal debtor to pa^', it was also necessary,
to fix their liability, that demand of payment should have
been made of the principal debtor within a reasonable time,
and notice given to them of his refusal to pay. But it was
not necessary to charge them, that legal proceedings should
have been commenced and prosecuted against the principal
debtor, but only that the creditor should have used reasonable diligence in making demand, and giving notice of nonThis is the general mode applicable to this class
payment.
and peculiarly proper in this case, where the
contracts,
of
letter of credit was not addressed to any particular person, and was for an indefinite sum.
(See Douglass and
others v. Reynolds amd others, 7th Peters, 113 ; Lee v. Deck,
10th ibid. 482; Olney v. Young, 2 H. Black. 613.)
In all cases where the liability of the defendant depends
on notice of the existence of a particular fact, such notice
is of the gist of the action, and should be specially averred ;
and it should also appear, that it was given in due time and
to a proper person.
(1 Chitty on Pleading, 321.) The only
averment in the declaration of notice, is to the following
effect: "The plaintiffs have prosecuted the said West to
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insolvency, and after using due diligence, have failed to
collect the same, or any part thereof; nor has any other
person paid any part thereof to said plaintiffs, or other
person for them; of all which said defendants had
due notice, whereby," etc.
It has been shown that, to fix the liability of the g^iarantors, it was necessary, within a reasonable time afterwards,
to give them notice, that credit was given on the guaranty ;
and also notice of nonpayment, within a reasonable time
after the debt fell due. The general allegation of notice
at the close of the declaration, although informal, might
be sufficient on general demurrer, if there were facts stated
in the declaration on which, by reference, it could operate.
It is true it appears when the credit was given, and its
amount; but it does not appear when the debt fell due, nor
when demand of payment was made, nor indeed, that any
demand was in fact made. The suit, which it may be inferred was brought, from the averment, that "West was
prosecuted to insolvency, might indeed be considered a deIt may
mand; but it is not stated when it was brought.
not have been brought within a reasonable time, and if not,
the defendants are not liable, even if notice was in fact
given, that the suit had been instituted.
There is, therefore, no liability on the part of the defendants shown in the declaration, as the very gist of the
action is omitted. The demurrer, therefore, should have
been sustained to both counts of the declaration.**,
96.
But the form of the notice does not have to be stated, in the absence
of a contract or statute requiring a particular form.
Thus, in a declaration
against an indorser of a promissory note, Chitty gives the following form
for an allegation of notice of dishonor, — ' ' of all which said several premises
the said G D afterwards, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, at,
' '
etc., aforesaid, had notice. — Chitty on Bills, Appendix, sec 2.

COLT

V.

MILLER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
10 Gushing,

Mbtoalf,

J.:

1852.

49.

The plaintiff's declaration sets forfii aa
executory agreement of the defendant to do certain work
for a certain sum, and within a certain tima, on materials
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to be furnished by the plaintiff, and alleges that the plaintiff did furnish the materials to the defendant in season for
him to complete the stipulated work within the stipulated
time. And the question is, whether this declaration was
legally proved by evidence that the plaintiff furnished the
materials to the defendant, but not in season for him to
complete the work thereon according to the agreement, and
that the defendant nevertheless received and worked on
them. "We are of opinion that it was not ; but that there was
a fatal variance between the allegation and the proof.
It is a cardinal rule of evidence, that allegations essential to the plaintiff's claim must be proved. In the declaration in this case, it was esential, in order to show the plaintiff's claim, that he should allege that he furnished or was
ready to furnish the defendant with the materials on which
he was to work, and in season for him to complete the work
on them within the stipulated time ; or else that he should
allege a sufficient excuse for not so furnishing them. 1 Chit.
PI. (6th Am. Ed.), 351, 358; 6 Greenl.
112; 2 Met. 502,
503. The plaintiff has adopted the former course, and has
alleged his performance of what the agreement required of
him; and to prove this allegation, he relies on evidence of
matter which excused him from such performance, to wit,
a waiver thereof by the defendant.
But a waiver, by one
party to an agreement, of the performance of a stipulation
in his favor, is not a performance of that stipulation by
the other party. It is an excuse for nonperformance, and,
as above stated, should be so pleaded.
The ground taken by the plaintiff is, that the defendant
by his conduct, waived his right to be furnished with the
materials according to the agreement, and that proof of
such waiver supports the averment that the plaintiff did
furnish them according to the agreement. And two cases
were cited in which it was held that, in an action by the indorsee of a note against the indorser, the allegation, that
notice was given to the defendant of nonpayment by the
promisor, was supported by proof that the defendant waived
Those decisions have often been questioned,
such notice.
and are certainly contrary to the law as held in England.
Burgh V. Legge, 5 Mees. & Welsh. 418; Chit, on Bills (10th
Am. Ed.), 577. But supposing them to have been rightly decided, they only show a single exception to an estab-

Ill,

lished rule.

New trial granted.
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HOLMAN

The Breads
V.

CRISWELIi.

Supreme Court of Texas.
13

[Cliap. 4

1854,

Texas, 38.

Hemphill, Ch. J.: This is a suit for specific performance.
The plaintiff alleges that Jerome B. Alexander, in
on the 30th December, 1840, executed to one
Horatio Griffith his bond for title to 220 acres of land; that
the said Horatio Grriffith, on or about the 18th of February,
1847, assigned his interest in said bond and the land therein to be conveyed to one Michael B. Griffith, who afterwards, in 1849, assigned said bond to petitioner.
his lifetime,

The defendants filed a general demurrer and other pleas,
to which reference is unnecessary, as the only point which
will be examined is that which arises on the assigned error
in overruling the demurrer.
The grounds assumed by counsel in their elaborate argument in support of this assignment are:
1st. That there is no averment of breach of the conditions of the bond.
2d.

*

*

*

To sustain the first ground several authorities have been
cited from common-law writers and report, to the effect
that in actions on penal bonds breaches must not only be
assigned, but stated with such particularity and certainty
that the defendant may know what to defend. This action,
however, if brought in courts where there is a distinction
between law and equity, would have been prosecuted in a
court of equity. But there is no material difference in substance in the certainty with which the grounds of complaint must be set forth, whether an action be instituted
in the one forum or the other. In equity the bill must
state, not only the right, title, or claim of the plaintiff,
with accuracy and clearness, but also the injury or grievance of which he complains; or, in other words, in cases
such as the one before the court, the breach or nonperformaace of his obligations on the bond.
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Our own statute, however, furnishes the authoritative
rule as to the matters which must be set forth in the petition, and this requires a full and clear statement of the
cause of action with such other allegations, pertinent to
the cause, as may be deemed necessary to sustain the suit.

(Hart. Dig., Art. 671.)
(Referring to the authorities to ascertain the definition

and scope of the phrase "cause of action," we find that the
breach of contract or covenant sued upon is one of its essential elements. Chitty, in treating of the statement of
the cause of action in assumpsit, says that the breach of
the contract, being obviously an essential part of the cause
of action, must, in all cases, be stated in the declaration
(Vol. 1st, p. 322), and its omission cannot be cured even
by verdict. (Id., p. 337.) This is said in treating of the
statement of the cause of action in asswnpsit, but the rule
is the same in action of debt, covenant, etc.)
The rule is founded in good sense, and has as much application in our system of pleading as in any other. Unquestionably, in the nature of things, there can be no cause
of action where no injury has been done. The invocation
of the remedial aid of a court necessarily presupposes the
infliction of some wrong for which redress is sought, and
this wrong must, as a matter of course, be stated in all
courts where the formality of pleading is required; and if
it be not averred, no such case is made as entitles the complainant to the interposition of the court
The only difficulty in holding that the averment of breach
is in all cases an essential portion of the statement of the
cause of action, consists in this, that in some cases it is not
incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the breach or nonperformance of the contract or covenant. Its execution being
established and its maturity passed, its breach will be presumed.
There is no doubt, that as a general rule, the plaintiff
cannot be compelled to assert more facts than on a general
denial he woidd be bound to prove in order to sustain his
We have repeatedly held that he cannot prove what
case.
he has not alleged, and as a general rule he ought not to
be compelled to allege what he is not bound to prove. But
there is another general rule of like cogency and pervasive
influence in pleading, and which is specially appHoable to
the question at issue, and that is, the plaintiff must allege
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such faxjts in his petition as would, were they admitted o
be true, entitle him to a judgment; and this certainly he
could not demand unless he complained that some wrong
or injury had been done him, or that some right had been
withheld.

For

instance, in this case it may be true that Alexander
entered into the obligations which had been averred. The
demurrer admits that such is the fact. But this fact alone
would not authorize a decree for specific execution.
The bond may have been filfilled. The obligor may not
have refused, expressedly or impliedly, to perform its stipulations.
so, the plaintiff has no ground of complaint,
or to apply to the court for relief.

If

He has not stated that the obligations have not been per-

formed, and if on his averment merely that such obligations
were made, judgment be given in his favor, the absurdity
might be presented of a judgment being for him, when in
fact he had no ground to complain against the defendant,
and this, too, when he had not stated that he had any such
ground, and when the defendant may fully have discharged
his obligations.
It is true that the plaintiff has alleged that he is entitled
to judgment.
But this is a legal conclusion drawn by the
pleader from the facts stated. It is not a fact, and consequently is not admitted by the demurrer, whose office is to
admit facts only, and those which are well pleaded.

The circumstances that the plaintiff would not, on the
trial, by the rules of evidence, be required to prove that the
conditions of the bond had not been fulfilled, that such would
be the prima facie presumption on the introduction of the
bond, does not relieve him from the necessity of making
out such a case by his allegations as would, if their truth
were admitted, be followed by judgment in his favor.
Where suit is brought on a note of hand, the execution
of the note, unless denied on oath, need not be proved, nor
is the fact of nonpayment to be established by proof; but
this certainly would not exempt the plaintiff from stating that such note had been made, and that it had not been
paid, or other equivalent averments of its execution and
subsisting obligation; and without such averments the petition would be insufficient, as not showing that any wrong
had been done, or that the plaintiff had, in fact, any cause
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why he should bring his action.*^ The roles of evidence
may be changed or modified. Parties may not in special
cases be required to prove the facts which constitute their
cases. But this does not relieve them, if they plead at all,
from the necessity of stating such a case as would on its
face be entitled to relief from the court
We are of opinion that on the first ground, viz., the want
of assignment of breach, the demurrer should be sustained.

BROWN

V.

STEBBINS.

Supreme Court of New York.
4

HUl,

1843.

154.

By the Court, Bbonson, J.: The contract with its recitals amounts to this : The defendant Stebbins had mortgaged a farm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff wished to
obtain further security for the payment of the mortgage
debt. Stebbins owned several lots of land at Bangor, from
the sale of which the whole or some part of the debt might
be paid. He covenanted with the plaintiff that he would
sell the lots "to the best advantage" — in other words, for
the best price — ^he could obtain for the same in cash between the date of the agreement and the first day of October then next, and that he would "pay the proceeds of said
sales" (deducting expenses) to the plaintiff by the first
day of October, to be applied on the mortgage. Thus far
we have nothing but the several covenant of Stebbins, But
Thurber now comes in as a surety, and then we have the
joint covenant of both defendants "that the said moneys
''
so received as aforesaid shall be paid to said Brown.
This
only boxmd Thurber to see that the proceeds were paid over
in case sales should be made. The plaintiff wanted something more. A further joint covenant was therefore added,
"that said Stebbins shall use all necessary care and dili97.
See Douglass v. Central Land Co. (1878) 12 W. Va. 502, given
in the text, on the question whether an allegation of non-payment is
See also a note in Ames'
sary in a declaration in debt or assumpsit.
on Pleading (2nd Ed.) 320, citing many cases on this point, most of
however, being cases decided Under the Code.

infra

neces-

Cases
them,

Common Law Pleading.

350
gence

in the sale of said lots."

I

[Chap.

4

On a fair construction of

this covenant,
think the defendants undertook for two
—
first that Stebbins should use all necessary care
things
and diligence to make sales within the specified time; and
second, that he should use such care and diligence to sell
the lots "to the best advantage," or for the best price that
could be obtained for the same within that time.
The breaches assigned are substantially the same in both
counts. One breach is, that the defendants, or either of
them, did not pay the proceeds of the sale of the lots to the
plaintiff. This is bad. It can only be made out by argument and inference, if at all, that there were any sales or
proceeds, and the demurrer is special. It does not follow
from the fact that no proceeds were paid over, that there
were any proceeds to be paid over. The fact that sales
were made and moneys received by Stebbins should have
been directly alleged.
{Serra v. Wright, 6 Taunt. 45.)
If there were no sales, it is impossible that there should
be a breach of this covenant. Another breach to which objection has been taken by special demurrer is, that "Stebbins did not sell and dispose of the lots to the best advantage, or for the most he could obtain for them."
Does the pleader mean that Stebbins did not sell at
all, or that he did not sell for the best price
which could have been obtained?
It is impossible to say
which.
there was no sale, that fact should have been
directly alleged ; and if the complaint be that Stebbins sold,
but did not get the best price which could have been obtained, the pleader should have said so in explicit terms.
Without such an averment the defendants can neither know
how to plead, nor what evidence they may expect to meet
on the trial.
The breach is not assigned in the words of the joint covenants, or either of them. And when the pleader undertakes
to assign a breach coming within the substance, effect or
intent of the covenant, he is held to a more strict rule than
when he follows, either negatively or affirmatively, as the
case may be, the words of the contract.
(Com. Dig. Pleader,

If

C. 47.)

The remaining breach is, that Stebbins did not use all
necessary care and diligence in the sale of the lots. Here
the pleader has followed and negatived the words of one
of the joint covenants, and as a general rule that is suflfi-
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{Hughes v. Smith, 5 John. 168 ; Smith v. amen, 8
Owings, 2 Gill & John. 430; McGeehan V. McLaughlin, 1 Hall, 33 ; Com. Dig. Pleader, C. 45 ;
Chit. PI. 365, 6 Ed. of '37.) There is an exception to the
rule, where this mode of pleading does not necessarily
amount to a breach of the covenant.
{Julia/nd v. Burgott,
John. 6; Gould v. Allen, 1 Wend. 182; Thomas v. Van
Ness, 4 Wend. 549.) It is undoubtedly true that the defendants may suffer some inconvenience for the want of a
more specific breach.
They are not advised whether the
plaintiff intends to go for a want of care and diligence to
make sales, or for not selling at the best price which might
have been obtained, or for both. But still the rule is well
settled that the pleader may follow the words of the covenant, either negatively or affirmatively, as the case may be,
where that will necessarily show the contract has been
broken ; and such is the case here. If Stebbins has not used
all necessary care and diligence in the sale of the lots, the
defendants have not kept their covenant.
As this breach is well assigned, and the demurrer goes
to the whole declaration, the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment The defendants should have pleaded to the breach
in each count which is well assigned, and demurred to the
others.
Judgment for the plaintiff. ^^

John.

Ill; Karthans v.

I

II

In an action on a covenant to perform an award, it is necessary to
98.
Btate fully and certainly what the award required in order to show a breach
of the eovenant.— Dale t. Dean (1844) 16 Conn. 579.

JULLIAND

V.

BURGOTT.

Supreme Court of New York.
11

Johnson,

1814,

6.

This was an action of debt on a bond, dated 3d December,
1811, with a condition that the defendants should secure

certain lands (sold and conveyed by Peter Burgott and
wife, by a warranty deed, dated the 30th of September, 1811,
to Henry Van Vliet, and conveyed by him, by deed, dated
the 3d of December, 1811, to the plaintiff) in the peaceable
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and quiet possession of the plaintiff, his heirs and assigns,
"free from all legal encumbrances, either by deed or mortgage, or otherwise, now in existence and binding on the
premises," etc.; and is was expressly agreed and understood that the defendants were "to see the lands free
from all encumbrances as above mentioned, by the 20th
of February, 1812," etc. The plaintiff averred that the
defendants, although often requested, etc., did not free, nor
cause to be freed, the land above described from all legal
encumbrances, either by deed, mortgage, or otherwise, then
in existence, and binding on the premises, by the 20th of
February, 1812, etc., in the words of the condition.
The defendants demurred to the declaration, and there
was a joinder in demurrer, which was submitted to the
court without argument.
Peb Ctjbiam. Without noticing other points in the case,
the declaration is bad in substance, in not assigning a sufficient breach. The breach is, that the defendants "did not
free the land from all legal encumbrances, either by deed,
mortgage, or otherwise, then in existence and binding on
the premises, by the 20th of February, 1812."
This was
following and negativing the very words of the condition
of the bond; but unless such an assignment necessarily
amounts to a brieach, it is insufficient, and here it does not;
for non constat that there was any existing encumbrance
on the 20th of February, 1812. The condition spoke hypothetically of legal encumbrances, either by deed, mortgage,
or otherwise, then in existence. It did not refer to any particular encumbrance, nor was any alluded to in the recital
By the generality of the terms, and by
to the condition.
the words or otherwise, it is most apparent that the bond
was taken for greater caution, and to guard against any
such encumbrance which might then be in existence. It was
incumbent, therefore, on the plaintiff to have shown at least
some existing encumbrance at the commencement of the
suit, or on the 20th of February, the time referred to in the
bond. He has shown none ; there is, then, no certain cause
of action appearing in the declaration, and the defendants
are entitied to judgment, with leave to the plaintiff to amend
on the usual terms.
Judgment for the defendants.
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SHAEFER

V.

MINOR.

High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi.
1

353

1835.

Howard, 218.

Action of debt in the circuit court of Claiborne county,

by Abraham K. Shaefer, assignee of the coroner of said
county, against William B. Minor et aX. on a bail bond. The
condition of the bond declared on, is in these words: "In
case the said Miaor shall be cast in the said suit, if the said
Minor shall pay and satisfy the condemnation of the court,
or render his body in execution of the same, or in failure
thereof, that the said, etc., shall do it for him, then this obligation to be void," etc. The breach of the bond assigned,
by which it is said to have become forfeited, is, "that the
said Minor hath not complied with th« tenor of his said
bond, in this that he hath not abided by, or performed the
order and judgment of the circuit court, by paying and
satisfying the said judgment, etc., whereby, etc."
The defendant below demurred, and for cause of demur-

rer, assigned:
That the declaration is defective, in not averring a breach
in the alternative like the condition of the bond. The
court sustained the demurrer and judgment for the defendant. An appeal was prosecuted.
Shabkey, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court.
•

•

•

The condition of the bond as set out is, that the
defendant shall pay the condemnation of the court, or render his body in execution. The condition is in the alternative, either that he should perform the one or the other of
the terms, and the performance of either would, of course,
be a compliance with the condition, and discharge the obligation and release the sureties. The plaintiff has assigned
for a breach, that Minor did not perform the condemnation of the court by the payment of the amount of the judgment, but has not averred the nonperformance of the alternative. It may be, for anything that appears in the declaration, that Minor did render his body in execution, in
strict pursuance of his undertaking; and if so, the condition was performed. The plaintiff should also have as-

a

L. P.

23
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signed as a breach that Minor had not rendered his body in
execution.
The judgment of the court below must be affirmed.

DAVIS

V.

DICKSON.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
2

1830,

Stewart, 370.

This was an action of debt in Franklin Circuit Court, in
which "James Davis, judge of the county court of Franklin county, successor of William Lucas," was plaintiff, and
"Michael Dickson and John Davis" were defendants, in-

stituted in 1824, to recover on a bond made by Dickson as
principal, and Davis and one Thornas, as his securities,
dated in May, 1820, payable to Lucas, as chief justice of
the county court of Franklin county, and his successors in
office, in the penalty of $20,000, conditioned, that Dickson,
who had been appointed guardian of Nancy Rogers, an infant, should well and truly perform the duties of guardian.
The declaration was on the penalty of the bond, without
noticing the condition, or assigning special breaches, the
usual breach only of nonpayment of the money being al•
•
•
leged.
•

•••••••••

By Judge Taylor.

•

•

•

I -will,

therefore, proceed to
examine the reasons assigned on the motion made in the
circuit court to arrest the judgment.
The first is, "that there is no cause of action in the plainunderstand this to mean, and it has
tiff's declaration."
been so argued by counsel, that the declaration is insufficient in not setting out the condition of the bond, and assigning breaches thereof. Previous to the statute, 8 and 9
William m, in actions instituted on penal bonds, the plaintiff had judgment and sued out execution for the full amount
of the penalty, where a breach of the condition was proved.
At that period, suits were always brought, and plaintiffs
declared for the amount of the bond; the declaration
simply recited the amount for which the bond was given,
and averred a breach in the nonpayment of that sum; the

I
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defendant then craved oyer of the bond and condition, and
pleaded performance of the condition ; whereupon the plaintiff replied, assigning breaches, upon which the parties went
to trial, and if the plaintiff proved a breach of the condition by the defendant, he had judgment and execution for
the whole amount of the bond, without regard to the damages, which he really might have sustained. The great injustice which was often done by judgments of this description, induced courts of chancery to interfere at an early
day, by injoining the amount of the judgment, except the
damages actually sustained. The statute above mentioned,
was passed with the single object of enabling courts of law
to do that justice, for which a resort to chancery had been
It was not the intention of the framers of the
necessary.
law to vary the remedy further than was necessary to secure
the right.
Plaintiffs were authorized to assign as many
breaches as they thought right, when, before, only one was
permitted to be assigned. But the reason of this is obvious. Previous to the statute, the proof of any one breach
was suflScient to fix the defendant with the whole amount
of the bond, and it would have encumbered the record, and
increased the expenses of the suit, by adding more, withBut after
out producing any corresponding advantage.
this statute was passed, the recovery was proportioned to
the injury, and as every additional breach produced an
additional injury, of course it became essential to the plaintiffs right to permit him to assign as many as he could
hope to prove. But it was of no importance that he should
make this assignment in any way different under the statute, from what had been customary at common law ; accordingly we find the statute altogether silent on this subject;
and that the practice formerly pursued, is still retained in

England."
State ex rel. v. Votaw (1846) 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 2; James
Md. 211; Band v. Band (1828) 4 N, H, 267; Burkholdei
v. Lapp's Ex'r (1858) 31 Pa. St. 322.
210.
Hibbard t. McKmdle7 (1862) 23
Contmt
Accord:
State (1852)

99.

V.

3
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DRAKE.

'Supreme Court of New York.

1831,

7 Wendell, 345.

Error from

it

5.

§

2

;

is

is

8

;

4

2

8;

a

1

7,

2

it,

the New York Common Pleas. Drake sued
Reed in the common pleas of New York in the term of
August, 1830, and declared in debt on bond, bearing date the
16th June, 1830, for the sum of $500. The defendant
♦
•
•
pleaded, 1, nan est factum.
* *
*
The condition of the
By the Court, Nelson, J. :
is not set out in the
brought
which
was
the
suit
bond upon
declaration, nor any breaches assigned in it. This was not
necessary under the statute of 1813, 1 R. L. 518, sec. 7.
Munro v. Alaire, 2 Gaines, 327. The assignment might
have been made in the replication, if the nature of the plea
the plaintiff
demanded it ; or, if the plea did not demand
might have suggested them on the circuit or nisi prms roll,
Saund. 187, (a), (b)
pursuant to the statute, before trial.
Tuxhury v. Miller, 19 Johns. R. 311. The statute of 1813,
R. L. 518, sec.
was substantially
copy of the English
and this
act of the 8th and 9th William 3d, ch. 11, sec.
court has considered the decisions under this act as appliCanes, 329; Van Bencable to ours. Munro v. Alaire,
Johns. R. 213 Smith v. Jansen,
tJiuysen v. Dewitt et al.,
id. 115.
It was compulsory on the plaintiff to assign
breaches, Van Benthuysen v. Dewitt et al., but he might do
so in any of the modes above stated. The revised statutes
now enacted,
have changed the law in this particular. It
"when an action shall be prosecuted in any court of law,
upon any bond, for the breaches of any condition other than
the payment of money, etc., the plaintiff, in his declaration,
shall assign the specific breaches for which the action
R. S. 378,
This differs from the law of
brought."
1813, the seventh section of which provided that in all actions, prosecuted in any court of record, upon any bond,
etc., "tile plaintiff shall assign as many breaches as he may
think fit," etc., but does not direct to be done in the declaration. The revised statutes undoubtedly intended to abolish the different modes of assigning breaches by the plaintiff in actions of this kind, which had grown up under the
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act of 8th and 9th William 3d, and adopted under ours, and
to make it compulsory on the plaintiff to assign them in the
declaration.
This alteration is an improvement of the law,
by simplifying and abridging the pleadings and diminishing the costs. As under the statute of 1813, it was compulsory on the plaintiff to assign breaches in some one of
the different modes authorized, if he sought to recover anything beyond nominal damages on bonds within the statute,
so now, under the revised statutes, he must assign the
breaches in the declaration, if he seeks to recover beyond
nominal damages.
•
•
•
The judgment must be reversed, the costs to
abide the event, and a venire de novo must issue. No doubt
the court below will allow the plaintiff to amend his declaration on terms.*
1.
In State v. Caflfee (1833) 6 Ohio, 150, a statute open to such constrnetion was held to require the assignment of breaches in the declaration,
for ths reason that this seemed to the court much more convenient practice.

(5)

Contracts in Writing,

ANONYMOUS.
Court of King's Bench.

1702,

2 SalJceld, 519.

If

an Act of Parliament makes writing necessary to a
common-law matter, where it was not necessary by the
common law, you need not plead the thing to be in writing,
but give it in evidence, but where a thing is originally made
by Act of Parliament, and required to be in writing, you
must plead it with all the circumstances required by the
act; as upon the statute of H. 8 of Wills, you must plead
a will to be in writing; but a collateral promise, which is
required to be in writing by the statute of frauds, you need
not plead to be in writing, though you must prove it so in
evidence. Per Holt, C. J.^
Fiedler v. Smith (1850) 6 Gush. (Mass.) 336.
Accord:
2.
"As to the rule under consideration, however, a distinetioi
Exception:
has to be taken between a declaration and a plea; and it is said, that thougl
in the former the plaintiff need not show the thing to be in writing, in th«
latter the defendant must." — Stephen on Pleading (Tjler'i Ed.) 331.
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STEVENS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
120 Massachusetts,

1876.

209.

Contract for services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant. The declaration alleged that the defendant made
with the plaintiff "a certain contract in writing." Answer,
a general denial.
At the trial in the superior court, before Bacon, J., the
plaintiff put in evidence, to prove the contract declared
upon, a diary * * • in which was written in the defendant's handwriting • ♦ * [the contract alleged].
The signature of the defendant was not attached to the
writing, and his name nowhere appeared in the book containing it. • * •
Gbat, C. J.: The allegation in the declaration, that the
defendant made a contract in writing, was denied in the
answer, and was not supported by evidence of a contract
not signed by the defendant.
The objection of variance
was open to the defendant, although he had not set up the
statute of frauds.
The case is thus distinguished from
Middlesex Co. v. Osgood, 4 Gray, 447.
Exceptions sustained.

REED

V.

SCOTT.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
30 Alabama,

1857,

640.

[Action upon a promissory note.]
On the trial it appears from the bill of exceptions, the
plaintiff offered in evidence an instrument in writing which
corresponded in every respect with that described in the
complaint, except that it was under seal. The defendants
objected to its admission, on account of this variance; and
•
•
•
the court sustained the objection.
Walkee, J. : The distinction between sealed and unsealed
instmrnents is not altogether destroyed by the Code. To
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the word promissory note the law attaches a distinct meaning, which does not include a bond, or instrument under
seal. Under the mercantile law and the Statute of Anne,
it was held, that the instrument's being under seal deprived
it of its character of a promissory note, and, consequently,
of its negotiable character. Sayre v. Lucas, 2 Stewart, 259 ;
Clark V. F. M. C. of Benton, 15 Wendell, 256 ; 1 Chitty on
PI. 15; Story on Bills 76, § 61; Story on Prom. Notes, 56,
§ 55; Farmers' S Mechanics' Bank of Phila. v. Geriner, 2
S. & R. 114. A bond is sometimes designated as a note
under seal, and bill single is sometimes used to designate
indiscriminately an instrument without condition, whether
with or without seal. 5 Com. Digest, 194, Obligation, C. ;
Bouvier's Law Die, Bill Single. But a bond cannot, with
strict legal propriety, be termed a promissory note; and
they have always been distinguishable in the incidents which
attach to them. The instrument sued upon, being described
as a promissory note, was not the instrument offered in
evidence, because the latter is a bond. The court did not,
therefore, err in the rejection of the evidence when offered.

PHILLIPS

V.

SINGER MANUFACTURING COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
88

Illinois,

1878.

305.

Bbeese, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This was debt on a bond with conditions, brought to the
circuit court of Tazewell county, by the Singer Manufacturing Company, plaintiff, and against William H, Phillips,
Lewis D. Lawton and Jeremiah B. Phillips, defendants.

The first is, the
Several points are made by appellants.
court should not have admitted the bond in evidence, on
account of a variance between the bond described in the
declaration and the one offered in evidence. The averment
in the declaration is, that defendant made and executed
their bond to "the Singer Manufacturing Company;" the
bond offered in evidence is a bond executed to that company
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it,

it,

and Everhard & Harris, of Peoria, Illinois. In the declaration the Singer Manufacturing Company is alleged to be
the sole obligee in the bond, whereas the bond shows that
Everhard & Harris were joint obligees with that company,
and the principle is well settled that all the obligees or
payees having a legal interest must join in an action upon
the instrument.
Here the allegation and proof did not
While the declaration alleged the bond as
correspond.
made payable to the Singer Manufacturing Company, the
bond in evidence showed it was made not only to that company, but to Everhard & Harris, and they should have
joined in the action. Where a bond, upon its face, denotes
the action must be between the parties to
the parties to
no matter what may be the terms of the defeasance. It
was error to admit this bond in evidence.*

it

&

4

3

a

5

la King v. Despard (1830)
S.
Wend. (N. T.) 276, the plea justified
by an execution alleged to have been returnable in 90 days; and proof
of an execution returnable in 60 days was held to be a fatal variance. In
Salter ▼. Richardson (1826)
T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 204,
bond was declared
on as dated 1821, stipulating for the payment of a certain sum, and the
evidence showed a bond dated 1823 stipulating for the payment of said sum
with interest from date; held to be a fatal variance in both particulars.
In
M.
S. 470, plaintiff declared on a demise of a
Hoar v. Mill (1816)
wharf and storehouses, while the deed used only the word "storehouse," and
WM Iwld that the variance was fatal.

Supreme Court
12

of

VAN SANTWOOD

v.

SANDFOBD.

New York.

1815.

Johnson, 197.
is

is

a

it

;

is

Spencer, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The decovewell taken the action
murrer to the fourth count
cannot be maintained but on
deed. The only
nant, and
"and hereupon the deaverment or allegation of a deed
fendant, on the 24th day of March, in the year aforesaid,
entered into a guaranty, covenant, and agreement in the

it

it

it

a

is

set
words and figures following:" then the agreement
was signed and
conclusion, that
out in haec verba, with
sealed with the name of the defendant and the locv^ sigiUi,
purporting to be a literal oyer of the agreement.
It must appear that the contract was under seal, and the
be expressly
law will not intend that was sealed, unless
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averred to be so ; and though the bond or deed, upon oyer,
recite, "in witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands
and seals," yet that does not amount to an averment, but
that the party must show that the bond or deed was actually sealed by the other. These principles will be found in
Cabel V. Vaughan (1 Saun. 291, note 1), where all the cases
are carefully and accurately collected.
There are some
words of art, such as indenture, deed, or writing obligatory,
which, of themselves, import that the instrument was
sealed ; but if it be alleged that J. S., by his certain writing, demised or covenanted, without averring that it was
sealed, the court will not intend that the writing was sealed.
(Cro. Eliz. 571; Ld. Eaym. 2537; 8 Com. Dig. Fait (A. 2)
Pleader, 2 W. 9. 14.)
•

•••••••••

Judgment for the defendant, with leave to amend on the
usual terms.

(k) Facts Showmg Tort LidbUity.
(1)

Plaintiff's Right and Defendant's Duty.*
v. THE CHICAGO, LAKE SHORE
EASTERN RAH^WAY COMPANY.

McANDEEWS

Supreme Court of Illinois.
222

Illinois,

&

1906.

232.

Hand, J., delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an action on the case brought by the plaintiff,
against the defendant, in the superior court of Cook county,
4.
The plaintifif's right and the corresponding
duty resting upon the
defendant do not always require express averment, because they are sometimes presumed and sometimes appear as incidental to allegations of title.
Thus, in trespass for assault and battery, the right to be free from personal
is an absolute ' right, which the law presumes, and no special
molestation
So in fraud and deceit, the right of the
facts disclosing it are required.
plaintiff "not to be induced by fraud to assent to a transaction which causes
him damage" (Holland: Jurisprudence (9th Ed.) 223) is an absolute one,
and this right, together with the duty of the defendant to observe it, ia
always presumed by law and hence need not be shown in the pleading;
except where the fraud consists in concealment of facts which ought to be
disclosed because of a relation of trust and confidence, in which case the
existence of such relation not being presumed, must be alleged (Feeney v.
In trespass to property, trover and nuisance
Howard (1889) 79 Cal. 525).
the right and duty appear as incidents of the title which the plaintift alleges
in hims6lf*
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to recover damages for a personal injury alleged to have
been sustained hy the plaintiff while in the employ of the

niinois Steel Company at its South Chicago plant on the
16th day of July, 1901, by reason of certain cars being
thrown by a locomotive engine under the control of the
servants of the defendant, against a car which the plaintiff
was unloading, whereby the plaintiff was thrown to the
ground -and run over and severely injured. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
$12,000, upon which the court, after overruling a motion
for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, rendered judgment, which judgment, upon appeal by the defendant, was
reversed by the branch of the appellate court for the first
district and a judgment in that court was rendered in favor of the defendant and the plaintiff has sued out a writ
of error from this court to review that judgment.

The original declaration charges the plaintiff was in the
employ of the Illinois Steel Company at its plant at South
Chicago, at which plant there were certain railroad tracks ;
that while the plaintiff was upon and about to unload a certain car standing upon one of said tracks, and while he was
exercising ordinary care and caution for his own safety,
the servants of the defendant "then and there recklessly,
negligently and without giving the plaintiff any warning,
shoved certain other cars against the said car upon which
''
The criticism made upon the
the plaintiff, was standing.
original declaration is, that it does not aver facts showing
the defendant owed the plaintiff the duty to notify him that
it was about to move the cars which came in contact with
the car upon which he was at work, prior to the time it
moved said cars, and it is said that although the defendant
recklessly and negligently shoved said cars against the car
upon which plaintiff was at workj/the defendant is not liable to him for a resulting injury therefrom unless it owed
him a duty to warn him that it was about to move said
cars, prior to the time they were moved, and that it is not
averred in the original declaration that the defendant knew,
or ought to have known, the plaintiff was upon said car,
nor are facts averred from which it appears that a duty
rested upon the defendant to anticipate the presence of the
plaintiff upon or in proximity to the car with which the
moving cars come in contact. In actions of the character
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of this it is necessary to aver and prove three elements to
make out a cause of action : (1) The existence of a duty
on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from
the injury of which he complains;
(2) a failure of the defendant to perform that duty; and (3) an injury to the
plaintiff resulting from such failure. When these three elements concur they unitedly constitute actionable negligence, and the absence of any one of these elements, either
in the declaration or proof, renders the declaration insufficient to sustain a judgment for negligence, even after verdict or the proof to establish a cause of action involving
actionable negligence {Schueler v. Mueller, 193 111. 402;
Mackey v. Northern Milling Co., 210 id. 115 ; Faris v. Eoberg, 134 Ind. 269 ; 33 N. E. Rep. 1028) ; and it is not sufficient in the declaration to allege that it is the duty of the
defendant to do certain things, as that would be but the
averment of a conclusion, but the declaration must state
facts from which the law will raise the duty. Ayers v. City
of Chicago, 111 111. 406; Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v.
Clausen, 173 id. 100 ; Schueler v. Mueller, supra.
In Schueler v. Mueller, supra, an action on the case was
brought against the city of Chicago and the appellants to
recover damages for a personal injury claimed to have been
sustained by the appellee by falling through a trapdoor in
a sidewalk upon one of the streets in the city of Chicago.
The case was dismissed as to the city, and the appellants,
who did not appear, were defaulted, and a jury were sworn,
who assessed the plaintiff's damages, upon which verdict
During the term at which the
a judgment was rendered.
judgment was rendered the appellants moved to set aside
and vacate the judgment. There was a failure to state in
the declaration any facts showing how or why it was the
duty of appellants to care for and guard the trapdoor in the
sidewalk, and this court held, by reason of the lack of such
averment the declaration failed to show any duty from the
defendants to the plaintiff to maintain and keep in safe
condition said trapdoor, and that by reason of such omission the declaration failed to state a cause of action, and
that the want of such averment in the declaration was not
cured by verdict.
And in Mackey v. Northern Milling Co., supra, an action
was brought to recover damages for the alleged negligence
of the milling company, which, it was averred, resulted in
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the death of the plaintiff's intestate. It was averred that
the appellant's intestate was in the milling company's employ; that he was lawfully on the sidetrack of the company
when injured, and was in the exercise of due care for his
own safety, when the milling company's servants, not ther
fellow-servants of said intestate, pushed an unloaded car
along said sidetrack and upon said intestate without giving him any notice or warning of its approach, whereby he
was injured, etc. The declaration failed to state that said
intestate's duties necessarily required him to be on the
sidetrack at the time and place where he was injured, or
that he was performing any duty he owed the milling company at that time and place, or that said company had any
reason to believe or suspect that he would be at that place
at the time of said injury, and it was held the declaratipn,
for want of such averments, was so defective that it would
not support a judgment. The court said (p. 118) : "In the
absence of averments showing that appellee (the milling
company) owed Mackey (the intestate) some duty which
was violated, and because of such violation said Mackey was
injured while in the exercise of due care, the declaration
must be held not to state a cause of action."
In this case, the only ground upon which the defendant
could be held liable for actionable negligence in injuring
the plaintiff would be that it owed the plaintiff a duty not
to run its cars against the car upon which he was at work,
without giving him warning of the approach of said cars
in time for him to reach a place of safety before the cars
collided, and that it neglected to perform such duty. There
is found in the original declaration no averment of fact
from which a duty to give the plaintiff such warning arises.
It does not appear from the averments of the original
declaration that the defendant knew, or was bound to know,
that the plaintiff was on said car or in its vicinity, or that
he was likely to be injured by the car upon which he was at
work being moved by the cars being handled by the servants of the defendant. The original declaration therefore
faUs to show that the defendant owed the plaintiff any
duty not to throw the cars being moved by its engine against
the car upon which he was at work, without giving the plaintiff timely warning. The declaration, therefore, in that
regard was fatally defective. In Mackey v. Northern Millis a welling Co., supra, on page 117, it was said:

"It
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establislied rule that a declaration, in cases of this character, must state facts from which the law raises a duty from
the master to the servant, and if the declaration fails in
this regard then it is insufficient to support a judgment.
As stated in Ayers v. City of Chicago, 111 111. 406, 'the
pleader must state facts from which the law will raise the
duty.' And as said in Cooley on Torts (2d Ed), 791: 'The
first requisite in establishing negligence is to show the existence of the duty which it is supposed has not been performed." And Mr. Thompson, in his work on Negligence
'Unless the
(2 Thompson on Negligence, 1244), says:
duty results in all cases from the stated facts, the declaration so framed wiU be bad.' " And in Schueler v. Mueller,
supra (p. 403) : "It is not sufficient in a declaration to
allege generally the duty of the defendant, but the pleader
must state facts from which the law will raise a duty, and
show an omission of the duty and a resulting injury."
"We think the original declaration stated no cause of ac*
*
tion. *
It is, however, urged, that a duty from the defendant to
the plaintiff should be implied from the averment found
in the original declaration that the cars were recklessly
and negligently shoved against the car upon which the
plaintiff was at work. A person may be guilty of a negligent or reckless act and still not be liable for actionable
Liability only follows a negligent or reckless
negligence.
act when the party guilty of the act owes to the party
injured some duty which is violated by the commission of
Thompson on Negligence
the negligent or reckless act.
(vol. I, sec. 3) says: "Where there is no legal duty to
exercise care there can be no actionable negligence. Therefor it is reasoned that a plaintiff who grounds his action
upon the negligence of the defendant must show not only
that the conduct of the defendant was negligent, but also
that it was a violation of some duty which the defendant
And in Bishop on Non-Contract Law (par.
owed to him."
446) it is said: "To sustain an action for negligence the
plaintiff must have suffered a legal injury whereof he is
entitled to complain. Therefore, however great the defendant's negligence, if it was committed without violating any
duty which he owed, either directly to the plaintiff or
to the public, in a matter whereof he had the right to avail
*
*
*
there is nothing which the law will rehimself,
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It would

appear to be clear that tlie averment, therefore, that the defendant shoved said cars negligently and recklessly does not supply the want of an averment of facts showing that the defendant owed to the plaintiff a duty not to move said cars without notice to him.

dress."

Finding no reversible error in this record the judgment
of the appellate court will be affirmed.

SEYMOUR

V.

MADDOX.

Court of Queen's Bench.
16

1851.

Adolphus & Ellis, New Series, 326.

Case. The declaration stated that the defendant was
possessed of a certain theatre, to-wit, the Princess ' theatre,
etc., and of a certain stage therein, on which operas and
other dramatic entertainments were performed, and of a
certain dressing room therein, known as the dressing room
of the male chorus singers, and of a certain floor therein
underneath the said stage, called the Mazarine floor, in
which floor was a certain cut or hole of great depth, etc.,
across and along which said floor persons performing at
and in the theatre, in operas and other dramatic entertainments, were accustomed, before, during, and after the performance thereof, to pass from and to the said dressing
room to and from the back of the stage.
That defendant
had hired plaintiff to act, sing, and perform as a chorus
singer at the theatre on the said stage, for reward in that
behalf. That plaintiff, on 31st May, ISiS, did act, sing, and
perform at the said theatre on the stage under such hiring
as aforesaid, in a certain opera called the Crown Diamonds,
which opera was then and there performed under the management and for the profit of the defendant. That it then
became and was the duty of the defendant to cause the
said mazarine floor to be so sufficiently lighted, and the said
cut or hole to be so fenced, guarded, or secured, before, during, and until after the lapse of a reasonable time
from the termination of, the said performance, as to prevent any accident or injury to persons passing across and
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along the Mazarine floor from and to the dressing room to
and from the back of the stage. That the defendant, well
knowing the premises, suffered and permitted the Mazarine
floor to be insufficiently lighted, and the cut or hole to be
open without any sufficient fence, guard, or security, before, during, and until after the lapse of a reasonable time
from the termination of, the performance.
By reason of
which insufftcient lighting as aforesaid, and of the cut or
hole being so as aforesaid open without any sufficient fence,
guard, or security, the plaintiff, who was then, within a
reasonable time from, to wit, immediately after the termination of the performance, passing from the back of the
stage across and along the Mazarine floor to the dressing
room, fell into and down the cut or hole, and thereby was
then grievously bruised and injured, etc.
Pleas, among others, not guilty, and a traverse of the
alleged duty. Issues thereon.
On the trial, before Eble, J., at the Middlesex sittings
after last Trinity term, the verdict was for the plaintiff.
Chambers, in last Michaelmas term, obtained a rule nisi
to arrest the judgment, on the ground that the declaration
showed no such duty to light and fence the hole as alleged.

Lord Campbell, C.

J.

I am of opinion

that judgment in
this case must be arrested. The duty , a breach of which is
laid, does n ot arise from the pa rticular t acts stated m tJbie
d eclaration n or_from the general relatio n" of ma s ter and
What, then, is the ettect of the positive allegas ervant.
tion of such duty? I confess that I, at first, thought that
where a relation, from which a particular duty may arise,
is alleged, and the particular duty is also alleged, it might
be shown in evidence that, in fact, such a duty did arise,
and that it was unnecessary to set forth the facts themselves which raise the duty. But the decisions show that
the allegation of duty is in all cases immaterial, and ought
never be introduced; for, if the particular facts raise the
duty, the allegation is unnecessary, and, if they do not, it
will be unavailing. In th is "^sft ther e is an allegation that
ilt a- deferida.n il!=^ duty to light t he floor and fenc e

if__waR

:

the hole , but-B^-£act s-are stated from which the duty arises.
The express allegation, therefore, will not help the defect/
and the declaration is bad.
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The allegation of duty is an allegation of mere
matter of law; and it is necessary to state facts from which
the duty which is charged to be broken arises. If the facts
are insufficient for this purpose, the allegation of duty will
not help. Here it is stated that the defendant held a theatre in which he hired the plaintiff to perform, that on part
. of the premises there was a hole in the floor along which the
plaintiff had to pass in discharge of his duty as a performer, and that it was the duty of the defendant to light
:

the floor sufficiently, so as to prevent accidents to those
who had to pass along it. Was any such duty cast upon
the defendant?
think not. A person must make his own
choice whether he will accept employment on premises in
this condition; and, if he do accept such employment, he
must also make his own choice whether he wiU pass along
he sustain injury
the floor in the dark or carry a light.
in consequence of the premises not being lighted, he has
no right of action against the master who has not contracted
that the floor shall be lighted.
confine my judgment to
this ground, that the decMration does not show any contract that the premises should be in any particular state
with respect to lighting and fencing, or that there was any
misfeasance.
Rule absolute. <
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V.

CITY OF CHICAGO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
111

Illinois,

1884,

406.

J., delivered the opinion of the court
no
"We find
error in the judgment of the appellate court.
The judgment of the superior court of Cook county was
properly affirmed. The only question of law presented by
the record relates to the propriety of the instruction directing the jury to find for the defendant, upon the ground
stated in the instruction — that ' ' there is no evidence to sustain the material allegations of the plaintiff's declaration."
The gist of the complaint, as stated in the declaration,
is, that the defendant was in possession and occupancy of
I>roKEY,
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premises adioining a public highway, and that on these
premises so adjoining the public highway and so possessed
by the defendant was a dangerous pit, and that by reason
of such possession and occupancy of the pit so situate, it
was the duty of the defendant to protect the public against
liability to injury by falling into the pit, by covering the
same, or otherwise guarding against the danger, and that
defendant failed to perform that duty. A plaintiff cannot
recover except by proof of the case stated in his declaration. The probata must support the allegata. It does not
tend to support the allegations of this declaration to furnish proof tending to show that defendant was possessed
of a public street frequented by the public, and by reason
of the possession of the public street it became the duty
of defendant to make and keep this public highway in a
safe condition, and in violation of this duty it had negligently permitted a dangerous pit adjoining such highway
to be and remain without any barrier to protect persons
passing from falling therein; ijor does proof tending to
show a negligent failure of the defendant to keep such
highway so in its possession safe, by permitting to be and
remain in said highway a dangerous pit wholly unguarded
by any barrier — and this, for the reason the declaration
charges defendant with no such duty. It is not necessary
here to decide whether proofs given would have made it
the duty of the court to have submitted the case to the
jury under a declaration charging the case which the proofs
It is enough that the proofs utare supposed to sustain.
terly faU to tend to show that defendant was in possesion
of the premises outside of and adjoining a public highway
where it is alleged this dangerous pit was. This allegaWithout it the dection cannot be treated as surplusage.
laration shows no cause of action. It is not sufficient, in a
declaration, to say, generally, that it was the duty of defendant to cover or otherwise protect a dangerous place.
The pleader must state facts from which the law will raise
the duty. Such duty in relation to this pit may arise from
the fact, if it be so, that the defendant excavated the pit.
Such duty may rest upon one in possession and occupancy of
such pit. Such duty may rest upon a city occupying a street
adjoining such pit, upon the ground that the position of the
pit renders the street unsafe ; and if the pit be in the street,
C.

L. p.
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the duty may rest upon the city to keep covered and protected all dangerous pits located in the streets.
On these
questions we need not here pass. What we rule is, that
under a declaration charging defendant with the duty of
covering or protecting a dangerous pit, upon the allegation that the pit is located on premises occupied by defendant and adjoining a public highway, plaintiff cannot recover
by proving that defendant is in possession of the highway,
and as occupant of the highway owes that duty to the public, whether the pit be in the highway or adjoining the
highway.
The judgment of the appellate court is therefore affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

BLOSS

v.

TOBEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
2

1824.

Pickering, 320.

Pabkee, C. J.: It is with great regret, and not without
much labor and research to avoid this result, that we are
obliged to arrest the judgment in this case for want of a
sufScient count to support the verdict.
anyone could be
supported there would be no difficulty in applying the verdict to
since we are informed by the judge, and the
nature of the case shows, that the same evidence would suit
equally well all the counts in the writ. The words for which
the action was brought, as described in the several counts,
are substantially the same.
The first count only charges the defendant with having
said that the plaintiff had burnt his own store in Alford.
The words are introduced with
colloquium ''of and concemkig the plaintiff and of and concerning a certain store
of the plaintiff's, situated in said Alford, before that time,
to wit, on the sixth day of December last past, consumed
by fire," and alleges that the defendant did speak, utter and
publish the following false, scandalous and malicious words
of and concerning the plaintiff, viz.: lie (meaning the
plaintiff) burnt
(meaning the plaintiff's store in Alford
and furaforesaid) himself (again meaning the plaintiff)
;

it

a

it,
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ther meaning and insinuating by the several -words aforesaid, that the plaintiff had been guilty of the crime of wilfully and maliciously burning his own store in Alf ord aforesaid." Now these words are not actionable, unless it is a
crime punishable by law for a man to destroy by fire his
own property ; and we cannot find that, either by the common law, or by any statute of this commonwealth, such an
act, unaccompanied by an injury to, or by a design to injure, some other person, is criminal; and although it is
alleged by the innuendo, that the defendant meant and intended to charge the plaintiff with having done this act wilfully and maliciously, yet the words do not thereby acquire
any force or meaning which they had not in themselves, th6
office of an innuendo being only to make more plain what
is contained in the words themselves as spoken, not to enlarge or extend their meaning or give them a sense which
they do not bear when taken by themselves without the aid
of an innuendo. The words spoken, as stated in this count,
These words are innocent in
are simply, "He burnt it."
themselves, though they may have a defamatory meaning,
if they relate to any subject the burning of which is unlawful. In order to give them that character, that they may be
actionable, the plaintiff should have set forth in a colloquium the circumstances which would render such a burning unlawful, or by an averment in the preceding part of
his count, without the form of a colloquium, and then should
have averred that the words spoken were of and concerning
Thus, if goods belonging to another
those circumstances.
person were in the store, or if goods belonging to the plaintiff had been insured, it should have been averred that such
was the case, and that the words spoken related to a store
with such goods in it. But there is nothing in the count
which indicates that any goods were in the store, or that
any damage had happened or was designed towards anyone
but the plaintiff himself; so that the whole accusation
against him, as represented in this count, is that he wilfully
and maliciously burnt his own store.
The words as
The second count is equally defective.
stated in the count, without the innuendoes, are, "There
is no doubt in my mind that he burnt it ; he would not have
got his goods insured if he had not meant to burn it."
These words, without a colloquium, or some averment in
the count to which thev mav ha rafc^r-vaA^ are wholly sense-
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They are alleged to have been spoken of and concerning the plaintiff, but that alone does not make them
more intelligible ; and there is nothing in the count to show
what it is that was burnt, whether a dwelling house, ship or
store, or whether any goods were actually insured or not.
But as in the innuendo in this count the defendant is stated
to have meant "the plaintiff's store aforesaid," this count
may be helped by referring to the colloquium in the first
count, so that the charge may be taken to be, that the plaintiff had burnt his own store in Alford, which had before
that time been consumed by fire. This, however, leaves the
second count in the same predicament with the first, except that the words are, "there is no doubt in my mind that
he burnt it," instead of the more direct charge, "He burnt
it. ' ' There is here no charge of any crime or off en,ce, there
being no prohibition in the law against a man's burning his
own store, if no one be injured or endangered thereby. It
is, however, further added in this count, that in connection
with the words, "There is no doubt in my mind he burnt
less.

it,"

the defendant said, "He would not have got his goods
insured if he had not meant to burn it."
Had there been
in
this
colloquium
or the preceding count, relative to
any
.goods in the store which had been insured, the action might
have been saved on this count; but there is no such colloThe count, therefore, with, the aid of the colloquium.
quium, stands thus: "There is no doubt in my mind that
he burnt his store in Alford, he would not have got his
goods insured if he had not meant to burn it."
What
goods? may be asked; and where were they? No answer
can be given from the declaration, and therefore there is
nothing to show that the burning the store, if the charge
was true, was criminal. The innuendo, it is true, makes
the application of these words, by stating that the defendant meant thereby certain goods which the plaintiff had
previously procured to be insured, and which were lodged
in the said store; but the difficulty is, that this matter is
not proper to be alleged by an innuendo, the office or use
of which, according to all the authorities, is not to enlarge
or add anything to, but to make more clear by explanation,
the sense of words averred to have been spoken.
*

*

*

The words must be averred to have been spoken
concerning
of and
the plaintiff, and of his trade, profes-
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sion or occupation, if he is slandered in those respects, and
where the words standing by themselves have no sense or
meaning, but with reference to some particular subject are
slanderous, there must be a colloquium or averment, setting forth that subject, and an apt reference to
showing
that the words spoken were of and concerning it. Examples are too numerous in the books of pleading to make
necessary to quote any of them here.
The case of Rex v. Home, decided in the House of Lords,
as reported in Cowper, 672, has settled the doctrine; and
the opinion of all the judges as delivered by Lord Chief
Justice DeGeey, was calculated, by its sound sense and able
commentary upon technical rules, to put at rest all questions upon the subject in England. He says, "As to the
matter to be charged, whatever circumstances are necessary to constitute the crime imputed, must be set out; and
"Where the circumstances
all beyond are surplusage."
crime they must be set out." Where the
go to constitute
crime
of such circumstances, they
independently
crime
may aggravate, but do not contribute to make the offense."
the terms of writing are general, or ironical, or spoken
by way of allusion or reference, although every man who
reads such writing may put the same construction upon
by understanding something not expressed in direct
matter of crime, and the party liable
being
words and
there wants something more. It ought
to be punished for
just;
judicial sense, whether the application
to receive
and the fact, or the nature of the fact, on which that deto be determined by jury. But a jury cannot take
pends,
unless
appears upon the record which
cognizance of
cannot do without an averment."
certainly giving a very sensible and intelligible
This
reason for the use of colloquiums in actions for slander,
undoubtedly applicable to actions
for the same doctrine
for words, as to actions or indictments for libels. It
founded upon the necessity of certainty in the declaration,
one of the first requisites in pleading.
and that
With respect to the manner of putting upon the record
those facts and circumstances which tend to render the
must be by
words actionable, the same great judge says,
averments in opposition to argument and inference, by way
new matter, and by way of innuendo,
of introduction,
only matter of explanation, for an innuendo means
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nothing more than the words, "id est," "sciUcet," or
"meaning," or "aforesaid," as explanatory of a subjectmatter sufficiently expressed before; as such a one, meaning the defendant, or such a subject, meaning the subject
in question. He then refers to Barham's case, in Coke,
which is cited in all the books in illustration of this doctrine. "He has burnt my barn, meaning a barn full of
corn." This is bad, because what comes in under the innuendo is an addition to, and not an explanation of the
words spoken ; though had there been in a preceding count
referred to in this, a colloquium respecting the plaintiff's
bam, fuU of corn, which had been burnt, the innuendo, by
reference to the colloquium, would have been holden good.

Vid. Tindall v. Moore, 2 Wils. 114. The case of Barham
V. Nethersall, is better reported in Telverton, 22, where it
is said, "if the words before the innuendo do not sound in

is

it

a

is a
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slander, no words produced by the innuendo will make the
action maintainable ; for it is not the nature of an innuendo
to beget an action."
Now let the second count in the declaration be tried by
these principles. It is very clear, as before stated, that
without the innuendo there is not sufficient matter averred.
The words are, as aided by the colloquium in the first count,
"There is no doubt in my mind that he burnt his store in
Alford; he would not have got his goods insured if he had
not meant to burn it."
This amounts to a direct charge
of his having burnt the store, and an insinuation of a
motive ; but still it imports no crime unless the goods were
in the store, or unless the plaintiff meant to avail himself
of his insurance by defrauding the underwriters by means
of the fire. It ought to appear somewhere in the shape of
an averment of some kind, and not by argument or inferwere inence, that goods in the store, or connected with
sured. This does nowhere appear except in the innuendo.
The words of that &re, "Meaning goods which the plaintiff
had caused to be insured and which were lodged in said
Is this new matter added to the words, or
store."
an
explanation of their sense?
merely
Clearly the former, because the words contained in the
count are not capable of such
construction by themselves.
The matter in the innuendo
new fact not appearing
before in any shape.
The count contains an insinuation
only; and
not possible, by any mode of reasoning, to
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infer from anything contained in
as
fact, that the
plaintiff had goods in his store which were insured.
The general counts are decidedly bad, for they contain

nothing more than the allegation, that the defendant said
he had burnt his own store which, for the
reason before given,
not actionable.
The judgment must therefore be arrested. If the plain^
tiff has suffered serious injury, another action may give
him indemnity. In matter of technical law, the rule
of
more consequence than the reason of it; and however we
may lament the lost labor and expense of the suit, we find
ourselves wholly unable to prevent it.
Judgment arrested.
a
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a
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of the plaintiff,

Invasion of Eight and Breach of Duty.
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Teeat, C. J.: This was an action for slander, brought
by Sanford against Gaddis.
The declaration alleged that
the defendant said of the plaintiff, in reference to testimony given by him as a witness in
judicial proceeding,
"You swore false." The proof was, that the defendant
said of the plaintiff, immediately after he had testified as
witness in the case referred to, "You have sworn false."
The court excluded the evidence on the ground of variance
assigned for error.
and that decision
It
well-established rule in actions for slander that
the allegations and proofs must agree. The plaintiff must
prove the words alleged in the declaration or so much of
not enough
them as will sustain his cause of action. It
to prove other words of like import and meaning. Equivalent words or expressions will not suffice. All of the words
takes all of them to
averred need not be proved, unless
constitute the slander. And proof of additional words will
not vitiate, unless they so qualify the words alleged as not
to /amount to the slanderous

charge.

For

example:

"If
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the words laid are, "He stole a large amount of money,"
the action is sustained by proof of the words, "He stole
money."
The words proved are those alleged, and they
are of themselves actionable.
So if the words laid are,
"He is a thief," the declaration is supported by proving
the words "He is a thief, for he stole money." The words
alleged are proved, and their sense is not varied by the additional words. But if the words laid are, "He is a
thief," proof of the words, "He is a thief, for he
bought the property and refused to pay the price,"
will not sustain the action. The additional words so qualify those alleged as not to impute the crime of larceny. A
count for words spoken affirmatively is not sustained by
proof of words spoken in the way of interrogatory. And
proof of words spoken to a person will not support a count
for words spoken of a person. MaitloMd v. Goldney, 2
East, 426; Rex v. Berry, 4 Durnford & East, 217; Barnes
V. Holloway, 8 id. 150; Opwood v. BarJces, 4 Bingham, 261;
Johnson v. Tait, 6 Binney, 121 ; Fox v. Vanderbeck, 5 Cowen,
513; Olmsted v. Miller, 1 Wendell, 506; Williams v. Bryant, 4 Alabama, 44; Easley v. Moss, 9 id. 226; Wheeler
V. Robb, 1 Blackford, 330; Linville v. Earlywine, 4 id. 469;
Crulman v. Maries^ 7 id. 281; Watson v. Meesick, 2 Missouri, 29; Berry v. Dryden, 7 id. 324; Slocum v. Kaykendall, 1 Scammon, 187; Patterson v. Edv>a/rds, 2 GUman,
720.

In

this case, the words proved, under the circumstances
of the speaking, had the same meaning as those laid in the
declaration, and equally imputed the crime of perjury. But
they were not the same words.
They were at most only
equivalent words. They were not in themselves actionable.
There was a clear variance between the words laid and
those proved, and the court was right in excluding the evidence from the jury.
The judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
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Eill,

1842,

282.

J. :

Althougli the declaration is
but a clumsy performance in the way of special pleading,
am inclined to think it suflScient after verdict. The objections to it are. 1. The want of an averment that the
words were spoken of and concerning the plaintiff. • * •
In actions for verbal slander, the usual course is, to allege a colloquium of and concerning the plaintiff, and then
to follow it by an averment that the words were spoken of
and concerning the plaintiff.
The pleader in this case has,
in all the counts, stated a discourse of and concerning the
plaintiff, but he has not followed it by an averment that
the words were spoken of the plaintiff. It was thought at
an early day that the laying of a colloquium of the plaintiff was indispensable in all cases. But in Smith v. Ward
(Cro. Jac. 674), it was held, on a motion in arrest of judgment, that the omission of the colloquium was not fatal
where the words were alleged to have been spoken of the
plaintiff, and their application to him was sufficiently apparent. The declaration in that case was, that the defendant said of the plaintiff, "He" (innuendo the plaintiff)
"is a thief." This was held sufficient after verdict; and
would now, I think, be held good on demurrer. (See 1
Chit. PI. 432, ed. of '37; 2 id. 306, 7, note (g), ed. of '19;
Stark, on Slander, 283, 4.)
The pleader in this case had laid a colloquium, but he
has omitted the more important averment that the words
were spoken of and concerning the plaintiff. These words,
says Mr, Chitty, are very material.
(2 Chit. PI. 312, n.
But in a subsequent edition he says,
(g), ed. of '19.)
"the declaration must show by a colloquium, or otherwise,
that the words were spoken, or the libel was composed and
published, of and concerning the plaintiff."
(1 Chit. PI.

I

of '37;

id. 623, notes (d) and (1) ; and p. 635, note
(w).) And upon principle it would seem to be sufficient,
especially after verdict, that it appears in any way that the
This has
slanderous words were spoken of the plaintiff.
432, ed.

2
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averment.
(Com. Dig, Defam. Gr. 7.) But Serjeant Williams, who is
good authority, thinks it enough, after verdict, that a colloquium concerning the plaintiff is laid, without any more
direct averment that the words were spoken of the plaintiff. Indeed, he thinks the defect should be pointed out by
Stark,
special demurrer.
(1 Saund, 242, note (3), And see
on Sland. '284, 5.)
But, however that may be, if it appears with reasonable certainty on looking at the whole
count, that the words were spoken of the plaintiff, that must
be enough after verdict, although the averment is not made
in the most skillful manner.
undoubtedly

been regarded

WAEE

V.

as an indispensable

CAETLEDGE.

Supreme Court of Alahama.
24

Alabama,

1854.
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LiGON, J, : The demurrer to the declaration, and to each
The only objection
count of
was correctly overruled.
taken to
as a whole, or to any of its several counts, is,
that in that portion of
in which the speaking and publishof
the
slanderous
words
averred, they are averred
ing
to have been spoken in the presence of a person whose name
left blank. The words spoken are, actionable in themsufficient to aver that they were spoken
selves, and
and published of and concerning the plaintiff. This averment necessarily implies the presence of some one, to whom,
or in whose presence, publicity was given to the charge.
set forth in the declaration,
The name of such person,
would not render
necessary for the plaintiff to prove
that the words were spoken to him, or in his presence, bethe testimony
fore she would be entitled to recover but
different
showed that they were spoken to another and
individual,
would suffice. The injury complained of is,
not that the defamatory words were spoken to this or that
individual, but that publicity had been maliciously given
false charge against the plaintiff.
by the defendant to
How,
Eliz.
861; Starkie on Slander, 460.
Cro.
Taylor v.
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v.

BQTTOMLY.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
80

8Td

1894.

Maryland, 159.

Betak, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
As this case comes before us, the declaration contains

only one count, and the question of its sufficiency is presented by a demurrer. This demurrer was sustained by
the court below, and the plaintiff has appealed. The declaration averred that the plaintiff was in the employment of
one Chard, and stood high in his regard and esteem, and
that the defendant had so great an influence over Chard
that he was afraid to offend him, and that the defendant
maliciously intending to alienate the regard and esteem of
the said Chard from the plaintiff, and maliciously intending to effect his discharge by Chard from his employment,
maliciously wrote and caused to be delivered to Chard a
letter in the following words: "John (meaning the plaintiff) has said something hear of late which I (meaning the
defendant) do not like, and myself (meaning the defendant) nor Lethia (meaning defendant's wife) shall never
pact our foot on the place (meaning the property of said
Chard) as long as (meaning the plaintiff) stays their. For
they are to bad to mention."
The declaration further avers that by reason of the letter, and without any other reason whatever, Chard discharged the plaintiff from his employment, and the plaintiff lost his regard and esteem.
The letter, mentioned in the declaration, stated to Chard
the defendant's displeasure at something which the plain-

tiff was alleged to have said. It was described

as something

too bad to mention. The declaration does not aver that the
defendant falsely charged the plaintiff with using the bad
language attributed to him. The law doesi not assume that
the charge was false in the absence of an averment to that
effect. It must pass judgment on the pleading according to
the facts which it sets forth. A true statement in regard to
plaintiff's language certainly would not subject the defendant to a liability to damages. The plaintiff would have no
legal cause of complaint if he were truly reported as having used very offensive language. Nor can the defendant
be regarded as culpable, because he expressed his indigna-
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tion to be so great that he -would have no intercourse with
him, not even to the extent of visiting the place where the
plaintiff was staying. A man certainly has a right to be
indignant when foul language is used respecting him, and
to make known to his friends and acquaintances and the
public generally that his resentment is so great that he will
not go to any place where he would be apt to meet the person who had offered him. This seems to be the overt act
which has caused the damage of which the plaintiff complains. If the defendant's letter had charged the plaintiff
with conduct which would justly incur scorn and contempt,
and would render him unfit for social intercourse; if it had
even charged him with the commission of an atrocious
felony, he could, nevertheless, maintain no action against
the defendant if the charge should be proved true at the
trial. It is well known that the truth of the offensive words,
written or spoken, is a complete justification for the use
of them. The rules of practice require the justification to
be specially pleaded. This is the technical form of presenting the defence on the face of the record ; but this mode of
proceeding is the result of another technical rule, and in no
way detracts from the force and effect of the truth as an
element in the case, which is destructive of the plaintiff 's
right of action.
We have implied, in what has been said, that the
declaration did not show a cause of action, inasmuch as it
did not aver that the words of the defendant's letter were
An examination of the approved precedents will
false.
show that in them the words which are the subject of complaint are usually charged as "false, scandalous and defamatory." * * * According to the technical rule which
we have mentioned, when the defamatory
words are
charged in the declaration to be false, the falsity is admitted, unless there is a plea specially alleging that they are
true. But if the words are determined to be true, it is of no
avail to allege that they were malicious, or that they caused
damage to the plaintiff.
The demurrer was properly sustained, and the judgment
will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.'
Falsity, not malice, the gist of the action. Lokd Hekschell, in Allei
Mood (1898) 1 A. C. 125, 126: "Some of the learned judges cite aetioni
of libel and slander a: instances in. which the legal liability depends on tlu
5.
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presence or absence of malice.
think this a mistake.
The man who defames
another by false allegations is liable to an action, however
good his motive,
and however honestly he believed in the statement
he made.
It is true that
m a limited class of cases the law, under certain
circumstances, regards the
occasion as privUeged, and exonerates the person who has made false
defamatory statements from liability if he has made them in good faith. But if
there be not that duty or interest which in law creates the
privilege, then,
though, the person making the statement may have acted from the best of
motives, and felt it his duty to make them, he is none the less liable.
The
gist of the action is that the statement was false and defamatory.
Because
in a strictly limited class of cases the law allows the defense that the statements were made in good faith, it seems to me, with all deference, illogical
to afSrm that malice constitutes one of the elements of the torts known to the
law as libel and slander.'

GEIFFIN

V.

GILBEET.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

1859.

28 Connecticut, 493.

Storks, C. J. : Tlie only question made by the plaintiff in
error, is, wlietlier the declaration on which judgment was
rendered in this case is defective, for the reason that the
last count in it is in case, and for a different cause of action
from that, which is set forth in the other two counts with
which it is united, and which are confessedly in trespass.
We are clearly of the opinion that the third count, properly considered, is in trespass and not in case, and that
therefore its joinder with the others is allowable at common
law. As a count in trespass it is obviously very informal,
and omits several technical expressions which are usually
introduced in such a count ; such as that the acts were done
with force and arms, and against the peace, and that the
defendant broke and entered the plaintiff's close or land.
But as to the two first of these phrases, it is well settled
that, if they ought to be inserted, their omission is a mere
formal defect, of which advantage can be taken only by
special demurrer ; and as to the other, we are aware of no
rule or decision which requires the injury to be described
exclusively by those very terms, and are of opinion that any
other language which imports a forcible and unlawful entry
upon the land is substantially sufficient. That the language
used in this count plainly describes such an entry, we have
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It

states that the plaintiff was in the lawful possession of the land on which the acts complained of were
done ; that those acts were the wrongful and wanton plowing and digging of a large and deep ditch on the land, and
digging and drawing a large rock from the highway and
placing the same and a large quantity of stones upon the
land, and that those acts were done wrongfully and wantonly and without law or right. We cannot doubt that a
declaration thus setting forth, not by way of inducement,
but directly and as a matter of complaint, acts of such a
character, should be deemed to describe a cause of action
for those acts;, rather than for their consequences merely,
and so to be a declaration in trespass rather than in case ;
and that a statement of those consequences
should be
viewed, not as a description of the cause of action upon
which the plaintiff intends to rely as the principal ground
of recovery, but as a statement of the result of the acts constituting such cause of action, and introduced only for the
purpose of laying the foundation for a recovery of damages
for those results, for which otherwise the pleader might
suppose no recovery could be had in the action.
There is therefore nothing erroneous in the judgment
complained of.
no doubt.

Judgment affirmed.

DUGGAN

V.

WRIGHT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
157 Massachusetts,

1892.

228.

Tort. The declaration was as follows: "And the plaintiff says that the defendant has converted to his own use
one meat cart, one spring wagon, one meat box sleigh, the
property of the plaintiff. " * * *

Bakkeb, J. * * * The allegation that the defendant
has converted the plaintiff's property to his own use is not
an allegation of a conclusion of law, but of a fact which may
be described as composite, and it allows evidence to be introduced of aU s.uch imjustified dealing with the property
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uamed as may tend to show a wrongful taking and disposal
of it to the prejudice of the plaintiff's rights. Wells v.
Connable, 138 Mass. 513. The allegation that the property
converted was the property of the plaintiff is not an averment that the plaintiff was absolute owner, but makes adloissible any evidence showing that the plaintiff stood in
such a relation to the property that she has a right to maintain the action. * * •

JACKSON

V.

CASTLE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 1888.
80

Maine, 119.

J.: Does the plaintiff's declaration set out a
cause of action? It charges in substance that the plaintiff,
being lawfully in a public street with his two-horse team,
suffered special damage in the loss of a horse by reason of
both horses taking fright at the defendant's sliding in the
same street with others engaged in boisterous outcries incident to their sport.
Sliding in a street accompanied with boisterous conduct
Haskeltj,

a

;

a

a

it,

is not necessarily unlawful. Nor is it necessarily a public
The averment that defendant's acts were "connuisance.
trary to law" does not help the plaintiff's case. It is merely
a conclusion that he draws from the facts stated. If the
the court cannot adopt it.
facts do not warrant
Sliding in street, accompained with boisterous conduct
calculated to frighten horses lawfully travelling therein,
public nuisance but there is no such averment in
may be
the declaration. Sliding may be prohibited in streets by
city ordinance, and a violation of the same would be evidence tending to show negligence. If the plaintiff would recover, he must show negligent or unlawful conduct to be
the proximate cause of his injury.
Plaintiff nonswi.
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THE LAFLIN AND BAND POWDER COMPANY
TEABNEY.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
131

Illinois,

v.

1890,

322.

J.,

delivered the opimon of the conrt :
This is an action on the ease brought in the superior court
of Cook county by the appellee against the appellant company to recover damages to the dwelling, bam and other
outhouses upon the premises of appellee, resulting from the
explosion of a powder magazine upon the premises of apMAGEtTDER,

pellant

•

•

•

It is claimed by the appellant that the declaration does
not set out a cause of action. The first objection made to
the declaration is that it does not charge the defendant with
negligence. The objection is not well taken.
The powder magazine kept by the defendant upon its
premises was so situated with reference to the dwelling
house of the plaintiff, that it was liable to inflict serious injury upon her person or her property in case. of an explosion. It was a private nuisance, and, therefore, the defendant was liable whether the powder was carefully kept or
not. As a general rule, the question of care or want of care
is not involved in an action for injuries resulting from a
nuisance.
actual injury result from the keeping of
gunpowder, the person keeping it will be liable therefor,
even though the explosion is not chargeable to his personal
negligence. (Woods's Law of Nuisance (1st Ed.), §§ 73, 115,
130, 142; Eeeg v. LicM, 80 N. Y. 579; Cheatham v. Shear on,
1 Swan (Tenn.), 213; Stout v. McAdam, 2 Scam. 67; Ottawa
Gas Co. p. Thompson, 39 111. 600; Nevins v. City of Peoria,
41 id. 502 ; Cooper v. Randall, 53 id. 24 ; Myers v. Malcorn, 6
Hill. 292; Hay v. Cahoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159; Phinney v.
Augusta, 47 Ga. 263; Burton v. McClellan, 2 Scam, 434;
Weir's Appeal, 74 Penn St. 230.)
The second objection to the declaration is that it does
not specifically aver the powder magazine to be a nuisance.
It was not necessary to use the word, "nuisance," if the

If
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facts alleged constituted a nuisance. The declaration avers,
that it was the duty of the defendant to so use its premises
as not to jeopardize the buildings of the plaintiff, and not
to store upon its premises any dangerous substance whereby plaintiff'si property might be destroyed in case of an
explosion; that the defendant did keep upon its premises
a magazine of gunpowder, dynamite, etc., and stored therein a large amount of gunpowder, dynamite, etc.; that the
gunpowder, djTiamite, etc., so kept upon said premises exploded, and that, by means of such explosion, ' ' the material
of which such magazine was consitructed was then and
there driven with great force and violence upon and against
the property of the plaintiff hereinbefore described," and
that "the following property of the plaintiff was by means
of such explosion struck by flying missiles, rocks and stones,
and was wrecked and torn by means of the concussion of
the air, then and there caused by said explosion, and was
totally destroyed and lost, and was of great value, to-wit:
One two-story frame dwelling," etc. "A private nuisance
is defined to be anything done to the hurt or annoyance of
the lands, tenements or hereditaments of another, (3 Bl.
Com. 216.) Any unwarrantable, unreasonable' or unlawful
use by a person of his own property, real or personal, to
the injury of another, comes within the definition stated,
and renders the owner or possessor liable for all damages
arising from such use." {Heeg v. Licht, supra.)
The averments of the declaration bring the present case
within the definition thus quoted. The fact that the magaThe fact that
zine exploded shows that it was dangerous.
the explosion destroyed the plaintiff's buildings, shows,
that the keeping of gunpowder in the magazine, considered
with reference to "the locality, the quantity and the surrounding circumstances," constituted a nuisance per se
{Heeg V. Licht, supra; Wood's Law of Nuisance, § 142,

supra).
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TOLEDO, WABASH AND WESTEEN RAILWAY
COMPANY V. FOSS.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
88

Illinois,

1878.

551.

Ceaig, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action, brought by appellee, to recover for
a personal injury received while a passenger on appellant's
and Springfield, on the
road, between Jacksonville
20th day of March, 1874. The declaration contains two
counts. In the first one it is averred that defendant negligently and carelessly ran the train of cars, on which plaintiff was a passenger, violently against and upon a horse,
by means whereof the car of the train occupied by plaintiff
was thrown from the track, by means whereof plaintiff was
injured, etc. The second count is like the first one, except
it is averred the defendant willfully ran the train upon the
horse. Under this declaration, the plaintiff could not recover on account of any negligence of the railroad company
other than that alleged. The allegation and proof must
correspond. The plaintiff could not aver negligence in one
particular, and, on the trial, prove that defendant was negligent in another regard. One object' of a declaration is,
to state the facts relied upon for a recovery so plainly that
the defendant may be prepared to meet them. This object in pleading would be entirely defeated if a plaintiff had
tlie right to aver in his declaration one ground of action,
and, on the trial, prove another and different one.
On the trial of the cause, the court permitted the plaintiff to prove the railroad track was not properly fenced;
that a gate was down, so that animals could go upon the
load, and, also, permitted the plaintiff to show the train
was not provided with steam brakes.
This testimony was
If the plaintiff based his right of action upon
improper.
the negligence of the defendant in failing to use proper machinery in the equipment of its trains, or, in neglecting to
make or keep in repair fences sufficient to keep animals
off its track, the established rules of pleading required him
to aver these facts in his declaration, so that the defendant
might, on the trial, be prepared to meet them by proof. Illi'
'
nois Central Railroad Co. v. McKee, 43 lU. 120.
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This error in the admission of improper evidence was

followed by an erroneous instruction upon the same point,
which was as follows :
"The court further instructs the jury, for the plaintiff,
that every man who has a sound physical system and healthy
body, and the free use of his limbs, has the right to retain
them, and their use and enjoyment, in any proper, lawful
and useful manner; and a railroad company, when transporting such person for hire, has no right to deprive such
person of his health, or the free use of any limb, under any
circumstances, when, by the use of proper appliances,
whether it be air brakes or other improved means of managing a train to avoid accident, or whether it be by the
employment of one skillful and trusty brakeman to every
two cars in a passenger train, or by other means reasonable
and proper, such injury would be prevented; and if the
jury believe that said defendant was guilty of negligence
in any of the particulars above mentioned, in the operation of its said train on which plaintiff was, and that, by
reason of such negligence, the plaintiff was deprived of the
free use of one of his shoulders, then the jury should find
their verdict for the plaintiff."
It will be observed that the only negligence averred in the
declaration is, that the defendant carelessly ran its train
Under this averupon which plaintiff was a passenger.
no
to
consider
negligence of
right
had
jury
any
the
ment,
the defendant in its failure to use air brakes or other proper
machinery which might have added to the safety or security
of the passenger; yet the jury were told by the instruction, if the injury arose from such negligence, the plaintiff
If authority is necessary to conwas entitled to recover.
demn the instruction, we will content ourselves by referring
to two decisions of this court, which fully settle the question : Central Military Tract Railroad Co. v. Rockafellow,
17 111. 541; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v.
Magee, 60 id. 529.

For

**********

the errors indicated, the judgment wUl be reversed
and the cause remanded.*
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence and not a rule
6.
of pleading, and it does not in any way exempt the plaintiff from the necesSee note to Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. Ey. Co. v.
sity of alleging negligence.
Hadley (1908) 16 L. E. A. (N. S.) 527.

Common Law Pleading.

388

STRAIN

V.

4

STRAIN.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
14

[Chap.

Illinois,

1853.

368.

Caton, J. : The demurrer to this declaration was properly sustained. It fails to show the prop er fiPTinoptinn Kp.
tween the defendant's act, or his negligenc e, and the inj ury
to the plaintiff's mare. The most that it charges is, that
the defendant wrongfully put his horse into the plaintiff's
stable, where his mare was confined; "and so carelessly and
negligently behaved and conducted himself, that the said
mare of the plaintiff then and there was greatly torn,
kicked," etc. What kicked the mare is not shown; whether
the defendant, or his horse, or something else, is left to conjecture. The gist of the complaint is, that the defendant so
cai^elessly conducted himself that the plaintiff's mare was
injured, but how or in what way his carelessness contribu ted
to jJ2^ JTli'Try, ^« ^"^ sTinwn
Under this declaration one
act of carelessness might be proved as well as another. It
fails to show what specific act the plaintiff might be called
on to meet. For aught that appears in this declaration,
there may have been no connection whatever between the
act of putting the horse in the stable and the injury to the
mare. Something altogther foreign from that act may have
produced the injury. The declaration should have shown in
what way the careless or negligent conduct of the defendant contributed to, or produced the injury complained of.
The same omission to show in what way the careless acts
of the defendant produced the injury is observable in each
of the counts of the declaratioii.
The judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

DI MAROHO

v.

BUILDERS' IRON FOUNDRY.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
18 Rhode

1893.

Island, 514.

Trespass on the case for negligence causing personal inOn demurrer to the declaration.

jury to the plaintiff.
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Pee Ctjkiam. We think that the amended
declaration is defective. The allegation against the defendant is that the corporation threw or caused to he thrown a
box, etc. Since a corporation can act only through a servant the allegation is ia effect that the box was thrown or
caused to be thrown by a servant of the corporation. The
plaintiff alleges that he was a servant of the corporation
engaged in his employment at the time of receiving the
injuries of which he complains. It follows, therefore, that
the act which occasioned the injuries was the act of a fellow-servant, for which the corporation prima facie at least
was not liable.
We think it is necessary in order to state a case, that the
declaration should set forth the relation to the corporation of the person who threw the box or caused it to be
thrown, so that it may appear that he was not a fellowservant with the plaintiff within the rule exempting the
master from liability for injury resulting from the act of a
fellow-servant, or if a fellow-servant that the defendant
was negligent in employing him or retaining him in its
12, 1893.

service.

Demurrer to amended declaration sustained.

THE EAST ST. LOUIS AND CARONDELET RAILWAY COMPANY.

McGANAHAN

v.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
72

Illinois,

1874.

557.

Cbaig, J., delivered the opinion of the court
This was an action on the case, brought to recover damages for an injury received by the plaintiff in coupling
cars of the defendant. A demurrer was filed to the declaration, which was sustained. The plaintiff brings the record
here by appeal, and assigns for error the decision of the
court in sustaining the demurrer.
The declaration contains but one count, in which it is
averred that, on the 17th of March, 1873, the defendant
employed the plaintiff as a brakeman, and that it was his
duty to couple together the cars of defendant; that while
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only ordinary wages, and
did not assume any special risks, but only such as were ordinarily incident to such employment; that it was the duty
of the defendant to furnish suitable cars and appliances,
so as to enable him to perform his duty with safety; that
defendant did not furnish safe and suitable cars, but negligently furnished a car for the transportation of certain
railroad iron, which was unsafe; that the car was much
shorter than the iron, so that the iron projected over the
ends of the car, thereby rendering it unsafe and dangerous
to plaintiff while in the performance of his duty, all of
which the defendant well knew ; that while the plaintiff was
coupling two of defendant's cars, one of which was a box
car, on its track, and the other was a rear car of a train
attached to an engine of defendant, which engine and train
he was so engaged, he received

were being backed up by defendant to be coupled to the
bos car, he necessarily had to go between the cars to couple
them; that while his attention was wholly absorbed in
watching the signals from the train, which was backing up,
and while he was between the cars for the purpose of
making the coupling, the cars came violently together, and
while he was using all due care, and without fault or negligence on his part, without any knowledge or notice whatever that the iron bars were projecting over the end of the
car at the time, etc., but by reason of the negligence of the
defendant, he had his right hand caught between said cars,
and thereby mangled and hurt, etc.
The declaration cannot be held sufficient. The only act
of negligence on the part of the defendant, of which the
plaintiff seems, by his declaration, to complain, is, the car
upon which the iron was loaded was too short, and the iron
projected over the end of the car.
While this may be conceded to be an act of negligence on
the part of the defendant, yet, unless this negligence of
the defendant contributed, in some degree, to the injury received by plaintiff, then it certainly could be no ground of
recovery.
The declaration does not aver that the pladntiff was injured by the iron projecting over the end of the car. The
substance of the averment is, that the cars came violently
together, and his hand was caught between the cars and injured while he was in the act of coupling the cars. For
aught that we are able to perceive, this would as readily
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no iron had been projecting over the end of the

The plaintiff entirely fails, by his declaration, to show
that the injury received was occasioned by the negligence
he attributes to the defendant.
This objection to the declaration we regard as fatal.
The judgment of the circuit court will, therefore, be
af-

firmed.

EIBEL

V.

VON

FELL.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
63

New Jersey Law,

1899,

3.

Magie, C. J.: The demurrer is mterposed to a declaration which contains two counts.
If either count is free from objection the demurrer must
be overruled. Perdicaris v. Trenton, etc., Co., 5 Dutcher,
367; Beavers v. Trimmer, 1 id. 97; Belton v. Gibbon, 7
Halst. 76.
My examination of the first count of the declaration has
led me to the conclusion that it exhibits a good cause of
action, not, as claimed in plaintiff's brief, for a false warranty, but for deceit.
It is settled in this court that to support an action for
deceit there must appear a false representation made with
If
a fraudulent intent, producing injury to the plaintiff.
it appear that the falsity of the representation was known
to defendant the fraudulent intent is deemed to be conclusively established. If, however, the representation made by
defendant, though false, was not known by him to be false,
the action can only be supported by proof that it was made
malo animo and with intent to deceive. Cowley v. Smyth,
17 Vroom, 380.
It follows that a good cause of action for deceit may be
set out without a charge that the representation alleged to
be false was Imown. by defendant to be so, provided it is
charged that the false representation was fraudulently
made. As was said in the leading case of Pauley v. Freemati, 3 T. E. 51, in respect to pleading in this action, "fraud-
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ulenter without sciens or sciens without fraudulenter"

will

be suflScient.

Tested by these rules, the first count of the declaration
manifestly discloses a good cause of action. It charges
that the plaintiffs, at the request of the defendants, bargained for the purchase from defendants of a lot with a

house upon it for a certain price, and that the defendants,
by falsely and fraudulently representing that the house was
new, sold the premises to plaintiffs for the proposed price,
which was paid. Then follows an allegation that the house
was in fact old and its timbers rotten, whereby the plaintiffs were injured. Proof that the representation charged
was made; that it was false in fact; that defendants, although ignorant of its falsity, had made it with intent to
deceive and that the deception had injured plaintiffs, would
justify a recovery. The liability of defendants in such case
is sufficiently and properly characterized in the pleading
as arising upon a representation which was false and also

fraudulent.

For

this reason the demurrer must be overruled.

(I)

Damages.

BECK AND GEEGG HAEDWAEE COMPANY
KNIGHT.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

v.

1904.

121 Georgia, 287.

Lamar, J. : This was an action on a sheriff's bond. The
breach alleged is his failure to levy and return an attachment. No special damages are set forth; and the question
raised is whether there is a presumption that the plaintiff
has been injured to an amount equal to the debt named in
the writ of attachment, or, if not, whether it may maintain
a suit for the recovery of nominal damages. At the outset
it must be conceded that the authorities in England, the
United States, and Georgia are in much conflict. See 2
Sutherland on Damages (3d Ed.), §§ 489-492; Crawford v.
Word, 7 Ga. 445; Hunter v. Phillips, 56 Ga. 636; Eacketi
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Green, 32 Ga. 512. • • • However, in spite of the
conflict and the want of a direct authority, all of the later
cases now point one way.
V.

is

of

4

;

;

1

is

a

is

a

a

it

'

2.

is

fi.

;

is

is

fi.

1. A sheriff is bound to serve original process, and to
execute and return mesne and final process. Both he and
his sureties are liable to any person aggreived by his misconduct in regard thereto.
Colquitt v. Ivey, 62 Ga. 168.
But these writs differ in kind and in effect. The pleadings,
burden of proof, and presumptions likewise, vary according
as the suit is for a breach of duty as to one or the other.
Where the plaintiff has established the validity of his debt,
recovered a judgment, obtained a lien, and places the
fa.
in the hands of the officer for levy and return, and the
sheriff fails to comply with the mandate of the writ, there
not only a breach of duty, but the presumption arises that
the plaintiff has been damaged the amount of the debt.
Wheeler v. Thomas, 57 Ga. 162 (2). The burden
then
upon the sheriff. Reeves v. Parish, 80 Ga. 222 Mullins v.
Bothwell, 29 Ga. 706; Smith v. Banks, 60 Ga. 642; French
V. Kemp, 64 Ga. 750. Under the later cases, he may shift
the burden and rebut the presumption, by proof of facts
mitigating the plaintiff's damages, or by showing that the
money could not have been collected on the
fa. by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
But where, as here, the process
mesne, the rule
different. The plaintiff has not even established the
amount of its debt. It does not follow that
will ever rejudgment, or that the property pointed out as subcover
ject to the attachment would ever be subjected to the payment of the debt. No presumption can arise in favor of
the plaintiff, and none against the officer, in order, therefore, to set out
cause of action, or to recover at the trial,
the plaintiff must aver enough to show that he has been
not
sufficient
actually injured. The ad damnum clause
Walters v. Retail Clerhs Union,
allegation of damages.
424.
The
failure
to show, why, and- to what
Ga.
120
extent the plaintiff has been injured renders the petition
Riggs v. Thatcher, Me. 69; State v. Fleming,
demurrable.
65
Bank
24 N. E.
Hartford v. Waterman, 26 Conn. 325,
W. Va. 721, and Shank333 and especially Brown v. Fry,
lin V. Francis, 59 Mo. App. 179, where the suit was for failure to levy and return a writ of attachment. "The sheriff
liable to an action on the case, or an attachment for con-

394

Common Law Pleading.

[Chap.

-1

tempt of court, wherever it shall appear that he hath injured such party, either by false return or by neglecting
to levy on his property."
To make the sheriff liable for
the breach of duty it is necessary that it should be made
to appear to the court that the plaintiff has been injured.
Eackett v. Green, 32 Ga. 512; Currell v. Phillips, 18 Ga.
469 ; Hunter v. Phillips, 56 Ga. 634.
While these were rulings as to final process, the principle would be even more
strongly applicable to suits for failure to execute mesne
process. In Colquitt v. Ivhy, supra, the case was against
the sheriff for failing to serve original process, causing
the action to be dismissed. It was alleged that the defendant who should have been served had afterwards removed
from the State, that he was solvent, and that the plaintiff
lost a debt he would otherwise have collected. It was held
that the petition as amended set out a cause of action. So
in Snell v. Mayo', 62 Ga. 743, the sheriff failed to arrest the
body of the defendant, or to take bond, or to seize the goods.
The plaintiff recovered a verdict in the bail-trover action,
execution issued for the value of the goods, and there was
a return of nulla bona. The sheriff was held liable for the
The necessity for the proof of actual damages,
damage.
where the officer is sued for failing to return other than
final process, was recognized in the early case of Crawford
V. Anderson, 6 Ga. 247, the court saying, "We hold the law
to be incontrovortibly settled, that for an escape on mesne
process no action lies unless some damage has been sustained, and that the plaintiff is only entitled to recover such
damages as he can show he has sustained." If he must
show it in his proof, he must aver it in his pleadings. The
authorities are in great conflict on this subject, but the
rulings in this State would indicate that as the gist of such
action is the injury done, the plaintiff cannot maintain a
suit for the recovery of nominal damages. There is no
.contract between the citizen and the officer, and therefore
the private individual cannot sue for a mere breach of duty.
There must be injury. Pol. Code, § 12. "A neglect to serve
*
*
*
mesne process is not in itself a legal injury
and
the officer is not liable in nominal damages for neglect to
serve mesne process." Brown v. Jarvis, 1 M. & W. 708;
Bank of Hartford v. Waterman, supra. Where there is
an injury to a right, even independent of actual loss, the
want of injury merely makes the damages nominal.
But
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where the whole gist of the case is the pecuniary damage,
some such damage must he proved, or the action will fail.
2 Suth. Dam. (3d Ed.) 1349.
Of course the court, for its own protection and that of the
puhlic, may proceed against the officer by attachment for
contempt, fine or other appropriate proceedings.
But with
that a plaintiff has nothing to do. He does not stand either
as the direct or indirect guardian of the public, nor is it
for him as an individual to enforce the performance of the
statutory duty. On petition for rule or mandamus a citizen may compel the performance of any duty in which he
has an interest. But when he sues the sheriff for money,
he must show that he has suffered a money loss. He cannot speculate on the officer's neglect or misconduct, so as
thereby to convert what might have been an ineffective suit
against his original debtor into an effective suit for damages against the sheriff. He cannot substitute one cause
of action for the other. It no doubt often happens that
there are technical or even substantial breaches of duty by
officers of court. They may fail to file or docket the petition
at the time and in the manner required by the statute. They
may fail to issue process or subpoena. They may neglect
the
to execute and return writs as directed in the code.
mere breach of duty gave rise to a cause of action regardless of whether it was folowed by injurious consequences
or not^ every such plaintiff might for every such breach
maintain an action and recover nominal damages and cost,
even though the witness may have voluntarily attended,
or the defendant may have appeared and pleaded, or the
execution though delayed may have been levied and the
money collected. Such is not the law. The gist of the action not being the breach but the injury, a petition failing
But
to charge such injury sets out no cause of action.
here, in the face of special and general demurrers pointing
out the defects, the plaintiffs failed to aver that they had
or would have obtained judgment and subjected the property pointed out to levy. They also failed to aver that the
defendants in attachment, were insolvent and nonresident,
or that by reason of the officer's breach they would be unable to collect their debt, or that they had been injured by
the delay, or put to any expense. The matters in aggravation might have authorized a rule, and they might also have
increased the damages if a cause of action had been stated

If
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and proved; but they could not aid an otherwise defective
declaration. The petition must be construed most strongly,
The failure to allege that they had
against the pleader.
been or would be actually damaged rendered it demurrable.
"We do not mean to hold that in every case the original
claim must be sued to judgment and a return of nulla bona
be nlade. The law will not compel the plaintiff to do an
impossible or useless thing. Proper allegations and proof
may supply the need for such allegations.
W. U. Tel. Co.
V. Bailey, 115 Ga. 725 (3) ; Colquit v. Ivey, 62 Ga. 169; Collins V. McDamiel, 66 Ga. 203; Swan v. Bridgeport, 70 Conn.
143.

Judgment affirmed.''
In those actions where a right is deemed to have been invaded without
7.
regard to the question whether any actual damage was done, no allegation
of damages would seem to be necessary in order to state a cause of action.
Such would be the case in slander and libel upon words actionable per se
(Pratt V. Pioneer Press Co. (1886) 35 Minn. 251), and in trespass to person
or property (Bragg v. Laraway (1893) 65 Vt. 673; Tuberville v. Savage
(1681) 1 Mod. 3; Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co. (1838) 3 Summer (U. S. C. C.)
189).
On the other hand, damage is of the gist of many torts, and in such cases
an allegation of damages would seem to be necessary to disclose the existence
of a cause of action. This is true of deceit (Jackson & Sharp Co. v. Fay
(1876) 63
(1902) 20 App. Cas. D. C. 105), nuisance (Campbell v. Seaman
N. T. 568), particularly in cases of public nuisance (Sullivan v. Waterman
(1898) 20 E. I. 372), liiel and slander based on words not actionable per se
v.
(Pollard V. Lyon (1875) 91 U. S. 225), and negligence (Washington
Baltimore, etc. E. Co. (1880) 17 W. Va. 190.
See, also, Howell v. Young (1826) 5 Bam. & Cres. 259, given supra in the
text.

PEGRAM

V.

STORTZ.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
31

,

1888.

West Virginia, 220.

J.:

This action was brought by the plaintiff,
Nancy A. Pegram, against John G. Stortz, a saloon keeper,
for selling intoxicating liquor to her husband after he had
Geeen,

served by her with a written notice not to do so,
whereby he became intoxicated, and by reason thereof injured her in her means of support. The action is given by
a statute passed in 1877.
been
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There is another objection to this count in the
declaration; but, while it is not a fatal objection, it \70uldi
have the effect of confining the plaintiff very much in the
proof she might be allowed to produce before a jury on a
plea of not guilty to such a declaration.
These allegations
in this second count, excluding the portions which I have
shown are surplusage, are, in general terms, that the plaintiff's husband, at divers times prior to a certain time named,
became intoxicated, and by reason thereof did injure the
plaintiff in her means of support, depriving her of food,
clothing, and other necessaries and comforts of life. Under
a general allegation of this character, only general damages, as they may be called — that
such damages as necessarily result from his being drunk— such as helplessness
and incapacity for labor, can be proven, as this would tend,
in some cases, to injure the wife in her means of support,
But, on
as being the result of his incapacity to labor.
general principles of pleading, damages, though the natural
consequence of the drunkenness of the husband,
they are
not necessarily the result of such drunkenness, but are what

is

called "special damages "^such as, for instance, the
spending of his means while drunk, breaking up or destroying property, and the like— cannot be proven unless especially alleged in the declaration. No acts of this sort can
be proven under such a declaration as was filed in this case.
the plaintiff wished to rely on any such grounds, she
should have specified them particularly, so as to give the
defendant notice, and prevent a surprise. What are the
necessary results of drunkenness, such as helplessness, and
presumed to know, and
inability to labor, the defendant
not
they need not be specified in the declaration but he
presumed to know what are not the necessary consequences
of drunkenness, though they may be the natural consequences. These differ very widely. Some are made very
close and miserly by becoming drunk others very prodigal.
Some are made quarrelsome and destructive of all property
is
So
around them; others unusually good-natured.
damages are claimed for acts which are not
obvious that,
the necessary results of the husband's drunkenness, but
only the natural results, they must be specified in the declaration, as wdl as that the plaintiff was thereby injured in
her means of support; and how she was injured by the
specified acts must be stated in the declaration. For the

if

is

it

;

;
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general principles, of pleading wHch lead to these conclusions, see 1 Chit. PI. (4th Ed.) 328, 346^ 347; 2 Greenl. Ev.
§ 254, p. 246; Baher v. Green, 2 Bing. 317; Pindar v. Wadsworth, 2 East, 154; Armstrong v. Percy, 5 Wend. 538, 539;

Dickinson v. Boyle, 17 Pick 78. And for application of
these general principles to cases like the one before us, see
HacJcett v. Smelsley, 77 111. 109; Barndby v. Wood, 50 Ind.
405. But, though in particular cases it may be very desirable for the declaration to specify the particular acts,
whereby the wife was injured in her means of support, yet
the failure to do so will not vitiate the declaration, and a
general declaration that in consequence of the drunkenness
she was injured in her means of support [is good against
a demurrer], though under such a declaration she will be
much restricted in the proofs she may wish to bring before
the jury. For these reasons, the demurrer to the second
count in the declaration was properly overruled.

HEISEE

v.

LOOMIS.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
47

1881.

Michigan, 16.

CooLET, J. : Loomis sued Heiser in trespass for assault
and battery. The evidence tended to show that, on the third
day of August, 1877, Heiser with some other persons suddenly came upon the plaintiff, and with words such as,
have got you where want you now," "We'll give you what
you deserve," proceeded to strike and kick him untU he
was seriously injured. • • *

I

"I

The most important question in the case is whether the
court correctly admitted certain e^ddence of special damThe declaration averred that the plaintiff, because
ages.
of the wounds, bruises and injuries inflicted upon bim by
the defendant "was greatly hindered and prevented from
doing and performing, his work and business and looking
after and attending his necessary affairs and avocations
for a long space of time," etc. The plaintiff testified that
his busiaess was that of a farmer; and under objection he
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was permitted to state that his farm was a grass farm;
that when assaulted he was about half through cutting his
hay; that he was bothered some about help, and that the,
cutting was delayed because of his injury, and that his
crop of hay was damaged in consequence at least fifty dolThe defendant contends that this evidence of injury
lars.^
to his hay was inadmissible, because the declaration contained no special averments which would fairly apprise the
defendant of the purpose to offer it.
We have been very liberal in this State in receiving evidence of special injuries when the declaration averred
them; much more so than the courts of some other States.
The cases of Chandler v. Allison, 10 Mich. 460; Allison v.

Chandler, 11 Mich. 542 ; Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117 ;
and Welch v. Ware, 32 Mich. 77, will sufficiently attest the
fact. The difference in the rules applicable in cases of contract and tort has also been carefully marked and emphasized. Where only a breach of contract is involved, the
defendant is not to be made liable for damages beyond what

may fairly be presumed to have been contemplated by the
parties at the time the contract was entered into. The damage allowed in such cases must be something which could
have been foreseen and reasonably expected, and to which
the defendant can be deemed to have assented, expressly or
impliedly, by entering into the contract. Bovill., Ch. J., in
British, etc., Co. v. Nettleship, L. R. 3 C. P. 499; Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Exch. 344 ; Hopkins v. Sanford, 38 Mich. 611.
But in cases of tort the plaintiff does not assist in making
the case ; it is made for him against his will by a party who
chooses his own time, place, and manner of committing the
wrong, and if the nature of the case which he thus makes up
is such that the elements of injury are uncertain and there
is difficulty in arriving at the just measure of redress, the
"To deny
consequences should fall upon the wrongdoer.
the injured party the right to recover any actual damages
in such cases, because they are of a nature which cannot be
thus certainly measured, would be to enable parties to profit
by, and speculate upon, their own wrongs, encourage vioGilbert v. Kennedy, 22
lence and invite depredation."

Mich. 117,

130.

But where the damages are such as do not follow the injury, as a necessary consequence, they should be specially
alleged in the declaration. This is a rule of fairness, that
'
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the defendant may know what case it is intended to make
against him, and be prepared to meet
false or
falsely colored. In the cases above cited from dnr own reports, the allegations of special damage were very full and
specific. But in this case there
only general allegation
the
plaintiff was prevented from doing and performthat
ing his necessary business and looking after and attending
his necessary affairs and avocations.
This inability may
well be said to flow as a necessary consequence from any
severe injury; and
was therefore held in Tomlinson v.
Derby, 43 Conn. 562, that such an averment could only be
construed as characterizing the injury and indicating its
extent in
general way, and that
did not lay the foundation for proof of special damages in a particular employparticular
ment. Evidence that plaintiff was engaged in
business, at which he was earning one hundred dollars a
month, was therefore excluded in that case, though the
declaration was similar to the one here. Taylor v. Monroe,
43 Conn. 36,
to the same effect. Wade v. Leroy, 20 How.
In Baldwin v.
must
be
as opposed to these.
regarded
34,
Gray, 333, similar evidence was
Western R. R. Corp.,
held inadmissible-, under the general allegation of injury.
The action was for physical injury, and the plaintiff had
been permitted to show that she was by occupation,
school
teacher and possessed the necessary education and learning. The court said the evidence "could have had no relevancy or application to the questions at issue between the
parties, except as forming the basis on which special damages were to be assessed for the injury of which she complained. It did not tend to show an injury falling within
the class of general damages. That class includes only such
damages as any other person, as well as the plaintiff might,
under the same circumstances, have sustained, from the
acts set out in the declaration.
Without determining the
more difficult question whether the evidence would be adclear that this
missible under any form of declaration,
part of the plaintiff's claim could be founded only upon
peculiar loss sustained by her by reason of the interruption
to her occupation resulting from the tortious act of the deThey were therefore in their nature damages
fendants.
not necessarily flowing from the acts set out in the declaration, and of which the defendants could not be supposed to
have notice unless they were properly averred." Evidence
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received in Hanover R. R. Co. v.Coyle, 55
Penn. St. 396, but the report does not give the pleadings.
See also N.
Express Go. v. Nichols, 33 N. J. 434.
The general spirit of our decisions would perhaps lead
to a more liberal rule than that applied in Connecticut as
above shown, but would not, think, support the ruling com^
plained of here. What was the special injury complained
of in the declaration? Only that the plaintiff, by reason of
the battery, was greatly hindered and prevented from doing
and performing his work and business, and looking after
and attending his necessary affairs and avocations.
Did
this fairly apprise the defendant that the plaintiff would
seek to show, not merely that he was disabled from pursuing a particular employment not mentioned, but also
bv rpasoTi of the inability to obtain la borers, hTRproj^"
th?^.f:.
prf.v wpnf to ynin'?
t.hprp is a. nfltnrnl and insepara.ble
connection between the alleged injury and the damage, then
the defendant should have been prepared to meet such showing; otherwise he was entitled to more specific allegations.
But there is no such natural and inseparable connection T
the circumstances must be altogether exceptional which
would cause a farmer to lose his crops because he could not
personally gather them. Indeed, accordi ng to the plaintiff's
showi ng, the circumstances were exceptional here; for the
"injuryto the" Wy is attributed to the difficulty of obtaining
help to save it. But the defendant, had he been apprised of
the purpose to claim for such a damage, might perhaps
have shown that the difficulty was wholly imaginary, ^r
bp ininrflfT
that fbp plaintiff willfully suffered his haj to
when he might h ave avoide d it. It was his rigk't to make
such a showing, if the facts would warrant it. ,^But he could
not be aware of the necessity until he was notified that damage to the hay by reason of the battery was claimed.-^
The judgment, think, should be reversed and a new trial
-was

J.

I

/If

ordered.

aup. n

I
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THE WEST CHICAGO STEEET RAILWAY COMPAl^
V.LEVY.
'Supreme Court of Illinois.
182

Illinois,

1899,

525.

Cahtee, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the appellate court
affirming a judgment of the circuit court of Cook county,
against appellant, for a personal injury.
Appellee was
driving in a buggy on Eobey street when appellant's electric car came up from behind and struck the buggy, threw
appellee out and injured him.
Respecting the injury and damages the declaration
alleged that the plaintiff "was sieverely and dangerously
cut, bruised, wounded and injured, both internally and externally; that plaintiff's back and spine and brain were
thereby then and there severely and dangerously and permanently injured, and divers bones of his body, arms and
limbs were then and there and thereby fractured and
broken, and plaintiff was otherwise severely, dangerously
and permanently injured, both internally and externally;"
that on account of said injuries ' ' plaintiff became sick, sore,
lame, disordered and injured, and so remained for a long
space of time, during which said time he suffered great
bodily pain and mental anguish, and still is languishing and
intensely suffering in body and in mind, and in future will
continue to suffer from the effect of said injuries for the rest
of his natural life." And the principal assignment of error
relied on is that the court permitted the plaintiff to prove
that one of the effects of his injuries was atrophy of the
optic nerve and consequent impairment of his eyesight.
The contention is, that the evidence showed that this condition of the optic nerve was produced by defective nutrition,
and not by any direct injury it received in the accident;
that it was not the natural and necessary result of the injury, and could not therefore be proved under the allegation
of general damages, and, not having been alleged as special
damages, could not be proved at all. We are of the opirion
that the evidence was properly admitted under the allegations. It is not necessary to allege specially every injury
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part of the body, in actions of this character, in
order to prove them on the trial. Injury to the back, spine
and brain was alleged, and the e\idence tended to show
that such injury was the natural and proximate cause of the
defective nutrition to the optic nerve and impairment of the
plaintiff eyesight. The damages claimed, therefore, were
^s
not special, but general, and could be recovered without
being declared for specially.
See Lake Shore and Michigan
Southern Railway Co. v. Ward, 135 111. 511; Chicago and
Erie Railroad Co. v. Meech, 163 id. 305; North Chicago
Street Railroad Co. v. Brown, 178 id. 187; Tyron v. Booth,
100 Mass. 258 ; Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway
Co. V. Blanker, 180 111. 357.
to each

Judgment affirmed.

SCHOFIBLD

V.

FEREERS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
46

1869,

Pennsylvania State, 438.

Strotstg. J. : This was an action of replevin for a horse,
to which the defendant pleaded non cepit, and property in
himself. The declaration averred the taking of a horse of
the value of $150, and an illegal detention. It concluded by
claiming damages in the sum of $1,000. On the trial the
court instructed the jury that, in estimating the damages,
"they were not confined to the value of the horse, but if
they thought the taking of him was accompanied with circumstances of outrage and oppression, they could go be^
yond the value." A verdict having been returned for $250
in favor of the plaintiff below, the defendant has sued out
this writ of error, and he now complains of the instruction
given. It is said that as the declaration contained no count
claiming special damage, nor any averment that the taking
of the horse was accompanied with circumstances of outrage and oppression, the jury were not at liberty to assess
damages beyond the value of the horse. The objection is
In the first place, it is made
untenable for two reasons.
after the evidence of the mode of taking had been received,
And secondly, the
so far as it api)ears, without objection.
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rules of pleading do not require that the circumstances
which attended the taking should be specially averred in
order to entitle! the plaintiff to recover damages commensurate with them. If consequential damages are claimed,
not necessarily or naturally resulting from the tortious act,
they must be specially alleged. But if outrage and oppression attended the taking, they belong to the wrongful act
itself, and are not merely special injury.
That in replevin, damages beyond the value of the property may be given where the taking has been accompanied
with peculiar wrong and outrage, was ruled on abimdant authority in McDonald v. Scaife, 1 Jones, 381.

Judgment affirmed.'
8.

Bat

distinct

Taylor (1848)

acts in aggraTation should be alleged.
122, given infra in the text.

FOREMAN

V.

'

J.,

Boenun

t.

SAWYER

'Supreme Court of Illinois.

Cbaig,

See

19 Conn.

73

Illinois,

1874.

484.

delivered the opinion of the court *

This was an action of covenant, commejiced in the circuit
court of Whiteside county, by George E. Sawyer against
Benjamin S. Foreman.
The ad damnum in the declaration was for only the sum
of $300, while the judgment rendered by the court was
$555.

The law is well settled, that the judgment cannot exceed
the ad dammm laid in the declaration:
Oahes v. Ward, 19
111. 46; Brotm v. Smith, 24 111. 196.
It was, therefore, error for the court to render judgment
for a larger sum than that claimed in the declaration; for

which the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded, with leave to amend the declaration.
Judgment reversed.*

"The rule is well settled, a party may recover less than he claimsis never confined to the precise amount for which he brings suit. "—
Sawyer v. Daniels (1868) 48 m. 270.
In case of discrepancy between the items of damage alleged and the amount
named in the ad damnum clause, the former will controL
Thus in-Abemathy
9.

he
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Township of Van Buren (1884)

52 Mieh. 383, the plaintiff alleged that
the time she thereby suffered great pain and was hindered from
transacting her affairs, to her damage one thousand dollars," and that she
was obliged to lay out money amounting to one hundred dollars for board,
lodging, care and medical treatment, to her damage ten thousand dollars.
It was held that no judgment beyond $1100 could be recovered.

"during all

SEcnoN 4.

(a)

Form of Allegations.

Pleading Avcordmg to Legal Effect.

JOHNSON

V.

CAETEB.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
16 Massachusetts,

1820.

443.

The declaration contained two eonnts in trespass, for
breaking and entering two closes of the plaintiff, cutting
down trees, etc. * * *
The defendant also pleaded in bar to the first count that,
before the supposed trespass, viz., on etc., at etc., one
Joseph Mclntire, who was then the lawful guardian of the
plaintiff, for a valuable consideration then and there received of the defendant, gave him license to enter upon said
close, cut and carry away said trees, continue therein, use,
occupy, and take the profits of the same ; by force whereof
the defendant on the same day, lawfully entered into the
said close, cut and carried away the said trees, and continued to use, etc., until the commencement of the plaintiff's
action, without any legal notice to quit.
The plaintiff replies, that after the day on which the said
license is alleged to have been given, and before the trespasses were committed, the said Joseph Mclntire died, viz.,
on, etc., at, etc., whereby the said supposed license was revoked and annulled.

To this replication the defendant demurs generally, and
the plaintiff joins in demurrer.

J.

to the first count, it is very clear that
a license by the guardian would determine at his death.
This is not denied ; but it is said, that the facts stated in the
plea show that this was a lease, and not a license ; and that,

Jackson,

:

As
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not a trespasser by holding over after the end of the tenn, but would be a tenant
at STifljerance, imtil a re-entry by the plaintiff, or a notice
to quit ; and that the defendant ought not to be prejudiced
by having miscalled it a license.
If such a mistake had occurred in a deed, or any act in
pais, the court would not, perhaps, be precluded from construing the expression according to its legal effect and the
true intent of the parties. But more strictness isi required
in pleadiQgs. The party is to state his case, according to
the legal effect and operation of the facts, on which he relies. It is not sufficient to display the evidence on the record ,
and leave it to the court to infer that there was a feoffment,
a lease, or a license; but he must say that the party did
enfeoff, or did demise, etc. If the defendant in this case
had pleaded a lease by the guardian, the plaintiff might
have traversed it ; and from what appears in the case, there
a lease, the defendant was

it

it,

seems to be no doubt she would have done so; because on
the general issue to this same count, she obtained a verdict.
It being pleaded as a license, she had no occasion to deny
might be wholly untrue; because she had
although
a better answer, viz., that all the trespasses complained

of were committed after the expiration of the supposed
license.

counts.

be

judgment for the plaintiff upon both the

BEAN

V.

AYBES.

Supreme Judicial Court
67

Maine,

of

There must

Maine.

1878.

482.

:

'

'

'
'

»

a

Case upon the defendants' accountable receipt for 1945
spruce and hemlock logs attached by the plaintiff, as
*
*
The declaradeputy sheriff, upon certain writs.
tion sets out that the plaintiff attached the logs, and at the
request of the defendants delivered the logs to them, "and
thereupon the said defendants executed undeSr their hands
and delivered to the plaintiff an agreement in words and
Penobscot ss. August 23, 1872.
figures as follows, to wit
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Then follows the receipt, ipsisimis verbis, closing with the
signatures. Then follows:
"Whereby the said defendants then and there became liable to return said logs to
said plaintiff on demand, or on failure so to do, indemnify
and save harmless," etc., but not alleging any promise.
Then follows an averment of the entry of the writ, the recovery of the judgments^ the demand and refusal to return
the logs and failure to save harmless, to the damage, etc.
To this new declaration, the defendant demurred spe^
cially, assigning for causes :

•••••••••

•

Third, that the legal purport and effect of said agreement set forth in said new declaration as made by said
defendants with said plaintiffs, is not directly alleged in

said new declaration, but that the said agreement is therein
improperly set forth in words and figures, and that the
liability and promise of said defendants thereon, by recital and reference, is in form and manner improperly, circuitously, indirectly, argumentatively and insufficiently alleged and set forth. And also that the said new declaration
is in other respects uncertain, informal and insufficient."
The presiding justice after joinder overruled this demurrer and adjudged the new declaration or second count
good; and the defendants alleged exceptions.

Peters,

J.

:

*

*

*

We find more difficulty upon the more prominent point of
objection, that the contract is set out in its entire words and
figures and not according to its legal effect. No doubt, it is
much the better practice to set out an instrument, not by
its form and its terms, but according to its legal operation
and effect. But there is no imperative rule against reciting
A declaration
an instrument in haec verba in pleadings.
will not be rejected on that account, provided that upon
all the averments and recitals taken together a good cause
of action is sufficiently stated. It is an objectionable mode
of pleading where it involves a needless and unnecessary
statement of facts. A demurrer, however, does not reach
that difficulty. A demurrer complains of too little and not
too much matter in a declaration. The maxim utile per vnutile non vitiatur applies. The remedy may be to move to
strike out or rediice useless and redundant allegations.
,
Upon inspection, the court may order it to be done,
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does not assert that these defendants ever did promise.
The plaintiff avers that he has written evidence of promise, and a general denial would be that he has not.

The authorities are many that support this view. We
few of them.— Chitty says: "The principal
quote from
the
as
to
mode of stating the facts, is, that they must
rule,
be set forth with certainty; by which term
signified
clear and distinct statement of the facts which constitute the
cause of action of the ground of defense." All the writers
upon the stubject of pleading at common law say the same
Here a material fact
not affirmatively stated.
thing.
Chitty. P. Declaration.
In Watriss v. Pierce, 36 N. H. 232, was decided that
replication was bad which traversed no fact alleged in
plea, but which was mostly
statement of facts which
would in evidence tend to prove a point had
been properly

it

a

a
a

a

it
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is

a
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But the point here urged
that the recital of the connot accompanied with averments enough to constitract
tute a legal declaration.
The weakness in the declaration
dithat, although an action of assumpsit, no promise
stated argurectly and positively asserted therein, but
at all. The plaintiff
mentatively and only inferentially,
declares that the defendants executed under their hands
and delivered to him an agreement. He does not say that
they made any promises in accordance with such agreement.
He does aver that thereby the defendants became liable to
perform the agreement described in the declaration. But
the pleadan allegation of law and not of fact. It
that
er's inference of law from the facts previously stated.
Gray, 484. Nor
29 Millard v. Baldwin,
Gould PI. c.
conclusion of
does a demurrer admit a mere statement of
Vol., 18th Am.
law from the facts averred. Chitty PI.
Ed. 694, and notes; Cliapin v. Curtis, 23 Conn. 388; Craft
The contract itself should have
V. Thompson, 51 N. H. 536.
been averred, not merely the written evidence of the contract. The facts are not averred, but the written evidence
a matter of
averred. The writing
of the facts only
evidence,
It
matter of allegation.
evidence, and not
but not conclusive evidence, of an undertaking and promIt may have been obtained by fraud or mistake in
ise.
which ease
contains no legal promise. The general issue
That
in assumpsit
that the defendant never promised.
plea would not strictly raise an issue here, for the plain-
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pleaded, because it offered no issue by the finding of which
the case could properly be determined.
Bell, J., says:
"The facts essential to a defense must in general be expressly and substantially alleged. The statement of mere
evidence tending to prove a material fact is not sufficient.
Such a mode of pleading, if admitted, would refer the matter of fact in question to the court instead of the jury.
Thus, if in trover the plaintiff allege a demand and refusal,
but omits to aver a conversion, the declaration is ill, the demand and refusal being only evidence of a conversion,
which is the gist of the action. ' '
In Hughes v. Wheeler, 8 Cow. 77, it was held that a plea
by a defendant that he had given the plaintiff his (defendant's) note for the demand in suit, which he accepted, was
bad in substance. He should have given the note in evidence under the general issue. Church v. Oilman, 15 Wend.
656, was a case calling for the decision of a similar question. There the rejoinders recited the facts- at large. The
opinion declares that, "facts, and not the evidence of fa<;ts,
must be pleaded, or the pleading will be held bad as argumentative. " It is further said: "The rejoinders are all
The defendant has pleaded the evidence
argumentative.
of the fact of delivery, instead of the fact itself, and for that
cause the rejoinders are bad." In Fidler v. Delavan, 20
Wend. 57, the court say: "Another defect is, that evidence
of the facts charged is spread out in the plea instead of
This is a violation of one of the
the facts themselves.
first rules of pleading, which requires a statement of the
facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's ground of defense. A plea should be direct and
positive and not by way of rehearsal or argument, which
leads to prolixity and expense."

Demurrer sustained.

410
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THE BANK OF THE METROPOLIS

v. GTTTTSCHLICK.

Supreme Court of the United States.
14

[Chap. 4

1840.

Peters, 19.

Babbotth, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action of assumpsit brought by the defendant
in error against the plaintiff in error, in the Circuit Court
of the United States, in the county of Washington, and
District of Columbia.
The declaration contains three special counts, and a count
for money had and received. The three special counts are
all founded upon an agreement in writing, which, after reciting that the plaintiff in the court below had bought for the
defendant in the court below, lot No. 5, in square No. 489,
in the city of Washington, for which he had paid a part
of the purchase money, and executed his note for the residue, contains the following stipulation: "The Bank of the
Metropolis, through the .president and cashier, is hereby
pledged, when the above sum (that is, the amount of the
note), is paid, to convey the said lot, viz., lot No. 5, in
square 489, in fee simple, to the said Ernest Guttschlick,
his heirs or assigns forever." Each of these counts avers
the payment, at the time agreed, of the amount of the nOte,
and the failure of the bank, on demand, to convey the lot.
At the trial several bills of exception were taken, and a
verdict was found, and judgment rendered in favour of the
plaintiff. To reverse that judgment, this writ of error is
brought.

it

is,

The second objection which was taken, applies to the first
count, viz., that the agreement sued on, is averred to have
been made by the bank, "through the president and cashier," without averring their authorization by the bank to
make it. We consider this objection as wholly untenable.
that the bank, through these
The averment in this count
oflScers, agreed to convey the lot. Now even assuming, for
the sake of giving the objection its full force, that the making of this agreement was not within the competency of
was unquestionably in the power
these officers, as such, yet
of the bank to give authority to its own officers to do so.
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the bank, by them, agreed,

this averment, ia effect, imports the very thing, the supposed want of which constitutes the objection; because,
upon the assumption stated, the bank could have made no
agreement but by agents having lawful authority. Nay, it
would have been sufficient, in our opinion, that the bank
agreed, without the words, "through the president and
cashier;" for it is a rule in pleading, that facts may be
stated according to their legal effect. Now the legal effect of an agreement made by an agent for his principal,
whilst the agent is acting within the scope of his authority,
is, that it is the agreement of the principal. Accordingly,
it is settled that the allegation that a party made, accepted,
endorsed, or delivered a bill of exchange, is sufficient, although the defendant did not, in fact, do either of these
acts himself, provided he authorized the doing of them.
Chitty on Bills, 356, and the authorities there cited. This
principle has been applied, too, in actions ex delicto, as well
as ex contractu.
In 6 Term Kep. 659, it was held, that an
allegation that the defendant had negligently driven his
cart against plaintiff's horse, was supported by evidence,
that defendant's servant drove the cart. In this aspect of
the question, it was one, not of pleading, but of evidence.

DOUGLASS

V.

VILLAGE OF MOREISVILLE.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
84

J.:

1910.

Vermont, 302.

The plaintiffs are contractors, and as
Buch, on July 2, 1906, contracted with the defendant for the
labor, materials, and construction of a concrete masonry
dam and steel penstock for the improvement of the defendant's electric light and power plant, as per a written agreement of that date, signed by both parties, which, and the
specifications thereto attached under which the work was to
be undertaken and performed, with certain exceptions, are
set out in haec verba in the declaration. The only exoepKowELt., C.
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tion important to be noticed here is the one providing that
the work should be performed according to the plans and
drawings of such an engineer, which plans and drawings
are made a part of the contract.
The action is assumpsit to recover the balance due from
the defendant for the performance of said contract, and
for certain extra work and material required to excav;ate
and fill a fissure in the bed of the river where the dam was
to be built, discovered simultaneously by the parties after
the contract was executed and the work begun.
The declaration contains four counts. The defendant demurred generally to the first, second, and third by enumeration, and pleaded to the fourth count. The demurrer was
sustained as to the first and .third counts, and those counts
adjudged insufficient; but was overruled as to the second
*
* *
count, and that count adjudged sufficient.
It is objected that the first count is bad because it contains no allegation of a promise by the defendant to pay
for the work specified therein, and claimed that such a
promise should have been expressly and positively alleged.
And it is true that there is nothing in that count that
amounts to an express promise by the defendant to pay,
though there are allegations of abundant evidence of a
But that is not enough. There
quasi promise to pay.
should have been an averment of assumpsit super se or its
equivalent, for assumpsit, without assuming, is no assumpsit. Mr. Gould says that whenever the promise is implied,
it is declared upon as an express promise, and that upon
the face of the record it is 'always taken to be an express
promise ; that there is no such thing as an implied promise
in pleading, or rather, that the fact of its being implied ap
pears only in the evidence and never upon the record.
Gould, PL chap.
§ 19. He says in a note to that section
that it is held in declaring in assumpsit on a bill of exchange
against the drawer or a promissory note against the maker,
that a statement of the facts that render the defendant
liable to pay is sufficient without expressly alleging a promise on his part, the reason assigned being that the drawing
of the bill or the making of the note is itself an actual
promise, so that alleging the act of drawing or of making
is virtually alleging a promise by the drawer or the maker,
to pay. He says that whether this rule, as far as it regards
the declaration of a bUl of exchange (in which the drawer

Ill,
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makes no express promise), is agreeable to the analogies
and principles of pleading, appears at least questionable,
for in all other cases of indebitatus assumpsit the facts
stated in the declaration as the ground of the defendant's
liability are regarded upon the face of the record only
as the consideration of the promise that it alleges and must
allege. So Mr. Lawes says that if no express promise is
alleged nor other equivalent words used, the
(declaration
will be bad even after verdict, for where the plaintiff declared that in consideration he would surrender a term
the defendant would pay him so much, it was moved in arrest after verdict for the plaintiff on non assumpsit that
there was no promise laid and therefore none to be tried,
and the court being of that opinion, stayed the judgment.
Lawes, PI. referring to Buckler v. Angel, 1 Lev. 164; s. c,
1 Sid. 246; s. c, 1 Keb. 878.
Chandler v. Rossiter, 10
Wend. 488, is a good illustration of this rule. There the
plaintiff declared in assumpsit for money paid, etc., omitting the ordinary assumpsit super se, but stating instead,
the circumstances of ,his case, namely, that he bought a
quantity of fish for the purpose of shipping it to a foreign
port; that the defendant put on board the same vessel an
equal quantity of fish for the purpose and with the intent
of creating a joint adventure so that the parties should
share in the profit and loss ; and that the fish was so damaged at sea or elsewhere that after it arrived at the port of
destination it wasi sold at a loss, the whole of which the
plaintiff sustained and paid without having received any
part thereof from the defendant, whereby the plaintiff had
suffered damage to such an amount. After verdict for the
plaintiff on non assumpsit, the defendant moved in arrest
for that the declaration was bad in not laying a promise
Mr. Wendell for the plaintiff contended
by the defendant.
that though the declaration was informal it was good after
verdict; that it was not a case of defective title, for the
agreement was stated, the liability charged, and a promise
need not be alleged, for it was enough that the evidence
justified the jury in finding a promise. But the court held
otherwise and arrested the judgment. The plaintiffs made
much the same arg-ument here, and say that in respect of
recovery for the extra work sued for, concerning which
the promise is not express but implied by law, the test of
the sufficiency of the allegations of fact in the count to
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if

it

is

is,

whether the plea of
show a promise by the defendant
non assumpsit would put those allegations in issue, or,
in other words, whether proof of the facts alleged would
no test, as shown by
establish such promise. But that
the case just cited, for if
would establish such promise,
the necessity of a promise in the declaration would not be
at all, accordthereby obviated, for recovery must be had,
ing to the allegations as well as according to the proof.

Supreme Court
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FISH

V.

the first

BEOWN.

Errors

of

•

•

count.

•

of

Judgment affirmed as to the insufficiency

Connecticut,

1845.

17 Connecticut, 341.

J.:

is

it

it

a

it

it

a

is

is

whether the
The only question before us
instrument produced in evidence, on the trial of this cause,
The
was variant from that described in the declaration.
writing obligatory under the
instrument
described as
aphand and seal of the defendant; on its production,
otherwise
affixed
executed than by having
peared to be not
scrawl.
the name of defendant, with
to
signed
Although the instrument itself states, that
by the defendant, with her hand, and sealed with her seal,
is clear from the authorities, that a scrawl does not, by
Stobes,

is

it

it

it

the common law, constitute a seal; and that, therefore,
did not support the allegation of the declaration, which deas being sealed, unless by virtue of the statutes
scribes
of 1824 or of 1&38, each entitled "An Act to conform
enacted, that "all
Deeds and Bonds," By the former,
bonds, which have been executed without seal, shall be valid
as though the same had been sealed;" and by the latter,
that "all instruments, which purport to have been intended
as bonds with condition, under seal, which have been executed without seal, shall be valid as though the same had
been sealed." Stat. 182S, pp. 393, ^94. The question before
us, therefore, depends on the operation of these statutes. As
that of 1838 embraces and applies more precisely to the
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instrument in question than the other, and does not differ
from it otherwise, the former may be laid out of view, as
being unnecessary

to be considered.
It is a familiar rule of evidence, that it is sufficient to
prove an allegation of a fact according to its legal effect
Stark, Ev. Pt. 4, p. 1565. Literal proof is not required.
Hence an allegation that a party did a particular act, is
satisfied by proof that the act, in legal effect, is his. Thus,
an averment that the defendants accepted a bill of exchange, is proved by evidence of an acceptance by their
authorized agent. So, in an action by the husband alone,
on a bond alleged to be given to him, evidence of a bond
to himself and his wife was held to support the allegation,
for he had a right to reject the obligation to his wife, and
in legal import, it was a bond to himself. Heys v. Heseltine, 2 Campb. 604; Coare v. Gihlet, 4 Bsp. Ca. 231. Ankerstein V. Clarke, 4 Term E. 616; Stark. Ev. pt. 4, tit. Variance; Phelps V. Riley, 3 Conn. E. 266. This principle, in
our opinion, applies to the present case, and justifies the
admission of the instrument in question in support of the
declaration. We have no doubt, from the language of the
act of 1838, that it was the intention of the legislature to
give to that instrument the same legal effect and operation
as it would have hadi, if it were actually sealed. All instruments not sealed, which purport to have been intended
as bonds with condition under seal (which is precisely the
description of the instmment in question), are made, or
declared to be, valid, as if the same were sealed. The object of the act was doubtless to make the instrument in law
what the parties intended it to be, viz., an instrument under
seal ; and this object was effected, by declaring that it should
be valid as though sealed, which from the nature of the case,
was the only mode in which it could be, by legislation, acThe terms of the act not qualifying nor recomplished.
stricting such validity, but on the contrary putting the instrument, in this respect, on the footing of those which are
sealed, by the most general and extensive form of expression, its true construction is, that the instrument should be
valid, as if sealed, to all intents and purposes. It is thus,
in legal contemplation and effect, made a sealed instrument; for the effect and operation of an instrument gives
it its legal character. We think, therefore, that it is to be
treated as if it were sealed, not only in determining the
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in pleading.
but in describing
obligation created by
Indeed, we cannot believe, that, when tbe legislature thus
contemplated
validated these instruments as specialities,
that they should be treated otherwise than as such, in actions to be brought upon them.
In Russell v. Hosmer, Conn. R. 229, 234, this court ex* • *
pressed an opinion in conformity with these views.
After remarking, that the instrument on which the action
was brought, assumed the form, and had all the solemnities,
of bond, except the seal [the court] add: "This defect
supplied by the statute (of 1824). It is, therefore, to every
legal intent and purpose, an instrument under seal." It
was not in terms alleged in the declaration to be sealed by
the defendant; but
was stated to be his "writing obligatherefore equivalent
tory," which legally imports, and
well settled,
to an allegation, that
was sealed; and
sufficient to describe
that in declaring upon
bond,
as
writing obligatory, without stating in terms that
was sealed.
Chitt. PI. 364. (9th Am. Ed., 6th Lond. Ed.)
ux. v. Jones,
Wms. Saund. 291, n.
Moore
320, n.
Ld. Eaym. 1536; Penson v. Hodges,
Cro. Eliz. IZl Ashmore V. Rypley, Cro. Jac. 420; Van Santwood v. Sand14.
W.
ford, 12 Johns. R. 197; Com. Dig. tit. Pleader,
That case, therefore, does not materially differ from the
was not there expressly alleged, that the
present, because
instrument was sealed, since a tantamount averment was

Connecticut.

1815,

Connecticut, 404.

This was an action against Bacon on

a

a

promissory note.
The declaration stated, "That the defendant, in and by
certain writing or note under his hand, by him well executed, dated the 7th day of June, 1813, promised the plaintiff to pay to him, or order, for value received, the sum ol
cwo hundred ninety dollars and seventy cents, as by the
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said writing or note ready in court to be shewn appears;"
and concluded by averring, "that the defendant, his promise aforesaid not regarding, hath never performed the
same, though often requested and demanded; which is to
the damage of the plaintiff," etc. The note was as follows: "For value received,
promise to pay Thomas G.
Page, or order, the sum of two hundred ninety dollars and
seventy cents. Petersburgh, June 7, 1813. Joseph Bacon."
In the superior court, the defendant made default of appearance, but was afterwards heard in damages. The court
assessed the damages, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant tiien brought the present writ of error,
assigning for error, that the declaration was iasufficient.
Swift, Ch. J.: The plaintiff should declare on a contract according to its legal effect, and not on the evidence
of the contract. The declaration should shew a consideration, a promise, and a breach of promise. In this case, it
does not appear from the declaration that the note had become payable. The defendant might have produced a written agreement that it should be paid at some distant time.
The legal effect of such note is, that it is payable on demand. The plaintiff should have so declared upon it; and
then the note, when produced in evidence, would have
proved the fact, unless the defendant could have proved
the contrary; and on such averment the question when the
note was payable would have been put in issue. But now no
allegation having been made of the time when the note was
payable, no evidence could have been admitted on that
point. The plaintiff then has declared not according to
the legal effect of his contract, but on the evidence only.
He has stated no breach of contract. The declaration,

I

therefore, is insufficient.
Such a defect is not aided by default, nor would it have
been by verdict.
am of opinion that judgment ought to be reversed.
In this opinion the other judges severally concurred.
Judgment reversed.
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Legal Conclusions and Evidence.

MILLVILLE GAS LIGHT COMPANY
8v/preme Court of New Jersey.
74

v.

SWEETEN.

1906.

New Jersey Law, 24.

J.: This is a demurrer to a declaration, the
defendant F. B. Sweeten, trading, etc., being the demurrant.
The declaration charges that the defendants Sweeten,
etc., under a contract with the other defendant, the city of
Millville, for the construction of a sewerage system, dug up
certain of the streets of the said city in which the plaintiff
had laid gas pipes, which it thereupon became the duty of
the said city and its said agent to support, protect and render safe during the construction of the said sewerage system ; that in disregard of this duty thus owing to the plaintiff the said pipes were so negligently supported by temporary props and stays that the removal of the earth incident to the digging of the trenches for the sewers caused
the plaintiff's pipes to be broken and severed from their
connections and to settle unevenly, to the injury of the
Garrison,

plaintiff.
It is evident that the foundation of this charge of the negligent performance of a duty owed by the defendants to the
plaintiff must be the existence of such duty. If such duty
existed it arose from certain facts, and whether upon such
facts such duty arose is a question for this court to determine. If this pleading does not display the facts from
which a duty was owing to the plaintiff, it makes no case
of negligent performance of such duty by the defendants.
The only information derivable from the plaintiff's declaration is that its pipes were "laid ia the said streets by
competent and legal authority."
This is the pleader's conclusion, based presumably upon some state of facts known
to him. It might not be the conclusion of this court if the
same state of facts were made known to it. A pleading is
primarily and essentially a statement of facts. Where the
facts are stated in a pleading the pleader may, and often
should, state the conclusion from such facts upon which he

The Declabation.

^ec. 4]

419

bases his right,^'> but where the facts upon which the pleader's conclusion is based are not stated his conclusion from
such undisclosed facts goes for nothing, and not
being in

itself a relevant fact is not admitted by a demurrer.
The demurrer in the present case not admitting the plain_
tiff's conclusion as to its authority to occupy the highway
with its pipes, the declaration alleges no foundation for
the duty which it charges was owing to the plaintiff, and if
it has not charged the existence of the duty it makes out
no case for damages for the negligent performance of such

duty.

Judgment must be for the defendants.
"Though it is in general unnecessary to allege matter of law, jet
is sometimes occasion to make mention of it, for the convenience or
tntelligibaUy of the statement of fact." Stephen on Pleading (Tyler's
10.

there

I'd.)

313.

MIJSEE
Circuit Court of

the

17

Bbown,

J. :

V.

EOBERTSON.

United States, Second Circuit.

1883.

Federal Reporter, 500.

«

The only question, then, is whether the complaints, all of
which are in substance as above stated, contain what is
technically a sufficient statement of a cause of action. The
sufficiency of the pleadings is to be determined by the New
York Code of Procedure. This requires a "plain and
concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action." Section 481. But the rule of pleading at common
law was the same viz., that facts, not mere conclusions
of law, were to be stated. 1 Chit. PI. 214 ; Allen v. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 478.
'
The facts essential to be pleaded are, however, the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, not those other
subsidiary matters of fact or law which go to make up the
ultimate facts, and are evidences of the latter. There is
often considerable doubt whether certain facts shall be
taken to be essential parts of the very cause of action itself.
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or only evidence of it. To resolve this doubt, recourse is
often had to the former rules of pleading, which^ Ipj their
approved forms, show what are regarded as the ultimate
facts constituting the cause of action. On this demurrer
it was claimed that the complaint does not state facts, but
only conclusions of law. This clearly is not accurate. The
complaint in the Miiser case, which is a sample of most of
the fifteen complaints, states that the true duty by law
on the goods imported was $2,483.25; that the collector
exacted as duties $3,049, which the plaintiff was compelled
to pay to get his goods, being $565.25 in excess of the legal
duties, which excess he now seeks to recover. The statement
of the amount exacted and paid is certainly a statement
of pure fact ; the only question that can be made is whether
the statement that "by law the true duty on said goods was
$2,483.25," is a statement of a conclusion of law merely, or
a statement of fact.
In my opinion, it should be considered as a statement of one of the ultimate facts in the case,
as distinguished from the mere evidences of such fact.
What the true duty is depends on a great variety of circumstances.
There is no dispute about the letter of the law,
but upon the application of different sections of the law;
and this may depend upon many circumstances to be given
in evidence, such as the kind of goods, their quality, fineness, weight, mode of manufacture, component materials^
the relative proportions or value of different component
materials, their commercial designation, and numerous
other circumstances which may be involved in the determination of the true duty.
the "true amount of duty" is
not an ultimate fact to be ascertained, then every circumstance about the goods, which may affect the rate of duty
and upon which the determination of the duty depends,
must be depmed the ultimate facts necessary to be pleaded ;
and the result would be a requirement to plead a minute
description of the goods in all particulars which might'
affect the rate of duty. No such pleading has ever heretofore been required or practiced. To require that would
be to require, as it seems to me, mere evidence of the one
ultimate fact which constitutes the cause of action.
On the rule contended for it would not be sufficient to designate the goods even by their statutory classification, or
to allege that they were dutiable at a certain rate, since this
classification, or rate, is ofteti the only subject of contra-

If
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versy, and depends on various other eirctimstances of fact
and principles of law. In the Muser case the goods are
designated as "thread laces" — a statutory classification;
but suppose they are in fact black silk laces, and, except in
color and material, are precisely the same as white linen
thread laces, and are dealt in by the name of thread laces,
or black thread lace, while the statute imposes a higher duty
on silk laces, or other manufactures of silk. The question
of the proper classification would then involve the law of
commercial designation and statutory construction,
as
well, probably, as numerous controverted matters of fact.
See Smith v. Field, 105 U. S. 52. But no one would, I think,
contend that all these details should be pleaded, or that a
simple statement, as one of the ultimate facts in the case,
that the goods were "thread laces," was not a statement of
fact, but a conclusion of law. So, when the rate of duty is
affected by the number of threads to the square inch, or
the weight, surely these need not be pleaded.
In general, I think, it may be said that a statement is
not to be deemed any the less a statement of fact, because
its ascertainment may depend upon some principles of law
applicable to various other facts and circumstances. Thus
a plea of payment is a plea of fact of the simplest form;
yet it may involve very nice questions of law and fact,
arising from the legal rules concerning the application of
payments upon the particular circumstances of fact that
may be proved in the case. So a statement that A sold and
delivered goods to B is plainly a statement of fact for tlie
purposes of pleading, although on the trial the issue turns
out to be one of law, whether, under the particular facts
proved, the transaction was a sale, or a mortgage, or a bailment or a loan. Norton v. Woodruff, 2 N. Y. 153; 4 N.

Y.76.

The chief ultimate facts which in this class of cases constitute the cause of action are that the true, or legal, or
lawful duty— it is immaterial in which form stated — was a
certain sum, and that the collector exacted a certain larger
sum; or, in a single phrase, that the collector on a certain
importation exacted a certain sum of money in excess of
the legal duty. How that legal duty is arrived at, i. e., the
methods and rules of law and various circumstances of
fact by which that legal duty is ascertained and determined,
are all subordinate questions, and are only evidence lead-
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ing to the one ultimate fact of the illegal exaction of a
given sum of money.
This view is sustained by the form of action sanctioned
by long usage in such cases. At common law, and under
the statutes of this country, it has been held that an ordinary coimt in indebitatus assumpsit for money had and
received, is an appropriate mode of declaration to recover
back an excess of duties exacted on the importation of
goods. City of Philadelphia v. Collector, 5 "Wall. 720, 726,
731; State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204, 209; Elliott
The exV. Stvartwout, 10 Pet. 137 ; 2 GHreenl. Ev. § 121.
of
for
duties,
action
money beyond the legal rate, whether
tolls, or taxes, is the one ultimate fact which in law constitutes the receipt of the money to the use of the person
illegally compelled to pay it. All the other facts and circumstances of the case, and any principles of law applicable
to them, and determining their effect or construction, are
only subsidiary, and evidences of the one ultimate fact to
be proved, viz., the unauthorized exaction of a certain sum
of money.
•

•

•

•

•••••••••

The demurrers must, therefore, be overruled,
with liberty to withdraw them, and answer, if desired,
within twenty days; the order to be settled on notice.^^
11.
Instances of Legal Conclusions. — That money is or is not due; that
certain acts constitute a contract; that there was not a sufficient consideration for a promise; the mere averment of fraud, mistake, conspiracy or undue
influence; that a party's conduct was arbitrary, illegal, reasonable or wrongful; that due notice was given; that an officer was duly appointed or was
that a party was released from liability; that a contract was
disqualified;
waived, abandoned or rescinded; that acts, instruments or proceedings were
lawful or valid; that a party is estopped or was justified; that an event is
likely to occur. See 31 Cyc. 52-65, where the foregoing and many other legal
conclusions are given, with citation of numerous authorities.

BENHAM

V.

EAEL OF MOENINGTON.

Court of Common Pleas.
3

1846.

Manning, Granger & Scott, 133.

Debt, on a bond, bearing date the 23d of August, 1833, in
the penal sum of 800/.
Plea, that the supposed writing obligatory in the declaration mentioned, was made and executed by the defendant
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as therein mentioned, in parts beyond the seas, to wit, at
Calais, in the kingdom of France, where the defendant was
then resident and domiciled, and not elsewhere; that the
said writing obligatory in the declaration mentioned, was
not taken, receiyed, made or passed by any public officer or
officers of the said kingdom of France, authorized by the
laws of that kingdom so to do, nor was the same writing
written throughout by the hand of the defendant; that, although the defendant signed the said writing with his own
hand, yet the defendant did not, in any part of the said
writing, write with his proper hand the formula or acknowledgment styled in the French tongue a "bon," or
"approuve," bearing in words at length the debt or sum
of money purporting to be secured or acknowledged by the
said writing, nor was the defendant, at the time of the
making of the supposed writing obligatory, a merchant or
tradesman, artisan, husbandman, ploughman, vine cultivator, labouring man, or servant ; and that, by reason of the
premises, the said supposed writing obligatory, by the laws
of the said kingdom of France, never was nor is obligatory
or binding on the defendant, but always was and is of no
force, effect, or validity-verification.
Special demurrer, assigning for caiises, that the plea did
not state facts with distinctness and certainty, so that the
court could perceive that the writing obligatory was void according to the law of France at the time it was executed.

J.

a

a

I

is

is,

It appears to me that this plea is bad for
:
TiNDAL, C.
one of the causes assigned, viz., that it is argumentative
and inferential only; whereas "every plea must be direct,
and not by way of argument or rehearsal," as is laid down
in Co. Lit. 303a. It is perfectly clear, that, but for the
words at the end — "by reason of the premises, the said supposed writing obligatory, by the laws of the said kingdom
of France, never was, nor is, obligatory or binding on the
of no force, effect, or
defendant, but always was, and
validity"— the plea would be no answer to the action. There
no direct affirmance of what the law of France is, or of
any state of facts to bring this case within the operation
think the plaintiff was entitled to a distinct
of, that law.
statement of the law and of the facts, in order that he
might take the opinion of the court as to whether or not
legal defense. If this had been
they amounted to
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question of evidence, instead of pleading, the witness
would not have been allowed to state, negatively, this or
that is not in compliance with the law of France; but he
would have been required to show affirmatively, from his
own experience, or from knowledge derived from some recognized code or book, what the law is. The entire plea,
after the introductory statement of the defendant's domicil, consists of negative propositions only. With respect
to the allegation that the defendant was not a merchant or
tradesman, etc., how do we know that there are not other
classes einbraced by the exception, that are not noticed by
the plea, and to one of which the defendant may belong?
think the plea is clearly argumentative and bad. * * *
CoLTMAN, J. : The plea could hardly have been held sufficient if it had alleged merely that the bond was executed
by the defendant in France, and that, by the laws of that
country, the bond was void : and, unless such a plea would
be sufficient,
think the matter that is here intermediately
stated would not help it. The plea should have alleged distinctly what the law of France is, and should then have
averred facts to bring the case within it ; so that the matter
might be decided by the court on demurrer, if the facts did
*
*
*
not bring the case within the French law.
also am of opinion that the plea in
Ckeswell, J. :
question is insufficient.
quite agree with my brother
Coltman, that a plea merely averring that the bon^ was executed in France, and was void by the laws of that country,
would be bad. The French law is only to be taken notice
of as any other matter of fact, and must be pleaded: it
clearly would be no plea to say, that, "by reason of some
fact that will hereafter be proved," the bond is null and
void. It has been insisted, on the part of the defendant,
that this plea does sufficiently state what the French law is.
think there is no such clear and unambiguous statement
of it as the plaintiff has a right to have upon the record : it
is a mere inferential, and a very inconvenient, mode of stat* *
ing what the foreign law is. *

I

I

I

I

I

Judgment for the plaintiff.
In

^'^

(1908) 81 Vt. 109, the allegation was as
avers that on September 24th, 1906, for a
long time previous thereto, ever since and now, it was and is the law of
the State of South Dakota that a husband and his wife may legally contract
with each other in the manner set forth in said contract. ' ' This was held
bad on demurrer, as not setting forth the law of South Dakota but only
pleader's conclusion in regard to it.
12.

Jenness

v.

Simpson

follows: — "And the defendant
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LIGHT AND
NICHOLAS.
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POWEE

1913.

Southern Reporter, 361.

The following are the counts of the compraint referred
to in the opinion:

"(4) Plaintiff claims of defendant $10,000 as damages
for that heretofore, on, to wit, August 2, 1911, defendant
was a common carrier of passengers for hire and reward,
operating electric cars for such purpose in Jefferson
county, Ala. And plaintiff avers that at the time aforesaid

in, to wit, the town of Brighton, a municipal corporation,
in said county and State, she was at or near a regular station or stopping place of defendant, where defendant's
cars were accustomed to stop for the purpose of taking on
and letting off passengers, and that she was at or near such
station for the purpose of taking passage on one of defendant's ears. And plaintiff avers that there was at said time
a valid ordinance of the said town of Brighton, making it
unlawful for cars to run within the corporate limits of said
town at a greater rate of speed than six miles per hour,
and that at the said time and place, which was within the
corporate limits of the said town of Brighton, one of defendant's cars was running at a greater rate of speed than
six miles per hour in violation of said ordinance, and that
as a proximate consequence of such greater speed than
six miles per Lour of the said car the plaintiff was run into
and knocked down by the same, and as a proximate cpnsequence received great personal injuries, suffered great
physical pain and mental anguish to her damage aforesaid,
and was put to great expense for doctor's services and
medicines, and was permanently made less able to work
and earn a livelihood to her damage as aforesaid, for which
she sues."
(7) Same as 4 down to and including "Jefferson county,
Ala.," and adds : "And plaintiff avers that she was at the
time and place aforesaid at or near the defendant's car
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track at or near East Brighton station on defendant's line
at a point where a puhlic street or thoroughfare or crossing of said town, which was constantly used by a large number of people in passing to and fro at this point, crossed
the same, and the plaintiff says that the motorman in charge
of said car knew of plaintiff's position of peril, yet, notwithstanding such knowledge, ran the said ear with wanton
negligence at a high and dangerous rate of speed over the
said crossing, and against or so near to the plaintiff that
she was knocked or thereby caused to fall into a ditch or
culvert, as a proximate consequence of which she received
great personal injuries, suffered physical pain and mental
anguish, was made sick and sore, put to great expense for
doctor's services and medicines, and nurse's hire in and
about the curing and care of her said injuries, and was permanently disabled and disfigured, all as a proximate consequence of the wanton negligence of the motorman in
charge of said car as aforesaid."
"(8) Plaintiff claims of defendant $10,000 damages for
that heretofore, on, to wit, the 2d day of August, 1911, the
defendant was a common carrier of passengers for hire
and reward, operating cars propelled by electricity for such
purpose in the town of Brighton, a municipal corporation,
in Jefferson county. State of Alabama. And plaintiff says
that at the time and place aforesaid she was standing at or
near the defendant's car track at or near East Brighton
on defendant's line at a point where a public thoroughfare
or street or other crossing crossed the said track, and that
said thoroughfare or street or crossing was constantly and
contiauously used by a large number of people passing to
and fro across the said track at said point. And plaintiff
avers that, while she was so standing at the said time and
place, the defendant negligently ran one of its ears against
or so near the plaintiff at said street, or thoroughfare, or
crossing, at a high and dangerous rate of speed, that plaintiff was thereby knocked or caused to fall into a culvert or
ditch, as a proximate consequence of which she received
great personal injuries, has suffered great physical and
mental anguish, and was disabled for a long time from
working and earning money, and has been permanently
made less able to work and earn money, was made sick and
sore, and has been put to great expense for doctor's services, medicines, nurse's hire, and proper diet, all as a
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proximate consequence of the negligence of the defendin negligently running its said car against or near the
ant_
plaintiff at a high and dangerous rate of speed at said
crossing aforesaid, for which she sues."
Maypield, J. : Appellee sued appellant to recover damages for personal injuries.
The wrongful act alleged is
that appellant's motorman ran a car against or so near to
plaintiff that she was knocked, or thereby caused to fall,
into a ditch or culvert. In two counts the wrong was alleged to be due to simple negligence, and in the other it is
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denominated wantonness.
The place of the injury — that is, the locus m quo — alleged to be at or near East Brighton station, on defendant's
car line, at or near the defendant's car line, at a point where
a public street or thoroughfare crossed the same. In one
coimt (count
alleged that plaintiff was at this point
for the purpose of taking passage on one of defendant's
cars. In the other counts
not alleged for what purpose plaintiff was at this point. In no count
alleged
that plaintiff was on the track or in dangerous proximity
thereto, except inferentially, according to an alternative
that the car struck her. According to the other alternative,
she may have been at safe distance from the track, but, on
account of fright was caused to fall into the ditch or culmade certain whether
vert. In none of the counts
plaintiff was walking along or near to the defendant's car
or whether she was
track, or whether she was crossing
traveling along the public street or thoroughfare, or
whether she was merely crossing such street or thoroughfare, or whether she was standing still, or was loitering on
or at the crossing of the street car track and the street or
not made to appear whether the street
thoroughfare. It
part of the street or
laid along so as to form
car track
merely
crosses
the street or
thoroughfare, or whether
crossing
alleged that there
thoroughfare. While
not alleged
of the street car track and the street,
at grade, or above or below grade.
whether the crossing
left wholly to conjecture whether the
In other words,
plaintiff was a trespasser on or near the defendant's track
at the time of the injury. The allegations to show this fact
are extremely indefinite and uncertain. Some of the alternative allegations, standing alone, clearly show that she was
trespasser at the time of the injury, while others leave
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it in doubt whether she was a trespasser or was rightfully
at the place where she was injured. Mr. Gould, Pleading,
"An important requisite in all pleading
§ 51, p. 80, says:
is certainty.
This requisite implies that the matter
pleaded must be clearly and distinctly stated, so that it may
be fully understood by the adverse party, the counsel, the

jury and the judges, and especially (as regards the declara-

tion) that the defendant may be enabled to plead the judgment, which may be rendered in the cause, in bar of any
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subsequent action for the same cause; for if a vague or
partial description of the matter in controversy, in a given
case, were allowed, and in a subsequent suit of the same
thing the declaration should contain a full and precise description of
the cause of action, though actually the same
in both cases, would not appear from a comparison of the
two records to be so."
to disclose,
The object and purpose of good pleading
and not to conceal, the real issue to be tried. The rules of
pleading are to be tested, as well as dictated, by good sense
only a means
and sound logic. The science of pleading
for obtaining the ends of justice. Attempts to evade or
conceal the real issue, or attempts to stifle justice in the
webs of form, each merits no more countenance than the
underlying rules of law compel the court to accord. It
would be a deplorable condition of the law of pleading
the plaintiff could file a count or a complaint good against
all proper or appropriate grounds of demurrer, yet leaving
impossible for the defendant or the court to know of
what particular wrong or injury the plaintiff complains.
While a plaintiff, under our system of pleading, may join
two or more causes of action in several separate counts, he
cannot so join them in one count. A plaintiff
not allowed, against an appropriate demurrer, in
single count,
to allege in
doubtful and uncertain manner two or more
distinct and incongruous causes of action, in order to hit
some possible cause of action that he may be able to prove
on the trial. The defendant has the right to be informed
of the particular cause of action for which he
sought to
be held liable in each count.
At common la^y alternative averments were not allowed
in civil or criminal cases, and some courts held that the
error was not cured by verdict. * * * In Dusenherry's
Case, 94 Ala. 418, 419, 10 South. 274, 276,
said:
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"Alternative averments of matters of substance are destructive of all certainty in the formation of definite, issues for trial. The prime object of the successive steps in

pleading under our system is to evolve such issues so that
they may be presented pointedly and distinctly, * * *
Under our system, 'all pleadings must he as brief as is consistent with perspicuity, and the presentation of the facts,
or matter to be put in issue, in an intelligible form ; no objection can be allowed for defect of form, if the facts are
so presented that a material issue in law or fact can be
taken by the adverse party thereon.'
Code, § 2664. It
cannot be said of a complaint that it is perspicuous, or that
it presents the facts in an intelligible form, so that a material issue may be taken thereon by the defendant, unless
it contains a clear and distinct statement of the facts which
constitute the cause of action, so that they may be understood by the party who is to answer them, by the jury, who
are to ascertain the truth of the allegations, and by the
1 Chitty on Pleading
court, who is to give judgment.
*
*
•
When the plaintiff, in a sin(16th Am. Ed.) 256.
gle count, shifts his right of action from one ground to
another, and states several branches of duty in the alternative, or disjunctively, so that it is impossible to say upon
which of several equally substantive averments he relies
for the maintenance of his action, then there is such confusion and obscurity as to the ground upon which a recovery
is claimed that the defendant is not clearly informed of
the matter to be put in issue ; and a count so substantially
variant and contradictory in its allegations is demurrable."

In

the case of Porter v. Hermann, 8 Cal. 619, 623, 624,
Field, C. J., later Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, said: "The allegation of the complaint is
that the money was 'collected and received by the defendant as the agent, or attorney in fact, of the plaintiff.' This
is, in substance, an allegation that the defendant collected
the money as agent, or, if he did not collect it as agent, then
the defendant can be
he collected it as attorney in fact.
charged in this alternative form, he may with the same
propriety be charged in the disjunctive form with the collection of the money in every character and capacity specified, thus: That the defendant was in possession of the

If
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money collected and received by him as attorney or factor,
or broker, or agent, or clerk of the plaintiff, or in some other
fiduciary capacity. Under no system of pleading would
such alternative or disjunctive allegations be permitted.
Stephen, in his Treatise on Pleading, lays down as rules
that:
'Pleadings must not be insensible, nor repugnant,
nor ambiguous, nor doubtful in meaning, nor argumentative, nor in the alternative, nor by way of recital, but must
be positive in their form.'
Pages 377, 388. Van Santvoord, in his Treatise on Pleading, under the Code of New
York, says: 'It was also and still is a rule that pleadings
must not be either alternative or hypothetical, as where it
was charged that the defendant wrote and published, or
caused to be written and published, a certain libel. This
was held bad for uncertainty.' Page 200."
Mr. Gould (Pleading, p. 14) says that: "Pleading is,
practically, nothing more than affirming or denying, in a
formal and orderly manner, those facts which constitute
the ground of the plaintiff's demand and of the defendant's
defense. Pleading, therefore, consists merely in alleging
matter of fact, or in denying what is alleged as such by the
adverse party. But in the theory or science of pleading
the averrhent of facts on either side always presupposes
some principle, or rule of law, applicable to the facts alleged, and which, when taken in connection with those facts,
is claimed by the party pleading them to operate in his
own favor ; for all rights of action, and all special defenses,
result from matter of fact and matter of law combined.
And hence in every declaration, and in all special pleading,
some legal proposition
e., some proposition consisting
of matter of law), though not in general expressed in terms
supposed judicially to
by the pleader (because the court
always and necessarily implied, or, to use the
know it),
language of grammarians, understood."
These fundamental rules of pleading find application
and
of this complaint, and
when applied to counts,
the objection was taken by appropriate special demurrer.
very indefinite, uncertain,
Each count of this complaint
on account of the alternative and disjunctive averments.
uncertain whether the plaintiff was a passenger, or
It
entitled to the care and protection of a passenger, or
licensee. It
uncertain whether
trespasser or
whether
or
whether she waa
passenger,
she was at the station as
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only near there with the intention of later becoming a passenger, or, if near the station with such intention, how
near or how far. It is also uncertain whether she was on
the track when injured, or when the wrongs complained
of were committed, or was only near the track, and, if only
near, how near or how far therefrom. It is likewise uncertain whether she was near enough the track to he struck
by the car, or whether only near enough to be frightened
and caused to fall. The right of passengers and the rights
of trespassers, as against common carriers, are not the
same, but quite different.
The duties and liabilities of
common carriers to passengers and those to trespassers
are likewise very different. Again, the rights and duties of
persons rightfully on a railroad track are different from
the rights and duties of those wrongfully thereon and who
are thereby trespassers; and the duties and liabilities of
the railroad company are likewise different as to each class.
AH persons have the right to cross a railroad track, but
they have no right to loiter thereon, nor use the track as a
passway longitudinally, unless the track is laid at grade, so
So the duties and
as to form a part of the public highway.
liabilities of railroad companies are different as to those
who are rightfully crossing its track and to those who are
or even loitering on or wrongwrongfully walking along
at a public crossing.
fully using
These principles of law have been so frequently anuseless to cite the cases.
nounced by this court that
in counts
and
are alallegations
material
So many
leged in the alternative or by disjunctive averments — and
some of the alternatives not stating good causes of action —
renders them subject to the demurrer interposed.
that
well expressed as
The rule in this State on this subject
follows: "The count being in the alternative, and in this
way attempting to present two causes of action in the same
the well-established rule that both alternatives
coimt,
must present a cause of action, or the count will be held to
be bad. In other words, in such case the count can be
one of the
no stronger than its weakest alternative, and,
cause of action, the count
alternatives fails to present
Pr. 620 Centred
Ency. PI.
will be held to be bad.
Ga. By. Go. v. Freeman, 134 Ala. 354, 32 South. 778."
Iron Go. v. Sharp, 156 Ala. 288, 47
Sloss-Sheffield Steel
South. 280.
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One of these alternatives of count 4 would make this case
only that plaintiff was near defendant's station for the
purpose of taking passage on one of its cars, and was run
into by one of its cars. This, it will be seen, in no wise
negatives the fact that plaintiff was a trespasser on the
track, and alleges only simple negligence, as for the violation of a municipal ordinance. There is no attempt to allege that plaintiff in this case was crossing the track, or
that she was in a public highway; but for aught that appears she was walking along, or loitering upon, the defendant's track, or attempted to board the car while the same
was in motion at this high rate of speed, in violation of
the ordinance.
Construing the count against the pleader,
as we must do, it shows that plaintiff was a trespasser,
and therefore does not state a good cause of action. Shewning's Case, 93 Ala. 27, 9 South. 458.
One of the alternatives of the eighth count would make
this cause only that plaintiff was near East Brighton station, and near defendant's car track, and that defendant's
car was negligently run close to her, and caused her to fall
into a ditch or culvert. It therefore wholly fails to show
any breach of duty owing the plaintiff. While it is alleged
in this count that "the point at which plaintiff was injured
was where a public thoroughfare or street or other crossing crossed said track," it is not alleged that plaintiff was
rightfully there — ^that is, that she was traveling the street
or thoroughfare and was crossing the track —^but the count
affirmatively alleges that she was "standing at this cross-

ing."

While a pedestrian has the right to cross a railroad track
at a public crossing, he has no right to stand upon or obstruct it or to loiter there. * * *
If the count could otherwise be justified on the ground
that plaintiff was in or traveling along a public street or
thoroughfare, it would be rendered bad by the use of the
last alternative — "or other crossing." In other words, it
is possible that, if plaintiff was in a public highway, she
might not be a trespasser, but if she was in a way, running
along and across the car track, which was not public and
was used only by trespassers, no matter how often or how
The error in
frequently, she would still be a trespasser.
pleadings of using a general or comprehensive term in the
alternative, preceded by the phrase "or other," was at an
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early date pointed out by this court, even where the very
words of the statute were used. In Raiford's Case, 7 Port.
104, the statute "prohibited the sale, in quantities less than
a quart, of rum, brandy, whisky, tafia, or other spirituous
liquor." Eaiford was indicted for selling "spirituous liqloors" without specifying the kind of liquor. This court
held the indictment bad. "In pleading it is not enough to
aver the existence of such other acts or means in the language of the statute ; but the pleader must, in addition to
the statutory, generic phrase, specify the acts or means under a videlicet.
Example.
Under our former statute
against retailing, if the pleader wished to proceed for the
sale of ardent spirits other than *rum, brandy, whisky, or
tafia' — ^these being all the kinds specified in the statutehe should have averred that the defendant sold spirituous
liquors, to wit, gin, etc., or words of similar import."
Johnson v. State, 32 Ala. 585. In the case just quoted from
the defendant was indicted for obstructing a public road
"by a fence bar, or other impediment." The court held
that the use of the phrase "or other impediment," though
it was the exact language used in the statute, was bad,
notwithstanding the statute expressly allowed alternative
averments as to the means by which an offense was committed.

The use of the word "near," as related to dangerous
agencies, has been several times considered by this court.
It has been held to be bad as an alternative, when used
alone with "at," "on," or "under" a dangerous agency,
such as a falling roof or wall or falling rocks, etc. ; but if
accompanied with the qualifying word "dangerously" or
"negUgentiy," with averments of knowledge of the danger,
on account of the proximity, it has been held to be good.
See Simmerman's Case, 170 Ala. 553, 54 South. 426;
Merriweather's Case, 161 Ala, 441, 49 South. 916; MUls'
Case, 149 Ala. 474, 42 South. 1019; Black's Case, 59 South.
497.
The correctness of these rulings is, we think, well
illustrated by this case. "On" a railroad crossing is, of
course, a dangerous place; but "at" or "near" such crossing or track is not necessarily dangerous. It all depends
upon how near the track one is, as to whether he is within
the zone of danger or that of safety. A point one foot from
a railroad track or from a public street which crosses the
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track may be said to be either "at" or "near" tbe crossing. A point fifty feet from tbe railroad track or from
tbe public street would likewise be at or near, or certainly
near, tbe crossing, yet one wonld be dangerously near a
passing car, wbile tbe otber would not be. A person in
one foot of a car track is within tbe danger zone of passing
cars, wbile one fifty feet from tbe track is not, but is witbia
tbe safety zone. To say that a person is "at or near" a
railroad station or "at or near" its track, without more,
does not show that such person is within tbe danger zone
of passing trains, or that those in charge of passing trains
or cars owe him any duty.
Tbe seventh count was treated by the pleader and by the

trial court as stating a cause of action as for wantonness.
Its sufficiency as a count of this character was properly
tested by appropriate demurrer, and sustained by the trial

court. In this ruling there was manifest error. The count
is not good as a wanton count under the rules laid down
by this court, in that it does not show, except as by a mere
conclusion of the pleader, that the plaintiff was in a position of peril, or that the motorman knew of her peril. The
facts upon which the conclusion is based are set out, and
they do not support the conclusion of tbe pleader. As before stated, a person near a street car station or track is
in a perilous situation or not, according to bis proximity
to the track, and according to whether be sees, or can see,
approaching or passing cars. This doctrine was early announced by this court in Tanner's Case, 60 Ala. 621, 642,
and has been many times followed. In that case Mr. Tanner was riding along tbe track. Tbe court said: "Unlike
animals, often found on railroad tracks, Mr. Tanner was
an intelligent human being, knew the speed and momentum
of railroad trains, and should have got off the track.
Doubtless be intended to do so. He possibly miscalculated
his ability to reach the crossing just ahead of him. Tbe
persons in charge of tbe train, perceiving by his movements that Mr. Tanner knew of their approach, were justified in supposing he would leave tbe track before they
would come up with him. The testimony, in which there
is no material conflict on this question, shows that there
were points at which he could have done so with safety.
The law does not require that trains shall be stopped, or
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checked up, when persons of discreet years are seen on the
track, ymless, from their position or movements, or other
eaiise, it can be inferred that they are not apprised of the
approaching danger, or, from some other cause, they are
unable to leave the track. Such requirements of railroads
would greatly impede their business, and would do them a
great wrong." The rule is different, of course, as to infants of tender years and as to persons who are disabled
by infirmity from getting out of the way, or who are imconscious of their danger ; but neither of those cases is before us, and we are not attempting to state the law in such
cases.
*
*
*
This count does not allege that the injury was
willfully or wantonly inflicted, as it might have done, but it
attempts to set forth the facts upon which the wantonness
is based, and the facts alleged do not show wanton or wilful injury. Everything alleged shows, at best, only simple
You cannot change a given fact by calling it
negligence.
harsh names or by gratuitously adding violent expletives
or epithets to its real name. • • *
It therefore follows that the trial court erred in overruling the demurrers as to each of these three counts; and
for this error the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed cmd remanded.
Andbeson, McClbllak", Somebvilie, and Db Gkaffbitconcur. DownsiiL, C. J., dissents as to counts 4
BiED,

JJ.,

and 7.

Recital.

(d)

BEOWN

V.

THURLOW.

Court of Exchequer.
16 Meeson

1848.

& Welsby, 36.

Case for slander. Declaration stated, for that whereas
the defendant, contriving, etc., heretofore, to wit, on, etc.,
in a certain discourse which the defendant then had of and
concerning the plaintiff, in the presence and hearing of
divers good and worthy subjects of the Queen, falsely and
maliciously spoke aaid published of and concerning the
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plaintifE the false, scandalons, and malioiotis, and defamatory words following: "Bill Brown, (meaning the plaincan prove you are a sheeptiff,) you are a slieei>-stealer.
stealer at any day or one time." The declaration then alleged special damage to the plaintiff, by means of the premises, in Ms trade and business of a cattle dealer.
Special demurrer, assigning for causes, that the defendant is not by the said declaration positively charged with
having committed the grievances in the declaration mentioned, but it is therein alleged by way of recital only, that

I

the defendant has committed the said grievances, and not
directly and positively, as it ought to have been; and that
nothing is directly or positively affirmed or charged in the
said declaration; and also that it does not appear by the
said declaration that the words, "Bill Brown (meaning
the plaintiff), you are a sheep-stealer, " etc., were spoken
or published of or to the plaintiff. Joinder in demurrer.

Pollock,

C. B. : The word "whereas" overrides the
whole of this declaration, including the special damage, as
if it had been repeated, and has not been exhausted. The
gravamen of the charge is only stated by way of recital and
inducement, nor is any positive averment interposed till
the concluding one, that the plaintiff brings his suit. That
is a defect available to the defendant on special demurrer.
The declaration is, therefore, bad on special demurrer.
Pakke, B. :
entirely concur. In trespass, the matter
complained of is positively averred without a preceding
"whereas;" and though in the action on the case recitals
generally occur, there must, notwithstanding, be a positive
averment of the cause of action. Here the plaintiff does
not positively or directly aver the cause of his action. This
defect
in reason, equally contrary to the true principles
of pleading, whether
occurs in case or trespass. Had
appeared by
long course of precedents, that averring the
cause of action by way of recital, and not positively or directly, had been considered sufficient, a form of pleading
thus established would have bound us; but, in the absence
of any such authority, the c'.ear principles to the contrary
must prevail.
Aldekson, B., concurred.
a

it

it

is,

I

Judgm^ni for the defendant.
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CHATFIELD.

Supreme Court of New York.
23
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^^
1840,

Wendell, 35.

Demnrrer to declaration. The plaintiffs declared in
_c oven<mt . setting forth., in the first place, an indenture
of lease, in ordinary form, of certain premises, reserving
an annual rent of $1,200, payable quarterly, and then alleging that after the making of the lease , and during
the term thereby granted, it was ^eovenanted and agreed by
the defendants by an^ ndorsement in writing made on the
lease, signed and sealed by them, that in consideration that
the plaintifFs had erected an additional buildin g on the demised premises, they would pay to the plaintiffs a further
rMn.ff nf ^^A in nAditinp. in ihft rPTit. T-fiSPrvftd iti thft IftflSft;
that they would pay such rent quarterly, as specified for the
rent reserved in the lease; that the plaintiffs should have
the same remedies for the collection of the additional rent
as if it had been originally reserved in the lease, and that
such additional rent s:hould be computed and commence
from 1st November, 1836. (The term demised by the original lease conmienced 1st May, 1835, and the quarter days
for the payment of rent were the first days of August, NoThe plaintiffs then allege
vember, February, and May.)
a breach of the indenture of lease, and of the covenant endorsed thereon, in the nonpayment on the 1st February,
1839, of the sum of $531, the rent for three months of the
term, commencing 1st November, 1838. The defendants demurred, and assigned for cause of demurrer, the joining of
two distinct causes of action in one count.
By the Court, Bronson, J. : The count is bad for duplicity; the objection pointed out by the demurrer. The^lain_tiffs have, in a__dnglaj;oimt,.-seljmtJ3gQ-jdiatinct^coatraetsi,
and alleged a breach which goes to both. Although both
of the covenants relate to nearly the same subject-matter,
and the plaintiffs have attempted to treat them as though
they constituted but a single contract, it is impossible to
deny that the count is framed upon two several deeds, and
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the claim is to recover damages for the breach of both of
the contracts. Profert is properly made of both deeds ; and
it is clear that the defendants might plead non est factum
to each of them; and there may be other grounds of defence as to one of the covenants, which do not exist in relation to the other.
There is no precedent for this mode of declaring, and it
would be likely to prove highly inconvenient in practice.
"Where the plaintiff has several distinct causes of action,
of the same nature, he is allowed to insert several counts
in his writ and declaration, for the very reason that the
pleading would be bad for duplicity if they were all inserted in one count.
the second contract had provided for the payment of
the rent originally reserved, as well as the additional sum
of $524, an action might then have been maintained upon
that covenant for the whole sum, and only one count would
have been necessary. But jhe jecond contract goes only to
the further or additionafr ent oi ^24. and the plaintiffs
cannot recover the whole debt without counting upon both

If

deeds.

In this case, the pleader might, in one count, have set
out the original lease, assigning for breach the nonpayment
of the rent reserved by that deed; and then, in a second
count, after stating the original lease, either at large or by
a proper reference to the first count, he might have set
out the covenant endorsed on the lease, and assigned for a
breach the nonpayment of the additional rent of $524, provided for by that instrument.
The covenant endorsed on
the lease was in itself a distinct and complete contract for
the payment of a specified sum of money, although it may
be necessary to look into the other instrument to which
it relates for the purpose of more fully understanding the
true nature and scope of the undertaHng. Such a course
is often necessary where one written instrument refers to
another ; but that does not prove that both instruments can
be regarded as a single contract.
The stipulation in the second contract that the plaintiffs
should have the same remedies for the collection of the
additional rent as if it had been originally reserved in the
lease, cannot alter the form of the remedy. Taken literally,
the clause may mean, that the additional rent should be
recoverable in an action on the lease alone, which is im-
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possible.
But the parties probably intended nothing more
than that the additional snm mentioned in the second
contract should be regarded as rent, and might be recovered as such, as effectually as though it had been originally
reserved in the lease. We do not refuse to give effect to
the agreement.^ We allow the plaintiffs to sue for, and recover this additional sum as rent — giving them as perfect,
a remedy as though the whole sum had been reserved in
the lease; but in pursuing the remedy the plaintiffs must
not depart from the established forms of pleadings.
It is
the business of the legislature and the courts to regulate the
forms in which judicial proceedings shall be conducted ; and
those forms cannot be controlled by any stipulation of the
parties, as, for example, an agreement that an action of
covenant may be maintained on a contract by parol, or that
two distinct causes of action may be inserted in one count.

The modem practice in the action of indebitatus assumpsit of inserting several debts in one count, as for goods sold,
money lent, etc., proved nothing in favor of this declaration.
If the assumpsit count is examined, it will be seen that the
several debts are only stated as the consideration for a
single promise. Although there are several considerations,
only one contract is alleged. But here the plaintiffs have
counted upon two contracts.
We are referred to the rule in pleading which allows a
party in his complaint or defence J;o allege several djatinct
must aU tend to a single point, or cormftfited pro pnai'tioTi.
the different facts make out more than one cause of
antinn or ground of defence, the pleading will be bad foF"
dnplicity.
Judgment for defendants. 13

li

Conuningluig two canses of action in the same count, while commonly
fault in pleading, is not usually called duplicity. Indeed there does
not seem to be any appropriate word by which it may be conveniently designated in distinction from duplicity proper.
13.

deemed a
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CENTRAL VERMONT EAILBOAD
COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
63 Vermont,

1890.

98.

Case for the negligence of the defendant. The declaration contained three counts. The defendant demurred g&sierally to all the counts, and especially to the first and second counts. [Each of these counts alleged a derailment of
defendant's train resulting in the injury of the plaintiff and
the death of his wife.] ^*
POWEBS,

J.

The first count is specially demurred to on the ground of
duplicity.
Duplicity is defined to be the joinder of different grounds
of action to enforce a single right of recovery. Gould PI.
Chap. 4, § 99. Here the ground or cause of action is the
negligence of the defendant.*^
statement of facts by the editor.
the declaration is usually defined as in this ease.—
*
•
*
meaning
is, that the deelaTation must not, in
support of a single demand, allege several distinct matters, by any one of
»
•
•
which that demand is sufficiently supported.
The following is an
The plaintiff declared in debt on a penal bill, by which the defendexample:
ant was to pay ten shillings on the 11th of June, and ten shillings upon
the 10th of July next following, and ten shillings every three weeks after,
till a certain total sum were satisfied by such several payments, and by the
said bill the defendant bound himself for the true payment of the said several
simis in the penal sum of seven pounds, and the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant did not pay the said total sum, or any part thereof, upon the
several days aforesaid; whereby an action had accrued to him to demand
This was held bad for duplicity. For, if
the said penalty of seven pounds.
the defendant had failed in payment of any one of the sums, such failure
would alone be a breach of the condition, and sufficient to entitle the plaintiff
to the penalty he claimed; and the plaintiff ought, therefore, to have confined himself to the allegation of the non-payment of one of those sums
•
•
•
only.
"The object of this rule being to enforce a single issue, upon a single
subject of claim, admitting of several issues where the claims are distinct,
the rule is, accordingly carried no farther than this in its application.
The
declaration, therefore, may, in support of several demands, tJlege as many
distinct matters as are respectively applicable to each.
Thus, let one of the
examples above given, with respect to the declaration, be so far varied
as to substitute, for the case of an action in debt on a penal bill for the
of non-payment of a sum by several installpenalty accrued in consequence
ments, the case of an action of covenant, on a covenant to pay that sum
In this latter case the plaintiff nught, without
by similar installments.
14.
15.

CoEdensed

Duplicity in
Stephan says: — "Its
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This negligence was the common source of disastrons
consequences both to the plaintiff and to his wife, as much
as if a person strike a blow which hits two persons at the
same time. There is then only one grownd of action stated
In the count.
Does it seek to enforce anything but a "single right of
recoveryt"

In Guy

Livesey, Cro. Jac. 501, there was a count in
trespass for an assault and battery upon the plaintiff cmd
upon his wife per quod consortium uxoris amisit. After
verdict a motion in arrest was filed based upon the ground
that the count was double. But all the court held that the
action was well brought, for as to the battery of the wife
the plaintiff sought no recovery but only for the loss which
he suffered by reason of that battery upon the wife.
If a battery be inflicted upon the wife the damages to the
husband springing from the loss of the wife's society and
services, are the husband's exclusive personal damages. In
a count merely to recover such damages all the allegations
showing the battery to the wife should be set forth as they
would be, in a count in favor of the husband and wife to
recover for the damages to the wife for the battery.
A count seeking a recovery for the husband's damages
for loss of the wife's services consequent upon a battery
of the wife, can be joined in a declaration with a count for
damages residting from a battery upon the husband alone.
1 Chit. PI. 73; 1 Salk. 119; Selwyn F. P. 286.
If in a single count nothing but damages personal to the
husband and arising at the same time and from the same
cause, are sought, how can they be treated as anything but
the result of a "single right of recovery."
V.

that the defendant 'did not pay the said total sum, or
For he does not, as in
upon the several days aforesaid.'
penal bill, found upon such non-payment a single claim,
the penalty of seven pounds; there being no penalty in
that
question his claims are multiplied in proportion to the non-payments;
and
ten
default,
in
of
the
first
respect
ten
shillings
is
entitled
to
he
is,
shillings more upon each of the rest; the allegation of several defaults
therefore, in this case, the allegation of so many distinct demands and conseStephen on Pleading (Tyler's Ed.) 242-245.
quently allowable."
supported by the cases
doubtless the correct one, and
This definition
B. 275; Higson v. Thompson
U. C.
generally. —Reid v. Carrall (1850)
B. 560; Orr v. Cooledge (1902) 117 Ga. 195; Henry v.
U. C.
(1851)
Heldmaier (1907) 226 HI. 152; State v. Commercial Bank (1857) 33 Miss.
474; Piatt v. Jones (1871) 59 Me. 232; Dunning v. Owen (1817) 14 Masa
157; Peoples Nat. Bank v. Nickerson (1910) 106 Me. 502; Ferguson T. Th«
National Shoemaiers (1911) 108 Me. 189.
Q.

8

Q.

8

is

is

is,

duplicity, declare
any part thereof,
the action on the
viz., the claim to
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But at all events the objection to the firdt count amounts
to this, that the plaintiff in this count asks for more damages than he is entitled to. If he cannot recover for the consequential damages he may for those done by the battery
upon himself.
The count is not demurrable because the plaintiff claims
too many items of damage. 1 Chit. PI. 349; Bayles v. Kan.
Pac. R. B. Co., 13 Col. 181, 5 L. B. A. 480 ; Bayles v. Glenn,
72 Ind. 5; Morits v. Splitt, 55 Wis. 441.
The judgment is reversed. The demurrer is sustained as
to the 2nd and 3d counts and overruled as to the 1st count
and that count is adjudged sufficient. The cause is remanded with leave to replead, to both parties.

HIGHLAND AVENUE AND BELT RAILROAD COMPANY V. DUSENBERRY.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
94

1891.

Alabama, 413.

Waikeb, J. —Demurrers to the three counts contained in
the original complaint having been sustained, a fourth
count was added by amendment. This count avers, in substance, that on the 16th day of November, 1889, the plaintiff's intestate was an employee of the defendant as a section hand on its railroad, and as such employee was rightfully on one of the defendant 's hand cars, and while he was
riding on the same, and engaged in the line of his employment, another hand car was being run and moved over and
along said line of road, each of said cars being under the
superintendence and control of the foreman in charge, and
running at a high and reckless rate of speed, and in close
and reckless proximity to each other, so that by the carelessness and gross negligence of the foreman in charge, in
directing or allowing said cars to run at such a high rate of
speed, and in such close proximity the one to the other, the
same collided, or the rear car ran into the front car, throwing or knocking plaintiff's intestate between said cars, and
thereby inflicting injuries from which he died. The portion of the compMnt just summarized states a cause of ac-
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Hon based npon the carelessness and gross negligence of
the foreman as the person having the superintendence and
control of both hand cars.
Bnt the complR int d nps Ti n t gfnp Tipt-p Immediately following the averments already mentioned, there are additional allegations to the effect, that said injuries were
caused by reason of the negligence of some person or persons inthe service or employment of the defendant, who,
at the time of said injuries, had the charge or control of the
running, moving or operating of the rear hand car; and that
one or both of said hand cars were in a defective and worn
condition, that the brakes or cog wheels of one or both of
said cars were in a bad and defective condition, and that
said injuries were caused by reason of the defect in the
condition of the ways, works, machinery or plant connected
with or used in the business of the master or employer,
and said defect arose from, or had not been discovered or
remedied owing to the negligence of the master or employer,
or of some person in the service of the master or employer
and intrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the ways,
works, machinery or plant were in proper condition; that
the defects aforesaid were known to, or could have been
known to the defendant, by the exercise of reasonable diligence ; and that said injuries were caused by reason of the
negligence of some person or persons in the service or employment of the defendant who had the superintendence of
the moving of said rear hand car intrusted to them at the
time of said injuries, and whilst in the exercise of such
The result of the allegations is, that the
superintendence.
death of the plaintiff's intestate is in one count succAi=;RiVft1y
attributed (1) to the gross negligence of tbp fnrpma-n in
charge or control of both hand cars ; (2^ to the negligence of.
some person or persons in charge or control of th e mnTiin g,
.^pying or operating nf thp TPf\T hand -ttar; (3) to the defective and worn conditio nj?f one or both of the hand cars,
which defect had arisen from, or had not been discovered or
remedied owing to the negligence of the defendant, or of
some person in its service who was intrusted by it with
the duty of seeing that the ways, works, machinery or
plant were in proper condition; and (4) to the negligence of.
somie person or persons in the service or employment of the
defendant who had the superintendenoe of the moving of
the reax car, whilst in the exercise of such snperintendeaice.
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We do not construe the complaint to charge that the several acts of negligence were concurrent, co-operating
causes, and that all of them together contributed to the alleged injury, so that each specification is to be regarded as
an integral feature in the description of the mode in which

the injury was inflicted. If that construction could be put
upon the complaint, the plaintiff would be in the position of
having stated his case with unnecessary particularity,
and he would not be entitled to recover unless his proof
made out the case with equal particularity of description.
Smith IK Causey, 28 Ala. 655; L. <£ N. R. R. Co. v. Johnston,
79 Ala. 436; C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 88 111. 431; L. S N. R. R.
Co. V. Coulton, 86 Ala. 129; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 57 et seq.
Here, the several specifications of negligence are stated
t.h^,m seems to
as_di sconnected defaults, a nd each one of
be put forward as a separate ground of liability, independent of the others.

In the present

distinct breaches of duty, each,
constituting an independent cause of action ^are alleged in
one count.
Neither of the specifications of negligence
could be stricken out, or disregarded as surplusage, or as
immaterial or impertinent matter; for each of them is an
essential part of one or several causes of action, upon
either of which as well as upon another the plaintiff may
rely. Nor can that which is one count in form be treated
case, several

counts which could be pleaded to
separately; for the averments are linked together in one
continuous narrative; the several allegations of negligence
are all made in connection with and in reference to a single
statement of the fact of injury; the circumstance of the
death of the plaintiff's intestate is averred only once, but
the defendant's liability therefor is rested upon several independent grounds, stated distributively. A cause of action is shown by coupling the averment of injury with either
of the specifications of negligence ; yet the allegations as to
the several independent breaches of duty are so mingled
together that they cannot be singled out and met separately,
but issues must be made upon all of them at once by any
single plea which would answer the whole of the one count
of the complaint. If the plaintiff is entitled to a recovery
ntion proof of only one of the causes of action, then equally
PThcf^nfive averments in the same count are ignored, and
as several independent
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the practical effect is to treat tlie several averments of
breaches of duty as if they were made in the alternative, so
that the plaintiff may select any one of them and not abandon the rest, though, as they are all in one count, they
must all be met by the same plea or pleas.
Alternative averments of matters of substance are doBtructive of all certainty in the formation of definite issues
for trial. The prime object of the successive steps in pleading, under our system, is to evolve such issues so that they
may be presented pointedly and distinctly. If, on the other
hand, the proof must sustain all the specifications of negligence, the result is to require proof of several independent
of action, to sustain one recovery. It is quite usual
causes^
in actions for torts, where a single act or transaction is
complained of as the cause of the alleged injury, to insert
several counts stating that act in varying shapes to meet
different phases of the proof as it may be developed, and
to charge in the successive counts different breaches of
duty as separate grounds of recovery.
Each count is
treated as the statement of a distiact cause of action, and
appropriate issues may be pleaded to them severally. Maupay V. Eolley, 3 Ala. 103. The separation into counts serves
the double purpose of supplying apt averments to meet
varying phases of proof, and at the same time presenting
material issues singly and not jumbled together. * * *
In the present case, a plea of contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff's intestate, though it would present
a good defense to several of the causes of action stated, yet
would, perhaps, be insufficient as an answer to the whole
count, because one of the separable grounds of recovery is
the alleged gross negligence and recklessness of the foreman in charge of the two hand cars. Likewise, a plea setting up a state of facts which would relieve the defendant
of liability for the alleged injury if it was caused by reason
of a defect in machinery, would not be a good answer to
the count, because it would not meet other issues wholly
foreign to this one. In short, if several independent causes
of action may be so joined in one count that thev may be
regaraed either a^s stated in the alternative or as putting
upon the plaintiff the burden of proving averments which
are not joined together as parts of the description of a
smgie transaction, tlien the defendant is put to the answer^
of a multiplicity of eauallv material issues at once, and no^
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steps in pleading can reducfi t^A prnitj^nfirm nf t.Vift pflrtiesjtoa. sing le material issue.
Inextricable confusion of issue s
"^wouia result fl'om IhS 'Wending in one count of a number of
distinct breaches of duty as independent grounds of recovery, to be chosen from and relied on at the election of
the plaintiff.
Perspicuity and certainty in his pleadings
are not exacted of the plaintiff, if he is permitted to put
forward in one count several independent causes of action,
stated in such ambiguous terms as to leave the defendant
wholly in doub t as to what alleged breach of duty is really
made the ground of tlie cJiarge of liability . The defenda nt
is entitled to be clearly and distinctly informed of the facts
jelied upon as the basis of recovery against him . The
count which was added by amendment in this case was uncertain and ambiguous in stating several independent causes
of action without disclosing which one was relied upon to
support the plaintiff's claim, and th e demurrer poin^ ^ing' ""^^
the defects in the complaint should have been sustained.
Reversed and remcmded.

CTJNNACK

v.

GUNDRY.

Court of King's Bench.
1

1819.

Chitty's Reports, 709.

Bayley on a former day obtained a rule to show cause
why the declaration in this case, which contained ninetyeight counts upon as many one-pound country banker's
promissory notes should not be referred to the master to
consolidate the said counts upon all the promissory notes
for the like suni, and to strike out such other superfluous
matter as the master should think fit.
Chitty now showed cause, and contended that it was not
possible to sustain this motion, which was without a precedent. It is not possible, as was suggested, to frame a
declaration alleging, "that the defendant heretofore, towit, on, etc., made divers, to wit, ninety-eight promissory
notes, and that by each and every of them respectively he
promised to pay the sum of one pound."
Vide James v.
Shore, 1 Stark. 426. There was indeed a similar motion
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Tidd (6th Ed.), 648; and 3 Smith,
The declaration in that case con-

tained two hundred and eighty-six counts, and the court
said that eaxjh of the notes being a special and distinct
contract, it was impossible to state several of them in one
count.
Abbott, Ch.
:
Could not the object be gained in this
way. Supposing the party making the application should
consent to enter into a rule, that all the notes except one
shall be given in evidence under the count, upon an account stated either before the master, or before the jury,
as shall be agreed upon, and that the defendant shall bring
no writ of error for want of a special original.
Bayley and CMtty agreed to this arrangement, and ac-

J.

cordingly
The rule was made absolute, "that it be referred to the
master to strike out all the counts except the first, the
defendant thereby undertaking to permit aU the other notes
to be given in evidence, either before the master or a jury
upon the count upon an account stated, and that he would
not bring any writ of error, and that the costs of the other
counts and of this application should be costs in the cause."

NEWBY

V.

MASON.

Court of King's Bench.
1

Bowling

<&

^U^
1822.

Ryland, 508.

Adam moved for a rule to show cause why it should not
be referred to the Master to strike out certain superfluous counts in the plaintiff's declaration. It was an action
for alleged bribery a t the Camelford election; the declaration pm^\l^^■r\M^ two Jmn dred and ten counts. One set charged
the defendants with procuring the corruption of, and the
othe r-. with corrupting pe rso ns to vote at the election . He
insisted, therefore, that as the evidence which would support one set of counts would support the other, he declaration contained superfluity, which was fit matter for reference to the Master.
Bayley, J., at the time the motion was made, said, thai
procuring the corruption, and corrupting, might be differ-
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for instance, giving a man money to vote

a

particular way might be one offence, and giving him money
not to vote at all might be another, so that different sets
of counts in the declaration might require different evidence.

The court, however, granted a rule nisi; and
Merewether now showed cause aga inst th e rule, and in-

sisted that unless the counts alleged to be superfluous were
introduced vexatiously. the court ought ~hotrTo intefTere;
and whether there was vexation or no t was a question
"proper for the court only to decide . and~ou ght not to be
referred in fbft Maatfi r. For this he cited Wilkins v. Perry,

Hardw. 129.
Sed per Curiam. This is a case to go to
Master, who
l^e
will flpffjdft wTipfliftr t.TiP plaintiff has introd ueed" the sup erfluous cou ntsjvexationsl y or not . .
jgifZ g absolute^

GODFEEY

V.

BUCKMASTEE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
-

Illinois,

447.

J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action of assumpsit brought in the Madison
Circuit Court.
The plaintiff counted on sis several promissory notes,
made payable at the same time, for the sum of one thousand dollars each, and included the whole of the notes in a
The count describes the
single count of the declaration.
notes according to their tenor and legal effect, and assigns the breach of the promise to pay as to each and to the
whole of the notes.
To this declaration the defendants specially demurred,
and assigned for cause a want of form by joining the notes
in the same count. The circuit court, holding the demurrer
and rendered final judgmeni
not well taken, overruled
for the plaintiff. A writ of error has been prosecuted, and
now assigned for error: First, that the declaration
contains different and distinct causes of action in one count,
•
•
*
and that this count
therefore double
j

is

is

it

it,

Smith,

2

1838.

Sec

Thb

5]

DEca^ABAsaoN.

449

It is

now argued by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error,
that although the several and distinct promises of the defendants could be joined in one action, yet the promises
being several and distinct they should have been declared
on in separate and distinct counts.
To this position, it may be remarked, that the present
case is not one of a misjoinder of causes of action so different in their nature as to fall within the rule which would
render a declaration bad because of such joinder; nor can
we perceive how it is a cause even for special demurrer
for want of form.

is

it

it,

There is no misdescription, no incongruity or want of
accuracy or certainty in the count which is even formally
perfect; and hence the cause of demurrer assigned is not
established.
We are entirely satisfied that no valid objection can be raised to the count.
The six notes are identical with each other, being for
the same sum, of the same date, and payable at the same
time, and might well be joined in the same count most conveniently, without ambiguity or perplexity. Indeed it is
most desirable, where it can be done without producing
confusion, when the causes of action are of the same nature
and may be clearly set forth together, that this mode of
declaring should be adopted. No possible embarrassment
can arise, for the defendant may avail himself of every
defense. He may plead specially to each note separate matters of defense, or he may plead the general issue and give
special matter in evidence in defense to any or to all the
notes. Suppose, instead of the six notes, there had been
but one payable by installments on six different days, would
it be objected that the promises and breaches could not be
set forth in the same count? We apprehend not. The promises then being on separate pieces of paper will not surely
nor can the count be
change the rule nor the reason of
describes several notes. The description
double because
of the six notes in separate counts would have been no
more clearly nor accurately described than they have been
in one, and the useless verbiage which would, in framing
thus desirably avoided.
them, have to be observed
The authorities cited by the counsel for the plaintiffs
in error, and particularly those in Gould's Pleading, are
c. L. p.
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far from sustaining the ground assumed in support of the
writ of error, while those in the 4th and 13th Johnson's

Reports, clearly sustain the court. In our system of practice it is of infinite, importance to introduce precision and
conciseness ; and whatever tends to dispense with prolixity
and useless recapituation,

should be encouraged.

The judgment is affirmed with costs.
Judgment affirmed.

EAWLINSON

V.

SHAW.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
117

Michigan,

1898.

5.

[Defendant agreed to publish a book which plaintiff
agreed to write, and after a large part of the manuscript
had been prepared, defendant wanted to be released from
the contract. The parties were unable to agree, and arbitrators were selected and certain proceedings were had relative to an arbitration. The book was never published. The
declaration consisted of several counts, the first being a
s pecial count on the original contrant, allegiTig the defend^
ant's promise a nd the consideration upon which it rested,
The offer of plaintiff to do his part, the breach by defendant
and a claim for damages.] ^®
Long,

J.:

*

•

*

The second count avers:
"And for that whereas the said defendant, on November 24, 1896, at the city of Grand Eapids, said county, was
indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $300 upon and by
virtue of an award there made by G. A. Buell, 0. R. WUmarth, J. S. Valentine, C. A. Shackleton, and W. G. Beckwith, arbitrators chosen by and between the parties, on a
submission in writing theretofore made on, to wit, April
13, 1896, by the

plaintiff and the defendant, to

and determination
16.

the award

of the said arbitrators, concerning cer-

Condensed stalement

of facts

Taj the editor.
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tain matters in difference then and there depending between
the plaintiff and the defendant, upon which said reference
the said arbitrators then and there awarded that the defendant should pay the plaintiff the said sum of money,
to wit, $300."
_To these are added tha jsomjaQ n counts in assvanpsit
The cause came on for trial before a jury in the Kent
Circuit Court. After the opening statement by plaintiff's
counsel, and before any testimony was taken, he was asked
by counsel for defendant:
"You make reference to two arbitrations, which you say
these parties had taken steps to set aside. Do you claim
anything under either of these arbitrations?
"A. We do not care to announce ourselves on the thing
until the proofs are in. We may or may not. It depends
on the evidence in the case. • • •
The Court: I think, if those two counts are allowed to
stand, we are trying two cases in one. ' '
The motion was therefore granted compelling plaintiff's
counsel to elect upon which count they would proceed, and
they elected to proceed upon the first count. This ruling
raises the first question presented.
The court was in error in compelling the plaintiff to
elect. Upon the face of the declaration two distinct rights
of action were alleged — one upon the contract, and the other
upon the award. The second count upon its face purports
to disclose a distinct right unconnected with that stated in
the other. Assumpsit could have been brought to enforce "
the award, which is alleged in the second count . The two
SQ unts could have been .join ed^ Even upon the supposition that the court was advised by the opening of counsel
that the second count was for the same cause of action as
stated in the first count, yet we think the court was in error
in compelling counsel to elect. One of the objects of inserting two or more counts in one declaration, when in fact
there is but one cause of action, is to accommodate the statement of the cause, as far as may be, to the possible state of
the proofs to be exhibited on the trial, or to guard, if possible, against the hazard of the proofs varying materially
from the statement of the cause of action, so that, if one
or more of the several counts should not be adapted to the
evidence, some other of these may be so. The plaintiff haa
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in every case a right to insert in his declarat ion as many
counEs (each one~bei ng in itself single) as~he'^Iease s^ It
appeared on the trial that tne claimed award grew out"" of
the proofs showed that the award was
the same contract.
binding between the parties, then the plaintiff could not

Ilf

recover on the contract. If it turned out, however, on the
trial, that the award f6r any reason could not be enforced by
either partv. the plaintiff had the right to stand upon his
first count. In Mather v. Day, 106 Mich. 371, the trial
judge submitted the question of the validity of the award
to the jury, with the instruction that, if they found the
award binding, they had nothing to do with any matters
involved in the controversy covered by the contract.
On
appeal to this court it was said :
"We think it was proper to submit to the jury, under the
circumstances, the questions arising under the submission
and aAvard. It is evident from the finding of the jury that
they were unable to compute the award from the statement
furnished, and therefore disregarded the award entirely,
and entered upon the coUsideration of the general account
between the parties."
A case nearly in point to the question here is Sadler v.
Olmstead, 79 Iowa, 121. It appeared that plaintiff in his
first count declared upon a contract for hay sold, and sought
to recover the contract price. In another count he set up
an arbitration and award for the same hay. It was held
that the plaintiff had the right to state his cause of action
in this way in different counts.

J

'\

^i

HITCHCOCK

Superior Court of Judicature
15

V.

MUNGEB.

f

of New Hampshire.

1844.

New Hampshire, 97.

Debt, a ui tarn, under the statute against usury.
The first count alleged that on the 26th day of February,
1839, one Samuel Richardson made his promissory note to
the defendant, for the sum of tiiree hundred dollars, upon

Sec
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whicli note there were three indorsements, the dates of
which were specified in the count, and that afterwards, on
the 8th day of April, 1841, Richardson and the defendant
made a corrupt agreement, by virtue of which Eichardson
paid the defendant the sum of fifteen dollars, for forbearance and giving day of payment of the sum due on the note,
over and above the rate of six per cent., contrary to the
form of the statute, etc., by reason whereof the defendant
forfeited the sum of forty-five dollars, beiag three times
the amount of the usury ; one-half to the use of the county,
and one-half to the use of the plaintiff.
*^*

^he

second count alleged that_ on the said 26th day of
^

February, 1839, said Richardson gave his other promissory
note to the defendant, of like date and amount, and payable
in the same manner, at the rate before mentioned, upowhich note were payments made by the said Richardson
similar to those upon the note first described. The corrupt
agreement etc., was then stated, as in the first count
The defendant pleaded that he did not owe the plaintiff
and the county of Sullivan in manner and form, etc.
The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff,
which the defendant moved to set aside. • * * He also
moved in arrest of judgment, on account of the insufficiency

of the second count in the declaration.

J.

Where there are several counts in a declaration, whether the subjects of them be really distinct, or
identical, they must always purport to be founded on distinct causes of action, and not to refer to the same matter.
Stephen on Pleading (2nd Ed.), 318, 319. This is rendered
necessary by the rule against duplicity, the object of which
is to insure the production of a single issue upon the same
subject-matter in dispute. 1 Ch. PI. 259. This rule, though
evaded as to the declaration, by the use of several counts, is
Where there are
not permitted to be directly violated.
several counts, they are for all purposes as distinct as if
they were in different declarations, and they must severally
contain all necessary allegation. But a party has a commonlaw right to introduce several counts into his declaration,
in fact for the same subject-matter of complaint, and varying from the first count only in statement, description, or
GiLCHEisT,

circumstances.

:

1

Ch. PI. 451.
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a
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it.

second count npon a deed or afiTfiftTn^Tit.^
proper to aver that
CftT^ain n t.hp.r deed or af preement
was made between the parties, containing the lilrft tftrma xnti
Blipnlations aa are contained in the deed set forth in thfi
connt
C?h. P. 450, note (h).
The second connt in
declaration before ns refers to
^ tlie "first eonnt with as Tfvnfth paTJic"1«Tnty n.a t>ie Irw n.Tid_a-Tithorities reqnire. We ar of opinion that
suflScd git.
. and that the mo tion in arrest of jndgmftnt Rlimi|
ovfti--^

jh

is

d
b
?

e

it

e

1

Jrst

ruled."
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ICAEDIS' ADM'RS

6

Supreme Court

v.

SHACKLEFORD.

//

o

t

[/^

of

y

B«> wfcwK
nae the

t

un&ral prior enrmt* diffnrmitly worflaaf It III nnt
aprassinn "aa afnreaaiH" wit.hnnt inifi catlng which prior
-— ioiut ITrafeirad ta-^ilmon t. Christ EoBpital(1902) 6S14. J. L. *ti

IT.

■nongh

Alabama. 1844.

Alabama, 433.

This was an action of assumpsit by the defendant in error, against the plaintiffs!

The declaration contains eight
which issues of fact were joined,

a

&

a

^

^i

f

o

counts, on the first, six
tii<» r^pfATidfrnts
(^omji rTAr^
'and to tho Hoyo nth arid
g^^t^*,
seriatim.
The seventh count alleges that the defendant's
intestate was an attorney at law, practicing in several inferior and superior courts of this State, and at his request
the plaintiff placed in his hands obligations and evidences
of debt due from divers persons resident in the same,
amounting in the aggregate to the sum of fourteen thousand
three hundred and fifty-three doUars and fifty-four and onefourth cents — all of which are particularly described by
statement of the names of the debtors, the aniount, and
when due. In consideration of the premises, and a reasonable fee to be paid to the intestate for his services, he
undertook to collect the obligations and evidences of debt,
and pay the amount thereon received, to Henry Hitchcock,
in the discharge of certain demands in his hands against the
late firm of Burke, Shackleford
Co., of which the plaintiff
was partner. The breach alleged is, that the intestate did
not proceed to recover the money due and owing to the
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plaintiff on the obligations,

•
•
•
sustained.
COLUER, C. J. • * • *
It is objected to the eight count, that it does not describe
the claims which the intestate received for collection, but
merely refers to the third and seventh counts, and adopts
the description contained in the third and seventh counts.
The several counts of a declaration are regarded as itt.
different parts or sections (Step, on Plead. 267) and in
framing
unnecessary repetition should be avoided. This
may be done by the counts referring to each other but unless such reference
made, one count will not be aided by
another; "for though both counts are in the same declaration, yet they are as distinct as
they were in separate('
declarations; and consequentlVf they must independently
contain all ne<^e spary flllpgatimiR or the latter count must
expresslv refer to the former."
Saund. on Plead, and
Ev. 417). In Ryder v. Robins, 14 Mass. Rep. 284, the first
count concluded that the defendant," though often requested
has never paid, etc., but neglects and refuses, etc.," but the
second containing no averment or anything equivalent:
Held, that the allegation of the first might be applied to the
Har.
J.
second count. And in Dent's Adm'r v. Scott,
Rep. 28,
was considered to be suflScient for one count to
and for the other counts seeking to
consideration,
out
set
enforce a contract founded upon the same consideration to
was said, need not contain a comrefer to it. Each count,
itself,
but by reference to another, its
plete declaration in
The case of Maupa/y v. Holley,
defects would be supplied.
Ala. Rep. 103,
entirely consistent wtih the authorities
cited. That was an action of assumpsit, and the declaration
contained two counts, in each of whioli the contract was

is

3

a

it

a

it

&

3

(1

,

!

!

if

is

;

it,

,

etc., and pay over the amount in
discharge of the claims existing against Burke, Shackleford
& Co., as it was his duty to do ; but wholly failed to collect
aiid pay over the same, etc. ; and by such neglect, the plaintiff has been prevented from collecting the obligations, etc.,
and has been altogether deprived of, and wholly lost the
same.
The declaration then concludes with a deduction of
the intestate's liability, and a promise by him to pay, eta
The eighth count, inste ad of describing the evidences of
clebt pla ced in tJie intestate^s hands, merely declares th at
they are identical with those mentioned in ihp ih\r^ taiH aav:
*
*
*
enth counts,
The demurrer to each count was
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stated differently. The court said, "Where a declaration
contains several counts, each count is considered as the
statement of a different cause of action ; and where issue is
taken upon all, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, upon
The citations made
proving the allegations of either."
are directly in point, and in recognizing them as authoritative we necessarily attain the conclusion that the objection
to the eighth count is not well taken.

Without extending this opinion to greater length, we
would merely remark that we consider the seventh and
The judgmen" t
eighth counts as entirely imexceptionable.
is consequently affirmed.^'
18.
Such reference is Biifflmanf, Bven thnngh tha yriar (•fmnt which is re^erre^Tto is nei(i hnrl nn HamnrraT (ATiTiiafnn'iniAff Co. V. Blwell (1905) 144
Ala. 317) or has been abandone d (Bobinson v. Dnunmond (1854) 24 Ala.
174; Jones v. Vanzandt (1851) 5 McLean (U. S.) 214; Cleveland, Cincinnati,
Chicago & St. Louis By. Co. v. Eice (1892) 48 111. App. 51; contra, EichardBon T. Lanning (1855) 20 N.
L. 130, where count smcken out).

J.

Section
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Joinder of Causes

DALSON

v.

Action.

BRADBERBT.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
50

op

Illinois,

1/

1869.

82.

Walkee, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
an action of trespass on the case
against appellant, to recover for an in^ry"fo^Hs~reyeP"
sionary interest in a tract of land held and occupied by a
iensnt under a lease from him. The declaration averred
that, he being the owner and entitled to the reversion of
the land, appellant, without leave and against the will of
appellee, threw down and destroyed a large amount of
fence, by hauling away the same, whereby the crop became
exposed to cattle and other stock, and was thereby destroyed, whereby appellee became and was injured, and sustained damage.
Subsequently, on leave granted by the court, appellee
filed an additional count. In it he proceeds for a trespass
quare clausum f regit, ana avers that appellant, with force

Appellee commenced
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and arms, broke and entered the close, and threw down and
hauled away appellee's fences, by reason of which the grass
and herbage were constaned and destroyed, to appellee's
damage.
A trial was had, which resulted in a verdict in favor of
api)ellee, whereui>on appellant entered a motion for a ne
trial, which the court overruled, and rendered judgment on
the verdict. The case is brought to this court on appeal,
and we are asked to reverse the judgment on sieveral

grounds.
It is urged that there is such a misjoinder of causes of
action as renders the judgment erroneous. A^ giisjoin der of
causes of action reiidfir&^jieduratipnbltd on d^nurrer, and
this, to67 wiSbout regard to the perfection of the coimts in
themggr^eBr-Tire^SW of pleading prohibits such a joinder,
andTiehee the objection may be reached in that mode. It is
not only subject to a demurrer, but it is bad in arrest or
upon error. 1 Chit. PI. 205, 8 Am. Ed. from the 6 Loni Ed.
It has, however, been held, that in some cases the misjoiader will be aided by intendment, as by taking damages
junderjbutj)ne count, or by entering a remittitur of damages
so as to recover but for one cause of action, or where the
verdict is for theplaintiff on the counts well joined, and for
the defendant on the others. Knightly v. Birch, 2 Maule &
Sel. 533. But in this case there was a general verdict, and,
for aught we can see, the jury may have found damages
under both counts.
It then remains to see whether case and trespass may be |
joined in the same declaration. Chitty lays down the ruleij
that assumpsit, covenant, debt, or account, cannot be joined
witFeachotEer, nor trespass with case, for they are actions
of distinct natures, and the judgments are different, that
in trespass being, in strictness, quod capiatur, and that in
ease, quod sit in misericordia. lb. 201 ; 1 Tidd's Prac. 10 Am
Ed. and note. It isla id down as a rule, that whenever the
on two countsTHiey
may be jmnfdrJaihejadae^they-cajiiiotJbe. DiiJce of Bedford
V. Alcock, 1 WUs. 248. It has also been said, that where the
same plea may be pleaded, and the same judgment rendered
on different counts, they may be joined. Brown v. Dixon, 1
Term. E. 274. Notwithstanding there are various rules
stated by different judges, by which to determine when
different causes of action may be joined, they aU agree that
same pro.oess and~jud^ent-may~.beJiad
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And we have seen that i
It, therefore, follows,]
they^are^'nof'Mrtr^F^^'i^^^fe-

the jndgme nts must be the same.

that there was error in joining these counts, and we have
seen that the defect may be reached, on demiurrer, in arrest
'
or upon error.
In this view of the case, we deem the consideration of the
other grounds urged for a reversal as unnecessary.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed and
the cause remanded.
%;J^^d£ment

reversed.^'

19.
The eonrta have found great difficulty in filing upon a satisfactory
test to determine the right of joinder of causes of action.
The best historical
■ynopsis of the matter is given by Tidd as follows: —
"Wherever several counts may be joined in the same declaration, fo r
different canses ot action, tnere is aiwavs tne same ^TM|">^g« hv niHynTial vlmt
and in general the same vlea or general issue, aiul the 8ame_-JMr?gmff»,t.
And hence, rules haTie been framed, in order to determine what different
counts may or may not be joined in the same declaration, from the similarity
In one case, it was said by
of the process, the plea, and the judgment.
Lek, Oh.
that the true way to judge of this matter is, that whenever
the process and judgment are the same on two counts, they may be joined;
otherwise they cannot. But it being found that the similarity of the process
afforded but a very fallible criterion, there being the same process of summons, attachment and distress, in actions of account, covenant, debt, annuity,
and detinue, and the same process of attachment and distress in actions of
assumpsit, case, and trespass, none of which can be joined, it was said
in a subsequent ease, by Wilmot, Ch.
that the true test to try whether
two counts can be joined in the same declaration, is to consider and see
whether there be the same judgment on bot h ; and if there be, he thought
jBut m a 'lfl,ter &SM6, the court of Common Pleaa
they might be well jomea.
were of opinion, that the rule or test to try whether two counts can be
joined, as laid down in the former one, was rather too large, and not
universally true; and the reason for this opinion probably was, that there
is the same judgment,
for damages and costs, in actions of assumpsit,
covenant case and trespass, and the same entry of a Tniserieordia in the three
first of these actions, and yet no two of them can be joined.
Therefore,
in a still later case, a new criterion was substituted; and it was said by
BuLLER, J. to be universally true, that wherever the Rani ^ plaa u pgy be pleadon two counts, they may be joined in the
ed, and *^i f|°""» jiifi;TTnf.Tif. frrran
But even this rule is not altogether unexceptionable; for
same declaration.
it is clear that case and trespass cannot in general be joined, although the
same plea of not guilty of the premises will serve for both, and there is
the same judgment in each for damages and costs; and though in general
the judgment in trespass i s^mwd fflpinii/r, ati/l in actions upon the case,
quod sit in miser innrdin^^ -rM. sbmetimes there is an entry of a eapiatur in ease,
as well as in trespass.
It should also be observed, that this rule is merely
affirmative; and it does not hold e converso, that different counts cannot be
joined, unless there be the same plea and judgment on all of them; for it is
holden, that deit on record, specialty and simple contract, may be joined,
although they require different pleas; and in deit and detinv,e, which may
The
also be joined, not only the pleas, but the judgments are different.
nature of the causes of action therefore should be attended to, in order to
determine whether different counts may or may not be joined in the same
I declaration;
and, with the exceptions which have been noticed, it may safely
be laid down qn_n_iynffTa1
ni1a» that wherever the causes of action are of the
I
[game nature, an d TP"/ P''"?"^^:^ ^" ^^^ ''"^3''"t fff ffmiTl ts in the same species
may be joii ;iP|^i,,pt.>i« Twise thev f'^ni'fffa
'' f'^'^'f''' Prnjt.im^ H,
jof action, thpv
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TAYLOB.

Supreme Court of Errors of ConnectievL
19 Connecticut,

1B4X

122.

[Plaintiff declared in two counts. In the first he alleged
trespass vi et armis, whereby the defendant took a certain jug containing a quart of rum, which was owned and
possessed by the plaintiff, and put into said jug tallow,
hair, soap suds and other noxious substances, and thereby
both the jug and the rum that was in it were rendered of
no value to the plaintiff. The second count alleged the putting of the same noxious substances into the jug for the
purpose of inducing the plaintiff to drink them, and that the
plaintiff, supposing the jug to contain rum, drank the said
mixture and became sick.J *»
Chuboh, Ch. J.: * * •
a

The only question which we deem important in the
case, is, whether in this declaration there is a misjoinder of
counts 1 The first count is in trespass, for an injury to the
property, and the second in case, for a consequential injury to the person, of the plaintiff. By the common law,
•
•
these counts cannot be joined. •
2.

And it makes no difference, in this respect, that by a
proper form of averment the plaintiff might have recovered under the first count for the injury described in the
second. The causes of action still are distinct and different.
And it is not uncommon, in actions of trespass vi et armis,
that by way of aggravation, the plaintiff recovers damages
for that, which alone considered, would furnish a good cause
of action in case: as in trespass quare clausum f regit, the
plaintiff may recover for the seduction of his wife or daughter; or as in the case of Barnum v. Vandusen, 16 Conn.
E. 200, for the damage sustained by the communication of
a deadly and contagious disorder to his sheep. But in all
such cases, to justify a recovery in aggravation, the facts
and circumstances must be averred, as a ground of recovery, specially and with reasonable
20.

Condensed

statement

particularity.

of facts by the editor.

1

Chitt.
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Saund. 346. Treat v. Barber, 7 Gorm. B. 275;
Barnum v. Vandusen, 16 Coim. R. 200; Bracegirdle v. Oxford, 2 Man. & S. 77; 2 Greenl. Ev., par. 273.
In the present case, no allusion is made in the first count
to any matter of aggravation ; but the plaintiff relies for a
recovery for the injury to his person, upon the additional
special facts alleged in the second count, as for a distinct
ground of complaint.
There is, therefore, in our opinion, a misjoinder of counts
386.

1

in this dedaration.

•

•

•

Judgment affirmed.

HOWE

V.

COOK.

Supreme Court of New York.
21

By

1889.

Wendell, 29.

J.: In

actions against bailees,
attorneys and others for negligence or misconduct in the
discharge of their duty, the plaintiff may in general declare
either in case or assumpsit. The gravamen may be alleged
as consisting either in a breach of duty arising out of an
employment for hire, or a breach of promise implied from
the consideration of hire; and other counts may be joined
belonging to that form of action which the plaintiff elects
to pursue. Govett v. Badnidge, 3 East, 62, 70; Church v.
Mumford, 11 Johns, E. 479. Mr. Chitty gives precedents
for declaring in both forms, and advises the pleader to
frame his principal count in such a manner that a count
in trover or one in indebitatus assumpsit may be joined,
as the circumstances of the case may require.
Although the plaintiff has two modes of framing his
principal count, and the evidence to support the declaration
may be the same in both cases, yet other counts can only
be joined when they belong to that form of action which
the pleader adopts. In actions against a carrier, the plaintiff cannot declare in case for a loss of the goods, and add
a count in assumpsit for money paid, or the like; nor can
he declare in assumpsit on the implied undertaking to carry
safely, and add a count in trover for the conversion of the
the

Court, Bbonson,
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is,

And so of actions against other bailees. It
not enough that the counts may all relate to the same subaction must be the same in all.
ject-matter', the form
Brown v. Dixon, T. E. 274; Chit. PI. 196-7.
The two first counts in this declaration are plainly
founded ^rpow contract. They set forth a promise and the
breach of
as the cause of action. The pleader has followed substantially the precedents for declaring tin asimprophorse for riding
sumpsit against the hirer of
adopted, the common inerly, etc. and where this form
Chit. PI.
debitatus assumpsit counts may be joined.
in
was
fatal
mis^
of
count
trover
145, 148. The addition
1

a

a 2

;

is

a

it

it,

1

of

property.

joinder.

6

it

if

a

is

it

is

;

is

is

it

is

alleged does not deThe manner in which the breach
not
termine the form of the action. In assumpsit,
unusual after setting out the contract, to allege for breach
that the defendant contriving a/nd fraudulently intending
to injure the plaintiff, did not regard his promise, but craftily and subtly deceived the plaintiff, etc. and this form
often followed, not only in actions against bailees and
others where case would also lie, but in cases where asthe only remedy. In declaring upon contracts,
sumpsit
sufficient breach to show that the defendant
always
the plaintiff goes
did not perform his engagement; and
further and alleges that the defendant fraudulently and deneither changes the form
ceitfully violated his promise,
the
proof to be given on the trial.
of the action, nor varies
Johns.
Lawes' Read, in Assump. 259; Evertson v. Miles,
138.

Judgment reversed.

V.

WESTCOTT.

Errors

2

Supreme Court

of

STOYEL

of

E.

Connecticut.

1807.

Day, 418.

Amos Westeott, Jr., brought his action
on the case against Isaac Stoyel and William Carder; averting that he was legally deputed to serve an attachment
which issued against Stoyel in favour of Job Smith, was

By the Couet:
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signed by Thaddeus Learned, justice of the peace, and directed to the said Westcott as an indifferent person: that
by virtue of the writ, he arrested the body of Stoyel, at
the house of Carder; and that Stoyel and Carder, with a
fraudulent intent to rescue the said Stoyel from the custody
of the said Westcott, and procure him an opportunity to escape, proposed to receive him into their custody,
and to redeliver him to the said Westcott at a day
and place mentioned, so that he might be conveyed to
prison; that in consideration of this engagement, the said
Stoyel, was confided to their custody; but that, instead of
being redelivered, the said Stoyel and Carder combined to
permit the said Stoyel to escape and depart out of the said
State; "and the said Stoyel, with the consent, connivance,
and assistance of the said Carder, did escape and depart
into the State of Rhode Island, to the great damage of the
said Westcott."
The defendants (below) went to trial on the plea of not
guilty ; verdict was rendered against them ; and, on motion
in arrest for the insufficiency of the declaration, the same
was adjudged sufficient.
1.
It is now objected, that the declaration was insufficient, inasmuch as tort and assumpsit were therein joined.
this were the fact, the judgment of the Superior Court
/ unquestionably
would be erroneous. Assumpsit and tort
may not be joined in one declaration, because they do not
admit of the same plea and judgment. But, on inspecting
the record, it plainly appears, that the action is wholly
I
\ founded in tort. The contract is disclosed merely by way
of inducement ; and the gist of the action is the misfeasance.
The plaintiff has alleged his gravamen, as consisting in a
breach of duty, arising out of a fraudulent combination to
procure the escape of Stoyel, and in his subsequent escape
by the assistance of the defendants.
That the action might have been legally founded on contract, is no criterion in this case. It is sufficient to say,
that the plaintiff, who had it in his option to commence
such an action as he considered best adapted to the nature
of the injury, has elected to lay the res gesta in tort. • • •

If
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GUINNIP

V.

CAETEB.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
58
•

•

46^

1871,

IlUnois, 296.

•

The first three counts were in debt in the usual
form, and the fourth was the common count in assumpsit
for interest. Defendant filed a demurrer to the declaration,
but afterwards, on plaintiff's motion, the demurrer was
stricken from the files, and judgment rendered in favor of

plaintiffs for

$1,171 debt and $28 damages, and costs; to
reverse which, defendant prosecutes this writ of error.
Walker, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action brought on the record of a judgment
recovered in another State, for the sum of $1,171, and
The summons was in debt, and so were the
$4.95 costs.
three first counts in the declaration.
The fourth count was,
in
It
was
the
common
however,
assumpsit.
count for $500
due and owing for interest.
It avers: "And being so indebted the said Guinnip, in consideration thereof, afterwards, etc., undertook and then and there faithfully promised the said plaintiffs" to pay the same when thereunto
afterward requested.
In the cases of CruiJcshank v. Brown, 5 Gilm. 75, and McGrinnity v. Laguerenne, ib. 101, it was held, that in a common count the averment that the defendant, in consideration
of the indebtedness, undertook and promised to pay, when
thereunto afterwards requested, made it a count in asIt was there said that, "had the pleader insum/psit.
tended it for a count in debt he should have used the word
'agreed' instead of the word 'promised.'." In those cases
the judgments were reversed, because there was a misjoinder of counts in debt and assumpsit.
In the case of Adams v. Hardin, 19 111. 273, it was held
to be error to join counts in debt and assumpsit, and the
judgment was reversed for that reason. This is a rule of
general application, and has always been held to be error
under the common law rules of pleading. The case at bar
falls within and must be governed by the cases above cited.
In this case there were in the declaration three counts in
This was a clear misjoinder
debt and one in assiimpsit.
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for that reason the judgment must

be re-

the cause remanded, with leave to amend.

ii,

Jvdgment reversed?'^
"The practica.! difficulty
21.
tliat
we recognize the forms of
plead.
non attumpsit in an action of debt, and
no answer to
claim for unliquidated
L. 420,
Co. ▼. Sheldon (1866) 31 N.
a

If

AENOLD

V.

6

'Supreme Court

421.

MAUDLIN.

of

Sk

J.

the defendant does not know how to
actions, the defendant cannot plead
nil debit is, in the nature of tUngs,
damages." — ^American Linen Thread

Indiana.

1842,

Blackford, 187.

J.:

;

c

is

The only objection made to the declaration is, that there
misjoinder of counts. This objection
without foun-

a

is

;

is

f

o

trespass. Three
This was an action
counts the first of which
for breaking the lose the second and third for an assault and battery . GTenSral demurrer to the declaration, and judgment for the defendants .

Blackford,

Several trespasses, as assault and battery,
ala£_
.,^_unprisonment, and trespasses upon prop erty eith er real or
~~
Gould on Flearl. 2T2^
personal, mav all he joined.
Peb Ctthiam. The iudgmen tis reversed witii costs. Cause
remanded, etc.

^'

f

dation.

%H

Supreme Court
54

v.

of

TBEGENT

MATBEB.
Michigan.

1884,

V

Michigan, 226.

*

a

t

a

:

*

*
Sherwood, J,
The defendants asked the court to require the plaintiff's
counsel to elect as to which of the counts he would rely
upon for
recovery in the case. The plaintiff had joined .
hia
Rpenial fon nt the common counts; he special count
•^\h
charging the fraudulent obtaining of the moneys sued for,
and waiving the tort. The plaintiff claimed there was
misjoinder of counts. The court refused to compel the
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election, and this is alleged as error. We think the ruling
of the court was right. Under our statute and practice assumpsii in cases o
fthi^ ki nd may h^ hrnn ght , fl.Tid koj
other causes maintalnabT ein the same form of action may
be nomed with it in the same suit.
It is no ground of objection that the facts constituting
the wrong are stated in the count wherein the tort is waived ;
they must be proved to entitle the plaintiff to recover and
therefore must be stated in the declaration. The defendant
is deprived of no right by the joinders complained of. He
is permitted to make any -defense to the count based on the
tort that he might had the common connts not been added,
and there is no reason why plaintiff should not .join all the
has, when recovery may hft had in i^ar>h in fTuT
__c auses"he
same for m of action if RoparaVo onita warn brmight

Under the declaration in this case the plaintiff was entitled
to recover under either count if he could make his proofs.**
22.

This

^nniversaUy

in the form
of action ia perhaps the most
Bjmpla test of identity~~
~

applicable.

COLE

V.

LIPPITT.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
22

1900, 1903.

Rhode Island, 31; 25 Rhode Island, 104.

Trespass on the case for negligence. The facts are sufiBciently stated in the opinion. Heard on demurrer of defendants to declaration. Demurrer sustained to ^ej3ond
count.

Stiness, J. : The plaintiff brings this action against the
owner, builders, and supervising architect of a house for
negligence in its construction, whereby the decedent lost
his life. The declaration has two counts, and the defendants severally demur upon the ground that they are improperly joined as defendants in the same action, because
the declaration sets out several and distinct, and not joint,
breaches of duty and causes of action.
The first count sets out a joint and common undertaking
to build the house, and a joint and common hiring of the

a

L. P.

30

[Chap. 4
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decedent, Pierce. It is not, therefore, objectionable on the
ground set forth in the demurrer.
The second count sets out the contractual relations existing between the defendants, the different parts which
each of them took in the work of construction, the consequent duty to the workman, the breach thereof by the several parties defendant, and the resulting death of Pierce.
Without reciting the long count, it shows that Lippett was
the owner of the estate, who made a contract with Maguire
and Penniman for a part of the construction of the house,
and employed Robertson to supervise the work, and that
Pierce was employed by Maguire and Penniman ; that in the
course of the work a part of a tower fell upon Pierce and
kiUed him.
The negligence charged against Lippitt is that he caused
the erection of the house upon improper plans, which provided for a tower with an overhanging battlement without
proper support, and also provided for bricks and mortar
of a kind too hard to form a strong bond, etc.
The negligence charged against Robertson is that he
caused the erection of the house under improper plans, and
the negligence charged against Maguire and Penniman is
that they did not use reasonable care in construction, and
failed to counterbalance and anchor the walls; also, that
they built the battlement in too short a time for the mortar to set and harden.
These several charges of negUgence are quite different
in kind and relation, but the plaintiff claims that they constitute a joint liability, because the negligence of each defendant combined with others to produce the injury. This,
however, is not enough to make a joint tort. As stated in
Bennett v. Fifield, 13 R. I. 139, parties cannot be declared
against jointly where there is no community of wrongdoing, even though the tort of one might be such that, withthe neglect of duty charged upon the other would
out
not have followed. A similar statement
made in SelMck
not enough to make
V. Hail, 47 Conn. 260, 274, that
the
acts
joint
that
constituting them stand in juxtatorts
position in time and place. "There must be
oneness of
act" The fact that the effects of several wrongful acts
are produced at the same time and place cannot affect the
was held
question. In Doremus v. Root, 94 Fed. Rep. 760,
master and his servant through whose negthat although
ligence another
injured may each be liable for such

is

a

it

a

is

it

is

it,
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injury, their obligations rest upon different grounds, and
they cannot be held jointly liable.

The second count of this declaratioii before us clearly
states "three different cases, against three different defendants, for three different causes of action."
Lippitt
is charged with furnishing improper plans ; Robertson with
improper supervision; and Maguire and Penniman with
improper work. These three grounds of liability are quite
distract.
There is no common legal relation between them
with respect to the plaintiff. Of course it may be said that
if there had not been improper plans or improper supervision or improper work, there would have been no injury;
but that does not make the three thiags a joint act. Evidently Maguire and Penniman had nothing to do with procuring the plans, nor Lippitt with the doing of their work.
A resulting liability on the part of the owner, arising from
a right of supervision of the work, does not make an act of
the buUders his act. Bolh may be liable and yet not jointly
liable, because the cause of action against each is different
from the other. Between Pierce and the builders there was
a contractual relation of master and servant, but none between him and the owner, unless the builders are treated as
his agents, and none whatever between Pierce and Eobertson. We think, therefore, that the count is clearly bad.
The demurrers to the second count are sustained.
When this case was last before the court,
in 23 E. I. 542, we said: "The declaration charges a joint
invitation. Such an invitation must be proved in order to
But the record
recover against the defendants jointly."
shows that the evidence offered at the trial tended to establish not a joint liability of the defendants, but rather, as
was said by the court when the case was before us in 22
B. I. 31: "Three different cases against three different
defendants for three different causes of action." The case
is therefore one of misjoinder of causes of action rather
than one of misjoinder of defendants in the same cause of
action, since neither is the tort of each defendant the same,
nor is the negligence or the liability of each defendant the
Peb Cubiam.

same.^*

*

•

•

It is equally fatal to the right to join different causes of action that
23.
—
the parties plaintiff are not the same in all of them. Teager v. Town of Pairmount (1897) 43 W. Va. 259; Miller ▼. Butler (1904) 121 Ga. 758.
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Common Law FLSACiNa

HANCOCK

V.

HAYWOOD,

Court of King's Bench.
3

[Chap, -i

j/

/

1789,

Term Reports, 433.

The plaintiffs in their original writ described themselves
as assignees of the estate and effects ^f Lomas , and also
as assignees of Edensor; there being no joint commission

agamst the two ; and declared for goods sold and delivered
by bnt.li the bankrupts^ and also for goods sold by each of
the bankrupts^ and for money paid, and money had and
received by the defendant to the use of each of the bankrupts ; and also for money had and received to the use of the
assignees, on separate counts. A verdict was found for the
plaintiffs, not in a gross sum, but the damages were assessed and apportioned to the demands proved on the several counts respectively. And a rule having been obtained
to shew cause why the judgment should not be arrested,
Er shine, Law, and 8. H. Heywood, now shewed cause, observing that this was not like the case of an executor being
sued for one debt due from the testator, and for another
from himself, where the judgment in one case is de bonis
testatoris and in the other de bonis propriis : in that case
the party is not sued in the same right. But here the plaintiffs are the representatives of each of the bankrupts, and
do not sue in different rights. The effects of both the bankrupts are centered in one set of persons, and they, in that
one, and the same, character may sue for debts due to
either ; in the same manner as a surviving partner may sue
for a partnership debt, and a debt due to himself alone, in
* * *
the same action.
One test of judging whether separate causes of action may or may not be joined, is to consider whether the same plea may be pleaded to, and the
same judgment given on them: now here the pleas and
the judgment are the same. At all events the court will not
arrest the judgment in toto; for as the damages are assessed on the several counts, the judgment on some counts
only may be arrested.
Bearcroft and Bussel, contra. This is an action in two
different rights, though brought by the same persons, between whom there is no privity as to the separate demands.
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Jt

is_ c,]Rar that, the b ankruptR -OiftTngftlvAH r^milrl jnoiJia^zp
■jniTiftfl in hrin^'ngr r,r}p flntinri fnr their separate rlphts ; then

their representatives cannot do wh at the represented could
not haVft nnnp; ann thA nnTTmrngginnc! »t^ V^QT.VTmpf TToaf Ti»
greater privileges in them than the bankrupts enjoyed.
•
•
•
Neither is the judgment the same : for it must be
thq.t fr>A plnintifppi g,s assignees of one of the bankrupts shall^
recover on one set o f co tmts, and on another set as as- i
signees of the other bankrupt: they m ust therefore —ben
judgments , so that this will not stand the test of I
^fferent
the ruie mentioned by the counsel for the plaintiffs. * * *l
This has no resemblance to the case of a surviving partnerP
joining debts due to himself in his own character, and a^
survivor, because there he must be plaintiff in both actions,
if he brought two ; whereas in this case it was not necessary
that the plaintiffs as assignees of one bankrupt should sue
for a debt due to the other. This falls within the rule
which doth not allow a person to sue in his own right, and
m aut&y d'tiiU^'m the ijume aetion: and the plaintiffs here
were obliged to sue as assignees for part of the demand;
the first set of counts being for goods sold by both the

bankrupts.
The court said they would consider the poiut; and

LoKD Kenyon, Ch. J., on the next day said, they had
looked into the cases, and were clearly of opinion that the
different rights could not be joined in the same action. But
that the plaintiffs might enter up their judgment on thos^
counts for the joint debts due to both bankrupts.**

24.
Joinder of actions in case of death by wrongful act. Where two
actions are maintainable bj the administrator of the deceased, one based on the
statute providing for the survival of the deceased 'a cause of action and the other
In Brennan v. Standard Oil
on Lord Campbell's Act, they cannot be joined.
' '
The first count is founded upon an
Co. (1905) 187 Mass. 376, the court said :
alleged statutory liability for causing the death of the plaintiff 's intestate, which
the plaintiff seeks to enforce as the representative of the next of kin, for whom
he would hold the proceeds. The second count is upon the liability at common
law, for injuries to the intestate, for which he had a right of action during
his life, and the claim is made by the plaintiff as legal representative of
the estate of the deceased, for which he would hold the proceeds. In the first
the plaintiff acts only as trustee for the next of kin, in the second only as
trustee for those interested in the estate. These claims do not accrue to him
in the same capacity ; and hence by the rules of common law pleading, which
in this respeet have not been changed by our statutes, they cannot be joined
Gould, PL e. 4, $ 93, and cases cited."
in the same action.
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LASHLEE

V.

WILY.

'Supreme Court of Tennessee.
8

[Chap. 4

1849,

Humphreys, 658.

Ttjelet, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action of trovgr^ brought by the plaintifF, as
administrator d e bonis nan, against the defendant, for the

g
npgrp girl slave named Caroline.
w7Yni£f]i Lr"^"^^rs ir>Ti nf
The declaration contain s two counts . The first charges that
the plaintiff, was in possession of the negro girl, as of hia
own property ; the second, that he was in posse ssipp nf Tipr
as administrator. Both counts aver a loss of possession
and a conversion by the defendant.

In the first co unt he may charge that he was in possession
in his own right ; a ndjn;ttr5~sgeo nd, that h& "w as:ffliBQSsessiS~
in his right as baiiee j)f the true owner; and i tjw'ould be no
mis.1oinder; for, as has be en_obsgryed^ the wrong dong ls~to
the .poagession an d_
Q JJifiJitle ;-andLihe action brought is
not upon two distinct separate demands, the one in plaintiff's own right and the other in auter droit; for though, in
the second count, he claims the property as bailee, yet it is
not an action in right of the bailor, but in right of the bailee.
So it is when a man is in possession of personal property as
executor or administrator, and a wrong has been done to
that possession by a conversion of
and he brings an action of trover for that conversion, he may charge in his
declaration that he was in possession of the property, either
in his own right or in his right as executor or administrator,
the one being
general and the other
special right, and for
both
he
and
no misjoinder;
safety
may charge
ways,
for in either way
an action upon a demand in his own
right,' and not in the right of another, for inasmuch as
in either ease his own possesson which has been invaded,
this which gives the cause of action,
and as
must of
in
his own right, and not in
necessity be upon a demand
that of ianother. In what other can be? Surely not that of
his testator or intestate, for no wrong has been done to
their property. By 4th and 25ith of Edward III, an executor or administrator may have trover for the goods of the
deceased taken in his lifetime.
it

is

a

it

it

is

it

is

it

is

it

it

a

it,
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Now, if one of the counts in this declaration had heen under these statutes for a conversion in the lifetinaie of plaintiff's intestate, and the other for a conversion of his own
property, then would there have been clearly a misjoinder,
because there would have been a demand in his own right,
joined with a demaiid in outer droit, to-wit, that of intestate.
And this is what is meant, and nothing more, when it is said
in the books that an executor or administrator cannot include counts on causes of action accruing to him in his private right and individual character, with counts on causes of
action which are laid to have been vested in him in his
representative character, viz., causes of action which accrued to the testator or intestate and are sued upon by their
executor or administrator, as his personal representative.
An executor or administrator, therefore, cannot in the same
action sue upon contracts made with his testator or intestate in his lifetime, and which have survived to him as his
personal representative, and contracts made with himself
in his individual capacity, because they are demands in
different rights. So neither can he unite in one action demands for the conversion of the propertv of his testator or
intestate in his lifetime, and for which a right of action
survives to him under the 4th and 25th of Edward III., with
demands for the conversion of his own property. To this
extent the authorities are abundant, but there is not one
that goes further. We are of opinion, then, that the circuit
judge was mistaken in supposing that the two causes of
action, as set forth in the declaration in this case, are for
demands accruing in different rights, and that he therefore
erred in refusing to give judgment in favor of the plaintiff
upon the verdict, and in arresting the same. And we now,
proceeding to correct this error, do direct a judgment here
in favor of the plaintiff for his damages assessed, and
costs.

,

CECIL

V.

BBIGGES.

Court of King's Bench.
2

1788.

Term Reports, 639,

Mamly obtained a rule to shew cause why these two actions fihould not be consolidated, because they were both in
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assumpsit; the cause of action arose in the same county;
the writs in both actions were sued out on the same day;'
and the defendant had been held to bail in both. The rule
likewise called on the plaintiff to shew cause why he should
not pay the costs of this application.
Lane now shewed cause, insisting that it was not necessary that the plaintiff should in all cases consolidate his
several causes of action, though they were of the same nature, and accrued at the the same time; for although his
witnesses to prove one contract might be able to attend the
first assizes yet perhaps a material witness to prove the
second cause of action might be absent. Such an application was never made before; and the court will not readily
grant the present, inasmuch as it will unnecessarily throw
a difficulty in the plaintiff's way of pursuing his right of action. At all events, however, the latter part of the rule, reBut
specting the costs, must be discharged.
The court said,, that, as by the rules of law the plaintiff
might have comprised both his causes of action in the same
declaration, it was oppressive to sue out two writs at the
same time. That the possibility of this rule being attended
mth any inconvenience to the plaintiff was no answer to this
application; because if any special reason why these two
actions should not be consolidated had existedi, the plaintiff
ought to have shewn it. And no inconvenience would arise,
even if the fact were as the plaintiff's counsel suggested,
namely, that all his witnesses might not be ready at the
assizes, because he might apply to put off the trial on that
ground. And as they were of opinion that it was an oppressive kind of proceeding, they made the rule absolute
with costs.

Section

7.

Bills of

Paktictjlabs.

AMERICAN E.OLLING MILL COB,PORATION
IRON AND METAL COMPANY.
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fir^t District.
120

Illinois Appellate,

Statement bt the Court.

v. OHIO
1905.

614.

Appellant brought an action
for slander against appellees. The declaration as amended
contained ten counts.
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March 16, 1904, an order was entered upon appellant to
file -within twenty days a bill of particulars of places at
which, and names of persons to whom, each of said slanderous remarks were uttered, and names of individuals,
firms or corporations which otherwise would have dealt
with the appellant but for the use of siaid slanderous words ;
the filing of said bill to be without prejudice to appellant's
right to amend it so as to set up matters coming to the
knowledge of appellant between the date of filing said bill
and the trial of said cause, provided the amendment be
upon reasonable notice. To the entry of this order appellant duly objected and excepted.
April 8, 1904, said suit was dismissed at appellant's costs
and judgment thereon for failure of appellant to comply
with the foregoing order. This appeal followed.
Ball, P. J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The several counts of the declaration charge that the
alleged defamatory words were spoken "November 25,
* * *
in the presence and hearing
1902, in SEiid county
of another, or divers persons, * • * and divers persons,
who had, previous to the speaking and publishing of said
words, been accustomed to deal, and others who would
otherwise have dealt with plaintiff in its business, have
since then, and wholly on that account, refused to have any
dealings with plaintiff," to the damage of plaintiff in the
sum of $100,000.

It

is plain that to whom and at what place the alleged
slanderous words were used are not set forth in the declaration, nor is any attempt made therein to state the name o^
any individual, firm or corporation that would have dealt
with appellant had such words not been spoken.
A bill of particulars may be demanded in all actions
where, by reason of the generality of the claim or charge,
the adverse party is unable to know with reasonable certainly what he is required to meet. C. S N. W. By. Co. v.
G. & E. Ry. Co., 112 111. 589, 604; Stiebeling v. LocJchaus, 21
Hun, 457. When required and furnished its effect is to
limit the plaintiff on the trial to proof of the particular
Morton v. McClure, 22
cause or causes therein mentioned.
111. 257 ; Waidner v. Pavly, 141 HI. 442 ; Eess Co. v. Dawson,
149 111. 145. Whether or not the plaintiff shall be ruled to
furnish a bill of particulars in a given case, is a matter resting in the sound l^al discretion of the court, and the action
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of the court in making or refusing the rule will not be reviewed in appellate jurisdictions unless it be shown dearly
that such discretion was abused. G. <& A. By. Co. v. Smith,
10 111. App. 359, 362 DuBois v. People, 200 111. 164.
1
Where the allegation of the declaration in an action for
slander are not specific enough fully to apprise the defendant of the cause of action in its statement of the actual
words uttered, or to whom or in whose presence, or the place
where uttered, the court may, and, upon proper application,
should order the filing of a jjill of particulars, so that the
defendant may have a fair chance to prepare for the trial.
It is almost necessary, of course, in an action of slander,

unless the plaintiff alleges the place where, the time when,
and the names of the persons to whom the slander was
uttered, to order a bill of particulars of the place where,
the time when, and the names of the persons to whom the
slander was uttered. Townsend on L. & S. (4th Ed.) 490.
In Gardinier v. Knox, 27 Hun, 500, the date the words
were spoken was given, and it was alleged that they were
spoken at the town of Eussell "in the presence of divers
good and worthy citizens. ' ' Upon motion the court ordered
a bill of particulars, saying: "The complaint gives little
information, for under it proof need not be confined to the
day stated ; it might be given as to any place in the town of
the
Russell and as to any persons shown to be present.
defendant knew the times and place where the occurrence
would be shown, he could obtain proof of his own where-

If

abouts."

In Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N. Y. 176, an action of crim. con.,
the trial court denied an application for a bill of particulars
solely upon the ground that it had no power to grant it
The court of appeals decided that the trial court possessed
the power, and for that reason reversed and remanded the
case. After an extended review of the authorities in England and in the United States, the court laid down the following rule: "A bill of particulars is appropriate in all
descriptions of actions where the circumstances are such
that justice demands that a party should be apprised of
the matters for which he is to be put for trial with greater
particularity than is required by the rules of pleading."
See, also, Gom. v. Snelling, 15 Pick. 321 ; Jones v. Piatt, 60
How. Pr. 277 ; Davies v. Chapman, 6 Ad. & B. 767 ; Stiebling

V. LocTthaus,

21

Hun, 457 ; Bex v. Hodgson,

3

Carr

&

Payne,
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422; N. ¥. Infant Asylum v. Roosevelt, 35 Hun, 501.
The trial court did not err in ordering appellant to file a
biU of particulars in this case. Appellant saw fit to disobeythat order. Such disobedience fully justified the action of
the court in dismissing the suit.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed
Affirmed.^"
25.
Late origin. Chief Justice Gibbs, writing the opinion of the Court of
Common Pleas in Lovelock v. Cheveley, 1 Holt, 552, in the year 1817, said that
"the demanding and granting of particulars is idmost a new system within
the recollection of many of us."
The plaintiff is entitled in appropriate eases to particulars of a set-off
(Mercer v. Sayre (1808) 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 248) and even of affirmative defenses (see many New Tork cases cited in 3 Encyc. PI. * Pr. 525), but not
of matters to be shown under a traverse. (3 Encyc PI. & Pr. 526-527.)
Application should ordinarily be made before pleading to the merits. (Amer,
Hyde & Co. v. Chalkley (1903) 101 Va. 458), and when made later will be
looked upon with suspicion as intended for delay (Andrews v. Cleveland
(1830) 3 Wend. (N. T.) 437).
"Affidavits may sometimes be necessary to show that the party applying
for particulars is ignorant of the particular groimd of action or defense intended to be covered by the statement of claim or defense; but, if it appears,
upon the face of the pleadings that there is nothing to indicate the real
fail to see the necessity of an affidavit at
ground of complaint or defense.
aU. "—McDonald, J., in Ashton v. Nova Scotia Cotton Mfg. Co. (1890) 22
Nova Scotia, 311.

I

VILA

V.

WESTON.

Supreme Court of Errors of Comiecticut.
33 Connecticut,

1865.

42.

Assumpsit, against the defendant as surviving partner
of the finn of Imlay & Weston. The declaration contained
a special count upon a promissory note of the firm, and the
•

•

*

common counts in general assumpsit,
The plaintiff previous to the trial filed the following bill

of particulars

:

Boston, August 10, 1857.

Messrs. Lnlay & Weston, Hartford, Conn.
Bought of Joseph Vila.
Sir barrels tallow oil, 248 gaUs. at $1
$248.00

Carting

1-26
$249.26
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The case was tried, on the general issue closed to the
court, before Carpentee, J. On the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence under the common counts the note of Imlay &
Weston.
The defendant objected to its admission on the
ground that it was not stated in the bill of particulars, but
the court admitted it.
.

•

•

•

The defendant moved for a new triaL
Chamberlin, in support of the motion.
1.
The note should not have been admitted under the
common counts.
It was inadmissible under the special
sount by reason of variance, and was excluded under the
common counts by the bill of particulars, which stated the
plaintiff's whole claim under those counts and made no
reference to the note. A bUl of particulars limits a plaintiff to the particular matters set forth in it. * * * It will
not do to say that the description of the note in the special
count is suflScient notice to the defendant, since it was rejected as proof under that count on the ground of variance.
It therefore cannot be regarded as described in that count.

•

it it

it,

Goodman and Freeman, contra.
1.
The note was admissible in evidence under the con^
mon counts. The whole object of the bill of particulars was
to give the defendant notice in an informal way of the claim
that he would have to meet. Landon v. 8ag&, 11 Conn. 306.
Where this appears from the declaration no bill of particulars is necessary. Here the note is set out in the special
count with sufiicient accuracy to give the defendant notice
and
was not necessary that further notice should be
of
of
by the bill of particulars. The defendant cannot
given
claim to have been taken by surprise.

J.: A

•••••••••

is

it

is

bill of particulars
demandable by the
defendant of right, where there are general counts. It may
be asked for in respect to one or all the counts. If required
and ordered for all the counts,
limits the right of the
plaintiff to give evidence in respect to all. If not required
at all, the defendant waives, or rather does not exercise his
right, and if required in respect to one or a part of the
counts, the right
waived as to the others. So the plaintiff
voluntarily
a bill of particulars in respect to one
give
may
or all the counts, and he will be concluded to the samp exBxjTL.EE,

'
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tent as if the bill was demanded and ordered, and famislied
in compliance with the order, for it is in effect an amendment of his declaration. It is not unusual for a plaintiff to
give, or for the defendants to ask, a bill in respect to the
counts for goods sold, or work and labor done, without
reference to the money counts, and in such case the bill is
not operative as to them. In this case it does not appear
whether the bill was furnished voluntarily, or on request,
or in compliance with an order of the court; nor does it
appear whether it was asked for or given with reference to
all the counts or not. On its face it is applicable to the count
for goods sold, and that only, and there is no presumption
that it was asked for, ordered or intended for any other.
The court must be presumed to have acted rightly, and the
onus of showing the contrary is upon the defendant, and
as the motion does not show that the bill furnished was intended for the money counts and was operative in respect to
them, the first point of the defendant could not avail him if
right in respect to the principles involved.
But the defendant is wrong in respect to those principles.
Such a bill is doubtless in a general sense an amplification
quoad
of the general count and has the effect to make
the consideration of the alleged promise,
special one, but
to apprise the defendant of the nature of
its only purpose
that consideration and demand. It need not be technically
sufficient
gives
cannot be demurred to
accurate
he thinks
the necessary information to the defendant, and
or
more
specific,
made
does not he must move to have
to give the party
abide it. As the sole office of the bill
information which the pleadings by reason of their generality do not give, he cannot require the bill where the
contained in a single count. It
necessary information
not necessary, therefore, that the plaintiff should insert in
declared upon specially, or state in
his bill a note which
under the money counts
the bill that he shall offer
The defendant is informed by the
becomes necessary.
special count that the plaintiff claims to recover in that
law, that
action on that note, and he knows, as matter
objected to on the
and
the plaintiff has misdescribed
and
ground of variance, he will have a right to offer
under the money counts; and these
probably wiU offer
are all the material facts that he could learn from the most

carefully prepared biU of particnlars.
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These principles have been recognized in our sister states,
Thus,
although, the cases seem to have been overlooked.
in Tibbetts v. Pickering, 5 Cush. 83, a note was declared
upon specially, and the money counts were added. A rule
of the court prescribed that lie plaintiff in all cases where
there were general counts
the declaration should file
bill of particulars, and should not be permitted to give evidence applicable to them unless he did so. None was filed
in the case. On the trial the note declared upon was offered nnder the special count, and objected to on the ground
of variance. The court admitted
and the question
whether
was properly admitted or not was carried to the
supreme court. That court did not decide that question,
inbut held that
was unnecessary to do so, for that,
admissible a new trial could not be granted because the note
was admissible under the money counts notwithstanding
there was no bill of particulars. In respect to that question
the court said
The defendant had full knowledge of this
claim of the plaintiff from the pleadings.
The note itself
now sought to be recovered was set forth as
cause of
action in one of the counts. This superseded the necesbill of particulars, setting forth the note as
sity of filing
demand upon which the plaintiff would rely at the trial."
So in the People v. Mimroe,
Wend. 200, a note was declared upon specifically, and offered, objected to, and received under the money counts, although there as here there
was a bill of particulars which did not specify it. The case
went up to the supreme court on that ruling, and they sustained it. Savage, Ch. J., in giving the opinion of the court,
said: "The note was properly received in evidence, although not specified in the bill of particulars. The use of
bill of particulars
to apprise a party of the specific
demands of his adversary, when the pleadings are general,
particularly demanded, either
and leave uncertain what
in
declaration or notice of set-off, and has no application whatever when the demand
specifically set forth in
the pleadings." These principles and cases are dedsive on
the point.
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COUNTY OF WAYNE.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

1880.

44 Michigcm, 173.

J.: This record is remarkable. It shows that
the plaintiff sued the county by declaration on the common
counts, and it contains a bill of particulars furnished by
the plaintiff, a plea of the general issue, a demurrer to the
declaration but no joinder, a stipulation to put the case on
the "jury docket" for the May term of 1878, and a final
judgment on the demurrer against the plaintiff in August
of that year. The date of the plea does not appear, and
whether it preceded or followed the demurrer is therefore
not explained. In case it was put in before the demurrer,
the demurrer was not regular.
The plea to the merits
should have been withdrawn. If it was put in afterwards
the effect was to waive or supersede the demurrer.
There
cannot be an issue of fact and one of law on the same record
at the same time in respect to the same matter. They are
incompatible. One admits what the other denies. In the
order of the pleading the defense by demurrer is required
to be taken before going to issue upon the fact, and in case
a plea has been made and it appears desirable to demur
to the same count or counts the plea should be withdrawn
from the record. So long as it stands it excludes the right
to demur.
the plea is put in subsequent to the demurrer,
it overrules it. These are familiar rules, and the record
contains no explanation in terms to rescue the case from
Graves,

If

their operation.
But let it be assumed that the demurrer was in the record to be adjudicated. The claim is made that the bill of
particulars became incorporated in the declaration, and
that it hence appeared that the cause of action was not
suable against the county, and this seems to have been the
theory on which the court below proceeded in allowing the
demurrer. Of course this view is wholly inadmissible. The
object of the practice for the production of bills of particulars, is to obviate the uncertainty of general pleading. The
intent is to secure such information as will enable the parties to make an intelligent preparation for trial, and to
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enter upon the investigation before the court or jury with
The
an understanding as to what is really in controversy.
bill is often mentioned as being an amplification of the declaration or as entitled to be considered as a part of the
The bill
pleading. But such expressions are metaphorical.
is never in strictness a component of the pleading. It may
have the effect of a pleading in so far as it restricts the
proof to what it contains. To consider it as pleading would
be a circuitous return to the practice of special pleading
within certain limits ; and this would contradict one of the
necessary implications of the introduction of bills of particulars. The remedy by the method of general pleading was
to be improved without impairing its convenience and without bringing in the technicalities and refinements of pleading. No one has ever supposed the service of a biU of particulars constituted an actual amendment of the pleadings, or
that an amendment of the biU operated as a change of the
issue on the record. And a plea or demurrer to a bill of
particulars would be an anomaly. The declaration in the
record was no more subject to demurrer after the bUI of
particulars than it was before. It continued to be the usual
declaration on the common coxmts, and whatever question
there was or might be in regard to the right to sue the
county for matters described in the biU of particulars,
would have to be raised in some other way. It would naturally arise at the tritd. It was not impossible that the
bill might be entirely changed so as to obviate all objection.
The result is that the only point the demurrer could
raise was the abstract right to bring a suit by declaration on the common counts against the county, and in regard to that there is no room for discussion.
The right
is plain. Endriss v. Chippewa Covmty, 43 Mich. 317.
The judgment must be reversed with costs and the case
be allowed to proceed according to law.'*'
26.
Technical exactness in the bill of particulars is not to be insisted
upon, and the variance between the particulars furnished and the evidence
offered must actually tend to mislead in order that advantage may be taken
of it. In Tillow v. Hutchinson (1835) 15 N.
L. 180, the court said:—
' ' In McNair v. Gilbert, 3
Wend. E. 344, the notes were described in the
particular, as being on interest, when they were not so. The objection was
overruled; and the court say, 'the true rule on the subject, seems to be, that
variances are immaterial, unless they are calculated to mislead.'
In Day
V. Bower,
1 Camp. N. P. 69, in note, a mistake had been made in the
particular, by charging 83 I. 13 s. 6d, with the usual mercantile abbreviation
of atto, ditto, under a wrong name; thus reading as if the payment had

J.
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bem made to the person last named, instead
of the person named in the
next
prece^g line but one. Lord Ellbnbokough, refused to eiolude the eviaence of that payment, unless the defendant
would make affidavit that he
*"^ ^^ *^® particular.
In Davis v. Edwards 3 M. and S. 380,
■A
V.?*
in debt for rent; the premises were in A, but
were described as in B; but it
was considered immaterial,
unless the defendant would show he held other
premises of the plaintiff in B. In Temmy v. Gibbs, 3
Bing. E. 3, which was
ejectment for non-payment of rent, a variance between the
rent proved, and
the amount stated m the particular, was disregarded.
In MiUwood v. Walter,
2 Taunt. 224, the work was charged in the
particular, as done in August,
instead of May.
Mansfield, Chief Justice, said, 'the bill of particulars
must not be made the mstrument of that injustice, which, it is
intended to
prevent.
there had been two demands; one for work done in May, and
_
another in August, there might have been some ground for the objection.' —
and in case referred to, in Manning's Index, 240, the particular
specified
a bai of a certain day for 60 l, but the evidence was of a bill for 63 l,
of a different day, but the same year and month; and Abbott, Justice, held
the variance immaterial.
See other cases cases cited in 2 Saund. pi. and evid.
246.
do not say, that we ought to go the length of all these cases; but
think we may extract from them, this reasonable rule; that if the particular
is not calculated to mislead, it shall be deemed sufficient, imless upon affidavit
or other satisfaetoij evidence of surprise, by the adverse party."

If

I

I

DIBBLE

V.

KEMPSHALL.

Supreme Court of New York.
2

Hill,

1841.

124.

Declaration, money counts in assumpsit, annexing copies of two promissory notes, Which the plaintiff gave notic6
would be given in evidence on the trial. Plea in bar that
the defendants had procured a bill of the particulars bf the
plaintiff's demand, pursuant to the rules and practice of
the court, and, after setting out the bill of particulars, which
contained copies of the two promissory notes, alleging matter of defence to the two notes. Demurrer and joinder.
0. Eastings, for the plaintiff, said the plea was bad. It
shoidd have been pleaded to the count or declaration — not
to the notes.
(Anon. 19 "Wend. 226, and note.)
The CJoxtbt. The plea is bad, for the reason assigned by
the counsel.
A. Sampson,, for the defendants, took a distinction between this case and the one cited. Here there is a hiU of
particulars of the plaintiff's demand, which is an amplification of the declaration, and therefore the defendants
may plead to the notes.
OL

li. P.

31
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The Coubi.

The bill of particulars makes no difference.
We decided the same point in a case argued by Mr. Stevens. The defendant can only plead to the note where the
plaintiff counts upon it.
Judgment for the plaintiff.

BUCKNER

V.

MEREDITH.

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.
1

1867.

Brewster, 306.

On the trial, before Beewstee, J., Edward McCabe, Esq.,
for plaintiff, offered in evidence a laook of original entries.
The first entry read thus : ' ' Balance from former account. ' '
John S. Powell, Esq., for defendant, objected. The entry
was ruled out.
The plaintiff then offered to give in evidence the items
composing this balance.
Mr. Powell objected that the bill of particulars did not
give those items in detail, but stated them thus: "Balance

from former account."
The objection was overruled,

the defendant
could have refused to plead, and have demanded a more
specific bUl.
because

CHAPTEE V.
PMNOIPLES RELATING TO PLEAS IN GENERAL.
Section I.

Necessity fob Plea.

EUFFNER

V.

HILL.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virgima.
21

1882.

West Virginia, 152.

[This is an action of ejectment. An order was made
docketing it for trial, and a jury was empaneled to try the
issues joined, who found a verdict for the plaintiff.
The
defendants took the case up on error, and it appeared that

record failed to show that any plea had been filed,
though private, unoflBcial memoranda of the judge and clerk
indicated that a plea of not guilty had been entered.] *'
Geeen, J., announced the opinion of the court:
the

In

the case before us, the private memorandum of a judge
no longer in office, and the docket of a clerk no longer a
clerk, would have to be resorted to to make an order of
the filing of a plea in this case nunc pro tunc. This clearly
cannot be done. We must therefore consider, that in the
trying of this ejectment case, no plea was filed in the circuit, court, and of course no issue was joined, and yet a
jury was empaneled and sworn to try the issue joined,
and they found a verdict for the plaintiff for the land in the
declaration mentioned, and that he was entitled to this land
in fee simple. On this verdict so procured, the court rendered on December 20, 1875, a judgment, that the plaintiff
recover of the defendants the possession of the premises
described in this verdict and his costs, and writ of possession was awarded him.
This is the judgment to which a writ of error has been
granted; and it is clear, that it must be reversed without
any regard to the merits of the case as set out in their bU]
of exceptions, for it is very well settled, that in no case
87.

Condensed

statement of facts by the editor.
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either civil or criminal, can the court direct the empaneling
of a jury and the trial of a case when no issue has been
made up; and if this be done, as it was done in this case
according to the record, the court below could not properly
enter up any judgment on this verdict of the jury sO rendered.
The cases are numerous both in Virginia and in this
State, where verdicts and judgments have been set aside by
the appellate court, only because the verdict was rendered
when no issue had been joined. See Stevens Vi Taliaferro, 1
Wash. 155; Taylors v. Houston, 2 H. & M. 161; Kerr v.
Dixon, 2 Call, 379 ; Williamson's Adm'r v. Bennett, 3 Munf.
316; Sydnor v. Burke, 4 Band. 161; McMillion v. Dobbins,
9 Leigh, 422; Rowans v. Givens, 10 Gratt. 250; B. S 0. Railroad Go. V. Gettle, 3 W. Va. 376; B. & 0. Railroad Co.
V. Christie, 5 W. Ba. 325; Gallatin's Heirs v. Haywood's
Heirs, 4 W. Va. 1; B. S 0. Railroad Co. v. Faulkner, 4 W.
Va. 180 ; State v. Conkle alias Swank, 16 W. Va. 736 ; State
V. Douglas, 20 W. Va. 770.
These decisions were rendered in a great variety of cases.
In actions of debt, detinue, trespass on the case and assumpsit, and in writs of right and indictments for felonies.
None of these however happen to be actions of ejectment;
and it is now claimed by counsel for the defendants in
error, that though in all other cases, either criminal or
civil, the judgment of a court based on the verdict of a
jury professedly on the issue joined, where in fact no issue
appears by the record to have been joined, must be reversed by the appellate court, yet such a judgment ought
not to be reversed in an ejectment cause; because by the
law. Code of W. Va., ch. 90, sec. 13, p. 519, no other plea
can be filed in an ejectment case except the plea of "not
guilty;" and therefore it must be conclusively presumed
that the jury were really sworn to try the issue on the plea
of not guilty, though no plea was put in.
It is said, the only issue which could be made up, is the
one actually tried, and it would be too technical to reverse,
because the formality of entering the plea of not guilty was
omitted. But these cases abundantly show, that the court
has not reversed judgments entered upon such verdicts, because there was any doubt as to the real issue which the
jury tried, nor because the defendant might have made up
some other issue, if he had pleaded. The reasons for these
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decisions are entirely different from what this argument
presumes.
The real ground on which these decisions rest
is, that by common law the court has no right to make up
the issue and empanel a jury to try it; but the parties by
their pleadings must first come to an issue, and then it is
tried by a jury. When, therefore, the record shows, that
the parties by their pleadings have not come to any issue,
but nevertheless the record shows that the issue was tried,
this issue must either have been illegally made up by the
court or by a blunder it must have been assumed to have
been made up by the parties, when in fact it was not.

In

some of the cases we have cited, the record showed

distinctly what was the exact issue tried by the jury, and
also that the verdict was distinctly responsive to such issue ; and that it was the only issue the parties in the par-

ticular case could have made, had they by the pleadings
made any issue. Yet the judgments were reversed, because
no issue so far as the record showed, had been formed. It

has thus been held as absolutely' necessary in every case,
that an issue shall be made up by the pleadings, before a
jury can be empaneled to try the case.
The State v. Conklm alias Swank, 16 "W. Va. 736, and
The State v. Douglass, 20 W. Va., show, that on indictments
for felony, if the defendant does not plead, but the jury is
nevertheless sworn to try the issue, which could be only
on the plea of "not guilty," and he is found guilty of the
felony charged in the indictment, though there can be no
doubt, that precisely the same issue and verdict would
have resulted, had the defendant put in the only plea he
could have put in ; yet this court has, nevertheless, reversed
such judgments entered on such verdicts, the court having
no authority to empanel a jury, in that or any case, till
an issue has been made up by the parties ; and therefore a
verdict rendered by a jury when no issue has been so made
up, must be treated as a mere nullity.
So in the cases of Taylors et al. v. Huston, 2 H. & M.
101; Rowans v. Givens, 10 Gratt. 250; and Gallatin's Heirs
V. Haywood's Heirs, 4 W. Va. 1, the jury were sworn in
cases of writs of right, and rendered verdicts on which the
But in each of these cases
courts entered lip judgments.
the appellate court reversed the judgments because the record did not show that the defendant had plead, or that any
issue had been joined by the parties. Yet ia these cases
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of writs of right, the jury were sworn
"You shall say the truth
in the words of the statute:
whether C. D. hath more right to hold the tenement which
A. B. demandeth against him by his writ or right, or A. B.
to have it as he demandeth."
Thus the issue actually tried
by the jury in these cases as distinctly appeared on the
face of the record as it could possibly have appeared, had
the defendant put in his plea, and it is precisely the same
issue as would have been tried, had the defendant filed his
plea. Yet no plea having been filed so far as the, record
as

in all other

cases

a

is

it

it,

showed, the appellate courts set aside judgments on verdicts, rendered when the record showed distinctly the issue joined ; and when it was precisely the issue which would
have had to be formed by the parties, merely because it
had not been formed by the pleadings of the parties.
The courts obviously act on the principle, that by the
common law and our universal practice, no jury can be
empaneled and no case can be tried, tUl there has been an
issue made by the pleadings of the parties, and that such
was the case must appear by the record. It is obvious, that
the jury cannot be empaneled to try an issue never formed
by the parties by their pleadings, any more in an action of
ejectment than in a writ of right, for which it has been subThe same reasons applying in both cases, and
stituted.
indeed in all cases, whether civil or criminal. It is a fundamental principle of the common law, that the parties by
their pleadings must come to issue before any cause can
be disposed of or tried by a jury.
The attorneys for the defendant in error, rely on the case
of Douglass v. The Central Land Co., 12 W. Va. 505, to sustain his position, that because there can be but one issue in
an action of ejectment and but one plea in such action, the
failure to put in this plea or form this issue ought not to
prevent the court from rendering a judgment on the verdict of the jury in such a case. In that case it was held,
that as there could be but one conclusion to the plea of
non assumpsit, and that conclusion was necessarily to the
country, it was unnecessary formally to add to
in order
to make the plea good. The decision was obviously right,
and in full accord with the decisions in Virginia and in
this State.
But surely
one thing for the courts after a verdict,
to construe pleas liberally to sustain
verdict and judg-
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ment thereon, and in so doing carry out the liberal spirit
sho'WTi by the legislature in the statutes of jeofail ; and quite
a different thing for the courts to dispense with pleading
altogether, and permit cases to be tried by juries in which
the defendant has not plead at all, and allow judgments to
be entered upon such verdicts.
For this reason the judgment of the circuit court of
Kanawha, rendered on December 20, 1875, must be set aside,
reversed and annulled, and the plaintiffs in error must recover of the defendant in error, his costs about his writ
of error in this court expended, and the verdict of the jury
must also be set aside and annulled, and this cause must be
remanded to the circuit court of Kanawha, to be further
proceeded with according to the principles as laid down in
this opinion and further according to law.

FAUROT

V.

PARK NATIONAL BANK.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District.
37

J.

Illinois Appellate,

In this

1890.

322.

it

appears that attachment
proceedings were begun by the Park National Bank against
Benjamin C. Faurot, on the 12th day of April, 1889. Faurot
appeared by attorney May 21, 1889, and on the 15th day of
June, 1889, filed his plea of the general issue.
On the 18th of June the default of Faurot "for want of
a plea" was taken, and judgment was entered against him

Waterman,

for

:

case

$3,829.74.

is doubtless the case that neither the court nor the
plaintiff below were aware that a plea had been filed when
However this may be, with a
the default was entered.
plea on file, it was error, without some disposition of the
plea, to enter the default of Faurot. Parrot v. Goss, 17
v. Clark,
111. App. 110 ; Mason v. Abbott, 83 111. 445 ; Sammis
17 111. 398; Steelman v. Watson, 5 Gilm. 249; McKenney

It

V.

May,

1

Scam. 334.

Reversed and remanded.

4:88

Common Law PliEadinq.

BATES

V.

[Chap. 5

Looms.

Bupreme Court of New York.
5 Wendell,

1830,

134.

Motion that writ of inquiry be executed at the circuit.
The action was for an assault and battery. The day laid
in the declaration was the second day of January, 1830.
The defendant did not plead, and a writ of inquiry was executed and an inquisition found for $200 damages, which
inquisition was set aside and a new inquiry held. On the
hearing before the sheriff and the jury, the plaintiff proved
that on the day laid in the declaration he was severely
beaten, but did not prove that the defendant inflicted the
injuries complained of. The counsel for the plaintiff insisted that the defendant, by his default in not pleading,
admitted, not only that he had been guilty of an assault
and battery, but also that he had been guilty of the assault
and battery committed on the plaintiff on the day laid in
the declaration.
This was denied by the counsel for the defendant, who contended that, though the default admitted an
assault and battery, it did not admit the assault and battery committed on the day laid in the declaration; ahd as
there was no proof that the defendant committed the injuries suffered by the plaintiff on that day, the plaintiff
•
•
*
was entitled to. nominal damages only.
By the Court, Maecy, J.: A default in a case like this
admits an assault and battery ; but it does not, apprehend,
entitle the plaintitff to anything more than nominal damages. It admits only the traversable allegations in the declaration. Neither the specific day when the injury was
done, nor the circumstances of aggravation are traversable. They are not, therefore, admitted by the default.
A
plea in this case denying a battery on the second day of
January (that being the day laid in the declaration) would
have been clearly bad, because the plaintiff, to entitie him
to recover, is not confined in his proof to a battery on that
day. The admission by the default is of a battery committed within the period to which the plaintiff is confined
by his proof. The battery may have been on the second
day of January, but not necessarily so. It may as well have
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any other day in any of the three or four preceding years.
the plaintiff received on that day a personal injury, the default does not establish the fact, in the
absence of all other proof, that the defendant inflicted it.
Before damages can he awarded against him for
the
plaintiff must show, either by direct proof or by circumstances, sufficient to produce a reasonable conviction in the
minds of the jury that the defendant inflicted the injury.
been on

GULLY

Sbveral Pleas to the Same Cottht.
V.

5

Court

THE BISHOP OF EXETEB.
of

ISEOTioK

2.

it,

If

Common Pleas.

1828.

Bingham, 42.

In

if

a

;

a

a

this case, the plaintiff in qtuire impedit having been
obliged to trace his title through a period of two centuries,
and the defendant having in forty-three pleas traversed
every allegation in the declaration, although the plaintiff's
claim rested solely on the validity of
deed of 1672, which
the defendant sought to invalidate by setting up a subsequent deed of 1692, the court rescinded the rule to plead
several matters, as having been made an improper use of.
new rule nisi to
E. Lawes, Serjt., thereupon obtained
*
*
*
following
matters
several
plead the
Wilde, Serjt., now showed cause, and objected, as before,
that all the pleas except those which disputed the validity
of the deed of 1672, and asserted the validity of the deed
of 1692, were an abuse of the rule to plead several matters,
great expense,
being calculated only to put the parties to
and wholly immaterial to the merits of the cause, so that
the defendant succeeded on them he would gain nothing.

J.:

a

it

a

is

it

a

I

am glad this question has been fully
matter of
brought before the court; for though merely
On the decision
point of great importance.
practice
depends, whether suits shall be carried
of this question
on at great and unnecessary expense, or whether the real
object of pleading shall be attained— that of reducing causes
single point to be tried.
to

Best, C.
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common law a defendant wa^ permitted to plead one
plea only, and it was a principle that pleadings ought to be
true. That can rarely be the case when many pleas are
pleaded. But as it was sometimes found difficult to comprise the merits of a defence in a single plea, the Statute
of Ann permitted a party to plead as many as might be
necessary to his defence, provided he obtained leave of the
court; thereby confining him to such as might be deemed,
in the discretion of the court, essential to the justice of his
cause. We have enough of the merits of this cause before
us to see what justice requires.
The living in dispute was
conveyed by a deed of 1672 ; the defendant claims under a
deed of 1692, under such circumstances, that if the deed of
1672 is valid, the defendant can have no interest in the
property. The justice of the case, therefore, requires that
the defendant should plead nothing that does not tend to
show the invalidity of the deed of 1672. He, however, insists on going into matters long subsequent even to the
deed of 1692. But if his right accrues from that deed, what
can he have to do with the subsequent matters ?
It has been urged that it is in vain to require the plaintiff to make certain allegations, if the defendant may not
deny them. But the object of pleading would be defeated,
as it is already in some actions, if the defendant were to
put the plaintiff upon tracing his whole title.
The object
of pleading is to narrow the matter in dispute to a single
point ; and a defendant ought not to be permitted to traverse
a series of facts wholly immaterial to his own claim.
Here
he ought to break in on the plaintiff's title but once; that
is, to dispute the validity of the deed of 1672. He may find
it advisable to do that in more ways than one, and, therefore, he may add the plea of non concessit, but he shall
only dispute the plaintiff's title in the point material to
him. The practice in criminal proceedings, which has been
alluded to, bears no analogy to the present question. The
humanity of our law allows the prisoner to put the prosecutor upon proving his case in every particular; but in
civil proceeding the interest of both parties requires that
they should be put to as little expense as possible. Perhaps we may not be able to return to the ancient simplicity
of pleading; but we must approach it as nearly as we can,
and remove, if it be possible, that reproach which has lately
been so justly cast on the administration of justice.
It is
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an important duty of the court to exercise its discretion
as to pleas, and to render justice as cheap and as expeditious as i)ossible.

J.

The Statute of Ann would never have been
passed if such abuses had been anticipated as have taken
place. The existing practice has given a defendant a most
inconvenient advantage over a plaintiff. Before the passing of the Statute of Ann, a party might have two or three
substantial defences to an action, and yet could only bring
forward one. The statute has enabled him, where he has
more than one, to plead
with the permission of the court.
Has he more than one in the present case! He may endeavor to perplex the plaiatiff, but his only defence rests
:

it,

Gaselee,

•

•

•

Is,

on the alleged invalidity of the deed of 1672.

;

if

is

a

;

it

a

if

that
The true principle of pleading several matters
tiie justice of the case requires that party should allege
but they will
several defences, the court will not prevent
not allow party to plead, merely for the purpose of throwing diflSculties in the way of his opponent. In the present
nothing essential to the defendant's case, but
case there
to contest the validity of the deed of 1672. The defendant,
therefore, shall be put to elect which liok of the plaintiff's
he contests the deed of 1672, he
title he will contest and
mfty plead non concessit, and that the deed was fraudulent.

CONNELLY

v.

PIERCE.

7

Supreme Court of New York.

1331,

Wendell, TSD.

a

a

Demurrer to plea. The plaintiffs declared in covenant
contract bearing date 30th May, 1827, whereby, after
on
reciting that the defendant on the 10th day of April, then
sheriff's sale, by virtue of
last past, had purchased at
executions against a certain person, 88 acres of land; and
that in consideration of $320 paid to him by the plaintiffs,
he had bargained and sold to tiiem 40 acres off of the north
part of the premises purchased by hjm, the defendant
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it

7

3

;

a

it

is

if,

covenanted and agreed that he would convey to the plaintiffs, by a deed of warranty, the said 40 acres, at tiie expiration of 15 months from the time of the sheriff's sale, provided the title to the premises should be vested in him by
virtue of the sheriff's deed. The plaintiffs averred that
on the 10th day of July, 1828, the title to the premises purchased by the defendant was vested in him by virtue of
such deed,""but that he refused to convey to them, although
requested so to do. The defendant interposed several pleas,
and among others, that he was not requested by the plaintiffs, on the 10th July, 1828, or at any time afterwards, to
convey to them the 40 acres ; nor did he on that day, or at
any time afterwards, refuse to convey the same. To this
plea the plaintiffs demurred, and assigned for cause of demurrer, that the plea was double: in alleging that the defendant was not requested, and that he did not refuse. The
defendant joined in demurrer.
By the Court, Savage, Ch. J. : The rule in pleading is,
that a plea may contain as many facts as are necessary to
The defence relied
make out one point, or one defence.
on by the plea demurred to is that the defendant is not in
default by refusal to give a deed on demand. It was not
necessary to his defence, to have negatived both facts ; for
if the deed had never been demanded of him, that alone is
an answer to the plaintiff's declaration; and
upon dethe
defendant
did
not
but
to
mand,
refuse,
convey,
offered
an answer.
that also
The two facts are closely connected, and the defendant could not be compelled to admit
either fact; but to deny both,
must be done in separate
pleas. Either allegation in the plea being
good defence
to the action, that settles the question as to the point of
form against the defendant. He cannot plead two defences
in the same plea he may plead as many defences as he has,
but each defence must be stated in a separate plea. In
Strong v. Smith, Caines, 160, the court held there was no
duplicity in the plea, because the point of defence being
the defendant's right to enter the locus in quo, he had shewn
that right by setting forth two facts, both necessary to
establish the right, to-wit, seisin in the trustees of the town,
and their demise to him. In TucJcer v. Ladd,
Cowen, 450,
the defence was a set off, and to shew the defendant's right
to the set off,
became necessary to allege that the plaintiffs were trustees for a third person, and that the defend-
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ants had a judgment against such person.
Both allegations were necessary to make out the point of defence. But
in Service v. Heermance, 2 Johns. R. 96, where, to a plea
of discharge, under the insolvent act, the plaintiff replied
five several acts, each of which was sufficient to avoid the
discharge, the court held the replication bad, for duplicity.
And a similar decision was made in Cooper v. Heermcmce,
3 Johns. E. 315.
In this case the defendant has coupled
in the same plea two facts, each of which, taken separately,
although there is an apparent connection between them, is
a sufficient defence to the plain tijBEs' action. The plea is
therefore faulty in point of form; and it is so because the
several matters which it contains are good defences in law.

MoALEER

V.

ANGELE.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
19

January

16, 1897.

1897,

Rhode Islcmd, 688.

Tillinghast,

J.:

This is assumpsit

to recover the sum of $172.80 for certain stone furnished
to the town of North Providence for highway purposes.
In addition to the general issue, the defendant has filed
a special plea in bar, in which he sets up that the plaintiff
ought not to have and maintain his action because at the
time of contracting said debt the said town had incurred
debts to the limit allowed by law, and also that there was
no money in the hands of the defendant town treasurer at
that time, nor has there been any money in his hands at
any time since then, with which said debt could have been

paid.

To this plea the plaintiff demurs on the grounds: (1)
*
*
*
That it is bad for duplicity.
We do not think the plea is bad for duplicity. A double

plea is one which consists of several distinct and independent matters alleged to the same point and requiring differGould's Pleading, p. 420. But this rule is
ent answers.
not violated by introducing several matters into a plea if
tiiey be constituent parts of the same entire defence. 1
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Chit. p. 512 ; Hmdy v. Wcddron, 18 B, I. 567. Without the
allegation objected to in the plea before ns it would not
state a full defence to the action, and hence would be demurrable because notwithstanding the fact that the town
had reached its debt limit when this bill was contracted, yet
there might have been money in the treasury at that time
which had been specially set apart for the payment of
claims like the one in suit; and if the town had the means
in its treasury to meet this indebtedness, or would have it
in anticipation of its current revenue, the contracting of
the liability, even though the town then was up to its debt
limit, would not be a violation of the statute. Dill. Mun.
Cor. 4 ed., sec. 1S5 ',Dively v. Cedar Falls, 27 la. 227 (232) ;
Barnard v. Knox County, 105 Mo. 382 '(391).

STAEKWEATHEE

v.

KITTLE.

Supreme Court of New York.

1837.

17 Wendell, 20.

This was an action of assumpsit, tried at the Washington circuit, in November, 1834, before the Hon. Esek Cowbn,
then one of the circuit judges.
The plaintiffs read in evidence a note given to them by
the defendant for $93.53 bearing date the 9th July, 1833,
payable one day after date, and rested. A son of the defendant proved that in March, 1834, by the direction of hia
father, he went to the office of Messrs. Ingalls & Powell,
attorneys at law, in whose hands the note in question was,
for the purpose of paying the same, and he then paid to
Powell $10 in cash and a promissory note payable at a bank
for $92.28, made by a firm doing business under the name
of Baker and Walbridge, and demanded the note in question; that Powell refused to deliver up the note, saying that
he would apply the payment to accounts against the defendant in his hands, in such manner as he pleased, and
that Powell gave him a receipt, which he handed to his
father. Powell testified on the part of the plaintiffs, that the
rc^ceipt he gave the defendant's son specified that the pay-
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ment was made on account of demands in favor of Walter
W. Webb, and that he accordingly applied the same to demands in the hands of his firm in favor of Webb.
He
further testified that nothing was said by the defendant's
son about applying the payment to the note in question.
The plaintiffs also read in evidence a bill of ' particulars in a
cause of Walter W. Webb against the defendant, delivered
by the defendant's attorney in that suit, in which, among
other items claimed by the defendant, was a receipt of
Messrs. IngaUs & Powell, for $102.28, of the date of 7th
March, 1834, and Powell testified that he never gave Kittle
any receipt on the Webb demands other than that given to
the defendant's son, as testified to by him. The defendant's
counsel objected to the bill of particulars, produced as
above, being received in evidence, but the objection was
overruled by the judge. Kittle, the witness, further testified, that his father never sanctioned the application of the
payment made by him to any other demand than the note
in question, that he claimed to have paid the account to
which Powell said he would apply the payment, and that
it was a disputed and contested accoimt. The counsel for
the defendant insisted that the cause should be submitted
to the jury to pass upon the question of payment; but the
judge decided that under the testimony in the case it was
whoUy a question of law for the court to say whether the
note had been paid, and that he was of opinion the note
had not been paid, but that the amount paid by the defendant's son had been applied to the Webb demand, by the
assent of all parties ; that it had been so applied by Powell,
and that defendant had adopted the application by setting
it forth and claiming it in his bill of particulars in the suit
of Webb against him. The defendant excepted to this decision, and the jury, under the direction of the judge, found
a verdict for the plaintiffs for the amount of the note and
interest. The defendant moves for a new trial.
By the Court, Bbonson, J.: * * * The particulars
cannot be evidence against the party furnishing them, in
any case, or for any purpose, where the pleading or notice
to which the bill relates would not be evidence.
An admission in pleading is evidence against the party
making it on the trial of the particular issue to which the
admission relates ; but an admission in one count of a declaration, is not evidence against the plaintiff under any other
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count; and where the defendant pleads several pleas, the
plaintiff cannot use an admission in one plea for the purHorpose of establishing a fact which is denied in another.
rington v. Macmorris, 5 Taunt. 228. The Supreme Court
of Massachusetts laid down a different rule in the action of
slander. Jackson v. Stetson, 15 Mass. E. 48; Alderman v.
French, 1 Pick. 1. These decisions have not been followed
elsewhere, CiUey v. Jenness, 2 N. Hamp. R. 89, and they
are much shaken at home by the recent case of Melvvn v.

Whiting,

Pick. 184.
The party may make an admission in one suit
or one plea, which he would be very unwilling to follow in
another. A fact which is either directly or impliedly admitted in pleading, will be deemed true for all the purposes
of that issue ; but it may still be that the fact does not exist,
and that it was only conceded in the particular case because
the party did not think it important in relation to that matter to put it in issue.
In this case the defendant was sued by the plaintiffs and
also by Webb. He had made a payment which he was entitled to have allowed in one of the suits. He pleads or
gives notice of the claim in both suits ; and if the doctrine
laid down at the circuit were fuUy carried out, he has for*

•

13

•

feited the payment, and cannot have it allowed in either
suit. The judge held that the defendant was concluded in
this suit by having set up and claimed the payment in the
Webb suit
tiie same doctrine should be applied on the
trial of the Webb suit, the defendant would be again concluded by having set up and claimed the payment in this ;
and the result would be that he must lose the money altogether. This shows, think, that the bill of particulars was
improperly received in evidence. In the suit to which it
belongs it will perform its appropriate oflSce; but in this
action it should neither conclude the defendant nor prejudice his rights.

If

I

tlew trial granted.
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KEMSHEAD.

Court of Common Pleas.
4
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181i.

Taunton, 459.

Marshall, Serjt., had obtained a rule nisi for leave to
plead several matters to an action of covenant for nonpayment of rent. The pleas suggested were, 1st, nan est
factum; 2nd, no rent in arrear; 3rd, to the first and second
counts, that the defendant had, before the rent became due,
assigned the premises to Joshua Eobinson, who had tendered the rent ; 4th, to the third and fourth counts that the
defendant, before the rent became due, assigned to Joshua
Eobinson, who assigned to
S. who tendered the rent;
and 5th, a tender of all the rent by the defendant

J.

J.

If

Mansfieid, C.
:
The pleas are clearly repugnant
the defendant assigned a lease, it must have existed; and
if the defendant tendered rent, it was not rent which had
never become due.
The court made the rule absolute to plead the other pleas,
striking out the nan est factum.

LECHMEEE

v.

EICB.

Court of Common Pleas.
2

Bosanquet

S Puller,

1799,
12.

Williams, Serjt, shewed cause against a rule msi for
pleading to an action of debt on bond ; first, nan est factum;
and secondly, that the bond was given upon an usurious
consideration; and contended, that although usury was not,
strictly speaking, an unconscientious plea, yet, that as it
is the constant practice of the court to refuse a rule of this
kind where the pleas are inconsistent, they would not depart from that rule in the- present instance. He also
relied on an afiSdavit, stating that the witness to the bond
lived in Worcestershire, and that the plaintiff would be
put to great expense if he wqfe obliged to bring him to
London where the venue was laid.
c. L. p. 82
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Shepherd, Serjt., in support of the rule, insisted, that
the object of pleading non est factum was to oblige the
plaintiff to produce the witness to the bond, in order that
the defendant might have the opportunity of cross-examining him as to the usury.
The court were of opinion that the two pleas were not
more inconsistent than many which are allowed to be
pleaded together, as not guilty to an assault and a special
justification ; and that probably the true reason for opposing this rule was, as had been suggested, to keep the attesting witness out of the way. They observed, that the court
of common pleas only continued to exercise an authority
over applications for pleading several matters (which had
originally been the practice of the King's Bench alsoy in
order to prevent an oppressive use being made of that
liberty which is given by the statute.
Ride absolvie.

PETERS
'Sv/preme
74

V.

ULMER.

Court of Pennsylvania.

1873.

Pennsylvania State, 402.

This was an action on the

case

for slander brought to the

November term, 1872, of the court below, by Frederick
Ulmer and Sophia his wife against John Peters and Margaret his wife.
The declaration was that Mrs. Peters had uttered words
imputing adultery to Mrs. Ulmer. The defendants pleaded

"not gidlty."
On the trial April

8, 1873, before Hamptoit, P. J., the
defendant had leave to add the plea of justification, and by
order of the court, the plea of "not guilty" was withdrawn.
The defendants excepted to this order of the court and a
bill of exceptions was sealed.

Shabswood, J.: The first assignment of error is, that
the court below refused to allow the defendant to plead "not
guilty" as well as justification, and in ordering the defendant to withdraw the plea of "not guilty." The ground
upon which this order was made appears to have been that
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the pleas were inconsistent.

Under tiie Statute of 4 Anne,
Roberts's Digest, 42, which first permitted a
defendant, with the leave of the court, to plead as many
several matters as' he should think necessary to his defence,
it was the practice at first for the court to refuse leave
when the proposed pleas were inconsistent, but in modern
practice such pleas, notwithstanding the apparent repugnancy between them, are permitted.
1 Troubat & Haly,
part 1, p. 470. Thus, to go no further, what seems to be
more inconsistent than to an action upon a bond to plead
non est factum and payment — to deny the execution of the
bond by the defendant, and yet to allege that he had paid
it? The only exception which appears to be recognized is
the general issue and tender, and there is a good reason,
perhaps, for not allowing these to be pleaded together;
for if a verdict were found for the defendant on the general
issue, this incongruity would appear upon the record, that
nothing was due, though the defendant had admitted on
the record, by pleading the tender, that something was due.
Maclellan v. Howard, 4 Term Beports, 194. In Kerlin v.
Heacock, 3 Binn. 215, the short entry of "not guilty, with
leave to justify," was considered, as in fact several pleas
of not guilty and a justification, and no remark was made
In truth they are
by the court as to their inconsistency.
in
slander
The
defendant
may believe
not inconsistent.
and allege that he never used the words imputed to him,
but as human testimony is fallible and uncertain, he may
well fortify himself by adding, if the plaintiff succeeds in
proving that did say the words, they were true. Against
an unscrupulous plaintiff of bad character— especially since
the Act of Assembly allowing him to be a witness in his
own behalf — may be the only safe line of defence. The
discretion vested in the court by the Statute of Anne to
legal
clearly
refuse leave to put in more than one plea,
reason
exists.
discretion, not to be exercised unless good
was refused to allow an amendment of
Where, as here,
was error, under the Act of March 21,
the pleadings,
Smith's L. 329. In Smith's Administrator
1806, sec.
Wright, 142, where, after a plea of payment,
V. Kessler,
plea of non
the defendant was refused leave to put in
assumpsit, the court reversed the judgment.
Judgment reversed, and venire facias de novo awarded.
c. 16, sec. 4,

a

4

8 3,

it

it

a

is

^it
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DOUGLASS
Supreme

V.

5

BELCHER

Court of Tennessee.
7

[Cliap.

1834,

Yerger, 104.

This was an action of debt brought by the plaintiffs in
Marion County Court. The defendant pleaded in abatement of the summons that it was not signed by the clerk,

but by some person not by him authorized to do so. At
the same time several pleas in bar were filed. The plaintiffs replied to the pleas in bar, and issues were taken, and
moved the court to strike out the plea in abatement. The
court sustained this motion, and the plea was stricken out,
and upon the trial of the issues there was a verdict and
The defendant appealed in
judgment for the plaintiffs.
error to the circuit court, where the county court judgment
was reveresd and plaintiff required to reply to the plea in
abatement. From this judgment an appeal in error is
prosecuted to this court.
Geben, J. : The county court did not err in striking out
the plea in abatement. A plea in abatement cannot be
pleaded at the same time with a plea in bar. 1 Bac. Ab.
26 ; 1 Mass. Rep. 538.
The plea in bar is inconsistent with
the plea in abatement, and, by answering the plaintiff's
action, overrules the plea in abatement. That plea was,
therefore, properly stricken out by the county court, and
the circuit court erred in reversing that judgment.
The judgment of the circuit court will be reversed, and,
proceeding to render such judgment as that court ought
to have given, the county court judgment will be affirmed.
•

•••••••••

Judgment
S8.

be pleaded in due order, and that order ii as follows:
jurisdiction of the eouit.
disabUitj of the person.
the plaintiff.
Of the defendant.
the count or declaration.
the writ.
To the form of the writ.
(1) For matter apparent on the tmem of Ik
(2) For matter dehors the writ.
To the action of the writ.
the action itself in bar thereof.

Pleai must
1.
To the
2.
To the
a. Of
b.

t. To
4.

To

a.

b.
5.

To

reversed.^^
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In this order the defendant may plead aU these kinds of pleas suecessively.
But he cannot plead more than one plea of the same kind or
degree. Thus,
he cannot offer two successive pleas to the jurisdiction, or two to
the disabilitT
of the person. Strahan on Pleading (Tyler's
Bd.) 373.
"The power of pleading several matters extends to pleas in bar only,
and not to those of the dilatory class, with respect to which the leave of
eonrt will not b« granted."—
Ste^haa on Pleading (Tylar'a £d.), p. 266.

BxonoN 3.

PiiEAs

MUBPHY

Sevebal Coxnm.

TO

V.

FAELEY.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
124

1899.

Alabama, 279.

Habalson, J.: 1. The complaint declared in two separate counts, on two promissory notes. There were three
pleas interposed to the entire complaint— the general issue,
failure of consideration, and a special plea of set-off. The
plaintiff moved to strike these pleas for the alleged reason
that they were not pleaded to each count separately, but to
the entire complaint, and the motion was granted.
This

If the pleas

ruling was erroneous.

were good to each count,
there was no necessity to plead them to each separately;
and, in such case, by interposing them to the entire com•
* •
plaint, each count thereof was pleaded to.

THE AMERICAN INSUEANCE COMPANY
Supreme Court of Illinois.
81

J.

Illinois,

v.

HOLLY.

1876,

353.

delivered the opinion of the court.
The ruling of the court below complained of is, in sustaining a demurrer to appellant's special pleas. The declaration contains two special counts and the consolidated
The pleas profess to answer the whole
common counts.
declaration, but in fact the matters pleaded, even if otherwise free from objection, answer only the special counts,
ScHOLFpiLD,

502
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and leave the ooramon counts unansweredFor this reason alone, therefore, the demurrer was properly sustained.
Moir et al. v. Harrington et ai., 22 111. 40. The judgment
is affirmed.

Judgment afflrmed.

SscnoN 4.

Joint

TEOUTNER
Supreme

v.

PARENT.

Court of Indiana.
4

Pixas.

and Several

1853,

Indiana, 232.

Davison, J.: This was an action of debt by Parent
against Troutner, Colerick, and Dawson, on an injunction
bond. The bond is in the sum of 100 dollars, conditioned
as follows: Whereas the above named Troutner, at the
July term of the Allen Circuit Court, filed his bill in chancery, praying an injunction against the said Parent, which
injunction was on that day granted by the judges of said
court ia open court; now if the said Troutner shall well
and truly pay to the said Parent all damages and costs
which may accrue in consequence of said proceeding, provided the said injunction granted in this case shall be dissolved, then the above obligation is to be void and of no
effect ; otherwise to be and remain in full force, etc.
The breach assigned, is, that at the July term of the said
AUen Circuit Court, in the year 1845, by the judgment and
decree of said court, the said injunction was dissolved and
said bill dismissed, as it appears of record, etc.
Colerick and Dawson were defaulted. Troutner obtained
oyer of the bond and condition, and filed two pleas: 1.
Nan est factum. 2. Performance generally.
A demurrer to each plea was sustained, a writ of inquiry awarded,
damages assessed, and judgment rendered for tjie plaintiff below.
The only error assigned is the sustaining of the demurrer to the pleas.
The defendant in error contends that the pleas are defective, because they are the separate pleas of Troutner; that
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in actions founded upon a joint or joint and several contract, codefendants cannot sever in their pleas. We think
this is a mistake. The rule seems to be, that when the defence is in its nature joint, several defendants may join in
the same plea, or they may sever. And one defendant may
plead in abatement, another in bar, and another may demur.
1 Chitty's PI. 596; Archbold's Civil PL 239; Gould on PL
422, a. 6.

CLAEK

V.

LATHEOP.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
33

1860,

Vermont, 140.

Trespass for false imprisonment.
The defendants jointly pleaded two special pleas in justification.
The first plea set forth that the plaintiff had been
duly elected and qualified constable and collector of Chelsea for the year 1854; that a tax was legally voted on the
list of that year, and with a legal warrant was put into his
hands for collection ; that he proceeded to collect the same,
and was delinquent in paying over to the proper authorities ; and further set out the proceedings for, and the regular
issuing of, and extent against him, under which, after due
demand, he had been committed by the defendant, Lathrop,
*
•
*
as constable of Chelsea.
Neither plea attempted in any way to connect the defendants, Cabot and Hude, with the acts of Lathrop, set out in
the pleas.
To these pleas the plaintiff demurred specially, on the
ground that the pleas were joint and did not allege any
facts in justification of two of the defendants or show any
• • *
connection between them and the petition and extent.

J.:

I.

The defendants, by pleading a special
justification of the trespass and imprisonment, admit their
liability unless their plea shows a sufficient legal answer.
All having joined in the saijae pleas, they must show a
good justification for all, or else they are good for neither.

Poland,
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These are familiar rules of pleading given in all the books
on that subject.
Conceding that the facts set forth in the pleas furnish
a good answer for Lathrop, the constable, who committed
the plaintiff upon the extent, they are no defence to the
others, for the pleas do not attempt to connect them with
the justification at all, by stating that they acted under the
constable as his aids or assistants, or that they were selectmen, or other officers of the town, and put the extent into
the hands of the constable for execution. As they do not
show themselves in any way connected with the justification, and have, by joining in the plea, admitted their connection with the trespass on the plaintiff, the pleas are
If the defendants, Hude and Cabot, rely
bad as to them.
on showing they had not any connection with the arrest
and imprisonment of the plaintiff, they should have plead
the general issue.
As before said, this renders the pleas insufficient to justify
•
•
•
the officer also.=^»
29.
"The reason is, that the court cannot sever the justification, and
say that one is guilty, and the other is not, when they aU put themselves
This rule is a very artificial one, and ought never to
on the same terms.
be extended beyond the very eases to which it has been applied; and it
may safely be asserted, that it never has been extended to the general issue
of not gmlty, pleaded jointly. In the case of assumpsit, if the defendants
plead the general issue jointly, the plaintiff is bound to prove a joint asaump•
•
•
There is
tiontion, and if he fails in doing this, he cannot succeed.
no reason to be given, requiring the defendants to sever in the plea of the
general issue, and there is no case which inculcates the doctrine." — Higby
y. Williams (1819) 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 215.

MOEBOW

V.

BELCHER.

Court of King's Bench.
7

1825.

Bowling S Ryla/nd, 187.

Declaration in trespass against Thomas Belcher, Caroline Watson, and Thomas Foster, for an assault and false
Pleas: first, by all the defendants, not
imprisonment.
guilty, and issue .thereon. Second, by Belcher, a justification, in defence of the possession of his house. Third, by
Fowler, as servant of Belcher, the like justification. Ee-
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plication to the second plea, that Belcher committed the
trespasses with more force than was necessary for the purpose in that plea mentioned.
Rejoinder by all the defendants, to the replication to the second plea, that all the defendants were not guilty of committing the trespass with
more force than was necessary.
Similar rejoinder to the
replication to the third plea. Demurrer to the above rejoinders, assigning for cause, that as Belcher and Foster
pleaded separately in the second and third pleas, and the
plaintiff replied that they separately were guilty of more
force than was necessary, the rejoinder by all the defendants, that aU the defendants were not guilty of committing
such excess, is bad in law.
Joinder in demurrer.

Batlet, J. : Two of these defendants have pleaded separately a special plea respectively, but the other has pleaded
no special plea.
The plaintiff complains of a joint and
several trespass committed by the three defendants.
One
of the defendants says,
reason
for
have no justifiable
conmaitting the trespass, but
deny the fact." The others
also deny the fact, but they respectively plead a justification. The plaintiff replies, that those two defendants were
respectively guilty of excess, for they had used more force
than was necessary to expel him from the house. The defendants reply, that they were not all guilty of excess. Now
they were not aU charged with excess, and therefore their
rejoinders do not pursue the pleas originally pleaded, and
•
•
•
are consequently demurrable.

"I

J.: I

I

am of the same opinion. It is a
fundamental rule, that the rejoinder should pursue the
plea, for otherwise a different kind of issue might be introduced. One of these defendants pleads no special plea
whatever. The other two plead distinct special pleas;
and then they all come together again in the rejoinder, which
is an informal and bad mode of rejoinder. But the defendant, Watson, had no right to rejoin, after having originally
pleaded no more than the general issue.
Judgment for the plamtiff.
LiTTi,BDAi.E,
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v.

STEWAET.

Court of New Jersey.

1888.

New Jersey Law, 116.

J.

In an action
:
BcTjDDEB,
note for $250, endorsed and

of assumpsit on a promissory
transferred by the payee to
the plaintiff, after maturity, a declaration was filed containing the common counts, with a bill of particulars of the
demand and copy of the promissory note whereon the declaration was founded. In this the defendant pleaded, as to
part of the sum claimed, that before the assignment he
paid to the payee, on account of said note, the sum of $35,
in two separate payments, for which no credit was given
in the bill of particulars. The motion is now made to
strike out this plea as sham or frivolous, on the ground
*
* *
that it is no answer to any part of the declaration.
This partial plea is the only answer that is given to the
plaintiff's action, and it is in effect a plea of part payment
for which the plaintiff has given no credit in his declaration; it is silent as to the balance of the claim. Although
payment, in whole or in part, prior to action brought, might
be given in evidence under the general issue, according to
our practice, yet the defendant is not bound to plead generally, but may also plead specially, and have a distinct
issue made on such plea. 1 Chitty PI. 478, 480; McKyring
A plea of part payment or of parV. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297.
tial performance is a good plea, if drawn in proper form.
Gould PI., sees. 102, 103, p. 334.
Where a payment or performance is known and admitted,
it is the better practice, in declaring on contracts to pay
money, to deliver goods, or perform works, expressly to
admit part payment or partial performance on the face
of the declaration, to deprive the defendant of all pretence
Chitty PI. 288, 338. But if this
to plead such defence.
be not done, the defendant, if he have no other defence than
a greater credit than is given him in the declaration, should
not be driven to plead the general issue, denying the whole

daim, under oath, but allowed his specific and true defence
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not necessary that

he should answer the whole declaration in one plea, for a
plea is good which answers any part of a count which is
material and severable, as a basis of recovery.
Care must
be taken, however, in drawing such plea, that it begins
properly, for if it commences as an answer to the whole,
but is to part only, it wUl be bad on demurrer.
it begias
by answering only part of the plaintiff's count, and is in
truth but an answer to part, and does not, in that or ia any
other plea, notice the remainder of the declaration, the
plaintiff cannot demur to the plea, for it is sufficient as
far as it extends, but must take judgment for the part unanswered, as by nil dicit. Fleming v. Hoboken, 11 Vroom,
270; 1 Chitty PI. 523; Grafflvn v. Jackson, 11 Vroom, 440;
Com. Dig., tit "Pleadings," E 1; 1 Saund. 28; 5 Bob. Pr.,
ch. 19, p. 168.
As to the part answered by the plea of part payment, the
plaintiff may enter a nolle prosequi, if he is satisfied that
it is correct, or, if he disputes the credit claimed, he may
reply and put that in issue. In this form the real controversy between the parties may be determined on its merits,
or, if there be no further dispute, the plaintiff will receive
the sum to which he is entitled under his judgment by nil

If

dicit.

While, therefore, this plea of part payment is not an
answer to the whole claim of the plaintiff, it is good as far
as it goes, and it is not sham or frivolous, or irregular or
defective, and will not be stricken out
Motion refused.

SPKAGUE NATIONAL BANK

v.

COMPANY.

EEIE RAILROAD

Swpreme Court of New JerSty.
62

J.

1898.

New Jersey Law, 474.

an action of trespass the plaintiff declared
that the defendant with force and arms broke and entered
a certain close of the plaintiff, and with force and arms
broke and entered certain buildings of the plaintiff, erected
DixoH",

:
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on said close, and ejected, expelled, put out and amoved the
plaintiff and its servants from the possession, use, occupation and enjoyment of the said close and buildings.
To this declaration the defendant pleaded, first, the
general issue; secondly, liberv/m tenementum in the defendant; and thirdly, liberum tenementum in E^ B. T. as
servant of whom and by whose command the defendant
broke and entered, etc., and ejected, etc.
The plaintiff's demurrer to the second and third pleas
is now to be considered.
In Thiel v. Bvlls Ferry Land Co., 29 Vroom, 212, this
court decided that the forcible eviction of a person in the
peaceable occupation of realty, although perpetrated by the
owner legally entitled to recover possession, was a wrong
remediable by the ordinary action of trespass.
On this principle it is evident that these pleas set forth
no justification for so much of the alleged trespass as consisted in the forcible expulsion of the plaintiff and its
servants.
The defendant urges that the pleas being good as to the
breaking and entering, the forcible ejection and expulsion
of the plaintiff and its servants should be deemed mere
matters of aggravation, and therefore legally answered by
the defence to the principal matter, and Davison v. Wilson,
11 Q. B. 890, is cited to support this contention.
But in that
case the personal tort was carefully excluded, both by the
pleader and by the court, from the circumstances which
were treated as mere aggravation.
In Chitty's Forms (2
Chit. PI. 863, 865), and in Perry v. Fitzhowe, 8 Q. B. 757,
the forcible expulsion of persons is regarded as substantially distinct from the trespass upon the land. Such also
is the clear import of Thiel v. Bulls Ferry Land Co., ubi
sv/pra.

Consequently the pleas, having in form professed to
answer the whole declaration and having in substance
legally answered only part, are bad. Grafflin v. Jackson,
They should
11 Vroom, 440; Newark v. Stout, 23 Id. 35.
have been limited in their comment to the alleged trespass
Fleming v. Hohoken, 11 Vroom, 270.
upon the realty.
The plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the demurrer.
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FENTEESS.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
10

509

1849.

Humphreys, 150.

MoBjnnet, J., delivered

the opinion of the conrt.
This is an action of debt upon a promissory note for
$750; to the declaration, which is ia the usual form, the
defendants filed the following plea, viz.:
"And the said defendants come, etc., and say, that they
have paid $65 on the note mentioned in plaintiff's declaration, and this they are ready to verify; wherefore they
pray judgment, etc." On which plea issue was taken by
writing underneath, the words "replication and issue."
And on this single issue the plaintiff went to trial, without
judgment by default, or any defence whatever, as to the
residue of the debt in the declaration left unanswered by
said plea.
The jury found the issue in favor of the defendants, and
they further found "the defendants still indebted to the
plaintiff in the sum of $707, the balance of the debt, after
deducting said payment, and they assess the plaintiff's
damages by reason of the detention to the sum of $70.70."
Upon this finding of the jury, the court proceeded to renThe defendants
der judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
moved for a new trial, and also in arrest of judgment ; but
the court overruled both the motions, and the defendants
have brought an appeal in error to this court.
In 1 Chitty on PI. 554 (Ed. of 1833), the position is laid
down, and Sergeant WUliams asserts the same doctrine (1
Saund. 28, n. 3), that if a plea begin only as an answer to
part, and is in truth but an answer to part, the plaintiff
cannot demur to the plea, for it is sufficient as far as it
extends; but must take his judgment for the part unanhe demur, or plead over, the
swered as by nil dicit.
The reason assigned for the
whole action is discontinued.
discontinuance is, that the plaintiff, in such case, by omitting either to enforce his claim in respect to the part unanswered or to abandon it by entering a nolle prosequi
thereto, causes a chasm or hiatus in the proceeding^.

If
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this doctrine were correct, we would be compelled to
But the position
declare the present action discontinued.
assumed by Mr. Chitty is contradicted and denied to be
law, by very high authorities, both English and American.
In the case of Bullythorpe v. Turner (Willes, 475, 480),
WnxES, Chief Justice, after reciting the authorities, declares it absurd to say, that the defendant can discontinue
the plaintiff's action by putting in a defective plea, and
expresses the opinion, tha;t, in all cases of a defective plea,
the plaintiff "ought to pray the opinion of the court which
''
he can do no otherwise than by demurring.
He refers to

;

it

it,

Yelverton 38, Cro. Jac. 27.
In Riggs v. Deniston (3 Johns, cases 205), Kent, Judge,
held that, a plea which did not either by denying, or justifying, meet the whole matter or gravamen contained in
the count, was for that reason bad. He cites 2 Vent. 193 ;
Cro. Jac. 27; Cro. Eliz. 434. In Sterling v. Sherwood (20
Johns. 204, 206), Spencee, Chief Justice, says, "It appears to me, the position laid down by Mr. Chitty and Sergeant Williams, is not law, and that the cases they refer
to do not bear out the proposition."
And in the latter
case a demurrer was sustained, and judgment rendered
for the plaintiff, on the ground principally, that the defendant's plea of justification answered only a part of the
libelous matter charged in the declaration.
These authorities, without citing others, are decisive of
the question. It is clear, we think, upon principle, as well
as upon authortiy, that a plea which professes only to answer, and does in fact only answer part of the entire gravemen, or cause of action stated in the count, leaving a material part, essential to the plaintiff's right of recovery,
wholly unanswered, is demurrable. It may, it is true, in the
language of Mr. Chitty, be "sufficient, as far as it extends," but in order to constitute a sufficient answer to
the whole declaration, or count, there must be coupled with.
either in the same plea, or in a separate plea, a response
to the residue of the count which
omits to answer.
We hold, then, that the present action was not discontinued by replying to the plea, without taking judgment by
default as to the part unanswered.
We think the plaintiff", in such case, may, at his election,
treat the plea as bad, and demur thereto or he may waive
the objection, and take issue thereon, and demand a judg-

Sec. 5]

PsmoiPLiEs Kela.ting to Pl^;^ in GiaJEaAiA

511

;

it

1

it,

ment by default as to so much of the cause of action as remains unanswered.
But it is clear that upon issue taken
on such plea, the jury cannot go beyond
and find in respect to the matter not embraced in the issue; and should
they do so, their verdict, thus far, must be wholly disregarded.
No judgment whatever can be based thereon.
Hence, in the present case, the verdict and the judgment
thereon are altogether erroneous.
The plaintiff, having
seen proper to take issue on the plea of payment as to part
of the debt, should regularly have demanded judgment by
default as to the residue thereof.
And such judgment
might, perhaps, have been entered up at any time during
the term of which the issue was tried.
Chitty's PI. 554,
n. h.
But, notwithstanding the plaintiff omitted to do so, we
think the court, whose duty
was to see that the proper
judgment was rendered, had ample authority to direct, and
ought to have directed the verdict, as to the remainder of
the debt to be set aside, and a judgment by default to be
entered up for the residue of the debt. It results that the
judgment must be reversed and proceeding to do what the
circuit court ought to have done, we direct that the verdict
thus far be set aside, and judgment by default entered.^**
Ala. 757; Frost v. Hammatt
Accord: —^Mallory v. Matlock (1845)
11 Pick. (Mass.) 70; Thompson v. Kirkpatrick
(1857) 18 Ark. 581.
Contra: —Eisher v. Wheeling Roofing Co. (1905) 57 W. Va. 149; Hunt
Gratt. (Va.) 578; Southall v. Exchange Bank (1855)
T. Martin (1852)
111. 266
12 Gratt. (Va.) 312; Mager v. Hutchinson (1845)
(cannot be
Sm.
Harrison v. Balfour (1845)
claimed for the first time on appeal)
M. (Miss.) 301 (criticized as a very technical rule, to be relaxed as much
as possible \sj permitting judgment by nil dicit to be taken even at a aubsequent term).
7

30.

5

;

V.

Errors

MINEB.
of

Supreme Court

of

WILLIAMS

&

7

8

(1831)

18 Connecticut,

Connecticut.

1847,

464.

The declaration contained
the first, the alleged slanderous words were

This was an action of slander.
two counts.

In

In

a

thief."

is

a

is

the second, they were — "He
thief, and he stole the hay and hayseed from Mrs. Dow's

— "He
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bam."

The defendant pleaded the general issue, without
notice of special matter in defence, or by way of justificartion.

Chubch, Ch. J.: In this declaration there are but two
counts, and in both of them the defendant is charged with
saying of the plaintiff, that he was a thief. • • •
4. There is, however, another question in this case, which
is not free from difficulties, and has been so regarded by
other courts before now. It grows out of the rejection of
the deposition of Mrs. Dow.
It will be seen, that in this case, the defendant made n(?
attempt at justification, either by plea or notice, which distinguishes the present from some of the cases cited in the
argument; but for the purpose of disproving malice, and
upon the question of damages, to show that she had, when

speaking the words, reasonable ground to believe them to
be true, she offered this deposition in evidence, which was
rejected by the judge.

The facts claimed to be proved by Mrs. Dow's deposition,
were, that the plaintiff took and converted to his own use
the hay and hayseed of Mrs. Dow, without her knowledge
and against her consent. This evidence, although it would
conduce to prove the truth of the charge of theft, yet unconnected with other circumstances, might, and, as we think,
did, fall short of it. The animus furcmdi was wanting. The
facts offered in evidence did not sufficiently prove the felonious intent; nor did the defendant claim it. And yet they
did prove that the property was taken under such circumstances as might and probably did excite reasonable suspicions of guUt, and such as by persons not legally informed, are often supposed to constitute the crime of theft.
These facts the defendant wished to prove. The judge at
the circuit, controlled, as he supposed, by opposing authority, rejected the proof of them — not because, in the
absence of any plea or notice of justification, they established the truth of the charge of theft, but because they
tended to that result, though offered for an entirely differThe correctness of this opinion will be exent purpose.
amined briefly.
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most actions for torts, as in trespass, assault and battery, false imprisonment, etc., as well as in actions on the
case, questions of intention and motive are important as
affecting the measure of damages. And they are equally
so in actions of slander; and have always been so considered. But it is said that there are certain rules of pleading
and evidence known to the common law, which, in cases like
the present, will exclude the application of this salutary
principle of justice. We recognize and submit to the rule
referred to, that the truth of a slanderous charge, either
written or spoken, cannot be proved and relied upon in
any action for the defamation of character, either in justification or in mitigation of damages, unless the truth of the
words has been specially pleaded, or notice of justification
has been given.
To this extent the rule has been slowly
and reluctantly brought; but we know of no adjudged case
or principle recognized by the courts of this State, which
has confined a defendant within more narrow limits. And
our opinion in the present case is not in conflict with this

principle.
The defendant here did not offer to justify her charge
of theft as a defence, or to prove its truth for any purpose.
She admitted her mistake; and only offered to prove facts
falling short of the accusation, and reasonably conducing
to show that she spoke the words bona fide, or without that
degree of malice which otherwise the law might presume
against her, and only for the purpose of mitigating damages.

^

That these are mitigating circumstances, we do not believe will be denied. They have been recognized as such
in many cases. In the case of Sims v. Kinder, 1 Car. &
Pa. 279 (11 E. C. L. 393), Best, C. J., says: "I am clearly
of opinion that any fact which goes to show that the de-

fendant spoke bona fide, and without malice, is admissible
in evidence; and further, that it is admissible on the genAnd in Enobel v. Fuller, Peake's Ev. 287,
eral issue."
the same judge held, that the defendant, on the general
issue, may prove in mitigation of damages such facts and
circumstances as show a ground of suspicion not amounting to actual proof of guilt. The same principle is recognized in Earl of Leicester v. Walter, 2 Camp. 251, and in
*
*
*
We refer also
V. Moore, 1 M. & S. 284.
to Alder vian v. French, 1 Pick. 1; Sav/nders v. Mills, 6 Bing.
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E. C. L. 60) ; Chalmers v. Shackell, 6 Car. & Pa.
E. C. L. 496) ; in corroboration of the principle

we have stated.

Bnt the claim of the plaintiff is, and he is certainly snstained in this by several American cases, and by some to
which we have referred as recognizing the general principle stated, that if the facts relied upon to diminish the presmnption of malice tend, in any measure towards proving
the truth of the charge, they cannot be proved under the
general issue. This distinction is certainly a nice one ; and
if not founded in good sense and obvious necessity, and
upon some principle from which it would be dangerous to
depart, it ought not to be adopted by us. Unnecessary distinctions should be avoided; they tend only to perplex the
administration of justice.
It is quite obvious, we think, that if the mitigating facts
objected to cannot be proved under the general issue, they
cannot be proved at all ; and a defendant, in such case, must
be deprived of his essential rights without relief. As they
do not constitute a full defence or justification, they canThey cannot be
not be pleaded specially as a defence.
pleaded in mitigation of damages; for facts affecting the
damages merely, and not constituting a defence, can never
be specially pleaded. It is intimated, in some of the cases
relied upon by the plaintiff, that if the defendant would
avail himself of such mitigating circumstances as tend to
prove the truth of the charge, he must plead the truth
in justification, and then, though he fails of establishing
it as a defence, he may have the benefit of these facts in
But a defendant ought not to be compelled to
mitigation.
in order to avail himself of a truth. Such
falsehood
a
plead
is not the morality of our law. And it should be remembered, also, that it is said in some cases, that if the defendant fail to support his plea of justification, he shall be punished by aggravated damages, even if he has honestly made
the attempt.
We are not satisfied that a defendant should be deprived
of the benefit of mitigating circumstances, for no better reason than that they conduce to prove the truth of the charge,
while they fall short of it. We see no sufficient cause why
he should not be permitted to prove such facts as weU as
any other, showing innocency of motive, and which can only

.
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Our convictions on this

B?ibject are sustained by the cases in this court, and in the
English courts before cited, as well as by several in our

sister States, and in which the distinction aforesaid has
not been recognized, but the general principle has been permitted to prevail. 3 Stephens' N. P. 2579; 2 Starkie on
Slander, 95, in notis; Williams et ux. v. Mayer et ux., 1
Binn. 92, in notis. Middleton et ux. v. Calloway, 2 A. K.
MarshaU's E. 372; Buford v. McLimy, 1 Nott & McCord,
268; Beehler v. Steever, 2 Wharton, 313; Wilson v. Apple,
3 Ham. 270 ; Begden v. Wolcott, 6 Gill & Johns. 413 ; Henson V. Veach, 1 Blackford, 369.
Suppose one is sued in slander, for saying of a mercantile house in the city of New York, that it had failed and
become bankrupt; is it not necessary, to the ends of justice,
that the defendant in such an action be permitted to prove
that the plaintiff's bills had been returned protested, and
were not redeemed — that his doors were closed, and his
business suspended — in the honest belief of which he had
spoken the words, although the affair had turned out to
And
be a mere temporary suspension, and not a failure?
yet all these facts upon which the defendant's bona fide
opinion was founded conduced to prove the truth of the
words spoken.
That courts of the highest respectability and authority
in this country have thought differently from us on tjiis
We feel the weight of their opinions,
subject we know.
while we remain unconvinced by their reasons. These reasons are given by Paekeb, C. J., in the case of Bodwell v.
Swan, 3 Pick. 376, and by the Supreme Court of the State
of New York, in Boot v. King, 7 Cowen, 629. Mapes v.
Weeks, 4 Wend. 659 ; Oilman v. Lowell, 8 Wend. 573 ; Purple V. Eorton, 13 Wend. 9. These reasons are, first, that
such evidence would answer all the purposes of the defendant, without exposing him to the just consequences of attempting to justify, and failing in the attempt; and secondly, that the notice to the plaintiff of what is intended to
be proved would be withholden. Neither of these reasons,
we think, has any force when applied to a case like the
present, in which the truth of the words spoken was not atThe reasons fipply
tempted to be proved for any purpose.
only to cases where the object is, or where the effect would
be, to avoid a justification upon the record, while the same
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to the first reason assigned.
This is predicated, we suppose, upon a principle sometimes advanced in
actions for defamation of character, and which we do not
intend now to deny; that if a defendant pleads the truth
of the words specially in his defence, and fails to prove
this
an aggravation of his offence, which calls for aggravated damages against him. We shall not discuss the
propriety of this doctrine but we may say,
be defenwe
not
sible, that
do
consider
of such an essential character as to justify us in sacrificing more important principles for its protection. Nor do we think the second reason
It
assigned, sufficient to justify the doctrine advanced.
the evidence offered by the defendant may be
is, that
admitted under the general issue, the plaintiff would not
have notice of what the defendant intended to prove.
Now,
certainly would be very desirable,
in aU cases, litigant parties should be timely advised of the course intended to be pursued by their adversaries.
And many of
the rules of pleading and practice were established to promote this purpose. But, where the question
one of damnot known that any
ages merely, and not of defence,
principle of the common law has hitherto required any
such notice.
Nor do we see any good reason for distinguishing the privileges of plaintiffs in actions of slander,
from the rights of parties in. other actions, in this particular. If there be any inconveniences peculiar to this action in this respect, the most appropriate remedy will be
found in some rule of court adapted to the case.
Another reason has been suggested, in some of the books,
which is, that
might be difficult to draw the line, and
restrain the evidence of facts tending to throw suspicion on
the plaintiff, within such limits that
should not produce
actual conviction in the minds of the jury. We cannot anticipate such a difficulty as of frequent, or hardly as of possible occurrence, in a case like this, where there
neither
plea nor notice of justification. It would be presuming too
much upon the credulity of
jury, to suppose they would
believe a fact to be either proved or true, which the defendant did not claim to be true, and which, by the record,
he has disclaimed the right of proving.
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is not our purpose to review the cases relied upon by
the plaintiff, to sustain his objection to the testimony offered: we only say, that the prominent reasons for the
opinions advanced, are not such as to induce us now, for
the first time, to incorporate into our law the principle for
which the plaintiff here contends. And we think that the
facts offered to be proved by the deposition of Mrs. Dow,
should have been admitted, to affect the question of damages in the case, although they had a tendency to prove
the truth of the charge.
And for this reason alone, we advise a new trial.

Sbotiok 6.

Defenses Arising Apteb Aotion Commenobd.

THE PEMIGEWASSET BANK

v.

BEACKETT.

Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire.
4

1829.

New Hampshire, 537.

Assumpsit upon a promissory note. The cause was tried
here at November term, 1828, upon the general issue, when
it was admitted, that the defendant made the note. It was
then shown in evidence, on his part, that a suit was commenced by the plaintiffs against one James Batchelder, on
the said note, the same having been made by said Batchelder as principal, and by the defendant and S. A. Pearson,
as sureties, and that judgment was rendered in the said
suit in favour of the plaintiffs in the court of common pleas
for this county, in. February, 1827, for $180.51, being the
amount then due upon the note; that an execution issued
on said judgment, was delivered to a deputy sheriff in
April, 1827, who, on the 28th September, in the same year,
received of this defendant the amount of the debt in said
execution, and returned the same, satisfied, as to the debt,
and not satisfied as to the costs, and afterwards paid over
to the cashier of the bank the sum received as aforesaid.
This suit was commenced on the 28th May, 1827.
Upon this evidence, a verdict was taken by consent for
the plaintiffs, for the sum of $5.40, being the interest on
the note from the time judgment was rendered against
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Batchelder, till the time when the money received by the
deputy sheriff was paid to the cashier, subject to the opinion of the court upon the aforegoing case.
Richardson, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court
The question is, whether, upon the pleadings in this case,
the matter offered in evidence by the defendant is a legal
answer to the action.
The manner in which a defendant is to avail himself of
any matter of defence, which he may have, depends in some
measure upon the time, when such matter of defence arises ;
whether before or after the commencement of the suit ; and
there are different forms of pleading founded upon this
circumstance. The law makes this distinction on account of
the costs of the suit. It would be unjust, that a plaintiff
who had rightfully commenced a suit for a just cause be
barred by matter arising after the commencement of the
action, and subjected to pay all the costs from the beginning. To prevent this injustice, the law compels a defendant to plead matter arising after the commencement of the
action in a particular manner, that the court may be enabled to settle the question of costs on just principles.
Where a defendant has a good defence to an action, at
its commencement, he may, in general, avail himself of it
upon the general issue, and when he cannot thus avail himhe can plead
self of
in bar, and, in either case,
he
prevail in the suit, he
entitled to costs.
When any matter of defence arises after the commencement of the action, and before plea pleaded,
may be
pleaded in bar of the further maintenance of the suit. If
the plaintiff confesses the plea, the action stops, and the
allowed no costs.
defendant
the plaintiff elects to
proceed and ultimately fails in the suit, the defendant
entitled to his costs arising after the plea was put into the
B. C. 117, Lyttleton v. Cross. We have decided,
cause.
that
general release given after the commencement of
the action forms an exception to this rule, and may be
pleaded in bar of the action generally.
The reason of
this
that when
general release
given, the costs of
the suit, up to the time of the release, are presumed to have
been adjusted, and cannot be made the subject of any contest in the cause. There is, therefore, no reason why the release should not be pleaded as
general bar.
N. H. Rep.
96, Kimball v. Wilson. But in such
case, the release must
&

is

a

3

a

a

is,

a
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be pleaded

according to the fact as given after tlie commencement of the action, otherwise it cannot be admitted

in

evidence.'^

When any matter of defence arises after plea pleaded,
it must be pleaded puis darrein contimumce; and such plea
is a waiver of all the former pleadings.
Such being the nature and objects of pleas in bar of the
further maintenance of actions, we should suppose, from
the nature of the thing, that the matter of such pleas could
not be given in evidence under the general issue as an
answer to the action. The general issue, as well as pleas
in bar, goes to the commencement of the action. 1 Tidd's
Practice, 592; 1 Chitty's PI. 472.
It seems to have been held in Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr.
1345, that matter arising after the commencement of the
action might be given in evidence on the general issue. And
in Sulivan v. Montague, Douglas, 110, it was said, that
actio non went to the time of ptea pleaded. But it is now
settled, in England, that matter of defence arising after the
commencement of the action, cannot be pleaded in bar generally, but must be pleaded in bar of the further mainte*
*
*
nance of the suit.
When matter is pleaded puis darrein contimumce, it is
Why is this, if such mata waiver of all former pleadings.
In Austin v. Hall,
issue?
ter is evidence upon the general
13 Johns. 286, a release obtained after the commencement
of the action was pleaded in bar of the action with the general issue. But no question appears to have been raised
upon the form of pleading.
It seems to us, that, from the nature of the case, matter
arising after the action brought cannot be given in evidence
upon the general issue, as an answer to the action, because
it cannot be, in its nature, an answer to the action generally, but only to the further maintenance of the action.
If such matter of defence can be so used, it must, from
the nature of the thing, be a good general bar, when specially pleaded; and the rules which have been established
31.
Other cases hold that such a release must be pleaded
tinuance:— Jewett V. Jewett (1870) 58 Me. 234; Field v.
81 Me, 36; Eyan v. Bait. & Ohio R. E. Co. (1895) 60 HI.
120 Ga. 1068; Smithwick v.
V. Georgia Land Co. (1904)
Jones L. (S. C.) 64.

piiis darein

con-

Cappers (1888)
App. 612; Cook
Ward (1859) 7
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with respect to pleas in bar, of the further maintenance of
actions are idle and useless. Indeed, they are worse than
useless with respect to the defendant, because they deprive
him of his costs, in cases where, by using the general issue,
he would be entitled to them.
he use the matter as a
defence upon the general issue, and prevail in the suit, he
will be entitled to his costs from the beginning. If he plead
it in bar of the further maintenance of the suit and prevail, he will be entitled at most to costs from the time of
filing his plea.
It will be convenient in practice to hold defendants to
It wiU give the plaiatiif an
plead such matter specially.
to
whether
he
will proceed in the action,
opportunity
elect
and the question of costs may be settled by the record. We
see no reason why partial payments might not be permitted
to be given in evidence upon the general issue to reduee the
damages,^^ but we are clearly of opinion, that payment cannot be so given in evidence as an answer to the entire ac
tion, and that, in this case, there must be
Judgment on the verdict.

If

32.
Costar v. Davies (1847) 8 Ark. 213, certain evidence "being confined exclusively to a matter that arose after the commencement of the suit,
was admissible alone under the general issue, for the purpose of mitigating
the damages, and could not possibly operate as a bar to the whole action."
Accord: — Moore v. McNairy (1827) 1 Dev. L. (N. C.) 319; Williams v.
Tappan (1851) 23 N. H. 385; J07 v. Hull (1832) 4
455 (partial payments made pending the suit).

Vt

LEE

V.

DOZIER.

High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi.
40

Ellett, J.,

1866.

Mississippi, 477.

delivered the opinion of the court.
The declaration in this case is upon a promissory note.
The defendant pleaded the general issue, and at a subsequent term filed two special pleas, as pleas puis dernier
continuance. The first of these avers that the note sued
on was given in payment of land in Louisiana, and that
prior to the making of the note, the plaintiff had executed
a title bond, a copy of which is filed and prayed to be made
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part of the plea, which instrument the defendant, a nonresident of the State of Louisiana, and ignorant of its laws,
understood and supposed to be properly drawn and executed, in accordance with the laws of said State ; that after
the last continuance of this cause, he ascertained that said
instrument was not executed or drawn in accordance with
the peculiar laws of said State, in that it was not signed
by both parties, nor registered as required by said laws, and
is therefore void, and that consequently the consideration
of said note had failed.
a

The plaintiff demurred to both pleas, and the demurrer
was sustained; whereupon a jury was impanelled to try
the issue, and a verdict and judgment were given for the
plaintiff.

it,

Both these special pleas were bad. The first contained
no matter that could be pleaded puis dernier continucmce.
The office of such a plea is to set up a matter of defense
arising after the last continuance, not one which, existing
before, has just come to the knowledge of the party. The
facts pleaded in tliis case were covenant with the execution of the agreement, and were necessarily within the
But he alleges that he had
knowledge of the defendant.
only, since the last continuance, ascertained the law of
Louisiana on the subject. That, however, does not alter
the case. The matters relied on, that is, the want of his
own signature to the contract, and the failure to register
are not facts that occurred after the last continuance,
and therefore cannot be so pleaded.

4

of

Supreme Court

HAMILTON.

v.

Sergeant

Pennsylvania.

&

WILSON

1818.

Rawle, 238.

Jane Hamilton, the defendant in error, brought an action

of assumpsit in the common pleas of Lancaster county
against John Wilson, executor of John Wilson, deceased,
to recover her share of the residue of the testator's es-
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tate undisposed of by his will. The defendant pleaded non
assumpsit and payment, on which issue was joLued, and
the cause came on to be tried at August term, 1817. After
the jury had been sworn and the evidence given, the defendsmt moved for leave to plead, that since the bringing of
the suit, the plaintiff had intermarried with one Joel Baker,
who was still in full life. The court thinking themselves
bound by the Act of Assembly of 21st March, 1806, admitted the plea. The plaintiff, however, did not reply, and
the cause was tried on its merits ; the court instructing the
jury to regard the plea of coverture as a nullity, and not
to suffer it to have any effect on their decision. The verdict was for the plaintiff, and the cause being removed to
this court by writ of error, the charge of the court below on
the point above stated, as well as on two others which
It
were afterwards abandoned, was assigned for error.
was also contended, that there was error in there being no
•
•
*
issue joined on the plea of coverture.
Gibson, J. : It is very certain a plea puis darrien continuance waives all former pleas; that the defendant must
stand or fall by it; and that if put in issue it forms the
only subject of inquiry before the jury. It admits the original merits to be with the plaintiff, and rests the defence on
something that has occurred, or some act that has been done
by the defendant since the last continuance of the cause.
If it be well pleaded, issue must be taken on or there wUl
be a mistrial;
be bad on its face, the plaintiff must
demur; but
good, in point of form, though pleaded out
of due time, the proper course
to move to have
set
aside. Coverture after suit brought,
a plea in abatement, which never can be pleaded after a plea in bar, unless the matter has arisen since the plea in bar, in which
be done the first opportunity that
case
may, provided
presented; for the plea in bar waives only matters in
abatement then existing. But the defendant must not suffer
continuance to intervene between the happening and
the rule as to all
pleading of this new matter; and this
matters arising after issue joined, whether going to the
merits or disclosing a personal disability to maintain the
suit. But for extrinsic reasons the court may exercise
discretion in receiving such
plea, even after
continuance. Here the plea was neither good in point of form nor
pleaded in due time. The marriage
not stated to have
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taken place since the last continuance, whicli is an iadispensable averment in every plea of this sort. If a continuance
had, in fact, intervened, before it came to the knowledge
of the defendant, it would still have been necessary to plead
it in this way, but the court to preserve consistency would
have permitted him to enter the plea nunc pro time, an
aflSdavit of the truth of the plea, and the extrinsic matter
first being made. Without an allegation of the matter having arisen since the last continuance, there can be no such
thing as a plea pids darrien continuance; its name imports its nature. It is the only plea that can be put in
after a plea in bar; and must be drawn with great certainty. The plea offered was not such, although so intended: it was an ordinary plea in abatement offered at a
time when no such a plea could be received, and when the
fact it went to controvert had been conclusively admitted
by the previous pleadings in the cause. Nor does the Act
of Assembly relied on, help the defendant's case. That
act merely permits an amendment to be made, or a plea
This the liberality
to be added after the jury are sworn.
of the courts had never refused, at any previous stage of
The act permits nothing to be done durthe proceedings.
ing the trial, that might not have been done before it commenced. This plea could not have been received before the
jury were sworn, and was therefore not within the act.
•
•
•
The plaintiff was not boimd to reply, and did not
reply; consequently the court did not err in instructing the
jury, that the matter contained in this plea formed no part
of their inquiry. We are of opinion, the cause was properly tried on the pleas of non assv/mpsit and payment, and
that the judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

SADLEB

V.

FISHEE'S ADMINISTRATORS.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
3

1841.

Alabama, 200.

[Plaintiff brought an action of assumpsit, to which

de-

fendant pleaded seven pleas, the fifth being designated
"Payment, puis darrein contiimance." Plaintiff moved to
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strike out all of the pleas except the fifth, on the ground
that the rest were waived by this plea.] '*
CoLUEE, C. J. : A plea of matter, arising since the last
continuance, as it is technically called, is a waiver of, and
substitute for, all former pleas. 6 Dane 's Ab. 31 ; Stephen
on Plead. 65 ; Kimba v. Huntington, 10 Wend. Eep. 675 ;
Yeaton v. Linn, 5 Peters' Eep. 224; Wilson v. Hamilton,
4 Serg't & Eawle's Eep. 238. But there is a distinction as
to a ground of defence, which has arisen after issue joined,
and as to matter arising, pending the suit, but before plea.
In the former ease, the defendant must plead pms darrein
continuance ; in the latter, he should show that his defence
arose, pending the writ, and insist that the plaintiff should
not further have or maintain his action, etc. 6 Dane's Ab.
32; Yeaton v. Linn, 5 Peter's Eep. 224; Gov ell v. Weston,
20 Johns. Eep. 418,
In the case at bar, the defendant designated his plea, a
plea of payment puis darrein continuance: we say designated, for it is not drawn out at length; but we know that
such was not its character, because there was no issue joined
or plea filed when it was pleaded. We may then consider
it as an original plea, and pleadable with other pleas in
bar, under our statute, which allows a defendant to plead
more pleas than one.
In Covell V. Weston, 20 Johns. Eep. 414, the defendant
pleaded, non assumpsit, and a special plea against the further maintenance of the action, of matter arising after suit
brought; no objection was made to the joining of the pleas,
and the latter plea was held good on demurrer.
33.

Condensed statement of facts by the editor.

CITY OF CHICAGO

v.

BABCOCK.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
143

Illinois,

1892.

358.

[One Guiseppe Le Cardi owned a building at No. 33 West
Adams street, in the city of Chicago.
There was a trapdoor in the sidewalk next to the building, covering a stair-
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way leading into the basement, and while this trapdoor was
negligently left open plaintiff stepped into the opening and
was hurt.] '*
Baker, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

It

appears from the evidence that appellee brought two
suits to recover damages for the injuries that she had received — one, the suit at bar, against the appellant city, and
the other a suit against Guiseppe LeCardi, owner of the
building and premises connected with which were the opening and trapdoor above mentioned, and Ellen Gaynor, tenant of the entire buUding; that afterwards LeCardi paid to
the attorneys of appellee the sum of $150, and that the
larger portion of this was applied, by said attorneys, in
paying the costs of the last mentioned suit and other expenses and charges, and some $30 or $40 handed to and
received by appellee, and that at the time of the payment of
the $150 a writing was executed and delivered to tiie agent
of LeCardi, which read as follows:

"State of lUinois,
County of Cook.

" It is

)
]

hereby agreed that no action shall be begun against
Joseph LeCardi, by reason of any matters existing at this
Given for good consideration,
date, by the undersigned.
Emma Babcock,
by Pease & Williams,

Attorneys for Plaintiff.

"Chicago, March 11, 1889."

It further

appears that afterwards an order was entered
in the suit of Babcock v. LeCardi and Gaynor, showing that
on motion of the plaintiff, by her attorney, the suit was dismissed out of court at the costs of the plaintiff.
It is urged by appellant that the dealings of appellee
and her attorneys with LeCardi, one of the joint tort-feasors amounted to an accord and satisfaction, and were not
only a bar to an action against LeCardi, but also, by operation of law, worked a release of the city from all liability. It appears from the evidence that the transactions
with LeCardi and the payment of the $150 were after this
suit was brought and after plea and issue joined thereon,
34.

Condensed

statement

of facts by the editor.
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and a claim is therefore made by appellee, that since appellant did not file a proper plea puis darrein continuance
it cannot avail itself of the alleged settlement. It is undoubtedly the general rule of the common law that a matter of defense which arises after the commencement of the
suit and before plea must be pleaded to the further maintenance of the action, and that a matter of defense which
arises after suit brought and also after plea filed, and
either before replication or after issue joined, must be
pleaded puis darrein continuance. {Mount v. Scholes, 120
But we understand an action on the case to be
111. 394.)
an exception to this rule. In such an action the defendant
is permitted, under the general issue, to give in evidence
a release, a former recovery, a satisfaction, or any other
matter ex post facto which shows that the cause of action
has been discharged, or that in equity and conscience the
plaintiff ought not to recover. (2 Greenleaf on Evidence,
sec. 231.)
To this last stated rule, that is applicable to
actions on the case, there are, it is true, some exceptions,
such as the statute of limitations, justification in an action
of slander by alleging the truth of the words, and the retaking, on fresh pursuit, of a prisoner escaped, all of which
defenses must be specially pleaded. But, so far as we are
advised, it has never been held in an action on the case,
that a defense otherwise admissible under the general
issue was inadmissible in evidence for the reason it arose
after suit brought, and was not specially pleaded either to
the further maintenance of the action or puis darrein continuance. On the other hand, in Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr.
1345, which was an action upon the case, the matter of defense arose after the commencement of the suit, but before
it came on to be tried, and it was not pleaded; but the
defense was sustained by the Court of King's Bench, and
it was held, that as the plaintiff had already received ample
satisfaction for the injury done him, he could not afterwards proceed against any other person for a further satAnd Lord Mansfield there said: "In such an
isfaction.
action as this is (an action of equity, not a formed action
stricti juris), it is enough if it appears, upon the evidence,
that the plaintiff ought not in conscience to recover."
But even if the rule be such as we have indicated, yet it
•
•
•
does not affect the result of this litigation.
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The pending snit against LeCardi was dismissed,
that no action should
be begun against LeCardi by appellee.
This, on its face,
was simply an agreement or covenant not to sue. The legal
affect of such a covenant is not the same as that of a release. A covenant not to sue a sole tort-feasor is, to avoid
sircuity of action, considered in law a discharge, and a bar
to an action against such tort-feasor. But the rule is otherwise where there are two or more tort-feasors, and the
covenant is with one of them not to sue him.
In such
case the covenant does not operate as a release of either
the covenantee or the other tort-feasors, but the former
must resort to his suit for breach of the covenant, and the
latter cannot invoke the covenant as a bar to the action
against them.
and a ■written agreement was signed

Judgment affirmed.

Sbction

7.

Commencement

CASEY

V.

and Conclusion of PliEas.

CLEVELAND.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
7

Porter,

1838.

445.

Oemond, J.: To an action on the case on a promissory
note, the plaintiff in this court, filed a plea in the follow-

ing words

:

"Micajah B. Casey,
V.

"Cleveland

& Stubblefield,

use, etc.

"Comes the defendant, Micajah B. Casey, in his proper
person, and says that the said Joseph Cleveland and William Stubblefield, who sue to the use, etc., ought not to
have and maintain their aforesaid action against him, in
manner and form, etc. For this, that he says, at the time
of the issuance of the said writ, he was and ever since that
time hath been, and yet is a permanent citizen and freeholder of Coosa county, and not subject to be sued in Talladega county; wherefore, he prays judgment," etc., all
of which he is ready to verify.
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To this plea, there was
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a demurrer.

and rendered judgment for the plaintiff helow. From this judgment, a writ
of error is prosecuted to this court.
The subject-matter of this plea would certainly have
been sufficient to abate the action, if it had been well pleaded.
But according to the well-established rules of pleading, it
is not a good plea in abatement. A plea which begins in
bar, though it may contain matter in abatement, and conclude properly, will be considered a plea in bar, and final
judgment be given on it. (2 Saunders' E. 209, note 1;
Littell's Select Cases, 269.)
That is precisely the predicament of this plea. It does
not, at the commencement, seek to postpone the action, or
give a better writ, but denies the right of the plaintiff to
maintain his action. This stamps its character as a plea
in bar ; and though it afterwards proceeds to set out matter
in abatement, it must, by the rules of law, be treated as a
plea in bar. The reason of this strictness in regard to
pleas in abatement is obvious; it is against the policy of
the law to encourage defences which do not go to the merits
t>t the cause, but only serve to promote litigation.

The court sustained the demurrer,

Let the judgment
35.

See,

on

he

the importance of a proper eommeneement
Co. v. Commercial Nat. Bank (1887) 121

Pitts Sons' Mfg.

affirmed.''
and

conclusion.
given in

111. 582,

text infra, ch. VIII.
Stephen states as his eighth rule, under the head of rules which tend to
prevent obscurity and confusion in pleading, "Pleadings should have their
proper formal commencements and conclusions," and he gives the foDowing
forms :
Flea to the jurisdiction. No formal commencement. Conclusion — "he said
C D prays judgment of the court of our lord the king here will or ought
to have further cognizance of the plea aforesaid."
Plea in suspension. No formal commencement. Conclusion — "the said C D
prays that the parol may demur (or that the said plea may stay and be
respited) until the full age of him the said G D, [or, as the case may be]
the

etc."
Plea in abatement. No formal commencement. Conclusion — ^"praya judgment of the said writ and declaration, and that the same be quashed [or as

the case may be]."
Plea in har. Commencement — ' ' says that the said A B ought not to have
or maintain his aforesaid action against him, the said C D, l^cause, he says,
This formula is called actio non.
etc."
Conclusion — "prays judgment if the said A B ought to have or maitnais
his aforesaid action against him." Stephan on Pleading (Tyler's Ed.) 344.
and conclusion of a plea in estoppel see Webster v,
For commencement
State Hut. F. Ins. Co. (1906) 81 Vt. 75, given infra im the teit, ch. VII,
sec 2,
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CENTEAL LAND COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
12

529

1878,

West Virginia, 502.

Gkebn, President, delivered the opinion of the court.

The next assignment of error is, "that the plaintiff did
not file any replication to the petitioner's plea of payment,
which is an affirmative plea." It is not necessary in every
case to file a replication to every affirmative plea. Whether
a replication be, or be not necessary depends not upon
whether the plea be affirmative or negative, but upon
whether it concludes to the country or not. As a general rule,
an affirmative plea concludes with a verification, because it
generally brings forward new facts confessing those stated
in the declaration and avoiding them by pleading these new
facts ; but sometimes it is necessary in order that the pleading may be good, that the pleader should insert in his declaration, or plea, a negative allegation, which, because it is
negative, he is not bound upon the trial to prove, but the
burden of proving the opposite is upon his opponent. If
in any particular case, such a negative allegation is required to make a plea good, such plea should conclude
neither to the country nor with a verification ; but the replication to such plea though it allege affirmative matter

For though the facts stated
must conclude to the country.
in such replication are affirmative, still they are not new,
but are alleged simply in direct denial of the negative
allegation required to be stated in the plea. So if a necessary negative allegation is made in the declaration, the plea
alleging affirmative matter in direct denial of such necessary
allegation should, though an affirmative plea, conclude to
the country ; though on the trial of the issue the burden of
Thus in
proving it will be in such case on the defendant.
the case of Brodenham et al. v. Hill, 7 M. & "W. 274, the defendant in an action of assumpsit for work and labor,
pleaded non assumpsit within six years or the statute of
limitations omitting the verification, and it was held on
The court
a special demurrer, that this plea was good.
in rendering this decision, said that the plea of the statc. L. p. S4
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ute of limitations had by the general practice in modem
times been concluded with a verification, but the ancient
and better authoritiep showed that it was entirely unnecessary, and the good sense of the matter was that a party
ought not to be required to verify what it does not lie upon
him to prove. And in Wilkes v. Hopkins & Nichols, 6 M.
& G. 36, it was decided in an action of assumpsit on a
declaration based on the nonperformance of a promise to
pay a bill, a plea that the defendant duly paid the bill,
should conclude to the country and not with a verification.
It is obvious that on the trial of an issue on this plea, the
burden of proving payment would be on the defendant, for
an affirmative contract to pay money being proven, it is
incumbent on the defendant to prove payment. McGregory
V. Prescott, 5 Cush. 67; and Van Gieson v. Van Gieson, etc.,
12 Barb. 520.
Nevertheless it was unnecessary and improper to conclude this plea of payment with a verification,
for as the declaration had necessarily alleged nonpayment
of the bill, the plea which alleged the payment of the bill
was a simple traverse or denial of a necessary allegation
in the declaration, and should therefore have concluded
to the country.
And the court so held, and as an illustration of this principle, Tindal, C. J., in the progress of the
case says:
"So in an action for a breach of covenant to
repair, a plea that the defendant did repair is affirmative,
but it concludes to the country."
And the reporter in a
footnote adds, that a plea that the defendant did not break
his covenant concludes to the country.
It is true that, if an unnecessary allegation, whether it
be affirmative or negative is made in the declaration,
a
plea denying such unnecessary affirmative allegation, or
affirming facts in denial of such unnecessary negative alleNo unnecesgation, ought not to conclude to the country.
saiy allegation in a declaration whether allegation be posi,
tive or negative can be traversed.
Thus in Goodchild v. Pledge, 1 M. & W. 362, in an action
of debt for goods sold and delivered, the plea alleged that
when the debt became due he paid the same, concluding to
the country, and the court held upon a special demurrer,
that the plea should have concluded with a verification, because it was unnecessary to allege the nonpayment in an
action of debt, the allegation of nonpayment in an action
of debt being mere form and not traversable, while in an
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action of assumpsit such allegation is necessary. This distinction we mil presently see has not been sustained in
Virginia, but the allegation of nonpayment is regarded as
necessary both in assumpsit and debt Had they so held,
the plea of payment concluding to the country would have
beer held good in Goodchild v. Pledge. In the case of EnsaU
V. Smith, 1 C. M. & B. 522, to a declaration on promises to
pay on request, the defendant pleaded he has paid, concluding to the country; a special demurrer was sustained
by the court, who held that the plea should have concluded
with a verification. The case is distinguished from Wilhes
V. Hopkins <& Nichols, C. M. & G. 4; E. C. L. 36, in this that
the plea then was, that the defendant did duly pay the bill
when due, which the court held was direct denial of the
necessary allegation in the declaration, that the bill was not
paid when it fell due. In Ensall v. Smith, the plea was,
that the defendant has paid the debt, and as it was unnecessary for the declaration to allege more than, that the bill
was not paid when due, that the plea amounted to more than
the denial of a necessary allegation in the declaration and
brought forward new matter, the payment of the debt after
it became due, and therefore it should have concluded with
In Virginia as we shall presently see, it
a verification.
is held that an allegation, that a debt was not paid when
it became due, would be insufficient to sustain a declaration
either in assumpsit or debt, but on the other hand, in either
of these forms the declaration must allege nonpayment of
the debt generally, including its nonpayment at any time
after it fell due. Had this been recognized to be the English
law, the court in Ensall v. Smith, would have held that the
general plea of nonpayment ought to have concluded to the
country, as then it would have been a direct denial of a
•
•
•
necessary allegation in the declaration.
•
*
•
From what we have said it appears that the
proper conclusion of a plea of payment must logically depend upon what allegations of nonpayment, if any, were
necessary in the declaration. If a general allegation of
nonpayment covering not only nonpayment when the debt
became due, but also nonpayment since the debt became due
must be alleged in the declaration, a general plea of payment which expressly denies this general allegation of nonBut if
payment, must necessarily conclude to the country.
if
the
or
allemade,
be
no allegation of nonpayment need
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gallon of nonpayment in the declaration may properly be
confined to the time when the debt became payable, then
the general plea of payment should conclude with a verification, alleging as it would a new fact not necessarily nega-

A long train of Virginia decisions
tived in the declaration.
has settled beyoud controversy that in that State and in
this, in an action for the recovery of a debt, whether it be
assumpsit or debt, the plaintiff in his declaration must
not only allege the nonpayment of his debt, but this allegation of nonpayment must be general and not confined to
the time when it became due, and must therefore be extended to every person who had a right to receive the payment either at the time it fell due or at any subsequent
time. Thus if the suit be on a bond which has been assigned, the allegation must be, that the debt has not been
paid to the obligee nor to his assignee. Braxton's Adm'r
*
*
*
As an original quesV. Lipscomb, 2 Munf. 282.
tion the necessity of averring in every form of action in
the declaration the nonpayment of a debt either at the time
it feU due or at any time subsequently might well have
But these numerous decisions settle bebeen questioned.
yond a controversy that in Virginia and in this State, the
declaration, whatever be the form of the action, must allege
nonpayment of the debt generally; that is so as to include
not only when it fell due, but also subsequently.
And such
being the settled law here we must hold that the general
plea of payment denying this necessary general allegation,
of nonpayment in the declaration must in every case
whether the action be assumpsit, debt or covenant, conclude to the country.

CHAPTER VL
TRAVERSES.
Bbotion

Thb Common Tbavxbsb.'*

1.

STATE

V.

CAMPBELL.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
8

A

1849,

Blackford, 138.

plea cannot traverse what is not alleged in the decla-

ration.

In debt on bond conditioned for the performance of
dnties, etc., where breaches are not assigned in the declaration, the usual course is for the defendant to set out the
condition of the bond on oyer, and plead performance generally, and for the plaintiff to assign breaches in the replication.*^
36.
"Of traverses, there are various kinds. The most ordinary kind is
that which may be called a common traverse. It consists of a tender of issue;
that is, of a denial, accompanied by a formal offer of the point denied for
decision, and the denial that it makes is by way of express contradiction,
Of this kind examples have already
in terms of the allegation traversed.
Upon referring to these, it will be found
been given in the first chapter.
That, however, is not invariably
that they are all expressed in the negative.
for, if opposed to a precedent negative
the ease with a common traverse;
allegation, it will, of course, be in the afirmative, as in the following example
did not promise at any time within six
[plea alleging that defendant
years next before commencement of suit, and traverse in the reply that
defendant did promise within six years — Ed.]. Stephan on Pleading (Tyler's

Ed.)

167.

While it is of course the general rule
Converse not universally true.
material
allegation in the pleading of
on
any
be
taken
may
that a traverse
the opposite party, this is not true where the party making such allegation
is not obliged to prove it. Thus, actions of defamation the falsity of the
charge is a material allegation, but since it need not be proved (see Bottomly
V. Bottomly (1894) 80 Md. 159, given in the text supra, chap. IV, see. 3, (k),
it in issue, and'
(2)) it is the universal rule that a traverse does not put
be
must
pleaded.
which
specially
defense
affirmative
an
the truth is therefore
18 Conn. 464, given in the text supra, chap.
v.
Miner
Williams
(1847)
(See
V, sec. 5.)
37.

(533)
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GILBERT

V.

6

PARKER.

Court of Queen's Bench.
2

[Chap.

1704,

Salkeld, 629.

In replevin for taking cattle, the defendant made conusance, that A., his master, was seised of the locnis in quo,
Plainand per ejus praecept he took them damage feasant.
tiff replied, that he was seised of one-third part, and put
in his cattle absque hoc, that the said A. was sole seised.
To this the defendant demurred, and judgment was given
against him; for the defendant makes a conusance under
his master as sole seised, when he was only tenant in common; in which ease he should have pleaded according to
the truth, that he was only tenant in common, etc. When
the defendant pleads his master was seised in fee of the
place where, etc., that must necessarily be understood that
he is sole seised; and whatever is necessarily understood,
intended, and implied, is traversable as much as if it were
expressed; and therefore, though a seisin in fee is only
alleged generally, yet that being intended a sole seisin, the
plaintiff may traverse, absque hoc, that he is sole seised;
since the plaintiff makes himself tenant in common with
the defendant, it had not been enough to say, that he is
tenant in common, without traversing the sol© seisin.

MOWER

V.

BURDICK.

Circuit Court of the United States, Seventh Circuit.
4

McLean,

1845.

7.

This action is brought upon a sealed instrument, dated
the 9th of June, 1839, in which the defendant agreed to
indemnify the plaintiffs and save them harmless against
the payment of a certain promissory note, made and signed
by the plaintiffs jointly and severally, with one Samuel
Mower, then of Michigan City, Indiana, for the sum of
seventeen hundred dollars, payable in one year, for the

Sec. 1]

Traverses.

535

benefit and nse of the said Samuel Mower. And the plaintiffs aver, that on the 12th day of July, 1842, they paid the
'
said note. The second count in the declaration was substantially the same on another note.
The defendant pleaded that the said Samuel Mower did
himself take up and pay each of the said several promissory notes when they became due. • • •
This plea is bad. The plaintiffs aver that they paid
the notes after they became due; the plea alleges that
Mower paid them when they became due, which is not a
direct answer to the averment in the declaration.
This
may be a good argument to show that the plaintiffs could
not have paid the notes as they allege, but it is an argumentative denial of the fact stated in the declaration, which
should be traversed. Stephen PI. 385, 175-6-7, 181.^8

"An

apt issue is not formed without an affirmative and a negative."
Holt (1672) 1 Ventris, 213.
"When, in the course of pleading, they come to a point which is affirmed
on one side and denied on the other, they are then said to be at issue."
38.

Fortescue
3

BL

▼.

Com. 313.

"Issnie (exitiis) a single, certain, and material point, issuing out of the
allegations or pleas of the plaintiff and defendant, consisting regularly
upon an afSrmative and negative, to be tried by twelve men."
Coke on
Littleton, 126, a.

HARRIS

V.

FRASEE.

Court of Queen's Bench.
12

1854.

Upper Canada Queen's Bench, 402.

Case. — The first count of the declaration set out that
the plaintiff was possessed of a. sawmill and premises
in the township of Brantford, and enjoyed the benefit and
advantage of a certain stream or watercourse, which ought,
and, until the committing of the grievances by the defendant as hereinafter mentioned, did run and flow from a certain creek called the Whiteman's Creek, above the said mill,
to the said mill, and thence to the said ~\Vhiteman's Creek
below the said mill whereby the waterwheel of the said mill
was worked, without being flowed back or dammed back
upon the said mill, or the wheel or apron thereof; yet the
defendant, well knowing, etc., but contriving, etc., wrong-
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fully and injuriously erected a dam ia and across the said
creek below the plaintiff's said, mill, and wrongfully and

injuriously kept and continued the said dam so erected in
and across the said creek, for a long time, to wit from thence
hitherto, and thereby, during all the time aforesaid, wrongfully and injuriously obstructed and diverted the usual and
proper course and natural flow, of the water of the said
creek, whereby the water of the said creek ran and flowed
out of its usual course, and became and was dammed and
penned back upon the said mill of the plaintiff, and the
said wheel and apron thereof; and the plaintiff, by reason
of the said water being so dammed and penned back was
deprived of the use of his said mill.
The defendant pleaded * * * that one Michael Force,
for a long time before the said mill of the said plaintiff
was erected, and before the digging and making the trench
or mill race by the plaintiff as hereinafter mentioned, and
before the committing the alleged grievances above in this
plea mentioned, and before and at the time of making the
deed hereinafter next mentioned, to wit, on the 15tii of
March, 1848, was, and stUl is the owner and occupier of the
land, sides, and banks on each side of the said creek, and
through and over which the said creek then ran and flowed,
and still ought to run and flow, at the place where the said
stream or watercourse in the said first count mentioned
runs to and into the said creek, below the mill of the said

plaintiff; and then owned and occupied, and stUl owns and

occupies, the land on each side of the said creek, and over
which the same runs for a long distance above the said
last mentioned place, to wit, forty rods above; and also
then owned and occupied, and still owns and occupies, the
land from the said last mentioned place, on each side of
the said creek, and over which the said creek runs, to the
close and premises of the said defendant as hereinafter
mentioned; and that the said Michael Force, on the day
and year last aforesaid, by a deed under his hand and seal,
gave and granted unto Henry Cope and Greaves Robson,
who were then the occupiers of the close and premises of
the defendant hereinafter mentioned, and their assigns, the
easement, right, and privilege of obstructing the natural
flow of the water of the said creek, and of raising and
danmaing the same back in and upon his said close and land,
at all times when they should require so to do (maMng

Sec. 1]

Traveeses.

537

profert of the deed), of all whicli premises tlie said pMn-

tiff

*
*
*
then had notice,
that afterwards, and before
the committing of the said supposed grievances in the introductory part of this plea mentioned, to wit, on the said first
day of March, 1853, he, the said defendant, became and was
lawfully possessed of a certain gristmill and premises situate upon the said creek, just below and adjoining the said
land and close of the said Michael Force ; and that it then
became necessary, for the purpose of properly driving and
working the last mentioned mill, to build, and erect, and
maintain, and continue a dam upon and across the said
creek, whereby to raise the water and obtain a sufficient
head of water for the purpose aforesaid ; and that the said
defendant did then, for such purpose, with the consent of
the said Michael Force, erect, maintain and continue the
dam in, upon, and across the said stream, upon the premises so in the possession of the defendant as aforesaid
*
*
*
so that a small quantity of the water of the said
creek, raised and dammed back for the purpose aforesaid,
ran and flowed out of its usual course and channel, through
the said trench or raceway Ifeading from the said mill of
the plaintiff to the said creek, through the said close of the
said Michael Force, upon the said mill of the said plaintiff,
*
*
*
and the wheel and apron thereof.
Demurrer. — The causes assigned sufficiently appear in
the judgment.
EoBiNSON, C. J., delivered the judgment of the court.
We think this plea is bad, not exactly as amounting to
the general issue, because "not guilty" in an action of this
kind only puts in issue the doing the act complained of;
but as being an argumentative traverse of the plaintiff's
alleged right to have the water flow along the raceway unobstructed from his mill into the river lower down.

The declaration does not, in terms as precise as are generally used, aver the plaintiff's right to have the water flow
unobstructed down the raceway. It says only, that it ought
to have so run and flowed. But we may give such force to
that expression as is necessary for supporting the action,
and must take it to be intended as a positive assertion of a
right. It follows then, if it is sufficiently averred to answer
the plaintiff's purpose, that it may be traversed by the defendant for in truth it lies at the very foundation of the
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plaintiff's action. Then in this plea, instead of simply
traversing the alleged right to the uninterrupted flow of
water through the raceway, the defendant sets up certain
facts tending to show that the plaintiff could have no such
right, and does not conclude witii a special traverse of the
right.
The ohstruction complained of is the erecting of a dam
across Whiteman's Creek, below the plaintiff's mill and
thereby obstructing the flow of the water of the creek
whereby the water of the creek — ^that is, of Whiteman's
Creek — flowed out of its course, and was "dammed back
upon the mill of the plaintiff, and upon the wheel apron
thereof."
The plaintiff does not in express words tell us that the
water was backed up the race to his mill, but his declaration shows that it must have been so, if his miU wheel was
obstructed. All therefore depends upon the plaintiff's
right to have the water of the stream or raceway run from
his mill unobstructed into Whiteman's Creek, for if the
plaintiff had not a right to have the water run into the
creek by the raceway as freely as it was running when the
defendant put up his dam, then no wrong has been done
him.

The 'facts as they were pleaded, would, it appears to
us, constitute a defence if substantiated in evidence, and if

they had been well pleaded unless they could be repelled
by new matter shewn by the plaintiff; but nothing turns
upon this demurrer beyond the cost of the pleading, for
there was upon the record another plea, simply traversing
the plaintiff's right to the flow of water through the raceway. But the plaintiff, it seems, succeeded upon that issue
upon the trial. He has gone to the jury upon the same defence, which the defendant desired to set up in this plea.
Jvdgment for the plaintiff on demurrer.

SMITH

V.

THOMAa

Court of Common Pleas.
2

1835,

Bingham's New Cases, 372.

[Plaintiff brought an action of slander, alleging that he
was a draper and haberdasher, and that the defendant had
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Falsely stated to divers persons that plaintiff had been in
embarrassed financial drcumstances and was unfit to be
credited in the way of his said trade, by reason whereof
plaintiff was specially damaged through the refusal of
several persons, nominatim, to deal with him. Defendant,
Ln his third plea, denied the existence of the special damage alleged, and to this plea plaintiff demurred.] »«
TiNDAL, C. J.: The argument in this case has turned
principally on the special demurrer to the second plea.
For as to the third plea, which is pleaded, not to the action,
but to the special damage only, we held it to be insufficient
as the argument was proceeding before us. The allegation
of special damage in a declaration of slander is intended
only as notice to the defendant, in order to prevent his
being taken by surprise at the trial.
Where the words
are actionable in themselves, it is not the gist of the action,
but a consequence only of the right of action.
the plaintiff proves his special damage, he may recover it; if he
fails in proving
he may still resort to, and recover, his
general damages. A traverse, therefore, of such an allefinding upon
immaterial and improper, as
gation
either way will have no effect as to the right to the verdict.
Condensed

itatement of facts

bj

LAWSON

V.

9

Supreme Court

of

89.

it

a

is

it,

If

the editor.

STATE.

Arkansas.

1848.

Arkansas, 9.

if

1

is

it

is

is

a

a

Oldham, J.: The objections taken to the replications
total misconare frivolous, and can be sustained only by
misapplication of the plain rules of pleading.
ception and
contended for by the plaintiffs in error,
true, as
It
that every plea must answer the whole count, and every
replication must answer the whole plea; but, to do this,
not necessary that every material allegation in the opponent's pleading should be traversed. A party may traverse
such averCh. PI. 644. For
any material allegation.
ment be necessary to support the plaintiff's action, or the
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defendant's defence, the plea or replication denying it ia
an answer to the whole count or plea. In this case each
allegation denied by the replication is material and unless
sustained by proof, if denied, the defendants below would
not have been entitled to a verdict.
The circuit court did
not err in overruling the demurrer.
Affirmed.

BRIDGWATER

v.

BYTHWAY.

Court of Common Pleas.
3

1683.

Levins, 113.

Battery; defendant pleads
father against Elias Jones,
whereon the goods of Jones
that the plaintiff assaulted

obtained by his
and an execution thereupon,
were taken in execution, and
the bailiffs, and would have
rescued the goods ; whereupon in aid of the bailiffs, and by
their command, the defendant molliter manus imposuit
upon the plaintiff to prevent his rescue of the goods. The
plaintiff replied, de injuria su-a propria absque hoc that
the defendant by command of the bailiffs and in aid of them,
to prevent a rescue of the goods, etc.
Whereupon the defendant demurred generally, and upon argument it was
resolved by the whole court :
That the replication in traversing the command of the bailiffs was not good. For he
might
himself do that, to prevent the rescue, which,
tort and
breach of the peace.

a

a

is

of

1.'

a judgment

1

Court

of

SIR RALPH BOVT'S CASE.

In

King's Bench.

1672.

Ventris, 217.

a

debt upon an escape, the plaintiff sets forth in his
voluntary escape.
declaration
The defendant protesting that he did not let him voluntarily escape, pleads, that he took him upon fresh pursuii

Sec. 1]

Traverses,

541

it

it,

To which it was demurred, because he did not traverse the
voluntary escape; and resolved for the defendant: for it is
impertinent for the plaintiff to allege
and no ways neces^
sary to his action.
'Tis out of time to set
forth in the

is

2

2

;

a

it

declaration; but
should have come in the replication.
'Tis Hke leaping (as Hale, Chief Justice, said) before one
come to the stile as in debt upon
bond the plaintiff should
declare, that at the time of sealing and delivery of the bond
the defendant was of full age; and the defendant should
plead deins age, without traversing the plaintiff's allegation.
Whiting and Sir G. Reynell's case 657 in Cro. seems
to be against it; but Harvey and Sir G. Reynell's,
Car.
in Latch,
resolved, that no traverse is to be taken.

5

Court

of

LUSH

v.

EUSSELL.

Exchequer.

1850,

Exchequer, 203.

:

Parke, B. . In this case, which was tried before my
Brother Ckesswell, at Bristol, a rule nisi was granted on
the ground of misdirection, and cause shown at the late

a

;

sittings after term.
It was an action brought by the plaintiff, a servant, for
dismissing him during the period for which he was hired,
viz., four years and the plaintiff in his declaration alleged
that the defendant refused to permit the plaintiff to continue in his service during the term, and wrongfully dismissed him therefrom without any reasonable cause.
The defendant pleaded, that, after the making of the
agreement, and before the discharge and dismissal, the
plaintiff conducted himself in an improper and disobedient
jnanner, 'and disobeyed the defendant's lawful lorders;
without this, that the defendant wrongfully dismissed and
discharged the plaintiff without reasonable cause, and concluded to the country.
On the trial, the defendant having admitted the dismissal,
proposed to show that the plaintiff had misconducted himself so as to justify the discharge; but the learned judge
verdict for
refused to receive the evidence, and directed
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plaintiff, being of opinion that the plea put in issue the
dismissal only. "We are to decide whether that direction
was right, and we are of the opinion that it was not. The
question is not, whether the plea would have been bad on
demurrer, for putting in issue an immaterial allegation,
but how tiie issue raised was to be disposed of at the trial.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff might have omitted
the

that the defendant dismissed him "without
reasonable cause," and that the averment of his having
done so, was, in the declaration, immaterial and surplusage, and ought not to have been put in issue ; and that the
plea, in form at least, throws the burden of the proof of
the want of reasonable cause on the plaintiff, which the defendant, on proper pleadings, ought to have borne ; and on
these grounds, the plea is clearly demurrable; but, it not
having been demurred to, the matters which it does put in
issue, though immaterial in that stage, and improperly put
in issue, must be disposed of by the jury, under the direction of the judge. For example, if the plea were to put in
issue matter of aggravation unnecessarily stated, and only
that — as the conversion of goods in an action of trespass
for taking them, the death of cattle in the same form of
action for driving them — though the plea would be unquestionably bad, the verdict must be taken one way or the
other upon the issue on the trial. In like manner, it must,
if the plea put in issue that and another and material fact,
the only question being, whether it is put in issue. Now,
it is certain that if the form of the traverse is such that the
material may be separated from the immaterial averments,
the material need only be proved on the trial. Such is the
case where there is a plea which is a general denial only,
as not guilty in trespass, or case, where immaterial matter
or matter in aggravation was stated; such would be the
case in non assumpsit, under the old system, on such a
declaration as the present ; and such would have been the
case if the defendant had traversed the allegation of dismissal in the general form, "that he did not dismiss the
plaintiff, modo ac forma;" then the dismissal only, the
material part would have been in issue.
the allegation

*

But if the traverse, instead of being in a general form, puts in issue the immaterial part in express
terms, that must be disposed of by the jury, and, generally
•

•
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speaking, according to the terms of the issue. The objection to such a plea on demurrer is, that if issue were taken
on
would oblige the plaintiff to prove what but for the
form of the issue he need not have proved. This
the
general character of the objection that a traverse
too
large — see the case of Gorham v. Sweeting,
Wms. Saund.
207a, n. 24, 6th edit., where
very correctly said in the
note of the learned editor,
shall not be permitted to
defendant, by expressly traversing any allegation in the
declaration by
formal traverse, to compel the plaintiff
to prove more than he would be bound to do if the defendant
had pleaded the general issue only to the declaration."
Now, there cannot be any doubt that this form of
traverse does in express terms deny the want of reasonable
cause and therefore, that question must be disposed of by
the jury. Whether
throws the burden of proof on the
wrong party
immaterial in the present inquiry;
does,
an additional reason for demurring to it; but
nevertheless puts in issue the want of reasonable cause,
however informally.
We think, however, that on the trial
of the issue the onus prohandi would be on the defendant,
on the ground that he had the affirmative of the proposition to maintain, and that the defendant ought to justify
prima facie a breach of
the act of dismissal, which
covenant.
Upon reference to the authorities and cases cited on the
none that
at variance with the rule,
argument, there
be
in its terms,
the
traverse
does not
general
that
involve matter which need not have been pleaded, and that,
does, exspecial, denying the matter expressly,
J.),
on the
cept the case of Powell v. Bradbury (18 L.
judge
no
doubt
the
learned
proceeded.
of
which,
authority
an inducement which leaves
In the present case there
no doubt as to the intention of the pleader in the traverse;
which there was not in that; but we do not think we ought
to rely upon that distinction.
We cannot ascertain, from the short report of the case
of Powell V. Bradbury, in the Law Journal, whether the
question of what was in issue on such a traverse, on which
the opinion of the court appears to have been declared, was
material to the decision of the case, or extrajudicial; in
Com. Bench Eeports, p.
the report of the same case in
does disas
may,
Be
this
does.
201, just published,

is

is

is

it

it
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it
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tinctly appear that the opinion was founded on the
authority of the case of Frankit,m v. The Earl of Falmouth,
as the question
2 A. & E. 452, which we think inapplicable,
there arose on the issue on a plea of not guilty, and it was
rightly held, that although there was an averment in the
declaration, that the defendant wrongfully diverted a
watercourse, the wrongful nature of the act was not in issue.
It was not the case of an express traverse. Matter of
aggravation would not have been in issue on not guilty, and
So
yet, if expressly put in issue, it must have been proved.
being
unnecessary matter, as an averment of the defendant
of full age when he executed a bond, if the plea had stated
(admitting the execution of the bond) that he was not then
of full age, that question would have been in issue, and
equally so if the issue was such (whether informal or not,
in that respect, is of no consequence) as to put both facts,
the execution of the bond and the majority, in issue.
The case of Pahner v. Gooden, 8 M. & W., 890, which
was the other case cited for the plaintiff, does not decide
the question as to what should be proved on an issue involving immaterial matter of the description which this
does.
A satisfactory reason for that judgment is, that
a traverse is not bad which involves what is not merely
immaterial but impossible, and therefore incapable of being
proved at all, as a traverse of an entry on and an expulsion
from an incorporeal hereditament, viz., tolls. Lord Chief
Justice TiNDAL says, indeed, that an issue upon the substantial matter to be tried by the jury, is not bad merely
because it includes in it something of total surplusage and
immateriality. But that is not the case here; for the allegation of the want of reasonable cause need not have been
made by the plaintiff, and is surplusage in that sense ; yet,
being expressly, though informally, put in isue, it is not
totally immaterial, but the contrary.*"

In Eowcliffe t. Murray (1842) 1 Car. & Marshnu 513, where thq
40.
declaration in trespass alleged that the acts were done without reasonable
or probable cause, it was held that under the general issue it might be
shown only in mitigation of damages that there was reasonable and probable
cause.
Aecord.
BuseeU y. Shuster (1844) 8 W. ft S. (Pa.) SOS.
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GOEAM

V.

SWEETING.

Court of King's Bench.
2

545

1670.

Saimders, 205.

Assumpsit on a policy of assurance by Goram, plaintiff,
against Sweeting, defendant.
The plaintiff declares that
he had caused a policy of assurance to be written on the
good ship called the Margaret of London, and on the tackle
and apparel, etc., of the same ship, in which policy it was
contained, that if any misfortune should happen to the ship
in the voyage, it should be lawful for the plaintiff to sue
and labour for the defence and safety of the ship, without
any prejudice to the policy, and that the assurers, of whom
the defendant was one, would contribute to the charges
thereof according to the several sums respectively insured
by them. And the plaintiff further shows, that the defendant became an assurer on the said policy for 50i., and in
consideration of the plaintiff's promise to pay him at the
rate of Zl. 12s. per cent, for six months, undertook and promised to perform the said policy as to 50^. so insured by him.
And the plaintiff avers in fact, that the ship, etc., did not
arrive in safety, but "that the said ship, tackle, apparel,
ordnance, munition, artillery, boat and other furniture
were sunk and destroyed in the said voyage," of which the
plaintiff gave the defendant notice, and abandoned all his
interest therein, yet the said defendant has not borne the
adventure, nor paid the said 50^., wherefore the plaintiff
brings this action.
The defendant pleads in bar that the ship and all the apparel and tackle aforesaid arrived in good safety, and traverses without this, that "the said ship, tackle, apparel, ordnance, munition, artillery, boat and other furniture were
sunk and destroyed in the said voyage in manner and form
as, etc.," and this, etc., wherefore, etc., upon which plea

the plaintiff demurs in law.
And Jones for the plaintiff argued that the traverse in
the defendant's plea was bad, because the defendant has
traversed in the conjunctive, namely, without this that the
said ship and tackle, etc., were sunk and destroyed, whereas it ought to be in the disjunctive, namely, without this
c. L. p. 35
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is,

that the said ship or tackle, etc., were sunk and destroyed.
For, as he said, if in this case any of the things enumerated
arrive in safety, as, for instance, if the ship arrive in safety,
although all the goods and merchandizes, and all the apparel and tackle of the ship, for which by the policy a
satisfaction ought to be made to the plaintiff are lost, yet
if issue had been taken on the defendant's traverse as it
now
would be found against the plaintiff; and this action being only for damages according to the loss which the
plaintiff has sustained, every part ought to be put in issue.
For perhaps the ship arrived in safety, and yet the other
things, as guns and anchors, and all the goods and merchandizes are lost, which ought to be put in issue by themselves
so that the plaintiff may have
verdict for the loss of them,
and his damages assessed according to the proportion of
them, and the defendant may be acquitted of the residue.
But now unless the plaintiff prove that the ship and all
the other things are lost, he shall not recover for any part.
the defendant prove that only
cable or anchor
And
the
arrived in safety, he would be acquitted of the whole,
plaintiff had taken issue on this traverse. Wherefore he
concluded that the traverse was bad, and prayed judgment
for the plaintiff.
Coleman and Saunders for the defendant argued, that
»
•
the traverse was good. •
But notwithstanding this,
was adjudged for the plainTwysden
tiff, because, as
was only an action for
declared,
damages, and the defendant might aid himself on the writ
he had traversed in the disjunctive, and
of inquiry; and
issue had been joined upon
the defendant might give
in evidence any such matter in mitigation of damages.

V.

THE UNION INSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Court
32

of

TEOOP

New Brunstvick.

1893.

New Brunswick, 135.

TxJCK, J.: •
The declaration contains two counts. The first count alleges that one Willeby 0. Cobert, at the time of the issuing
*

•
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of the policy, was interested in and possessed of a vessel
called the "E. A. BeWitt;" that the plaintiffs caused Cobert's interest in the vessel to be insured by the defendants, loss to be paid to the plaintiffs, in consideration of
the premium paid to them by the plaintiffs; and that at
the time of the making of the policy, and from then until
and at the time of the loss, Cobert was interested in the
vessel to the amount of all the moneys insured thereon;
and that the insurance was for the benefit of Cobert; and
then avers that the vessel, while so insured, was wholly lost
by the perils insured against, and that all conditions were
fulfilled, etc., to entitle the plaintiffs to be paid. • • •
The second and seventeenth pleas to the first and second
respectively, are the same, and are as follows:
"And for a second plea to the said first count the said
defendant company says, that the said Willeby 0. Cobert
was not at the time of the making of the said policy of
insurance, and from thence until and at the time of the
loss in the said count mentioned, interested in the said
schooner or vessel, and premises to the amount of all the
moneys insured thereon."
The plea given in Bullen & Leake, 611, denying interest,
is, that the said plaintiff was not interested m. the said ship
But the defendant company is
and premises as alleged.
with
that form of plea, and makes
not
satisfied
apparently
its traverse larger by alleging that Cobert, at the time of
the making of the policy and at the time of the loss, was
not interested in the vessel to the amount of all the monI think this denial is too large, for
eys insured thereon.
Cohert may have been interested in part of the moneys insured, for which part, under the allegations in the first
The plea
count, he would have been entitled to recover.
should have alleged that Cobert was not interested in all
the moneys, nor in any part thereof.
counts,
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ALDIS

V.

MASON.

Court of Common Pleas.
11

[Chap, 6

1851.

Common Bench, 132.

[Action of covenant, the declaration alleging the making
of a certain indenture whereby the plaintiffs leased two
certain messuages to the defendant, and wherein the defendant covenanted to keep the said premises in repair at
his own expense during the entire terms of 21 years, and
And the breaches
18 years wanting ten days, respectively.
alleged were that the defendant did not keep the premises
in repair during the said terms but during all the said
terms suffered them to be and continue ruinous, prostrate, etc.] *^
Plea to the first breach, that the defendant did not, duriag the said term of twenty-one years by the said indenture
created, suffer or permit the said premises so demised for
the term last aforesaid, or any part thereof, to be or continue, nor were the same, for or during all the said time,
ruinous, prostrate, fallen down, etc., for want of needful or
proper reparations, etc., concluding to the country.
To the second breach, that the defendant did not during the said last-mentioned term of eighteen years, wanting ten days, by the said indenture created, suffer or permit the said premises so demised as last aforesaid, or any
part thereof, to be or continue, nor were the same, for or
during all the said time, ruinous, prostrate, etc., concluding to the country.
To each of these pleas, the plaintiffs demurred specially,
assigning for causes — that the traverse and denial contained in the said plea are too large, and are informal;
that the traverse and denial purport and attempt to put in
issue the length of time during which the premises were so
ruinous as in the breach alleged, and to compel the plaiatiffs to prove a breach of covenant extending over all the
time in the breach mentioned ; and that the plea ought to be
in the affirmative, and ought to follow the words and meaning of the covenant of the defendant in that behalf, and is
bad and objectionable on account of traversing and deny41.

Condensed statement of facts by the editor.

Sec. 1]

Travekses.

549

ing that tiie premises, or any part thereof, were ruinous,
prostrate, fallen down, foul, miry, choked up, in ^eat decay, or in bad or untenantable repair or condition, as therein purported or attempted to be done, etc. Joinder in demurrer.
WUles, in support of the demurrer. The pleas are bad,
for attempting to put in issue the length of time over which
the breaches alleged in the declaration extended. The defendant should have pleaded performance.
It is no plea,
to say that the premises were not out of repair during ail
the time alleged in the declaration; for, the plaintiff would
have a right of action, if the premises were permitted to
be out of repair during any part of the term.
The pleas
are calculated to perplex and embarrass the plaintiff.
Piggott, contra. The pleas are good. * * *
Jbevis, C. J. The court is of opinion that the pleas are
bad, for the reasons already stated.

AUBERY

V.

JAMES.

Court of King's Bench
1

1670.

Ventris, 70.

Assault, battery and wounding: the defendant insisted,
for that he being master of a ship, commanded the plaintiff to do some service in the ship, which he refusing to do,
he moderate casiigavit the plaintiff, prout ei bene licuit.
The plaintiff maintains his declaration absque hoc quod
moderate castigavit, and issue was taken thereupon.
After verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved in arrest
of judgment, that the issue was not well joined; for non
moderate castigavit doth not necessarily imply that he did
beat him at all, and so no direct traverse to the defendant's
justification, which immoderate castigavit would have been :
but, de injuria sua propria absque aliqua tali causa would
have been the most formal replication.
But the justices held, that it would serve as it was after
a verdict, tho' the statute at Oxford, 16 Car. 2, the last
and most aiding Act of Jeofails be expired, and that de
injuria sua propria, not adding absque aliqua tali causa,
hath been held good after a verdict.
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KIMBAIiL

V.

BOSTON, CONCORD

&

RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
55

[Chap.

6

MONTREAL
1882,

Vermont, 95.

[The plaintiff alleged in his decleiration that the defendant "received the plaintiff into one of its passenger cars
to be by it safely and securely transported and conveyed
over its said road for a certean hire and reward paid to
the defendant and in consideration of the plaintiff's sending large amounts of freight over the defendant's said
road, for which it received pay, ' ' etc. ; and that the plaintiff was injured though the negligence of the defendant.
The defendant pleaded the general issue and two special
pleas in bar. The second plea alleged that the plaintiff
was being carried over defendant's railroad without charge
and free of expense, and in consideration thereof plaintiff
agreed to assume all risk of accident and not to hold defendant liable for any injury to his person or his goods
while being so carried over said raUroad, concluding with
a verification.
The third plea alleged that the plaintiff
applied for and received from defendant a free ticket to
pass him over defendant's railroad, which ticket was in
words and figures as follows: "This tickfet will pass Mr. 0,
Kimball, Concord to Marshfield, without charge ; he, in consideration thereof, assuming all risk of accident, and agreeing that the corporation shall not be liable, under any circumstances, for any injury to his person, or loss or injury
to his goods, while using this ticket. Not good unless used
within three days from date.
"(Issued by B. L. & N. R. E.) B. F. Kendrick;" and
that plaintiff used this ticket at the time of the injury alleged, concluding with a verification.
Demurrer to the second and third pleas.] **
EowELL, J. : The second and third pleas are attempted
to be sustained on the ground tliat they are special issues.
Instead of pleading the general issue, the defendant may,
in some cases, effectually answer the declaration by a special issue, i. e., by directly denying some one material and
42.
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traversable allegation in the declaration, and concluding to
the country. Gould PI., c. 6, s. 60. But such a plea never
advances new matter, but merely denies some particular
material and traversable allegation, the denial of which
is, in effect, a denial of the entire right of action. Gould
PI., c. 2, s. 38. In England, such pleas were allowed as
matter of convenience for the sake of confining the evidence to one single point, so that if the jury on that point
gave a corrupt verdict, they might be more easily attainted
than they could have been on the general issue, where the
matter was more complicated. Issues of this sort were formerly not uncommon there; but they fell into disuse except in feig-ned issues, where they were, and perhaps now
are, uniformly adopted, the pleas in those cases always being drawn with express admissions of all the facts stated
in the declaration, except the particular fact that the issue
was intended to try. Lawes PI. (523). See forms of such
pleas in 2 Chit. PI. (239), and 1 Wentw. 120 to 140. Such
pleas are to the particular allegation that they deny what
the general issue is to the whole declaration.
And they
effectually deny the whole declaration; for when each of
several concurring facts is necessary to one entire cause
of action, the denial of any of them is a denial of the whole
cause of action.
But when the defence consists of matter of fact merely
in denial of such allegations in the declaration as the plaintiff would on the general issue be bound to prove in support of his case, a special plea in bar is bad as amounting
to the general issue. 1 Chit. PI. 527 ; Steph. PI. 418, Rule
II. Such is the character of these pleas. The declaration
alleges a consideration for carrying the plaintiff. On trial
on the general issue, the plaintiff would be bound to prove
this allegation as one of the essential elements of recovery,
for such has he made his case by the declaration. The pleas,
in an indirect way, deny this allegation by advancing new
matter, showing a contract contradictory to that stated iu
They
the declaration, and conclude with a verification.
have no semblance to special issues, either in form or subThey allege new matter, they contain no direct
stance.
Viewed as
denial, they do not conclude to the country.
traverses, they tend to unnecessary prolixity, and are an
argumentative denial and a departure from the prescribed
foi-m of pleading the general issue.
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There is a great distinction between the case of a plea
that amounts to the general issue and a plea that discloses
matter that may he given in evidence under the general
issue. In Carr v. HincMiff, 4 B. & C. 547, a defence was put
upon the record that, it was admitted, might have been
gone into under the general issue and yet the plea held good.
It is there said that there are instances in which a defendant
has the option of giving his defence in evidence under the
general issue or of putting it on the record. And those instances are said to be — 1st, where the right of action is
confessed and avoided by matter ex post facto, e. g., by a
plea of payment, accord and satisfaction, and the like; and
2d, where the plea does not deny the declaration, but answers it by matter of law, as, in Jussey v. Jacobs, 1 Ld.
Raym. 87, which was an action against the acceptor of a
biU of exchange, the defendant pleaded that it was given
for money lost at play, and therefore void under the 16
Car. 2, c. 7. See, also, Maggs v. Ames, 4 Bing. 470. In
Eayselden v. Staff, 5 A. & E. 153, a plea setting up a different contract from the one declared on, was held ill as
amounting to the general issue. In this case Lord Denman said, that "what, in correct language, may be said
to amount to the general issue is, that for some reason
specially stated, the contract does not exist in the form
ia which it is alleged ; and when that is the case, it is an
argumentative denial of the contract instead of being a
direct denial, and, which, according to the correct rules of
pleading, is not allowable. ' ' In Morgan v. Pebrer, 3 Bing.
N. C. 357, a plea setting up a contract incompatible with
the one declared upon was held ill as amounting to the
general issue. In Lyall v. Higgins, 4 Q. B. 528, a plea alleging a different consideration from that stated in the
declaration was held bad for the same reason. Patterson,
J., said, "It is now settled that the proper mode of traversing a consideration is by a plea of non assumpsit." In
Potter V. Stanley, 1 D. Chip. 243, a special plea in bar that
the note declared upon was given without consideration
was adjudged to amount to the general issue.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the pleas now before
us cannot be sustained in form. As to the proper manner
of taking advantage of a defect of this kind, we express no
opinion further than to say, that by joining in demurrer
the defendant waived whatever right it might otherwise

'
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have had to appeal to the discretion of the court, and the
question may be decided on demurrer. Gould PL, c. 6, s.
88.

Judgment affirmed cmd cause remanded, with leave to the
defendant to replead on the usual terms.

Thb Special Tbatbbss.

SxonoN 2.

STATE

V.

CHEISMAN.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
2

Pebkins,

1850,

Indiana, 126.

J.:

Debt upon an administrator's bond against
him and his sureties. The plaintiff is the State upon the
relation of Barrell and Hannah. The defendants are John
Chrisman, John H. Nelson, Simon Emmert, Samuel Miller,
David Bush, William D. Porter, Caleb Osborn and John
Porter. The date of the bond is alleged to be the 29th of
September, 1838. John Chrisman is the administrator, and
The condition
upon the estate of John Galvin, deceased.
of the bond is stated in the declaration; and, according to
that statement, is in the usual form of an administrator's
The declaration alleges that in April, 1840, Barbond.
rell and Hannah obtained a judgment against Chrisman, as
administrator, upon a debt due from Galvin, and that an
execution upon it was returned, no goods, etc., of the deceased Galvin 's estate. It then assigns four breaches of the
condition of the bond by Chrisman. The first is that he
had received a large amount of the effects of Galvin, with
which he should have paid such judgment, but that he had
wasted them, etc. The other breaches need not be stated.
The defendants pleaded separately, and filed, in the aggregate, fifty-one pleas. The case went off upon demurrer in
favor of the defendants ; and we shall find it necessary to
state but one of the pleas in determining upon the correct-

ness of the decision below.
The eighth plea of William D. Porter was as follows:
"The said defendant says actio nan, because he says that
the said John Chrisman, on the 29th of September, 1838,
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in the vacation of the Boone Probate Court, took out special letters of administration on the estate of one John Galvin, deceased; and the supposed writing obligatory in the
plaintiff's declaration set forth was the supposed bond of
the said John Chrisman, and the other defendants herein,
for the faithful discharge of his duties as such administrator; and the said Boone Probate Court, at its session next
ensuing the date of said bond, did not confirm the said
special letters of administration, nor continue said bond.
And the said defendant avers that from the 29th of September, 1838, until the end of the next session of the said
probate court thereafter ensuing, the said John Chrisman
was not guilty of any of the said supposed breaches of the
condition of said bond. Without this, that the said John
Chrisman was the administrator of the goods, chattels,
rights, etc., of the estate of the said John Galvin, deceased,
at any time after the end of the session of the Boone Probate Court next succeeding the said 29th of September,
1838; and this," etc.
To this plea the plaintiff replied, giving a minute history
of Chrisman 's vacation appointment, and averred "that
the said John Chrisman, under and by virtue of said appointment, took upon himself the burthen of said administration, and possessed himself of the goods, etc., of said
estate, and proceeded to make an inventory, etc., thereof
(the said John Porter assisting, etc.) ; and afterwards, and
before the term of the said probate court next ensuing his
said appointment, said Chrisman caused said inventory, etc.,
to be filed in the office of said clerk of said probate court;
and at the term of said court next ensuing said appointment of Chrisman, to wit, at the November term, 1838, said
court (whereof Samuel McLean continued to be judge, and
who, as such, in vacation, approved said Chrisman 's said
bond), made no order of record in relation to said appointment and said bond; nor did the said court, at said
November term, 1838, or at any other term, ever recall or
set aside the appointment of said Chrisman, or disapprove
of said bond, or appoint any other administrator of said
estate, or make any other appointment of said Chrisman,
as such administrator; nor was any other or different administration of said estate ever granted than said appointment of said Chrisman as aforesaid made; nor was any
other security ever given by or on behalf of said Chrisman
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it
a

it,

in the premises than the bond aforesaid; and said plaintiff,
further avers that, by virtue of said vacation appointment,
Chrisman continued to act as administrator for many years
after said November term, 1838, and made reports of his
doings as such to said probate court, which said court
received and acted upon, and further dealt with and treated
said Chrisman as administrator as aforesaid, under and
by virtue of his said vacation appointment, and after the
said November term, 1838; and while said Chrisman so
continued to act as such administrator, under his said appointment, he, the said Chrisman, committed the grievances,
etc., complained of, etc., which the plaintiff is ready," etc.
To this replication a demurrer was sustained, and final
judgment given for the defendants.
The replication was to several pleas, all similar to the
one we have set out; and what we shall say will apply to
all of said pleas.
The plea in question was drawn with an eye to the following provisions of the E. S. of 1838, p. 178, s. 18 :
"When any person shall die intestate in the vacation of
said court (probate court), and his or her estate is in such
condition as to require the immediate care of some person
of competent integrity and ability, it shall be lawful for
the clerk of such court, in the county in which, by the conditions of this act, administration shall be granted, to grant
some such person special letters of administration on the
estate of the said deceased, until the next ensuing session
"Provided, that such court, at its next
of said court."
ensuing session after the granting of such special letters
of administration, at its discretion, may confirm or revoke
the same; and if such court shall confirm the granting of
said letters, it may, at its discretion, either continue the
bond taken as aforesaid by said clerk, or require such administrator to renew said bond, conditioned as aforesaid;
and if such court shall revoke such letters, it shall proceed
to grant general letters of administration to such person
or persons as are or may be legally entitled to the same."
The plea is what is called a special traverse, and its inducement must be, in substance, a sufficient answer to the
declaration, though not a direct denial, nor yet a confesand the traverse with which
sion and avoidance of
concludes must go to a material point which will try the
merits of the cause. We think this substantially such
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The declaration goes upon a general appointment, as
administrator, and alleges breaches occurring nearly two
The plea, in its inyears subsequent to the appointment.
plea.

ducement, states the appointment to be a special one, made
by the clerk in vacation, to continue till the next term of
the court; that the appointment was not confirmed at that
Now,
term, and that no breach occurred prior thereto.
as the clerk had only power to make an appointment that
should continue till the next term of the court, and as
that made was not, according to the plea, confirmed at that
term, it would seem that Chrisman could not have been
administrator of said estate at the time the maladministration took place; and if not, his sureties could not be liable
for it. As to the traverse, it denies directly that Chrisman was administrator at the time of the commission of the
alleged breaches. The decision of that question would certainly determine the merits of the case. It has been objected that the special traverse was not the proper plea to
have been adopted on this occasion; that it should have
been a simple traverse of the fact that Chrisman was administrator at the time of the alleged breaches. Suppose
this to be true, as to which we give no opinion, stiU, as
the plea adopted contains that very traverse, the inducement can be regarded as nothing worse than surplusage,
which does not vitiate upon general demurrer, as upon
which we must decide upon this plea.
then, not seeing fit to demur to the plea
I The plaintiff,
specially, and it being good, as we have seen, upon general
demurrer, what course was left for him to pursue in regard to it? Stephens, in his work on Pleading, p. 189,
says: "As the inducement of a special traverse, when the
denial under the absque hoc is sufficient, can neither be
traversed nor confessed and avoided, it follows that there
is, in that case, no manner of pleading to the inducement.
The only way, therefore, of answering a good special travSee, also,T/ie Mayor of
erse, is to join issue upon it."
Oxford V. Richardson et al., 4 T. E. 437 ; and Benner v.
Elliott, 5 Blackf. 451. And this is but the general rule as
to all good traverses. There cannot be a traverse upon a
good traverse, and there cannot be a confession and avoidance of a good traverse. Issue must be taken on it. In this
case, suppose the defendant had simply traversed the fact
that Chrisman was administrator, could it have been possi-
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the plaintiff to have confessed the fact that he was
Qot administrator, and still avoided it so as to hold him
liable as being administrator?
It remains but to determine whether the replication in
this case does take issue on the plea. The plea is, that
Chrisman was not administrator at the time of the alleged
breaches. The replication should have simply and directly
joined issue upon it. It does not do this, but recites facts
and circumstances, going to show that Chrisman was administrator, but not such, we think, as, if true, would establish
•

*

*

"With respect to the verification,
Must conclude with a verification.
traverse, in view of another
conclusion
was adopted in a special
•
•
•
viz., that wherever new matter is introduced in a pleading
rule,
it is improper to tender issue, and the conclusion must consequently be with
ft Taiification."— Stephan on Pleading (Tyler's Ed.) 192.
43.

this

PIKE

V.

HUNTER.

Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. 1885,
4

Mackey, 531.

James, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a qui tarn action to recover the penalties provided
by the following sections of the Revised Statutes :
Sec. 2116. No purchase, grant, lease or other conveyance
of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian
nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law
or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention
entered into pursuant to the Constitution. Every person
who, not being employed under the authority of the United
States, attempts to negotiate such treaty or convention, directly or indirectly, or to treat with any such nation or
tribe of Indians for the title or purchase of any lands by
them held or claimed, is liable to a penalty of one thousand

dollars."

•

*

'

Sec. 2117. Every person who drives or otherwise conveys any stock of horses, mules or cattle, to range and feed
on any land belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe, with-
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out the consent of such tribe, is liable to a penalty of one
dollar for each animal of such stock.
Sec. 2118. Every person who makes a settlement on any
lands belonging, secured or granted by treaty with the
United States to any Indian tribe, or surveys or attempts
to survey such lands, or to designate any of the boundaries
by marking trees, or otherwise, is liable to a penalty of
one thousand dollars.
Authority to bring an action in this fc^rm is provided
by section 2124, as follows: "All penalties which shall accrue under this title shall be sued for and recovered in an
action in the nature of an action of debt in the name of the
United States, * * * the one half to the use of the informer, and the other half to the use of the United States."
The declaration alleges that these penalties have been
incurred by acts of the defendant relating to lands owned by
the Cherokees, and to lands held by the Cheyenne and
Arapahoe tribes. It contains four counts ; two of them under section 2116, and two under section 2118. The first is
for an alleged negotiation with the Cherokees; the second
for an alleged negotiation with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes; the third for an alleged settlement and marking of
boundaries on lands of the Cherokees, and the fourth for an
alleged settlement and marking of boundaries on lands of
the Cheyennes and Arapahoes.
The cause stands for trial on the pleas to the first and
To the
second counts, and these issues are not before us.
third and fourth counts, which allege a settlement and
marking of boundaries on lands of the Cherokees and of the
Cheyennes and Arapahoes respectively, the pleas interposed were, first, the general issue ; second, a special traverse that the defendant had entered upon and occupied the
lands in question for grazing purposes only, under a license
or lease from, the Indians, and ivithout this that he had
made any settlement,'** or surveyed or attempted to survey
or designate any boundaries on these lands. On the general
issue there was a joinder, and to the special traverse a
demurrer.
The latter was overruled in the circuit court,
and from this order the present appeal is talren. The only
question before us then is, whether the case stated affirma^

44.
There is an error in the wording of this sentence as given in the
The language in the report is "and
official report, which is here corrected.
that without this he had not made any settlement."
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tively in the special traverse, constitutes the unlawful act
charged in the declaration, for which a penalty is provided
by section 2118.
At the argument of the demurrer counsel for plaintifE
insisted that, consistently with the plea, it might still be
true that the defendant had surveyed and marked boundaries on these lands, and that plaintiff's allegation to that
effect— constituting, as he claimed, a distinct offence under
the statute — ^was therefore admitted by the plea. This objection ignores the character of the plea. The object of a
special traverse is to accompany the direct denial of plaiutiff's averment with an explanation of the ground on which
that denial is based. This explanation takes the form of an
affirmative statement of what the defendant had actually
done, and it is put forward as a disproof and defeat of the
plaintiff's alleged case. Stated in technical language, the
defendant may be understood to say: "What I actually did
was as follows, and this is not equivalent to the act which
plaintiff avers; therefore I wholly deny his averment." In
this way he presents separately a question of law, whether
the case stated by himself, which he offers to prove, is
equivalent to the case stated against him, or, on the contrary, disproves the latter and justifies a denial of it. In
the plea before us the defendant directly and fully denies
that he made any settlement, or surveyed or marked boundaries as alleged. But in his "inducement" he explains that
he so denies because he had simply occupied these lands for
grazing purposes only, and this under a lease or license
from the Indians.
There is no room, therefore, for the
such
a
criticism that
plea is consistent with his having surveyed and marked boundaries, and consequently admits the
allegation that he had done so. The only question raised
by the demurrer, then, is whether the case stated affirmatively by the defendant still amounts to the case stated in
the declaration, and subjects the defendant to the penalties
of the statute. This brings us to a consideration of the
meailing of the statute.
*
*
*
Section 2117 does not forbid, but permits, an
occupation of Indian lands, with the consent of the Indians,
to the extent of using them for grazing purposes only.
* * * A license or lease for grazing purposes only, that
is for a limited use, subordinate to the title of the Indians
and recognizing that title, involves none of the pretensions
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which section 2118 is intended to suppress. It does not in
any way involve dispossession of the Indians, nor contemWe are of opinion, therefore,
plate such dispossession.
that the case stated in the affirmative part of this plea sustains the direct denial with which the plea concludes. The
demurrer is consequently overruled, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

HUNT

v.

CHAMBEES.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
21

1845.

New Jersey Law, 620.

This was an action of replevin brought by Chambers
against Hunt to recover a sloop, etc. The defendant below
pleaded that the sloop was the property of the defendant,
and not of the plaintiff, and prayed a return. Eeplication
that the sloop, etc., at etc., was not the property of the
defendant but of the plaintiff, and issue to the country.
Cabpenteb, J. : * * *
•
•
*
On property pleaded, and issue thereon, on whom
* * *
does the onus of proof lie?
*

*

Upon the plea of property it is not sufficient to
allege property in the defendant; such allegation would be
but an argumentative denial of the plaintiff's allegation;
the plea must go further, and by an express traverse deny
that the goods are the property of the plaintiff.
The direct denial under the absque hoc is rendered necessary by this consideration: that the affirmative matter
taken alone would be only an indirect, or as it is called in
pleading, an argumentative denial of the precedent statement, and by a well-known rule, all argumentative pleading
In order, therefore, to avoid this fault of
is prohibited.
argumentativeness, the course adopted is, to follow up the
explanatory matter of the inducement, with a direct denial.
This plea, so selecting some
Steph. PI. 179 (Phil. 1845).
material allegation in the plaintiff's declaration, and after
a formal inducement, meeting that allegation by a formal
•
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denial, is called a special traverse. The inducement is an
indirect denial, the traverse is a formal denial.
Steph.
PI. 184-5. The inducement is not in the nature of a confession and avoidance, a point necessary to be adverted to
and understood, and of which a mistaken impression has,
in regard to this plea, led to error. This plea does not confess the allegation of property or the right of possession;
it does not confess any part of the allegation of the plaintiff and then avoid its effect by new affirmative matter ; but
it is simply an indirect denial, introductory to, and the
foundation of , the direct denial which immediately succeeds.
Steph. PI., 185-6.

This traverse by the defendant in his plea,

if

well taken,

is

a

is

a

a

is

it

is

if

7,

;

it,

a

it,

must be met. The inducement cannot be traversed. If the
first traverse be well taken and material, there can be no
traverse on a traverse, and upon satisfactory reason. "By
the first traverse, a matter is denied by one of the parties,
which had been alleged by the other, and which having once
the latter" (the plaintiff) "is hound to maintain
alleged
instead of prolonging the series of the pleading and retarding the issue, by resorting to a new issue."
Steph. PL
186-7. The meaning of this rule, says Judge Gould, is, that
when one party has tendered
material traverse, the other
cannot leave
and tender another traverse of his own on
but
must join in that first tendered otherthe same point,
wise the parties might alternatively tender traverses to
each other, in unlimited succession without coming to an
sec. 42. Without alluding
issue. Gould PI., p. 400, ch.
any, of which the present
to the exceptions to this rule,
sufficient to say that
traverse
not one,
instance
point material, for
can properly be tendered, only on
immaterial
cannot decide
what
reason
that
the obvious
the controversy. When the inducenient and the traverse, as
dein the present instance, go to the same point, to wit,
nial argumentatively and directly of the plaintiff's allegabut an inference from the inducement.
tion, the traverse

To the plea of property, therefore, by which the defendant, in a formal mode prescribed by the rules of pleading,
denies the property in the plaintiff, the plaintiff must reply
it

if

;

it

by reaffirming his own title, and tendering an issue to the
cannot be pleaded to, can
country. The inducement, as
be dethe
issue and
no
of
part
of consequence form
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nied, as has heen unnecessarily done in the present instance,
such denial is immaterial.
It is only necessary for the
plaintiff to reaffirm his own title, and such is the mode of
pleading adopted in some of the most authoritative precedents. Lilly's Entr. 357, 358, 512; 2 Rich. K. B. 455; and
other collections that might be cited. If the issue be joined
on the reaffirmance by the plaintiff of his allegation, it is
obvious that the issue is : property in the plaintiff or not.
The affirmative, therefore, is on the plaintiff, and such
appears to be the result not only on the reasons applicable
to this particular issue, but upon the principles which appertain to traverses in general. * * *

I

So are the subsequent authorities, and have been unable
after a diligent search, to find a well-considered case in
which under this plea and issue, the onurS of the proof was
thrown upon the defendant. * * *

**********

The results of these authorities and of this reasoning is,
that when issue is joined on a special traverse, the party
traversing, in general, is not bound at the trial to prove the
affirmative part or inducement, but is entitled (as in ordinary cases) to insist on the negative of the issue joined.
It was so held in a late case in the Common Pleas of Eng-

;

,

it

3

it

a

(i.

land, which has come under my observation since the preparation of this opinion. The declaration was for carelessly
impinging with a ship against the plaintiff's bridge, and
thereby doing damage. The plea was, that plaintiffs improperly narrowed the channel by an obstruction without
this
e., traversing), that the damage was occasioned by
the carelessness of the defendants.
On motion for
new
under
was held, that
this plea the defendants were
trial
entitled to give evidence in disproof of carelessness, after
they had failed to establish the obstruction imputed to the
plaintiffs; and such evidence having been rejected, the cause
was sent back for a second trial. Cross Keys Co. v. RawBingh. N. Cas. 71. •
lings et al.,
The burthen of proof, in my judgment, rested upoh the
being necessary for him to prove such property
plaintiff,
as
would support replevin, to wit, an exclusive
in himself
right of possebsic* of the sloop in himself and the defendant was entitled to rehut such testimony. The defendant did offer to rebut the prima facie case sheAvn by the
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plaintiff.

He offered to prove that he owned one-half of
that he was in possession of her by the assent of the plaintiff, in the double capacity of master and
joint owner, previous and up to the commencement of the
action.
This evidence, in my judgment, was lawful and
competent, and * • * having been overruled,
am of
opinion that the judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
the vessel, and

I

Section" 3.

FIILLEE

The Geneeal Isstjes.
v.

EOUNCEVILLE.

Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire.
29

1854.

Neiv Hampshire, 554.

Trespass, for taking and carrying away the plaintiff's
sleigh. Plea, the general issue. * * *
It appeared that the sleigh was formerly the property
of Ela Rounceville, and that in March, 1851, it came into the
possession of the plaintiff, where it remained until the defendant took and carried it away, in December, 1851. The
plaintiff gave in evidence a note, dated April 20, 1850,for the sum of $22.28, signed by Ela Eounceville and payable to the plaintiff, on demand, with interest, and George
Fuller, called by the plaintiff, testified that the sleigh was
pledged to the plaintiff, and in that way came and remained
*
*
*
in his possession until taken by the defendant.
The defendant offered to prove that prior to the alleged
pledge, the sleigh was mortgaged by Ela Rounceville to
James B. Sumner, and that he (Sumner) authorized the
defendant to take the sleigh. But the plaintiff's counsel
objected that this could not be shown under the general is•
»
•
sue, and the court sustained the objection.
. A verdict was
returned for the plaintiff, which the deset aside. It was ordered that the questo
fendant moved
tions arising in this case should be transferred to this court
for decision.
Woods, J. : Two questions are involved in the case.
The first arises upon the ruling of the court rejecting the
evidence of the mortgage of Ela EoTmceville to James B,
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Sumner, and of the authority of Sumner to the defendant
to take the sleigh. It was rejected upon the ground thai
the evidence was inadmissible under the general issue.
That it would have made out a perfect defence to the axition
of trespass, if receivable, admits of no doubt. The offer
was to show a mortgage prior in point of time to the title of
the plaintiff, whatever that might have been, and peaceable
possession taken of the property mortgaged, by the defendant, an agent of the mortgagee. The taking the possession
in that manner is the act complained of.
The question made in this branch of the case is, whether
that evidence was admissible under the general issue, or
whether the facts should have been specially pleaded. The
rule upon this subject would seem to be well and distinctly
settled in the books.
In 2 Saunders on PI. and Bv. 855, it is said that "the defendant may, under the general issue, give in evidence any
matter which directly controverts the truth of any allegation which the plaintiff, on such general issue, will be
bound to prove." A similar rule is recognized in 2 Saund.
Rep. 159, note 10.
Chitty says: "In trespass, whether to the person, personal or real property, the defendant can, under the general issue of not guHty, give in evidence any matter which
directly controverts the fact of his having committed the
acts complained of." 1 Chitty 's PI. 500 (8th Am. Ed.).
In Peavey v. Walter, 6 Carr & Payne, 232, which was
trespass for driving a gig against the horse of the plaintiff,
and wounding him, it was held that it might be shown,
under the general issue, that instead of the defendant driving against the plaintiff's horse (as a witness for the plaintiff had first testified), the plaintiff drove against the gig
of the defendant. The abstract of the opinion in that case
that "under not guilty, in trespass, that only can be
given in evidence which shows that the defendant did not
do the act complained of."
In Gerrish v. Train,
Pick.
126, Mr. Justice Wilde remarks that, in trespass de bonis,
"if the defendant pleads property in himself or a third
no admission that the property
person, this
the plainan allegation inconsistent with a material
tiff's but
allegation in the declaration, and
traverse
necessary."
That same fact, given in evidence, would go to disprove
the same material allegation.
In trespass to personal
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property, in general the defendant may show, under the
general issue, that the chattels in question are not the
plaintiff's property. 2 Sir Wm. Blackstone's Rep. 701;
2 Saund. PL & Ev. 855.
In Rcmson v. Morse, 4 Pick. 127,
Morton, J., says that "in trespass quare dauswin f regit,
the defendant may give in evidence, under the general
issue, any matter that contradicts the allegations which
the plaintiff is bound to prove, or shows that the act complained of is not in its own nature a trespass. Thus he
may give in evidence soil and freehold in himself, or in
another by whose authority he entered, or that he has any
other right to the possession.
For he cannot be a trespasser in exercising a right which the law gives him, nor
be bound to justify when he does not, prima facie, appear
to be a trespasser."
But it is well settled that, in general,
matters which admit the plaintiff's property as well as the
seizure and carrying away, etc., must be pleaded.
Com.
Dig. PL 3 M. 25; 2 Saund. PL & Ev. 855; 1 Chitty's PL
502 (8th Am. Ed.). Chitty states the rule thus: "Where
an act would, at common law, prima facie, appear to be a
trespass, and the facts stated in the declaration could not
be denied, any matter of justification or excuse, or done
by virtue of a warrant or authority, must, in general, be
specially pleaded; and, therefore, even where the defendant did the act at the request of the plaintiff, or where the
injury was occasioned by the plaintiff's own fault, those
matters of defence must always have been specially
pleaded. 1 Chitty's PL 501. In Rawson v. Morse, 4 Pick.
127, before cited, it is said that "a license from the plaintiff must be specially pleaded, but a license from a stranger,
in whom the soil and freehold are, may be proved under
the general issue."
The doctrine, as laid down by our own court in Stow v.
Scribner, 6 N. H. Rep. 24 (a case cited by counsel), which
was trespass for killing a horse of the plaintiff, is thus:
"Matters which do not directly contradict that which a
plaintiff is bound to prove, in an action of trespass, under
the general issue, but which show collaterally that the action is not maintainable, must be specially pleaded, or a
brief statement of the matter must be filed under the statute." The same principle is recognized in Welch v. Nash,
8 East 39, which is a case in a clear manner illustrating
the doctrine.
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the matters offered in defence constitute a direct denial of the allegations in the plaintiff's declaration, which,
ander the general issue, are essential to he proved, in order
to maintain the plaintiff's action, or, in other language.
If the matters offered in defence are a direct denial of the
material allegations of the declaration,
essential to be
proved,
and inconsistent therewith, the same may and
ought to be given in evidence under the general issue.
But if the matters relied upon as an answer to the action
do not involve a denial of the material allegations in the
writ, but are consistent with the existence of such a state
of fact as would constitute, at common law, a priwira facie
case of trespass, and amount only to an excuse or justification of such prima facie trespass, they cannot be given
in evidence under the general issue, but must be specially
pleaded.
Under the general issue it is necessary that the plaintiff
should show either the actual possession or the constructive possession of the thing injured, as well as a general
or qualified property therein. l^Term, 480; 4 Term, 490;
1 Chitty's PI. 500, before cited; 2 Saund. PI. & Ev. 855, 861
(3d Am. Ed.). It denies and puts in issue the plaintiff's
property as well as the taking by the defendant. ■ It is true,
that proof of the actual possession by the plaintiff of the
chattel at the time of the trespass will, in all cases, suffice to
sustain this action against a mere wrongdoer not being
,the real owner of the chattel.
2 Saund. 47d; Chatteris v.
Cowper, 4 Taun. 547.
In the case under consideration, it was admitted that
Ela EounceviUe was once the owner of the sleigh in question, and the plaintiff claimed to have derived a title from
him as the pledgee of the property, for a valuable consideration. The title, which the defendant proposed to prove
as a ground of defence, was a mortgagee's title, derived
from Ela EounceviUe, and acquired prior to the date of
the pledge to the plaintiff by one James B. Sumner. Here,
then, was a proposition to disprove the title of the plaintiff, by showing an elder and better title in said Sumner.
The defendant proposed further to show that in taking the
sleigh he acted by the authority of Sumner, who was thus
clothed with a mortgagee 's title.
In effect, then, the defendant offered to show that Sumner was the owner of the property by an elder and better

~
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Verdict set aside and

a

a

a

is

4

it,

it,

title than that claimed by the plaintiff, and that in virtue
af that title, and of the right of possession which accompanied
by direction of Sumner and under his authority,
the defendant took possession of
which was, in point
of law, the act of Sumner. Rawson v. Morse,
Pick. 127,
before cited.
In the act complained of the defendant stood in SumQer's place. Merritt v. Miller, 13 Vermont Eep. 419, before cited. It
clear that the matters of defence, relied
upon in this case, were
direct denial of the allegations of
property in the plaintiff, as well as of all right of possession in him, as against the defendant, at the time of the act
of trespass complained of.
They were, then,
direct denial of the essential allegations necessary to be proved by the plaintiff upon the plea
of the general issue, and according to the whole current
of the authorities receivable in evidence under the general
issue.
new trial granted.*'^

2

a

45. A license, while not admissible as
defense unless specially pleaded,
may nevertheless be shown in mitigation of damages under the general issue. —
Eich. L. (S. C.) 93; Hamilton v. Windolf (1872)
Hendrix v. Trapp (1845)
36 Mi. 301.

Supreme Court
31

J.:

V.

of

BEIGGS

MASON.

Vermont.

1859.

Vermont, 433.
a

is

an action of trespass for taMng
This
great number of articles of personal property. It comes

Alois,

a

a

to this court upon two bills of exceptions, one upon the
trial under the general issue,
decisions of the court upon
former
the other upon decisions upon a demurrer at
term.

As to the other articles claimed by the plaintiff on the
trial under the general issue, the court held that as the
plaintiff had himself, in order to show the taking by the
defendants, put in the writ and return which justified the
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taking by the defendants, they might rely upon the justification so shown under the general issue.
Tbe general rule, that matter of justification must be
pleaded specially and cannot be shown under the general
But the defendants seek to establish
issue, is admitted.
an exception, viz., that when the plaintiff's own evidence
to show the trespass also shows those facts which justify
the trespass, so that in point of fact no prima facie trespass is proven by the plaintiff which is not at the same time
disproved, then the matter in justification may be relied
upon under the general issue. It is urged that the object
of requiring a special plea is to apprise the plaintiff of
the facts to be relied upon in defence; but that where the
plaintiff himself proves those facts the reason of the rule
ceases.

There is much force in these considerations, but from an
examination of the decided cases in this State, we do not
feel at liberty to regard the question as open to discussion.
They seem to be conclusive against the establishing of the
exceptions.

Parkhurst S Fuller, 10 Vt. 557, was an action of
trespass in which the plaintiff, to prove the seizing of his
person (which was the trespass complained of), gave evidence of the warrant upon which he was arrested and
which the defendant claimed to justify the trespass. There
was no special plea. The defendant insisted that as the
plaintiff put in the evidence, he (the defendant) might
rely on it under the general issue. Collamek, J., says,
"The rules of evidence and pleading are in strict accordAllen

V.

ance and consistency and constitute a system, the symmetry of which, in the action of trespass, has not been destroyed by any modern relaxations or exceptions in the
The party is bound to prove
science of special pleading.
what he alleges, so far as the s,anie is denied, and he is
neither bound nor permitted to prove more." Again, "the
general issue in trespass is a denial of the facts stated in
requires the plaintiff to prove these
the declaration.
facts, and it permits the defendant to simply contradict
these facts, and it permits no more.
the defendant has
matter of justification he must specially plead
or he
cannot be permitted to prove
or insist upon
cas-

It

ually appears."

it,

it

if

it,

it

If

These principles of law as applied in
that case are decisive of the question.
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Walker v. Hitchcock, 19 Vt. 634, was trespass to the
realty. The court say (Bennett, J.) "it is claimed that as
the plaintiff gave the record in evidence to show a title in
himself, the defendant may claim the benefit of it as a bar
to the action, without pleading it. No authority has been
produced to show that in such a case the special plea may
be dispensed with; and
can discover no reason why it
should be. The plea of not guilty is simply a denial of the
facts stated in the declaration; every cause is to be tried
upon the issue joined bet^veen the parties; and the evidence
is to be received and applied only as it bears upon the
issue which the parties have seen fit to join."
In Richardson v. Stockwell, decided in Essex county, at
the August term, 1858, the very point was again considered
and the rule reaffirmed.
The reasonableness of the rule
was vindicated upon the ground that the defendant, by
omitting to plead the justification specially, might be assumed by the plaintiff to have waived defence on that
ground ; and if allowed to claim it under the general issue,
the plaintiff would be surprised and prevented from properly replying to such defence, and from having his proof
ready at the trial. Without further considering the reasonableness of the rule, we rest upon these decisions as
having settled the question in this State. The ruling on
this point was therefore erroneous.

I

EIDGELEY

v.

TOWN OF WEST FAIRMONT.

8v/preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
46

English,

J.

1899.

West Virginia, 445.

This was an action of trespass on the case
brought by William Eidgeley against West Fairmont, a
municipal corporation, in the circuit court of Marion
:

The facts upon which the suit is predicated, as
appears from the pleadings, are that the plaintiff was the
owner of about one acre of land, except the coal underlying
the same, which fronted on the public highway, known, in
1892, as the "Fairmont and Weston Turnpike," on which
County.
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was situated a two-story frame dwelling house, and a twostory frame storehouse jointly, both of which buildings
stood near said turnpike. Subsequently plaintiff erected
on said land another two-story frame building used for a
dwelling and storehouse combined. Said buildings were
erected and used in conformity with the grade of said
Fairmont and Weston Turnpike, as it existed at the time
they were built, and in December, 1892, a part of the territory, of Fairmont district was incorporated, and became
a municipal corporation, under the name of "West Fairmont;" and in 1892 said corporation established all that
part of the Fairmont and Weston Turnpike lying within
its limits, including that part adjacent to said land, as one
of its streets, and called it "Main Street," or "Locust
Avenue," and in September, 1894, changed the grade and
raised the surface of said street in front of, and adjacent
to, said plaintiff's property, by filling the same with dirt,
gravel, stone, etc., and without his consent and against his
raised the grade, fifty-six inches higher
protestations,
than it was when plaintiff became the ovmer of said property and the houses thereon; and the plaintiff claims that
he is damaged by the drainage of water on his lot caused
by the change of grade, and that he is thereby deprived of
all safe, commodious, and convenient egress and ingress
from and to said land, and the houses .thereon; and, by
reason of said wrongs and injuries, he claimed five thous*
*
*
and dollars damages.
*
*
*
The gravamen of the plaintiff's declaration appears to be that, without the consent of the plaintiff, the
defendant has raised the grade of the street in front of his
property, so that surface water is thrown upon plaintiff's
lot, which, with the buildings on
thereby damaged
the
plaintiff's consent, and he
without
thereby deprived
of all safe, commodious, convenient, and proper ingress
and egress to and from said land. Now, while
true
that, where the defendant seeks to confess and avoid in
trespass, a special plea
required, in the case at bar the
plaintiff avers in his declaration that the grade was
changed in front of his property, and the injury complained of resulted therefrom, without his consent, and
under the general issue, surely the defendant might be permitted to show that the grade was raised with his consent,
especially when he was paid
consideration for it. As to
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the evidence whicli may be given under the general issue
in an action on the case, Hogg, in his valuable work on
Pleading and Forms (184), says: "The general issue,
as we have seen, in actions ex delicto, is that of 'not
guilty ;' " giving the form of the plea, and adding: "Under which may be given in evidence a former recovery, release or accord and satisfaction, or whatever would, in
equity and good conscience, according to existing circumstances, preclude the plaintiff from recovering,
as any
matters which operate a discharge of the cause of action,
or any justification or excuse.
By this plea, all the material averments of the declaration are put in issue"— citing 1 Chit. PI. 490. The same strictness in pleading does
not obtain in trespass on the case as in trespass. The law
is stated thus in 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 534: "At common law, the general issue 'not guilty' is in form a traverse
or denial of the facts which form the subject of complaint.
On principle the evidence admissible under it should be
confined to matters of defense which rest in denial. But,
by gradual relaxation of the practice similar to that which
occurred, in assumpsit, evidence came to be received, not
only of matters in denial, but of defenses by way of conThere is, therefore, an essential
fession and avoidance.
difference between actions of trespass and on the case.
The former are stricti juris, and accordingly a former recovery, release, or satisfaction cannot be given in evidence under the general issue, but must be specially pleadBut the latter are founded on the mere justice and
ed.
conscience of the plaintiff's case, and are in the nature of
a bill in equity, and in effect are so, and therefore a former recovery, release, or satisfaction need not be pleaded,
but may be given in evidence under the general issue. On
the general issue, the plaintiff is put to the proof of his
whole case, and the defendant may give in evidence any
justification or excuse of it. Thus, a license which in trespass must be pleaded may in case be given in evidence un" To the same effect, see Andrew, Steph.
der 'not guilty,'
PI. 238, section 118; also opinion of Lord Mansfield in
Bird V. Randall, 3 Burrows, 1353, in which he asserts the
doctrine above announced, and draws the distinction between trespass and trespass on the case. See, also, 1 Bart,
Law Prac. 503 ; Greenwalt v. Horner, 6 Serg. & E. 77. So,
also, in nills v. Railroad Co., 18 N. H. 179, it is hdd: "In
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an action on the case for an injury to the plaintiff's land,
it is not necessary to plead specially. Evidence that the
acts complained of were done by the permission of the
plaintiff is admissible under the general issue, and a
fortiori that they were done at the request and by the direction of the plaintiff." Authorities might be multiplied
in support of this proposition, but these are sufficient to
show the trend and weight of authority on the question.
Bill of exceptions No. 10, taken by defendant, shows
that he offered to prove by several witnesses that, at the
time the improvement was made in front of this property,
the plaintiff agreed that, if they would put in tiling from
the end of the culvert on the side of the street nearest his
property to a point near his dwelling house, which was
said to contain fourteen rooms, he would take that in consideration of all damages by said improvement to his
property, and that defendant put in said tiling according
to contract; which evidence was objected to by the plaintiff, and excluded by the court. It is presumed ^this ruling
of the court was based on the supposition that this evidence
was not admissible under the general issue. Counsel for
the defendant in error insist that it would have been error
'
to permit this evidence to go to the jury, because there
was no such defense set up by special plea, and it could
not be shown under the general issue. "We have, however,
discussed this point above, and hold that the evidence was
admissible under the general issue, and the court erred in
to the prejudice of the defendant.
excluding

•••••••••

Reversed.

Supreme Court

v.

AENOLD.

of

EOGERS

New York.

12 Wendell,

By the Court, Nelson,

J.

1834,

30.

It

:

has been long settled in
of personal chattels by the
plaintiff, and an actual wrongful taking by the defendant
are sufficient to support replevin, and that
may be

it

this State that the possession
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brought, where trespass de bonis asportatis will lie. 7
Johns. Eep. 140; 17 id. 116; 1 Wendell, 109; 10 id. 322,

349.

As the pleading in this action is in some respects complicated and peculiar, as given in the books, it may be
useful to examine some of its principles, and the cases
adjudged, on the subject.
The revised statutes have in
some measure simplified the pleadings, p. 529, sec. 44. The
form of pleading, however, as it existed heretofore, maybe resorted to at the option of the defendant.
The general issue of non cepit, in the case of a wrongful
taking, puts in issue not only the taking, but the place
where taken, if material, 2 R. S. 528, sec. 29 ; and in case
of a wrongful detention, the general issue, to wit, that the
defendant does not detain the goods, etc., puts in issue
not only the detention of the goods, but the property of the
plaintiff.
The distinction here made between the effect
and operation of the general issue, in the cases of non
cepit and non detinet is in analogy to that existing in the
actions of trespass and trover. In the one the defendant
cannot,' under the plea of not guilty, show property out
of the plaintiff, but he may in the other. 11 Johns. B.
132, 528; 13 id. 284; 14 id. 132, 353 ; 15 id. 208. The reason
of this distinction is, that the action of trespass is founded
upon the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the
goods taken, and that of trover to the right of property.
It should be remembered, however, that possession is
prinia facie evidence of right, and conclusive against all
the world, except the true owner, or one connecting his
title with him. This principle goes far to assimilate these
The distinction, however, still
two remedies in practice.
exists in regard to the defence to be given in evidence under the general issue.
It is laid down generally, and in all the books on this
branch of the law, that the defendant in replevin may
plead property in liimself, or in a stranger, in bar of the
action, and pray for a return and damages. So he may
plead property in himself and the plaintiff, or in a stranger and the plaintiff, or if there are two plaintiffs, in one
of them, etc. All these different pleas are obviously
founded upon the principle applicable to this action, that
the plaintiJff, as in trover, must recover upon the strength
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of Ms title to, or property in the goods in question, and
in this respect there is a shade of difference between this
action and trespass.
2 Selw.
911; Gilb. Eep. 119; 1
CHtty's PI. 158, 159; Woodf. Landlord & Tenant, 473.
Under the plea of non cepit we have seen the caption only
is put in issue, except the place, when material ; and if the
defendaut intends to deny the property of the plaintiff, he
must plead
or give notice under the general issue. Now
clear that all these different pleas of property in the

it

defendant, etc., are used for the purpose, and to the end
of showing
out of the plaintiff who holds the affirmative,
and must sustain the allegation of property in himself;
and what must be proved on one side, may be disproved on
the other. Non cepit admits property in the plaintiff, and
hence the necessity of the different pleas of property in
others, to enable the defendant to contest it.

J. J.

~

BAUGH.
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V.
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Appeals

3

Court
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SMAET

Kentucky/.

1830.

Marshall, 363.
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Opinion of the court by Eobertson, C. J.
an action of detinue, by J. P. Smart v. Betsy
This
On the genfemale slave named Catharine.
Baugh, for
verdict' and judgment were rendered for the
eral issue
defendant.
On the motion of the defendant's
stmcted the jury:

counsel, the court ia-

if

those from whom the defendant derived her
claim had been in possession of Catharine more than five
years before the institution of this suit, holding her adversely to the claim of the plaintiff, his right was barred
and he could not recover.
a

The statute of limitations may avail
detinue under the general issue. The plea

defendant in
in the pres-

is

That

Sec. 3]

Teaveeses.

575

ent tense {non detinet), and nnder this issue anything
(except a pledge) which will show a better right in the defendant than in the plaintiff may be admitted as com-,
petent evidence.
The plea puts in issue the plaintiff's right. Five years'
uninterrupted adverse possession of a slave, not only bars
the remedy of the claimant out of possession, but vests
the absolute legal right in the possessor.
Therefore,
proof of such possession may show that the claimant has
no right to the slave, and therefore cannot recover.
Consequently, it would seem to result, from the reason
of the case, that the adversary possession may be proved
under the general issue.
The same reason does not apply to assumpsit, because
the statute of limitation does not destroy the right "in
foro concientiae" to the benefit of the assumpsit, but only
bars the remedy if the defendant choose to rely on the
bar. Time does not pay a debt ; but time may vest a right
to property.
It was said by Holt, in one case (Draper v. Glassop,
1 Ld. Eay'd, 153), that the statute of limitations might
be given in evidence under the plea of "nil debet," and
the following is the reasoning by which he attempted to
maintain his opinion: "For the statute had made it no
debt at the time of the plea pleaded, the words of which
are in the present tense. But in case on non assumpsit,
the statute of limitations cannot be given in evidence, for
it speaks of a time past and relates to the time of making
the promise. But upon nil debet pleaded, the statute is
good evidence, because the issue is joined, per verba de
praesenti, and it is no debt at this time though it was a

debt."

This reasoning is applicable to the plea of non detinet
in an action of detinue for property, and therefore in detinue it ought to be conclusive. But we doubt its application to the plea of nil debet, and therefore could not admit that the conclusion of Chief Justice Holt is logical or
consistent with the reason and analogies of the law. His

it

it

if,

deduction is the necessary consequence of his premises.
at the time of pleading nil debet, the statute of limitations had extinguished the debt, and in his language
no debt,
would certainly be allowable to show
made
the fact, under the plea that the defendant did not at the

For
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This is perfectly true
time of pleading owe the debt.
in detinue for a slave, because in such a case the lapse of
time has divested the plaintiff of his right of property,
and vested it in the defendant. Stanley v. Earle, 5 Littel,
281. And, therefore, the lapse of time may in such a case
be given in evidence under the general issue, to show that
the plaintiff has no right to the property, and that the defendant has a perfect right. But it is not so in debt, because the statute of limitations does not destroy nor pay
the debt.
This has been abundantly established by authority since the time of Holt. A debt barred by time is a
sufficient consideration for a new assumpsit. The statute of
limitations only disqualifies the plaintiff to recover his debt
by suit, if the defendant rely on time in his plea. It is a personal privilege, accorded by the law for reasons of public
expediency. Ajid the privilege can be asserted only by
plea; otherwise, that which, by barring the legal remedy,
would conclude the legal right, will not affect either. The
distinction suggested by Holt between nil debet and non
assumpsit, does not sustain the discrimination which he
makes in the admissibility of evidence under the two issues. For although non assumpsit is in the past, and nil
debet is in the present tense, yet it is known to be the law
that whatever will show that the defendant does nol owe
anything at the trial will be admissible evidence under the
plea of non assumpsit; and, therefore, if the statute of
limitations would be admissible under nil debet, it would
be equally so under non assumpsit.
See 1 Cranch. 465, appendix.
We, therefore, consider Holt's opinion as to the admissibility of evidence of limitation, under nil debet, as
unsupported by principle, and as overruled by subsequent
But his reasoning and his opinion apply necauthorities.
essarily to "non detinet," and so far it is good law, and
In Virginia it has been decided
has not been overruled.
that the statute of limitations may be given in evidence,
under the general issue, in detinue for property.
See
Elam V. Bass' Executors, 4 Munford, 301.
Under nil debet and non assumpsit, lapse of time may
be admissible evidence,

as

far

as

it may tend to prove the

fact of payment, but not as a legal and conclusive bar to
the action. In detinue, the limitation may be proved under the general issue, as conclusive evidence of the de-
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fendant's right to the property, unless the plaintiff can
evade its effect, by showing some suspension of its operation.
In debt and assumpsit the statute must be pleaded. Balantine on Lim. 210. The statute 'does not destroy the debt,
it only takes away the remedy, and the debtor may either
take advantage of the statute or he may waive the statute." Ibid, 208; Burrows, 2630.
But the adverse possession of a slave not only bars the
remedy but destroys the right, unless the effect of time
can be obviated by the proof of some saving disability. It
might seem just and eligible, therefore, to plead the limitation, so that the plaintiff might have an opportunity to
reply, some fact showing disability. But neither authority nor principle seems to require such a plea, in such
a case, any more than they require a plea of title acquired
by contract, which might be avoided by infancy or other

disability.

VIRGINIA FIEE AND MARINE INSUEANCE COMPANY V. BUCK.
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
88

Virginia,

1891.

517.

J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action on the case in assumpsit on a policy
of insurance. Issue was joined on the plea of non assumpsit, and the defendant company, in accordance with a practice common in the circuit courts of this State, obtained
leave to file special pleas within sixty days.
HiJiTTON,

Three special pleas were filed in the clerk's office. To
the first of these no objection was made; but the plaintiffs,
treating the other two as tendered by the filing in the clerk's
office, moved the court to reject them, which was accordingly done. The defendant then tendered a fifth plea,
which, on the plaintiff's motion, was also rejected.
The rejection of these three pleas constitutes the first
0. L. p. 37
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assignment of error. Upon this point we shall spend but
little time, because, in the opinion of the court, every fact
might have been proved under the general issue in the
case which could have been proved under either of these
pleas. Their rejection, therefore, could not have prejudiced the defendant.
"The fact is undeniable," says Mr. Minor, in his Institutes, "that for more than a century past there has been
admitted, under the plea of non assumpsit in all actions of
assumpsit, whether founded on an implied or express
promise, any matter of defence whatever (the same as in
the case of nil debit) which tends to deny his liability to
the plaintiff's demand." 4 Min. Institutes, p. 645. And
at page 641 of the same volume the author says: "Under
the plea of nil debit the defendant may prove at the trial
coverture when the promise was made, lunacy, duress, infancy, release, arbitrament, award and satisfaction, payment, a want of consideration for the promise, failure or
fraud in the consideration, and, in short, anything which
shows there is no existing debt due. The statute of limitations, bankruptcy and tender are believed to be the only
defences which may not be proved under this plea, and
they are excepted because they do not contest that the
debt is owing, but insist only that no action can be maintained for it." And to the same effect seem to be all the
1 Chitty on Plead. (4th Amer. Edition), sec.
authorities.
18; Stephen Plead. (4th Amer. Edition), p. 162, note 20;
1 Rob. (old) Prac. 210; 5 Eob. Prac. 259.
Nor can this court assent to the proposition that the statute, which allows the defendant to plead as many matters
of defence as he may elect, confers upon him the "absolute right" to file special pleas setting up defences covered by a plea already received. Such a construction of
the statute would be inconsistent with the authorities already cited, and, so far as we can see, could serve no good
purpose. This same suggestion seems to have been made
in Pant v. Miller, 17 Gratt. 47; but, said Joynes, J..
think the object of the (special) plea was to set up the
defence that the plaintiffs were not bona fide holders of
the note on which the action was founded.
That defence,
however, might have been made, as in point of fact, it was
made under the plea of nil debit, which issue had already
been joined in 1853. The plea was, therefore, wholly un-

"I

"
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necessary, and this would have been good ground for rejecting it when offered if it had been objected to. Reed v.
Banna's Ex' or, 3 Rand. 56. And it was competent for the
court to strike it out after it was received, even though
issue had been joined upon it. Kemp v. Mundell, 9 Leigh.

The plaintiffs in error not having been deprived of
any defence by the striking out of this plea, have not been
injured by
and cannot complain.
The multiplication of
by
issues,
special pleas, tends to embarrass the jury, and
ought not to be encouraged, 'except in cases where, by
law, the defence would otherwise be excluded or rendered
unavailing.' "
It suggested, however,
we correctly apprehend the
brief of the plaintiff in error, that the plaintiffs below
ought to have demurred to those pleas, "if insufficient in
law," and should not have moved the court to reject them.
But this, as the defendants in error point out in their
brief,
The better way,
generally an unsafe practice.
to
move
the
when
has not been
court,
undoubtedly, being
Rand,
received, to reject it. In Reed v. Banna's Ex'or,
p. 62, the court said: "Where the objection to a second
*
*
*
that the matter of that plea
already
plea
put in issue, the party ought not to be put to the hazard of
a demurrer in order to avail himself of that objection, the
proper and safe practice being to try that question on a
has been
out,
motion to reject the plea, or to strike

it

if

it

is

is

3

it

is

if

is

it,

12.

entered on the record."

We see no error in the judgment of the circuit court, and
the same must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

Supreme Court
59

of

WILBUR

V.

ABBOTT.

New Bampshire.

1879.

New Bampshire, 132.
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is

a
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This
judgment recovered in Louisiana.
Debt, on
defendant
The
the same case reported in 58 N. H. 272.
pleaded mil tiel record to each count, and the plaintiff
joined issue. The plaintiff filed three special replicaestopped
tions to each plea, alleging that the defendant
to plead nul tiel record because of certain proceedings
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tlie courts of Louisiana (set forth in the replications),
whereby it was adjudged that he was estopped to deny the
validity of the judgment declared upon. The defendant
moved to reject the replications, on the ground that the
plaintiff, having joined issue on the plea of nul tiel record,
cannot set up any other matter as an answer to that plea.
Smith, J. : In Gould PI. c. 6, s. 10, md tiel record is said
to be the general issue in debt on judgment.
So in Lawes
PI. 225. It is the only general plea in such an action, and
puts in issue the verity of the record itself ; and no evidence
but that is admitted. Pillshury v. Springfield, 16 N. H. 565,
572 ; Gould PI. c. 6, s. 10 ; Story on PI. 336. It is the proper
plea when there is either no record, or where there is a
variance in the statement of it. 1 Ch. PI. 480, 481. The
plea of nul tiel record does not conclude to the country, because the matter is to be determined by the court by inspection of the record. Hence it concludes with a verification, although it is a direct denial of the allegation in the
declaration that there is such a record; and herein it
differs from the general issue in other forms of action
where the parties are at issue, when the defendant simply
It confesses
denies the essential part of the declaration.
nothing, and avoids nothing; and there remains nothing
for the plaintiff to do but to traverse the denial of the
want of a record, concluding with a verification by the
record.
For general purposes nul tiel record is the general issue,
and in this case it can make no practical difference to the
parties whether the estoppel is pleaded, or given in evidence under the issues which have been joined.
Motion granted.

VAN VALKENBURGH

v.

EOUK.

Supreme Court of New YorJc.
12

1815.

Johnson, 337.

This was an action of debt on a bUl obligatory, or sealed
note, and was tried before Mr. Justice Yates, at the Orange

circuit, in August, 1814.
The defendant pleaded non est factu/m, and at the trial
entered into evidence to show that the note had been fraud-
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ulently obtained, by substituting in the place of the note

which the defendant intended to execute, one for a much
larger amount. To this testimony the counsel for the plaintiff objected, that it was inadmissible under the plea, but
the judge overruled the objection.

Spencer, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The evidence in this case looks towards a substitution
of an instrument of a larger amount, for the one the defendant supposed he was executing. Had it been made out
satisfactorily that there had been a note drawn for a
smaller amount, that the defendant was defrauded into
executing the note in question, by its substitution at the

I

moment of execution,
cannot perceive any objection to
think it
the admission of such proof; and if made out,
would avoid the instrument upon the issue of non est
Cliitty lays it down, that the defendant, on non
factum.
est factum, may give in evidence that the deed was void
at common law, ai) initio; as that it was obtained by fraud,
etc. (Chitty, PI. 479). The fraud he refers to, must have
been a fraud relating to the execution of the deed, for the
In
issue involves only the execution of the instrument.
cannot
must
and
plead infancy,
the case of an infant, he
give it in evidence on non est factum, because the deed is
his, though he is not bound by it. A feme covert, having
no capacity to contract, is not bound to plead coverture.
a deed be misread, or misexpounded, to an unlettered man,
this may be shown on non est factum, because he has never
So, if a man be imposed upon,
assented to the contract.
while
he
believes he is signing another,
one
paper
and signs
he cannot be said to have assented, and may show this on

I

If

non est factum.

I will not pretend to

say that there is not a great deal of
technicality in the application of the rule, as to the cases
in which you may give evidence impeaching the execution
of the instrument, under the plea of non est factum, and
those in which you may not. In the present case, the defendant was not unlettered, and there is not sufficient proof
to warrant the verdict, that there was a substitution of one
instrument for another. There must be a new trial.
New trial granted*^
Non est factum is also the general issue in covenant, and its scope is
46.
Stephan on Pleading (Tyler '■ Ed.) 171.
the same as in debt on specialtj.
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1849.

Georgia, 88.

By the Court, Lumpkin, J., delivering the opinion.
Four things are necessary to enable a person to support
an ejectment, viz., title, lease, entry and ouster. And as
the three latter are only feigned in the modem practice,
the plaintiff would be nonsuited at the trial, if he were
obliged to prove them. The courts, therefore, compel the
defendant to enter into what is called the consent rule, by
which he undertakes that at the trial he will confess the
lease, entry and ouster to have been regularly made, and
rely solely upon the merits of his title. In England, at
present, the consent rule. admits possession also. The consent rule is presumed to be taken in every case, and being
at best but a useless form, its observance is dispensed with
in point of fact; and this dispenses with all special pleading in ejectment. The defendant can plead only "not
guUty," and the statute of limitations.
"With us in Georgia, as in most of the States, the general
issue in ejectment denies the defendant's possession, as
well as the plaintiff's title. Stevens v. Griffith, 3 Ver. E.
448,

It was not necessary, therefore, in this case, that the defendant should have pleaded specially, that he was not in
the possession of the premises in dispute, at the time suit
•
•
•
was commenced.

CHAPTER Vn.

AFFIRMATIVE PLEAS IN BAR.
Sbction

1.

Pleas in Confession and AvoiuAaoB.

CONGEE

V.

JOHNSTON.

Supreme Court of New York.

1845.

2 Den'io, 96.

By the Court, Beonson, Ch. J.: Every plea in confession and avoidance must give color, by admitting an apparent or prima facie right in the plaintiff. It must either
expressly or impliedly confess that but for the matter of
avoidance contained in the plea, the action could be maintained.
This plea makes no such confession, and is therefore bad. Instead of saying, as the pleader should have
done, that the several causes of action mentioned in the
declaration did not accrue within six years, the words are
that the several supposed causes of action mentioned in
the declaration "if any such there were, or still are," did
not accrue within six years. The defendants do not admit,
that but for the statute of limitations the plaintiff could
have sued. The plea gives no color. Margetts v. Bays (4
The action was
Adol. & Ellis, 489) is a case in point.
debt on simple contract; and the plea was, that the supposed debt in the declaration mentioned, if any such there
be, did not accrue within six years ; and the plea was held
bad on demurrer for not confessing the debt. The following cases will serve to illustrate the rule which has been
mentioned : Griffiths v. Eyles, 1 Bos. & Pul. 413, 417 ; Mamchester v. Vale, 1 Saund. 27, and note (1) ; Brown v.
Artcher, 1 Hill, 266; McPherson v. Daniels, 10 Barn. &
Ores. 263. But we are referred to a precedent from which
the plea has evidently been copied.
(3 Chit. PI. 941, 7th
Am. from 6th Lond. Ed.) This is not the first time that I
have noticed precedents of questionable authority in the
late editions of what was originally a very good book. In
(583)
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the 3d American from the 2d London Edition of the work
(Vol. 2, p. 498), the same plea is given without the qualiany such there were, or still are," which
fying words,
make this plea bad.
Judgment for the plaintiff ."

"If

47.
EavestaflE v. Eussell (1842) 10 M. & W. 365:— "Pakkb, B.— There
can be no doubt whatever that the word 'supposed' is a sufficient admission
of a cause of action.
It is the usual and ordinary mode of pleading in
cases of this nature; and
have seen instances without number, where, after
a plea of the general issue, a special plea has followed, professing to answer
the supposed causes of action in the declaration mentioned.
Il>« words 'if
any' ctand on a different footing."

I

BROWN

V.

AETCHEB.

Supreme Court of New York.
1

Eill,

1841,

266.

was for trespass
de bonis, etc., and contained two counts, both of which alleged the taking by the defendants of certain goods, etc.,
the property of the said plaintiffs.
The general isThe defendants pleaded separately:
1.
sue; 2. Proceedings against one Corl, a resident of the
city of Detroit, in the State of Michigan, as an absent
debtor, at the suit of the defendant Van Vliet, and one
Hart; and that Artcher, under an attachment issued
therein, seized the goods as sheriff of Albany. These pleas
averred respectively, that the goods belonged to Corl.
They also interposed a third plea, not materially different
from the second.
The plaintiffs demurred to the special pleas, assigning
for cause, among other things, that they amounted to the
general issue; and the defendants joined in demurrer.
By the Court, Cowen, J. : It was held in the Year Book
(27 H. 8, 21, case 11) that, in trespass de bonis, a plea that
the goods were not the plaintiff's property was bad. The
same thing was afterwards admitted in Wildmcm v. Norton
(1 Ventr. 249, 2 Lev. 92, S. C. nom. Wildmcn v. North).
believe it has never been denied. Chitty says that "the
defendant cannot plead property in a stranger or himself,

Demurrer to pleas.

I

The declaration
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because that goes to contradict the evidence which the
plaintiff must adduce on the general issue in support of
his case."
The
(1 Chit. Plead. 527, Am. Ed. of 1840.)
usual test of an objection that the plea amounts to the
general issue is, whether it takes away all color for maintaining an action, by frsing a negative upon the plaintiff's
right in the first instance. Thus, in trespass qioare clausum
f regit, the defendant pleading title in a third person, a demise to himself and an entry under that demise, this plea
was held bad, because it shewed a right of possession in
the defendant at the time when he entered and committed
the trespass complained of.
{Collett v. FUnn, 5 Cowen,
466.) So, a plea that he entered under a license from such
third person.
{Underwood v. Camphell. 11 Wend. 78.)
Such a plea standing alone, virtually says, that the defendant did not commit any trespass in the plaintiff's close;
and is, therefore, but another mode of pleading not guilty.
It absolutely and necessarily denies all possessory right
in the plaintiff, the contrary of which he must maintain, or
he is not entitled to sue. Such a plea is said, by the books,
in itself to take away aU color or pretense for an action;
and therefore, to be maintainable as a special plea, it must
surmise some possession in the plaintiff, at the time, under
color of a defective title. Taking away, in itself, all mwplied color, it must, in the manner mentioned, substitute
what is called express color. (1 Chit. Plead. 529, Am. Ed.
of 1840. 5 Cowden, 167, 8, note.)
The same rule of pleading has been applied to trespass
de bonis.
(1 Chit. Plead. 530, Am. Ed. of 1840; Ley field's
case, 10 Rep. 90.) Chitty says, a plea that A. was possessed
of the goods in question as of his own proper goods,
amounts to a denial that the plaintiff had any property
in them, and therefore gives no color of action in itself. To
remedy this defect, it must surmise that the defendant
bailed the goods to a stranger, who delivered them to the
plaintiff, from whom the defendant took them; or, a possession of the plaintiff under some other defective title.
(Vid. Fletcher v. MariUier, 9 Adolph. & Ellis, 457.) It is
peculiar to the action of trespass, that the defendant may
surmise such possession, setting up a mere fiction, not
traversable, and thus turn what would otherwise be defective as amounting to the general issue, into a special plea.
(1 Chit Plead. 530, Ed before cited.)
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of propdeemphatically
is
erty in a stranger, or the defendant,
fective, in the case of trespass de bonis; for there, especially, no actual possession being expressly shown in the
plaintiff, the law intends that it is with the general owner.
Accordingly, the common count alleges merely that the
things taken were the goods of the plaintiff, without otherwise showing possession.
(2 Chit. PI. 859, Am. Ed. of
be not given, the plea

1840.)

In

is

a

(2

is

a

it

is

a

it

it,

the case at bar, all the pleas demurred to aver that
the goods in question were the goods of Corl ; each following out the averment with the allegation that the goods
were therefore taken by an attachment against Corl. According to the books cited, had the pleas stopped with the
averment of property in Corl, giving, as they do, no express color, they would have been bad as amounting to the
Such an averment alone would have cut
general issue.
off all implied color ; for it would be saying, they were not
the plaintiff's goods, in manner and form as he has alleged
in declaring.
This being so, the farther allegations, showing a lawful
authority under the attachment to take them as the goods
of Corl, certainly cannot help the pleas. To this, Hallett
V. Birt (12 Mod. 120), cited by the plaintiff's counsel on
the argument, is, as he supposed, in point against the defendant. The plea there was, that the plaintiff had taken
and impounded property belonging to A., at whose suit the
defendant, under a warrant directed to him, replevied the
property. This was held bad ; though the court agreed that
if the plea had said, the plaintiff took and detained the
property, and so it had been taken by the defendant from
the plaintiff's possession, it might have been well enough.
That is probably one mode of giving express color.
It was supposed by the defendant's counsel, on the argument, that, the pleas, by not expressly denying the plainand so there
implied color;
tiff's possession, confessed
expressly said, in Wildman v. North
Lev.
whereas
plea of property in
stranger, with a traverse
92), that
that the goods belonged to the plaintiff, in trespass
amounts to the general issue, though not in replevin. And
on the authority of this case, among others, that Chitty
says, the simple plea of property in
stranger would be
bad in trespass.
Stephen on Pleading (179, Am. Ed. of
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says, the general issue is applicable, if the defend1824)_
BJit did take the goods, but they did not belong to the plaintiff. And it is said in Bacon's Abridgment
(tit Pleas &
Plead. G. pi. 3, p. 372, Am. Ed. of 1813), that if in trespass,
the defendant plead property in a stranger or himself, it
amounts to the general issue. (Gould's Plead, pt. 2, ch. 6,
sec. 78, p. 345, 1st Ed. S.
P.) Such uniform language cannot be accounted for, unless, as
have already supposed,
the allegation of property in a third person involves a denial of the plaintiff's possession.
The objection we have thus examined applies to all the
pleas, and we are of opinion it is well taken.
It is not necessary to say, whether there be any founda^
tion for the other objections of form specified by the de-

I

murrers.

Judgment for plaintiffs.*'
48. Stephan eaje of express color: "Color, in this sense, is defined to be
a feigned matter, pleaded by the defendant in an actioh of trespass, from
which the plaintiff seems to have a good cause of action, whereas he has,
in truth, only an appearance or color of cause.'
This is one of the most
— ^Pleadine« (Tyler's
eorions subtleties that belong to the science of pleadinir."
i6
V /
Ed.) 210.
'

McPHEESON

V.

DANIELS.

Court of King's Bench.
10

1829,

Barneiuall S Cresswell, 263.

Declaration for slander stated, that the plaintiff before
the time of the committing of the grievances thereinafter
mentioned, and from thence had been and still was a coach
proprietor, and sold and disposed of cattle for divers persons for commission, and that he had never been suspected
to be insolvent, or unable or unwilling to pay his just debts ;
that defendant contriving, and wickedly and maliciously
intending to injure the plaintiff, and to cause it to be suspected and believed by his neighbors that the plaintiff was
poor, and in indigent and bad circumstances, and incapable of paying his just debts, and debts to be by him contracted, and thereby to injure him in his trade and business, falsely and maliciously spoke and published in the

088
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hearing and presence of divers good and worthy subjects
of this realm of and concerning the plaintiff, and of and
concerning and relating to him in his trade or business of
a coach proprietor, the false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words following, that is to say, "His (meaning
the said plaintiff's) horses have been seized from the coach
(meaning the said plaintiff 's coach), on the road, he (meaning the said plaintiff) has been arrested, and the bailiffs
are in his (meaning the said plaintiff's) house," thereby
theli and there meaning and intending that the said plaintiff was in bad and indigent circumstances, and incapable of
paying his just debts. By means of the committing of which
said grievances by the defendant, he the plaintiff was
greatly injured in his good name, etc. ; and also by means
of the premises, one Morrison, who before the committing
of the said grievances was about to send, and otherwise
would have sent divers, to wit, eleven head of cattle to the
plaintiff, for the purpose of being sold and disposed of by
the plaintiff for Morrison for commission and reward payaable to the plaintiff in that behalf, to wit, on the day and
year aforesaid, wholly refused and declined so to do, and
thereby the plaintiff lost and was deprived of the commission which would have been payable by Morrison to the
plaintiff. Plea, that before speaking and publishing of the
several words in the declaration mentioned, and therein
supposed to have been spoken and published by the said
defendant, of and concerning the said plaintiff, and of and
concerning and relating to him in his trade or business of
a coach proprietor, to wit, on, etc., at, etc.^ one T. W. Woor
of Swaffham, in the county of Norfolk, spoke and published
the following words to the defendant of and concerning the
plaintiff, and of and concerning and relating to him in his
trade or business of a coach proprietor, that is to say, "His
(meaning the said plaintiff's) horses have been seized from
the coach (meaning the plaintiff's coach) on the road; he
has been arrested, and the bailiffs are in his house ; ' ' thereby then and there meaning that the plaintiff was in bad
and indigent circumstances, and incapable of paying his
just debts. And the defendant further saith, that at the
time of speaking and publishing the said several words
in the declaration as therein mentioned, he the defendant
also declared, in the presence and hearing of the same persons in whose presence and hearing the said words were
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spoken by him the defendant, that he had heard and
been told the same from and by the said T. W. "Woor of
Swafifham, in the county of Norfolk; wherefore he the defendant, at the said time when, etc., in the said declaration
mentioned, did speak and publish of and concerning the
plaintiff the said several words in the said declaration
mentioned, as he lawfully might for the cause aforesaid.
General demurrer and joinder.
BO

Pakke,

J.

*

*

*

This plea is bad for two reasons.

To

plea it must confess and avoid the cause of action
stated in the declaration. But this plea either does not confess, or if it confesses, does not avoid that cause of action.
It appears from the case of Bell v. Byrne, 15 East, 554,
that if a defendant has not made an assertion as his own,
but has merely alleged that some other person had made
must be so averred and that an averment in a declaration, that the defendant used slanderous words, must be
taken to mean that he used them as his own words, and as
a substantive allegation of his own; and will not be supported by proof, that he used them as the words of anTo apply the principle of that decision to
other person.
the plea be understood to confess that
the present case,
the words were spoken as those of another person, and not
does not
as
direct assertion of the defendant himself,
properly confess the matter stated in the declaration;
on the other hand, the plea be considered as confessing
the words to have been used as those of the defendant himdoes not
self, making
substantive allegation of his own,
of
the
matter
so
confessed;
proper
contain any
avoidance
slander as his own,
one make such assertion of
for
can be no answer, even admitting the latter part of the
fourth resolution in Lord Northampton's case to be law,
in the same conversation he add that some one else has also
•
said the same thing.
*

•

it

if

a

if

a

it

if,

a

it

if

;

it

it,
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BUSH

V.

7

PARKEE.

Court of Common Pleas.
1

[CJiap.

1834.

Bingham's New Cases, 72.

Trespass, for assaulting the plaintiff, seizing and laying
hold of him, pulling and dragging him about, striking him
many violent blows, forcing him out of a certain field into
and through a pond, and there imprisoning him.
Second count for assault and imprisonment.
The defendants pleaded, first, not guilty; and then, as
assistants of John Powell, justified the assaulting, seizing,
and laying hold of the plaintiff, and a little pulling and
dragging him about, on the ground that the plaintiff was
unlawfully in a close of John Powell's and refused to go
out when civilly requested.
The jury having found Parker and John Powell guilty on
the general issue, with bl. damages, and having found a
verdict for the defendants on the residue of the record,
Ludlow, Serjt., moved to enter up judgment for Parker
and Powell, notwithstanding the verdict against them on
the general issue, on the ground that the dragging through
the pond, which was not adverted to in the pleas of justification, was only matter of aggravation; the gist of the action being the assault and battery, which were covered by
the pleas of justification. Taylor v. Cole, 3 T. E. 297 ; Dye
V. Leatherdale, 3 Wills. 20 ; Gates v. Bayley, 3 Wills. 313 ;
Fisherwood v. cited Cannon, 3 T. E. 297; Stammers v.
Yearsley, 10 Bingh. 35 ; Cheasley v. Barnes, 10 East, 73.

I

TiNDAL, C. J. :
agree in the rule of law as laid down
by the counsel for the defendants, that where in trespass
a defendant pleads a justification, going to the gist of the
action, it is not necessary to include that which is mere matBut that brings us to the application
ter of aggravation.
of the rule, and to the inquiry whether it will serve the defendants or not. And we have only to look to the pleadings,
here, and to apply our common sense to the allegation that
the defendants dragged the plaintiff through a pond, to see
that it is a distinct and substantive trespass, and not part
of the assault of which the plaintiff first complains. He jd-
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leges that the defendants assaulted, seized, and laid hold of
him, pnlled and dragged him about, struck him many violent blows, forced him out of a certain field, into and
through a pond, and there imprisoned him. It does not appear where the pond was, whether in the field or not. However, waiving that, how much do the defendants justify?
The assaulting, seizing, and laying hold of the plaintiff,
and a little pulling and dragging him about, altogether
omitting to notice the allegation in the declaration, that the
plaintiff was forced through a pond.
The question is,
whether this was a separate and distinct trespass, or a mere
aggravation of the original assault; and it is plain that
this was one link in a chain of trespasses following each
other, and not a mere aggravation of the first assault
that assault were alone the gist of the action, and justifying the gist were to be considered a justification of all
that followed, we might suppose a case in which, after the
assault, the assailant might throw his adversary over a
precipice and break his arm. Would that, which stands on
such distinct grounds, be justified by any answer to the
assault ? From one assault to another it might proceed to
a contest in which the life of the plaintiff might be at
stake. In like manner, as the outrage in question is no
part of the trespass included in the justification, and would
have required a distinct statement of facts to justify
*
*
not covered by the defendants' plea.

is

*

it

it,

If

a

is

is

I

am also of opinion that this was a subGaseleb, J.:
not covered by the plea. If, in
stantive trespass, and
one transaction,
such cases, we were to say that the whole
single assault, much
and covered by a plea justifying
Suppose a case of assault, and
would remain unanswered.
in handcuffs, through the
the
party
assaulted,
dragging

J.

•

BOSANQUET,

•

a

streets to a place of confinement: could a defendant justify
debt?
that by pleading that he arrested the party for
*

a

is

is

The defendants profess to justify the assault, battery,
and puUing and dragging about; and then contend, because
they have justified that, that the dragging through the pond
only part of the manner in which the trespass was comnot reasonable construction of the decla^
mitted. That
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The defendants have pointed out their justification to the battery only, leaving the affair of the pond unanswered; and, as that was also a substantive trespass,
the plaintiff ought to retain his verdict.
Bule discharged.
ration.

HUEST

V.

COOK.

Supreme Court of New York.
19 Wendell,

1838.

463.

Pemurrer to plea of property in a third person in an
The plaintiff, John Hurst, declared in
action of trover.
trover, for the taking and conversion of certain goods and
chattels belonging to him. The defendant pleaded that he
as a deputy of the sheriff of Onondaga, by virtue of two
executions against one Thomas Hurst, for the purpose of
satisfying the same, took the goods and chattels specified
in the declaration, "the same then and there being the
property of the said Thomas Hurst." To Which plea the
plaintiff demurred, assigning as special causes of demurrer, that the plea amounted to the general issue.
By the Court, Cowen, J. * * *
It must be admitted that the books are studded with
special pleas in the action of trover, even such as shew
that the plaintiff never had any cause of action. They set
up either property out of the plaintiff, or admit that it
belonged to him, and insist that the defendant lawfully took
and converted it : as that he distrained or took it in execution, or that he never did convert the property, and the
like. Many such pleas have passed mthout being met by
*
*
•
a special demurrer.

**********

Most of the eases, however, ancient and modem, have
overruled such pleas, on the, point of their sufficiency being
raised by special demurrer, assigning for cause that they

*
*
•
amounted to the general issue.
At a time when the judgments at "Westminster Hall stood
in singular conflict, and their reasoning and dicta on the
subject of these special pleas in trover exhibited contra-
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dictions and subtleties no less extraordinary, as may be
seen on a still closer examination of the cases, the courts
adopted and have since steadily pursued, if they have not
extended the doctrine of that line of authority which, taken
together, was found to repudiate all special pleas in trover
going to the original cause of action. * * *
It is also said in 1 Chitty's PI. 490, that the defendant
may, in trover, plead anything specially which admits
property in the plaintiff and a conversion by the defendant.
think he might have added that a special plea shewing either property out of the plaintiff or that there was
no conversion, or both, would be bad on special demurrer,
as amounting to the general issue. It may be taken as the
clear result of the more numerous
cases
including
modem authorities, of the course of which this court
strongly intimated its approbation in Kennedy v. Strong,
10 Johns. E. 289, that a special plea showing there never
was an unlawful conversion of the plaintiff's property, or
in other words, that he never had any cause of action, is
bad in form. But where the plea admits that there once
was a cause of action, and sets up subsequent matter in
discharge or avoidance, it may be pleaded specially.
The
issue
not
general
is,
guilty of the premises, etc. In good
sense, this denies all which the plaintiff, in legal effect,
alleges in his declaration, viz., property in himself and an
illegal conversion by the defendant. The evidence on
such an issue, so long as it is confined to the original cause
of action, comes literally within the scope of the pleadings,
as remarked by King, Ch. J., in regard to other actions on
"Everything which shews that the defendant
the case:
might do, may be given in evidence upon not
what
he
did
guilty pleaded; for that proves he had done no injury."
Anon. Com. Rep. 274. It is not necessary to say that the
defendant must plead even matter in discharge or avoidance. We know that generally he need not, though h<3 may
do so in actions of assumpsit, and especially in other actions on the case. 1 Clatty's PI. 486, and the cases there
have noticed the statute of limitations as a decited.
fence, which it is said must be pleaded. So of justification
in slander. But do not now remember any other exception to the rule that, in an action on the case, every matter
of defence may be received under the plea of not guilty. In
Bird V. Randall, 3 Burr. 1353, 1 Black. Rep. 388, S. C,

I

I

I
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Lord Mansfield made no exception.
pleas in bar, not in abatement.

[Chap.

Of course

I

I

7

speak of

presume tbe general issue has been pleaded, though
so, no
very properly omitted in the demurrer book.
amendment is necessary.
otherwise, the defendant may
now add the general issue.
Judgment for the plaintiff.

If

If

HUNTEE

V.

HATTON.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

1848.

This was an action of trespass

g. c.

/.,

4 GUI, 115.

brought on the 16th

a

February, 1844, by the appellant against the appellee, for
forcible entry into, and expulsion from a tract of land

it

called Boarmans Content.
The defendant, H. D. H., pleaded, 1st, nan cul.
2d. That the locus in quo, etc., is, and at the time was,
the proper soU and freehold of the said H. D, H., wherefore he entered, as
was lawful for him to do.
The defendant, G. K., pleaded nan cul.
The plaintiff joined issue on the general issue; and as
to second plea of H. D. H., replied, that the matters and
facts therein alleged, are not true, etc.
Ist Exception. At the trial of tiiis cause the plaintiff to
maintain the issues on his part, proved that some short
time before the institution of the present suit, the plaintiff was in the possession of the land and premises in the
declaration mentioned, called Boarmans Content, claiming
title to the same; and that he was engaged in the repairs
of the dwelling situated on said land, on the 3rd February,
1844. That during the night of that day, the said dwelling
house was forcibly entered, and broken open by some person or persons, and that on the next morning, when the
witnesses went to the said house, they found the defendants in the possession of the said house. That the defendants told the witnesses that they had taken possession of
the said house and premises, and that they meant to keep
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possession.
The defendants had with them, at that time,
guns, and threatened to shoot the servants of the plaintiff
if they came upon or crossed the said land. The said witnesses also proved, that the said defendants kept possession of the said house and premises for eight or ten days,
refusing to suffer or permit the plaintiff or his servants to
enter thereon.
The defendants then, for the purpose of maintaining the
issues on their part joined, proved to the jury, that the
said land and premises was formerly the property of
Gustavns Brown, deceased, father of Mary E. Brown, the
present wife of the defendant, Hatton; that Gustavus
Brown died intestate in 1830, seized of the said land, leaving Mary E. Brown, now the wife of the defendant Hatton,
his anly child and heir at law, who intermarried with the
said defendant, Hatton, in the year 1838.
The plaintiff then, further to maintain the issues on his
part joined, offered to prove, that after the death of the
said Gustavus Brown, the said land was sold by a decree
of Prince George's county court, sitting as a court of
equity, as the estate and for the benefit of the said Mary E.
Brown; and offered to prove that the same was, at that
sale, purchased by one Joseph Hatton, who subsequently
sold it to the plaintiff, and for that purpose offered to read
to the jury, the following record of a decree in Prince
George's county court, and all the proceedings therein.
[This record showed that on December 12, 1837, a petition was filed in the Prince George's County Court, on behalf of Mary E. Brovsm, an infant, for the sale of the said
land called Boarmans Content, and that a decree was made
ordering its sale by Gustavus Brown as trustee, on two
years' credit. On October 14, 1841, H. D. Hatton and Mary
E., his wife, filed a petition alleging that a pretended sale
of the land had been made to Joseph Hatton, but the same
had not been reported to the court or ratified, that no part
of the purchase money had been paid, that the trustee was
dead and Joseph Hatton insolvent and praying for a new
Joseph Hatton answered that he
trustee and a resale.
had been let into possession of the land, had given a bond
with security for the purchase money,, and had sold the
land to Peter D. Hatton who had been in possession ever
since, and prayed for the appointment of a trustee to convey the land to Peter D. Hatton, who was willing to pay as
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soon as he could get title.
On July 8, 1844, Robert W.
Hunter filed a petition alleging the sale to Joseph Hatton,
his purchase of the land from Joseph, his payment of the
entire purchase money to H. D. and Mary E. Hatton with
the consent of Joseph, and praying that he be substituted
for Joseph as purchaser, the sale ratified and a new trustee
appointed to convey. A decree was made pursuant to this
prayer, and Thomas F. Bowie was appointed trustee to
complete the trust.]*®
The plaintiff also offered in evidence the deed of Thomas
F. Bowie, as trustee under the decrees aforesaid, to R. W.
Hunter, for the land decreed to be sold, bearing date 9th
September, 1844, duly acknowledged and recorded.
But the defendants objected to the admissibility of the
*
*
*
said record and deed.
*
*
*
The court (A. C. Magrudee, C. J.) sustained
*
*
*
The plaintiff excepted.
the objections.

J.,

delivered the opinion of this court.
The defendants in this case severed in pleading; Kendrick relying on the general issue plea of not guilty, only;
and Henry D. Hatton, in addition to the general issue, having pleaded libenim tenementum. Issues were joined upon
the pleas of not guilty; and to the plea of liberum tenementum, the replication contained nothing more than a
general traverse of the facts contained in the plea.
On the trial, the plaintiff having proved his actual possession of the close on which the trespass is alleged to
have been committed; and the defendant, Hatton, having
proved a freehold interest therein, jure uxoris, the plaintiff offered in evidence a record of certain proceedings on
the equity side of Prince George's County Court, instituted in 1837 (whilst she was sole and an infant), for the
sale of her real estate, descended to her from her father, it
being the freehold in controversy in this case; and also
the deed of conveyance thereof, of the trustee to the appellant.
The admissibility of this evidence being objected to, a
great variety of grounds have been relied on by the apthe testimony were
pellees in support of the objection.
admissible for none of the purposes for which it was ofDoESEY,

If

49.

Condensed statement of part of the facts by the editoy.
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fered, by reason of any of the causes assigned in the court
below for its rejection, or which can be urged here, then
must the dedsion of the county court in the first bill of
exceptions be sustained.

But it is alleged that the conveyance by the trustee to the

purchaser, being several months posterior to the trespass
for which the present action was brought, that although it
were conceded that the appellant was rightfully possessed
of the land, and entitled to hold such possession adversely
to the appellee, Hatton, the owner of the freehold, yet, that
in the present state of the pleadings, such right of possession in the appellant, formed no part of the issue on the
plea of liberum tenementum; and, therefore, upon the issue
joined thereon, no evidence could be admitted to prove
such mere right of possession in the appellant; that if intended as an answer to the plea of liberum tenementum, it
should have been specially pleaded by way of replication.
And when regarding the title of the appellant as a mere
right of possession, the objection to the admissibility of the
record offered in evidence should have been sustained.
Liberum tenem,entum is a plea interposed by a defendant,
for the purpose of trying his right to the freehold; it is
not an absolute denial of all colorable right to possession by
the defendant.

The opinion of Lord Denman, C.

J.,

in Doe v. Wright, 37
Eng. C. L. B. 231, does not, as has been asserted, clearly
show, that upon the issue joined in this case on the plea of
liberum tenementum, the superior possessory right of the
appellant can be given in evidence. His lordship says, "It
is necessary to settle what is the true meaning of liberum
tenementum; what it admits, and what it denies. Now
if it is pleaded in answer to a possessory action, it must admit a possession in the plaintiff, or it would be bad, as
amounting to the general issue. It must admit such a possession as would suffice to maintain the action if unanswered, or as against a wrongdoer. On the other hand, it must
deny a rightful possession, or it would fail as a defence to
the action. In the language of pleading, it gives implied colour to the plaintiff, but asserts a freehold in the defendant,
In an ordinary
with a right to immediate possession.
case, therefore, such a plea is answered, by replying a term
of years in the plaintiff created by the defendant, which

[Chap. 7
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colorable
not
plaintiff's
merely
possession is
shews that the
Such a replication admits the freehold in
but rightful."
the defendant, and only asserts a right of possession in
the plaintiff. On an issue upon such a replication, the question to be tried by the jury would be the plaintiff's right of
possession. But what is the matter to be tried under the
issue in this case, on the plea of liberum tenementum?
The jury,
Whether the freehold be in the defendant?
upon finding that fact, have nothing to do with the right
of possession. The plaintiff's traverse of the plea admits
the defendant's right to the possession, should the jury
These views, it is befind him entitled to the freehold.
lieved, are sustained by Thompson v. Hardinge, 50 Eng.
C. L. B. 940, where Matjle, J., says, "The plea of liberum
tenementum does not assert a freehold interest only, but
present freehold, a right of immediate possession as
And Coltman, J., who deagainst any other freehold."
livered the opinion of the court in that case, said, "We
are of opinion, that if the freehold is in the lord, the
tenant's interest must be of a subordinate nature, and
must be replied, on the same principle on which a term
of years must be pleaded in answer to a plea of liberum
tenementum."
And in 1 Chit. PI. 503, it is thus stated:
"In observing upon the qualities of pleas, we shall hereafter see that a special plea in trespass, which claims for
the defendant a possessory right, and yet does not give
the plaintiff express color, is bad, because it amounts to
the general issue, and violates the principle that a plea
must deny or confess and avoid the matter alleged in
A plea of liberum tenementum, is free
the declaration.
from this objection, because it gives apparent color, as
it is not absolutely and manifestly inconsistent therewith, that the plaintiff might have had some inferior leasehold or minor title, in respect whereof he might have had
possessory right or title, or at least, possession." And in
treating of the plea of liberum tenementwm, it is stated:
"Thus if the defendant be in reality the freeholder, so that
the plaintiff cannot with safety deny the plea he is driven
to admit its truth, and to deduce a title from the defendant,
as that he demised the close to the plaintiff," etc. And in
page 595, "if the plaintiff derive title under the defendant,
then he must not traverse his plea; but confessing the defendant's title, must reply the lease, or some -other title under him, concluding with a verification."
598

Sec. 1]

Aj-fibmative Pi^as in Bae.

599

But although the record, apart from the

deed of conveyance by the trustee, is not under the pleadings in this cause,
admissible in evidence of the possessory right thereunder
acquired by the plaintiff, yet when offered with such deed
of conveyance, it is competent testimony to go to the jury
to shew that the freehold, in the premises in question, is
not in the defendant, but in the plaintiff.
It is true, the
present action was instituted on the 16th day of February,
1844, a few days after the commission of the trespass complained of ; and that the deed of conveyance from the trustee to the appellant, bears date on the ninth day of September of the same year, some months after both the cause and
commencement of the present action. This deed, however,
does not operate to pass the freehold, merely from the time
of its execution; but being a conveyance under a judicial
sale, upon the principles of relation, it operates retrospectively, and vests the freehold estate in the premises, in
the grantee from the date of the sale; and therefore disproves and defeats the plea of liherum tenementum, by
shewing that, by operation of law, at the time the trespass
was committed, the freehold was in the plaintiff.
See
Viner's Abr., tit. Kelation, 290, and Jackson v. Ramsay, 3
Cowen, 75, and the cases therein referred to.
It hence follows that the county court erred, in refusing
to permit the record and deed offered in evidence, in the
first bill of exceptions, to be read to the jury.

DUNLEVY

V.

FENTON.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
80

1908.

Vermont, 505.

Assumpsit for breach of a marriage promise. Heard on
special demurrer to plaintiff's replication to defendant's
sixth special plea, at the September term, 1907, Windham
County, Hasblton, J., presiding. Demurrer overruled and
The defendant excepted.
replication adjudged suificient.
The opinion states the substance of the pleadings in question.

Common Law Pleading.
[Chap. 7
MuNSON, J. : The plea alleges in substance that the plaintiff by her deed in writing under her hand and seal released
and discharged the defendant from the cause of action sued
upon, and covenanted and agreed that at the next succeeding term the suit should be entered "settled and discontinued," and makes profert of said deed.
The replication alleges in substance that the plaintiff
made said supposed deed of release and delivered it to one
Garceau, on condition and in consideration that the defendant then promised that he would make and deliver to the
plaintiff a like deed of release discharging the plaintiff to
the same extent, and would deliver to the plaintiff the pleas
prepared in the case, and would leave five hundred dollars
with Garceau for the plaintiff by a time stated, and that
both parties should treat such agreement as strictly confidential ; and alleges further that the parties were to meet
at Garceau 's office at the time stated, and that Garceau was
then to deliver said money to the plaintiff and said supposed deed of release to the defendant, but that said deed
was not to be of any force untU defendant had fully complied with every condition of said agreement; and alleges
further that the terms of said agreement were made public
by defendant; that said pleas were not delivered to the
plaintiff but were filed in court, and that neither the defendant's release nor said sum of money was delivered to
the plaintiff; that plaintiff was at Garceau 's office at the
time named and was then informed by Garceau that the
defendant had not left said money as agreed, and that plaintiff waited some time without the defendant appearing, and
then demanded of Garceau the return of her said supposed
and
deed of release, but that Garceau refused to return
to defendant's attorneys against
afterwards delivered
her protest, and that the supposed deed pleaded by defendant
not her deed of release; concluding with
verifibation.
The replication
demurred to; and special causes of
demurrer are assigned, which are in substance, that
does
not answer the plea, either by
general form of denial or
denial of any single material fact; that
advances
by
new matter, and thereby sets forth
contract different
from that stated in the plea, and so amounts to the general
issue and that
does not confess and avoid any material
allegation of the plea.
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The plaintiff argues that the replication is a proper plea
of confession and avoidance; that the matters set up in

avoidance were not coincident with the execution of the release, but occurred after its execution, and so constitute
no impeachment of its original validity; that the release
became inoperative by reason of these subsequent occurrences, and that matters of avoidance thus arising may be
specially pleaded.
It should be noticed at the outset that the matters set
up as occurring subsequently to the execution of the release are not matters that arose independently of the contract as the replication alleges it to have been made. These
subsequent occurrences, as alleged, were merely breaches
of an agreement under which the deed of release was made
and deposited.
The replication alleges a delivery to a
third person to be held for delivery to the defendant when
certain conditions were complied with, and a possession
wrongfully obtained without such compliance, and avers
in conclusion that such supposed deed of release is not the

plaintiff's

A

deed.

is

is

a

1

is

it,
is

is

is
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plea of confession and avoidance must at least give
color to the matter to which it is applied ; that
must so
far confess the matter adversely alleged as to give the opposite party an apparent right — must contain at least an
implied admission that the allegations to be avoided are
true. Dunklee v. Goodenough, 65 Vt. 257; Baker v. Sherplea of confession and
man, 75 Vt. 88. It follows that
avoidance which in effect denies the existence of the claim
The plea rests upon the confesdefective.
opposes
nothing
no such adverse claim there
sion, for if there
Connected with this
requiring new matter in avoidance.
the doctrine that a
rule, and largely depending upon
the
issue
bad.
to
Chitamounting
general
special plea
different contract
ty, 526, A plea which sets up in reply
an argubad for this reason. It
from the one alleged
pleader
must
prove
mentative denial of what the adverse
to sustain his claim. Kimball v. Railroad Co., 55 Vt. 95;

is

&

5

A.
E. 153.
Hayselden v. Staff,
The allegation of the replication that the plaintiff made
the supposed deed of release pleaded by the defendant
not sufficient to give color. The plaintiff's brief proceeds
upon the theory that the deed of release went into effect
and was made inoperative by subsequent occurrences, but
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the allegations of the replication show that the deed never
The replication sets forth a contract
became operative.
which led to the preparation of a deed of release, but the
contract as set forth is eniirely inconsistent with the existence of the release as the defendant claims it. When a
deed is deposited with a third person to be delivered to
the grantee only upon the performance of some condition
precedent, and the depositary delivers it without the performance of the condition, there is no delivery in law, and
the deed is without effect. Stiles v. Broiim, 16 Vt 563. We
•
•
•
hold the replication insufficient.

CITTY

V.

MANUFACTUEING

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

COMPANY.
1893.

93 Tennessee, 276.

Wilkes,

J,:

The only question of importance in this
cause is whether the statute of frauds can be relied upon
under the general issue, or whether it must be specially
pleaded by the defendant, in order that he may obtain the
benefit of the same. The decisions are uniform that the
statute must be set up in the pleadings, and its benefits
claimed in all cases where, in fact or in law, the defendant
admits making the alleged contract, otherwise the defendant will be held to have waived the benefit of it.
In many of the States of the Union, and in England until the making of the late rules under the Judicature Act,
it was held that a denial of the agreement set up places
the burden of proving it upon the plaintiff, and he must
sustain it by proper evidence, and the objection that parol
evidence is insufficient may be interposed at any time. See
the cases cited and collated in 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p.
747; Eotchkiss v. Ladd, 86 Am. Dec. 682; Talbot v. Bowen,
10 Am. Dec. 747 ; Wynn v. Garland, 68 Am. Dec. 191.
On the other hand, it is held in many of the States that
a failure to plead the statute specially is held to be a waiver
of its benefit, and a consent that the agreement may be
proven by parol. It has been so held in Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri, Maine, Massachusetts, and other

Sec.

IJ

Affibmattte Puias in Bab.

States.
See
McCandy, 32
639; Gorden
Maine, 227;
cases.

Brigham v. Carlisle, 78 Ala. 243; Gwynn v.
Ark. 97; Illinois Coal Co. v. Leddell, 69 HI.
v. Madden, 82 Mo. 193 ; Farrell v. Tillson, 76
Graff am v. Pierce, 143 Mass. 386, and other

consider the question

"We

W6

cisions.

•

At

an open one under our de-

•••••••••

the present time our holding is that such contracts
are voidable merely, at the option of either party, and not
void. See Brahefield v. Anderson, 3 Pickle, 606.
In view of this holding, we are of opinion the better practice is to require the statute of frauds to be specially pleaded whenever it is desired to rely upon it as a defense. To
allow the defendant to proceed with his defense and speculate upon his chances of a successful opposition until a
large bill of cost has accumulated, and then, when he finds
the chances against him, to permit him to interpose the
statute, would be an unreasonable advantage to him at the
the contract is voidable under
expense of the plaintiff.
the statute, and the defendant intends to rely upon that
fact and avoid
but just that he should so notify the
he does
plaintiff, to the end that the litigation may end.
not rely upon the statute in his pleading,
but just that
the contract be enforced.

is

is

If

it

it

it,

If

is

not
The mere denial of the execution of the contract
equivalent to denying its validity and legality, since the
contract may have been made, and stiU be invalid and voidable under the statute.

a

is

is

reversed, and appelThe judgment of the court below
relee win pay the costs of the appeal, and the cause
new trial. The costs of
manded to the court below for
will
be
that court.^°
adjudged
by
court
below
the

is

J.

it

it

\t

it

it

is

•
•
•
But upon principle, the plea [of
50. Accord: —"Spbncek,
well pleaded, if the promise laid in the second
the statute of frauds]
be in writing.
The rule
this, in an
count, is not a yalid promise, unless
action of assumpsit, matter which shows that no contract was made, cannot
be pleaded; but matter which admits the contract as laid, but shows that
being matter
was not binding in point of law, may be pleaded, because,
Myers v. Morse (1818) 15
to the court."
is proper to show
of law,

Johns.

Y.)

(N.
* Under the former system of pleading
•
Contra. — "Paek, B.
[before
the Kules of Hilary term] the plaintiff was required to prove a writing within
the statute of frauds. This must have been in order to support some allegano allegation, except that of the making
tion of his declaration, and there
is

425.
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This allegation is still put in issue by
of the contract, which it supports.
Buttemere v. Hayes . (1839) 5 M. & W. 456.
the plea of non-assumpsit."
In Euggles v, Gatton (1869) 50 111. 412, it was held that the defense was
available either by special plea or in evidence under the general issue.

CITY, MEMPHIS AND BIEMINGHAM
EAILEOAD COMPANY v. CROCKER.

KANSAS

Supreme Court of Alabama.
95

1891.

Alabama, 412.

"Walkee, J.: It is insisted in the application for a rehearing that the defense of contributory negligence could
be made under the general issue. The scope of that plea is
prescribed by the statute. It puts in issue "all the material allegations of the complaint. ' ' Code of 1886, sec. 2675.
Of this statutory plea it was said in Petty v. Dill, 53 Ala.
645:
"It cast on the plaintiffs the onus of proving every
material allegation of the complaint ; it limited the defense
to evidence in disproof of them. -No matter in avoidance
of the allegations of the complaint, or in excuse or justification of the wrongful act imputed to the defendant, was
within the issue found. All such matters the statute required to be specially pleaded. * * * If it was intended
*
*
*
h^q matter of avoidance
to confess and avoid,
should have been specially pleaded. The general denial
of the allegations of the complaint was not sufficient to put
it in issue." It is well settled, that any defense, special in
its nature, or reaching beyond a mere denial of the material
allegations of the complaint, is required by the statute to
be presented by a special plea. Rowland v. Wallace, 81
Ala. 238; Daniel v. Rardwiclc, 88 Ala. 557; Slaughter v.
Swift, 67 Ala. 494. The question, then, is, does a statement
of a cause of action based upon the charge that the defendant was negligent, involve the assertion that no negligence
on the part of the plaintiff proximately contributed to the
injury of wbich he complains, so that a mere denial of the
allegations of the complaint casts the burden on the plaintiff to show that he was not guilty of contributory negligence ? As shown in the opinion already delivered in this
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a

is

is

a

is

&

is

it

a

is

is,

case, this court has several times decided that contributory
negligence is in its nature defensive, and that it is not iacumbent on the plaintiff in the first instance to negative the
defense either in his pleading or in his proof. Contributory negligence is none the less defensive because the
proof of it is disclosed in the evidence which the' plaintiff
himself offers in support of the charge that the defendant
was negligent. The ruling in North Birmingham Street
Railway Co. v. Calderwood, 89 Ala. 254, that the burden
of proving contributory negligence is not on the defendant
when it is shown by the evidence introduced by the plaintiff, has not been adhered to. The rule on this subject
which we regard as correct is thus stated in a later case :
"The onus in this regard is in all cases on the defendant,
though plaintiff's evidence sometimes relieves from the
necessity of discharging it." Geo. Pac. Railway Co. v.
Davis, 92 Ala. 312. The defendant need not introduce evidence in support of a special plea, if the evidence introduced by the plaintiff has already established the defense.
But the source from which the evidence to support a defense conies does not determine that it was not purely defensive matter, and available only under a special plea, or
that the burden to prove it was not on the defendant. The
term "contributory negligence," instead of implying such
a denial of the material allegations of the complaint as is
made by pleading the general issue, implies just the conthat the detrary. The theory of this special defense
fendant was negligent, but that the negligence of the. plaintiff conduced to the injury complained of. The defense
in the nature of a confession and avoidance. It may be
single allegation of the
fully made out without denying
is, that admitting that the decomplaint. Tie pith of
yet the plaintiff
as
not
was
charged,
negligent
fendant
entitled to recover because his own negligence proximately
contributed to the injury. The plea of contributory negligence, when standing by itself, admits the negligence
L. N. R. R. Co. v. Hall, 87 Ala.
charged in the complaint.
708; Carter v. Chambers, 79 Ala. 229; Geo. Pac. Railway
Co. V. Lee, 92 Ala. 270. Now, the very essence of the gendenial of all the material allegations of the
eral issue
counted on, the fact of negcomplaint. When negligence
certainly denied by the general issue. The same
ligence
denial and an admission of the
words cannot at once be
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The
same thing.
in a double sense.

statutory general issue does not palter
It does not admit what it denies. True,
it was said in Government St. R. R. Co. v. Hanlon, 53 Ala.
70, that the defense of contributory negligence was available under the general issue. The statement of this proposition was not necessary to the decision in that case. It is
stated in the report that the record did not disclose upon
what pleas the case had been tried. Such being the case,
as it appeared that the defence of contributory negligence
was considered without objection on the trial, it could have
been presumed, in favor of the correctness of the rulings
of the lower court, that the defense was presented by a
special plea. Brinson v. Edwards, 94 Ala. 447. The proposition, however, that the defense of contributory negligence
could have been availed of under the general issue, was
simply asserted without discussion or argument, and the
only authority cited in support of it was Steele v. BurlcThe ruling of the Massachusetts
hardt, 104 Mass. 59.
court in the case cited is put upon the ground that the plaintiff's allegation that the injury happened in consequence
of the negligence of the defendant implies that there was
no negligence on the part of the plaintiff which contributed
to the injury, and throws upon him the burden of proving
that he was free from such negligence. It is now well settled in this State that no such implication is involved in the
plaintiff's
that the defendant's
allegation
negligence
caused the injury, and the burden is not primarily on the
plaintiff to negative fault on his part. During the sixthat have elapsed since the case above cited
from 53 Ala. was decided, many phases of the defense of
contributory negligence have been passed on by this court.
The proposition that that defense is available under the
general issue has not been reaffirmed. This court has declined to reaffirm the proposition. Montgomery S Eufaula
R. Co. V. Chambers, 79 Ala. 342. In Rich & Danv. R. Co.
V. Hammond, 93 Ala. 181, it was distinctly recognized, that
the defense is one requiring a special plea to support it.
As the nature of the defense has been brought out in clearer light in the later decisions, its distinctive character as a
A defense
special defense has been fully established.
in
which
its very nature concedes the truth of the charge
against the defendant, but avoids the effect of the concession by making a counter charge against the plaintiff,
teen years
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cannot reasonably or logically be availed of under a plea
which limits the defendant to evidence in disproof of the
charge made in the complaint.
"We adhere to the ruling
that the defense of contributory negligence must be made
by a special plea. On this point the case of Government
St. R. B. Co. V. Hanlon, supra, must be overruled.

BRIDGE

V.

THE GRAND JUNCTION RAILWAY
COMPANY.

Court of Exchequer.
e Meeson

S Welshy,

1838,
244.

Case.
The declaration stated, that, before and at the
time of the committing of the grievances thereinafter mentioned, to-wit, on the 9th September, 1837, the plaintiff was
a passenger by a certain carriage forming part of a certain
train of railway carriages then being on a journey on and
by a certain railway, to-wit, the Liverpool and Manchester
Eailway; and the said company was also then possessed of
a certain other train of railway carriages then also journeying on and by the said railway, under the care and management of certain servants of the said company; nevertheless the said company by their said servants, so carelessly, negligently and improperly behaved and conducted
themselves in and about the management, control, and direction of the said train of the said company, that the same,
by and through the default, carelessness, negligence and
improper conduct of the said servants of the said company,
then with great force and violence ran upon and against
the said train of carriages, in one whereof the plaintiff
then was being carried as aforesaid, and struck against
the same, by means whereof the said last-mentioned train
was very much injured, and the said carriage on which
the plaintiff then was, was driven in, broken to pieces, and
destroyed, and thereby three of his the plaintiff's riba
were fractured and broken, and he was otherwise greatly
wounded, bruised and injured, etc.
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Plea, that, before and at the time of committing the
grievances in the declaration alleged, the said train of carriages, in one whereof the plaintiff was a passenger, did
not belong to the defendants, nor was the same under the
care and management of the defendants or of their servants, but imder the care and management of other persons ; that before and at the time when, etc., in the declaration mentioned, the said train of railway carriages of the
defendants was lawfully proceeding on the said railway,

o:^

and that the persons who had the management, control,
and direction of the said train of carriages, in one whereof
the plaintiff was then being carried^ carelessly, negligently,
and improperly behaved and conducted themselves in and
aboTjt the management, control and direction of the same,
and that, in part by and through the default, carelessness,
and negligence, etc., of the last-mentioned persons, as well
as in part by and through the default, carelessness, and negligence, etc., by or on the part of the servants of the defendants in and about the management, etc.,
the said
train of carriages of the defendants, the said train of carriages of the defendants ran upon and against the said
train of carriages, in one whereof the plaintiff was then
being carried, and struck against the same, and occasioned
the damage, injuries, etc., in the declaration mentioned.

Verification.
Special demurrer,

assigning

the plea amounts to not

the following causes: that
•

•

*

•

Section

2.

•

The plea undoubtedly amounts to the gen-

•

Paeke, B.:
eral issue.

guilty.

Pleas in Estoppel.

Appellate Court
34

of

CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS

v.

FLANNIGEN.

Illinois, Fourth District.

Illinois Appellate,

1889,

596.

:

The city of East St. Louis brought this suit
Reeves, J.
against Alexander Flannigen and the other appellees, on
his bond as treasurer of said city. The declaration avers
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the appointment of Flannigen as treasurer, on the 20tli day
of April, 1886, and the execution of the bond sued on. The
declaration sets forth the ordinance of said city defining
the duties of the treasurer, and alleges that on the 31st
day of August, 1886, the city council passed its annual appropriation ordinance, by which the sum of $113,056 was
appropriated to be applied as follows: * * *
On the 14th day of September, 1886, the city council
passed an ordinance for the annual tax levy of $64,129,
which amount was declared to be to defray the expenses
of said city for the year 1886, as provided by the appropriation ordinance for the fiscal year beginning July 1,
*
•
•
1886, as follows, to- wit:
The declaration further avers that there came into the
hands of said Flannigen, as treasurer of the funds belonging to fiscal year 1885, the sum of $28,494.74, and afterward at divers times between July 1, 1886, and April 14,
1887, there came into his hands of the funds of said city
for the fiscal year 1886, the following sums, to-wit ; * * •
AH of which, except the sum of $20,000, came into his
hands after the adoption of the appropriation ordinance
aforesaid, and was subject to the classification and distribution by said ordinance provided, and that it was the
duty of said treasurer to so classify and distribute the

same.

*

*

*

Four breaches were assigned.
First. That Flannigen did not classify and distribute
the moneys coming into his hands as treasurer for the

fiscal year 1886, as required by the appropriation and tax
levy ordinances, whereby the city suffered $5,000 damages.
The 1st,
Nineteen pleas were filed by the defendants.
2nd, 3rd and 4th were to the first breach; the 5th, 6th,
and 7th were to the second breach; the 8th, 9th, 10th,

11th and 12th were to the third breach ; the 13th, 14th and
15th were to the fourth breach; the 16th, 17th and 18th to
the declaration, arid the 19th plea to the third and fourth
breaches.
To the 1st, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th,^llth, 13th, 14th, 16th,
17th and 19th pleas a demurrer was interposed and to the
remaining pleas replications were filed. The demurrei
to the pleas named was overruled, and the plaintiff stood
by its demurrer, and as the 16th and 17th pleas purported
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to answer the whole declaration there was judgment on
demurrer for defendants, from which this appeal is prosecuted.
The errors assigned are that the circuit court
erred in overruling the demurrer to pleas, in rendering
judgment for defendants and in not sustaining the demurrer to pleas. So it wUl be seen that the question presented for our consideration is whether the court properly
overruled the demurrer to the several pleas named above.
The first plea is to the first breach hereinbefore set forth,
and is in substance that the defendant Flannigen, as treasurer, on the 13th day of April, 1887, made full and complete
report, and submitted the same to the city council, showing
the moneys received by him as such treasurer and the disbursement thereof, and the city councU with full knowledge
of all the facts, then and there approved said report and
confirmed and ratified the disbursements made by him as
treasurer, and then and there approved of the manner ia
which said Flannigen had kept the account of said city,
and this the defendants are ready to verify, etc. It would
seem, if this plea can be sustained at all, it must be as a
plea of estoppel.
A plea in estoppel neither denies the allegations of the
opposite party as in a plea of traverse, nor admits them
as in a plea of confession and avoidance, but alleges some
new matter which precludes the opposite party from making the allegations contained in his declaration.
Steph.
PI., 219, 220; Gould PL, 39 to 42. This plea is recognized
as a distinct plea to the action, and is not, technically
speaking, a plea in bar, which must either deny or admit
and avoid the allegations of the declaration (1 Chitty, 551) ;
but as it is a plea to the action it is usually spoken of as
a plea in bar. Without denying any of the facts alleged
in the breach, it avers that with full knowledge of all the
facts as to the manner in which Flannigen kept his books
as treasurer and as to how he had paid out the moneys referred to in this breach, the city council approved and ratified what had been done, and the legal principle imderlying the defense claimed is, that with such full knowledge of ■
all the facts the city, by its council, ratified and approved
what had been done and is now estopped from alleging that
these payments were not properly and legally made. As
a plea of estoppel it is defective in form and substance.
This plea, without confessing or denying the matter of fact
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adversely alleged, relies merely on some matter of estoppel as ground for excluding the opposite party from the
allegation of fact. Like pleadings in abatement, this plea
has formal commencement and conclusion to mark its special character and quality and to distinguish it from an ordinary plea in bar. Stephens on Pleading, 219 and 220.
It would seem at common law, this defect of want of formal commencement and conclusion of the plea could be
reached by a general demurrer, and this rule was not
changed until the Statute of 4 and 5 Anne, which is not in
force in this State.
But if we concede that under our statute and practice
this defect could only be reached by special demurrer, there
is another defect in this plea which may be reached by
general demurrer. It is a necessary averment ia a plea
of estoppel that the new matter in the plea shall be relied
on as estoppel and so pleaded. Co. Litt, 303 b, Com. Dig. ;
Pleader E. 31; Estoppel B.; 1 Saund. 325a, note (4);
Shelly V. Wright, Willis, 13; Steph. PI., 2d Ed. 443. As
has been seen, this is not a plea of discharge, for that is
a plea of confession and avoidance.
Reversed and, remanded.^^
Lord Coke stated the rule which
strictness in pleading estoppels.
51.
has since been followed, "that every estoppel, because it concludeth a man to
Coke on Littleton, B'k
allege the truth, must be eertaiu to every intent."
The rule seems to have caused little inconvenience, though on
ch. VI.
See the discussion on this point by Kedfield,
principle it is probably wrong.
J., in Gray v. Pingry (1845) 17 Vt. 419, where he says that the doctrine of
estoppel by former adjudication, "instead of being an odious doctrine, ia
one of the most salutary and conservative doctrines of the law."

III,

WEBSTEE

V.

STATE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
81

1906,

Vermont, 75.

PowEES, J.: This case comes before us on the defendant's exceptions to the judgment of the county court overruling the special demurrers to the plaintiff's amended
replications to the defendant's third, fourth and fifth pleas.
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By the third plea, it is alleged that, notwithstanding

certain express conditions, stipulations and agreements
in the policy of insurance sued upon, the plaintiff failed
and
to give immediate written notice to the defendant,
limwithin
the
time
failed to make proper proofs of loss
ited in the policy.
To this plea, the plaintiff replies that
within the specified time, she, in good faith, gave the defendant a true and accurate list of the property, the value
and loss thereon, and offered to furnish the defendant
whatever proof thereof it might require; which said list
the defendant carried away and kept, without making any
objection to the form or suiBciency thereof, either "at that
time or at any time in season for her to repair the error,
if any, therein; and that the defendant then and there
"waived the technical, literal requirements of said policy

in that respect."
To this replication the defendant demurs specially, on
the ground (1) that it neither confesses and avoids nor
*
*
denies the allegations of the plea. *
It is an elementary rule of pleading, as claimed by the
defendant, that the pleader, if he does not demur, must
either traverse or confess and avoid all the material allegations to which he makes answer. 1. Chitt. PI. (14th Am.
Ed.) 524a; Stephen PI. (Heard's Ed.) 138. But this rule

has no application to pleadings in estoppel. Stephen PI.
219 ; Gould PI. Ch. II, sec. 39.
Such pleadings neither confess nor deny the truth of the allegations which they answer,
but deny the right of the party to allege the facts. It is
said that such pleas are not technically pleas in bar, though
like pleas in bar they deny the right of action or defence,
by denying the right to assert the facts. East St. Louis v.
Flamiigan, 34 111. App. 601. The issue which they present is not to determine the truth or validity of the particular facts pleaded, but the right and power of the party to
insist upon them. So if the plea under consideration is
a plea in estoppel, it is not open to the first objection speciThe terms "waiver" and "estopfied in the demurrer.
pel," as applied to the law of insurance contracts, are usually used as meaning the same thing and they are so used
in many of our own cases. Courts have frequently asserted
that they are convertible terms, as was done in Security
Ins. Go. V. Fay (Mich.), 7 Am. Rep. at page 674; EllioU «.
Lycoming County Mut. Ins. Co. (Penn.), 5 Am. Rep. a?
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page 325; Ins. Co. v. Wolf (U. S.), 24 L. Ed. 387; ZJmiec^
Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 47 L. R. A. 450. A closer
inspection of the matter, however, convinces ns that they
are essentially different. A waiver involves the act or ^.-uPxduct of one of the parties to the contract, only. An estoppel involves the act or conduct of both parties to the contract. McCormich v. Ins. Co., 86 Cal. 260. A waiver is the
intentional relinqnishment of a known right. Donahue v.
Ins. Co., 56 Vt. 374. It involves both knowledge and intent. An estoppel may arise where there is no intent to
mislead. A waiver does not necessarily imply that one has
been misled to his prejudice or into an altered position.
Metcalf V. Phenix Ins. Co. (R. L), 43 Atl. 541; HanscomV. Home Ins. Co.
(Me.), 38 Atl. 324; Washburn v. Life
Ins. Co. (Ala.), 38 So. 1011; Queens Ins. Co. v. Young
(Ala.), 11 Am. St. Rep. 51. An estoppel always involves
this element. A waiver may amount to an estoppel, but
not necessarily so. Though the conduct of the insurer may
not have misled the insured to his prejudice, yet if with full
knowledge he intentionally elects not to take advantage of
the forfeiture, the law in its zeal to avert the forfeiture will
hold the insurer irrevocably bound as by an election to
treat the contract as if no cause of forfeiture had occurred.
And this election may be either express or implied.
We think the replication to the third plea must be considered to set up a waiver rather than an estoppel. It commences with the usual precludi non and concludes with a
prayer for judgment for damages; while the proper commencement of a replication in estoppel is that "the defendant ought not to be admitted or received to plead" the
matter set out in the plea; and it should conclude with a
prayer for judgment "whether the defendant ought to be
admitted and received, against his own conduct, etc., to
plead the plea," etc. Shelley v. Wright, Willes, 9, approved
in Gray v. Pingry, 17 Vt. 419. It lacks an essential element of estoppel — the reliance to her prejudice by the
plaintiff upon the conduct of the defendant. The pleader
alleges that the defendant "waived" the requirements of
the policy, instead of alleging that the defendant is "estopped," apparently having in mind the distinction herein

pointed out.
We can see no very good reason why a replication setting up a technical waiver would not be classed with those
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setting up a technical estoppel, and so not required by the
rules of pleading to traverse or confess and avoid ; but we
think that this replication does suflSciently confess and
avoid by implication, which is just as good as an express
confession. Baker v. Sherman, 75 Vt. 88, 53 Atl. 330. The
question is, whether the language can fairly be construed
as an admission of the facts alleged in the plea. Blood v.
Adams, 33 Vt 52. As we have Seen, the commencement
and conclusion are those of confession and avoidance. It
is alleged that the defendant did not make objection in
season for the plaintiff to repair the error, if any; and
that the defendant waived the technical, literal requirements in that respect. This last expression must be taken
to mean in respect to the matters set up in the plea. Clearly,
these allegations are entirely inconsistent with a denial of
the facts in the plea. On the other hand, the whole tenor
thereof, fairly considered, implies an admission. See Mossmam v, Bostrich, 76 Vt. 409, 57 Atl. 995.

VOOGHT

V.

WINCH.

Court of King's Bench.
2

1819.

Barwwall S Alderson, 662.

[Plaintiff brought an action against defendant for di-

yerting the water in a stream so as to diminish the flow to
plaintiff's miU, and the defendant pleaded not guilty. On.
the trial the defendant gave in evidence the record of a
verdict and judgment obtained by him in a former action
between the same parties and for the same caiise of action.
It was insisted at the trial that this judgment was conclusive and operated as an estoppel, but the judge refused
to nonsuit the plaintiff.] ^^
Abbott, C. J. * * * Upon the second point
am of
that
opinion
the verdict and judgment obtained for the defendant in the former action was not conclusive evidence
against the plaintiff upon the plea of not guilly. It would
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indeed have been conclusive if pleaded in bar to the action
by way of estoppel. In that case the plaintiff would not be
allowed to discuss the case with the defendant, and for the
second time to disturb and vex him by the agitation of the
same question.
But the defendant has pleaded not guilty,
and has thereby elected to submit his cage to a jury. Now
if the former verdict was proper to be received in evidence
by the learnd judge, its effect must be left to the jury. If
it were conclusive indeed, the learned judge ought immediately to have nonsuited the plaintiff, or to have told the
jury that they were bound, in point of law, to find a verdict for the defendant. It appears to me, however, that the
party, by not pleading the former judgment in bar, consents that the whole matter shall go to a jury, and leaves
it open to them to inquire into the same upon evidence,
and they are to give their verdict upon the whole evidence
then submitted to them,
am aware that in Bird v. Randall, 3 Burr 1353, Lord Mansfield is reported to have said
that a former recovery need not be pleaded but will be a
bar when given in evidence.
cannot, however, accede to
that ; for the very first thing learnt in the study of the law
was that a judgment recovered must be pleaded.
That
has so strongly engrafted itself on my mind as a general
have heard in argument this day,
principle, that nothing
has shaken it.
am, therefore, of opinion, that there ought
not to be a nonsuit.
•
•
•
Bayley J. :
am of the same opinion.
An action is here brought, as it is alleged, for the same cause in
respect of which a former action had been brought, and in
Now a
which a verdict was obtained by the defendant.
defendant ought not, in point of law, to be twice vexed for
the same cause of action; and he would have had a right,
if he had thought fit, to have pleaded the former verdict
by way of estoppel, and thereby have shewn that the plaintiff was not at liberty to try that question a second time,
which had been tried before and decided against him. Instead, however, of putting himself on that estoppel, he
merely says, that he is not guilty of the offence imputed
to bim ; and, upon that issue, the jury are to try, not whether the plaintiff is estopped from trying the question, but
whether the defendant be guilty or not. Upon that issue,
the defendant may prove, that the act imputed was not
done by him, and that another jury were of opinion that
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was not guilty; and, for that purpose, he may give in
evidence the judgment in the former cause, for the consideration of the second jury.^ The question, however, for
the second Jury (when the defendant has chosen to plead
the general issue) is, whether the defendant be guilty or
not; and the question raised upon that issue, in an action
on the case is, whether the plaintiff had or had not any
cause of action' at the time of the commencement of the
suit. Now the judgment for the defendant in a former action for the same cause, does not necessarily prove that the
plaintiff has no cause of action. It decides nothing unless
by way of estoppel. In Outram v. Morewood, 3 East, 346,
where the subject was very fuUy considered. Lord EllenBOEOUGH C. J., in giving the judgment of the court, takes
this distinction, and states expressly, that a former judgment, if properly pleaded by way of estoppel, would be conclusive, but if only offered in evidence it would not be so.
am of opinion, that, upon this issue,
For these reasons,
the judgment in the former verdict was evidence only to
go to the jury.
he

I

SANDEESON

v.

COLLMAN.

Court of Common Pleas.
4

1842,

Maiming and Granger, 209.

Assumpsit. The first count of the declaration stated,
that whereas certain persons using the name, style and
firm of Daeniker and Wegmann, on, etc., in parts beyond
the seas, to-wit, at Rio de Janeiro, made their bill of. exchange in writing, and directed the same to the defendants,
and thereby required the defendants to pay that their first
of exchange, second and third not paid, to the order of a
certain person, therein named and described as A. V.
Bahlsen, Esq., 600 I. sterling, sixty days after the sight
thereof; that the defendants, more than sixty-three days
before the commencement of the suit, to-wit, on, etc., had
sight of the said bill, and then accepted the same, payable
at Messrs, Jones, Loyd and Co.; that the said person, sw
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named and described in the said bill as A. V. Bahlsen, Esq.,
then indorsed the said bill, by and in the name of A. V.
Bahlsen, to the plaintiff s
j^f which the defendants then
had notice, and then promised the plaintiffs, to pay them
the amount of the said bill, according to the tenor and effect of the bUl, and of the said acceptance. Breach, nonpayment.

First

plea, that the said D. and W. did not make the said
bills of exchange in the said first and second counts of the
said declaration respectively mentioned, or either of them,
modo et forma.
Replication to the first plea, so far as it related to the
first count, that the defendants ought not to be allowed to
plead or say, that the said D. and W. did not make the said
bill in the said first count of the declaration mentioned, because the plaintiffs say that, at the time when the defendants accepted the said bill of exchange as in the said
first count mentioned, the same bill purported to have been,
made and drawn by the said D, and W., and to have been
signed by them as the drawers thereof; and that the plaintiffs, at the time when the last-mentioned bill was so indorsed to them as in the said first count mentioned, had no
notice or knowledge that the said bill had not been made
by the said D. and "W., and they, before the said bill of exchange became due and payable according to the tenor and
effect thereof, gave value for the same, upon the faith and
credit of the defendants' acceptance thereof. Verification;
and prayer of judgment if the defendants ought, contrary
to their said acceptance of the said bill in the said first
count mentioned, and to their acknowledgment thereby, to
be admitted to say that the said D. and W. did not make the
said bill in the said first count mentioned.
_

Special demurrer to the replication to the first plea,
so far as it related to the first count, assigning for causes,
that the subject-matter of the said replication was matter
of evidence only, and did not, by law, constitute an estoppel to the defendants' pleading the said plea to the first
count; that the replication was a departure from the first
count, wherein it was alleged that D. and W. made the bill
therein mentioned, whilst it was admitted by the replication that they did not make any such biU; that the repU-
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cation was inartifically and improperly pleaded, and without the certainty required by law in a plea of estoppel,
in this, that it did not aflSrma^ely and precisely state, by
positive and direct averments, the facts which were necessary to constitute the alleged estoppel, namely, that
there was such a bill as that alleged in the said first count,
that the defendants did accept such bill, that they had
part
sight of
and that the acceptance was written upon
D.
the
names
of
and
of the said bUl, whereon were written
W. as drawers.
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whether the
TiNDAL, C. J. The first point in this case
drawee, after accepting and thereby giving an apparent
bill, has
right, in an action against him as
validity to
defence that the name of the drawer
acceptor, to set up as
was forged, or other matter invalidating the bill. And
*
*
*
appears to me that he has no such right.
The question then arises, whether the plaintiffs can set
this up by way of estoppel. It
said that. this may be
evidence — and even conclusive evidence — against the defendant, but that the plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of
as an estoppel. If, however, we find upon the record,
verdict,
fact which would have entitled the plaintiffs to
do not see why they may not rely upon that fact by way
of estoppel. Estoppel may be by matter of record, by deed,
and by matter tw pais. Co. Litt. 352 a.
If, by the last
meant only that the matter may be given in
branch,
evidence,
would certainly not be pleadable, and ought
not to be put on the record. But there seems to be no rea^
son why the meaning should be so confined. No very precise instances are given in the books where matter of this
sort has been pleaded. But
to be remembered that under the old system of pleading, almost every defence might
have been given under the general issue and the plaintiff,
therefore, could not have known that
defence would be
attempted to be set up which the defendant was estopped
from making. Lord Coke in Co. Litt. 352a, speaking of
estoppel by matter in pais, refers to estoppel by acceptance of rent and
may be said that this naturally would
be matter of evidence but looking at the whole of the context, he appears to me to be treating
as being on the recmatter for the jury.
ord, rather than as
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With regard to the third objection, it appears to be an-

swered by the declaration, which, after setting out each
bill of exchange, alleges that the defendants had sight
thereof, and then, that is after having had sight of the bill,
accepted the same. Upon the whole
think there must be
judgment for the plaintiffs.
CoLTMAN,
:
am of the same opinion. Notwithstanding some of the earlier cases,
think it may be taken as settled, that the acceptor of a bill of exchange is not at liberty to shew that it was not drawn by the party who appears to be the drawer. My brother Channel! has argued
that this is not a matter of plea, but matter of evidence,
and that matter of evidence cannot be pleaded. But the
meaning of that rule,
apprehend, is, that a party shall
not plead facts from which another fact, material to the
But here the defence itself is
issue, is to be inferred.
Then it is said that matter in pais cannot be
pleaded.
1 Wms.
by
Veale v. Warner,
way of estoppel.
pleaded
Saimd. 323 c, is certainly no authority for such a mode of
think, however, that if a party has a legal depleading.
fence to that which is set up against him, he cannot be pre•
•
•
cluded from pleading such defence.**

I

J.

I

I

I

I

See an exhaustive article hj Prof. Gordon Stoner on Pleading Estoppel,
Michigan Law Eeview, 484-498, 576-587.
In Dean v. Crall (1894) 98 Mich. 591, it was held, overruling earlier eases
"In
contra, that estoppels in pais need not be pleaded, the court saying:
as
first
come
to
they
to
plead
estoppels,
is
it
impracticable
instances
jnany
That is perhaps
light upon the trial, in answer to evidence not anticipated.
not true in the two cases named, or in this case; but a case can easUy be
imagined where the claim of forgery might first come to the knowledge of
the plaintifE upon the trial, and if a plaintiff were not convinced of its truth
h« might not caxe to amend his declaration if the opportunity were givaii."
63.

9

DANA

V.

BRYANT.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
6

J.

lUinois,

1844,

104.

the October term, 1839, of the Peoria Circuit Court, a judgment was recovered in the name of the
people of the State of Illinois against Thomas Bryant,

Tkeat,

:

At
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Charles Ballaiice, Augustus 0. Garrett, John C. Caldwell,
and Luther Sears for the sum of ten thousand ddUars, the
amount of the penalty of the official bond of said Bryant, as
sheriff of Peoria county.
At the April term, 1841, in pursuance of the 14th section
of the "act concerning sheriffs and coroners" (E. L. 376;
Gale's Stat. 655), Giles C. Dana moved the court for a writ
of inquiry of damages on said judgment, and suggested several breaches of the bond, the most material of which was,
in substance, that at the May term, 1838, of said court, he recovered a judgment against Thomas Phillips for $373.60 ;
that on the 18th day of March, 1839, a writ of fieri facias
was issued on said judgment and delivered to said Bryant,
as sheriff, to be executed ; that during its lifetime said Bryant received $5 by virtue thereof; that on the 18th day of
September, 1839, an alias fieri facias issued on said judgment, which came to the hands of said Bryant as sheriff,
and that on the 18th day of December, 1839, by virtue
thereof, he received from said Phillips the whole amount
due thereon, which he refused

and neglected to pay said
Dana. The defendant appeared and pleaded six pleas to
the assignment of breaches. A demurrer was sustained to
the third, fourth, and sixth pleas.
The first plea denies that a fieri facias was issued on the
judgment on the 18th day of March, 1839, directed to the
sheriff of Peoria county to be executed.
The plaintiff
joined issue on this plea.
The second plea denies that Bryant, as sheriff, received
on the 18th day of December, 1839, the amount due on
the aMas fieri facias.
On this plea issue was joined.
The fifth plea alleges that the said sum of money was
received by said Bryant without any legal authority, and
was not received by him as sheriff. To this plea the plaintiff replied by way of estoppel, that the defendants ought
not to be permitted to plead said plea, because said Bryant, by his return, indorsed on the alias fieri facias, acknowledged that he received said sum of money as sheriff
as by the said return, remaining of record, will be seen.
The defendant rejoined, md tiel record.
This last issue was heard by the court, and found for the
defendants. A writ of enquiry was awarded, and a jury
sworn to assess the damages sustained by the plaintiff, by
reason of the breaches suggested, who found that the
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breaches assigned were true, and assessed the plaintiff's
damages at $509.66.
The defendants entered their motion for judgment on
the issue found in thfeir favor by the court, which motion
the court sustained, and rendered final judgment for the
defendants, although the jury had found for the plaintiff
on the other issues.
To reverse that judgment Dana prosecuted his writ of

error.
The main question presented for our consideration by
the assignment of errors, is whether the defendants, in the
finding of the court on the issue of md tiel record, were entitled to judgment.
It is insisted by the defendants, that the replication admitted the truth of all the material allegations of the plea,
and that the plaintiff failing to sustain his replication by
the production of the record, the defendants were entitled to
final judgment If the replication is to be regarded as an
admission hy the plaintiff of the facts set up by the plea,
the conclusion contended for follows, and the defence was
The principle is undeniable, that a defendant
complete.
succeeding on one plea, which is a complete answer to the
declaration, shall have judgment in his favor, in bar of the
action.

It

is a general rule in pleading, that a party confesses all
such traversable allegations on the opposite side, as he
does not controvert. The omission by him to traverse material facts alleged hy his adversary, is considered as an
admission of them. And what he thus concedes on the
record, he is not permitted afterwards to contradict.
To this general rule, there are certain exceptions. One
of them is in the case of dilatory pleas. Such pleas do not
go to the merits of the action, but merely oppose some
matters of form to the further progress of the case.
Another exception is in the case of a new assignment.
The oflBce of a new assignment is to obviate a difficulty occasioned by the generality of the declaration, and the defendant is required to plead to it anew, leaving out of
•
question the original plea tendered to the declaration.
Again, the rule is not held to be applicable to pleadings
in estoppel. A plea in estoppel, instead of confessing the
allegations of the opposite party, neither admits them, as
in the case of a plea in confession and avoidance, nor de-
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nies them, as in the case of a plea of traverse, but alleges
some new matter, which being inconsistent with those allegations, precludes the party from availing himself of them.
Stephens on PI. 219, 220; Gould's PI. 46, 343.
this be the correct doctrine in relation to this kind of
pleading, it would seem to follow necessarily that a party,
who has been unsuccessful in pleading an estoppel, is not
afterwards precluded from confessing and avoiding, or
traversing the allegations of his adversary. The issue presented by the estoppel, is not to determine the truth or
validity of the particular facts, pleaded, but the right and
This is
power of the party to insist on them as a defence.
the only question to be decided.
If the estoppel is susthe
other
tained,
party is concluded from making the alleIf disallowed, the party who
gations he has interposed.
has admitted nothing by pleading
may then present his
answer to the allegations.
The question seems, therefore,
to be a preliminary one, which may not necessarily dispose
of the whole case, and should be first decided, when there
are other questions of fact to be tried.
In this view of the ease, the finding of the court on the
issue of md tiel record only decided that the defendants
were not estopped by the record from insisting on the allegations of their plea, and did not determine that those
allegations were true. The proper judgment on such finding was interlocutory, and not final, concluding the plaintiff from further assertion of his claim. The plaintiff,
after this decision against him, should have tendered an
issue to the plea, and that issue, with those formed on the
other pleas, should have been submitted by the court to the
jury for trial together.
The judgment of the circuit court
reversed with costs,
and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A petition for rehearing was filed in this case, which
was denied.
Judgment reversed.
a
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it,
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CHANDLER

v.

DREW.

Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire.
6

1834.

New Hampshire, 469.

Assumpsit on a note for $27.27, made by the defendant,
dated October 21, 1831, payable to one T. Chandler, or order, and by him endorsed to the plaintiff.

Upon the trial of the cause at October term,

1833,

it

appeared, that the defendant made the note, and that it was
endorsed to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration on
the 15th of March, 1832. It further appeared, that at the
time the note was endorsed to the plaintiff, T. Chandler,
the endorser was indebted to the defendant on an account
in a larger sum than the amount of the note. The defendant, having given notice that he should avail himself of
this account, as a set-off in this case, was permitted so to
do, and obtained a verdict.
The plaintiff moved for a new trial, on the ground that
the account could not be legally admitted as a set-off in

this case.

C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.
At the common law there was no set-off of the unconnected mutual demands and debts between the parties in
an action. Each party had his action to enforce the payment of his claims against the other. The law of set-off,
before judgment, is regulated entirely by statute. When
the mutual claims of parties have passed into judgments,
it is the practice of courts to set off one judgment against
This practice does not rest upon any statute, but
another.
upon the general jurisdiction of courts over the suitors in
them. It is an equitable jurisdiction, frequently exercised.
RiCHAEDSON,

D. & E. 123. Mitchell v. Oldfield; 4 Bingham, 423, Bourne
V. Bennett; 8 Pickering, 342, Barrett v. Barrett; 14 Johns.
63, Simpson v. Hart; 3 East. 149 ; 1 M. & S. 240.
Our statute of February 8, 1791, provides, that where
there are mutual debts or demands between the plaintiff
and defendant, one debt or demand may be set against the
other. This statute, which is a transcript of the English
4
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Btatute, with very slight alterations, and is, in substance,
the same as the statutes of New York and Massachusetts, is

a very beneficial law; is in its nature remedial, and has
always received a very liberal construction."
The statute speaks of mutual debts between the plaintiff
and defendant. But this has been construed to mean the
real, and not merely the nominal plaintiff and defendant.
Thus, if the payee of a note bring a suit in the name of
an endorsee, but for his own benefit, the payee is considered
as the plaintiff, within the meaning of the statute. 6 N, H.
Rep. 28; 4 Greenleaf, 415, Moody v. Towle; 4 B. & 0. 547,

Carr

v.

Johns. 263, Buggies v. Keeler; 13
Gaines v. Brishan; 10 Johns. 45 and 396 ; 2 Chitty 's

EmchcUff;

3

Johns. 9,
Eep. 387, Jarvis v. Chappie.
It has been held that equitable debts or demands are
within the meaning of the statute. Thus a bond assigned

to the defendant, although such assignment gives to the
assignee no legal right of action in his own name, is a good
set-off. 3 Binney 135, Murray v. Williamson; 8 Johns. 152,

Tuttle V. £ee6ee."
Where a factor, dealing for a principal, but concealing
the principal, delivers goods in his own name, the person
dealing with him has a right to consider him the principal,
and may set off any claim he has against the factor in an
action brought by the principal. 7 D. & E. 360, Babone v.
Williams and George v. Glaggett. The law is otherwise in
the case of a broker. 2 B, & A. 137, Barring v. Gorrie.
The distinction is grounded upon the circumstance, that
factor has a right to sell in his own name, but a broker in
so doing exceeds his authority.
a

II,

The English statute is section 13 of chapter 22, 2 Geo.
entitled
the relief of debtors with respect to the imprisonment of their
"And be it further enacted
persons," and the section reads as follows:
by the authority aforesaid, that where there are mutual debts between the
plaintiff and defendant, or if either party sue or be sued as executor or
administrator, where there are mutual debts between the testator or intestate
and either party, one debt may be set against the other, and such matter
may be given in evidence upon the general issue, or pleaded in bar, as the
nature of the ease shall require, so as at the time of his pleading the general
issue, where any such debt of the plaintiff, his testator or intestate, is
intended to be insisted on in evidence, notice shall be given of the particular
sum or debt so intended to be insisted on, and upon what account it became
due, or otherwise such matter shall not be allowed in evidence upon such
general issue."
Contra: — ^Wake v. Tinkler (1812) 16 East, 36; McDade y. Mead
55.
(1850) 18 Ala. 214; Milbum v. Guyther (1849) 8 Gill (Md.) 92.
54.

"An Act for
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"Where one of a firm appears to the world to be the only
person engaged in the business, and to be solely interested,
if he sells goods, the purchaser may avail himself of any
tslaim he has against such person, in answer to an action in
the name of the firm. 7 D. & E. 361, note.
"Where a bond is taken in the name of one person, for the
use of another, a set-off of claims against the person for
whose use the bond was given is admissible, in a suit on the
bond. Bottins v. Brooks, cited 1 D. & E. 621.
But in an action against two persons, their several demands against the plaintiff are not admissible as a set-off
either in a court of law or equity. 4 N. H. Eep. 236; 6 N.
H. Eep. 28; 11 Johns. 70; 4 Johns. C. Eep. 11; 3 Johns C.
Eep. 351; 2 Merrivale. 121-122.
It thus appears that while courts have adhered strictly
_
to the rule prescribed by the statute, they have been very
liberal in the application of
and have looked beyond the
parties upon the record, to the real parties, and have applied the rule accordingly.
"When the mutual demands between the parties upon the
record are not in their nature assignable at law, the circumstance that a third person has acquired an interest in the
setdemand of the plaintiff, win not in general preclude
N. H.
off of the defendant's claims against the plaintiff.
Eep. 539, Scmhorn v. Little. The reason of this is, that in
just and reasonable that the assignee
case,
such
in
the place of the assignor.
should stand
"We were at first inclined to think that the endorsee of
a discredited note might be considered as standing in the
place of the endorser, so as to admit a set-off of claims
an important differBut, there
against the endorser.
and those
ence between demands which are negotiable,
which are not so. In the one case, the defendant has, by his
contract, made the legal title assignable, and has agreed to
pay to anyone who may have the legal title. In tlie other
When a note
negocase, he has made no such contract.
the
title
to
passes
may be assigned, and the legal
tiable,
discredited or not, and whether the
assignee, whether
dismaker has a set-off against the payee or not. "When
valuable
credited note has been in reality assigned for
in
And
assignee.
due to the
consideration, the debt
suit upon the note, in the name of the endorsee against
the maker, the endorsee and the maker are the real, as well
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as the nominal, parties. And the endorsee cannot he considered as standing in the place of the endorser, unless the
note can be considered as still due to the endorser; or the
endorsee, by taking the discredited note, as having made

the set-off his own debt; either of which is repugnant to
common sense.
It would, therefore, seem that the set-off, in this case,
was not admissible; because the demands of the plaintiff
and the defendant cannot be considered in any point of
view, as mutual demands ; and so the claim of the defendant
is not within the statute.
There are, however, cases, which are directly in point in
favor of the defendant, and which must be examined.
These are the cases of Sargent v. Southgate, 5 Pickering,
312; Ford v. Stuart, 19 Johns. 342, and O'Callagha/n v.

Sawyer,

5

Johns. 118.

These decisions are placed entirely on the ground that
he who takes a discredited note, takes it subject to all objections and equities, to which it is liable in the hands of
the endorser; and that a set-off is ah equity within the
meaning of this rule.
It is, without question, a very just and equitable rule,
that he who takes a discredited note shall take it subject
to any legal or equitable defence, to which it was liable in
the hands of any previous holder. But is a set-off a defence
within the meaning of this rule?
Strictly speaking, a set-off is not a defence. When a
set-off is made, mutual claims, to an equal amoimt on each
side, become, under the statute, a satisfaction of each other.
They operate as a payment of each other. When the claim
of the plaintiff is wholly paid by a set-off, the action is at
an end, and he may be liable to costs. But his claim has
not been defeated by a defence, but has been paid by the
extinguishment of claims against him, to an equal amount.
And, with the exception of the cases, to which we have just
adverted, no case has occurred to us, in which a set-off has
ever been considered as a defence, within the meaning of
the rule, on which the decisions, in those cases, rest.
In order to determine whether a set-off be within that
rule, we must advert to the statute of set-off, and see what
a set-off is, and when it is authorized by the statute. The
question is, not whether there should be a set-off in a case
like this, but whethefr there can be one under the statute.
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seem to have been examined
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considered, by the courts, either in Masachusetts or New
York, in the cases where it was decided that a set-off was
admissible, in a case like this.
Tlie statute authorizes a set-off of mutual demands between the plaintiff and defendant.
All mutual demands,
equitable as well as legal, between the real parties to the
suit, are within the statute. This is the utmost extent of
the mle prescribed by the statute. And from the very nature of
nothing can be
set-off but
claim against
person whom the defendant has a right to consider the real
plaintiff. But in this case the defendant made the note
payable to the order of the payee; and
having been actually transfered to the endorsee, what right has the defendant to consider the endorser as the real plaintiff? On
what reasonable ground can the endorser be so considered,
by any person? We see none.
The circumstance, then, that the account of this defendant
a claim against the endorser, and would be
good
the endorser were the real plaintiff, renders
set-off,
inadmissible, under the statute, in this case. From the
very nature of set-off, an account of the maker of a negotiable note against the payee cannot run with the note and
in the hands of any person, to whom
be a defence to
achas been legally transferred. The moment the note
tually transferred, the demands must cease to be mutual;
and of course, must cease to be within the statute.

A

We are of opinion that the set-off. in this case, was improperly admitted, and there must of course be
new trial granted?^

3

a

subject of set-off, must be due and
56.
The demand, in order to be
Houghton v. Houghton (1853)
payable at the commencement of the action.
37 Me. 72; Spradbery v. GUlam (1851) 20 L. J. N. S. Eich. 237; Evana
T. E. 186; Henry y. Butler (1864) 32 Conn. 140;
T. Prosser (1789)
Toppan ▼. Jenness (1850) 21 N. H. 232; Eoig v. Tim (1883) 103 Pa, St.
115.

1436, 1437,

Jj

2

a

a

set-off of a demand agamst the payee is available
Upon the point whether
against an endorsee of a negotiable note who took after maturity, the rule
majority of the
here stated is adhered to in England and probably in
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (6th Ed,),
American states. See
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1809,

Johnson, 105.

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This
was an action of debt upon a bond, conditioned for the performance of an award. By the pleadings and assignment
of breaches, it appears that the award was in favor of the
plaintiff, for the sum of twelve dollars and fifty-nine cents,
for the recoveiy of which this action was brought. The defendant, pursuant to his plea and notice, offered ia evidence, as a set-off, a promissory note, drawn by the plaintiff to one Chappel, and duly endorsed to the defendant.
This was objected to, but admitted. And the questions now
presented to the court are, whether any set-off was admissible in this case; and if so, whether it ought not to bo
against the penalty, and not against the award.
We think the set-off was properly admitted. The statutes in England, and our act, allowing a set-off, have always been considered as very beneficial acts, tending to
prevent circuity of action. It is laid down by Montagu (p.
18) that a set-off cannot be pleaded to a debt on bond, conditioned for the performance of covenants, where damages
are to be assessed by a jury, nor to an action for general
damages, in covenant or assumpsit; but a set-off may be
pleaded to an action of debt, covenant, or assumpsit, for a
sum certain. Is not the present action for, a sum certain?
The plaintiff claimed nothing more than the twelve dollars
and fifty-nine cents. Had the action been upon the award,
and not upon the bond, no objection certainly could have
been made to the set-off. The action, though in form upon
the bond, is in substance upon the award; and to exclude
the set-off would be yielding substance to form. In order
to allow a set-off, the plaintiff's cause of action must be
such, that it would have been a good set-off for him, had he
been the defendant.
Suppose the
(2 Johns. Rep. 155.)
parties in this case changed, and the action had been by the
defendant against the plaintiff, upon this note. What possible objection could there have been against the plaintiff's
setting off the award? The sum is certain, liquidated, and
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is
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a

;
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;

it

it,

precisely ascertained.
Wherever the debt is so certain,
that an indebitatus assumpsit would lie for
may be set
off (Cowp. 56). The English statutes on this subject are
in substance the same as ours so that their decisions upon
the construction of their statutes are iu point as to the construction of ours.
Johns. Rep. 155.) In the case of
Collins V. Collins
Burr. 825), Lord Mansfield says, that
before the statute, the actual payment of money in discharge of the demand was exactly upon the same footing
as the set-off of a debt
now put upon and
plea of payment of
sum of money sufficient to discharge the whole
demand, was just the same then as the set-off of a debt
large enough to balance the whole demand
now. It was
a full answer to the plaintiff's demand; and he could have
no judgment at all against the defendant.
The setting off
of mutual debts has become equivalent to actual payment,
and a balance shall be struck, as in equity and justice
ought to be. To apply these principles to the case before
not have been competent for the defendant to
us, would
have craved oyer of the bond and condition, and set out the
award, and plead payment of the twelve dollars and fiftynecessarily follows, that such payment
nine cents? If so,
This case likewise decides, that
a
set-off.
be
shown
by
may
notwithstanding the set-off being allowed, the penalty of
the bond remains as a security against all future breaches,
an answer to one of the difficulties suggested by
which
the plaintiff's counsel. In this case, also, the condition of
the bond was not only for the payment of an annuity, but
for the maintenance of a certain person therein named;
not conwhich shows, that the right of set-off to bonds
for the payment of
fined to cases where the condition
money only. The set-off may be good as to one part of the
condition, and not as to another. We do not understand
our statute (24 Sess. c. 90) as saying, or implying, that
set-off to an action on the penalty of a bond is. confined to
for the payment of money only.
cases where the condition
for the recovery
It only declares, that when the action
of a penalty for the nonpayment of money only, the sum
bona fide and in equity due, and not the penalty, shall be

a

I

it

necessary to go
deemed to be the debt due. But were
thus far, should consider, that the bond in question, by the
bond for the payment of
award, become substantially
twelve dollars and fifty-nine cents.
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In order

is

it,

;

f

it,

to determine the right of set-off, we may look at
the state of things disclosed by the pleadings, and the object and intention of the bond ; we are not confined to what
appears on the face of it. In the case of Fletcher v. Dytche
(2 Term Rep. 32) the bond was conditioned for the performance of certain work within a stipulated time, and on
failure thereof, for the payment of a weekly sum thereafter,
until the work was finished. The work not being finished
within the time, the sum of 40 I. became forfeited, according to the provisions of the bond, and this sum was allowed
was not
to be a good set-off. This bond, upon the face of
conditioned for the payment of money, but for the per
ormanee of work and whether the weekly forfeiture could
ever become payable, was, at the time of the execution of
the bond, contingent and uncertain, but was made certain by
matter ex post facto. Upon the face of the bond, nothing
was due to the obligee; and whether anything ever would
become due, depended altogether upon subsequent events,
to be established by proof, dehors the bond. The only question with the court was, whether the set-off, offered in evidence, had not become certain and liquidated damages. So,
in the case before us, the bond, upon the face of
for
of
the performance
certain engagements, in their nature
uncertain and contingent, at the time of the execution of
the bond; but which became certain by the subsequent
award, which, so far as respects the twelve dollars and
fifty-nine cents, may be considered as liquidating the
damages.

5

Supreme Court

Error

of

BABBER V. ROSE.
New York.

Hill,

1843.

76.

Pleas. Rose sued Barjustice's court, and declared in assumpsit on the

tft the Rensselaer Common

a

a

a

ber in
common counts, and also on
special contract by which the
plaintiff agreed to lay a quantity of stone wall and dig
certain ditch for the defendant for the sum of $100. The
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dedaration further averred that, after performing a part
of the work, the defendant agreed to aid the plaintiff in
completing the job for a reasonable compensation.
The
plaintiff claimed $100 damages. Plea, the general issue
and set-off; also that the plaintiff never finished any part
of the ditch, to the defendant's damage of $100. Replication, that plaintiff had finished the ditch. On the trial before the justice, it appeared that the plaintiff agreed to
build the wall and dig the ditch for the price mentioned in
the declaration, the work to be completed by a certain time.
The plaintiff commenced the work, but failing to complete
it by the stipulated time, the defendant told him to go on
with the job, and that he (the defendant) would turn in
and help him on being allowed a compensation for his services. The defendant accordingly furnished assistance to
the plaintiff, and the work was finally finished.
The defendant offered to show, among other things, by way of
recoupment of damages, that he had sustained loss by reason of the ditch not having been finished
at the time
specified in the original contract.
The plaintiff objected,
on the ground that the time had been extended by the
agreement of the parties; and the justice sustained the
•

•

•

objection,
•
•
•
CowEN,
Was the proof in mitigation admissible under the general issue?
think that question arises. There was no
notice of a claim for the default as to time; but only for
not completing any part of the ditch. This rather precludes the idea that the defendant intended to put himself
on time ; and the evidence was not admisible unless proper
under the general issue.
The rule of recoupment has come to us from England,
accompanied with the remark that, where the quality of
work done at a stated price is to be impeached, notice of the
defence is proper. (Lord Ellenbobough, C. J., and Lawrence, J., in Fasten v. Butter, 7 East, 479,) Counsel had
complained of surprise, and Bulleb, J., had refused to allow the defence, while Lord Kenyon had allowed it; and
the remarks mentioned seem to have been thrown out, first,
as a reply to the counsel, and, secondly, as possibly tending
They
to reconcile the conflicting decisions of the judges.
probably led the chancellor to say, in Reab v. McAlister, 8

J.

I
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Wend. 109, that he considered a like defence perfectly just
and equitable when the plaintiff has notice of it. In Ives
V. Van Epps (22 Wend. 157) the point was raised; but it
there said, nowas not thought necessary to decide it.
tice may be necessary ; but added, that the rejection of the
evidence was not put on the want of it. The question has
can discover, nor
never been much thought of, so far as
do
find it has ever become necessary to decide it in any
of the cases where it has been mooted. In no English case,
except Bdsten v. Butter, is the idea of notice suggested.
Other decisions have gone forward without any attention
to it. {King v. Boston, 7 East, 481, note (a), A. D. 1789;
Farnsworth v. Garrard, 1 Camp. 38, A. D. 1807; OkeU v.
Smith. 1 Stark. Eep. 107, A. D. 1815 ; Poulton v. Lattimore.
3
9 Barn. & Cress. 259, A. D. 1829 ; Allen v. Cameron,
Tyrwh. 907, 1 Cr. & Mees. §32, S. C, A. D. 1833; Street v.
Blay, 2 Barn. & Adolph. 45i6, A. D. 1831, recognizing Cormack V. Gillis, cited 7 East, 480, 481; and see Cousins v.
Baddon, 1 Gale, 305.) These cases belong to two classes;
one where the defence was partial, another where it was
total. The want of notice was equally disregarded in both.
Mr. Leigh, in his late book on Nisi Prius (voL 1, p. 79).
deduces the rule from Basten v. Butter, in these words:
"Tlv/ defendant should (though he need not) give notice to
the plaintiff of the intended defence ; for otherwise he may
have ground to complain of surprise, as he may only come
prepared to prove the agreement for the specific sum."
presume he means to be understood as saying that the defendant may or may not give notice at his pleasure ; but if
he gives none, the court will listen more readily to a motion for a new trial on the ground of surprise. That any
judge or writer ever intended to lay the rule down as one
of pleading, do not believe. There is no color in precedent
or principle for saying that a defence striking directly at
the whole cause of action need be pleaded in an action of
assumpsit; and there is stUl less ground for saying that a
partial defence — ^matter going merely to mitigate damages — should be pleaded. A partial defence can never, according to our cases, be introduced by a plea ;and the universal rule both in England and this State is, that where a
matter 'cannot be pleaded, it may be given in evidence.
{Herkimer Manufacturing and Eg dr. Co. v. Small, 21
Wend. 273, 277 ; Wilmurth v. Babcock, 2 HiU, 194, 196.) No

I

I

I

I

I
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one will pretend that the statute of special notice applies;
for by that you can give notice of such matter only as may
be pleaded.
The matter
{Wilmarth v. Babcoch, supra.)
does not come in as a set-off, and so is not within the statute of notice with respect to that. In short,
am satisfied
that to require notice of a defence by way of recoupment

I

in any case, would be a departure from principle, from
precedent, and all the analogies of pleading.
The truth is,
as remarked by Mr. Justice Beonson in Bateman v. Pierce,
3 Hill, 172, the doctrine of recoupment is of recent origin.
It would not have been surprising, therefore, after the remarks in Basten v. Butter, had some judges required a plea
or notice. The cases fluctuated for some time both in England and this State on the question whether the doctrine
itself should be received into the law. About as much has
been said on the point of notice in one country as in the
other; but not enough in either to give any serious coTmtenance to the idea that it is necessary.
On the whole,
am entirely satisfied that the fact of the
plaintiff's contract having been broken as to time, formed
a good ground for claiming damages by way of recoupment; and that the defence was admissible under the general issue."'^ The judgment of the common pleas affirming
that of the justice should be reversed.
Beonson, J. : Although it may never have been directly
and necessarily decided that the defendant must give notice of his intention to recoup damages, it has often been
assumed by the courts of this State that notice must be
given; and such appears to be the general opinion of the
profession. Very few cases have fallen under my observation where the defence was attempted without a notice.
If this must be regarded as an open question, then, upon
think notice should be required. The defendant
principle,
has
an
election either to bring a cross-action or to set
often
up his claim by way of recouping damages; and without
a notice the plaintiff may be surprised on the trial by a deThere can
fence which he is wholly unprepared to meet.
be no hardship upon the defendant in requiring him to give

I

I

Accord: — Tully v. Excelsior Iron Works (ISaS) 115 IlL 544; Cooke
Preble (1875) 80 111. 381; Lee v. Eutledge (1878) 51 Md. 311; Koyes
Western Vermont Slate Co. (1861) 34 Vt. 81; Allen v. Hooker (1853)
Vt. 137; Wilson v. Town of Greensboro (1881) 54 Vt. 533; Blodgett T.
BerUn MiUs (1872) 52 N. H. 215; Sterling Organ Co. t. House (1884) 25
W. Va. 64; Gaw v. Wolcott (1848) 10 Pa. St. 43.
57.

V.
V.
25
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notice, i^hile a different rule would be likely to work injusam aware that notice is not necessary where the
tice.
defence goes to the whole consideration of the promise on
which the plaintiff sues.
Such a defence shows that the
plaintiff has no cause of action, and is fairly covered by the
plea of non assumpsit. But it is not so, where, as in this
case, the defence admits that the plaintiff has a right to
sue, and seeks to recoup damages on the ground that the
plaintiff has failed to perform some stipulation in the contract which was obligatory upon him. In such a case notice should he given."'
But the defence seems to have been rejected on the
The
ground that it was not, in its own nature, admissible.
want of notice was not mentioned in the court below. On
this ground agree that the judgment should be reversed.
Nblson, Ch. J., concurred in this view of the question.
Jvdgmsnt reversed.

I

I

58. In Organ Co. ▼. House (note 57, gupra), the court suggests a distinction between cases where the recoupment is a mere reduction in the
amount of damages and cases where the entire contract or transaction
between the parties is opened up for the adjustment of cross-actions, and
holds that in the former eases the defense would be admissible under the
general issue without notice, but in the latter eases there should be special
notice given under the general issue.
But the court expressly states that
no recoupment should ever be set up in a special plea. The practice of giving
notice under the general issue is a modern statutory substitute for special
pleas at common law.
^ccor<J :—MeLure v. Hart (1857) 19 Ark. 119; Hogg v. Cardwell
(1856)
4 Sneed (Tenn.) 151 (expressing
doubt as to the rule but recommending
Simonds v. Cross (1884) 63 N. H. 123.
that it be pleaded).

WAED

V.

FELLERS.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
3

Michigan,

1854.

J281.

This was an action of assumpsit originally brought in

a

justice's court, and upon appeal, tried in the circuit court
for the county of "Wayne. The plaintiffs claimed to recover
as common carriers for freight and charges for the transportation of eight packages of merchandise, against which
the defendants set up a claim by way of recoupment against
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the plaintiffs for damages done to the goods while in the
plaintiffs' possession.
The cause was tried by jury and a special verdict found,
"That the defendants are indebted to the plaintiffs in the
sum of $34,94 for the freight and transportation of goods,
and interest thereon; that in transporting said goods the
defendants suffered damage by the default of the plaintiffs,
who were common carriers, to and upon the goods so transported to the amount of $125.6/20, interest, etc." Upon
this verdict a motion was made by the defendants' counsel
for judgment on the verdict in their favor, and the opinion
of this court was asked whether the defendants were entitled to judgment against the plaintiffs for the excess of
their damages as found in the special verdict over the
amount of the freight earned by the plaintiff."
the Court, Martin, J. : At the common law a defendant was in no instance allowed to recover a judgment for
To
damages for a positive claim against a plaiatiff.
obviate the rigor of this rule of law, and as well to avoid a
multiplicity of actions as to enable parties where there were
mutual cross demands unconnected with each other, and
arising upon contract express or implied, which are liquidated or capable of being ascertained by calculation, and
not resting in opinion only, to have the whole adjudicated
upon in one action, the statutes of set-off were enacted.
Hence, set-off is the compensation of one debt or demand
for another, by virtue of which damages are recovered by
the party in whose favor a balance shaU be found, and the
judgment is statutory. But at the common law before the
adoption of the statutes of set-off, the defendant was entitled to show that the plaintiff had not sustained damages
to the extent alleged, and thus to reduce, or altogether deThis right of the defendant
feat the plaintiff's recovery.
was, however, in the earlier period of the law, of very
limited application, and could only be resorted to when the
defendant insisted upon a deduction from the plaintiff's
demand arising from payment ia part or in whole, or for*
*
*
It is evimer recovery, or some analogous facts.
dent, says Mr. Sedgwick (see Sedg. on Dam's, 2 Ed. 431),
that recoupe, or recoupment, in its origiaal sense, was a
mere right of deduction from the amount of the plaintiff's
recovery, on the ground that his damages were not really

By
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high as alleged." This was allowed to avoid circuity
of action, and was only permissible when the subject-matter of reduction sprang immediately from the claim relied
upon by the plaintiff. This defence is contradistinguishable
from set-off in these three essential particulars. 1st. In
being confined to matters arising out of, and c«nnected with
the transaction or contract upon which the suit is brought.
2d. In having no regard to whether or not such matters be
liquidated or unliquidated.
{Wheat v. Dotson, 7 Ark. E.
And 3d. That the judgment is not the subject of
699).
statutory regulation, but controlled by the rule of the comas

mon law.
This remedy was, in the earlier periods of the law, of
very limited application, and it is said, it is in cases where
fraud entered into, but did not equitably go to the entire
prevention of a recovery by the plaintiff, that we find
the first cases of the defense in question in the common-law courts of England. Whether this be strictly true
or noty it is certain that so much uncertainty involved the
remedy, and it was so trammeled by the technical rules of
the law, that it was but little used — the defendant preferring his cross action or the relief afforded by equity —
and the term itself became obsolete.
Yet the principle was
always retained under the form of a diminution of damages, upon the equitable ground of avoiding circuity of
actions, and we constantly encounter it in the books, and
most frequently involved in a question as to the sufficiency
of pleadings. But within a few years not only has the term
been revived, but the doctrine has also, and as the rigid
rules of the common-law courts have yielded to the influence of social progress, and the expansion of the commercial relations of society and the new developments of
trade, common justice as well as common sense and convenience have adapted it to present wants, infused into it
new vigor, and rendered it a valuable remedy in the administration of justice, as at present understood and administered. In all cases where the demands of both parties
spring out of the same contract or transaction, the defendant may recoupe, although the damages on both sides are
See Bateman v. Pierce, S "Hiil, 172.
was
unliquidated.
formerly," says Bbonson, J., in Bateman v. Pierce, "supposed that there could only be a recoupment where some
fraud was imputable to the plaintiff in relation to the con-

"It
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tract on which the action was founded; but it is now well
settled that the doctrine is also applicable when
the defendant imputes no fraud, and only complains that there
has been a breach of the contract on the part of
the plaintiff. As now generally administered in this country, it
opens up the entire contract or transaction, so far as necessary to determine the plaintiff's right to damages, and the
amount, and the defendant's cross claims."
See 15 Mass.
389; Story on Bail sec. 315; ib. sec. 349; 20 Wend. 51, 269;
3 Mete. 9; 14 Pick. 359; 6 Mass. 20; 3 Dana, 489; 20
Conn.
204; 1 Scam. 403; Stone v. Yarwood in Sup. Ct. of 111., cited
in Monthly Law Rep. 456; and cases hereafter cited. In
the language of the court in Stone v. Yarwood, "this doctrine of recoupment tends to promote justice and to prevent needless litigation. It avoids circuity of action and
multiplicity of suits. It adjusts by one action adverse
claims growing out of the same subject-matter.
Such
claims can generally be much better settled in one proceeding than in several. It is not necessary that the opposing
claims should be of the same character. A claim originating in contract may be set up against one originating in
tort. It is sufficient that the counterclaims arise out of the
same subject-matter, and that they are susceptible of adjustment in one action."
See also McAllister v. Beab, 4
Wend. 48'2 ; 8 ib. 109.
But while it is said that by the application of the doctrine of recoupment, circuity is avoided, and the rights of
parties adjusted in one and the same suit, it must be understood that such adjustment is only by way of abatement or
reduction, and that no other judgment can be rendered than
such as is authorized by the rules of the common law. This
necessarily foUows from what has already been said, and
a reference to a few of the many authorities which might
be cited upon this subject wiU show that such is the uni*
*
*
In Bateman v. Pierce,
versally received doctrine.
the
purpose of avoiding
"for
Hill,
3
172, the court say,
circuity or multiplication of actions, and doing complete
justice to both parties, they are allowed and compelled, if
the defendant so elects, to adjust all their claims growing
out of the same contract in one action." And in a subsequent portion of the same opinion, this language is explained and qualified as follows: "The defendant has the
election whether he wiU set up his claim in answer to the

[Chap. 7
Common Law Pleading.
plaintiff's demand, or riesort to a cross-action; and whatever may be the amount of his damages, he can only set
them up by way of abatement, either in whole or in part of
the plaintiff's demand. He cannot, as in the case of a setoff, go beyond that, and have a balance certified in his
638

favor."

•

•

*

It

appears from these, and indeed, from all the authorities, as well as from principle, that the force of the remedy
by recoupment is spent in the discount or abatement of
the plaintiff's claim, either partially or wholly, as the case
may be. The defendant has his election to pursue this
remedy, and thus save the expense and delay of his crossaction, or he may maintain such action for the default or
failure of the plaintiff, and for his damages, as may best
subserve his interests.
The defence then not being compulsory, but one of choice, the defendant can hardly urge
with propriety that a hardship is imposed upon him by
denying him a judgment for his excess of damages, when
such is found to exist.
It was suggested upon the argument, that if the defendant should choose to recoupe his damages, instead of resorting to a cross-action, he would be barred from recovering any excess or further damages in a second action, by
reason of the former adjudication, and from this was argued
the hardship of the rule, denying him a judgment in this
case. This suggestion, if well founded, can have little force
in opposition to settled rules of law, for the defence is at the
defendant's option. But
nowhere find it adjudged that
It is true that in Britton v. Tursuch would be the result.
J., says, "There may be inN.
Paekee,
ner (6
H. 481),
stances, however, where the damage occasioned is much
greater than the value of the labor performed, and if the
party elects to permit himself to be charged for the value
of the labor, without interposing the damages in defence,
he is entitled so to do, and may have an action to recover
his damages for the nonperformance, whatever they may
be; and he may commence such action at any time after
the contract is broken, notwithstanding no suit has been
instituted against him, but if he elects to have the damages
considered in the action against him, he must be understood
as conceding that they are not to be extended beyond the
amount of what he has recovered, and he cannot afterwards
sustain an action for further damages."

I
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In Fabricatte v. Lannitz (3 Sand. S. C. R. 744), tMs suggestion of Judge Parker, that the defendant cannot sustain an action for further damages, is approbated. But in
neither case was the question before the court, and the suggestions are only important as shewing the universality of
the doctrine that the defendant, by recoupment, can only
reduce the plaintiff's damages, and takes nothing in that
action for his excess of damages.
But in Mendell v. Steel (8 M. & W. 858), this question of
the right to maintain an action for further damages was

before the court, and Paeke, B., after discussing to some
extent the origin and present extent and application of this
doctrine of diminution or reduction of damages by the defendant, uses this language: "It must, however, be considered that in all cases of goods sold and delivered with
a warranty, and work and labor, as well as the case of goods
agreed to be supplied according to a contract, the rule which
is found so convenient, is established; and that it is competent for the defendant in all of those, not to set off by a
proceeding in the nature of a cross-action, the amount of
damages which he has sustained by a breach of the contract, but simply to defend himself, by showing how much
less the subject-matter of the action was worth by reason of

the breach of contract, and to the extent that he obtains,
or is capable of obtaining, an abatement of price on that
account, he must be considered as having received satisfaction for the breach of contract, and is precluded from recovering in another action, but no more. All the plaintiff
could by law be allowed in diminution of damages on the
former trial, was a deduction from the agreed price, according to the difference at the time of delivery between
the ship as she was, and what she ought to have been, according to the contract ; but all claims for damages beyond
that, on account of the subsequent necessity for more extensive repairs, could not have been allowed in the former
Although this auaction, and may now be recovered.""^
thority does not cover the entire question suggested by
This is perhaps doubtful (1 Sutherland on Damages, J 189; Edgemoor
Co. V. Brown Hoisting Mach. Co. (1906) 6 Pennew. (Del.) 10), though
quite clear that if the defendant attempts to establish a recoupment
and is defeated on the merits he wiU be barred from afterwards prosecuting
an independent action on the same facts.
(Grant v. Button (1S17) 14 Johns.
(N. Y.) 377; O'Connor v. Vamey (1857) 10 Gray (Mass.) 231; Beall v.
59.

Iron
it is

Pearre (1858)

12

Md. SSC)
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counsel, it shows that the judgment in the
former action is not considered as necessarily a complete
and final adjudication of the whole subject-matter of the
defendants' injury, in all cases. Nor is there any hardship
in the rule that when the defendants' claim for damages is
complete at the time he seeks to recoupe them, he shall be
considered as waiving all of such claim against the plaintiff,
The defence
except so much as will defeat the recovery.
by recoupment is voluntary. The remedy by cross-action
always subsists, and the defendant is presumed to know
the extent of the loss and injury he has sustained.
With
both remedies before him, the exercise of an option, when
the consequences are known and can be provided against,
If, then,
can never be regarded as imposing a hardship.
the defendant at his election can compel the whole matter
to be adjudicated in one action, it can do no great injustice
to say, that by such choice he concedes that he has no claim
for damages, beyond those of the plaintiff, and that he is
content to defeat the plaintiffs ' recovery.
the defendants'

It

must be certified to the circuit court for the county of
Wayne as the opinion of this court, that the defendants
are not entitled to judgment against the plaintiffs for the
excess of their damages, as found by the special verdict
over the amount of the freight earned by the plaintiffa.

CHAPTER VIII.
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PITTS SONS' MANUFACTUEING COMPANY
COMMERCIAL NATIONAL BANK.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
121

Illinois,

Plaintiff in error

v.

THE

1887.

582.

made and delivered to Meeker & Co.
its three promissory notes, which the payees assigned to
defendant in error, who brought suit thereon. The defondant pleaded, specially, three pleas; but reliance was placed
upon the second amended plea, which was as follows :
"Now comes the said defendant, by its attorneys, and
by leave of the court, etc., and defends, etc., and says actio
non, etc., because, it says, that the causes of action set
forth in the special counts, and in the common counts of
said plaintiff's declaration, are one and the same, and not
other or different; that the only demand said plaintiff has
against said defendant is upon the promissory notes, copies
of which are attached to the said declaration, and which are
This defenddeclared upon in the special counts thereof.
ant further says, that the plaintiff was not a bona fide
holder, but held the notes in trust for Meeker & Co. ; that
on the day named, defendant was in embarrassed circumstances and unable to meet its financial obligations; that
Meeker & Co., then the owners of the notes, were threatening suit thereon; that defendant was then indebted to
Meeker & Co. on the notes, and also was indebted upon
debts due to certain other creditors (naming them), which
last named creditors also threatened suit; that Meeker &
Co., at the request of the defendant, and in consideration
that the other creditors, aforesaid, of defendant, would
withhold suit against defendant and give further day of
payment, then and there agreed with defendant, and with
the other creditors of defendant, aforesaid, to withhold
suit against defendant, and to extend the time and give
C.

L. P.

(641)
41

642
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further day of payment, as follows (naming such time),
and not to sue defendant upon either of said notes until
default had been made in the said payments upon the said
further days, as aforesaid; that Meeker & Co. and the
creditors named, in consideration that each should withhold suit and give further days of payment, as aforesaid,
then and there mutually agreed to, and did, withhold suits,
and did give further day of payment, as aforesaid, and
then and there mutually agreed not to bring suit until default had been made in the payments upon said further
And this defendant is
days of payment, as aforesaid.
ready to verify; wherefore it prays judgment," etc.
This suit was commenced and plea filed before either of
the installments became due according to the agreement set
up in the plea. A demurrer to the plea was sustained. The
defendant stood by its plea, and final judgment for plaintiffs was rendered, which the appellate court for the second
district aflBrmed. The record is brought here by writ of
error to that court.

it

it,

Shope, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The common-law system of pleading has prevailed in this
State, and, from time to time, such modifications have been
made by statute as seemed to be required, removing arbitrary and artificial distinctions, and, by the allowance of
amendments at any and every stage of the proceeding, and
to every reasonable extent, doing away with its purely
technical and objectionable features.
As a system of
pleading, and as existing in this State, it is clearly defined,
With the general, logical
easUy understood and certain.
arrangement of the system, as at common law, there has
been no interference by statute.
The order of pleading,
and the structure and oiBce of pleas of different character,
remain substantially unchanged. Without entering into an
extended discussion, a statement of some of the principles
of pleading seems necessary.
Pleas are divided into two general classes, viz., dilatory
and peremptory, otherwise designated as pleas in abatement and pleas in bar. A plea in abatement is defined to
be, a plea that, without disputing the justness of the plaintiff's claim, objects to the place, mode or time of asserting
and requires that therefore, and pro hoc vice, judgment
be given for the defendant, leaving
open to renew the
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Buit in another place or form, or at another time ; while to
the second class belong all those pleas having for their object the defeating of the plaintiff's claim. Hence, a plea
in bar of the action may be defined as one which shows some

ground for barring or defeating the action, and makes
prayer to that effect. Pleas in bar and pleas in abatement
have, therefore, this marked distinction : Pleas in bar are
addressed to the merits of the claim and as impairing the
right of action altogether, whereas pleas in abatement tend
merely to divert, suspend or defeat the present suit. 1
Saunders' PI. and Ev. 1, 2; Comyns' Digest, title "Abate-

ment;"

1

Chitty's PI.

441.

Owing to the nature and effect of pleas in abatement,
they are required to be certain to every intent.
(Comyns'
Digest, title "Abatement," 1, 11.) Whenever the subjectmatter to be pleaded is to the effect that the plaintiff cannot maintain any action at any time, it must be pleaded in
bar; while matter which merely defeats the present proceeding, and does not show that the plaintiff is forever concluded, should be pleaded in abatement. 1 Chitty's PI. 445.
Whether a plea is in abatement or in bar is to be determined, not from the subject-matter of the plea, but from
The advantage or relief sought by the
its conclusion.
—
plea the prayer of the plea — determines its character.
{Jenkins v. Pepoon, 2 Johns. Cas. 312; 1 Tidd's Pr. 637.)
It would be both illogical and absurd in a plea in bar to
pray, as in a plea in abatement to the count or declaration,
"judgment of the said writ and declaration, and that the
same may be quashed;" and as only the relief asked can
be awarded, a mistake in this regard is fatal to the plea.
And, hence, the rule that a plea beginning in bar and ending in abatement is in abatement, and though beginning in
abatement and ending in bar is in bar, so a plea beginning
and ending in abatement is in abatement, though its subject-matter be in bar, and a plea beginning and ending in
bar is in bar, though its subject-matter is in abatement.
(Comyns' Digest, title "Abatement," b. 2.) With respect
to all dilatory pleas, the rule requiring them to be framed
with the utmost strictness and exactness is founded in
wisdom. It says to the defendant: If you will not address
yourself to the justness and merits of the plaintiff's demand, and appeal to the forms of the law, you shall be
judged by the strict letter of the law. And so it has been
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held that a plea in abatement concluding, wherefore he
prays judgment if the said plaintiff ought to have or maintain his aforesaid action against him, etc. (a conclusion in
bar), is bad. Jenkins v. Pepoon, 2 Johns. Cas, 312; Isley
V. Stubbs, 5 Mass. 280,
An inspection of the plea in question shows that in form
and structure, in its begimiing and conclusion, it is a plea
in bar to the count and declaration, and upon application
of the principles announced it must be held to be a plea in
bar. Its subject-matter, however, is in abatement, and
clearly falls within the definition of matter pleadable in
abatement. The justness of the plaintiff's demand, that
the defendant owes the debt evidenced by the notes sued
on, is not denied, but the defendant denies that the debt is
due. He objects, then, simply as to the time the debt shall
be asserted against him. The contract set out in the plea
is of an extension of the time of payment, and such a contract, this court has repeatedly held, cannot be pleaded in
bar of an action brought before the time has expired.
Guard v. Whiteside, 13 111. 7; Hill v. Enders, 19 id. 163;
Payne v. Weible, 30 id. 166; Archibald v. Argall, 53 id. 307;
Culver V. Johnson, 90 id. 91.
The circuit court did not err in sustaining the demurrer
to the plea, and when the defendant elected to stand by its
plea, final judgment was properly rendered against it; for
the rule is, if matter in abatement be pleaded in bar of the
action, final judgment shall be against the defendant, if the
plea be disallowed. Comyns' Digest, title "Abatement,"
1, 15.

Judgment affirmed.

HAVEEHILL INSURANCE COMPANY

v.

PEESCOTT.

Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
38

1859.

New Hampshire, 398.

FowLEB, J.: By the 17th section of chapter 182 of the
Revised Statutes (Comp. Laws 465), it is provided that
"all original writs shall, before they are served, be indorsed on the back thereof by the plaiutiff, his agent, or
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attorney, being an inhabitant of this State ; and if the plaintiff is not an inhabitant of this State, by some responsible
person who is such inhabitant."
The present action was entered at the November term,
1858, of the court of common pleas for this county, and at
the subsequent April term, 1859, the defendants moved to
quash the writ for the want of a sufficient indorsement.
The court overruled the motion, and the defendants excepted.
Is their exception well taken? It seems to us
clearly not.

It

is not necessary to decide, in this case, whether a motion to quash, for the want of any indorsement apparent
upon the writ itself, should be made at the first term, and
within the first four days of that term, under the rule relating to pleas in abatement, on the ground that matters in
abatement are to be taken advantage of in the same time
by motion, as by plea, as has been contended by the counsel
for the plaintiffs. Upon an inspection of the writ it appears that there is indorsed upon the back thereof the name
of Samuel Dudley. It makes no difference that the letters,
"Agt.," are added to that name, indicating that he claimed
to be the agent of the plaintiffs, or of somebody else. If
necessary, those letters would be held a mere matter of
description, and he would be personally bound. PettengUl
V. M'gregor. 12 N. H. 179; Woods v. Blodgett, 15 N. H.
569; Brackett v. Bartlett, 19 N. H. 129.
The writ, then, having the name of Samuel Dudley written upon its back, was prima facie well and sufficientiy indorsed, and the motion to quash it was properly denied, as
the court will abate an action, upon motion, only when the
abatable defects are apparent upon the writ itself.
If the defendants relied upon the fact that Samuel Dudley was not the name of a person, that he was not an inhabitant of this State, that his name was not placed upon
the back of the writ by himself, or by his authority, or that
he was not a responsible person, they should have pleaded

the supposed defect in abatement, so as to have given the
plaintiffs an opportunity, by the proper replication, to
have raised an issue upon any traversable objection to the
indorsement. Jacobs v. Mellen, 14 Mass. 134; Hawkes v.
Inhabitants of Kennebv/nk, 7 Mass. 461; Purple v. Clark,
5

Pick.

206.
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The exceptions taken to the ruling of the court below
must, therefore, be overruled, and the judgment of the
court below, on the point in controversy, be affirmed.
Exceptions overruled.

WTTMER

V.

SCHLATTER.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
15 Sergeant

J. :

d Rawle,

1826,

150.

This is a plea in abatement, and the cause
was, "that the promises, if ever such promises as are laid
in the declaration were made, were made with one George
Earp, who is still living." The plaintiffs moved to strike
off this plea, because put in too late, and because there had
been in a former action a plea in abatement, that aU the
proper parties were not sued, and the action abated. To
this it has been answered by the defendants, that the defendants who now put in this plea, were not sued in the
first action; and the plaintiffs reply to this, that the defendants axe all bound by the plea of their partners in the
former action.
The plea is a plea in abatement; for where any person
who ought to be joined as a defendant is omitted, this is
pleadable in abatement only, and not in bar; because such
plea is to give the plaintiff a better writ, which is the true
criterion to designate pleas in abatement from pleas in
bar; and certainly such plea comes too late after a general
imparlance; for this is an objection which applies to the
writ itself, and the court holds a strict hand over the dilatory pleas, and will not suffer a departure from the usual
forms of pleading in these cases. But if the plea had been
put in in time, it ought not to have been received; for in
this form of plea in abatement, that all the contractors
are not sued, the defendant must give the plaintiff a better
writ. 1 Saund. 284, note. Therefore it is, that in a plea of
misnomer in the Christian name of the defendant, the defendant must show what his Christian name is, and also
what is his true surname, and this, although the true surlest the
name, be already stated in the declaration,
Dttnoan,
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should be defeated a second time by error
the names ; for these pleas tending to delay justice are not favorably
received,
and the rule was
adopted to check the repetition of these pleas in abatement.
Stephen's Principles of Pleading, 435. And this
sensible writer (in a book of small bulk, but which contains
much useful matter) gives the meaning of the rule, that
the defendant must give the plaintiff a better writ. It is,
''
that pleading a mistake in form, in abatement of the writ,
thfe defendant must at the same time correct the mistake,
so as to enable the plaintiff to avoid the same objection in
framing his new writ." The defendants cannot say that
they have corrected the inistake here, so as to enable the
plaintiffs to avoid the same objection in a new writ, when
they take the same objection to the new writ itself, the nonjunction of all the contractors. They cannot say they have
given him a better writ, and yet repeat the same objection
to the new writ; a matter so perfectly within their own
knowledge as the names of all the secret partners would
be. Nor is it anything but mocking, to say one of the new
defendants had no former opportunity to put in this plea:
for, if it could be sustained, the plaintiffs' suit never could
terminate in a trial on the merits. He might bring action
after action, and every new defendant give one new name
at a time. In the case of secret partners, it is hard enough
for a plaintiff to be once put out of court for a mistake
which he could not know, and which was scarcely known to
any other than the ostensible partners themselves; but to
put him one hundred times out of court, which are the principles contended for by the defendants, where the associates are numerous, would be excluding him so long as
The defendants did not give the
the associates please.
plaintiffs a better writ, did not make known to them that
which in fairness they ought to have done — the names of
all the partners. Instead of correcting the mistake, and enabling them to avoid a repetition of the error, they lead
them into a labyrinth, from which they cannot find out their
way by any clue. The defendants should have given the
plaintiffs all the names at once ; that was the way to correct
the error. The plaintiffs could not then have been defeated
a second time for the same cause, namely the omission of
the names of all the joint contractors. The plea admits,
that if there is a cause of action, it is a joint one. The al-

in
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legation is, that all the joint contractors were not named,
the very plea put in before ; and the very plea that might,
if this action is abated, be used again and again and again.
The plea is in the way of justice which the court ought to
discourage. To suffer its repetition, would bring a reproach
on the proceedings in courts of justice ; the mischief to the
plaintiffs is incalculable, while it inflicts no injury on the defendants, for all the partners would be entitled to contribution, and courts ought never to suffer pleading, which
is said to be a great excellence in our jurisprudence, and to
be founded on strong sense in the choicest and soundest
legislation, to be made the instrument of oppression to the
suitors.
speak of the consequences of suffering the plea
in abatement to be thus used, without any relation to this

I

particular case.

BOSTON

Plea in abatement struck off.

TYPE AND STEREOTYPE FOUNDRY

v.

SPOONER.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
5

Vermont,

1833.

93.

WmLiAMS, J. : In this case the defendant plead in abatement that there was no such person or corporation as the
Boston Type & Stereotype Foundry. This plea was demurred to, and a judgment of respondeat ouster, rendered.
To this judgment the defendant excepted.
After a final
judgment rendered for the plaintiff, the cause is brought
here for a decision on the question of law arising on the
exception, and presents the enquiry, whether the fact set
forth in this plea, was the proper subject of a plea in
abatement.
There can be no doubt, but that the fact, if verified, is
an answer to the suit. In every action commenced in a
court there must be a party against whom a judgment may
be rendered, and an execution issue. The defendant is not
compelled to answer to a suit, unless it is prosecuted in the
name of a person either natural or artificial agaiust whom
he may have a judgment, and an execution to obtain satis-
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faction of the same. He is not under the necessity of resorting alone to the recognizance, which a plaintiff must
procure on praying out a writ, in order to collect his cost
if he obtains judgment therefor ; as the recognizance is only
an accTimulative security for the same.
This position is so obvious that it has not been controverted, but the only objection taken to the plea is that the
fact should have been plead in bar. And if it is true, not
only that it could have been plead in bar, but that it could
not be plead in abatement, the objection is well taken. It
does not foUow, however, that because the defendant might
have availed himself of this defence by plea in bar, therefore he cannot avail himself of the same, by plea iu abatement. As a general rule, matter in bar camiot be plead ia
abatement, but to this rule there are exceptions, and the
case under consideration comes within the exceptions. The
nonjoinder of a person who ought to have been made a
plaintiff may be plead in abatement, and advantage may
also be taken of it under the general issue. In replevin,
the defendant may plead property in himself or a stranger
either in abatement or bar. Certain personal disabilities
which entirely defeat the suit, may be plead in abatement
or bar, as outlawry for felony, attainder, alien enemy.
Coverture is only pleadable in abatement inasmuch as it
does not destroy the cause of action, but only precludes the
person from maintaining the suit.
It would seem from the principles on which pleas in
abatement are founded, that the defence relied on by the
defendant could only be taken advantage of by a plea in
abatement, as it merely denies that there is any right in
those claiming to prosecute, or that there is any such person as the plaintiff; leaving the contract to be enforced
The
by those from whom the consideration proceeded.
authorities, however, show that it is a proper subject for a
plea in abatement or bar.
That there may be a plea in abatement, to the disability
of a plaintiff, denying his existence, showing that there is
no such person in rerum natura, as that at the commenceof the suit he was a ficticious person is recognized in 1 Com.
Dig. tit. abatement, E. 16; 1 Chitty, Pleadings, 435-6;
Guild V. Richardson, 6 Pick. 370; Doe v. Penfield, 19 John.
308. That the same matter be plead in bar, we find in Bro.
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93, as quoted in the case of the Mayor
Stafford v. Bolton; Bos. & Pull. 40, 44.

Abr. Misnomer,
Burgesses of

S

It

has also been objected to this plea as a plea in abatement, that pleas in abatement must in all cases give the
plaintiff a better writ, i. e., must be so plead as to enable
the plaintiff in a subsequent suit to avoid the error committed in the first. This as a general rule is undoubtedly
true. It obviously, however, has relation to those cases
only where it is in the power of a defendant to give and
As where
where the plaintiff can have a better writ.
the plea is founded on some fact of which the defendant is
It cannot apply to those
presumed to have knowledge.
In the
cases where a plaintiff cannot have a better writ.
alien enemy, and in other
case of outlawry, attainder,
cases where the right of action is suspended on account of
the disability of a plaintiff to sue, he cannot have a better
writ while the disability exists. It is sufficient in a plea
in abatement for any of those causes to set forth the fact
without attempting that which is impracticable.
It will be
found that it is by no means a criterion to test in all cases
whether a matter must be plead in abatement or bar, to determine whether it can be so plead as to enable the plaintiff in a subsequent action, to obviate the facts set forth in
As we find from the authorities that the subsedefence.
quent matter of this plea is proper for a plea in abatement,
and if that which is set forth is true, no better writ can be
made in the name of the plaintiff, the writ must abate.
The judgment of the county court inust therefore be reversed, and judgment entered that the writ abate.

LINDSAY

V.

STOUT.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
59

Illinois,

1871,

491.

McAllistbe, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

In

this case, which was assumpsit upon two promissory
notes, the defendant below filed, first, a plea in abatement,
averring that plaintiff was a married woman at the com-
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mencement of the suit, and her husband was still living. To
this plea plaintiff first demurred, then obtained leave to
withdraw the demurrer, and, replying, alleged that the
notes sued on were her sole and separate property, etc. Rejoinder by defendant, traversing the matters alleged.
At a subsequent term the defendant, by leave, filed the
general issue, and a special plea setting up that the notes
were obtained by fraud. At the next term the defendant,
by leave, withdrew the plea of the general issue. The record shows that, as the case then stood, there was a trial by
a jury, and verdict for plaintiff for $265.33, upon which
judgment was rendered.
There is nothing in the record to show that the plea of
fraud was answered by either demurrer or replication.
The defendant, by filing the general issue and special
plea to the merits, waived the plea in abatement, and when
the general issue was withdrawn, the case stood merely
upon a plea of confession and avoidance; that plea remaining unanswered at the time of the so-called trial, there
was no issue to be tried, and the unanswered plea constituting a good bar to the action, the judgment of the court
below is erroneous, and must be revers.ed, and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.*^
60.
A demnmr is also m waiver of a plea in abatement. Fergnson t.
Bawlins (1859) 23 lU. 69.
Time for filing. — "A dilatory plea must ordinarily be filed at the return
term of the writ, if the declaration has been filed, or at the earliest practicable
time.
It has been held that a dilatory plea is too late after the expiration
of the mle to plead, and that ignorance of a cause for abatement will not
A plea in abatement
excuse the filing of the plea after the time limited.
cannot be filed after a general imparlance, or general continuance, nor after
But it may be filed after a
a motion for a continuance has been overruled.
•
* * But as in the ease of other
special imparlance entered of record.
pleas, dilatory pleas may, in the discretion of the court, for caow ihowa,
' ' 31 Cyc.
162, 163.
be received after the time limited has passed.
See Douglass v. Belcher (1834) 7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 104, given ia the text
tupra, eh. V, see. 1, aa to contemporaneous filing of pleas in abatement and
in bar.
See Wilson t. Hamilton (1818) 4 S. & B. (Pa.) 238, given in the text
supra, «k. Y, mo. d^ M to Biattex in abatement pleaded puis darrei» eontinu-
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EICHAEDS

V.

8

SETREB.

Court of Exchequer.
3

[Chap.

1816,

Price, 197.

is

it

it

a

is

it

is

it,

is

is

it,

Thomson, C. B. : This is a question as to the validity
of the plea of privilege, which has been pleaded in abatement.
There is no objection made to the form; but it is
said that it has not been properly supported, by the affidavit of the truth of
which
required in all pleas of abatement. The body of the affidavit, too,
admitted to be
right in itself, but an objection
made to the title of
which is, that
to
have
been made in another
purports
cause than that now before the court.
(His Lordship
stated the title of the affidavit, and of this cause.)
Certainly, wherever an affidavit
made in
suit that has been
ought to be entitled, and as of the precise
commenced,
cause in which
to be used.

it

The plea, therefore, was insufficient, for want of a proper
affidavit in support of it. So that, independent of the other
question on the validity of a plea of privilege, which, under
the circumstances of this case,
has become unnecesto
the
on
discuss,
sary
that ground, a nullity, and
plea was,
the plaintiff was entitled to sign his judgment at the expiration of the four days.*^

5

4

61.
The statute
and
Ann. e. 16, s. 11 (4) provided that no dilatory
plea Bhould be received unless the party oflfering such plea should by affidavit prove the truth thereof or show some probable matter to the court
to induce them to beUeve that the facts of such dilatory plea were true.

3

V.

Judicature

MOESE.
of

Superior Court

of

DODGE

New Hampshire,

1825,

New Hampshire, 232.

Assumpsit upon an account, annexed to the writ, of

goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff's intestate to the
defendant.

Pleas in Abatement.
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The defendant pleaded in abatement of the plaintiff's
vsrit, that the promise in the declaration mentioned, if any
such were made, was made by him jointly with several other
persons, and not by him alone.
To this plea the plaintiff replied, that the promise was
made by the said Morse alone, as alleged in the declaration ;
and upon this issue was joined.

By the Coubt.

On behalf of the defendant in this case
because they
were instructed, that in case they found the issue in favor
of the plaintiff, it would be their duty to give him in damages the value of the goods charged, without any further
inquiry into the merits of the case. But this objection is
altogether without any foundation. For it is well settled,
that if issue be taken upon a plea in abatement, and the
jury find for the plaintiff, they must assess the damages in
the same manner, as when an issue is found for the plaintiff upon a plea in bar. 2 Wils. 367, Eichom v. LeMaitre;
3 Saund. 210, g. note 3; Yelo. 112, Tompson v. Colier; T.
Eay. 118; 1 Lev. 163.«='

it is urged, that the jury were misdirected,

62.

"On

the other hand, if such an issue [an issue of fact] is found in
the judgment ia that the suit abate oi tliat plaintiff's
23 C^e. 773.

favor of defendant,
wzit be quashed."

CHAPTER IZ.

REPLICATION AND SUBSEQUENT PLEADINGS.
Section

HENRY

V.

Gbnbbal Pbincipi.es.

1.

OHIO EIVER EAILEOAD COMPAITY.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

1895.

Virginia, 234.

40 West

a

it

it,

a

is

it

it,

Beannon, J.
Darius Henry brought trespass on the case in the circuit court of Mason county against the Ohio River Railroad Company, and by direction of the court the jury
found for the defendant, and judgment was rendered for
and the plaintiff appeals. The suit was for damages to
a lot and residence thereon, injured by an overflow of water caused, as alleged, by. an embankment raised by the
laid its track.
company, on which
A question of law in the case
this: The defendant
pleaded not guilty, putting itself on the country, and issue was regularly joined on that plea. The defendant also
filed
plea of the statute of limitations, but the plaintiff
and the want of such replication
made no replication to
introduces trouble in the case. When this plea came in,
redemanded
being one of confession and avoidance,
plication either by way of traverse or confession and avoidance; but, standing without replication, judgment should

is

it

a

(654)

a

is

it

it

for the defendant, as
have been rendered upon
rule in the science of common-law pleading that a pleading introducing new matter must be met by demurrer or
by some response of fact. There was an objection to the
demurrer, which was overruled, and
plea, operating as
there was no replication, and,
received;
but
the plea
alone called for judgment for destanding unanswered,
based on the groimd, under the
fendant. This judgment
that
the
plaintiff, by failing to reply
of
pleading,
system
to the plea, does not further prosecute his suit. A suit
may not reach an issue. It may be cut short by failur«

Sec

Replication and Subsequent Pleadings.
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a

is

if,

of one of the parties to pursue Ms litigation. As to the
defendant, if he appears and fails to demur or plead to
the declaration, or
after plea, he fails to maintain the
course of pleading required of him by the law of
pleading,
judgment called judgment by nil dicit
(he says nothing)
given against him. This would be
judgment quod recup-

3

a

a

6

it

1

2

4

is

a

a

is

it

a

is

6

is

is

it

&

1

is

is

is

is

it

if

is

a

is

4

is

a

eret, both final in the cause and conclusive in
second suit.
On the other hand judgment may be given against the
plaintiff for not declaring, replying, surrejoining, or surrebutting, and this
called judgment by non pros,
(non
prosequitur— he does not prosecute).
Steph. PI. 108, 109;
Minor, Inst. 866; Tidd, Prac. 730. This judgment of
non pros,
species of nonsuit, and does not bar another
suit. The matter of the unanswered plea
not taken for
true; for,
were, the judgment ought to be one of nil
capiat, both final in the particular suit and a bar against
another. It
based, not on the idea that the matter
true for all purposes, but only for failure to prosecute. It
seems to be an unreasonable exception to that principle
of the law of pleading which holds that whatever
well
pleaded, and not denied,
taken to be true.
Saund. PI.
Ev. 39. A much more logical principle would be to treat
as confessed, and render judgment final and conclusive, like the proceeding in chancery, where an answer
filed responsive to the bill alleging new matter, which, in
absence of replication,
taken to be true, and final decree rendered upon it. Cleggett v. Kittle,
W. Va. 542.
At first thought, such judgment might be regarded as
both final in the cause and conclusive upon the matter in
the declaration stating the cause
controversy, as there
of action, and the plea stating facts constituting
bar on
its merits, and
remains unanswered, and we might expect a judgment of the law, which would ever be an end of
controversy upon those facts; but such
judgment
not
regarded as one on the merits, but only as
nonsuit, and,
while final in the particular case, not conclusive upon the
treated as a nonsuit by
matter of action. It
Bl. Comm.
Minor, Inst. 867;
Black, Judgm. sec. 702;
296; by
Freem. Judgm. sec. 261. Judge Summebs regarded
as
Eand. 675. All authora nonsuit in Pinner v. Edwards,
ities hold that nonsuit does not bar a second suit for the
same cause. The authorities just given say that a judgsecond suit. The quesment on non pros, will not defeat
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tion was fully discussed in Howes v. Austin, 35 HI. 396,
in a case where, just as in this case, the pleas were general
issue, and a special plea in har, and, the plaintiff failing
to reply to the special plea in answer to a rule to reply,
judgment was entered that the defendant go henc^, not
that the plaintiff take nothing by his suit. It was held
to be a judgment of nonsuit, and not a bar to second suit.
It was not necessary, before rendering such judgment of
non pros., to wait for trial on the plea of not guilty; for
there was the plea of the statute, and no replication, and

it alone called for judgment ending the suit.
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there be
two or more pleas, one a good bar to the whole declaration,
though others be bad, or found against the defendant, he
is entitled to judgment on that plea. He may now plead
several defenses, and, if one only be good, that is enough
to defeat the action. 2 Tuck. Bl. Comm. 260; Steph. PI.
273 ; Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wall. 25. If the plea were
bad, such judgment would be improper; but this was the
ordinary plea that the action accrued more than five yeats
before suit, and was on its face good and properly admitted. But the trial went on, notwithstanding there was no
replication to the plea of th6 statute, court and parties
treating the case as though there had been an issue on
probably by mere inadvertence. After the introduction of
the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant, without giving any
verevidence, moved the court to direct the jury to find
dict for the defendant on the plea and issue joined on the
statute of limitations, and the court instructed the jury
to find such verdict, and
was found.
The plaintiff in
error says this verdict should be set aside, because there
was no replication, and therefore no issue on the plea of
the statute of limitations.
"Where a plea converification, there cannot be a joinder of
cludes with
issue without a replication."
LocJcridge v. Carlisle,
•
•
Bart. Law Prac. 478, 480.
Band. 20;
So, tested by technical principles of common-law pleading, we shall say there was no issue on this plea. What
then? What the result! There
considerable difficulty
iu reaching this result. It has been long and often held by
our courts that when
judgment rests on a verdict of
jury sworn to try an issue joined in a case, criminal or
civil, when no issue had in fact been joined,
would be
for
its
reversal.
State v. Douglass, 20 W. Va. 770;
fTOund
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So often and indiscriminately has it been held that the rule seems almost inexorable; but the courts have in some instances felt its inv.
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The case of Moore v. Mauro,
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convenience, in cases where there has been a fair trial on
the merits, and no ob.iection was made on that score in the
trial court. In this case there was a plea of not guilty, and
isue on
and this plea of the statute, and all the evidence
bearing on both, was heard, and a verdict responsive to
issues under both pleas, had there been issues, was found
all parties treating the case as tried upon both pleas. In
W. Va. 616,
was held that,
Huffman v. Alderson,
though some of the pleadings conclude with
verification,
and no issues are formally joined thereon, though joined
on others, yet
the record states that the jury was sworn
to try the issues, and the instructions show that the case
was fully tried on the merits, including the defenses set
up by the pleadings, on which no issues were joined, and
the verdict responds, not only to the issues joined, but to
the defenses on which issues were not joined, such verdict
being a
cures such defects under the statute of jeofails,
W. Va.
case of misjoinder of issue. In Griff v. McCoy,
201, Judge Haymond referred, with some expression of
disapprobation, to the rigor of former decisions upon this
subject, and thought they might need revision. He says
he would foUow the principles in Southside R. Co. v. Daniel, 20 Gratt, 344. This was an action for damage to land
caused by overflow from sCa embankment made for the railthis case, and, as in this case, the defendant
road, as
pleaded not g\iiity, on which issue was joined, and a specspecial replication, concluding
ial plea, and there was
to the country, but no rejoinder, nor any joinder of issue
on it; but the parties went to trial, and the subject of the
special plea and replication were contested before the jury,
verdict for the plaintiff. The record, as
and there was
here, showed that the jury was sworn to try the issue, not
issues. It was held that, as there was no objection to the
could not avail in
want of joinder in the court below,
the appellate court. We know in the case in hand that the
whole matter on this plea of the statute was contested, beverdict
cause the record states that the defense moved for
"on the plea and issue joined on the statute of limitations,"
and the evidence covering that defense was before the jury.

Rand. 488, supports this
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The case of Gurry v. Mannington, 23 W. Va. 14,
might seem at first view to forbid the application of this
doctrine to this case.
There the defendant pleaded not
guUty and the statute of limitations, and there was no
replication or joinder of issue on either plea, and the verview.

dict for plaintiff was set aside at defendant's instance.
There the defendant was not chargeable with the omission
to reply to the pleas, and he could with consistency avail
himself of the defect; whereas, in this case, it was the
plaintiff's duty to reply to the plea, and he is the party
asking to have the verdict set aside, and take advantage
of his own default in pleading, as the defendant could not
rejoin till the plaintiff replied. This is a reason, in addition to others stated above, for not allowing the plaintiff
for this cause to set aside the verdict. So it seems to me
that the plaintiff cannot, under the circumstances, set aside
the verdict.®'.
63.

•

♦

•

See Douglass v. Central Land Co. (1878) 12 W. Va. 502,
on the question when a replication
is necessary.

in the text,

given supra

Forms.
should have formal commencement and conclusion.
Replications
"Says
The commencement of a replication to a plea in bar is as follows:
that by reason of anything in the said plea alleged, he ought not to be barred
from having and maintaining his aforesaid action against him, the said
This formula is called precludi non. The conC D; because, he says, etc."
clusion is: (in debt) "wherefore he prays judgment, and his debt aforesaid
together with his damages by him sustained by reason of the detention
thereof, to be adjudged to him."
Stephen on Pleading (Tyler's Ed.) 347.
See same reference for other forms.

HOLDING'S EXECUTOB

v.

SMITH.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
1

In

1807.

Murphy, 154.

this case among other pleas the defendant pleaded a
set-off. To this plea the plaintiff replied — first, there was no
such set-off, and secondly, the statute of limitations^ To
this replication the defendant demurred specially, and for
cause of demurrer alleged that the replication was double.
IjOcke, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
According to the strict rule of pleading upon commonlaw principles, this replication is certainly bad; but it appears to be good under the provisions of our Act of As-
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sembly, Iredell, 305. This act does not warrant a double
replication to every plea, and perhaps allows it to no plea
but that of set-off. This plea was allowed in England by
Stat. 2d, Geo. 2d, Ch. 22, and adopted by our act of 1756,
the preamble of which states that the. object of introducing
the plea was to prevent multiplicity
of lawsuits; and
wherever there were mutual debts subsisting, instead of
compelling each party to sue, one debt was allowed to be
set-off against the other, and this in lieu of an action, or
rather cross-action.
Every defendant therefore pleading
a set-off is to be considered (so as respects this plea)
in the light of a plaintiff, and bound to produce the
same testimony to support it that would be required to
enable him to recover in that character; and consequently
the plaintiff against whom the set-off is pleaded, ought to
be permitted by way of replication to make the same defence which the law would permit him to enter by way of
plea, had he been originally sued. If, then, the present defendant had sued the plaintiff on this account, would he
not, in the character of defendant, have been permitted to
He
plead the general issue and statute of limitation?
surely would, and if so, he may reply the same to the plea
of set-off. Let the demurrer be overruled.^*
Statutory authority to plead double does not apply to replications and
64.
"On the subject of several pleas it is to be, further
subsequent pleadings,
observed, that the statute [4 Ann., c. 16, s. 4] extends to the case of pleas
These remain subject
only, and not to replications or subsequent pleadings.
to the fuU operation of the common law against duplicity, so that, though
yet
to each plea there may, as already stated, be a separate replication,
there cannot be offered to the same plea more than a single replication,
nor to the same replication more than one rejoinder; and so to the end
The legislative provision allowing several matters of plea
of the series.
was confined to that case, under the impression, probably, that it was in that
part of the pleading that the hardship of the rule against duplicity was most
seriously and frequently felt, and that the multiplicity of issues which would
be occasioned by a further extension of the enactment would have been
attended with expense and inconvenience more than equivalent to the adStephea on Pleading (Tjkr's £d.) 26&
vantaga."

Common Law Pleading.

660

Section

2.

SELBY

9

Tbavebse db Injubia.
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I.;

Declaration in replevin for taking the plaintiff's goods
and chattels in Verulam Buildings, Gray's Inn, in the county of Middlesex, and detaining the same against sureties and
pledges. The fourth avowry and cognizance were by the
defendant Bardons, as collector of the poor rates of that
part of the parish of St. Andrew, Holbom, which lies above
the bars, in the county of Middlesex, and of the parish of
St. George the Martyr in the said county, and by the other
defendant as his bailiff ; and it stated that the plaintiff was
an inhabitant of the said part of the parish of St. Andrew,
Holbom, and by law ratable to the relief of the poor of
that part of the said parish, and of the parish of St. George
the Martyr, in respect of his occupation of a tenement situate in the said place in which, etc., and within the said
part of the parish of St. Andrew; that a rate for the relief of the poor of that part of St. Andrew, Holbom, and of
the parish of St. George the Martyr, was duly ascertained,
made, signed, assessed, allowed, given notice of, and published according to the statutes ; and that by the said rate
the plaintiff was, in respect of such inhabitancy and occupation as aforesaid, duly rated in the sum oi 7
that Bardons, as collector, gave him notice of the rate, and demanded payment, which he refused; that the plaintiff was
duly summoned to appear at the petty sessions of the justices of the peace for the said county, to be holden at
time
and place duly specified, to shew cause why he refused
payment; that he appeared, and shewed no cause; that
warrant was duly made under the hands and seals of two
justices of peace for the county then present, directed to
Bardons as collector, requiring him, according to the statute, to make distress of the plaintiff's goods and chattels;
that the warrant was delivered to Bardons, under which he,
as collector, avoided, and the other defendant, as his bail-
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iff, acknowledged tlie taking of the goods as a distress, and
prayed judgment and a return of the goods. The plaintiff
pleaded in bar that the defendants of their own wrong,
and without such cause as they had in their avowry and

cognizance alleged, took the plaintiff's goods and chattels, etc. To this plea there was a special demurrer, and
the causes assigned were, that the plea in bar tendered
and offered to put in issue several distinct matters — ^the
inhabitancy of the plaintiff; his changeability to the relief
of the poor, in respect of his occupation mentioned in the
avowry and cognizance; the ascertainment, making, signing, assessing, allowance, notice, and publication of the
rate ; the rating and assessment of the plaintiff ; the notice
to him of the rate ; the demand and refusal of the sum assessed; the summons, the appearance before the justices,
the warrant of distress, and delivery thereof to the defendant Bardons. Another cause assigned was, that the
plea in bar was pleaded as if the avowry and cognizance consisted wholly in excuse of the taking and detaiaing, and
did hot avow and justify the same, and claim a right to the
goods and chattels by virtue of the statutes. To the fifth
and sixth avowries and cognizances, which were similar
in form to the fourth, the plaintiff pleaded de injuria; and
there were special demurrers, assigning the same causes
as above. The plaintiff joined in demurrer.
The case was argued in last Michaelmas term by Coleridge in support of the demurrer, and Maule contra. The
judges not being agreed in their opinions, now delivered
judgment seriatim. The points urged and the authorities
cited in argument are sufficiently stated and commented on
in the opinions delivered by them.
Patteson, J. : The pleas in bar to the fourth, fifth,
and sixth cognizances are so entirely at variance with one
of the principal objects of special pleading, viz., that of
bringing the parties to clear and precise issues of fact
cannot bring my mind to consider them
or of law, that
upon the authorBut
as maintainable upon principle.
should appear that they are mainity of decided cases,
am not prepared to overrule those cases upon
tainable,
may entertain respecting the inconvenany opinion that
ience of so general form of issue and am free to confess
that, after an attentive examination of the authorities,
am of opinion that the pleas are maintainable.
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The leading cases upon the subject (I mean Crogate's
case, 8 Co. 132, for the year books throw little light on the
subject) is by no means consistent in all its different parts,
and much that is contained in the four resolutions is unnecessary to the decision of the case itself.
The pleadings were in substance as follows: Trespass
for driving cattle. Plea, a right of common as copyholder
in a piece of pasture into which the plaintiff had put his
cattle; and that defendant, as servant of the commoner,
drove them out. Replication, de injuria sua propria absque
tali causa.
The first' resolution is in substance this: that the replication de injuria absque tali causa refers to the whole plea ;
for all is but one cause. The second resolution
that
where any interest in land, or common, or rent out of or
no plea; for
way over land
claimed, de injuria
proper when the plea does consist of matter of excuse only,
and no matter of interest whatever. The third resolution
is, that where the defendant justifies under authority from
no plea; so where he justifies
the plaintiff, de injuria
under authority of law. The fourth resolution is, that the
issue in the. case then at bar would be full of multiplicity.
Upon the authority of this case,
the pleas in bar now
under consideration be bad, they must be so on one of the
following grounds
Either that the avowries claim some interest, or that the
defendant justifies under authority of law within the meaning of the third resolution, or that they are bad for multiplicity.
In the first place, as to any claim of interest,
plain
that the avowries claim no interest whatever in land, the
sort of interest to which the second resolution
in words
confined. But, supposing any interest in goods were within
the spirit of that resolution, still,
apprehend that
must
be an interest existing antecedent to the seizure complained
of, and not one which arises merely out of that seizure;
otherwise this plea could never be good in replevin where a

I

it

is

is

return of goods
claimed, and, of course, an interest in
asserted. Indeed,
them
seems to be considered in some
textbooks that this plea in bar can never be used in replevin; but on reference to the authorities cited for that
position, they aU appear to be cases where an interest in
land was claimed by the avowry. In this respect,
con-
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cannot see any distinction between on action of
replevin and one of trespass ; and as the plaintiff can bring
either at his election, it would be strange if he should be
able by suing in trespass to entitle himself to the general
form of replication, but if he sues in replevin should be debarred from it. * • •
As, therefore, the avowries in this case shew no interest
in land or in the goods seized, except that which arises from
slaiming a return; and as I find no authority for saying,
that such claim of return is an interest within the meaning
of the second resolution in Crogate's case, it seems to me
that the avowries shew matter of excuse only, and that, as
to this ground of objection, the general pleas in bar of de

injuria are good.

In

*

it,

the next place, are the general pleas bad on account
of any authority in law shewn by the avowries?
It is certainly stated in the third resolution in Crogate's
case, that the replication de injuria is bad where the plea
justifies under an authority in law ; but this, if taken in the
full extent of the terms used, is quite inconsistent with
part of the first resolution, which states, that where the
plea justifies under the proceedings of a court not of record,
the general replication may be used, or where it justifies
under a capias and warrant to sheriff, all may be traversed
except the capias, which cannot, because it is matter of
record and cannot be tried by a jury. Now, proceedings
of a court not of record, and the warrant to a sheriff and
seizure under
are surely as complete authorities in law
as any authority disclosed by the present avowries.*" * *
In the last place, are the pleas bad on account of the
issue, tendered by them, being multifarious?
this were res integra,
should have no hesitation in
holding that they were bad, and
cannot,
think, he denied
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65.
It is the fact of the authority of law appearing of record which
the controlling feature in this class of cases, for on the appeal of the principal
case to the Exchequer
chamber, Tyndal, C. J., giving the unanimous opinion
That the dictum of Lord Coke cannot be intended
of the judges, said
of justification under all authorities in law generally,
abundantly
clear
from the instances already adverted to of justification under process of
law against the person and goods of the plaintiff, so also of justification
by peace officers arresting upon breach of the peace and the like. So also
statute, in all which cases the general
in the case of justification under
traverse is invariably replied to such pleas, where no matter of record forms
not equally be replied where the justification
so, why may
part of it.
Tyrwhitt,
poor's rate being an authority of law."
is under a distress for
430. 438.
3

a
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that the present issues are as full of multiplicity as that in
Crogate's case, and to which the fourth resolution there
applied. But I am unable to find any instance in wlhich the
general replication has been held bad on that ground. The
objection is indeed mentioned in the cases cited from Lord
.Chief Justice Willes 's reports, but in no one of those cases
does the decision proceed on that objection alone, and in all
of them there were other undoubted objections. In Cooper
V. Monhe, Willes. 52, the plea justified under a distress for
rent, and the general replication was clearly bad within the
second resolution in Crogate's case. In CockerUl v. Armstrong, Willes, 99, the plea justified under a seizure of cattle
damage feasant in a close of which the bailiffs and burgesses of Scarborough were alleged to be seized in fee; an

is

is

it,

interest, therefore, was claimed in the land, and the general replication was bad within the same resolution, and
Lord Chief Justice Eyeb in commenting on that case in
Jones V. Kitchin, 1 Bos. & Pull. 80, expressly states that the
replication was bad on that grouhd, and not because it put
two or three things in issue, for that may happen in every
case where the defence arises out of several facts all operating to one point of excuse. In Bell v. Wardell, Willes, 202,
the pleas set up a custom, which was held bad, and, therefore, any decision as to the general replication became imnecessary.
It is every day's practice where the plea justifies an
assault in defence of the possession of a close, or removing
to reply de injuria generally, and
goods doing damage to
yet this objection as to the multifarious nature of the issue
would apply in both cases. The same observation holds
good where this general replication
used in actions for
libel or slander, in which a justification
pleaded.

I

it

I

The present avowries state many facts undoubtedly, but
they are all necessary to the defence, and combined together they shew but one cause of defence, namely, that the
plaintiff's goods were rightfully taken under a distress for
poor rates, and if the general replication be held bad in this
am at a loss to see in what case such a replication can
case,
puts more than one fact in issue.
be held good, where
am compelled, therefore, however reluctantly, to come to
the conclusion, that the pleas iu bar are good.
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Paekb, J., after stating the pleadings, proceeded as follows:
The question for our decision is, -wihether the objections
pointed out in the special demurrer, and which have been
insisted upon in the argument before us, are well founded
in law? It appears to me, upon an examination of the
authorities, that they are not, and that the pleas in bar are
good.

It

is true that these pleas in bar put in issue a great
number of distinct facts ; aad it is also true that the general
rule is, that where any pleading comprises several traversable facts or allegations, the whole ought not to be denied
together, but one point alone disputed: and I am fully
sensible that the tendency of such a rule is to simplify the
trial of matters of fact, and to save much expense in litigation. But it is quite clear, that from a very early period in
the history of the law, an exception to this general rule
has been allowed with respect to all actions of trespass on
the case, in the plea of the general issue; and with respect
to some actions of tort, in the replication of de injuria sua
propria absque tali causa. This replication, where it is
without doubt admissible, generally, indeed it may be said
always, puts in issue more than one fact, and often a great
number. For instance, in an action of assault, where there
is a justification that the defendant was possessed of a
house; that the plaiutiff entered; that the defendant requested him to retire, and he refused; that the defendant
laid his hands on the plaintiff to remove him, and the
plaintiff resisted; all these facts may be denied by this
general replication. Com. Dig. Pleader (F) 18; Hall v.
Gerard, Latch. 128, 221, 273. So, where an obligation to
repair fences, and a breach of the fences by the plaintiff
is pleaded as an excuse for a trespass with cattle, Eastell,
621. a.. Com. Dig. Pleader, 3 (M) 29. So if there be a justification of assault and false imprisonment, on the ground
of a felony committed, and reasonable suspicion of the
plaintiff, Br. Abr. De Son Tort, 49. So as to other justifications in the like action, ibid. 18, 20. Under the precept
of an admiralty court, or under a precept after plaint levied
in a county or hundred court, Eastell, 668 a., many facts
may be put in issue by the general replication, and there
appears no question about the validity of such a replication.
Crogate's case, 8 Coke, 132. The case of O'Brien v. Saaon,
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is a further authority to the same effect, that
many facts may be included in one issue ; and if many facts
may be traversed,' it can be no valid objection that more
than usual are denied in any particular case.
2

B.

& C. 908,

The second ground is, that the avowry and cognizance
claim an interest in the goods, and that for this reason the
pleas in bar are not admissible. Upon the best consideration I have been able to give to the authorities on this subject which are (many of them) obscure and contradictory,
do not think that any interest is claimed in these pleadings, within the meaning of that word in the rules laid down
on this subject. In Crogate's case, 8 Rep. 132, the principal
authority, three cases are mentioned in which the general
traverse is not allowed.
The first is, where matter of record is parcel of the issue ;
and that for the obvious reason, that if it were permitted,
it would lead to a wrong mode of trial.
The second case is, .where the defendant in his own right
or as servant to another (who is by that decision put on the
same footing as his master) claims an interest in the land,
or any common, or rent going out of the land, or any way
or passage upon the land.
The third case is, where, by the defendant's plea, any
authority or power is mediately or immediately derived
from the plaintiff. Under this description is included any
title by lease, license, or igift from the plaintiff ; Br. Abr. De
Son Tort Demesne, 41, or lease from his lessee; 16 Hen.

I

7. 3.

•

*

*

Lord Coke says, after laying down

these three rules,- that

injuria, etc., is proper when the defendant's plea doth consist merely upon matter of excuse,
By this I underand of no matter of interest whatever.
stand him to mean an interest in the .realty, or an interest
in, or title to chattels, averred in the plea, and existing prior
to, and independently of the act complained of, which interest or title would be in issue on the general replication ;
and I take the principle of the rule to be, that such alleged
interest or title shall be specially traversed, and not involved
in a general issue.
It is contended, however, on the part of the defendants,
that the interest here meant, is one that the party would
the general plea de

acquire by the seizure which forms the subject of complaint,
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and that the replication would be improper whenever the
defendant justified under any proceedings by which, if
rightful, he would acquire an interest or a special property.
this were the meaning of the term "interest," a general replication would be bad to a plea to an action of trespass justifying seizure under process of the admiralty
court, or of any inferior jurisdiction not of record. So in
case of a justification of taking beasts in withernam (16
Hen. 7. 2). So of a justification of seizure for salvage,
Lilly 's Entries, p. 349. And yet in all these cases it appears
to be settled that the general traverse is permitted.
It seems to me, therefore, that the objection is applicable
to those cases only where a party justifies as having an interest, or under one who has an interest, by title at the
time of the act complained of, which interest would therefore he put in issue btf the general traverse.

If

Lord Tendebden, C.

J. I

consider the system of special
pleading, which prevails in the law of England, to be founded upon and to be adapted to the peculiar mode of trial
established in this country, the trial by the jury; and
that its object is to bring the case, before trial, to a simple,
:

and, as far as practicable, a single question of fact, whereby not only the duties of the jury may be more easily and
conveniently discharged, but the expense to be incurred by
the suitors may be rendered as small as possible. And experience has abundantly proved, that both these objects
are better attained where the issues and matters of fact
to be tried are narrowed and brought to a point by the previous proceedings and pleadings on the record, than where
the matter is left at large to be established by proof, either
by the plaintiff in maintenance of his action, or by the deam sensifendant in resisting the claim made upon him.
not
been
in
view by
always
kept
ble that this principle has
the courts, and that there have been, in practice, many
founded upon very nice
instances of departure from
and subtle distinctions. The decisions of our predecessors,
the judges of former times, ought to be followed and
adopted, unless we can see very clearly that they are erroneous, for otherwise there will be no certainty in the adminhad found the question in
istration of the law; and
should
this cause distinctly decided in any former case,
my duty to abide by the decision, especially
have thought

it

I

I

if

it,

I
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in a matter regarding rather the course of proceeding than
a question of pure law. But after an attentive consideration of the cases quoted at the bar, and of such others as I
have been able to meet with after a very diligent search,
do not find that this has been done. I find, indeed, many
decisions and dicta not easily reconcilable with each other,
founded, as I have already observed, upon very nice and
subtle grounds, and not capable of being reduced to any
plain, or, to my mind, any solid principle. There is one
matter in which all the authorities in our books agree. If
an action of trespass be brought for turning sheep or cattle
to feed upon land in the possession of the plaintiff, and the
defendant justifies the act, by pleading that A. B., his landlord, was seised of certain lands, and demised the same to
him for a term not yet expired, and that he thereupon
entered and was possessed of the demised lands ; and then
goes on to allege, in the ordinary form of prescription, that
his landlord had right of common on the plaintiff's land for

I

cattle levant and couchant on the demised land, and that he
put the cattle on the plaintiff's land in the exercise of that
right; in such a case, say, it is agreed by all the decisions
that the plaintiff cannot reply generally de injuria sua
propria absque tali causa, but must traverse some one of
the facts alleged in the plea, admitting, for the purpose of
the cause, all the others. In such a case at least three
separate and distinct facts are alleged: the seisin of the
landlord, the demise to the defendant, the immemorial right
of common. Every one of these three is necessary to the
defence ; but the plaintiff must elect which of them he will
deny, and when he has so done, the cause goes down to the
jury for the trial of that single fact ; the jury are not embarrassed by a multiplicity of matter, and the parties are
relieved from much of the expense of proof, to which they
would be subjected if all the facts alleged in the plea were
to be matters of proof and controversy before the jury.
In the case now before the court, the avowry alleged that
a poor rate was made ; that it was allowed by the justices ;
that the plaintiff was assessed in it for his messuage in
which the distress was taken; that this messuage was within
the parish ; that payment of the assessment was demended
and refused; that a warrant of justices was iss.ued to levy
and that the goods were taken under the authority of
that warrant. Manv distinct and independent facts are
it,

I
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thus alleged in the avowry, every one of which is necessary
to sustain the right to take the goods, and to entitle the
defendant to have them returned to him ; and if this general
plea in bar be good, the defendant must prove every one
of them at the trial, and the jury must consider and decide
upon each before a verdict can properly be given. Now,
think might safely venture to ask any plain and imlettered
man, whether he could find any difference between the two
cases that
have put, either in common understanding or
in sound logic. For myself, must say that can find none.
no such distinction exists or can be found, why should a
different rule prevail? Why should all the matters of fact
be sent together to the jury in the one case and not in the
other? To this question
am persuaded that no satisfactory answer could be given to the mind of an unlettered
man. To a judge, who is to act upon the decisions of his
predecessors, a binding if not a satisfactory answer might
be given, by shewing that the matter had been already so
decided ; but this, as
conceive, has not yet been done.
*
*
•
For the reasons which have thus, perhaps, imconperfectly given, and which are founded upon whiit
and
not
and
upon
authorities,
to
be
which,
principle,
ceive
therefore, render it unnecessary for me to advert to particular cases, feel myself reluctantly bound to differ from my

I

I

I

I

If

I

I

I

I

two learned brothers.

I

•

*

I

*

Judgment for the plaintiff.

^^

Affirmed hy the unanimous opinion of ssTen judges in the Exchequer
66.
3 Tyrwhitt, 430.
Chamber.
The traverse de injwia has been held a proper replication to pleas of
Griffin v. Yates (1835) 2 Bing. N. C. 579; Euekman v.
excuse in assumpsit.
Ridgefleld Park K. E. Co. (1875) 38 N. J. L. 98; Bank of British North
America v. Fisher (1850) 6 New Brunswick, 606; Paddock v. Jones (1868)
40 Vt. 474.
It was held in the early New York eases that defenses in justification, as
distinguished from excuse, could not be repUed to de injuria, but those cases
criticized by the Supreme Court ot iia United State* in
are adversely
WaU. US.
Erikine t. Hohnbach (1871)

U
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DIepabtcbbl
V.

GIBSON.

Supreme Court of Alabama. 1843,
5

Alabama, 341.

[Detinue. Plea: Justification as sheriff under an attachment at the suit of Thomas Alford against the Mississippi
and Alabama R. R. Co., issued on Oct. 19, 1840, for the
recovery of a debt of $500. Replication; Prechidi nan because the property in question did not belong to the said
Railroad Co., a demand having been made before the levy
of the attachment alleged' in defendant's plea, to wit, on
Oct. 12, 1840. Rejoinder: That on Sept. 21, 1840, two revenue attachments were issued at the suit of said Alford
against said Railroad Co., one for $1640, and the other for
$2200, both of which were received by defendant as sheriff
and levied on the property in question. Demurrer.] ®^
COLUEB, C. J. * * *

A

departure in pleading is said to be, when a party quiis
or departs from the case or defence which he has first
made, and has recourse to another; it occurs when the replication or rejoinder, etc., contains matter not pursuant
to the declaration or plea, etc., and which does not support
or fortify it. One reason why a departure in pleading
is never allowed, is, because the record would by such
means be spun out into endless prolixity; for he who has
departed from, or relinquished his first case or plea, might
resort to a second, third, and so on ad infinitum; he who
had a bad cause would never be brought to issue, and he
who has a good one, would never obtain the end of his suit.
(1 Chitty's Plead. 7th Am. Ed. 681; Co. Lit. 304, a; 2
Saund. Rep. 84, n. 1; 6 Com. Dig. tit. Pleader, F. 7, 8, 9,
It is needless
10, 11, and the cases cited by these authors.)
citation
cases
this
the
of
to show, that
to extend
opinion by
the rejoinder does not pursue and fortify the defence set
67.

Condensed statement of facts

by the editor.
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up by the pleas. This is sufficiently shown by the definition of a departure.
The pleas are an attempt to justify
under attachments issued, it is true, at the suit of the plaintiff, but on a different day and for a different amount. In
fact it is conceded, that the rejoinders do not rely on the
same process to defeat a recovery, as that which is insisted
on by the pleas.
•
•
•
The rejoinder is for the reasons already stated,
bad on general demurrer. (See 6 Com. Dig. tit. Pleader,
F. 10; 2 Saund. Bep. 84, n. 1, and cases there cited; 1
Chitty's Plead. 7 Am. Ed. 686, and cases there cited.)

ANONYMOUS.
Court of King's Bench.
3

1704,

Salheld, 123.

trespass, assault and battery, it was ruled by Holt,
Ch. J., that where the plaintiff laid the assault to be done
on such a day, and the defendant in pleading some special
matter justifies on another day, so that now by this pleading the day is made material, yet the plaintiff in his replication may allege the assault to be done on another day,
and that this is no departure; 'tis true it hath been held
otherwise, but the later opinions are, that the day is not
material, and that the plaintiff may maintain his declaratioa.

In

ANONYMOUS.
Court of Common Pleas.
3

i

1566,

Dyer, 253.

lease was made by indenture for years without impeachment of waste, and one covenant was, that the lessee
at every falling of wood should make a fence to save the
spring; and he was bound for the performance of the cov-

A
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9

enants. And in debt on bond he pleaded the indentnre, and
to the said covenant pleaded that he had not feUed any
wood, etc. And the plaintiff shewed the felling of two acres
of wood, and that the defendant did not make any fence
to save the spring; and the defendant rejoins, that he made
a fence, etc., and of that he puts himself upon the country;
and the aforesaid plaintiff does the like, therefore let
twelve, etc. And this was holden a jeofail amd departure;
and the jury at the bar discharged for this in the Bench.

VERE

v.

SMITH.

Court of King's Bench.
2

1671 f

Levins, 5.

*

2,

•

is

;

is

a

it

it,

Debt upon an obligation , by the plaintiff a brewer,
against the defendant his clerk, conditioned to perform
covenants, to account for eill sums of money he should receive. Defendant pleads covenants performed.
The plaintiff replies that such a day 26 I. came to his hands, for
which he has not accounted. The defendant rejoined, that
he accounted modo seguente, viz., that certain malefactors
broke into his countinghouse and stole
wherewith
he
acquainted the plaintiff, et hoc paratus est verificare; upon
which the plaintiff demurred: and now
was argued, 1st
that the rejoinder
departure, for fulfilling a covenant
to account, can't be intended but by actual accounting;
whereas the rejoinder does not shew an account, but an ex*
*
cuse for not accounting
Cur' contra. To the
•
•
an
this
account, and no departure.
1st,

5

Supreme Court

of

TRUSTEES OF R. E. BANK

v.

HARTFIELD.

Arkansas.

1844,

Arkansas, 551.

the

is

Court, Sebastian, J.: This
an action of assumpsit on promissory note, to which the statute of limita-

By
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tions was pleaded. The plaintiff in the circuit court replied specially, a payment made by defendants within the
three years preceding the institution of the suit. To this
there was a demurrer sustained, and whether the fact replied is a good answer to the plea, and whether it is well
pleaded, are the only questions arising in the cause.
•

••••••••

As to the objection which has been raised to the replication, that it is a departure from the declaration, we
think it is not tenable. The matter is, as it is clearly set-

a

it

a

is

if

it,

led, a good answer to the statute of limitations, and rendered necessary to be replied to by the plea of the defendant. A departure in pleading is when a party quits or
departs from the case or defence which he has first made.
1 Ch. PI. 635; and a departure can never be in a matter
which maintains and fortifies the declaration or plea. Com.
Dig. Pleader, F. 11. Now here is no resting upon a ground
different from, or inconsistent with, that occupied in the
declaration, but the replication sets up a matter affirming
the cause of action upon the same grounds, and denying the
matter alleged in the plea. When a new promise is relied
upon as an answer to the statute of limitations, the declaration is founded upon the original cause of action, and
the new promise is set forth in the replication or adduced
in evidence as a simple denial of the truth of the plea.
Barrett v. Barrett, 8 Greenleaf, 355. A part payment
stands upon the footing of an acknowledgment or promise,
to avoid the statute, and according to this rule may be replied or given in evidence. The plea alleges that the defendants did not undertake, etc., within three years next
before the commencement of the suit ; and a payment within that time either pleaded or proved in evidence, directly
contradicts the plea. There can be no departure in a
replication when it simply denies the plea. The effect of
payment, whether regarded as a renewal or the continuation of the old contract, is still a denial of the plea. Doubtless it- is more proper to introduce a part payment in evidence, under the general replication, without specially
such payment
and this would be necessary
pleading
proof. This, however,
stood alone upon the footing of
not the case. By our statute, and the law as established by
amounted in legal efjudicial decisions up to that time,
It was such by implication of law. We,
promise.
fect to

674
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therefore, cannot see why it may not be replied as a distinct answer to the statute, with as much propriety as if
it were given in evidence under the usual replication. We
are, therefore, of opinion, that the matter contained in the
replication was well pleaded, and sufficient to take the case
without the operation of the statute. For that reason the
judgment must be reversed, etc., and the court instructed to

overrule said demurrer, etc.
Judgment reversed.

BUEDICK

V.

KENYON.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
20 Rhode

1898.

Island, 498.

Sttness, J.: The plaintiff sued as administrator c. t. a.
of Robert N. Langworthy, upon a promissory note given
December 21, 1887, by the defendants Kenyon and Chapman, as principal and surety, averring promises to the
testator, and the defendants pleaded the statute of limitations. The plaintiff replied by averring a promise within
six years to himself. The defendants joined issue, and the
case went to the jury, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendants move for a new trial upon the ground
that the replication was a departure from the declaration,
as stated above, and also upon the ground that the verdict
was against the evidence.
A replication which avers a promise to one person, while
the declaration avers a promise to another, is clearly a departure in pleading. And the rules of pleading have made
no exception in the case of a representative plaintiff, who
stands in the place of, and who for all legal purposes is a
continuation of, the original promisee, although such an
exception would seem to be both reasonable and just. The
textbooks agree that where an executor sues in assumpsit
upon promises to the testator, to which the statute of limitations is pleaded and the reply is a subsequent promise
to himself, the replication is a departure and bad. 1 Chit.
PI. 675; Steph. PI. 410; Gould PL chap, viii, sec. 67.
The defendants filed a demurrer to the declaration, but
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the record does not show that it was passed upon, and,
even if it was, no exception having been taken, objections
to the rulings must be regarded as waived.
Another rule, also well settled, is that when a party takes
issue upon a replication or rejoinder containing a departure, and it is found against him, the court will not
arrest the judgment. The verdict cures the fault. 1 Chit.
PI. 679; Gould PL Chap. VIII, sec. 79.

In Kannaugh v. Quartette Mining Co., 16 Col. 341, the
court said: "If it be conceded that the replication is a
departure from the cause of action as pleaded in the complaint, this could only have been taken advantage of by
demurrer, motion, or otherwise, before trial. If this had
been done, the complaint might have been amended and
It was not done. By voluntarily
the omission supplied.
going to trial with the pleadings as they were, the defendant must be held to have waived such objections.
This is
true at common law as well as under the code."
We are of opinion that the petition for a new trial, upon
the ground that there was a departure in pleading, must be
denied.

This being

so, and the pleadings

POTTS

POINT PLEASANT LAND COMPANY.

being treated as though
they had been regular, the evidence is sufficient to sustain
the verdict, and the second ground must also be denied.
Petition dismissed, and case remitted to the common
pleas division for further proceedings.

V.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
47 New Jersey Law, 476.

J.

1885.

The declaration is for breach of covenant. It
sets out a contract under seal, by the terms of which the
plaintiff was to perform for the defendants certain work in
filling and grading certain lots and claying certain sidewalks at Point Pleasant. It then declares that the defendants did covenant, in consideration of the faithful performance of the said work, to pay eighteen cents per cubic
yard for the sand or clay removed, the payment to be made
by a deed of real estate, by an assignment of certain
mortgages, by orders for guano and the payment of cash.
Eeed,

:

Common Law Pleading.
[Chap. 9
It then avers the due performance of the work on the part
of the plaintiffs, and the failure of the defendants to perform their covenant to make payment according to the
terms of their contract. To this declaration the defendants
pleaded, among others, the plea that the performance of the
work was a condition precedent to the plaintiffs' right to
payment, and that the plaintiffs had not performd the said
work.
To his plea the plaintiffs replied that although they tendered themselves ready and willing to complete the said
work, the defendants notified them to remove from the defendants' land all the plaintiff's material, tools and working implements, by reason of which they were prevented
from continuing said work according to the terms of the
contract. To this replication a demurrer was filed.
The point of the demurrants upon the argument was that
the ground upon which the plaintiffs based their right of
action in their replication, was a clear departure from the
position taken by them in their declaration.
The counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the replication fortified the case made by the declaration, and so was
The design of a replication is to put upon
legitimate.
the record some new facts which show that, notwithstanding the existence of the matters pleaded by the defendants,
the declaration is yet true.
Tjhus if plaintiff declares upon a statute, and defendant
pleads that it is repealed, a replication that it has been
revived by a subsequent act, is good. For the reviving act
gives renewed effect to the first, on which the action is
founded. Gould on Plead. 455.
So, if in trespass the defendant justifies for a distress
damage feasant, the plaintiff may reply that the defendant
afterward converted to his own use, for this shows the taking to be a trespass ab initio. Comyn's Dig., tit. "Pleader,"
676

paragraph

11.

These are obvious instances of a fortification of the position first taken by the pleader. But in the two pleadings
of the plaintiffs in the present case it appears manifest
that the grounds upon which the plaintiff rests his claim
IS in each distinct.
He assumes on each that he has a condition to perform as a precedent to his. right to recover
compensation. He first says ' ' performed it. ' ' He next
but was ready to do so, and you
says,
did not perform
hindered me."
it,

"I

I
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;

is

a

1

is

it

:

it,

The peiformaiice of such a condition, and an excuse for
not performing
are matters so distinct that good pleading requires the certain averment of that one upon which
the party relies. They are so treated by Mr. Chitty, he giving the rules that regulate the pleading of a performance
of conditions precedent, and also the averments, necessary
in setting out an excuse of performance
by the plaintiff.
In regard to the latter he remarks "In stating an excuse
for nonperformance of a condition precedent, the plaintiff
must in general show that the defendant either prevented
the performance or rendered
unnecessary to the prior
act by his neglect or by his discharging the plaintiff from
Chitty on Plead., p. 326.
performance."
not new. Thus, Mr. Gtould,
But the point involved here
citing Co. Litt. 304a, and
Sid. 10, says: "If in covenant
in general
broken the defendant pleads performance
parterms, and the plaintiff replies nonperformance of
ticular act, a rejoinder that the defendant was ready* to
perform, and tendered performance, and that the plaintiff
a departure from the plea performance, and
prevented it,
tender and refusal being distinct and inconsistent grounds
of defence. The matter rejoined should have been pleaded
in the first instance." Gould on Plead. 455.
In the present case the plaintiffs rest their case upon performance of a preceding covenant. In the case mentioned
by Mr. Gould the defendant rested his defence upon the
performance of his covenant.
In neither case could the parties in a subsequent pleading shift their ground of attack or defence from performance to an excuse for nonperformance.
There should be judgment for the defendants with costs.

VIEGINIA FIRE AND MAEINE INSURANCE

86

V.

SAUNDERS.

Appeals

Virginia,

of

8v/preme Court

of

COMPANY

Virginia.

1890.

969.

Error to judgment of circuit court of Mecklenburg

county
a
of
insurpolicy
on
rendered October 17, 1888, in an action
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Mrs. Sarah K. Saunders and husband were
plaintiffs, and the Virginia Fire and Marine Insurance
This
Company (plaintiff in error here) was defendant.
210,
84
Va.
court.
See
been
this
before
to
has
once
case
Opinion states the case.
Lewis, P., delivered the opinion of the court.
ance, wherein

After the case went back to the drouit court, the plain- ,
tiff replied anew to the defendant's special pleas, and the
question again is as to the sufficiency of the replications.

is

'

'

is

it

;

;

it

;

it

it it,

On the former appeal the judgment was reversed, because
the replications concluded to the country, instead of with a
verification, as they ought to have done, inasmuch as they
The replications, subsequently
introduced new matter.
filed, and upon which we are now to pass, set up the same
matters, and are in all respects the same as those first
filed, except that they conclude with a verification.
The first plea sets up a warranty by the plaintiff as to
the' cost of the property, alleging that whereas she repre^
in the written application for insurance, to be
sented
was, in fact, much less. And the second alleges
$1,600,
that this representation was material to the risk and untrue.
The policy recites that the application shall be treated as a
part of the policy, and that its statements shall be treated
as warranties by the assured that the facts therein stated
are true.
To the first plea the plaintiff replied, in substance, that
when the application was made, she expressly informed the
agent of the company who procured her signature to the
application, that she could not tell with certainty what the
at $1,600 that this
property cost, but that she estimated
estimate was concurred in by the agent, who himself inin the application, which was signed by her that
serted
he, the said agent, then and there fully inspected and examined the property, and was as fully informed as to its
value and cost as the plaintiff herself was that the defendant, through its agent, also had knowledge of the real condition and situation of the risk, and that, with such knowledge, the property was valued by its agent at the said sum
inWherefore
of $1,600, and insured accordingly.
sisted "that the said defendant is concluded and estopped
from alleging the matter set up in the said plea.
substantially to
The replication to the second plea
the same effect.
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The defendant moved to reject these replications, but the
motion was overruled, and to this action of the court an
exception was taken. The case was thereupon submitted to
a jury, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff for $1,000,
the amount of the policy, upon which verdict the court entered judgment.

The principal assignment of error relates to the action

of the circuit court in overruling the motion to reject the

replications.

It

is contended that the replications are defective, because, instead of answering the contention raised
by the pleas as to the cost of the property, they undertake
to set up in estoppel an alleged valuation of the property
by the defendant's agent. And this, it is contended, constitues a departure in pleading, for which the motion ought
to have been granted.

A

learned author lays it down that the only mode of
4 Min.
taking advantage of a departure is by demurrer.
[nst. 1040. But be- that as it may, here there has been no
departure. To the general rule which requires the pleader
either to traverse or to confess and avoid, there are several
exceptions, one of which arises in the case of pleadings in
estoppel. Steph. PI. 219. Indeed, it is one of the essential
qualities of a replication, that it must present matter of estoppel, or must traverse or confess and avoid the plea. 1
Chit. PI. 643. Moreover, a departure takes place only when
the party deserts the ground that he took in his last antecedThus, the replication
. ent pleading and resorts to another.
must be conformable to the declaration, the rejoinder to the
Or as Lord Coke expresses it: "Each party
plea, etc.
must take heed of the ordering of the matter of his pleading, lest his replication depart from his count, or his rejoinder from his bar; et sic de caeteris. 3 Th. Co. Jitt.
435; 4 Min. Inst. 1038.
In the present case this rule has been observed; that is
to say, there has been no abandonment of the case stated
in the declaration, and a resort to another, but the matter
contained in the replication conforms to and fortifies that
contained in the declaration. There was no error therefore,
in overruling the motion to reject the replications.
Judgment affirmed.
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V.

MADSEN.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Illinois,

1913,

51.

Cabtwbight, J,, delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action of trespass quare clausum fregit,
brought by Delia D, Marks, the appellee, in the circuit court
of Cook county, against James P. Madsen, the appellant.
The declaration described the premises as a certain close
of the plaintiff situated in Cook county, to which she had
title, under the statute of limitations, by adverse posses-

sion for twenty years. The defendant filed a plea of the
general issue and a plea of liberum tenementum. To the
plea of freehold the plaintiff filed a general replication.
Afterward, by leave of court, the plaintiff filed an additional count, in which the premises were described in the
same general way and the title alleged was the same as in
the original declaration.
To the additional count the defendant filed a plea of the general issue, a plea of liberum
tenementum, * • * On the trial the plaintiff introduced
evidence of record title to the west forty feet of lot 18 in
block 1, in a subdivision of a tract of land described by the
government description, in Cook county, and the defendant introduced evidence of like record title to the east ten
feet of the same lot and the adjacent lot 19. There was no
description of any particular tract, piece or parcel of land
in the declaration or additional count, and there was no
new assignment by the plaintiff describing the premises
upon which the trespass was alleged to have been committed. Evidence was introduced by both parties relating
to a dispute as to the boundary line between the two portions of the tract. There was a verdict for the plaintiff
for $300, on which judgment was entered, and an appeal
was allowed and perfected.

The court refused to direct a verdict for the defendant
and also denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, and
these rulings present the question whether the defendant
made a complete defense under his pleas of liberum tene-

Sec. 4]

Replication and Subsequent Plbadings.

681

mentum. The plaintiff alleged a trespass upon a close in
Cook county, which would be well enough as against a
wrongdoer, but the defendant by his pleas alleged that he
was the owner of said close. The plea answered the declaration and if proved was a complete defense. The rule has
always been that if a declaration be general, without naming the locus in quo, and the defendant has any land in the
same jurisdiction, the plaintiff must always make a new
assignment, setting out the locus in quo with more particularity.
(Chitty's PI. 595.)
The plea confessed that the
plaintiff had such possession of a close in Cook county as
would enable her to maintain trespass against a wrongdoer, and asserted a right of freehold in the defendant with
a right of immediate possession, carrying with it a right
to enter, as a justification for the trespass.
{Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein, 115 111. 177.) The issue under the
plea was whether the premises described in the declaration
were defendant's freehold, and the premises being described generally, the defendant could show title to any
L. 357 ;
land in the jurisdiction.
{Ellet v. Pullen, 12 N.
Helwis V. Lombe, 6 Mod. 117; 1 Saund. 299; Austin v.
Morse, 8 Wend. 476; Goodright v. Rich, 7 T. E. 323,; 38
The office of a new assignment is to furnish a
Cyc. 1093.)
particular description of the premises, and the plaintiff
having given no such description in the declaration or additional count, could not succeed without such new assign•
There is good reason in the rule requiring
ment • •
a new assignment where the defendant proves title to land
fitting the description in the declaration, in the fact that
the judgment, where the plea of liberum tenementum is
filed and the ownership of the land is tried, is res judicata
of the location of the boundary line. {Herschbach v.
Cohen, 207 111. 517.) The court was in error in the rulings
on the motion to direct a verdict and the motion for a new

J.

trial.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded."

68.
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V.

9

BEMIS.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
46

£01iap.

187S,

Vermont, 29.

[Trespass for breaking and entering plaintiff's close,
tearing down his fence, etc. Pleas: (1) Not g^iilty and
(2) that at the time when, etc., there was, and of right ought
to have been, a common and public highway over the locus
in quo, and because the said way was obstructed by said
fence in said declaration mentioned, the defendant pulled
down the same. Reply to second plea: (1) Be injuria.
'*
(2) New assignment. Special, demurrer to replication.]
Baeebtt, J.: The case is before us on special demurrer
to the replication.
The declaration counts on a single act
of trespass, without continuation or repetition.
The defendant justifies, setting forth by plea an alleged right of
way, and that the alleged trespass was the doing what he
lawfully might do in removing obstructions placed across
said way by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff replies, denying
the alleged way and right, and that the fence named in the
declaration and plea was across or obstructing any highway, with de injioria, and closing with verification and
prayer for judgment. This is followed by new asignment,
alleging that the action is brought, not only for the trespasses justified by the plea, but also for that the defendant on the several days and times mentioned in the declaration, on other and different occasions, etc., following the
'
form in 3 Chit. PL 1218.
By traversing the plea, as well as by what is said in the
new assignment, the plaintiff is still pursuing the justified
trespass as being one for which he brought his suit. That
being so, it is not permissible to him to bring upon the
record other acts of trespass, they not being within the
New assignment means specially
scope of the declaration.
designating a cause of action within the scope of the declaration, and other than the one covered by the plea. But
when the declaration embodies only a single act of trespass, and the plaintiff by his replication treats that as a
cause of action for which he brought his suit, the declara69.

Condensed statement of facts by the editor.
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tion is thereby exhausted. There is no subject-matter remaining on which a new assignment can operate. And it
is in this respect that the plaintiff seems to have fallen into
mistake.
The precedent in 3 Chit. PI. 1218, which he followed, is a proper one for a proper case. But that is when
the declaration may embody more than a single act of trespass. In the present case, either the plaintiff should not
have traversed, or not new assigned. It was at his option
which to do. If the trespass justified in the plea is the one
sued for, then a traverse would be proper. If the trespass
sued for was extra viam, then he might new assign.
In
case
he
such
would be pursuing for a single act of trespass,
which, under the declaration, may have been intra, or extra
viam. This whole subject is well developed in 1 Chit. PI.
626 to 634, and is illustrated by the precedents and notes in

Vol.

3.

The judgment is reversed, mth leave to reply anew, and
the cause remanded.

PUGH

V.

GRIFFITH.

Court of King's Bench.
7

1838.

Adolvhus & Ellis, 827.

The declaration charged that
1st October, 1835, and on divers other days
tween, etc., with force and arms, etc., broke
dwelling house of plaintiff, situate, etc., and

defendant, on
and times beand entered a
made a great
noise, etc., and stayed and continued therein, making such
noise, etc., for a long, etc., and forced and broke open,
broke to pieces and damaged, divers, to wit, ten doors of
plaintiff, of and belonging to the said dwelling house, and
broke to pieces, damaged and spoiled divers, to wit, twenty
locks, twenty bolts, twenty staples, and twenty hinges, of
and belonging to the said doors respectively, and wherewith the same were then fastened, and of great value, etc.,
and also, during the time aforesaid, to wit, on, etc., seized
and took divers goods and chattels, to wit, etc., of plaintiff,
and carried away and converted, etc.
Tbespass.
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Plea

1.

As to coming with force and arms,

[Chap.

9

etc., and

a

7

4

1

i.

fi.

whatever else is against the peace, etc., and as to seizing,
taking, carrying away, and converting, etc. (a part of the
Not guilty.
goods).
Plea 2. As to the. residue, that heretofore, and before
any of the said times when, etc., Eobert Jones sued out in
fa., directed to the
the Court of Exchequer a writ of
sheriff of Montgomeryshire, to levy of the goods and chattels of plaintiff 55
s.
d., indorsed to levy the whole
and
s. for costs, etc., which was delivered to defendant,
being then, and thence until and at and after the times
when, etc., sheriff of Montgomeryshire, to be executed; by
virtue of which writ, afterwards, and before the return of
the said writ, to wit, at the said time when, etc., in the
declaration first mentioned, defendant then lawfully being
in
certain room in and parcel of the said dwelling house
in which, etc., and which said room then was occupied by
one Elizabeth Davies as tenant thereof to the plaintiff, defendant, so being such sheriff as aforesaid, peaceably and
quietly entered into the residue of the said dwelling house
in which, etc., through the door communicating between the
said room so occupied by the said Elizabeth Davies and the
residue of the said dwelling house in which, etc., the same
being then open, in order to seize and take in execution the
said goods and chattels of plaintiff in the introductory part
of this plea referred to, the same then being in the said
dwelling house in which, etc., for the purpose of levying
the said monies so directed to be levied by the said writ
and the said indorsement bo made thereon as aforesaid,
and did, at the said times when, etc., seize and take in execution the said last mentioned goods and chattels, and, by
sale thereof, levy a certain sum of money, to wit, etc., part
and parcel of the damages, etc., and, in so doing, and because certain doors of and belonging to the said dwelling
house in which, etc., at the said time when, etc., were shut,
locked, and fastened with the said locks, bolts, staples, and
hinges in the said declaration mentioned, so that defendant, so being in the said dwelling house in which, etc, could
jtiot seize, take, and carry away the goods and chattels
aforesaid, to levy the monies aforesaid, or execute the said
writ, without forcing and breaking open the said doors, defendant, while he so continued in the said house as aforesaid, at the said time when, etc., and for the purpose afore-
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said, did force and break open the said doors, and, in so
doing, did necessarily a little break and damage the samej
and also a little break to pieces, damage, and spoil the said
locks, bolts, staples and hinges of and belonging to the said
doors respectively, doing no unnecessary damage to the
plaintiff in that behalf; and also, in the said execution of
the said writ, defendant, so being such sheriff, did necessarily and unavoidably make a little noise, etc., and stay,
etc., for the space of time in the declaration mentioned, as
he lawfully, etc., which are the said, etc.
The plaintiff joined issue on the first plea; and, as to
the second, replied that he brought his action, not for the
trespasses in the second plea mentioned and attempted to
be justified, but for that defendant, on the said several days
and times, etc., with force and arms, etc., broke and entered
the outer door of the said dwelling house in the declaration mentioned, and also broke and entered the said dwelling house, and made the said noise, etc., therein in the
declaration mentioned, and stayed and continued, etc., making the said noise, etc., on other and different occasions,
and at other and different times, and in other and different
parts of the said dwelling house in the declaration mentioned than in the second plea mentioned, and therein attempted to be justified, in manner and form as the said
plaintiff hath above thereof in his declaration in that behalf complained against defendant; which said several
trespasses above newly assigned are other and different
trespasses, etc. Verification.
Plea to the new assignment. As to all except breaking
the outer door of the said dwelling house, in which, etc.,
and entering the same, as in the new assignment, etc., not
guilty. As to breaking the outer door, etc., and entering,
etc., as in the new assignment is alleged, etc., that, the said
fieri facias having so issued and having been so delivered
to defendant, so being sheriff, etc., and defendant having
peaceably and quietly entered into the said dwelling house
in which, etc., to seize and take in execution the goods and
chattels of plaintiff in the second plea mentioned, in the
manner and for the purpose therein also mentioned, defendant, at the said times when, etc., did seize and take in
execution the said goods and chattels as in that plea is
alleged, under and by virtue of the said writ; and, because
the outer door of and belonging to the said dwelling house
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in the said

new
assignment mentioned, was shut and fastened, so that defendant, so being in the said dwelling house, etc., as aforesaid, and having so seized, etc., as aforesaid, could not take

and carry away the goods and chattels aforesaid in order
to levy the monies directed to be levied by the said writ
and indorsement, or execute the said writ, without opening
the said outer door, and because neither plaintiff nor any
other person on his behalf was in the said dwelling house
at the same time when, etc., so that defendant could request
plaintiff or such other person to open the said outer door,
defendant, so being in the said house at the said time when,
etc., for the purpose last aforesaid, did open the said outer
door, and, in so doing, did necessarily and unavoidably a
little break the same, doing no unnecessary damage, etc.;
and defendant did then take and carry away the said goods
and chattels for the purpose aforesaid, and in order to levy,
etc.; and, in so doing, defendant did necessarily and unavoidably go out of and re-enter the said dwelling house by
the outer door thereof, the said outer door being open at
the time of such re-entry, in order to take and carry away
the said goods and chattels for the purpose aforesaid, and
«is he lawfully, etc., which are the same supposed trespasses, etc.

The plaintiff joined issue on the traverse; and, as to the
second plea to the new assignment, new assigned again,
that he brought his action, not for the trespasses in the
introductory part of the second plea to the said new assignment mentioned, etc., but for that defendant, on the several
days and times in the declaration and in the said new as-

signment in that behalf mentioned, with force and arms,
etc., broke to pieces, damaged, and spoiled the locks, bolts,
staples, and hinges in the declaration mentioned, which
said locks, bolts, staples and hinges were appertaining, belonging, and fixed to the said outer door of the said dwelling house in the declaration and in the said new assignment mentioned, and wherewith the same was fastened, in
manner and form as plaintiff hath above thereof in his
declaration, etc., complained, which said several trespasses
lastly new assigned are other and different trespasses than
the- said trespasses in the said second plea to the said new
assignment mentioned, etc.
To this second new assignment, the defendant pleaded,
first, not guilty -. secondly, as to breaking, etc., one lock, one
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bolt, and one staple, parcel of the locks, bolts, and staples
in the said last new assignment mentioned, and as is therein
alleged, that the said fieri facias having so issued, and been
so delivered to defendant, being sheriff, as in the said
second plea is mentioned, and defendant having peaceably
and quietly entered into the said dwelling house in which,
to seize and take in execution the goods and chattels of
etc.^
plaintiff in the second plea mentioned, in the manner and
for the purpose therein also mentioned, defendant, at the
said times when, etc., did seize the said goods and chattels,
as in that plea is alleged, under and by virtue of the said
writ; and, because the outer door of and belonging to the
said dwelling house in which, etc., at the said time when,
etc., in the last new assignment mentioned, was shut and
fastened with the said one lock, one bolt, and one staple, in
the introductory part of this plea mentioned, so that defendant, so being in the said dwelling house in which, etc.,
and having so seized, etc., the said goods and chattels as
aforesaid, could not take and carry away the said goods
and chattels in order to levy or execute the said writ, without opening the said outer door, nor could defendant, upon
that occasion open the said outer door so being fastened
as aforesaid, for the purpose last aforesaid, without a little
breaking, etc., the said last mentioned lock, bolt, and staple,
and because neither plaintiff nor any other person on his
behalf was in the said dwelling house at the said time when,
etc., so that defendant could request plaintiff or such other
person to open the said outer door, defendant, so being in
the said house as aforesaid, at the said time when, etc., and
for the purpose last aforesaid, did open the said outer door,
and, in so doing, did necessarily and unavoidably a little
break, etc., the said last mentioned lock, bolt, and staple,
then appertaining and belonging to the said outer door, and
wherewith the same was so fastened as aforesaid, doing no
unnecessary damage, etc., and as he lawfully, etc., which are
the said supposed trespasses, etc., and whereof plaintiff
hath above by his said last new assignment complained, etc.
The plaintiff joined issue on the traverse ; and, as to the
rest of the plea demurred, assigning for cause that defendant acknowledged the breaking to pieces, etc., one lock, one
bolt, and one staple, appertaining, belonging, and fixed on
the outer door of the dwelling house of plaintiff, and wherewith the same was fastened, as in the declaration and in
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the second new assignment alleged, and attempted to justify the same breaking, etc., under the execution of a writ
of fieri facias directed to the sheriff, etc. Joinder in de-

murrer.

J.,

in this term (January 31st), deof
the court. After going through'
livered
the pleadings his lordship said :
Upon this state of the pleading, it appears that the defendant, in his plea to the declaration, has justified breaking and entering the house, and seizing the goods, under a
writ of fieri facias. He does not allege in the plea that the
outer door was open, which is generally necessary; but
he says that he was lawfully in a part of the house in the
occupation of a lodger; and, if the communication between
the part of the house occupied by the lodger and the rest
of the house should be in the nature of an outer door for
the protection of the plaintiff's house, there is an averment
in the plea that the communication between the two was
open, and therefore the entry into the part occupied by the
plaintiff was authorized. The plaintiff, in answer to this,
says the matters justified in the plea are not what he complains of; but he says he brought his action, not for that,
LoBD

Denman,

C.

the judgment

but for breaking the outer door, and entering the house on
other occasions, and at other times, and in different parts
of the house. The defendant's answer to this new assignment is what has been already stated ; that, in order to take
the goods out of the house, it was necessary to open the
outer door; and, as neither the plaintiff nor anybody on
his behalf was there, so as a request could be made to
The plaintiff, in answer, says, by
them, he opened it.
another new assignment, that he did not bring his action
for that, but for breaking the locks, bolts, staples, and
hi'nges of the outer door.
It is to be observed that, in the first new assignment, the
plaintiff says nothing about the locks, bolts, staples and
hinges; and, as the plaintiff has in that new assignment
confined his complaint to breaking the outer door, and
breaking and entering the house, he cannot carry his second
new assig-nment beyond the first new assignment. A question may at first appear to arise, whether this second new
assignment is not bad altogether: but we think not, because, undar the complaint of breaking the outer door, the
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etc.,

Then the defendant, in answer to this, pleads as before
stated : so that the general question, whether a sheriff who
has seized goods under a fieri facias has a right to break
an outer door to take them out of the house, when there is
nobody of whom to request that the door may be opened,
would not appear to arise; for the plaintiff, by his second
new assignment abandons that complaint, and the only
question on this record would now appear to be, whether
he has a right to break the lock, bolt, and staple of the outer
door to take out the goods. But, though the plaintiff has
abandoned the general complaint of breaking the outer
door of the house, yet, under the objection he makes as to
breaking the lock, bolt and staple, he may contend that the
sheriff had no right to break the outer door; and, though
he has abandoned the general breaking open the door, he
has not admitted, in the pleadings, as he might have been
held to do if he had pleaded over in answer to the defendant's pleading; but here his pleading over is that the defendant has not given any answer to what the plaintiff
means to complain of, and that he has mistaken the nature
of the plaintiff's complaint, and that it ought to be considered in the same light as if there was a nolle prosequi
as to the whole of the trespasses except breaking the lock,
bolt, and staple of the outer door ; and, as to that, we think
that he may stand in the same situation as if his declaration
had been originally confined to the mere act of breaking
the lock, bolt, and staple of an outer door of the house.
It appears to us that, on the allegations on this record
which are not denied, the sheriff had a right to break open
the outer door, and to break the lock, bolt, and staple affixed
to it. The sheriff shews a lawful entry into the house, and
a lawful seizure of the goods; and, in his plea to the first
new assignment, he says that he could not take the goods
out of the house without opening the outer door; the particular door therefore is identified, so that it cannot be
said there were any other doors, or any other mode of getting the goods out Then what was the sheriff to do? The
goods could not be kept forever lq the house; and neither
the plaintiff, nor anybody else, was there so that he could
request them to open the door, and there was nothing else
to be done but to open it himself; and he says that he did
c. L. p.— 44
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no unnecessary damage; and then, as to the complaint of
l)reaking the lock, bolt, and staple, that he could not open
the outer door without breaking, damaging, and spoiling
them; and as to that also he alleges the absence of the
plaintiff and every other person to whom he could make a
request; and therefore, as to that also, which is now the
only cause of complaint, he appears to be justified as a matter of necessity in order to get the goods out to execute the

writ.

•

•

•

Upon the whole of the case, we are of opinion that there

should be judgment for the defendant.

Judgment for defendant!"*

"A

new assignment may be made in most actions, whether in form
contractu or ex delicto, but it more frequently occurs in trespass; and
ip replevin, as the plaintiff must show the place in certain where the taking
was, it is said there can be no new assignment as to the place.
in an
action of assumpsit for goods sold, the defendant has pleaded a judgment
recovered, and in fact the plaintiff has obtained a judgment
in another
action, though for different goods and causes of action, the plaintiff ought
not to reply nul tiel record, but should new assign that his present action
So if
is brought for the nonperformance of other and different promises.
in ease for the publication of a libel, without mentioning the particular
person to whom it was published, the defendant has pleaded that he published it lawfully, as to members of a committee of the house of commons,
to other persons not members
and the plaintiff proceeds for a publication
of the committee, he should reply or rather new assign lueli illegid publica70.

ex

If

tim."

1
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CHAPTER Z.
AMENDMENT, AIDER AND REPLEADER.
Sbohon 1.

BETTS

Amekdmiht.
V.

flt)YT.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
13 Connecticut,

This was an action on

1840.

469.

promissory note. The declaration alleged, that the defendant, in and hy a certain writing
or note, by him well executed, dated the 20th day of June,
1838, promised the plaintiff, for value received, to pay him
the sum of 213 dollars, with interest ; as by said writing or
note, ready in court to be produced, will appear; nevertheless, the defendant, his said promise and undertaking not
regarding, hath never performed the same, nor paid said
sum of money, or any part thereof, though often requested
a

and demanded so to do.
The defendant pleaded nan assumpsit; and on that issue, the cause went to the jury, who returned a verdict for
the plaintiff, for 236 dollars, 53 cents, damages. The defendant moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground of
the insufficiency of the declaration in this, viz., that it did
not appear, by the averment thereof, that the promise set
forth therein, had been, at the commencement of this action, broken, by the defendant ; nor at what time the money,
by such promise payable, was, by such promise, due or deThe court adjudged the motion sufficient; and
mandable.
judgment was arrested accordingly.
The plaiatiff thereupon filed a motion for liberty to
amend his declaration, by inserting therein next after the
words "promised the plaintiff, for value received, to pay
him the sum of 213 dollars, with interest," these words,
viz., "on demand." The defendant objected to this motion,
claiming that no such amendment could, at this time, be

legally made.

The questions arising on this motion were reserved for

the consideration and advice of this court.
(691)
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Chtjbch, J. : The allowance, or disallowance, of amendnaents, is within the discretionary power of the courts, in
The time, beyond
the absence of statute regulations.
which an amendment may not be allowed, has not been
prescribed, by any statute of this State. At common law,
amendments of pleadings have been permitted, at any time
1 Peters d. Abr. 504,
before judgment.
Co. Litt. 280.
539a. And the same has been permitted, in special cases,
in the State of New York, and by the courts in other States.
18 Johns. Rep. 510; 2 Cowen, 515; 4 Cowen, 124; 7 Cowen,
483, 518.

In this

State the courts, in the exercise of their discretionary power, in ordinary cases, have refused to sanction amendments of pleadings, after they have been adjudged insufficient, upon motion in arrest. 1 Sw. Dig. 779.
And the present motion discloses nothing, which should
induce us to depart from established practice, in such cases ;
and by doing so, we fear we might encourage a negligence
and laxity in pleading and practice, which would prove
very inconvenient, both to the bar and the court; and we
must therefore, advise the superior court to deny this motion.
But, at the same time, had the motion set forth facts,
which had satisfied us that a serious and irretrievable loss
would have resulted to the plaintiff, from a refusal of this
amendment, beyond the mere loss of a bill of costs, and the
expense and delay of commencing and prosecuting another
action; such as a loss of the debt, by the operation of the
statute of limitations, or discharge of the lien created by
attachment, etc. ; we should have believed, that a just exercise of the discretionary power of the court, would have
In the case of
sanctioned the amendment prayed for.
Aubeer v. Barker, 1 Wils. 149, the court said, that it was
a rule of that court, that a new count could not be added,
after two terms ; and yet this had been permitted, to prevent the loss of the debt, by the statute of limitations. The
Duke of Marlhoroitgh's Exrs. v. Widmore, 2 Stra. 89;
Petersd. Abr. 531 ; DartncUl v. Howard et cd.,2 Chitt. Rep.

I

28.

In

this opinion the other judges concurred.
Amendment not Mowed.

Sec

1]

Amendment, Aider and Eepleadeb.

LOHEFINK

V.

693

STILL.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.
10 Maryland, 530.

1857.

Babtol, J., delivered the opinion of this court.
This is an action for a malicious prosecution. The declaration was defective in not averring that the alleged malicious prosecution was "without probahle cause." That

such averment
been, doubted.

was essential is not now, and has never
It constitutes the gist of the action. 2
Chitty's PL 608, 609, note (x) ; 2 Saund. PI. & Ev. 652, 654,
659; 7 Cowen, 717.
After the jury had been sworn, and all the evidence
offered to them, the plaintiff asked leave to amend the
declaration, by inserting the words, "without any reasonable or probable cause whatsoever," and "that the
declaration might be taken to read as if said averment
were made," and the court granted leave to amend at bar
as prayed. The defendant objected to the amendment being made, without first withdrawing a juror, which objection the court overruled. The defendant also objected to
the making of said amendment in the manner proposed,
which objection the court overruled, and the defendant excepted. The court directed the trial to proceed before the
same jury without their being resworn, to which also the
defendant excepted.
The first question presented by these exceptions is,
whether the leave to amend the declaration operated as an
It is clear that a permission to amend does
amendment.
not, per se, amount to an amendment. A party may have
leave to amend, and yet not choose to avail himself of it.
The amendment must actually be made, either by altering
the declaration in the cause, or by filing a new one.
In this case no amendment was, in point of fact, made
in conformity with the leave granted by the court. The
declaration remained unchanged ; and as it now appears in
the record, it contains no averment of "want of probable
cause," without which it is insufficient.
We think the court erred in treating the leave to amend
as an actual amendment, and for that reason the judgment
ought to be reversed.

Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded.
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'Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
88
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1898,

Maine, 488.

FosTEB, J.: The plaintiff and defendant traded horses.
The defendant was to pay seventy-five dollars to the plaintiff as the difference between horses, and in lieu of the
money turned over a negotiable promissory note of eighty
dollars, which he held against one Joseph Frost. The note
was not then due, and the defendant endorsed it in blank.
The note was not paid at maturity, nor was the defendant
seasonably notified so as to hold him as an indorser.
The plaintiff claims that while the trade was going on
the defendant represented that the maker of the note was
a man of means and financially responsible, and that these
statements were false and fraudulent, and made with intention of deceiving him, and that he relied upon them and
was thereby deceived and injured.
On the other hand, the defendant asserts that he made no
that what he said was but the honest
misrepresentations;
expression of an opinion; that the plaintiff neglected seasonably to notify him so as to hold him as an indorser of the
note, and that in consequence of that neglect this suit was
brought in which he seeks to collect his debt.
The action was originally framed in assumpsit, the
declaration containing three counts. At the second term
the presiding justice allowed an amendment of the writ by
striking out the three counts and substituting therefor a
count in case for deceit.
To the allowance of this amendment the defendant's counsel seasonably objected, on the
ground that if changed the form as well as introduced a
new cause of action. '
The case is before us upon exceptions as well as report.
I. The first question, and one of vital importance, is,
whether this amendment was allowable.
We think it was not.
Our attention has been called to no case under our system of practice that goes to the extent of authorizing the
court to allow an amendment which changes the nature of
The case of Band v.
the action from assumpsit to tort.
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Webber, 64 Maine, 191, was never intended to authorize
amendments to the extent of allowing the form or nature
of the action to be changed. Upon examination of the facts
in that case, it will be found that the amendment there was
but the correction of an error in the writ, the correction of
an amendment (improperly made) to the original declaration, so as to restore the declaration as originally framed
and prevent a change in the nature of the action from what
seemed to be its form as originally drawn, and to escape the
statute of limitations that might be pleaded to another suit.
The original count was more ia the nature of deceit than
assumpsit, and the last amendment was but a restoration
to its former self — the spirit taking on form ' ' in the
furtherance of justice." "As the special count stood," say
the court, ' ' it could easily be amended so as to have been an
action of deceit. ' ' In Dodge v. Haskell, 69 Maine, 429, 434,
this court, in referring to Rand v. Webber, supra, remarked
that it "has been erroneously supposed to allow an amendment to the extent of allowing the nature of the action to
be changed.
That case merely allowed a correction of the
writ, already improvidently and improperly amended, that
such a result might be avoided."
In the present case, the change is absolute from assumpsit to an action on the case for deceit. It is not a
restoration of form as originally drawn. The cause of action, as originally stated, was clearly and distinctly set
forth in appropriate counts based upon an alleged promise.
There was no defect to be amended, or correction of the
cause of action as originally stated, as in Rand v. Webber,
supra. The amendment was not the correction of a defect
in pleading, but the addition of a cause of action not set
forth in the original declaration, as well as a change of the
This was clearly wrong.
nature of the cause of action.
is
allowed
in the inatter of
While the greatest liberality
amendments, the authorities are abundant and uniform,
that no new cause of action can be introduced by way of
amendment against the objection of the defendant.
In Houghton v. Stowell, 28 Maine, 215, it was held that a
change in the form of action from debt to case was unauthorized, and that the court had no alithority to aUow it.
A fortiori, in the present case, would it be unauthorized
to allow an amendment which changes the nature of the
action from assumpsit to an action on the case for deceit.
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The plea of the defendant in ^e former case is "never
promised," while in the latter, it is "not guilty." At eommon law the court had no po^^er to allow an amendment
which introduced a new cause of action. Com. Law PI. sec.
142.
Nor has this been extended by statute in this State.
Farmer v. Portland, 63 Maine, 46; Cooper v. Waidron, 50
Neither can counts which are in form ex conMe. 80.
tractu be joined with those in form ex delicto. Corbett v.
Packinton, 6 Barn. & Cress. 268; 1 Ch. PI. 201- Unless
this rule is observed confusion would arise in the forms of
pleas and judgments which the different forms of actions
require.

The remedies and forms of action which have been
afforded to parties, and which have been sanctioned by long
usage and approved by the highest authorities, should be
adhered to, and it is not the province of the court, upon reasons of supposed convenience or occasional hardship, to
dispense with them, and to substitute one for another, varying the righ.ts of one or both of the parties.''*
71.

499;

Accord: Hess v. Birmingham By. L't & Power Co. (1906) 149 Ala.Dewey v. Nicholas
(1871) 44 Vt. 24: Slater v. Fehlberg (1903) 24

E. I. 574.
Contra:

Kirwin v. Eaborg
H. 591; North

(1888) 64 N.

CHOBANIAN

v.

1 H. & J. (Md.) 296; Morse t. Whitcher
Nichols (1872) 39 Coirn. 355.

(1802)

v.

WASHBUEN WIRE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
33 Rhode

J.

1911.

Island, 289.

This is an action brought to recover damin the writ dated August 2, A. D. 1906, and
returnable to the superior court. Providence county, September 11, A. D. 1906, for personal injuries sustained by the
plaintiff while in the employ of defendant on the twentieth
day of April A. D. 1905, through the negligence of said deJohnson,

:

ages, as appears

fendant.

At

the time he was injured he was working in a pit, in
what is called the open hearth room, in defendant's steel
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plant, and was inexperienced in that kind of work. This is
a long, large rectangular-sliaped building with earthem
floors, and contains two earthem pits in which cast-iron ingot molds are set to receive pourings of steel from the furnaces which are located just south of and above the pits.
These two pits are known as pit number 1 and pit number 2.
The plaintiff was injured while at work in pit number 2.

Plaintiff was in the pit setting ingot molds prepara+ory to
the pouring when injured. The work of the person setting
was to stand in the bottom of the pit and guide the mold
as it was lowered into the pit by the crane man, so that it
would rest properly in its place upon the iron plate in the
bottom of the pit.
The molds that were being lowered into the pit to the
plaintiff had passed through a heating that night and plaintiff used bagging to protect his hands when placing the
molds in position. He had set five molds and was setting
the sixth one, which would be the second mold in the second
row, when he was injured. The crane man had lowered this
sixth mold and when it rested upon the plate the trunnions
upon that mold were not in line with the trunnions upon
the mold next to it.
The plaintiff signalled the crane man to raise the mold
a little so as to align it. The crane man then raised the
mold and when he lowered it the second time the brick was
out of the bottom of the mold upon the plate, the mold
struck upon the brick, the hooks came off the trunnions and
the mold toppled over upon the plaintiff, who was between
tfie mold and the side of the pit and the upper end of the
mold fell upon plaintiff's right arm and pinioned it against
the side of the pit. The weight of the mold crushed the
arm, and the heat of the mold burned the arm to the bone
before the mold could be removed. As the hooks had come
off the trunnions when the mold fell over, the crane man
was powerless to handle the mold or to move it from off the
plaintiff's arm until two of the other pit men jumped into
the pit and affixed the hooks to the trunnions, and the mold
was then removed from the plaintiff's arm. The plaintiff
was taken to the Bhode Island Hospital, where his arm was

•••••••••

amputated that day.
•

The defendant's second exception is to the decision of
the superior court denying the defendant's motion to strike
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out thxee certain counts of the plaintiff's declaration, designated as "First Additional Cotint," "Second Additional
''
''
''
respectively. Said
Count, and Third AdditionafCount,
counts were filed on March 20,yl909', to an amended declaration then on file in said case; said filing being more than
In said three additional
two years after the accid^t.
counts the plaintiff set f ortli the following additional specifications of negligence, viz, : that improper hooks were used
in connection with the trunnions and specifying in what
particulars the hooks were improper; the employment of
incompetent fellow servants, and the defendant's failure to
properly inspect.
The defendant's motion to strike out said additional
counts was based upon two grounds, first, that in each of
•
said additional counts the plaintiffs stated a cause of action
different from the causes of action stated in the amended
declaration, and, second, that said additional counts were
not filed within two years after the causes of action in said
additional counts had accrued.
The rule is stated in 1 Ency. PL & Pr. 564, as follows :
"As long as the plaintiff adheres, to the contract or the
injury ©riginally declared upon, an alteration of the modes
in which the defendant has broken the contract or caused
the injury is not an introduction of a new cause of action.
The test is whether the proposed amendment is a different
matter, another subject of controversy, or the same matter
more fully or differently laid to meet the possible scope and
varying phases of the testimony."
In Columbus v. Anglin, 120 G-a. 786, the question was
whether an amendment to the declaration was properly allowed under a statute providing that "no amendment adding a new and distinct cause of action, or new and distinct
parties, shall be allowed unless expressly provided for by
law." The plaintiff sued for damages for personal injuries
resulting from the fall of a shed built over a sidewalk. The
negligence alleged in the original declaration was that the
municipal authorities had changed the grade of a certain
s.treet and put insufficient drains therein, so that' the surface water was allowed to pond near and upon the sidewalk
and cause a washout, which the municipal authorities negligently filled with unsuitable material, thereby causing
the support of the shed to settle, and as a result the wooden
The trial court allowed an
shed fell upon the plaintiff.
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amendment setting forth a further ground of negligence, in
this, that the defendant had failed in its duty to inspect said
shed and permitted said street to be dangerous by allowing said shed to stand and that from said neglect of duty
said shed fell and injured the plaintiff. The court held that
the amendment was properly allowed and that no new and
distinct cause of action is added by an amendment containing additional matter descriptive of the same wrong originally pleaded. The rule is laid down that when, in an action
ex delicto, the declaration sets out certain acts of negligence,
to show a violation by defendant of the plaintiff's right, such
petition may be amended by setting out additional acts of
negligence to show substantially the same violation of the
same right. The reasoning of the court is shown in the
following excerpts from the opinion: "So long as a plaintiff pleads but one wrong, he does not set up more than one
cause of action. Courts will look to the allegations both as
to the primary right of the plaiatiff and the corresponding
primary duty of the defendant, and as to the violation or
breach thereof, in order to determine whether it is the intention to plead but a single wrong only, or more thaa one.
A single wrong may, however, be composed of numerous elements and shown by various facts. Facts, alone or in conjunction with purely substantive law, do not give a right
of action, but are alleged in order to show a wrong which
has called into operation the remedial law which gives the
right of action. The facts are merely the means, and not
the end. T!hey do not constitute the cause of action, but they
'
The thing,
show its existence by making the wrong appear.
therefore, which in contemplation of law as its cause, becomes a ground for action, is not the group of facts alleged
in the declaration, bill, or indictment, but the result of these
in a legal wrong, the existence of which if true, they conclusively evince." Sibley, Eight to and Cause for Action,
48. Different facts may be alleged, separately or cumulatively, to show the same wrong, and the manner and variety
of the facts alleged will not make more than one cause of
action, so long as but one wrong is shown. A single wrong
will not be made plural by alleging that it is made up of a
•
*
*
"If there is a subnumber of constituent parts."
stantial identity of wrong (which necessarily includes identity of the right violated), there is substantial identity of

cause of action.
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In Smith

it

a

if

it,

v. Bogenschutz, 19 S. W. (Ky.) 667, the plaintiff,
a laborer in defendant's foundr^ sued to recover damages
for personal injuries caused by an overflow of molten iron
from a ladle iii which it was- being carried. The negligence
alleged in the original petition was the failure of the defendant to widen a narrow and dangerous passageway so as to
render it safe for the employees in carrying molten iron in
ladles from one part of the building to another. The court
held that an amendment alleging that the overflow was due
to a defect in the ladle was not an introduction of a new
cause of action. The court said, "The injury to the plaintiff
was caused by the spilling or the boiling over of this molten
iron in the ladle in which it was being carried ; and the allegation that the overflow of the liquid was caused by the
narrowness of the passageway bringing the workmen too
close together in carrying
untrue, was not the real
cause of the injury, and did not estop the plaintiff from
different
alleging that this overflow was produced from
cause; nor did
change the character of the action. It
is at least the same cause of action, viz., the injury to the
plaintiff by the overflow of this liquid.
the plaintiff had
been injured by a defect in a particular part of the machinery connected with this foundry — a fact known to the defendant — the averment as to the cause of the defect or the
character of the negligence would not preclude the plaintiff
from alleging that the defect in the machinery was to he
attributed to another cause than that alleged, or that the
negligence of the defendant, with reference to the particular
machinery, was different from that alleged;
but one

is

it

If

of action."
In Wilson v. N. Y., N. E.
E. R. R. Co., 18 R.
598,
one of the grounds of the defendant's petition for
new
trial was the allowance by the trial court of the filing by
the plaintiff of an amended declaration, against the defendant's objection. In behalf of the defendant
was contended that the amendment was improper in that
was in
matter of substance rather than of form, and that
amounted to the statement of a new cause of action. An
examination of the papers of the case shows that the original declaration was in two counts, the first count alleging
that the defendant was negligent in that
carelessly, negligently and improperly propelled, drove, managed and conducted the said engine^ etc., so that the same was driven

it

a

it

it

it

a

I.

&

cause
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upon and against tbe plaintiff, and the second count set
up as a ground of negligence the act of the defendant in
leaving the gates open at a certain railway crossing and in
inviting the driver of the sleigh in which the plaintiff was
riding to cross the track and negligence in running and controlling its cars. The additional count which was filed as an
amendment set forth a distinct ground of negligence in
that the defendant failed to place a flagman at the grade
crossing as required by law and the order of the town council of Cumberland. The court said, * ' The amended declaration sets forth with more particularity than in the original
declaration the matters in which it is alleged the defendant
was guilty of negligence but does not change the form of
action or introduce a new cause of action." Atlantic Mills
V. Superior Court, 32 R. I. 285.
The great weight of authority is to the effect that the
allowance of an amendment to a declaration setting forth
an additional ground of negligence as the cause of the same
injury does not amount to the statement of a new cause of
action. Smith v. Missouri Pac. By. Co., 56 Fed. 458 ; Cross
V. Evans, 86 Fed. 1; Columh v. Webster Mfg.. Co., 84 Fed.
592 ; Berube v. Horton, 199 Mass. 421 ; Daley v. Gates, 65 Vt.
591; Mclntire v. The Eastern Bailroad, 58 N. H. 137 ; Babb
V. Paper Co., 99 Me. 296; Kuhns v. By. Co., 76 Iowa, 67;
Sheffield v. Harris, 112 Ala. 614; Greer v. Bailroad Co., 94
Ky. 169; Pickett v. Bailway, 74 S. E. 236; Lee v. BepubUc
Steel Co.. 241 111. 372; Tanner v. Harper, 32 Col. 156; Straus
V. Buchanan, 96 App. Div. (N. Y.) 270; Davis v. B. B. Co.,
110 N. Y. 646; Galveston, etc., B. B. Co. v. Perry, 85 S. W.
(Tex.) 62; District of Columbia v. Frazer, 21 App. D. C.
154; Texas, etc.. By. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593.
The cases cited by defendant's counsel are not in our
opinion in conflict with the cases cited supra. The amendments which it was held could not be granted, in every case
set out causes of action which were clearly separate and
distinct from those set out in the declaration to which they
were offered.
In Wright v. Hart's Admr., 4A: Pa. St. 454, the court
said: "This claim was three years old when the suit was
brought, nine years old when the declaration was filed, and
twenty-one years old when the amendment was allowed on
which the recovery was had. It could not therefore be in>
troduced by amendment, unless it plainly acDcars that the

/
/
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amendment is a mere specification of a claim already substantially counted upon. ' ' Thie note declared on was dated
October 10, 1837, and was for $541.34, payable to Lewis
The note set out
Darragbi and endorsed to the plaintiff.
in the amendment was made by Lewis Darragh, dated October 16, 1837, and was for $525.
Li Allen v. Tuscarora Valley B. Co., 229 Pa. St. 97, the
declaration was at common law for injury resulting from
the negligence of defendant in using a coupler more dangerous than the usual coupler employed on railroads. The
amendment alleged that the railroad was engaged in interstate commerce and its cars were equipped with couplers in
violation of the act of Congress of March 2, 189i3. Such a
change was held to be a departure in law.
In Quimhy v. Claflin, 27 Hun (N. Y'.), 611, plaintiff had
leave below to amend by adding as a third cause of action,
a further claim against the defendant for $34,000, which
said claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The
court held that the amendment was improperly allowed.
In Pratt v. Cir. Judge, 10'5 Mich. 499, the amendments
offered stated that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due
care and did not in any way contribute to the injury. The
court say: "The declaration, as amended, relates to precisely the same state of facts and no new theory is evolved
by the proposed amendments which simply amplify the
averments contained in the original declaration by statements in no way inconsistent with those originally set out.
It is a question of acknowledged difficulty to ascertain in
just what cases an amendment may be said to set out a new
cause of action, but we think the result of the authorities
is well summarized in 1 Euc. PI. & Pr. 564, as foUows"
(quoted by us supra) : "And, when the amendment does
not introduce a new cause of action, the running of the statute of limitations is arrested at the date of the institution
of the suit. See 1 Enc. PI. & Pr. 621. ' '
In Buel V. Transfer Co., 45 Mo. 562, the court say:
"Whether an amendment by relation takes effect from the
commencement of the suit, or only from the term of its filThe rule is this: When
ing, depends on circumstances.
the amendments set up no new matter or claim, but is a
mere variation of the allegations affecting a demand already
in issue, then the amendment relates to the commencement of the suit, and the running of the statute is arrested
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at that point; but when the amendment introduces a new
claim, not before asserted, then it is not treated as relating
to the commencement of the suit but as equivalent to a fresh
suit upon a new cause of action— the running of the statute continuing down to the time the amendment is filed."
Inasmuch as the three additional counts did not introduce
any new or different cause of action, the superior court
did not err in overruling the defendant's motion to strike
out said counts, even though the period of limitations had
expired. Atlantic Mills v. Superior Court, 32 B. I. 285. The
rule is stated in Ency. PI. & Pr., vol. 1, p. 621, "Where an
amendment has been properly made and is for the same
cause of action, the amended pleading is regarded as a continuation of the original pleading and takes effect as of the
date when the latter was filed." Clark v. Delaware, etc.,
Canal Co., 11 R. I. 36. "Where an amendment does not set
up a new cause of action, or bring in any new parties,
the running of the statute of limitations is arrested at the
''
Ency. PI. & Pr., vol.
date of filing the original pleading.
1, p. 621; Berube v. Horton, 199 Mass. 421; Lee v. Republic
Steel Co., 241 111. 372; Sheffield v. Harris, 112 Ala. 614;
Quimby v. Claflin, 27 Hun (K Y.), 611; Buel v. Transfer
Co., 45 Mo. 562.

COX

V.

MURPHY.

Supreme Court of Georgia.
82

J.:

1889.

Georgia, 623.

In

his
original declaration he alleged, in substance, as follows:
On the streets of Savannah he was attacked by a wild and
ferocious steer, the property of S. H. Zoucks and D. Cox,
or one of them; that it was in the possession of Cox's servants; that the defendants knew that the animal was ferocious and dangerous and had a propensity for attacking persons, but that they attempted to drive it through the public
Btreets of Savannah. The declaration then shows how the
plaintiff was injured and damaged. The plaintiff amended
Simmons,

Murphy sued Cox for damages.
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it,

his declaration by alleging that Cox had damaged him in
the sum named, because he carelessly kept the steer, well
knowing that it was accustomed to attack, gore and trample

it

it

it

a

a

it

a

it

attacked, gored and
mankind, and while so keeping
second amendtrampled upon the plaintiff. He offered
or had in
the
owner
ment, wherein he alleged that Cox was
his custody, care, keeping or control this animal, and so
escaped and unlawfully came
that
negligently kept
upon the streets and injured the plaintiff, who was lawfully
walking thereon. In third amendment, he alleged that the
defendant kept
vicious and dangerous steer, which, by
the careless management of the defendant or his agents in
along the streets, was allowed to
attempting to drive
attacked, gored and
escape and go at liberty, upon which
walking
who
was
along me street,
on
the
plaintiff,
trampled
•
•
•
without any fault on his part.

a

it

We think the court was right in allowing the first and
It wUl be rememthird amendments to the declaration.
bered that the original declaration alleged that this was
a wild and ferocious steer, and that the defendant knew
propensity
was ferocious and dangerous and had
that
for attacking persons. The first and third amendments,
while they go more into detail as to the manner of the
plaintiff's injury, both alleged that the steer was wild and

it

a

;

it

it

;

it

it

ferocious, and that this was known to the defendant; and
we think, therefore, they were germane to the origiaaJ
declaration, and did not introduce any new cause of action.
They simply allege more particularly than the original
declaration did, the escape of the steer and the fault of the
defendant in allowing him to go at large. Both adhere to
the vicious character of the animal.
The second amendment, however, does not make these
allegations, but alleges that the steer was so negligently
escaped and unlawfully came upon the streets
kept that
was error to allow
and injured the plaintiff. We think
alleged an entirely distinct cause of
this amendment for
original
the
declaration.
As said before, the
action from
original declaration and the first and third amendments
charged the defendant with knowingly keeping a vicious
to go at liberty the second amendanimal and allowing
ment does not allege that the defendant knew that the animatter of fact
mal was vicious, or even that as
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was vicious; but alleges that the defendant kept it so negligently that it escaped and injured him. The plaintiff could
not recover, under the original declaration and the first and
third amendments, without proving to the satisfaction of
the jury that the defendant knew that the animal was
vicious and allowed it to escape or go at large. Under the
second amendment he might perhaps recover by simply
proving the negligent keeping and escape, and the injury.
Under the original declaration and first and third amendments, it was necessary to prove the scienter of the defendant; under the second amendment this was unnecessary.
We therefore think that the second amendment contained
a new and distinct cause of action, and should not have
been allowed.

•

*

•

Judgment reversed.

DALEY

V.

GATES.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
65

1893.

Vermont, 591.

EowEL, J. : The original declaration charges that the
defendant enticed away plaintiff's husband, per quod consortium amisit. The new count charges criminal conversation with him with the same per quod.
An amendment cannot be allowed that introduces a new
cause of action.
But as long as the plaintiff adheres to
the contract or the injury originally declared upon, an
alteration of the modes in which the defendant has broken
the contract or caused the injury is not an introduction of
The test is whether the proposed
a new cause of action.
amendment is a different matter, another subject of controversy, or the same matter more fully or differently laid
to meet the possible scope and varying phases of the testimony. Cassell V. Cooke, 8 S. & B. 268 (11 Am. Dec. 610) ;
Steivart v. Kelly, 16 Pa. St. 160 (55 Am. Dec. 487) ; Maxwell V. Harrison, 8 Ga. 61 (52 Am, Dec. 385) ; Stevenson
V. Mudgett, 10 N. H. 338 (34 Am. Dec. 155 and note).
This rule is variously illustrated by the cases. Thus, in
The Executors of the Duke of Marlborough v. Widmore, 2
0.

L. p.— 45
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Stra, 890, the plaintiffs declared as executors on a promise
to the testator, but were allowed to amend by declaring on
the promise as made to themselves. So in Ten Eyck v.
Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 4 Hair. (N. J.) 5, plaintiff
was allowed to amend by declaring for another injury occasioned by the same wrongful act originally complained

of. In an action for goods Sold and delivered you may
amend by adding a count for not accepting the goods.
Mixer v. Howarth, 21 Pick. 205. So in covenant, you may
amend by assigning new breaches of the same covenant.
Stewart v. Kelly cited above. You may also amend by
declaring on another covenant in the same instrument, if
both covenants and the breach thereof relate to the same
thing. Boyd v. Bartlett, 36 Vt. 9; Tillotson v. Prichard,
60 Vt. 94. A declaration on a warranty can be amended by
showing that the warranty covered things not originally
declared for. Church v. Syracuse Coal and Salt Co., 32
^onn. 372.
an action of this kind can be maintained by a wife,
r'^nceming which we are not called upon to express an
opinion, the cause of action is the wrongful deprivation of
t^? plaintiff of that to which she is entitled by virtue of the
marital relation, namely, the consortium, or the conjugal
sciety, affection, aid and assistance of her husband. Bennett V. Bennett', 116 N. Y. 584 ; Rinehart /v. Bills, 82 Mo.
534 (52 Am. Eep. 385) ; Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1 (18 Am.
St Eep. 258) ; Westlahe v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621 (32
Am. Eep. 397) ; note to Shaddock v. Clifton, 94 Am. Dec.
593; Bigelow's Lead. Cas. on Torts, 337; Cooley, Torts
(1st Ed.), 224; 1 Chit. PI. (134).
It follows, therefore, that the injury complained of in the
original declaration and the injury complained of in the
new count are one and the same injury, namely, the loss of
consortium, and that the new count is but the statement of
another way in which that injury was committed, of another ground for demanding the same thing, namely, damages for said loss, the identity of the cause of action being
preserved.
If you can amend by declaring for another injury occasioned by the same wrongful act, why can you not amend
by declaring for the same injury as occasioned by another
wrongful act? And this you virtually do when you amend
by assigning a new breach of the same covenant; but you

If

Sec.

1]

Aideb and Repleader.

Ambstdment,

707

are seeking the same thing all the time, namely, damages
for the breach of that covenant.
That the new count in this case is for the same cause of
action is as clearly shown by the record as it could be
dehors the record.

Affirmed and remanded.

DOWNING

V.

BURNHAM.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
84

1911,

Vermont, 149.

MuNSON, J.: The declaration contained counts in trespass quare clausum, alleging the cutting and removal of
trees and growing timber; a count in trespass de bonis,
alleging the removal of saw logs, wood and timber; and a
count in trover, alleging a conversion of like property.
When the case was reached for trial, plaintiff moved to
amend by striking out the last two counts, and the defendants objected, for that the counts of trespass on the freehold and the count in trover were not and could not be for
the same cause of action, and so were improperly joined,
and that consequently the declaration could not be amended
as proposed without changing the cause of action.
The question presented is purely one of pleading, no
jurisdictional question being involved. It is not necessary
to inquire whether the counts are for different causes of
action; for the striking out of one of two counts, whether
it be for a separate cause of action or not, does not change
the cause of action set up in the other count; and we think
the rule forbidding an amendment which changes the cause

of action cannot preclude

a plaintiff from perfecting his
a count for a different cause of

declaration by abandoning
action, which has been mistakenly added. The amendment
Chitty 206; Gould, Ch. 4, sec. 101;
was properly allowed.
See Abbott v. Keith, 11 Vt. 525; Haskell v. Bowen, 44 Vt.
579 ; Rowley v. Shepardson, 83 Vt. 167 ; Sawyer v. Childs,
83

Vt.

329.

affirmed and cause remmided for the assess
ment of damages.

Judgment
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LASSITER

V.

10

EAILROAD COMPANY."

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
136

[Chap.

1904.

North Carolina, 89.

Claek, C. J.: The complaint is a sufficient statement
of the facts constituting a cause of action (if the death had
occurred in this State) for negligently causing the death of
plaintiff's intestate hy ordering him to go between cars not
equipped with improved couplers to uncouple said cars, in
The deobeying which order he was run over and killed.
fendant demurred on the ground that the complaint disclosed that "the intestate came to his death in the State of
Virginia by reason of the alleged wrongful acts of the defendant, but does not allege that an action for wrongful
death may be maintained in that State."
Thereupon the
plaintiff asked leave to amend the complaint by pleading
the ' ' statute law of Virginia, which gives a right of action
for negligently causing death," which motion was refused
on the ground that "the court had no power or discretion to
allow the same, and but for such want of power the amendment would be allowed. ' ' The court further gave as a reason why it did not have such power to grant the motion:
"1. Such an amendment would introduce a new cause of
action and not enlarge or amplify the cause of action
pleaded. 2. Such an amendment would deprive the defendant of the benefit of the statute of limitations embraced in
the statute law of Virginia."
•

•

•

Such allegation does not add to or change the
"cause of action" which by the Code, sec. 233 (2), is a
"statement of the facts." Those facts, the death and the
wrongful negligence, are already fully stated. "In such
cases the law of the place where the right was acquired or
the liability was incurred will govern as to the right of
action." Railroad v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 197. The failure
to allege this foreign law is merely a defective statement of
a good cause of action. But even if there were a failure
This is a "Code" case, but the decision is based wholly on common
72.
laTT considerations and is not controlled by any provision of the Code.
The

"complaint"

is the Code equivalent of the common law

"declaration."
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to allege an essential fact to
constitute the cause of actionthe Code, sec. 273, expressly gives power
to amend "by inserting other allegations material to the case. ' ' The rounding out of the complaint to cure a defective
complaint, even
m material matters, is not changing a
cause of action nor
adding a new cause, but merely making a good cause out of
that which was a defective statement of a cause of action
because of the omission of ''material allegations" which
the
Code, sec 273, authorizes to be inserted by amendment.
the cause of action were not defectively stated there
would
be no need of amendment.
The difference between a "defective statement of a good
cause of action" which can be amended by inserting "other
material allegations, ' ' as here, and a ' ' statement of a defective cause of action" is that the latter cannot be made a good
cause by adding other allegations.
Ladd v. Ladd, 121 N. C.
121. We have a case exactly ' ' on all fours ' ' with this under
the New York Code, sec. 723, which is the same as our
Code, sec. 273. In that case, Lustig v. Railroad, 20 N. Y.
Supp. 477, the administratrix brought suit in New York f or
the death of her intestate in New Jersey caused by the
wrongful act of the defendant. After both sides had rested
the defendant moved to dismiss "because there was no allegation in the complaint, nor proof on the trial of any
statute in New Jersey authorizing a recovery of damages
for death from wrongful injury, and that as no right of
recovery existed at common law no cause of action had
been made out. ' ' The trial court reopened the case and allowed the plaintiff to amend her complaint and to supply
this defect in her evidence. This was sustained on appeal,
the court holding that it was authorized by the New York
Code, sec. 723 (which, in the words of our Code, sec. 273, allows an amendment "inserting allegations material to the
case"), and that this "did not add a new cause of action"
nor change the cause of action, but merely perfected a defecbive statement of a good cause of action, defective because of
the omission of this averment.
For the same reason the
plea of the statute of limitations would not run, because
the facts of the transaction being stated in the complaint
the defendant had notice of the demand from the beginning
of this action. The same power of amendment to insert the
allegation of the foreign statute (which had been omitted
in the complaint) was sustained and the same ruling that
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the amendment related back to the beginning and the statute of limitation did not bar was made in Railroad v. Nix,
68 Ga. 572, in effect overruling a former Georgia decision
which is the only one found in any court to the contrary. In
Tiffany on "Dfeath by Wrongful Act," sec. 202, it is said
that "if the plaintiff's right of action arises under a foreign statute he should allege and prove it," but if the complaint "fails to allege the foreign statute, an amendment
alleging it is not open to the objection that it sets up a new
cause of action, although the pyeriod of limitation prescribed
•
•
•
by the foreign statute has elapsed."
•

In holding that

•••••••••

the court had iio power to permit this

there was error.^*
73.
Accord:
T. Decker (1877)

Pratt v. Davis (1895) 105 Mich. 499; Huntingdon B. E. C3o.
84 Pa. St. 419; Georgia Co. v. Murden (1889) 83 Ga. 753;
Bowden t. Bumham (1894) 59 Fed. 752.
Contra: Foster v. St. Luke's Hospital (1901) 191 111. 94, where, in an
aetion for wrongful death of a wife, the husband failed to allege in the
declaration his relationship to the deceased and that she left a surviving
husband or nest of kin and that anyone suffered pecuniary loss by reason
of her death. After the time fixed by the statute of limitations had expired plaintiff amended by adding these essential averments, and the statute
was pleaded against the amended declaration.
It was held that the action

was barred.

mSCH

V.

MeALPlNE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
78

Illinois,

1875,

507.

Scott, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The declaration in this case was upon a promissory note,
to which defendant, in the first place, filed the general issue,
together with his own affidavit of merits as to his defense.

At

it,

a subsequent term, and before the cause was called for
trial, defendant entered a motion, in writing, for leave to
plead specially, setting up fraud in obtaining the note, that
it was given without consideration, and that plaintiffs, behad notice of such fraud and want of
fore they received
consideration.
The affidavits of defendant and Reed, made in support of
the motion, showed clearly the necessity for additional pleas,
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and that there had been no culpable negligence in not ask-

ing for leave at an earlier day to file them; but the court

refused to allow the motion to plead further, except upon
condition defendant would not ask for a continuance of the
cause. Without abandoning his defense, defendant could
not submit to the terms imposed and thereupon the court
overruled the motion. A motion was subsequently made,
based upon an affiavit, for a continuance of the cause, which
the court overruled, and compelled the defendant to go to
trial. Plaintiff recovered the amount of the note, and from
that judgment defendant prosecutes this appeal.
Under the liberal provisions of the Practice Act in this
State, we are of opinion the court ought to have permitted
the defendant to file additional pleas, and that the refusal
was error. Our present statute is much more comprehensive than the former one upon this subject. It allows amendments in civil cases at any time before final judgment,
"either in form or substance, in any process^ pleading or.
proceeding, which may enable the plaintiff to sustain the
action for the claim for which it was intended to be brought,
or the defendant to make a legal defense." K. S. 1874, p.
778, sec. 24.
In this case, the affidavits

in support of the motion show

it was indispensable, to enable defendant to make

a legal

defense, that leave should have been given to file additional
pleas. His alleged defense was not available under the former plea, and unless leave was given to present others his
defense would be entirely cut off.
' '
Such amendments, however, are to be allowed upon such
terms as are just and reasonable," within the discretion
of the court. But such terms, in the language of the statute,
must be "just and reasonable," and not so onerous as would
practically amount to a deprivation of the right secured by
the statute.

The conditions imposed by the court in the case at bar,
under the circumstances, were unreasonable, and, in fact,
amounted to a denial of an opportimity to make a "legal
defense." Had defendant agreed to abide the terms suggested, it would have deprived him of testimony necessary
to his defense, and the privilege to file his pleas would have
been of no benefit to him. It appears, from the affidavit of
defendant in support of the motion for a continuance, that
he could not, with safety, have proceeded to trial at that
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term of the court, on account of the absence of a witness,
whose testimony was all-important to the defense proposed
to be made. It is shown defendant had omitted no reasonable effort to procure the attendance of the witness but that
he was absent from the State by the advice of a physician,
on account of his health. The affidavit was full and complete, and made a clear case for a continuance of the cause.

For

the errors indicated, the judgment will be reversed,
and the cause remanded, that defendant may have a new

triaL
Judgment reversed.''*
As a condition precedent to the allowance of an amendment the court
74.
may require the party to submit to a new trial, or may allow the other
party time to plead, or may impose the payment of costs, or may require
the party to give security for costs.
31 Cyc. 378-381.
will not do for courts in the exercise of their judicial discretion to
impose conditions upon litigants by way of punishment." — Beecher v. Circuit
Judges (1888) 70 Mich. 369.

"It

Section

2.

Aider by Verdiot.

JACKSON

V.

PESKED.

Court of King's Bench.
1

1813.

Maule & Selwyn, 234.

Action upon the case. The declaration stated, that before and at the time of committing the grievances hereinafter mentioned, a certain yard, and part of a certain wall,
situate, etc., was in the possession and occupation of one
William Frisk, as tensmt to the plaintiff, the reversion thereof then and stiU being in the plaintiff, to wit, at, etc. ; yet the
defendant weU knowing the premises, but intending to injure and aggrieve the plaintiff in his reversionary estate and
interest of and in the said yard and the said part of the said
wall, heretofore and whilst the said yard and the said part
of the said wall were so in the possession and occupation of
Frisk as tenant of the plaintiff, and whUst the plaintiff was
so interested therein as aforesaid, tO' wit, on, etc, and on
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divers other days and times between that day and the day of
exhibiting this bill, at, etc, wrongfully, injuriously, and
without leave and against the will of the plaintiff, erected,
put, and placed upon the said part of the said wall divers
large quantities of brick and mortar and other materials,
and thereby raised the said part of the wall to a great
height, to wit, the height of three feet more than the same
had been before that time, and also put and placed divers
pieces of wood and timber, and tiles upon the said wall overhanging the said yard, to wit, at, etc., by reason whereof,
etc. After verdict for the plaintiff on the general issue,
with Is. damages, a motion was made in arrest of judgment
against whioh Jervis and Comyn showed cause, and Lawes
was heard in support of
on a former day in this term.
Lord EuLENBOROUGH, C. J., on this day delivered the judgment of the court. This was an action by a reversioner for
an injury done to
yard and part of a wall of which the
reversion belonged to him, and the plaintiff obtained a verdict but not being alleged in the declaration that the acts
done were to the damage of the plaintiff, as such reversioner, or that his reversionary estate and interest was thereby
depreciated or lessened in value, the defendant obtained
rule nisi to arrest the judgment. The declaration contained
only one count, and that count stated several acts which are
ordinarily stated in declarations of trespass as mere injuries
to the possession, viz., putting and placing upon part of
wall of the plaintiff quantities of brick and mortar, and
thereby raising the same to great height, and putting and
placing pieces of timber, wood, and tiles upon the wall overhanging the said yard. The plaintiff also added, as consequental damage, "by reason whereof not only the said plaintiff during all the time aforesaid lost the use and advantage
of his said part of the wall," (that is, sustained temporary
loss affecting the occupation and enjoyment thereof merely,
which he had not, not being in possession) "but also by
means of the said wood, timber, and tiles so overhanging the
said wall, large quantities of rain and moisture have from
time to time during all the said time run and flowed from the
top of the said wall upon the yard of the plaintiff, and the
said yard and the said part of the wall have been greatly
injured and damnified." And the question seems to be
usually,
whether, in the absence of any such allegation as
and
l^lieve) invariably made in declarations of this sort,
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that thereby the plaintiff's reversionary estate and interest
in the premises were damaged or prejudiced, or lessened in
value, we must infer that the water drip so described had a
permanently injurious effect of this nature. It is not stated
that the foundation of the wall was injured or undeimined,
or that the yard was more injured thereby as being wetted.
The count does not import in terms that any act charged
upon the defendant' was injurious or to the damage of the
plaintiff; the declaration does indeed contain the usual conclusion, "Wherefore the plaintiff saith he is injured and
hath sustained damage, etc.;" but this is not matter of
charge in the declaration, it is only the resulting inference
of damage drawn by the plaintiff from the raatter of charge ;
and unless the count, which is the matter of charge-, warrants
such inference, it has no effect ; and in truth, although this
part of the declaration was brought under our notice, but
little stress was laid upon it as a special allegation of damage in the argument. The main point relied upon was this,
that after verdict the court would infer that the plaintiff
was confined at the trial to the proof of such an injury as
would be prejudicial to the reversion, and that all the evidence short of this effect must be supposed to have been excluded; and it was with a view to look into this point that
the court forebore igiving its judgment at the time. Where
a matter is so essentially necessary to be proved that had
it not been given in evidence, the jury could not have given
such a verdict, there the want of stating that matter in express terms in a declaration, provided it contains terms

sufficiently general to comprehend it in fair and reasonable
intendment, will be cured by a verdict; and where a general
allegation must in fair construction so far require to be
restricted, that no judge and no jury could have properly
treated it in an unrestrained sense, it may reasonably be
presumed after verdict, that it was so restrained at the
trial ; but unless the allegation is of such a nature that it
would have been doing violence to the terms as applied to
the subject-matter, to have treated it as unrestrained, we
are not aware of any authority which will warrant us in
presuming that it was considered as restrained merely because in the extreme latitude of the terms such a sense
might be affixed to them. The rule by which we must go,
must be one applicable to all actions, in inferior as well as
superior courts, to cases in which the judge has no power
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to grant a new trial as well as to those in which there is
such power; and to cases in which, if the jury do not think
fit to follow the judge's direction, there is no power to cor-

rect their decision ; and we must take care therefore not to
extend the rule (if it has not been already extended
further)
beyond those cases in which we must presume the judge to
have given a right direction, and the jury to have followed
it. In Barber v. Fox, 2 Saund. 136, the heir of an obligor
was sued upon a promise in consideration of forbearance.
He pleaded non assumpsit, and there was a verdict against
him. It was then moved in arrest of judgment, because it
was not alleged that the bond in this case bound the obligor's
heirs. It was answered, that the verdict had cured the
objection; for if the heir was not bound, the jury should
have found for the defendant; and it ought therefore of
necessity to be intended that the obligor bound his heirs;
but the court held they could not make the intendment ; and
the judgment was arrested. Hunt v. Sicaine, 1 Lev. 165, and
Sir T. Baym. 127, are to the same point. In Buxendin v.
Sharp, Salk. 662, in an action for keeping a mischievous
bull, iJiere was no scienter in the declaration; and after
verdict for the plaintiff, the judgment was arrested on that
account; and the Court said they "could not intend it was
proved at the trial, for the plaintiff need not prove more
than is in his declaration ; ' ' and yet every lawyer is aware
that a knowledge of the mischievous nature of the animal
is of the essence of such an action, and would therefore
never suffer a jury, if he could control them, to find for the

a case, unless such a knowledge in the defendant were proved. In Nerot v. Wallace, 3 T^erm Eep. 25,
DuLLEK, J., says, "After verdict everything shall be intended which the allegations of the record required to be

plaintiff in such

but do the allegations of the record in this case
properly require an injury to the reversion to be proved, or
will they not be more justly and naturally satisfied by an
injury to the possession only? The case most favourable
for the plaintiff which I have been able to meet with, is
Jenkins v. Turner, Ld, Eaym. 109, where, upon a declaration
for keeping a boar accustomed to bite, which had bitten a
mare of the plaintiff; the allegation was that he was accustomed to bite "animals," and it was urged, upon a motion
in arrest of judgment, founded upon the generality of this
word, that animals might be frogs or such animals ; to which
proved

;
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answered, that the judge of assize knew well
that this would not be actionable unless the boar had been
used to bite horses, sheep, etc., and not frogs; and consequently if that had not been proved, he would not have
suffered the jury to have given a verdict for the plaintiff;
and therefore they would intend that the evidence was of
biting such animal as would support the action. It may be
observed, however, upon this case, that it would have been
a forced and uxmatural construction to have applied the
word animals to frogs or such animals, and that the sense
in which the court understood the term is the sense in which
alone a judge and jury would naturally understand it. And
Powell, J., said it might have been a question in the case
of keeping a dog, whether ad mordend. animalia consuet.
had been good because then it might have been intended
more generally of animals ferae naturae, which it is the
nature of a dog to kill. As, therefore, there is no authority,
upon which we can say we are warranted in presuming that
the jury were confined to such injuries as would necessarily
prejudice the reversion; as the charge in the declaration is
conceived in such terms as to include injuries which are not
but more aptly and naturally
necessarily prejudicial to
applied to injuries to the possession only; and as the plaintiff has not charged that the reversion was prejudiced, or
that the plaintiff was damnified in respect thereof, we are
not warranted in inferring that such a prejudice out of the
natural and ordinary scope of the allegation must have been
proved and therefore the rule for arrestiog the judgment
must be made absolute.
;

it,

PowBxaCi,

NOEWICH CITY GAS COMPANY.

Supreme Court

Errors

of

V.

of

McCUNE

Connecticut.

1862.

30 Connecticut, 521.

J.:

a

a

This

is

motion in arrest for the iasufficiency of the declaration. There are two counts, but in all
their material allegations they are substantially alike, and
the same questions arise on both of them.
corporThe plaintiff alleges that the defendants were
ation, created for the purpose, and engaged in the business,
SiANFOBD,
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of making, distributing and selling illuminating gas, and
that they had laid down their main pipes in the streets and
lanes of the city for the conveyance of gas to their customers; that the plaintiff's rooms had been fitted up with gas
pipes, and fixtures, connected with the defendants' main
pipes, and that for some time immediately prior to the 15th
November, 1858, the defendants had by means of said pipes
supplied the plaintiff with gas for lighting said rooms for
a certain reasonable compensation paid therefor, and that
the plaintiff desired to continue to light his said rooms
with gas as aforesaid, and was ready and willing to pay

to the defendants a reasonable compensation for the same,
and to abide by all the reasonable rules and regulations of
said company, and requested the defendants to continue
to supply said rooms with gas; and that it then
became and was the duty of the defendants to continue to
supply the plaintiff with gas for the purpose aforesaid on
the conditions aforesaid; yet that the defendants, not regarding their said duty, but contriving and intending to
vex and annoy the plaintiff in the use and enjoyment of his
said premises, maliciously, wantonly, and without any justifiable cause, and contrary to the mind and will of the plaintiff, refused to supply the plaintiff with gas, and shut off
the same from entering the gas pipes of said rooms, etc, ; by
reason whereof the plaintiff has been deprived of the means
of lighting said rooms with gas, and of the use and enjoyment of said gas fixtures, and has , been put to great ex''
pense in providing other means of lighting said rooms, etc.
No contract for the supply of gas for any definite period
is alleged to have been made by the defendants, nor indeed
any contract at all. The entire foundation of the plaintiff's
claim, as it is set out in this declaration, rests upon the supposed legal duty or obligation, independent of any contract,
to continue the supply. But no facts are stated from which
such duty or obligation arises, and the allegation of a duty
or liability is of no avail, and will not help a declaration, unless the facts necessary to raise it are stated. It is but the
statement of a legal inference, never traversable, and of no
avail in pleading. Bailey v. Bussing, 29 Conn. 1; and the

authorities there cited; Hayden v. Smithville Mcmufacturing Co., id, 548.
Had the defendants agreed to furnish the plaintiff with
gas for any specified time, or imtil they should give notice
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of their intention to discontinue the supply, they would undoubtedly have been liable in damages for the nonperformance of such contract, but the contract itself must have
been set up in the declaration and the action must have been
founded upon it. And perhaps, too, had the plaintiff de-,
clared upon a contract by the defendants to supply him with
gas until they should give him reasonable notice of their
intention to discontinue such supply, the jury might have
found such contract and its violation, upon proof of the
But
facts and circumstances detailed in this declaration.
no such case is now before us, and we know of no principle
upon which we could stand in holding the defendants liable
upon the facts set up in this declaration.
The manufacture and sale of gas is a business which may
be prosecuted or discontinued at the will of the party engaged in it. The relations between the maker and the consumer originate in the contract between them, and their
respective rights and obligations are controlled entirely by
the stipulations of such contract, and as (where no contract
prohibits) the one may refuse to take the article at his
pleasure, so may the other at his pleasure refuse to supply
it. We discover no reason for subjecting the maker of gas
to duties or liabilities beyond those to which the manufacturers and venders of other commodities are subjected
by the rules of law.
The articles of association under which the defendants
are organized and exist as a corporate body, confer upon
them no peculiar powers, and impose no peculiar duties or
obligations, affecting the question now before us.
The allegation that the defendants cut off the supply of
gas maliciously and wantonly, and with intent to injure the
plaintiff, is of no importance in the determination of this
question. Where a party has a legal right to do a particular act at pleasure, the motive which induced the doiilg
of the act at the time in question can never affect his legal
liability for the act, whatever effect such motive may have
upon the quantum of damages, when his liability is fixed.
It was claimed upon the argument that the declaration,
though it might have been demurrable, was cured by the
verdict, because, it was said, that from the allegation thai
the defendants had connected their main with the plaintiff's pipes and burners and were, up to a specified time,
supplying the plaintiff Avith gas. some agreement betweer
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the parties must be implied, and
the terms of it must have
been proved upon the trial, or the
jury could not have found
their verdict for the plaintiff. But upon this
motion the
question is not whether an agreement in fact
existed or
was proved, but whether it is set up in the
declaration as
the foundation of the plaintiff's right of
recovery.
The
verdict establishes the truth of all the material allegations
of fact which the declaration contains, because it must now
be presumed that they were, as they might have
been,
proved upon the trial; but no evidence was admissible to
prove facts not stated, and therefore it cannot be presumed
that such facts were proved, or passed upon by the jury.
The plaintiff can prove and recover upon only the allegations in his declaration. It is true that when a fact not
specifically stated in the declaration is so inseparably connected with one which is, that the latter cannot be proved
at all without proving the former, then a general verdict
for the plaintiff demonstrates the existence of both of them,
because both are necessarily involved in one and the same
'ssue. So, too, if a material fact is stated in such general
and indefinite terms that, if demurred to, the pleading
would be adjudged bad for want of sufficient certainty, yet
instead of demurring, the other party takes issue upon
and the verdict
against him, the defect
cured, because the fact stated could not have been proved at all without proving at the same time those concomitant circumstances attending it, for the omission of which the pleading
a tender
was demurrable. Thus,
pleaded without time
or place, the plea
bad on demurrer, for the opposite party
has
right to be informed by the plea when and where the
tender
claimed to have been made, in order that he may
instead of demurring,
prepare to meet the claim. But
against him,
he takes issue upon the plea and the verdict
cured; because the tender could not have been
the plea
was made.
proved at all without proving when and where
if the dea
contract,
upon
simple
But in
special count
no allegaalleged, and there
fendant's promise only
tion of any consideration for such promise, no verdict
would aid the omission, because the promise and the considhave no necessary or natural connection, and
eration for
the one may be proved without giving any evidence of the
would be the
other. And yet in the case last supposed
duty of the jury to give their verdict for the plaintiff, al-
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though a judgment for him thereon would be erroneous;
the province of the jury beiiig to decide whether the material allegations in the declaration are true or false, and to
render their verdict accordingly.
The verdict of the jury in favor of the pleader, therefore,
establishes the truth of all those material allegations of
fact which the pleader makes, and nothing more. And
when a fact material to the plaintiff's right of recovery is
omitted from his declaration altogether, and is not so connected with other facts which are stafed that the latter cannot be proved without proving the former, the verdict of
the jury of course ascertains nothing in regard to such
omitted fact, and cannot aid the declaration.
This seems to be the logical as well as legal corollary
from the settled propositions, that no evidence is admissible to prove any fact not stated in the pleadings and involved in the issue, and that the court will never presume
that illegal evidence was received upon the trial. Stephen's
PI. 167, et seq.; Gould's PI. 496, et seQ.
In the case at bar the title or right of recovery set up by
the plaintiff in his declaration, is the supposed duty or obligation imposed upon the defendants by law to supply the
plaintiff with gas, and the facts oul; of which that duty is
claimed to have arisen are, that the gas pipes of the plaintiff and the defendahts were united, that up to a specified
time the defendants had supplied the plaintiff with gas by
means of such pipes and had been paid for
and that the
plaintiff desired to continue to take the defendants' gas,
and was ready and willing to pay for
as he had done before, which, as we have already said,
the statement of no
title at all, for on these facts the law raises no such duty
or obligation as the plainliff claims.
We think the motion in arrest ought to prevail, and we
advise accordingly.
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PHILLIPS.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

1854.

2 Sneed, 185.

J.

delivered the opinion of the court.
Phillips sued Cannon, in the circuit court of Bedford, in
an action on the case for oral slander.
Defence is made,
first, by demurrer to the declaration, and that is overruled.
The defendant, by leave, then pleaded not guilty, and the
trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for
$3,000. The defendant appealed in error.
ToTTEN,

It

is argued that the defect in the declaration is cured by
the verdict.
On this subject the rule is that where there is a defect or
omission in the declaration, that must be fatal on general
demurrer, yet if the issue joined be such as required the
facts defectively stated or omitted to be proved on the trial,
the defect or omission is cured by the verdict. For the law
'Adll presume that the facts were proved, otherwise the verdict would not have been for the plaintiff. Panghurn v.
Ramsey, 11 Johns. 142 ; Chapman v. Smith, 13 id. 80.
But in the present case there was no waiver of the defect
in the declaration. The objection was taken at the threshold by demurrer. The declaration was not amended; the
demurrer was erroneously overruled, and the defendant
compelled to plead and go to trial on a declaration which

contained no cause of action.
In such case the whole proceeding is erroneous, and the
declaration is not cured by the verdict.
Let the jvdgment he reversed.

aXbP^

[Chap. 10

CoMMOK L4W PXiKADiHa.

722

Section 3.

I^pi;badbb.

EX PAETE PIEECE.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
80

J.

In

1885,

Alabama, 195.

an action, brought by M. P. Levy & Co.
against the petitioner in the circuit court for Calhoum county, the defendant pleaded the general issue and three special pleas. Each of the special pleas contained a confession
of a cause of action, and alleged in avoidance immaterial
There was a verdict for the deand insufficient matter.
which
was
and a repleader awarded.
aside,
set
fendant,
This is an application for a mandamus to have judgment
entered on the verdict, and the case stricken from the docket. "When a plea contains a confession of a cause of action,
and avoids it by presenting an immaterial issue, and there
is a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment non obstcmte veredicto; but if the plea does not
confess a cause of action, a repleader may be granted. Lambert V. Taylor, 4 B. & C. 138; 1 Chitty PI. 688. Such is the
rule at common law, and was of easy application so long
as the parties were restricted to a single issue; but since,
by statute, the defendant is allowed to plead as many distinct pleas as he may be advised, though inconsistent with
each other, thus presenting several issues of fact, a serious
difficulty arises as to the application of the rule, when some
of the issues are materia* and others immaterial, and there
is a general verdict for the defendant.
In Wallace v. Barlow, 3 Bibb. 168, issues were joined on
three pleas, two of them being immaterial. It was held,
that a material issue having been joined, and a general verdict for the defendant, it should not be set aside and a repleader granted; and that whenever the court can give
judgment upon the whole record a repleader should not be
awarded ; but the finding as to these issues, which could not
affect tiie merits, should be disregarded, and judgment entered on the finding as to the good issiie. In Cullum v.
Branch Bamk, 4 Ala. 21, the right of the defendant to have
the jury instructed to find a verdict on any issue sustained

Clopton,

:
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his proof is conceded without question, because in such
event, the plaintiff could evade the consequence of the verdict founded on an immaterial issue by a motion to enter a
judgment non obstante veredicto. It is said : ' ' The defendant did not pursue this course, but asked a charge which,
if given, would have led to a general verdict, and the
plaintiff would, in that case, have been remediless, as under
the issue of non assumpsit, the reason on which the verdict
was founded could not have been ascertained."
In Mudge v. Treat, 57 Ala. 1, the rule is thus stated: "A
repleader should not be awarded, because of the inunateriality of one of the issues, after a general verdict on all,
some being sufficient, unless it affirmatively appears the
verdict was on the immaterial issue only." The logical
sequence from these decisions is, that whenever enough
exists in the record, not being impertinent or uncertain, on
which judgment may be given, the reason for awarding a
repleader, when all the issues are on immaterial points,
does not apply ; and that the statute, allowing several pleas,
operates to abrogate the rule, when there is a general verdict on both material and immaterial issues, except in case
the entire record affirmatively shows, that the finding was
on an immaterial point only.
by

The record, as presented, does not disclose what instructions, if any, were given by the court as to the insufficient
pleas. The verdict of the jury is set out in haec verba :
"We the jury find the issues in favor of the defendant."
Its terms are responsive to, and comprehensive enough to
embrace all the issues, material and inmiaterial, submitted
to the jury. The fair and reasonable interpretation of the
verdict is, that the jury found all the issues in favor of
Tippin v. Petty, 7 Por. 441. On such a
the defendant.
verdict, it cannot be said, that it is founded on any particular issue only, whatever may be our opinion of the state
and character of the proof. If such be the fact, no means
are furnished to ascertain on what particular issue. The
general issue is a denial of the cause of action as set forth
by the plaintiffs, and devolved on them the onus of proving it. The juries are the exclusive judges of the credibility of witnesses, and the sufficiency of evidence. If their
finding is contrary to the evidence, resort for the correction of the error must be bv a motion for a new trial. It
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may operate a hardship on the plaintiffs; bnt violence
would be done to the finding of the jury as expressed in
the terms of their verdict, were it restricted to the immaterial issues only, by inferences only from the insufficiency of
the evidence to support the verdict on the material issue.
On the record, a case for a repleader was not presented,
and the defendant was not entitled to have judgment e^tered on the verdict.
Otherwise, the effect would be to
grant a new tried under the guise of awarding a repleader.
The remaining question is, will mandamus lie to compel
It is an established
the circuit court to enter judgment?
principle, that a mandamus will issue to an inferior court
to compel the rendition of a judgment, where such court,
having heard and tried the case, refuses to render judgment; but relief will not be granted by mandamus, when
there is another adequate legal remedy, as when the interlocutory order complained of may be revised and corrected
on appeal from the final judgment. Ex parte S. S N. Ala.
R. B. Co., 65 Ala. 599. ^Vhether or not a repleader shall
be awarded is not a matter in the discretion of the court,
and the action of the court relating thereto is revisable.
Awarding a repleader is not the same as granting a new
trial. They are distinct in their nature and purposes, and
constitute different modes of proceeding.
Chapman v.
Holding, 60 Ala. 522. The one is discretionary, not subject
to revision.
The other does not rest in the discretion of
the court, and must be granted or refused on established
common-law principles ; and if error intervenes, it may be
court.
corrected by the appellate
The plaintiff having
made a motion for a new trial, which was withdrawn, and
afterwards made a motion to set the verdict and for a repleader, elected their remedy, and must submit to its bura repleader be improperly redens and disadvantages.
fused, the plaintiff may appeal from the judgment entered
on the verdict, and have the refusal revised.
Mvdge v.
Treat, supra. Hence in such case, a mandamus will not lie.
But' if a repleader be improperly awarded, no judgment is
entered from which an appeal can be taken. Though the
defendant may object, if he subsequently appears, engages in another trial, examines witnesses, and litigates,
he waives his objection to the award of the repleader, and
is precluded to deny that the case is properly pending in
court. Byrd v. McDaniel, 20 Ala. 582; Hair v. Moody, 9

If
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An appeal from the final judgment would not be
an adequate remedy. Lloyd v. Brinck, 35 Tex. 1; Fish v.
Neathertoood, 2 Johns Cas. 215.
"In my opinion the mandamus should be granted.
But
the majority of the court do not concur in this conclusion.
Per Cttbiam. The result of the trial and verdict in this
case was a manifest injustice to plaintiffs.
The defenses
set up were without merit, and the court would have been
justified in setting the verdict aside ex mero motu, and allowing the pleadings to be amended. We will not say it
was not the duty of the court not to do so. One of the chief
purposes for which courts are organized is, that while observing the dividing line which separates the duties of the
judge from those of the jury, the presiding judge should
exert his powers in favor of legal justice. The effect of
the order made was precisely the same as the granting of
a new trial, with leave to amend the pleadings.
Justice
was done, and the law regards substance rather than forma,
or the name of things. Judgments, correct in substance,
should never be reversed because bad reasons are given for
them, nor because they are designated by erroneous names.
The majority of the court hold that the mandamus must
be denied.
399.
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WESTERN AND ATLANTIC RAILROAD COMPANY
DALTON MARBLE WORKS.

v.

Supreme Court of Georgia. 1905.
122 Georgia, 774.

Simmons, C. J. : A smmnons was issued by a justice of
the peace in the name of the "Dalton Marble Works"
At
against the Western and Atlantic Railroad Company.
the trial before the justice a motion was made to dismiss
the case on the ground that it was not alleged that the
''
Dalton Marble Works was a corporation, nor, if it was a
partnership, did it appear who were the partners composing
the firm, nor was it the name of an individual." To meet
this objection plaintiff's coimsel amended by inserting,
after "Dalton Marble Works," the words "H. P. Colvard,
proprietor," to which amendment the defendant objected.
The magistrate rendered judgment against the railroad
company, and it appealed the case to a jury, where the same
motion to dismiss and objection to the amendment were
made.
The jury returned a verdict against the railroad
company, and it sued out a certiorari to the superior court,
alleging various errors committed on the trial, among them
being those above stated. The certiorari was refused, and
the railroad company excepted.
1, 2. The view we take of the case renders it unnecessary
to discuss any of the questions made in the bill of exceptions, except the validity of the suit commenced in the
justice's court. We think the court erred in not sustaining
the certiorari upon this ground. As was said in the case of
Anderson v. Brumby, 115 Ga. 649, "This court is fully committed to the proposition that no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of a plaintiff having a legal entity,
(726)
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either as a natural or as an artificial person." In every
suit brouglit in this State there must be a real plaintiff
and
a real defendant.
The plaintiff or the defendant may be a
natural or an artificial person, or a q^las^ artificial person,
such as a partnership. If the suit is brought in a
name
which IS neither that of a natural person, a corporation, nor
a partnership, it is a mere nullity. A natural person
may
bring a suit in his name for himself, or for the use of any
other person when he holds the legal title and such other
person the equitable title. A corporation may briag suit in
its own name, and, if it fails fully to describe its legal
entity, may amend by alleging that it is a corporation. A
partnership may do likewise." And this is the distinction
between this case and those of St. Cecilia's Academy v.
Hardin, 78 Ga. 39 ; Smith v. Columbia Jewelry Co., 114 Ga.
698; Adas-Teshurun Society v. Fish, 117 Ga. 345; and Perkins V. Shewmake, 119 Ga. 617, relied on by defendant in
error. In these cases the legal entity, of the partnerships
or corporations was not fully disclosed, and this court held
that the petition might be amended by alleging that the
party was a partnership or corporation, as the case might
be, the names importing partnerships or corporations ; and
if the cases had gone to judgment without any objection to
the names the judgments would have been good, because
each of the names imported a corporation or partnership.
The name "Dal ton Marble Works" cannot be fairly said to
import a corp>oration or a partnership, without further description of its legal entity. Even if it is probable that the
court might have construed this name as one that imports a
corporation or a partnership, the amendment offered and
allowed by the court negatives such a construction, for the
reason that the amendment, which was simply "Dalton
Marble Works, H. P. Colvard, proprietor," clearly shows,
if it be true, th^t the "Dalton Marble Works" was neither
a partnership nor a corporation, but merely the name of
Colvard 's property. The "Dalton Marble Works," then,
being neither a natural person, a corporation, nor a partnership, could not legally institute an action; or, in other
•words, there was no plaintiff to the action, and, there being
75.

A partnership is

a statute

not to be deemed a legal entity in the absence of
It is a mere group of individuals acting jointly
See Wright v. Williamson, given in
as such.

so declaring.
should sue and be sued

and
the text infra, and notes.
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suit was a mere nullity, and could not be amended
by inserting the name of Colvard as proprietor, there being
nothing to amend by. See, on this subject, Barbour v.
Albany Lodge, 73 Ga. 474; Thurman v. Cedar Spring
Church, 110 Ga. 816; Mutual Life Co. v. Innum Park
Church, 111 Ga. 678; Anderson v. Brumby, 115 Ga, 649;
Wynn v. Richard Allen Lodge, 115 Ga. 796; 15 Enc. PL &
none, the

Pr.

476, and notes.

Judgment
Cani>l£b,

J.,

reversed.
absent.

All

the justices concur,

McLEAN COUNTY COAL COMPANY
Supreme Court of Illinois.
91

Illinois,

ejocepf

v. LONG.

1879.

617.

Walker, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
It appears that John Long, the husband of appellee, in
his lifetime sued appellant to recover for a quantity of coal
it had mined, removed from land belonging to him, and
converted to its own use. He recovered a judgment, and
appellant brought the case to this court, "and the judgment
was reversed and the cause remanded.
(See 81 lU. 359.)
After the judgment was reversed, and before the case was
tedocketed in the court below, Long died, having, by will,
devised and bequeathed all of his property to appellee.
The cause was docketed, the death of Long suggested, and
leave given to amend the declaration, which was done by
making appellee plaintiff, and the cause progressed in her
name to a trial and judgment against the company, a
motion for a new trial and in arrest having been overruled,
and the company again appeals.
On the trial appellant objected to the admission of evidence of the mining and conversion of the coal.
It appears that neither appellee nor any other person
ever became executor or administrator of Long's estate, no
steps being taken in the probate court for the purpose. On
the one side it is urged that appellee could hot maintain
the action, or anyone else, until letters should be granted
on Long's estate. But it is claimed, as all of Long's prop-
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erty was -mlled to appellee, ste thereby became vested with
the legal title to the claim, and may recover.

At common law it was an inflexible rule, with few excep^
tions, that a chose in action could not be assigned or transferred so as to give the assignee a right of action in his own
name.
That could not be done verbally or in writing,
neither by deed, will or simple contract. Even promissory
notes could not be so assigned or transferred until authorized by the Statute of Anue. Bills of exchange were not an
exception, under the common law, as they were governed
by the mercantile law. Leases, and some covenants for
title, ran with the land, and were assigned and transferred
by a conveyance of the land to which they related. An effort to thus transfer causes of action and contracts no
doubt passed to the assignee an equitable title, which the
courts of law came to recognize and protect, as such, by requiring the assignor, on being indemnified, to permit suit
to be prosecuted in his name, that his assignee might have
the benefit of the equitable transfer of the claim.
Had Long in his lifetime sold this claim, would anyone
contend that the purchaser could have maintained an action in his own name ? Or, suppose he had bequeathed this
claim to some one else, and willed the remainder of his
property to appellee, would anyone suppose that the legatee could sue and recover in his name? Had Long bequeathed to appellee notes or contracts, does anyone suppose she would thereby derive authority to sue? The will
does not vest the legal title to a cause of action in the legatee, any more than would his assignment of such claim in
his Ufetime. The appointment of an executor to carry out
the provisions of the will, vests the title to the goods, chattels and choses in action in the executor, as a quasi trustee,
for the use of the creditors, distributees and legatees. He
can maintain trover, replevin, or other appropriate action
for the recovery of the personal property, or to recover
The legadamages for its wrongful injury or destruction.
tee cannot maintain such actions, dnd the same is true of
choses in action.
These are elementary rules that need no discussioiL
*

Here, appellee has only an equitable title, and
•
•
•
that never confers the right to sue at law.
•

•
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We are, therefore, of opinion that appellee had no right,
without obtaining letters on the estate, to maintain the ao.tion.

It

is urged that appellant should have pleaded in abatement. We fail to see that the law required such a plea to
interpose the defence. To recover, she was bound to prove
a legal right vested m her. She could not recover by proving a right in another person. A person cannot recover
by claiming a demand, and showing another person holds
the demand claimed ; and such is the proof here. This defence may be made under the general issue, as that put her
»
•
*
on the proof of her claim.

The court below, therefore, erred in not arresting the
judgment,' and for that error the judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.

WELCH

V.

MANDEVILLE.

Supreme Court of the United States.
1

1816,

Wheaton, 233.

[This was an action of covenant brought in the name of
Welch for the use of Prior against Mandeville and Jamieson. Mandeville pleaded in his second plea that a former
suit had been instituted on the same demand, and that it
upon Welch's acknowledgment in
had been dismissed
court that he would not farther prosecute it. To this plea
plaintiff filed a special replication alleging that Welch was
indebted to Prior in more than the sum of $8707.09 and the
defendants were indebted to Welch in said sum of $8707.09
upon the covenant mentioned in the declaration, and that
Welch assigned the covenant to Prior in discharge of said
debt, of which assignment the defendants had notice. The
replication further alleged that the suit in the plea mentioned was brought in the name of Welch, as the nominal
plaintiff, for the use and benefit of Prior, and that the
said suit was dismissed without the authority consent or
knowledge of Prior, by the fraudulent collusion of Mande-
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ville and Welch, for the purpose of defrauding Prior.

To
this replication a general demurrer was
filed.]
Stoky, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The question upon these pleadings comes to this, whether a nominal plaintiff, suing for the benefit of his assignee,
can, by a dismissal of the suit under a collusive agreement
with the defendant, create a valid bar against any subsequent suit for the same cause of action.
Courts of law, following in this respect the rules of
equity, now take notice of assignments of choses in action,
and exert themselves to afford them every support and protection, not inconsistent with the established principles and
modes of proceeding which govern tribunals acting according to the course of the common law. They will not, therefore, give effect to a release procured by the defendant under a covenous combination with the assignor, in fraud of
his assignee, nor permit the assignor injuriously to interfere with the conduct of any suit commenced by his assignee
to enforce the rights which passed under the assignment.
The dismissal of the former suit, stated in the pleadings in
the present case, was certainly not a retraxit ; and if it had
been, it would not have availed the parties, since it was procured by fraud. Admitting a dismissal of a suit by agreement to be a good bar to a subsequent suit (on which we
give no opinion) it can be so only when it is bona fide, and
not for the purpose of defeating the rights of third persons. It would be strange, indeed, if parties could be allowed, under the protection of its forms, to defeat the
whole objects and purposes of the law itself.
It is the unanimous opinion of the court, that the judgment of the circuit court, overruling the replication to the
second plea of the defendant, is erroneous, and the same is
reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceeding.
Judgment reversed.''''

"

Condensed statement of facts by the editor.
Becord need not disclose real plaintiff.
is well settled that in suits at law, a person who is interested merely
as iisee, is not regarded as a party to the suit, and the fact that the suit
American
is brought for his use need not be expressed upon the record.
It follows that the insertion of
Express Company v. Haggard, 37 111. 465.
the name of the usee may be regarded as surplusage, at least on demurrer."
Northrop v. McGee (1886) 20 111. App. 108.
is usual, when an action is brought in the name of one person for the
use of another, to state the fact in the body of the declaration, or by an
And it is useful and convenient to
endorsement ther«)n or on the writ.
do so, to give notice to the defendant of the rights of the substantial plaintiff,
76.
77.

"It

"It
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and to enable the conrt to protect them hj its orders.
But this is mot
Clarksons
necessary. The statement is no material part of the pleading."
V. Doddridge
(1857) 14 Gratt. (Va.) 42.
Consent of nominal plaintiff.
It is neither necessary that the consent of
the legal plaintiff to the use of his name be obtained, nor will an objection
to such use be effective to prevent it; the only privilege enjoyed by the record
plaintiff is the right to demand security for costs:
Fay v. Gnynon (1881)
131 Mass. 31; Sumner v. Sleeth (1877) 87 111. 500; Hargraves
v. Lewis
(1849) 6 Ga. 207; Eckford v. Hogan (1870) 44 Miss. 398; Webb v. Steele
(1842) 13 N. H. 230; Guernsey v. Bums (1841) 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 411.
Beal plaintiff protected against nominal plaintiff.
In Dazey v. Mills
(1848) 10 111. 67, after conceding that there were cases holding that admissions of the nominal plaintiff could be given in evidence to defeat the
' '
real plaintiff, the court said :
On the other hand, it is held in the cases
of Frear v. Evertson, 20 Johns. 142 ; Hackett v. Martin, 8 Greenl. 77, and
Chisholm v. Newton, 1 Ala. 371, that the declarations of the nominal plaintiff, made after he has parted with his interest in the cause of action, are
not admissible in evidence to defeat the claim of the real party in interest.
The assignee of a chose in action will be protected in a court of law against
the acts and declarations of the assignor subsequent to the assignment.
Kimball v. Huntington, 10 Wend. 677. Where a chose in action is assigned
by the owner, he cannot interfere to defeat the rights of the assignee in the
prosecution of a suit brought to enforce those rights, and it makes no dif
Mandeville
ference whether the assignment be good at law or in equity only.
A payment made to the nominal plaintiff after the
V. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277.
Littlefield
defendant has notice of the assignment constitutes no defense.
So of a set-off obtained after notice of the assignV. Storey, 3 Johns. 426.
ment.
Anderson v. Van Allen, 12 Johns. 343.
So of a release procured
Andrews
v.
from the nominal plaintiff after notice of the assignment.
Beecker, 1 Johns. Gas. 411; Raymond v. Squires, 11 Johns. 47. And it is
immaterial whether the assignment be of the whole subject-matter, • or as
Wheeler v. Wheeler, 9 Cowen, 34.
collateral security.
' ' It seems to be the
decisions, to recognize the rights
, tendency of modern
of the beneficial party, and to protect him against the acts of the party
possessing the naked legal interest, whenever it can be done without injuriously
we are
affecting the rights of the debtor; and subject to this qualification
inclined to adopt the rule in its fullest extent.
The assignee is allowed to
sue in the name of the person having the legal interest, and to control the
The latter cannot interfere further with the prosecution than
proceedings.
to require indemnity against the payment of costs."

HAYWAED

V.

GIFFARD.

Court of Exchequer.

1838.

4 Meeson and Welshy, 194.

Jervis had obtained

a rule calling upon one George
he should not pay forthwith
cause
to
why
show
Spencet
to the defendant, Francis Giffard, the sum of 112 1. 14 s. Bd.,
the amount of the taxed costs on the judgment as in the
case of a nonsuit in the above cause, and also the costs of
The action was brought against the dethe application.
Giffard,
as
clerk to the trustees of Tothill Fields,
fendaat
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acting under an act of Parliament for paving, lighting and
improving the district called Tothill Fields; and the other
defendant, Edward Grove, was and acted as a constable or
broker for the trustees in making a distress upon a house in
the district, occupied by the plaintiff as tenant to the said

George Spencer.
The affidavits upon which the rule was
obtained stated a variety of facts, for the purposes of showing that Spencer was the real plaintiff, and not Hayward;
and they set forth an admission by the plaintiff's attorney,
whereby he agreed to admit on the trial of the cause "that
the action was brought by and at the expense of the said
George Spencer, and that the said John Hayward was the
nominal plaintiff only." Tihe cause, however, did not proceed to trial, but judgment as in case of a nonsuit was
signed, and the defendant's costs were taxed at the above

mentioned sum of 112 1. 14 s. 3d.
Rogers showed cause. This application, calling upon a
person who is not a party to the record to pay the costs of
an action after judgment has been signed, is altogether
without precedentj'and no case of a similar application can
be found. Many cases may be found where, in the early
stages of a cause, a plaintiff has been compelled to give
security for costs; but even in those eases the courts require the application to be made in the first instance, so as
not to allow the party to incur costs. And the reason for
such practice is, that thereby the party is prevented from
going on and increasing the amount of costs until he has
given security for them, which may induce him to consider
whether he has any good grounds for proceeding in the
Here the party ought to have come to the court
action.
immediately after the admission was made, and not have
waited until after judgment was signed. He cited Adams
v. Brovm, 9 Bing. 81, 2 M. & Scott, 154, and Berkeley v.
Dimery, 10 B. & Or. 113.
Jervis and Turner, contra. In this case, Spencer, the
real plaintiff, is seeking, ia the name of Hayward, to try a
right affecting his property, and ought therefore to be
compelled to pay the costs of the action. In cases of ejectment it is frequently done; and in Doe d. Martin v. Gray,
10 B. & Cr. 615, the court, in an action of ejectment, compelled the real defendant, although he was not the party
on the record, to pay the costs.
Pabke, B. — These cases proceed on a different ground:
that as the landlord was tiie real defendant, he ought to
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is,

The defendhave entered into the landlord's rule.
ant should have come to the court for security for costs.]
This is in truth the same as an ejectment, for it is
an action to try a right affecting the property of the landlord. There can be no doubt here that Spencer is the
real plaintiff ; the attorney in the cause admitted that
he
and he himself has not ventured to deny it. [Lord
Abingeb, C. B. — What jurisdiction have we over persons
who are not parties to the record? We have over attorneys
and oflfficers of the court; but in a case where persons are
not parties to the record, and have committed no contempt,
It may be enforced by
how could we enforce our order?}
* • •
attachment for disobedience to a rule of court.
Lord Abingee, C. B. — we were at Uberty to consult
equity and justice, we should probably make this rule
absolute. But the authority of the courts at Westminster
derived from the Queen's writ, directing them to take
cognizance of the suits mentioned in the writs respectively,
and thus bringing the parties before them. This being so,
they have no power to order any particular individual to
come before them at their pleasure.
In the present case,
could have been shown that Spencer had committed any
contempt of court, or been guilty, in respect of this suit,
of anything in the nature of barratry or maintenance,
would have been another matter but we cannot make any
order against an individual who
not party to any suit
before us, nor has been guilty of any contempt, but merely
because he has an interest in the event of the suit. However anxious, therefore, we might be to make this rule
absolute, by doing so we should establish a precedent which
might open a wide sea to injustice.
The casesi where the
courts have interfered in this way are cases of exception.
They are cases where application
made for security for
costs, and even there the order
made in the cause, and
the immediate thing commanded
a stay of proceedings, by
which means the ulterior object of a security for costs
obtained. So in ejectment, which
a fictitious proceeding,
the courts allow the action to be brought in the name of a
nominal plaintiff, and allow the landlord to come in and
defend, but they take notice of the real parties litigant.
Those are the excepted cases, but the general rule is, that
is

is

is is

is

is

;

it

it

if

is
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courts of justice have no power to except over parties to the
record.
Parke, B., concurred.
Rule discharged, without costs? ^

8

6

■^'

78.
New parties, either plaintiff or defendant, cannot be added by amendment of the pleadings, in the absence of
statutory authorization:
CJhoteau
l-^^^J}^^ (1846) 10 Mo. 131; Chamberlin v. Hite (1836) 5 Watts (Pa.)
''^a.^ace (1822) 8 S. & E. (Pa.) 53; EUiott v. Clark
(1846)
Voir^^°^ "'• ■'^y®'"
^- Cfleason (1872) 60 Me. 207; NoU t. Swineford
iT"
Pa. St. 187; Seitz v. Buffum (1850) 14 Pa. St. 70; Commission (1847)
Co. v.
Enss (1828)
Cow. (N. T.) 122; except by express eonsent, Wiuslow t.
MerriU (1834) 11 Me. 127.

PEARSON

1

NESBIT.

North Carolina.

of

Supreme Court

V.

1827.

Devereux Law, 315.

a

&

&

[Eichmond Pearson, at the time of his death, was indebted to A. Nesbit
Co., which firm consisted of the defendant
Nesbit and Jesse A. Pearson. He appointed the plaintiff,
Elizabeth Pearson, and Jesse A. Pearson executor and executrix of his will. Nesbit
Co. sued these personal representatives on the said claim, and they confessed judgment,
unsatisfied.
Later Elizabeth Pearson
which remained
writ of error or for an order
moved in the alternative for
on
the ground that Jesse A.
aside
the
judgment,
setting
Pearson was both plaintiff and defendant in the original ac'»

a

is

is

;

is

it,

a

it

a

:

is

tion.]
contest between two
A suit at law,
Hendeeson, J.
court of justice; the one seeking, and the othparties in
er withholding the thing in contest. The same individual
cannot be, at the same time, both the person seeking and
involves an absurdity, that
the person withholding. For
person should seek from himself, or withhold from himself. Between a corporation and individuals composing
this identity does not exist, and the absurdity above stated
both plaintiff and
avoided but where the same person
defendant, in different rights, as for himself on the one
inside, and as executor on the other, this absurdity
creditor
and
as
executor,
When adversary rights,
volved.
79.
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or debtor and executor, meet in the same individual, the
law considers the contest as settled — at least as long as the
union exists. As soon, therefore, as it appears to the court
that the same individual is both plaintiff and defendant,
any judgment entered up in the cause is, to say the least erroneous, and should be reversed.
am not prepared to say, whether a writ of error, or a
motion to vacate, is most proper mode of proceeding in this
am satisfied, that a writ of error is a proper
case; but
remedy, although it may not be the only (proper one.
The judgment of the superior ,court, reversing the original judgment, must be aflBrmed.
Pbb Cueiam. Judgment of reversal affirmed."*

I

I

80.
Under this rule an action at law cannot be prosecuted bj a partner
against the partnership, nor by a member against a Toluiitary association,
nor hj one partnership
or association against another having a common
member:
Blaisdell v. Ladd (1843) 14 N. H. 129; Portland Bank v. Hyde
(1834) 11 Me. 196; Moore v. Denslow (1841) 14 Conn. 235; Eastman v.
Wright (1828) 6 Pick. (Mass.) 316.
The rule is limited to cases where the record shows that the same party
is both plaintiff and defendant.
Van Ness v. Forrest (1814) 8 Cranch
(Uj 8.) 30; Blanchard v. Ely (1839) 21 Wen. (N. T.) 342: Mahan v. Sherman (1844) 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 378.

Section

2,

Plaintiffs in Actions
TREAT

V.

on Conteact.

STANTON.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
14 Connecticut,

1841.

445.

This was an action of assumpsit brought by Amos Treat,
of Dolly Stanton, against John Stanton, eve-

as executor

cutor of Adam Stanton, to recover certain moneys which
the defendant's testator had received from the plaintiff.
•

*

*

The defendant claimed, that the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover in this action; 1st, because the legal
right existing under the receipt, [mentioned in the opinion
of the court], was only in the children of George Stanton;
and consequently, the plaintiff had no right of action.
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and

the defendant

is

if,

Stokes, J.: Dolly Stanton, the plaintiff's testator, having, by her last will, among other bequests, given to five of
her nieces the sum of four hundred dollars each, to be paid
to them when they should arrive at full age, with a proviso, that ia case either of them died without heirs, her
share should be divided among the survivors, and that the
sum of one hundred dollars out of each of said legacies
should be expended, at the discretion of her executor, in
the nurture and education of said nieces,
in his opinion,
necessary, with power to said executor to invest said sum
in stocks, or loan the some on good security bearing interest; the plaintiff placed the amount of said legacies in the
hands of the defendant's testator, who thereupon executed
to the plaintiff the instrument in writing on which this action
brought, acknowledging the receipt thereof, and expressing that the same was so left to said nieces, and agreeing to retain the same in his hands until said nieces should
arrive at full age (except such part thereof, not exceeding
one-fourth, as the plaintiff should want to expend for their
education), and to pay the same with interest to said nieces,
by an order from the plaintiff, when they should become of
age.

is

it

is

it,

is

it

a

is

;

(1

a

is

a

is

the proper
The first question is, whether the plaintiff
suit on this agreement.
person to bring
It
general principle, applicable, to all actions at law,
that they must be, brought by the person whose legal rights
have been affected, or, in other words, who has the legal inof
Chitt. PI. 1.) since
terest in the cause of action
and
legal rights alone that courts of law take cognizance,
that only in favor of those who are recognized as having
those rights. In regard to contracts in particular, the gencorrectly laid down by Chitty, in his treatis.e on
eral rule
Pleading (p. 2.), where he says, "In general, the action on
a contract, whether express or implied, or whether by parol,
or under seal, or of record, must be brought in the name of
the party in whom the legal interest in such contract was
vested,*' And the parties to
contract are the persons in
deemed to be
whom the legal interest in the subject of
vested, and who therefore must be the parties to the action
or reinstituted for the purpose of enforcing
which

Common Law Pueading.

738

[Chap.

11

is

is

is

it

it

it

is is

it

is

is

is

it

is

it

is

is

is

a

is

is

it

it

is

it

is,

covering damages for its violation. Not that the person to
whom the promise is nominally made, is always to be considered as the real party to the contract ; for if he is acting
merely as an agent of another, or the promise is made to
hiTn as such, his principal is the person to whom the promise
is deemed to be made, and therefore is the real party to the
contract. If, however, such nominal promisee is an agent,
and has a beneficial interest in the performance of the contract, or a special property in the subject-matter of the
agreement, then the legal interest and right of action is in
him. 8 Conn. Eep. 60; 1 Chitt. PI. 7. It is not, in every
case, however, that it is stated, in express terms, to whom
the promise is made. In such case, the general principle
that
deemed to be made to the person from whom the
consideration for the promise proceeded.
Applying these familiar principles to the contract in
question, there would seem to be no difl&culty in determining the point which we are now considering, unless indeed
some exception can be shewn within which
embraced.
not in this contract expressly stated to whom
Although
the promise
made, yet
appears that the money which
constituted the consideration for the promise of the defend'
ant's testator, was received by him of the plaintiff; and
was money, the legal title to which was in the
also, that
plaintiff. He, therefore,
to be considered the person to
whom the promise
made, and the party to the contract
in whom
vested the legal interest in it. Hence
results,
that the alleged violation of
an injury to his legal
the proper person to bring this suit.
rights, for which he
The defendant, however, insists, that the case
within
a rule which creates an exception to the foregoing principles, that where one person makes a promise to another for
the benefit of third, the latter
the proper party to maintain an action upon it; and therefore claims that the legatees, and not the plaintiff, ought to have brought this suit.
indeed thus laid down, in several cases of
TOie principle
actions on simple contracts; and we are not disposed to
question its correctness as applicable to those cases. It is,
however, so far from being a universal rule, that
quite
true only in a qualified
limited in its application, and
sense; and although the cases decided under
have been
sometimes spoken of as exceptions to the elementary principles which have been mentioned, there
no evidence that
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the courts have intended, in that class of cases, to depart in
the least from those principles. It wiU be seen, by an examination of the cases referred to, that the principle is confined to those cases, where the third person, for whose benefit the promise was made, had the sole and exclusive interest
in the subject of the promise, and the person to whom the
promise was ostensibly made, for the benefit of such third
person, being whoUy destitute of interest, might more
properly be considered an agent for such third person, than
a principal in the transaction, and the person thus exclusively interested, therefore, the real promisee, rather
than the person to whom the promise was made on his beh^f. The rule is laid down with more precision and accuracy, by Chitty, where he says, that "the party, for whose
sole benefit it is evidently made, may sue thereon in his
own name, although the engagement be not directly to or
with him." 1 Chitt. PI. 4. It is very plain that the courts
have not intended to relax, in any degree, the rule that a
legal interest is requisite in the plaintiff. They only invest
the party who is solely benefited by the promise, with that
legal interest, and thus consider him as the real party to
the contract. It is upon this ground that these cases are,
for the mosit part, vindicated and approved.
In Button v. Poole, which is the leading case on this subject (reported in 2 Lev. 210 and also in T. Eaym. 302), the
father of the plaintiff's wife being seised of a wood, which
he intended to sell to raise fortunes for younger children,
the defendant, being his heir, in consideration that he would
promised to pay his daughter, the plainforbear to sell
for which the action was brought and
tiff's wife, lOOO
It is stated that some stress was laid upon the
sustained.
nearness of relationship between the plaintiff's wife and
her father, to whom the promise was made and Mr. Hammond, in his treatise on Parties to Actions, considers that
the father must, in that case, have been deemed to have
furnished the consideration, and acted as his daughter's
agent.

a

it

;

it

1

Johns. Kep. 139, the
v. Camderheyden,
defendant, in consideration of an assignment, by his father,
of his property, promised to purchase for his sister a cherry desk and on the authority of Button v. Poole was held
promise to the sister, considering, undoubtwas
that

In Schemerhorn
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edly, that she, and not her father, was the real promisee,
and he only her agent in the transaction.
In Arnold et al. v. Lyman, 17 Mass, Rep. 400, where A, a
debtor of B, conveys property to C, who, in consideration
thereof, promises to pay certain debts of A, and particularly that which he owes to B; it was held, that C was
liable to B for the amount of A's debt to him, in an action
of assumpsit. The court say: "We think that the promise may be legally considered as made to the several creditors, whose debts the defendant undertook to pay, if they
chose to avail themselves of his engagement. The promise
was to pay certain particular debts ; and there seems to be
no reason why it should not be treated as a promise to the

creditors."

In

The Company of Felt-makers v. Davis, 1 B. & P. 98,
102, Eyeb, Ch. J. says: "As to the case put at the "bar of a
promise to A, for the benefit of B, and an action brought
by B, there the promise must be laid as being made to B,
and the promise actually made to A. may be given in evidence to support the declaration." And in Pigott v. Thompson, 3 B. & P. 149, Lord Alvanley expresses the opinion,
that if A let land to B in consideration of which the latter
promises to pay the rent to C, C may maiatain an action
The reason which he gives, is, that C
on that promise.
would be only a trustee for A ; thus placing it on the
ground that C is to be deemed to be the real promisee, and
so having the legal interest.
Without going into a more particular examination of
the cases of this description, which have been referred to
in the argument, it will be found that they have proceeded,
substantially, on the ground that the sole and exclusive
beneficial interest in the contract is in the person who has
been allowed to bring the suit, and that the nominal promT
isee is only the person through whom the contract was
made. No case has been cited, nor is it believed that any
can be found, where, on a promise made to one sustaining the character of a trustee, the cestui que trust, or person ultimately interested, has been permitted to bring an
action upon it. In such case, the obligation and legal responsibility is exclusively to the trustee, and must be enforced by him in a court of law, as remarked by Chitty:
''
The courts of law will not, in general, notice mere equitable rights, as contradistinguished
from the strict legal ti-

^®°-
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tie and interest, so as to invest the equitable
or merely
beneficial claimant with the abiHty to adopt legal
proceedings in his own name; although the equitable right embrace
the most extensive, or even the exclusive,
interest in the
to be derived from the contract or subject matter of
henefit^
litigation. This could not be disregarded, mthout destroymg the fundamental distinction between courts of law and
courts of equity, with regard to the remedy peculiar to
each jurisdiction.
If the cestui que trust were permitted to
sue at law, in his own name, the benefits and protection intended to result from the intervention of a trustee, clothed
with a legal title, might be lost, and the advantages, arising
from giving courts of equity exclusive control over matters
of trust, would be defeated. Besides, it would be impossible, consistently with the common principles of jurisprudence, to exclude the power of the trustee to sue in respect
of his legal right ; and it would be highly mischievous and
unjust to permit the defendant to be harrassed by two actions upon the same contract or transaction.
The right of
action at Imo has, therefore, been wisely vested solely in the
party having the strict legai title and interest, in exclusion
of the mere equitable claim. ' ' 1 Chitt. PI. 2.
In the present ease, the plaintiff, as executor, sustained
the character of a trustee, not only for the legatees, but
also for the creditors of his testatrix, and the legal title to
the money which formed the consideration for the defendant's promise. For the faithful performance of the trust,
he and his sureties are responsible on the bond given to the
judge of probate ; and it is to that bond that those interested
The money due to
are to resort, if he fails in his duty.
him from the defendant on this contract, forms a part of
the trust fund with which he is to discharge his obligations
It is just and necessary,
as such executor and trustee.
therefore, that he should have the control of that fund, and
the legal means of obtaining and protecting it. The trust
is a personal one, confided to him by the testatrix, of which
it was neither intended that he should, nor is it in his power,
to divest himself. He has not, in our opinion, attempted
to do so, He has, in pursuance of the will, invested this
portion of the money of his testatrix, with a view only of
guarding it so as to enable himself to fulfill the terms of
that instrument. For this purpose it was necessary that he
without any interfershonld retain the entire control of
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in any form, either by the legatees or any other person; and it is most evident that he intended to do so; for,
by the very terms of the agreement, the defendant's testator
was to pay over the money on the order of the plaintiff. In
this loan to Stanton, Treat acted, not as the agent of the
legatees, but on his own behalf. The legatees were minors at
the time of making the contract and could not legally exercise any control oyer the subject. They had no power over
or interest in the money, and could impart none to others.
Treat acted not by their authority, but by that of the testator, given in the will. Indeed, it was wholly uncertain
whether any of these legatees wo^ld ever have any title to
this money or to what extent; since by the will, it will be
perceived that contingencies might have occurred, which
would have varied the amount to which they would be entitled, or indeed deprived them of jt altogether. It is also
obvious, that claims might exist against the estate, which
would absorb the whole estate of the testatrix in the plaintiff's hands. But if the claim of the defendant is correct,
the obligation of the plaintiff, as executor, would continue,
and he be deprived of the means placed in his hands to discharge them. An account of his administration is, moreover, to be rendered, and settled, by the court of probate;
until which it is uncertain what will finally remain for distribution under the will. To sustain the claim of the deence

fendant, therefore, that the legatees are entitled to recover
these moneys from the defendant, would be productive of
the most glaring injustice, thwart the manifest intention
of the testatrix, and of the parties to the agreement, and
introduce a novel principle, which would be attended, in
the management of trusts, with the utmost confusion and
inconvenience.

The superior court is advised, that a new trial ought not
to be granted.

In

opinion the other
Chubch, J^ who was absent.
this

judges

concurred,

except

New triai not to he granted.
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ATKINSON, EXECUTOR OF GUT.

Court of Queen's Bench.
1

1861.

Best cmd Smith, 393.

The declaration stated that the plaintiff was the son of
and hefore the making of the agreement
hereafter mentioned, married the daughter of William Gruy,
deceased ; and before the said marriage of the plaintiff the
said William Guy, in consideration of the then intended
marriage, promised the plaintiff to give to his said daughter a marriage portion, but the said promise was verbal,
and at the time of the making of the said agreement, had
not been performed ; and before the said marriage the said
John Tweddle, in consideration of the said intended marriage, also verbally promised to give the plaintiff a marriage portion, which promise at the time of the making
of the said agreement had not been performed. It then alleged that after the marriage and in the lifetime of the said
William Guy, and of the said John Tweddle, they, the said
William Guy and John Tweddle, entering into the agreement hereafter mentioned as a mode of giving effect to
their said verbal promises ; and the said William Guy also
entering into the said agreement in order to provide for
his said daughter a marriage portion, and to procure a
further provision to be made by the said John Tweddle, by
means of the said agreement, for his said daughter, and
acting for the benefit of his said daughter, and the said
John Tweddle also entering into the said agreement in
order to provide for the plaintiff a marriage portion, and
to procure a further provision to be made by the said William Guy, by means of the said agreement, for the plaintiff,
and acting for the benefit of the plaintiff ; they the' said
William Guy and John Tweddle made and entered into an
agreement in writing in the words following, that is to

John Tweddle,

say:

"High Coniscliffe, July

11, 1855.

"Memorandum of an agreement made this day between
William Guy, of, etc., of the one part, and John Tweedle,
of, etc., of the other part. Whereas it is mutually agreed
that the said William Guy shall and will pay the sum of
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to "William Tweddle, his son-in-law; and the said John
Tweddle, father to the aforesaid WUliam Tweddle, shall
and will pay the sum of 100 I. to th^ said William Tweddle,
each and severally the said sums on or before the 21st day
of August, 1855. And it is hereby agreed by the aforesaid
William Guy and the said John Tweddle that the said William Tweddle has full power to sue the said parties in any
court of law or equity for the aforesaid sums hereby promised and specified."
"And the plaintiff says that afterwards and before this
suit, he and his said wife, who is stiU living, ratified and
assented to the said agreement, and that he is the William
Tweddle therein mentioned.
And the plaintiff says that
the said 21st day of August, A. D. 1855, elapsed, and all
things have been done and happened necessary to entitle
the plaintiff to have the said sum of 200 I. paid by the said
William Guy or his executor ; yet neither the said William
Guy nor his executor has paid the same, and the same is in
Dearrear and unpaid, contrary to the said agreement."
murrer and joinder therein.
WiGHTMAN, J.: Some of the old decisions appear to
support the proposition that a stranger to the consideration
of a contract may maintain an action upon
he stands
in such) a near relationship to the party from whom the
consideration proceeds, that he may be considered a party
to the consideration.
The strongest of those cases
that
cited in Bourne v. Mason,
Ventr.
in which
was held
that the daughter of a physician migh^ maintain assmnpsit
upon a promise to her father to give her a sum of money
he performed a certain cure. But there
no modern
case in which the proposition has been supported.
On the
now established that no stranger to the concontrary,
sideration can take advantage of a contract, although made
is

it

is

if

1

6,

it

is

if

it,

200 I.

for his benefit.

J.: It

it

;

is

it

is

is

admitted that the plaintiff cannot
an exception to the modern and
well-established doctrine of the action of assumpsit.
At
the time when the cases which have been cited were decided
the action of assumpsit was treated as an action of trespass upon the case, and therefore in the nature of a tort;
and the law was not settled, as
now is, that natural love
and affection
not a sufficient consideration for a promise
upon which an action may be maintained nor was
settled
Crompton,

succeed unless this case
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that the promisee cannot bring an action unless the consideration for the promise moved from him. The modem
cases have, in effect, overruled the old decisions ; they show
that the consideration must move from the party entitled
to sue upon the contract. It would be a monstrous proposition to say that a person was a party to the contract for the
purpose of suing upon it for his own advantage, and not a
party to it for the purpose of being sued. It is said that the
father in the present case was agent for the son in making
the contract, but that argument ought also to make the son
liable upon it.
am prepared to overrule the old decisions,
and to hold that, by reason of. the principles which now
govern the action of assumpsit, the present action isi not
maintainable.
BLACKBTmN, J. : The earlier part of the declaration shows
a contract which might be sued on, except for the enactment
in sec. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3. The
declaration then sets out a new contract, and the only point
is whether, that contract being for the benefit of the children, they can sue ujron it. Mr. Mellish admits that in general no action can be maintained upon a promise, unless the
consideration moves from the party to whom it is made.
But he says that there is an exception ; namely, that when
the consideration moves from a father, and the contract is
for the benefit of his son, the natural love and affection between the father and son gives the son right to sue as if the
consideration had proceeded from himself. And Button a/nd
Wife V. Poole, 2 Lev. 210, 1 Ventr. 318, aff 'd, T. Raym. 302,
was cited for this. We camiot overrule a decision of the
Exchequer Chamber ; but there is a distinct ground on which
that case cannot be supported. The cases upon stat. 27 El.
c 4, which have decided that, by sec. 2, voluntary gifts by
settlement after marriage are void against subsequent purchasers for value, and are not saved by sec. 4, show that
natural love and affection are not sufficient consideration
whereon an action of assumpsit may be founded.
Judgment for the defendant.'^

I

Thia rule does not find much support in the American cases, though Id
81.
view is taken,
a few states, notably Massachusetts, a very strict and technical
See
eontracts.
euing
from
upon
third
persons
almost entirely precluding
30 dye. 64, 65.
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CLAIR.

1899.

Maine, 35.
This was an action of assumpsit upon the following
guaranty executed by the defendants :
"Whereas Wilson & Berry, copartners of Camden, Knox
Co., Maine, have sold to us all their right, title and interest
in and to the machinery, pulleys, belts, couplings, hangings,
and 16 feet of shafting now in the miU in said Camden occupied by them and known as the 'Bakery Building,' said
machinery being mortgaged to Chase & Son & Co. of Port93

land, and sold to us subject to said mortgage.
"Now, therefore, in consideration thereof we hereby
guarantee to said Wilson & Berry that we will assume said
mortgage debt and pay the notes secured by said mortgage
and hold all parties to said notes harmlessi from all damage
on account of said notes.
M.
St. Claib & Co."
November 29, 1892.

K

J. H. and C. 0. Montgomery, for defendants.

While courts have held that actions may be maintained by
third parties for whose benefit a promise has been made,
when the agreement is made to parties directly liable to
them, they have disallowed such actions when not made to

,
parties directly liable to the plaintiff.
The earliest and most constant courts to maintain the
doctrine are the courts of New York. But that court says,
''
in every case in which an action has been sustained there
has been a debt or duty owing by the promisee to the party
claiming to sue upon the promise." Vrooman v. Turner,
69 N. Y. 280; Merrill v. Green, 55 N. Y. 270.
In Bohcman v. Pope, 24 Maine, 93, it was agreed that the
plaintiff was hired by Whitney and worked upon the logs
in hauling and cutting them. Before hiring the writing was
shown to him wherein defendant promised to pay.
In Lewis v. Sawyer, 44 Maine, 332, the money was put
into defendant'® hands for the use of the plaintiff.
In Maxwell v. Haynes, 41 Maine, 559, defendant received
funds for which he promised to pay a debt of A. to C.
In Dearborn v. Parks, 5 Maine, 81, money was left in the
hands of defendant to pay plaintiff a debt owed to him by

A.
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Meech v. Ensign, 49 Coim. 191, 44 Am. Reports, 225, is the
argument against the doctrine and reviews the cases with
great clearness,
Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray, 317, is also in line.
" It is not every contract for the benefit of a third
person
that is enforceable by the beneficiary. It must appear that
the contract was made and was intended for his benefit. The
fact that if the contract is carried out according to its terms
would inure to his benefit, is not sufficient for him to demand its fulfilment. It must appear to have been the intention of the parties to secure to him personally the benefit
of its provisions." Sayward v. Dexter, Horton & Co., 72
Fed. Eep. 765.
Haskell, J.: Assumpsit to recover from the purchaser
of mortgaged property, who assumed the mortgage debt and
agreed to pay the mortgage notes, the contents of a promissory note secured by the mortgage.
The promise to pay the note was made with two persons,
who with another were makers of it and personally liable
therefor. The promise was for the benefit of the holder as
well. Had the promise to pay been a covenant under seal
with the covenantee, to pay either to him or to the beneficiary, the covenantee alone could sue, for the covenant
would have been with him, and damages for the breach
thereof would arise to him only, although for the benefit of
another, who might bring the suit in the name of the covenantee, but for his own benefit. Brann v. Maine Benefit Life
Association, 92 Maine, 341, and cases cited. If the deed
contain no covenant to pay, but merely recitals from which
a promise to pay would arise, or be implied, then assumpsit
would lie in favor of either the grantee or beneficiary.
Baldwin v. Emery, 89 Maiae, 498. So where the promise is
by parol, as in the case at bar, to assume the debt and pay
with the debtor, and for his benefit, bethe promise
cause payment will relieve him from the debt. So, too,
for the benefit of the creditor, as an additional security.
No good reason can be given why the creditor may not reimpliedly to him.
cover his debt upon a promise to pay
due and ought to
The law implies assumpsit where money
be paid, if there be no express promise, but an express
promise excludes an implied one. Wirth v. Roche, 92 Maine,
383; Billings v. Mason, 80 Maine, 496; Wood v. Finson, 89
Maine, 459. In the case at bar there was an express promise
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with tiie debtor to pay the debt. The law implies a promise
to the creditor also. He therefore may sue. It is true, that
the beneficiary may not always sue where the fruits of a
promise with another inure to his benefit, but only where the
transaction fairly imports that right to have been within the
contemplation of the parties, for an implied promise resultsi
from equitable considerations, that many times gives a
remedy to prevent circuity of action, unnecessary delay, and
perhaps the failure of justice altogether. For illustration,
reverse the situation. A man without request of the debtor
voluntarily pays the debt. The law wUl not imply a promise
of the debtor to repay him. Ames v. Coffin, 89 Maine, 300;
Lafontain v. Hayhurst, 89 Maine, 388 ; Sanderson v. Broum,
57 Maine, 308; Hill v. Packard, 69 Maine, 158.
Exceptions overrvled.^^
82.
Such a pTomise is not within the statute of frauds because founded
Merrill v. Near (1830) 5 Wend.
upon a new and distinct consideration.
(N. T.) 235; Moore v. First National Bank (1903) 139 Ala. 595; Sweatman
V. Parker
(1873) 49 Miss. 19.
The distinction ietween this rule and that permitting the sole ieneficiary
to sue is clearly pointed out by Mr. Hepburn in 30 Cyc. 67, article "Parties,"
as

follows:

"When A

has agreed with B, on a consideration moving from B, to pay to
C a debt which B owes C, the prevailing American doctrine permits C, if
his debt is still unpaid, to bring an action in his own name against A, for the
breach of A's contract with B.
"Not a beneficiary. The current explanation of the rule is that the creditor
of the promisee, in such a case, is a third person beneficiary, and can sue
Manifestly, however, the creditor cannot claim as sole beneficiary;
as such.
in any normal case the promisee, whose debt will be discharged by the perIn strictness
formance of the contract, is at least the primary beneficiary.
indeed there is no legal ground on which the creditor of the promisee, as
such, can claim a standing before the courts as beneficiary under the promise
a debt already exists from one person to another, a promise
to his debtor.
by a third person to pay this debt is for the benefit of the original debtor
At the most the creditor of the promisee is but an
to whom it is made.
incidental beneficiary under the promise to pay his debt, and on principle
and weight of authority the incidental beneficiary canBOt claim as plaintiff.
"Basis of creditor's right as plaintiff. But although the creditor of the
promisee cannot appear as a beneficiary, he can proceed against his debtor's
the creditor can sue the promisee for his
promisor upon another ground.
debt, and the promisee can sue the promisor for breach of his promise to pay
this debt, it is evident that unless the procedure of the forum presents some
obstacle there is no good reason why the creditor should not proceed directly
The result is to accomplish through one action what
against the promisor.
But in this there is no need to assume
would otherwise require two actions.
a contractual interest in the creditor as against his debtor's promisor; the
creditor of the promisee is 'allowed, by a mere rule of procedure, to go
directly as a creditor against the person ultimately liable, in order to avoid

If

If

"
circuity of action.'
The rule allowing a beneficiary to sue is therefore a rule of substantive
law, creating a new right of action, while the rule permitting the creditor of
the promisee to sue merely simplifies the procedure in enforcing liabUitie*

already conceded to exist. 30 Cyc. 66.
It has been sought to justify the right of th«
Doctrine of novation.
creditor of the promisee to sue the promisor on the ground of a novation;

°^^-
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12 E. I. 169.
But one of the essential
^'^y*"".
(1878)
Biements of* a novation is lacking,
namely the discharge of the original
a«Dtop and the
substitution in his place of the

Siri'*'*

promisei.

MASTE-RSON

V.

PHINIZY.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
56

^

1876,

Alabama, 336.

This action was brought by John T. Phinizy, against
Thos. Masterson and J. T. Masterson; was commenced

on the 13th July, 1874, and was founded on an attachment
bond, igiven by the defendants, which was in the following words: "Know all men by these presents, that we,
Thomas Masterson and
, are held and firmly bound
unto John T. Phinizy, Eliza P. Phinizy, J. W. Falk, and
Thomas Lile, in the sum of four thousand dollars, to be paid
to the said John T. Phinizy, Eliza P. Phinizy, J. W. Falk,
and Thomas Lile, their heirs, administrators, and assigns ;
for the payment of which, well and truly to be made, we
bind ourselves, and each of us and our and each of our
heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, jointly and
severally, firmly by these presents. Sealed with our seals,
and dated this 2d day of February, 1872. The above obligation is conditioned as follows: that whereas the abovebound Thomas Masterson, as the administrator de bonis
nan of the estate of Paul J. Watkins, deceased has, on the
day of the date hereof, prayed an attachment, at the suit of
himself as said administrator, for rent, for the sum of two
thousand dollars, with interest from the 1st day of Jan-

uary, 1872, against said John T. Phinizy, Eliza P. Phinizy,
J. W. Falk, and Thomas Lile, and has obtained the same returnable to the next term of the circuit court of said county
of Lawrence : now, if the said plaintiff shall prosecute his
attachment to effect, and pay the defendants all such damages as they may sustain from the wrongful or vexatious
suing out of such attachment, then this obligation to be

void," etc.
The complaint, as amended, averred that said attachment
was wrongfully sued out; that no cause existed for suing
out; that he (plaintiff) was not about to remove his crop
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from the rented lands without paying the rent, and had
not removed any part of it without the consent of the
landlord; also, that the cotton levied on under the attachr
ment belonged to him alone, and the other defendants in
the attachment suit had no interest in it ; and that he was
the only person injured by the suing out and levy of the
attachment, and the only person interested in this suit.
Tlie_def endants demurred to the complaint as amended, on
the ^oundjhai it showed nO' right of action in the plaintiff
alone, and that the other obligees in the bond ought to have
been joined as plaintiffs j but the court overruled their de-

murrer.

•

•

•

•

•

it

a

a

it

;

a

a

2

3

is

a

is

is

is

it

is

it,

BBioKBLii, C. J.: The material ground of -demurrer to
the complaint, as amended,, is, that the suit is brought by
one only of the four obligees of the bond ; and it is insisted
that an action for a breach of the condiin support of
tion of the bond, though
averred the obligee suing alone
not maintainable without joiuing as
sustained damage,
plaintiffs all the obligees.
The bond
payable to the obligees jointly, and its condifor the payment to them of "all such damages as
tion
they may sustain from the wrongful or vexatious suing out
It contains no covenant to or with,
of the attachment."
in
nor any stipulation
favor of the obligees severally. The
unqualified rule of the common-law is, that an action on
bond or covenant must follow the nature of the interest disclosed on its face. If the interest sodisclofifijdas joint, the
action must be in the^nanre^trf "SlT'tEeliving obligees. If
several, the action must be several. Add.
the interest
Con. 946; Chit. Con. 1340. In Gai/le v. Martin,
Ala. 593,
bond was executed for the replevy of
steamboat, paywith
condition to pay several and
able to several libelants,
was held, that
distinct judgments in favor of each and
the legal interest was vested in all the obligees, and all
must join in an action for its breach. The precise question
raised by this demurrer was presented in Boyd v. Martin,
bond given to obtain the is10 Ala. 700, in an action on
which
attachment,
was
an
levied on the property
of
sue
of one only of the several defendants and obligees. An
breach of the condition,
was held, was propaction for
erly brought in the name of all the obligees.
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This covenant or oHigation is joint, or joint and several,*'
or several, according to the nature of the interest disclosed within its four corners. TIm_aetion mnst follow the
D atare_ ji£_ihat interest : there is no right of election in the
oblig ees, to sue upon it severally or jointly, because of the

damages resulting from its breach. 2 Chit. Con. 1351. The
obligation or covenant will be construed joint or several,
according to the interest of the parties, as that appears on
its face, if the words are capable of that construction.
To
authorize the construction, when the interest is prima
facie joint, that the obligees can take or sue severally, it
must be manifest that it was intended a separate and distinct duty should arise to each of them. Add. Con. 947.
As_we hg yp °'^^^i ^\[? T^ond in all its term s ia jmnt., nntse veral.
There is no ground for argument from these
terms, or the purposes for which the bond is required, that
will justify its interpretation as operating to create a several interest in the obligees. The indemnity of each and
all the obligees, who are defendants in the writ of attachment, against any and all damages resulting from the
wrongful or vexatious use of the process, is the purpose of
the bond. Each one and aU are entitled toits_secuxi
one could sue. and ]Tecovcr tho -damageslE^Sad sustaine_d,
the penalty of the 15o53~mi^rt"1be'"exhaust. edt_a nd the oth grs
!eff remediless. Ttrg^^nbTT gora woul d be vexed with several
^^k&-nnnH-g lef t in doubt~
g^^2tfo---ftjn^
for_jwh^~"jM^e5r
should bP! givan. The averment that the appellee alone has
"sustained damage, cannot change the character of the obli-j
gation, or the nature of the interest it creates. The char- ^
a r'ter and nature ari se out of its terms; and these cannot
be departedT f rom,T)<iC'austi flamages result to one only of
the obligees, or result to the obligees in different proportions. The demurrer to the complaint should have been
sustained.
83. It may be both joint and several as to the promisors, but not as to
"One and the same contract, whether it be a simple conthe promisees.
tract or a contract by deed, cannot be so framed as to give the promisees
and separately.^'
Dicey
or covenantees the right to sue upon it both jointly
110.
Eule
14,
p.
Parties,
,
on
,
. .
. ,
other words, a covenant 'may be either a ]omt or several covenant,
is to be taken as joint or
and it will depend upon the context whether it
•
•
•
that
is
established
fully
For
'it
several, but it cannot be both.'
and several aa regards
joint
made
both
be
cannot
covenant
same
the
and
one

"In

the covenantees.'

"

Id.

111.
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For

the error in overruling the demurrer to the complaint, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded.**
rule is general and applies to all contracts.
"AH the persons
a contract is made must join in an action for the breach of it."
Dicey on Parties, Rule 13, p. 104.
'A contract by one person with two jointly does not comprehend or
involve a contract with either of them separately,' as 'is evident from the
well-known doctrine, that a covenant or promise to two, if proved in an
action brought by one of them, sustains a plea which denies the existence
of the contract.'
Id. p. 104.
is often hard to determine who are the persons with whom a given
The
simple contract is made and who, therefore, must sue for its breach.
i. e., of dedifficulty is often, though not invariably, one of interpretation,
termining from the words of a given contract whether it is to be interpreted
as a contract with A and B jointly, or a contract with A and B severally."

Tfte
IfVith84. whom

"

"

"It

Id.

p.

105.

it

i.

a

[i.

When one coplaintiff refuses to join.
This will not defeat the rights of
the rest.
"One of two coplaintiffs has a right to bring an action in the
name of both, nor has the court any power to interfere,
unless the coplaintiff's name be used, not only against his wUl, but fraudulently. Hence
'one of several partners has a right to use the name of the firm
e., the
names of all the partners — Ed.] in order to bring an action.
But
eoplaintifE whose name is used without permission is not without protection.
1st.
He may obtain an indemnity against costs from the party who makes
use of his name;
e., he may apply to the court to have such party's
2nd.
He may release
proceedings stayed till he gives security for costs.
or settle the action.
Any one of several coplaintiffs may give the defendant
a release from the action, which is good, and may be pleaded, unless
is fraudulent."
Dicey on Parties, 108

WEIGHT

3

Supreme Court

WILLIAMSON.

of

V.

New Jersey.

New Jersey Law,

^
1813.

978.

The action below was brought by Williamson as acting
partner of the late firm of Okee and Williamson, against
Wright.

"paT-tTipra|iip

was dissol v ed. the contrac

t_

c

J

By the Cotjbt.— [he plaintiff below _£ai6d-ia-~hia_ own
name, for a joint ontract; ttos cann ot be sustain ed. XT"
was.

Judgment reversed.^^
General Mules as to Partners and Unincorporated Companies, as given
on Parties, chap. VI.
"Rule 20. — ^A firm or an unincorporated company cannot sue in its name
as, a firm or as a company, but must sue in the names of the individiutl
membws of tJie firm or of the company."
85.

in Dicey

pABriEs to Actions.
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company.
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'
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a

2.

'^'^

"Exception 1. — ^Whero an unincorporated company is empowered by statute
to sue, etc., in the name of its public officer"
[or in its own name as a
firm or company. — Ed.]
— Where an unincorporated company is being wound up."
Exception
'Rule 21. — ^AU persons who are partners in
firm, or members of an unincorporated company, at the time when a contract
made with the firm
or the company, should join in an action for the breach of it."
Exception. One partner must or may sue alone on contracts made with
him on behalf of the firm in the same cases in which an agent must or may
sue on contracts made with him on behalf of his principal."
Eule 22. —One partner or member of an unincorporated company cannot
eue another upon any matter involving the accounts of the partnership
or

:

a

is

2.

"Exception 1. — ^Where there is an agreement which, through relating to
partnership business, can be treated as separate and distinct from other
matters in question between the partners."
"Exception — Where the matters in respect of which an action
brought
are connected with the partnership business only through the wrongful act
of the partner sued."
"Eule 23. — Actions for breaches of contracts made with
firm must be
brought
"1. On the bankruptcy of the firm, by the trustee or trustees of the
bankrupts.
"2. On the bankruptcy of one or more partners, by the solvent partners,
together with the trustee, or trustees of the bankrupt partner or partners."
"Eule 24. —On the death of a partner, the surviving partners and ultimately the last survivor, or his representative, must sue on contracts made
with the firm."
Incorporated companies, on the other hand, must sue in their corporate
Dicey on Parties, Eule 25.
names.
"In the absence of an enabling statute defining the rights and liabilities
of the members, societies, associations, partnerships, and other bodies, combined under their own rule, for their own private benefit, and without any
express sanction of law, are not, in the collective capacity and name, recognized
at common law as having any legal existence distinct from their members."
Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Union (1905) 165 Ind421.

is

At law, if the objection is properly taken, every member of an unincorIn equity, if the
porated association must be joined as a party defendant.
made parties
members
be
may
the
number
of
a
numerous,
members are
Pickett v. Walsh (1906) 192
of the class:
as representatives
defendant
Mass. 572.
Numbers immaterial. "The declaration shows that the obligee named m
an unincorporated society, composed of many persons, of whom
the bond
a few bring this action at law, on the bond, in their own names for the
By the rule at common law this is forbidden. It
use of all the members.
can be maintained only in the names of all, however numerous." O'Connell
V.

Lamb (1895)

63 111.

App.

652.

Appeals

V.

of

Court

of

MORRISON

Hardin,

WINN.

Kentucky.

1808.

480.

:

The Chief Justice delivered the following opinion of the
Lettice Winn, executrix of George Winn, deceased,
court
c. L. p.— 48
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and Adam Winn, brouglit an action of assumpsit against
Morrison, and declared therein, upon an assounpsit made hy
the said Morrison, to Adam WLnn, and George "Winn, in
his lifetime, jointly; and judgment, upon a writ of inquiry
was rendered against Morrison, in favor of Adam Winn,
and Lettice, the executrix of George Winn, deceased.
The question made by the first assignment of error
can the action be maintained jointly by the surviving promisee, and the executrix of the deceased promisee?
This 4nesition, considered independently of the Act of
Assembly "concerning partitions, joint rights, and obligations,"
free from difficulty. By the common law, joint
rights survive to, and become vested in the surviving joint
tenant. But for the encouragement of trade and husbandry,
stock on a farm, though occupied jointly,
held that
and also stock used in a joint imdertaJdng, by way of partnership in trade, shall always be considered as common,
and not as joint property; and there shall be no survivorBlack. Com. 399; Bac. Ab. 589.
ship therein.
This, however, must be imderstood of the right of property only; for although the duty does not survive, the remedy does, and therefore the survivor must sue alone; and
when he recovers, he shall account with the executor of the
deceased partner, for his share. The executor and survivor
cannot join in an action against the debtor.
Bac. Ab. 589
Ld. Raym. 340.
The assumpsit here, having been made to Adam Winn and
George Winn, jointly, must be considered as a partnership
transaction; so that, although the right of property did not,on the death of George, whoUy survive to Adam, yet the
right of action did; and the suit was maintainable by him
alone, and not by him and the executrix of George, jointly.
The Act of Assembly before recited, at first produced
some difficulty but upon full consideration, we think
does
not alter the case. It provides, in substance, that after the
death of one joint tenant, his rights shall be preserved, and
go to his representatives, in the same manner as
he and
the survivor had been tenants in common. This act was
made to preserve the right of property, which, in many
cases, would have been lost to the representatives
of
the decedent, by the jiis accuscendi; and not to change the
remedy or action for the recovery of a chose in action, belonging to the joint tenants. It places the survivor and the

^^^-
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representatives of the deceased joint tenants, in all cases,
upon the same footing, as in the case of joint traders, or
fanners, before mentioned. Where the right of property
is considered as a right in common, and therefore not subject to survivorship, but the right of action strictly joint,
and therefore in all cases vesting solely ia the surviving
party.
We are more strongly inclined to this interpretation of
the act, because, in the language of Lord Holt, in the case
cited from Raymond, "It would make sitrange confusion
that one plaintiff should sue in his own right, and the other

in another's."
It is not intended to be laid down as a principle, that
tenants in common, must, in all cases, sue jointly. The gen-

it,

eral rule is otherwise ; but the case before the court is not

within the general rule, but within the exceptions to

is

it

if,

is

which declare, that whenever the thing or demand
disseverable in its nature, the action must be brought by the
tenants in common, jointly.
And
however, this case
were considered in every respect, a proper tenancy in common, and that the partners might, and ought to have
brought their actionsi for a moiety of the debt, severally,
then
would follow that Adam Winn, and the executrix
of George Winn, ought to have brought their actions severally, for one moiety each, and must be equally fatal to
the present suit.
In every way of viewing the subject, we are of opinion,
the suit is not maintainable by the plaintiffs in the court below, jointly; and consequently, that the whole of the proIt
unceedings are erroneous, and must be reversed.
necessary to consider the other errors assigned,*"
a

contract made with several persons jointly
86.
"The right of action on
each to the survivors, and on the death of the last
passes on the death of
Dicey on Parties, Eule 16, p. 128.
to his representatives."
The same rule applies in cases of partners and members of unincorporated
See Dicey on Parties, Eule 24, p. 162.' "The same rule appears
societies.
companies, supposing of course
to hold good with regard to unincorporated
Id.,
that these companies are not empowered to Bue by a publiis officer."
162.
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FORD

V.

11

WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of the United States.
21

[Chap.

1858.

Howard, 280.

Ford lived in New York, and brought an action against
John S. Williams & Brother upon the following contract:

Baltimore, October 31, 1856.
For and in consideration of the sum of one dollar, the
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, we have this day
purchased from John W. Bell, and agree to receive from
him in all the month of February next, at his option, two
thousand barrels Howard street super flour, we paying for
the same at the rate of nine dollars per barrel, on the day
the said flour is ready for delivery.

JoHK S. Williams & Bko.
below, much evidence was
in
court
the
trial
the
Upon
given which it is not necessary to recite in the present
aspect of the case. The court, on the application of the defendants ' counsel, instructed the jury that, upon the above
contract. Ford could not recover. The only question in the
case was whether, assuming the contract to have been made
for the benefit of the plaintiff, without any disclosure to
the defendants of his interest, he was competent to maiatain a suit in his own name.
Geiee, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
The single question presented for our decision in this
case is, whether the principal can maintain an action on a
written contract made by his agent in his own name, without disclosing the name of the principal.
The contract of the agent is the contract of the principal,
and he may sue or be sued thereon, though not named there-

in ; and notwithstanding the rule of law that an agreement
reduced to writing may not be contradicted or varied by
parol, it is well settled that the principal may show that
the agent who made the contract in his own name was acting for him. This proof does not contradict the writing;
it only explains the transaction. But the agent, who binds
himself, will not be allowed to contradict the writing by
proving that he was contracting only as agent, while the

^®°-
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SMue evidence will be admitted to charge the principal.
"Such evidence (says Baron
Pakke) does not deny that
contract binds those whom on its face it purports to
^e
bind; but shows that it also binds another, by reason that
the act of the agent is the act of principal."
(See Higgins
V. Senior, 9 Meeson and Welsby,
843.)
The array of cases and treatises cited by the plaintiff's
counsel shows conclusively that this question is settled, not
only by the courts of England and many of the States, but
by this court. (See New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v.
Merchants Bank, 6 How. 381 et cas. ib. cit.)
The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed,
and a venire de novo awarded.*''
87.

"A

person can sue on any contract

made on his behalf,

whether made

by an agent authorized to act for him at the time, or made without his
authority, or even without his knowledge, but subsequently ratified by himself." Dicey on Parties, 130.

NABOBS

V.

SHIPPET.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
15

1849.

Alabama, 293.

This was an action of assumpsit, instituted by defendant
in error, as the agent of one John Kirby, against the plaintiff in error, in a justice 'a court, and taken by appeal to the
circuit court. The statement, or declaration, was on the
common counts. Plea, non assumpsit. By the bill of exceptions it appears, that defendant in error was the known
agent of Kirby, and had been such for some time ; that an
execution in favor of Kirby had been levied on the property
of one G-eorge Branch, the defendant therein, and that defendant in error, as the agent of said Kirby, on the undertaking of plaintiff, verbally, to pay the debt, released the

levy. The debt not having been paid, the defendant, in his
own name, as the agent of Kirby, sued the plaintiff, to recover the amount thereof.
The court was requested by plaintiff in error, to charge
the jury, that the action could not be maintained, on this
state of facts, in the name of defendant in error although
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in the pleadings as the agent of Kirby,
but that it should have been brought in the name of Kirby,
the priucipal. This charge the court refused to give, but
charged the jury, that if there was any force in the objection, it came too late, the plaintiff in error having gone to
trial on the general issue. To the refusal to charge as requested, and to the charge given, the plaintiff in error exhe was described

cepted, and now assigns them as error.
CoLLiEE, C. J.: Ordinarily, an agent contracting iu the
name of his principal, is not entitled to sue, nor can he be
Thus an agent selling goods for
sued on such contracts.
his principal, and in the name of the latter, cannot maintain'
an action for the purchase money. * * *
The cases in which the agent has personal rights, and
may maintain an action on a contract, in which his principal
is interested, are thus stated. "First, where the contract is
made in writing, expressly with the agent, and imports to
be a contract personally with him, although he may be
known to act as an agent. Secondly, where he is the only
known or ostensible principal, and therefore is, in contemplation of law, the real contracting party. Thirdly, where
by the usage of trade, or the general course of business,
he is authorized to act as the owner, or as principal contracting party, although his character as agent is known.
Story on Ag. Par., 393. The facts recited in the record,
do not bring this case within an exception to the general
rule, which declares, that an agent shall not sue on contracts made by him in the name, and on the behalf of the
principal. The contract was verbal, the consideration for
the defendant's promise was the release of property which
had been levied on to satisfy a judgment in favor of the
principal, as the defendant very well knew. Upon principle, as well as authority, this promise inured to the principal, and he alone could sue for its breach.^^
88.

Where a party only pretends to act as agent, there are two rules, given

in Dicey

on Parties as follows:
18. — A person who enters into a contract in reality for himself, but
apparently as agent for another person, whom he does not name, can sue on.
the contract as principal, • • • the reason for this being, that the defendant cannot be supposed to have entered into the contract in reliance on

"Rule

principal whose name was not known to him." Pp. 143, 144.
*'Eule 19. — ^A person who contracts, in reality for himself, but apparently
as agent for another person, whose name he gives, cannot sue on the contract
•
•
•
as principal.
To allow him to sue would be to violate the 'rule of
if
a person intends to contract with A, B cannot give himself any
law, that
right under [the contract].' " Pp. 144, 147.
a,

Parties to Actions.
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and be sued upon it;
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made, an
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In some cases the agent is the only person
competent to sue.
These are
{1) where an agent is contracted with by deed in his own name:
where
(2)
the agent is named as a party to a biU of
exchange, etc.; (3) where the right
to sue on a contract is by the terms or circumstances of
expressly restricted
to the agent. Dicey on Parties, 134, 135. In other cases
where the agent
may sue, the principal also has the right, so that the
suit may be brought
by either one. Dicey on Parties, 136, 140.

law

1

Supreme Court

of

WILLIAMS

V.

COWAED.

Pennsylvania.

1852,

Grant's Cases, 21.
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Woodward, J.: A married womaii can neither sue nor
be sued on her contract made during coverture.
If she
contract for necessaries or for goods that go to the use of
her husband, the law presumes her to be his agent, and
treats the contract as his, and the suit must be against him
aJone. It
only when an action
brought on her antenuptial contract that she
to be joined as
coplaintiff or
defendant with her husband. Nutz v. Rentier,
W. 229.
And this because in case of the husband's death, the action
contract between two
must survive. But in an action on
married women, made after coverture, neither wife should
If any right of action accrued, belongs to
be joined.
the husband of the one wife, and whatever liability
created, attached to the husband of the other. Though the
wives may have created the cause of war, they are to be
to
regarded as the ministers of their lords, and the battle
be fought by them single handed.,
These rules and prijiciples were all violated in the case
before us. Mrs. Coward deposited moneys with Mrs. Williams to the amount of $600, and drew upon her for various
sums, until the balance was reduced to $143.50, which, with
$22 interest claimed, amounting to $165.50, are the moneys
brought, which were her earnings
for which this suit
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during coverture, and not property of her separate estate.
Neither wife was a feme sole trader.
The plaintiff's counts all charge an assumpsit, by Moses
'
Williams and Elizabeth, Ms imfe, v. Peter Coward and'
Ann, his wife, and the plaintiffs have a verdict and judgment. Tjhere is nothing in the common law of the marriage
relations, and nothing in the statutory modifications of it to
justify such misjoinders, and the judgment is accordingly
reversed, and restitution awarded of the moneys collected on
the execution.**
89.
ehap.

General Sules as to Eushand and Wife, as given in Dicey on Parties,

VIII.

29. — A wife cannot during coverture, sue without her husband."
"Subordinate Eule. — A husband cannot bring an action against his wife,
or a wife against her husband."
"Eule 30. — A husband and wife must sue jointly in two cases, sc. : 1. On
contracts made by the wife before marriage.
2.
On contracts in which the
wife claims as executrix or administratrix."
"Eule 31. — A husband may sue either alone or jointly with his wife in
three cases, sc. : 1. On negotiable instruments
(e. g., bills of exchange)
2.
On contracts made after marriage
given to his wife before marriage.
with his wife alone. 3. On contracts made after marriage with himself and

"Rule

his wife. ' '
These rules are largely the result of the common law conception of the
unity of husband and wife and of the characteristic incidents of the marriage
relation.
The reasons upon which they rest belong primarily to the subject
of domestic relations, and will not, therefore, be discussed here.
Statutes have in all States materially changed the common law doctrines
regarding husband and wife and the rules relative to proper parties in actions
by and against married persons.

RAYMOND

V.

FITCH.

Court of Exchequer.

Meeson and Roscoe, 588.

2 Crompton,
LoET>

Abingee.,

C. B.

1835.

:

The demurrer to the first breach

gives rise to this question, whether an executor can sue
for the breach of this covenant, not to fell, stub up, head,
lop, or top timber trees excepted out of the demise, such
breach having been committed in the lifetime of the testator and no part of the timber, loppings, or toppings, appearing to have been removed by the defendant.
This
question was argued in the latter part of the last term,
before my Brothers Pabke, Bolland, Gubney, and myself,
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and stood over, that we might more attentively consider
how far the modem decisions, referred to on the argument,
had overruled or qualified the old authorities. Those authorities are uniform, that the present representative maysue, not only for all debts due to the deceased, by specialty
or otherwise, but for all covenants, and indeed all contracts with the testator, broken in his lifetime; and the
reason appears to be that these are choses in action, and
are parcel of the personal estate, in respect of which the
executor or administrator represents the person of the
testator, and is in law the testator's assignee. And this
right does not depend on the equity of the statute, 4 Ed.
3 c, 7, but is a common law right, as much as the right to
sue on a bond or specialty for a sum certain due in the
testator's lifetime. The maxim that "actio personalis
moritur cum persona," is not applied in the old authorities to causes of actions on contracts, but to those in tort,
which are founded on malfeasance or misfeasance to the
person or property of another, which latter are annexed
to the person, and die with the person, except where the
remedy is given to the personal representative by the statute law. The authorities as to actions of covenant will be
found in Com. Dig. "Administrator," B 13, "Covenant,"
B 1: Bacon's Abridgment, "Executors and Administrators" N; and in the cases of Mason v. Dixon, Sir "William
Jones, 173; Morley v. PolUll, 2 Ventr. 56, 3 Salk. 109, pi.
10, wliich was the case of an action by the executor of a
deceased bishop for 'a breach in his lifetime of a covenant
to repair in a former bishop's lease; Smith v. Simonds,
Comberbach, 64, in which an administrator de bonis non
recovered on a breach in the time of the testator for not
discharging the land from encumbrance; and lastly, Lucy
V. Levington, 2 Lev. 26, 1 Ventr. 176, where the executor
recovered for a breach in his testator's life of a covenant
The old authorities are also many,
for quiet enjoyment.
that an action will lie upon every breach of contract, though
not under seal. In March, p. 9, pi. 23, Justice Jones said,
"that it was agreed by the court, in what case soever there
is a contract made to the testator or intestate, or anything
which ariseth by contract, there an action will lie for the
executor or administrator; but personal actions die with
And in 9th Eeports, 89 a,
the testator or intestate."
Pinchon's case, in which the question was, whether an axj-
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tion of assumpsit for payment 'of a debt lay against an
executor, it is laid down as follows: "As to the other objection, that this personal action of trespass on the case
moritur cum, persona, although it is termed trespass, in respect that the breach of promise is alleged to be mixed with
fraud and deceit, to the special prejudice of the plaintiff,
and for that reason it is called trespass on the case; yet
that doth not make the action so annexed to the persons of
the parties, that it shall die with the persons ; for then, if
he to whom the promise is made diesy his executors should
not have any action, which no man will affirm ; and an action sur assumpsit, upon good consideration, without specialty, to do a thing, is no more personal, i. e., annexed to
the person, than a covenant by specialty to do the same
thing;" and in Bacon's Abr. "Executors" (N), "An executor stands in the place of his testator, and represents him
as to all his personal contracts, and therefore may regularly maintain any action in his right, which he himself
might." These authorities have certainly been limited by
the modem decisions, quoted on argument, and are to be
understood with some qualification; but it will be found
that none of those qualifications affect the present case.
The rule that the executor may sue upon every covenant
with his testator broken ia his lifetime, has been directly
qualified by the decisions in the two cases of Kingdon v.
Nottle, 1 M. & Selw. 355, and 4 M. & Selw. 53, followed by

that of King v. Jones,

5

Taunt. 518,

1

Marshall, 107, in

which cases it was held, that, where there are covenants
real, that is, which run with the land and descend to the
heir, though there may have been a formal breach in the
ancestor's lifetime, yet if the substantial damage has taken
place since his death, the real representative, and not the
personal, is the proper plaintiff. These cases go further,
and they do not apply to the present ; for there is no doubt
but that the covenant in question is purely collateral, and
does not run with the land; for the trees being excepted
from the demise, the covenant not to fell them is the same
as if there had been a covenant not to cut down trees growing upon an adjoining estate of the lessor. It is a security
by specialty given by the lessee to the lessor, not to commit
,such a trespass during the lease,, which may continue beyond the lessor's life. For the breach of such a covenant
after the death of the covenantee, the heir or devisee of the

^®®'
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land on which the trees grow could not sue the executor
;
would be the proper party, as the covenant is collateral,
and IS intended not to be limited by the life of the covenantee; and if he could not sue, no one could. It is equally
clear that the heir or devisee could not sue for a breach of
the covenant in the time of the ancestor or devisor, and the
executor, therefore, must sue, or all remedy is lost. These
decisions, therefore, do not affect the present case. The
old authorities, with respect to the right of the personal
representative to sue on all contracts made with the deceased, have also been qualified by the modern decision of
Chamberlcdn v. Williamson, 2 M. & Selw. 408, in which it
was held, that the administrator of a woman could not sue
for a breach of contract to marry the intestate, the declaration not stating any ground of injury to the personal
estate; and in giving judgment Lord EijuEistboeough
enumerates other instances of contracts, the breach of
which imports a damage only to the person of the deceased, such as implied contracts by medical practitioners
to use a proper portion of skill and attention, and for which
the personal representative could not sue; and the argument on the part of the defendant in this case was, that
the same limitation of the old authorities must be applied
to all contracts except such as directly relate to the personal estate, and the performance of which would necessarily be a benefit, and the breach a damage, to the personal estate of the testator, whether such contracts are
under seal or not ; and that upon such contracts the executor
could not sue without alleging a special damage to the
personal estate. The case certainly does not go that length ;
and we thinTr that such an extension of the doctrine laid
down in it is not warranted by law, and that it cannot be
extended to a contract broken in the lifetime of the deceased, the benefit of which, if it were yet unbroken, would
pass to the executor as part of the personal estate ; at all
eventsi, not to such a contract under seal. The present case
is one of that description — it is a case more favourable to
the executors than those of Morly v. Folhill, Smith v. 8imonds, and Lucy v. Levington, in which the covenant did
run with the land ; and if the last case is to be considered
as having been decided, as was suggested in the argument
before us, on the ground that the loss of rents ana profits by
an eviction of the testator was an injury to the personal
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estate (though such a ground is not intimated in either report), it is difficult to say that the loss of the shade and
casual profits of trees is not equally so. We, therefore,
think that our judgment must be for the plaintiffs.
Judgment for the plaintiffs?'^
9O.

on

General Mules as to Executors

Parties, chap. X.

and Administrators, as given in Dicey

"Eule 41. — The personal representatives of a deceased person (L e., his
executors and administrators)
can sue on all contracts of whatever description
made with him, whether broken before or after his death."
"Exception 1.— Contracts, the breach of which occasioned merely personal
suffering to the deceased."
"Exception 2. — Contracts limited to the lifetime of the deceased."
"Exception 3. — Covenants real broken during the lifetime of the deceased."
"Exception 4. — Contracts on which the deceased must have sued jointly
with other persons."
' '
Subordinate Eule I. — An executor can commence an potion before probate,
but an administrator cannot commence an action before letters of administration granted to him."
"Subordinate Eule II. — On the death of a plaintiff the action can be
carried on by his executor or administrator."
At
[This rule is statutory.
common law the death of a plaintiff caused the action to abate, and it was
necessary for a new action to be brought by the personal representative.
3 BL Com. 302;
Tidd's Prac. 846 and 1024.— Ed.]
"Eule 42. — ^An executor or administrator:
"1. Must sue in Ms representative character on all contracts made with
the deceased.
"2. May sue either in his representative or in his personal character
on contracts made with him as executor after the death of the deceased."
"When A contract is made with an executor, he may sue either in his own
name personally (as being the party contracted with), or in his representative
character, if the money to be recovered would be assets of the estate."
"Subordinate Eule. — ^An executor or administrator cannot join claims
made in his representative with claims made in his personal character. ' '
"Eule 43. — Coexecutors or coadministrators must all ji^in as plaintiffs in
an action."
"Exception 1. —^Where a contract is made with some of several coexecutors
jointly."

"Exception 2. —^Where an executor renounces the executorship."
"Subordinate Eule. — One coexeeutor or coadministrator
cannot bring an
action against another concerning matters connected with the executorship."
"Eule 44. — On the death of a coexeeutor or coadministrator, his rights of
action pass to the survivors, and ultimately to the last survivor."
"Eule 45. — ■'The executor of a sole or of a sole surviving executor represents
the original testator, but the administrator of an executor does not represent
of an administrator or the executor
the testator nor does the administrator
of an administrator represent the original intestate."
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BALTIMOEE AND POTOMAC RAILEOAIDi COMPANY
V.

TAYLOR.

Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
6

1895.

Appeal Cases, 259.

This is a suit to recover damages for injury to the rental
value of certain real estate in square 268, in the city of

Washington, alleged to have resulted from the unlawful occupation of the adjacent streets by the appellant.

Morris, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

it

is

is

it,

There seem to be five questions raised by the appellant :
1st. That the suit should have been instituted by and in the
name of the guardian, and not in the name of the children
themselves, by their next friend ; * * •
1.
At first sight, at least, it seems to be a rather novel
and startling proposition of law that any person, who has
both the legal title to property and its beneficial ownership, should not be entitled to bring suit for injury to the
usufruct of it. It is not contended that minors may not,
by next friend, institute suit in ejectment for the recovery
of real estate, or any other suit proper or necessary to preThe claim
serve the property or to insure its usefulness.
is, that as a guardian is entitled to take possession of real
estate and collect the rents and profits for the benefit of his
ward, and is given by law the right of control and manageas well as the right to execute leases, releases,
ment of
receipts and acquittances, therefore he, and not the ward,
the proper person to bring suit for the recovery of rent,
and for injury to the rent value. The motive for this contention, the appellant does not hesitate to avow, consists
in the fact that the statute of limitations may be available
imaagainst a guardian, as claimed by counsel, while

vailable against minors.

it

;

Originally at the common law a minor could not maintain
any suit for he was disqualified by his minority from bindwas very early settled
ing himself by any legal act. But
that he could sue by guardian; and the statute of 13 Ed1

made him competent to sue by next friend. Since
ward
that statute there never has been any question as to the
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right of a minor to sue, either by guardian or by next
friend, as the case may be, La any matter whatever in
which suit might be maintained by an adult. And it is quite
clear that in tliis is included the right to sue for diminution
of the rental value of his own property, unless there has
been some statute by which that right has been denied to
him and his- guardian has been substituted in his place. We

fail to find any such statute.

The rights of guardians in this regard should not be
confounded with those of executors or administrators, or, in
some cases, trustees and receivers. These have a legal title
in them, and as to all the world except their beneficiaries,
the right of absolute ownership. There is neither legal title
What they do,
nor ownership of any kind in guardians.
they do in the name of their words, on their behalf, and
for their sole and exclusive benefit. A case has been cited.
Smith V. Williamson, 1 H. & J. 147, in which a father, as
the natural guardian of his minor child, was held entitled to
But any person may maintain reto maintain replevin.
plevLu and trover who has a present right of possession;
and undoubtedly a guardian has the right of possession of
the personal property of his ward, A guardian is no more
than a custodian. He is a custodian both of real and of
personal property, as well as of the person of the minor.
As the custodian of personal proper<fcy, he may, in his own
name, briug any suit that has reference merely to the question of custody or possession. But neither in reference to
personal property nor in reference to real estate should he
bring suit in his own name, where the question of right
or title is involved ; for he has neither right nor title in the
premises. The right and title are in the ward; and it is
proper always and in all cases to bring suit in the name of
the ward. Guardianship in socage has never existed in the
District of Columbia, and cannot exist under our law to direct descents ; and whatever may have been the rights of a
guardian in socage, a general guardian appointed under
statute cannot possess them, unless' they are given by the
statue. As we have said, we find no provision in any statute law in existence in the District of Columbia that either
expressly or by necessary inference gives a guardian the
authority to sue in his own name for injuries to the rights
of his ward. A certain specific power to sue in a certain
case (Act of Maryland of 1729, chap. 24, sec. 7), or the
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power to execute conveyances of the ward's estate in certain specified cases (Eev. Stat, for D. C, sec. 651), cannot
be construed to give general and
unlimited authority to
bring suit. The inference would rather be to the contrary.
We have no doubt that, except in some particular cases,
such as those to which we have just referred, the rule is
universal in the United States, that suits with respect to the
property of a ward, where recovery is sought for his benefit,
naust be in the name of the ward, and not in the name of
his guardian, unless statutory authority is given to the latter to so institute the suit, and the only point as to which
there may be doubt or controversy is whether the suit
should purport to be by a guardian or by next friend. It
does not seem to us that it is of much consequence which
way it is brought, as the court will have power to direct a

it

it,

change from the one to the other, as occasion may require,
both being officers of court for the purpose of such suits.
French v. Marshall, 136 Mass. 556; Biggs v. ZalesU, 44
Conn. 121 ; Thomas v. Dike, 11 Vt. 273 ; Bradley v. Amidon,
10 Paige, 239; Stafford v. Boof, 9 Cowen, 626; Eoare v.
Harris, 11 111. 24; Fox v. Minor, 32 Cal. 112; Beford v.
Keyser, 30 Md. 179; Mayer v. Norman, 4 Md. 352. Three
cases are cited to the contrary, two of which have apparently been overruled; and the other is based on a special
statute.
There is no danger, it. seems to us, that the difficulty will
arise, which is apprehended by counsel for the appellant,
that, for the same cause of action, a defendant might have
to respond to two suits, one by the guardian and the other
by the ward. When there is a recovery in a suit instituted
by or in the name of the true beneficiary, there is no danger that any court will permit another recovery in the name
of a merely formal party, who has no real interest in himself. Nor is there any danger that the act of a guardian,
performed within the sphere of his duties, will not be given
its full and proper effect in any proceeding instituted by
or in the name of the ward. The act of the guardian so
performed is the act of the ward, and can be shown against
the ward in any proper proceeding.
We are of opinion, therefore, that this suit was properly
instituted in the name of the minor children who have been
is. not objectionable beand that
made the plaintiff in
cause instituted by next friend, instead of by guardian.
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Defendants in Actions on Contbact.

ANNETT

V.

CARSTAIES.

Court of King' Bench.
3 Camph

1813.

ell's Nisi Prius, 354.

This was an action for the plaintiff's wages and disburse-

ments as master of the ship Airly Castle, of which the defendants were alleged to be the owners.

**********

'
Lord Ellenboeotjgh :
We are here to consider, with
whom has the plaintiff contracted? There is express privity oi contract between him and Masson. The legal owner-

ship of the ship thus becomes immaterial. The transfer of
the title to the defendants did not at all affect the relation
subsisting between Masson and the plaintiff. The plaintiff
was employed by Masson originally, and continued to treat
him as his employer throughout.
What right then can he
have to resort to the defendants 1 It might as well be said,

I

that if
mortgage my estate, my steward, who continues
to manage it for my benefit, may maintain an action for
work and labour against the mortgagee. Title has nothing
to do with these cases. We must look to the contract between the parties.
Plaintiff nonsuited.

STEAENS

V.

FOOTB.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
20

1833.

Pickering, 482.

Wilde, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant is charged with the breach of a contract in writing,
whereby he undertook and promised the plaintiffs, among
other things, to sell and deliver to them all the wool he
should cut annually for five years from and after the first
day of June, 1833; also all the wool which should be cut
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a

a

is,

annually from the flocks of Ms two sons, Daniel Foote and
Asaph. D. Foote, for the same time. By the contract offered in evidence on the trial, it appears that it was signed
not only by the plaintiffs and defendant, but also by the
defendant's two sons above named. The defendant objected to the introduction of this contract, as being variant
from that set out in the declaration; but the objection was
overruled, and we think the ruling was clearly right.
On the face of the contract it is declared to have been
made by the defendant of the one part, and the plaintiffs of
the other part. This clause conclusively shows that they
alone were the contracting parties, and controls the subsequent language of some parts of the contract, by which it
might otherwise be inferred, perhaps, that the defendant
and his two sons were joint contractorsi. But if that were
the case as to some parts of the contract, still this action
might be maintained, for the promise set out in the declaration is expressly made by the defendant alone. If the signing of the contract by the defendant's two sons has any
legal effect, it would only be evidence of a parol promise of
the sons to their father to co-operate with him for the purpose of enabling him to fulfill his contract with the plaintiffs.
But however this may be, it is very clear that the promise
in express terms, the
on which this action is founded,
sole promise of the defendant.
The other exceptions to the decisions of the presiding
judge at the trial, appear to us to be equally unfounded.
It has been argued that as the defendant could not make
valid sale of property belonging to his sons, his agreement or promise to make such a sale at a future time must
void promise. But this consequence does
consequently be
he
not follow, for he might have procured a title, and
responsible in damages. An agreehas failed so to do, he
convey property or perform
shall
ment that a stranger
a valid contract, although the promservices for another,
isor may perhaps be unable to fulfill it. {Vide Ante, 105.)
Judgment on the verdict.^^

General Bules as to Defendants, as given in Dicey on Parties, chap. XI.
contract who is not
No person can be sued for the breach of
46.
contract.
the
to
a party
liable in an action on contract at the
The ground on which one person
the latter person, either directly oi
to
made
has
he
that
is,
another
of
suit
indirectly, either expressly or as the result of his acts, such a promise as the
No one, therefore, who
law considers binding, and has broken this promise.
C. L. P.— 49
91.

a

is

'
'

"Rule
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is a. stranger to a contract can bo sued upon it ; or, in other words, no one
can be sued for the breach of a promise except the person who has made
•
•
•
the promise.
"Eule 47. — The person to be sued for the breach of a simple_ contract is
the person who promises or who allows credit to be given to him.
•

»

•

•

1.— Actions

against a person appointed by statute to be sued
Exception
of others.
2. — ^Actions on some contracts implied by law or actions
Exception
quasi ex contractu.
' '

on behalf
''

•

•

•

"Eule 48. — The

person to be sued for the breach of a contract by deed
is the person by whom the contract is expressed by the deed to be made, i. e.,
the

covenantor."

NATHANSON

v.

SPITZ.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
19 Rhode

Island,

1895,

70.

Assumpsit on certain checks signed by defendants Adams
& Spitz. Certified from the common pleas division on demurrer to a plea in abatement.

Tilmnghast, J.: At the time of the
suing out of the plaintiff's writ in this case, the defendants,

April

17, 1895.

Samuel Adams and Jacob Spitz, were copartners in business under the firm name of "Adams & Spitz," at Boston
in the State of Massachusetts, where they both resided.
The writ was served by arresting the defendant Spitz while
temporarily in this State, aiid.by-se ndin g an attested copy
of said writ by mail jtoj;he_ defendant Adams, at Boston,
The defendant Spitz entered a special appearance for himself and filed a plea in abatement on the ground that there
\
had
been no legal service upon the defendant Adams, the
I
other joint obligor in the contract sued on; to which plea
I
The^only. qu^stitrmraisedTiirere[the plaintiff demurred.
is
as
to the sufficiency-of-^sgid service.
the
by
pleadings
7or&,
The substance of the contention of counsel who appears for
said Spitz in support of his plea in abatement is, first, that
the liability of partners on a firm obligation is, during the
lives of the partners, joint and not joint and several; and
hence that the partners must sue and be sued jointly; and
second, that in regard to service of process, the common
law makes no distinction between partners and other joint
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obligors, and hence that they all must be served with
process before judgment can be obtained against any of
them, even though some are nonresidents.
As to the first point.
It is doubtless true that independently of any statute the liability of a partnership for
the debts thereof is a joint and indivisible liability; and
hence that all of the partners must be joined in a suit for
recovery of such debts. Dicey on Parties, Truman's Ed.
p. 285, Rule 56; Bates on Partnership, sec. 1049 and cases
cited; Pearce v. Cooke, 13 R. I. 184; Page v. Brant, 18 111.
37; Kent v. EoUiday, 17 Md. 387.
As to the second point. At common law, when one of
several joint defendants was o>it of the jurisdiction of the
court, so that it was impossible to obtain service upon him,
the plaintiff might institute proceedings
of outlawry
against such nonresident defendant, and after judgment of
outlawry had been obtained against him the plaintiff could
proceed to recover a separate judgment against the defendants served with process. 3 Cooley's Blackstone Comment. 281-283; Edwards v. Carter, 1 Strange, 473; Tidd's
Practice, 130; 1 Chitty on Pleadiag, 42. The proceeding of
outlawry in civil cases, however, is unknown in the United
States ; and if there are any cases of outlawry in criminal
cases even, they are very rare. In England, also, it has
long been obsolete in civil proceedings, and was formally
abolished by the Civil Procedure Acts, Repeal Act, 1879,
In criminal proceedings even, it is but
42-3 Vict. c. 59.
little used, but is formally kept alive by 33-4 Vict. c. 23.
In Eall V. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160, Mr. Justice Bradley in delivering the opinion of the court said: "In most of the
States legislative acts have been passed, called joint debtor
acts, which, as a substitute for outlawry, provide that if
process be issued against several joint debtors or partners,
and served on one or more of them, and the others cannot
be found, the plaintiff may proceed against those served,
Various
and, if successful, have judgment against all.
effects and consequences are attributed to such judgments
in the States in which they are rendered. They are generaily-lield to bind the common property of the joint
debtors, as well as the separate property of those served
with^rocess, when such property is situated in the State,
but not the separate property of those not served; and,
whilst they are binding personally on the former, they are
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regarded as either not personally binding at all, or only
prima facie binding on the latter."
In this State, while there is no statute which in express
terms goes to this extent, although by the Judiciary Act,
cap. 13, sec. 17, partnership debts become joint and several
on the decease of One of the partners ; Pearce v. Cooke, 13
R. L 184; yet, there is a statute which practically accomplishes the same result.
We refer to the Judiciary Act,
cap. 13; sec. 18, which provides as follows : "No judgment,
without complete satisfaction, rendered against a part only
of the defendants in any action upon a joint contract shaU
be a bar to any future action on said contract, for any unsatisfied balance due, against such of the defendants upon
whom or whose estate the writ in the original action shall
not have been served."? It is clearly to be implied from this
statute that service on a part only of the defendants in an
action upon a joint contract is sufficient to give the court
ju:^sdiction. And it is doubtless by reason of the existence
of said statute, which appears in substantially the same
form as early as the revision of 1844, that the settled practice in this State, in eases like the one now before us, has
been to serve the writ upon such of the defendants as are
within the jurisdiction thereof, and to proceed only against
them for the breach of such contract.
See Winslow v.

Brown, 7 E. I. 95.
Moreover we see no reason why the return of non est
inventus made by the sheriff in this case as to the defendant Samuel Adams, may not properly be treated as equivalent to the common law process of outlawry. Thej writ was
properly sued out against botii of th e defend ants and the
retur^. thereon shows tKat the j^aiiitifE-has-done-alLthaLhe
could to Fring them both into court ; and having succeeded
as to one of them it would seem that he ought to be allowed
to proceed to obtain a judgment against him. See Dillman
V. Schultz, Serg. & Eawle, 35; Tappan v. Bruen,^" 5 Mass.
92.

In

this case the court

said:

"It

has been

an immemorial

practice,

in the service of a writ sued on a contract against two or more defendants,
if some of the defendants are without the jurisdiction of the common*
•
•
to cause the writ to be served on the defendants within
wealth,
the State, and to proceed only against them for the breach of the contract
*
*
*
This practice originated from necessity, as
by all the defendants.
no mode of service is provided by our laws upon a debtor without the State,
who has no place of abode or property within it."
But in McCaU v. Price (1821) 1 MoCord (S. C.) 82, the majority of the
court held that although this procedure would be substantially an equivalent
of outlawry at common law, and although the plaintiff would be left entirely
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But, however this may be, we are clearly of the
opinion that under the statute above quoted and the uniform practice in this State, the case at bar may properly
proceed against the defendant Spitz, upon whom only the
writ was served. The demurrer is therefore sustained and
the plea in abatement overruled.®'

193.

^

without a remedy unless permitted

to resort to such procedure, nevertheless
not authorized, and unless all joint obligors could be
brought into court together there was no remedy against any of them.
93.
Exceptions to the rule that aU joint obligors must be joined are
stated by Dicey as follows:
"Exception 1. — Where a co-contractor has become bankrupt."
"Exception 2. — Where a claim is barred against one or more joint debtors,
and not against others. ' '
"Exception 3. — Where a co-contractor is resident out of the jurisdiction."
[This is statutory, based on 3 and 4 W. 4, c. 42, sec. 8. See JoU v. Lord
Curzon (1847) 4 0. B. 249.— Ed.]
"Exception 4. — Where an action is brought against common carriers."
also is based upon statute, — 11 Geo. IV ; 1 WilJ. IV, c. 68, s. 5. — Ed.]
[This
*'
Exception 5. — Wliere an action is brought against a firm, some of the
members of which are nominal or dormant partners."
"Exception 6. — Where a co-contractor is an infant or a married woman."
Dicey on Parties, chap. XT.
This rule as to the joinder of
Partners and Unincorporated Companies.
all co-obligors applies to partnerships and unincorporated companies, and all
the members must be joined as parties defendant, though one member must
or may be sued alone on contracts made by him on behalf of the firm or
company, in the same cases in which an agent must or may be sued on
Dicey on Parties, chap.
contracts made by him on behalf of his principal.
such

procedure

XIII.

was

In case of the death of a joint ohligor the liability passes to the survivor,
Dicey on Parties,
and on the death of the last survivor to his representative.
And since contracts made by partners and unincorporated companies
237.
are joint obligations of all the members, the same rule as to survivorship
Dicey on Parties, 274.
obtains.
The use oi the process of outlawry to compel the appearance of a defendant,
Law, 591,
is thus desciibed by Pollock and Maitland, 2 History of English
"Whe.i there was no specific thing that could be seized and adjudged
592:
to the plaintiff as being the very thing that he demanded, the law had at
its command various engines for compelling the appearance of the defendant.
Bracton has drawn up a scheme which in his eye is or should be the normal
from the
process of compulsion; but we can see both from his own text and
some
also
that
and
simplicity,
and
aiming
at
generality
plea rolls that he is
(1) Summons, (2) Attachment
questions are still open. The scheme is this:
by pledges, (3) Attachment by better pledges, (4) Haleas corpus, (5) A
however, consists in the mere
distraint by all goods and chattels, which,
hand,
king's
the
(6) A distraint by all goods
ceremony of taking them into
from meddlmg with them
defendant
the
to
prevent
as
such
and chattels
mean a real seizure of
will
which
chattels
and
(7) A distraint by all goods
the proceeds (issues,
for
answerable
become
will
who
sheriff,
them by the
outlawry.
and
t,
exitus) to the king, (8) Exaction
tt
He has ^
to suggest
"Braction however, has to argue for the use of outlawry.
minor
excommunicaa
can
be
there
as
outlawry
just
that there can be a minor
outlawry can be employed which will
tion in other words, that a form of
little later time a distmction is here
a
At
not 'involve a sentence of death.
for example Trespass w et armis,
action,
of
forms
the
of
In some
drawn
and, failing this, there may be
respondendum)
ad
there can be arrest (Capias
At a yet
is
the last process.
infinite'
Mistress
foms
other
outlaT^:
and
fictions,
capias
the
cover
of
under
later stage, partly by statute, partly

^
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outlawry became common to many forms, and 'imprisonment
upon mesne
process' was the weapon on which our law chiefly relied in its struggle with
the coutumacioua."

WINSLOW

V.

HEEEICK.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
9

V

1861,

Michigan, 380.

J. :

The suit below was brought on a repleyin
bond executed by Garret S. Swazie, as principal, and James
B. Vleit, Jonathan H. Bescherer and Wilder Winslow, as
suretieSi.
All of the sureties were served. The bond was
Campbell,

joint and severalT"^
Vleit appeared and pleaded, and

a

default was entered

against the other defendants served. Wh^Sj^e^case came
on for trial, plaiatiff discontinued as against Swazie and
Vleit, and took judgjneht against Bescherer and Winslow.
This is assigned as error.
We think the objection well taken. A party cannot, upon
a joint and several demand, treat the demand as a joint
obligation of less than all the debtors. .It must be joint as to
all,, or several as to all. 1 Pars, on Cont. 12, 13. This is a
well-settled and very familar doctrine.
The rule authorizing a plaintiff to discontinue against one
or more defendants was not designed to change any legal
rights, but merely to enable a plaintiff who had sued more
parties than he could recover against to amend his case by
declaring agaiast his real debtors. * * * It is very clear
that the declaration before us does not set out a contract
under which the plaintiffs in error were jointly liable without Swazie and Vleit,. and had they been sued jointly without
their co-obligors, they might have pleaded in abatement.
Plaintiff could not, by the indirect process which he adopted,
place them in any different position, or charge them in any
way not justified by his declaration.
Some other questions were presented, but the view we
have taken renders it unnecessary to decide them. The
judgment must be reversed, with costs.

Sec. 3j
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WELCH.

Supreme Ccmrt of Appeals of West Virginia. 1896.
42

West Virginia, 18.

English, J. : This was an action of trespass on the case
in assumpsit, brought by Greorge S. Johnson and H. W.
Poutz, doing busiiiess under the firm name and style of
Johnson & Foutz, against I. A. Welch and Beuben Boggess, in the circuit court of Mercer county, in which the
plaintiffs sought to recover the sum of one thousand, nine
hundred and five dollars and twenty-five cents, for material
furnished and labor expended by said plaintiffs at the instance and request of the defendants in building and erecting a certain church house near the mouth of Simmons
Creek, in Mercer county, W. Va. The defendants demurred
to the plaintiff's declaration. The demurrer was overruled.
The defendants then pleaded non assumpsit, and issue was
joined theron. On the 26th day of November, 1894, the case
was submitted to a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the
The plaintiffs moved the court to set aside the
defendants.
verdict of the jury, and award them a new trial, and to
arrest the judgment upon said verdict, which motion the
court sustained, set aside the verdict, and awarded the

plaintiffs

a new

trial, and the defendants excepted.

The contract upon which this suit is predicated reads as
follows :
"Princeton, W. Va., Feb. 10, '87. To the Building Committee of the Baptist Church, Simmons Creek, Mercer
County, West Va. : We propose to erect and finish a church
building according to the accompanying specifications made
by (H. W. Foutz) for the sum of seventeen hundred dollars. Johnson & Foutz. $1,700."Bid accepted, at seventeen hundred dollars, to complete
the church according to the accompanying specifications,
and to do the stone work at $3.50 per cubic yard. I. A.
Welch. Eeuben Boggess."
The defendants obtained this writ of error, and claim that
the court erred in setting aside the verdict, and awarding

the plaintiff a new trial.

[Cliap. 11
Common Law Pleading.
The question for our determination is whether the verdict
rendered hy the jury is warranted by the law and the testimony. When we look to the paper itself upon which the
suit is predicated, we find it is addressed to the "Building
Committee of the Baptist Church, Simmons Creek, Mercer
County, "West Va.," by the plaintiffs, Johnson & Foutz. It
was a formal bid for the construction of the church for the
sum of one thousand and seven hundred dollars. They did
not make the offer to build this church at the price named
to any particular individuals, calling them by name, but
the offer was made to the building committee of that church ;
and when the acceptance of that bid in writing to complete
said church at that price according to the accompanying
specifications was signed by I. A. Welch and Reuben Boggess, and the plaintiffs proceeded to build the church, they
thereby recognized the defendants as the building committee to whom it was addressed, and the said Welch and Boggess acknowledged themselves to be the committee addressed
by accepting said bid, over their signatures.
ITnder the title "Liability of Agents to Third Parties,"
p. 401, 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, we find the law thus stated :
"A duly authorized agent, acting in behalf of his principal,
is not personally responsible on the contract when the third
party knows that he acts in the name and on behalf of the
principal." And in the footnote on same page it is said:
"But the bare want of authority in an agent or trustee
to bind the persons or estates for which he assumes to be
acting does not render him individually liable where the
facts and circumstances indicate that no such liability was
intended by either of the parties."
Applying this law to
the facts of this case, it is apparent from the face of the
paper itself tha.t the proposition to erect the church for
one thousand and seven hundred dollars was not addressed
to I. A. Welch and Reuben Boggess either as individuals or
as a building committee, but was addressed to the "Building Committee of the Baptist Church, Simmons Creek, Mercer County, West Va. ;" and the plaintiffs concluded no contract with them as individuals when they accepted said bid,
and said Welch and Boggess, in their individual capacity,
could not have compelled a compliance with said bid, while
as a building committee, recognized as such by the plaintiffs, they could have enforced compliance in accordance
with the specifications attached. * * *
776
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Upon this point we find the law stated in Mechem,
Ag., in a note on page 386 (section 550) quoting from the
opinion of Ellsworth, J., in the case of Ogden v. Raymond,
22 Conn. 379 : ' ' The authorities are somewhat conflicting
as to the liability of an agent in actions ex contractu, but
the weight of authority, we think, is that, to charge an agent'
in such action, the credit must have been given to him, or
there must be an express contract, and, if there is a written contract, there must be apt words in it to charge him."
See the case of McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 199 (point 4
of Syllabus), where that court holds. "The agent is not in
any case liable in an action ex contractu, unless the credit
has been given to him, or he has expressly agreed to be liable, and, if there is a written contract, it must contain apt
words to charge him."

For

these reasons, my conclusion is that the court committed an error in setting aside the verdict of the jury, and
the judgment complained of must be reversed, with costs
and damages to the plaintiffs in error."*
The exceptions to the rule that the principal alone, and not the agent,
94.
is to be sued on contracts made through an agent, are stated as follows in
Dicey on Parties, chap. XII:
"Exception 1. — ^Where an agent contracts by deed in his own name."
"Exception 2. — ^Where an agent draws, indorses, or accepts a bUl of exchange in his own name."
"Exception 3. — Where credit is given exclusively to the agent."
"Exception 4. — Where an agent contracts for persons incapable of contracting. ' '

"Exception 5. — Where the contract is made by the agent himself, i. e.,
where the agent is treated as the actual party by whom the contract is made,
or in other words, where the agent, though acting as such, incurs a personal
responsibility."
,
.
.
''
Exception 6. — Where the agent is the only known or ostensible principal,
or where a contract (not under seal) has been made by an agent in his own
name for an undisclosed principal."
■ , ,
.
"Exception 7. — Where money received by an agent for his prmcipal has
bean paid under a mistake of fact, or obtained by means of a tort"

DAVIS

V.

MILLMTT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
34

1852,

Maine, 429.

Assumpsit, for the price of a cooking stove.
It was admitted at the trial that the defendants were husband and wife, whereupon the judge ordered a nonsuit, and
the plaintiff excepted.

Common Law Pleading.
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Applbton,

J. :

[Chap. 11

This is an action of assumpsit, for a cook-

ing stove sold the defendants, who, it is conceded, were hus^
band and wife. The sale, as it appears from the allegations
in the writ, was made to them jointly. Whether, however,
it was made to the wife alone, or to the husband and wife
jointly, is immaterial, since the result must in either case
be the same.
As a general rule, the wife, by the principles of the common law, cannot, during coverture, enter iato any contracts,
by which she can bind her own estate or that of her husband. 2 Bright, Husband & "Wife, 5. Neither can she jointly
contract with him. When acting as his agent, she may bind
his estate but not her own. While such is conceded to be
the doctrine of the common law, it is insisted that its provisions have been so modified by recent statutes as to allow
the maintenance of this suit.
The common law remains in full and unimpaired vigor,
unless it is changed by legislative enactment. The statute
of 1848, c. 73, upon which the counsel for the plaintiff, relies, is entitled "an Act in addition to an act to secure to
married women their rig'hts in property. ' ' The act referred
to, and the preceding acts on the same subject, do not authorize a married woman to enter generally into contracts
in her own behalf. Neither do they empower her to become
*
•
•
a joint contractor with her husband.
The contract set forth in the declaration is a joint contract. The vnte cannot, by the common law or by any statute of this State, become a party to a contract of purcliase
jointly with her husband. Nor has she the general power
so to contract as to bind the estate of her husband without

bis authority.
Exceptions overruled.

Nonsuit confirmed.^^

On contracts made by the wife alone during coverture, the husband
alone, on the ground that the wife acted as his agent and the
In Waithman v. Wakefield (1807) 1 Campb. 120,
contract is his contract.
Lord EUenborough said: "Where a husband is living in the same house ■mt\
his wife, he is liable to any extent for goods which he permits her to receivq
there; she is considered as his agent, and the law implies a promise on his
they are not cohabiting, then he is, in general,
part to pay the value.
oxily liable for such necessaries as from his situation iii life it is his duty to
supply her."
On contracts nlflde by the wife before marriage, both are to be joined.
"The propriety of joining the husband as a defendant with the wife in
actions ex contractu, when the cause of action originated with the wife dum
tola, is obvious; because, as the law makes him liable during the coverture
for the fulfilment of all her engagements made anterior thereto, it would be
repuEoant to the first principles of natural justice that he should be con95.

is to

be sued

If

^60.
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^^^® * judgment rendered
against him without an opportunity
of being first heard. But still in such suit the contract, or foundation of it, must appear to have originated with the wife alone while sole.
And as the husband is only liable for such cause of action during the covit follows necessarily that the moment that the tie is severed, either
f^^^^>
°y "'e death of the wife or by the death of the husband, all liabiUty of the
husband, or of his estate, in that action ceases; if the wife, however, should
happen to b« the one that survives, the action survives also against her,
and may be prosecuted to judgment and execution."
Nuti T. Beuttar (1832)
1 Watt* (Pfc) 833.

''^""j^i

°^

afforded

MoKAY

V.

ROYAL.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
7

Jones Law,

1860,

426.

Action of assumpsit, tried before Shepherd^

J., at the last

spring term of Sampson Superior Court.
The plaintiffs, who are attorneys at law, and professional copartners, appeared as counsel for Catharine Eoyal,
who propounded the will of her husband, Eozen Eoyal, for
probate, wherein she was named executrix, and they also
acted as counsel for her generally, in the management of
the estate. After the rendition of these services, the plaintiffs demanded payment, which the defendant refused,
whereupon this suit was brought against her individually,
without declaring against her as executrix. The counsel for
the defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that as no
express promise was made by defendant to pay this demand, the plaintiffs could not recover.
His Honor refused the iastruction, and defendant excepted.

Judgment and appeal.
Battle, J. : There is not the slightest foundation for the
defense attempted to be set up by the defendant. _As the
plaintiffs were employed by the executrix to advise and
assist her in the probate of the will of the testator, and in
the management of his estate, she became liable to them
upon a quantwm meruit in her individual, and not in her
official capacity. Their claim against her could not be a
debt of the testator, for, say the court, in Eailey v. Wheeler,
4 Jones' Eep. 159, "it ia not possible to conceive ho^v^ a
debt of the testator can be created by matter occurring
wholly in the executor's time. If an executor makes an ex-

Verdict for plaintiffs.

Common Law Pleading.
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it, is

it

is

it

a

if

it,

press contract in reference to the property of the estate,
as, if he employ one to cry the sale of the property, as
So, in the
auctioneer, this is not a debt of the testator."
present case, the executrix having employed the plaintiffs
as her attorneys and counselors, though in relation to the
business of the estate of her testator, the debt is hers, and
she must pay
the disbursement be
proper one,
and
will
be
a
in
the
settlement
of her
she
credit for
allowed
account with the estate. This
common learningj and
or cite any other authority
unnecessary to enlarge upon

in support of it.

Judgment

affirmed.^^

Section

4.

1,

it

96.
This Title differs from fhe rale as to plaintiffs, for an executor or
administrator
may sue in either his personal or his representative character
upon all contracts made by him as representative after the death of the
See note on page 764, titprxi.
deceased.
In most other respects the rules are the same for both plaintiffs and
Thus Eule 41, together with the 2nd and 4th exceptions to
defendants.
quoted from Dieey on
and the two subordinate rules thereunder, Eule 42,
Parties, given on page 764, aupra, are aU applicable to defendants by simply
introducing the necessary changes in wording to make them apply to defendants.

Plaintipfs in

Acan:oNS

in Tobt.

Coke, 111

1613,

b.

King's Bench.

9

Court

of

EGBERT MARYS'S CASE.

:

a

[The plaintiff, Edward Crogate, brought an action
against Robert Marys, and alleged that he was copyholder
of a certain parcel of land and as such had a right of common of pasture in certain adjoining land called TownBamingham Common, and that the defendant unlawfully
put his beasts into this common and pastured the herbage,
to the injury of the plaintiff.
To which the defendant
And the jury found among other
pleaded not guilty.
things that as to depasturing the herbage defendant was
guilty. And upon the question of his right to sue for such
depasturing the court said — ]"
97.

Condensed

statement

of facts by the editor.

Sec. 4]
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For every feeding by the cattle of a stranger, the commoner shall not have an assise nor an action on
the case, as his case is, but the feeding ought to be such
per quod the commoner, etc., common of pasture, etc., for
bis cattle, etc., habere non potuit, sed proficuum suum inde
per totum id' tempits amisit, etc. So that if the trespass
be so small, that he had not any loss, but sufficient in ample
manner remaius for him, the commoner shall not take them
damage feasant, nor by any action for it ; but the tenant of
the land may in such case have an action. And therefore, if
my servant is beat, the master shall not have an action for
this battery, unless the battery is so great that by reason
thereof he loses the service of his servant, but the servant
himself for every small battery shall have an action; and
the reason of the difference is, that the master has not any
damage by the personal beating of his servant, but by reason of a per quod, viz. per quod servitium, etc., amisit; so
that the original act is not the cause of his action, but the
the cause
viz., the loss of his service
consequent upon
the
of his action; for be the battery greater or less,
not
he
shall
servant,
lose
the
service
of
his
master doth not
have an action. So in the case at bar, the lord of the soil
shall have an action for trespass done in the waste or comgreater or less,
mon, as an immediate trespass to him, be
but the conunoner shall not have an action but by consethe trespass be such, per quod proficuum
quence, viz.,
communiae suae, etc., amisit, or that he could not have his
*
common in so beneficial manner as he had before.®^
*

•

*

*

if

it

if

is

it,

*

Dicey states
The doctrine here suggested is of very wide application.
"Eule 78. — No one can bring an
in general terms as follows:
Eule 79. — The
not an injury to himself.
action for any injury which
for the
an
action
person who sustains the injury is the person to bring
wrongdoer."
injury against the
Under these rules he states the following subordinate rules:
—The person to sue for any interference with the
"Subordinate Eule
or possession of land or other real property is the
enjoyment
immediate
one can sue merely for such an
person who has possession of it, and no
, ,,
interference who has not possession."
.
"Subordinate Eule II.—For any permanent mjury to the value of land,
e., for any act which interferes with the future
or other real property,
land, an action may be brought by the person
the
enjoyment of, or title to,
it,
in
e., by the reversioner.
estate
future
a
to
entitled
may sue for an mterferenee with the
Any
person
III.—
"Subordinate Eule
has a right to the
the defendant,
against
as
who,
of
goods,
possession
sue
for w'hat is merely
can
no
person
and
such
goods;
Snmediate possession of
to the immediate possession of the
a
right
not
has
who
interference
such an
98.

•,

,

L

L

,

I.

is

■the rules

a

to the reversionary interest
^""Subordinate Eule IV.— Any person entitled
action for any damage to
an
bring
may
e., the reversioner)
in ffoods
his right of ultimate possession." Dicey
to
words,
other
in
interest,
or,
such
on Parties, chap. XIX
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EHOADS

V.

BOOTH.

Supreme Court of Iowa,
14

[Chap.

11

^
1863,

Iowa, 575.

J.:

Upon the information of defendant the
plaintiffs in this action (three in number, but not partners),
were arrested, tried before a justice of the peace for larThey
ceny and after due examination were discharged.
thereupon instituted this action to recover damages for an
On the trial, defendant,
allege d malicious prosecution.
amohglrtfa cra, aol s e d-feesginstructions :
1st.
The damages in the case, if any, are purely
personal, that is, they appertain to each person separately,
and unless some cointerest or joint interest is shown, plain"Weight,

tiff cannot recover.

If a

man commit a trespass and kill a horse, which
belongs to A and B jointly, then they can sue ajid recover
in a joint action. But if he, by the same act, kills two
horses, one belonging to A and the other to B, they could
not, in a joint action, recover the value of the horses. So in
this action plaintiffs can only recover such damages as they
have jointly sustained.
By these and other instructions of a like import, defendant claims the rule to be, that plaintiffs could not maintain
this action unless they h ad a joint interest in the damages
cMmfidj^ or the judgment to be "recovered. These were all
refused, and such refusal is now assigned for error.
The instructions should have been given. As a rule it is
•only when two or more persons are jointly entitled to, or
''have a joint interest in, the property affected, or the damages to be recovered, that they can unite in an action.
Thergfore ,severa1 pa rties cannot sue jolntlvinr iTijinTPgjT>^
"tSeperson, as for aland erj_a_b attery, o rjor false^aprisonFor words spoken of parties in their joint trade, or
ment.
for slander of title, they may sue jointly ; but not so when
two or more sue for slanderous words, which though spoken
of all, apply to them all separately; or in a case of false
imprisonment, or a malicious prosecution, when each, as
individuals, are imprisoned or prosecuted.
Tha-principle
underlying is. .that it is not the act but the consequence
2nd.

Pakties to Actions.
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•••••••••
2

•

1

i

is it
is

is

if

Thus,
two persons are injured by the
same stroke, the act
one, but
the consequence of the
ot the act tael£,..which
redreaaed, and therefore
a^t, a^d^
thejnxury is .several. There^
cannot_ba-a-4oint -a&U^j because onedoes not share in the
suffering- of the other.
Ch. Pi. 6372 S^unS^rs, 116, 117;
Bouv. Inst., p. 171.
Reversed.^*

"^

.

a

a

1.

99. "Enle 80. —
Persons who have
separate interest and sustain
separate damage must sue separately.
"2. Persons who have a separate interest, but sustain a joint damage,
may sue either jointly or separately in respect thereof.
".^:. ^'■so^s who have a joint interest must sue jointly for an iniury
to it." Dicey on Parties, 380.
"Rule 82. —Where several persons have a joint right of action for a tort
it passes on the death of each to the survivors, and on the death of the last
(if the right of action be one that survives) to his representatives." Dicey
on Parties, 382.
Partners and Unincorporated Companiet.
Since the firm or company is
nothing but the individuals who compose it, the general rules as to joinder

of plaintiffs apply.

7

Supreme Court

Indiana.

^

1

CEOW.

(U

V.

of

HAET

^

"Eule 84. —^All the partners in a firm, or members of an unincorporated
company, should join in an action for wrong done to the firm or company."
Dicey on Parties, 384.

1845.

Blackford, 351.

is

a

it

a

a

:

This was an action on the^casejby Crow
SuiiLiVAiT, J.
libel onThe plaintiffs, written
and wife againM_Hart^or
and posted up by defendant in place of public resort. The
declaration alleges that the defendant, wickedly and maliciously intending to injure the plaintiffs in their good name,
to be believed by their neighbors and
etc., and to cause
others that they had been and were guilty of the crimes of
lying and stealing, and to subject them to the scorn of
their neighbors, etc., did, on, etc., at, etc., falsely, wickedly
and maliciously, compose and publish, of and concerning the
certain false, scandalous, malicious and deplaintiffs,
then set out, and
famatory libel, etc. The alleged libel
charges that John Crow and his wife are liars, rogues, etc.
By means whereof the plaintiffs have been greatly injured,

Common Law Pleading.
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Denrarrer to tlie declaration overruled, and joint dametc.
ages assessed upon a writ of inquiry.
There are some questions raised on the admissibility
of certain testimony that was objected to on the execution
of the writ of inquiry, but the case does not require that
The court erred in overruling the
we should decide them.
The suit is brought not only
demurrer to the declaration.
for the injury sustained by the wife, but for the wrong done
to the husband also. The action is joint, and joint damages
are sought to be recovered. Two _separate causes of
action are shown, accruing to different, persons, that cannot
be unitedjn_the_samg suit. For the injury done to the wife,
the husband must join, in the suit; but the declaration
must show that it is for the wrong done to the wife that
the suit is prosecuted. For the injury done to the husband,
he alone should sue.
(1) In Neioton et ux. v. Hatter, 2
Ld. Baym. 1208, the suit was brought for a battery committed on both. There was a judgment by default, and a
writ of inquiry was executed. On the return of the writ,
judgment was arrested because the wife could not be joined
in an action with the husband for a battery on the latter.

If

the defendant had pleaded to the declaration, and the
cause had gone to a jury, and separate damages had been
given for the injury to the wife, it may be that the verdict
might have been sustained. BuU. N. P. 21 ; Cro. Jac. 655 ;
3

Binney,

Per

555.

Cxjbiam.

The judgment

is reversed

with costs.

Cause remanded, etc.

SMITH V. FITZGEEAIiD.
Supreme Court of Vermont.
59

J. i

1887,

Vermont, 451.

This is an action quare clausum f regit for
on
land of which the plaintiff and his wife,
cutting trees
Laura, were in possession in right of the wife, who held the
same under a warranty deed from her father, and over
which the plaintiff exercised such control and management
as a husband may, in the law, exercise over the wife's real
estate, and had no right or estate in the premises except
Walker,
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such as a hnslxand acquires by marriage in the real estate
of his wife. The wife was not joined as a party plaintiff in
the writ • • •

II.

The next question to be considered is whether an
action can be maintained in the name of the husband alone
against a person for cutting trees upon the wife's land during the coverture.
As we have no statute law upon this subject the question
must necessarily be determined upon the principles and
authority of the common law.
The common law rule as to the joinder of husband and
wife in actions for damages to the real property of the latter
during coverture is said by some writers to be not quite
clear. The rule, however, seems to be quite uniform in the
elementary books and decisions of the courts.
In Chitty's Pleading, vol. 1 (6th Atn. Ed.), page 85, the
law is stated as follows: "In real actions for the recovery
of the land of the wife, and ia a writ of waste thereto, the
husband and wife mitst join. But when the action is merely
for the recovery of damages to the land or other real prop•
*
*
the huserty of the wife during the coverture
interest
wife
be
her
joined,
or
the
may
band may sue alone
in the land being stated in the declaration."
In Waterman on Trespass, vol. 2, s. 937, the rule is stated
as follows: "At common law, where the action is merely
for the recovery of damages done to the real estate of the
wife during coverture, the husband may sue alone, or his
wife may be joined."
In Dicey on Parties to Actions, 412, the rule is laid down
as follows: "A husband may sue either alone, or jointly
with his wife, for all injuries done during; coverture to real
property, of which the husand and wife are seized, or to
' '
which they are entitled in right of the wife.
The same doctrine is asserted in Hilliard on Torts, vol. 2,
page 502. It is there stated that an action for trespass for
cutting trees on land held by husband and wife in right of
the wife, may be brought by the husband alone, or by the
husband and wife jointly, at his election.
The rule thus laid down seems to have been followed in
the decisions of the courts where the common law governs
and is supported by an unbroken line of authority. 2
Saunders PL & Ev. 81; 1 Boll. 348; 2 Vent. 195; Com. Dig.
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tit. Baron & Femme, V. W. & X.; 2 Bao. Abr. tit Baron &
Femme (K.) ; Cro. Car. 347; 1 W. Saunders, 291; Selwyn
N. P. 310; Bidgood v. Way, 2 Black. 1236; Weller v. Baker,
2 Wils, 423; Clapp v. Stoughton, 10 Pick. 469. Allen et ux.
V. Kingsbury, 16 Pick. 235; Tallmadge v. Grannis, 20 Conn.
296; FairchUd v. Chaustelleux, 1 Pa. 176; Ih. 8 Watts, 412.

principle deduced from the cases cited, and upon
which the decisions are based, is, that in all cases for injuries done to the wife's land during coverture, where the
right of action will survive to the wife upon the death of the
husband, and to the husband upon the death, of the wife, the
husband may sue alone or join with his wife at his election;
and that the wife must be joined only in those cases where
the right of action will survive to the wife alone and not
to the husband; such as actions to recover the title to the
Tihe

land and actions brought to recover for waste only.
It is well settled that an action of trespass for injuries
committed to the wife 's land during the coverture will survive to the husband on the death of the wife, and that if the
wife survive any action for a tort committed to her real
estate during the coverture will survive to her. 1 Chitty PI.
85.

It must

therefore be held in this case that the action was
properly brought in the name of the husband alone.

We find no error in the judgment of the court below, and
the same is affirmed.

FAIRCHILD

v.

CHAUSTELLEUX.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
8

J.:

1839.

Watts, 412.

The only poiat on which the plaintiff in
error relies, is raised on the charge of the court, that husband and wife can sustain an action of replevin for timber,
cut and carried away from property belonging to them
during the coverture. It is a principle of law, stated by
Chitty in his treatise on CivU Pleading, and since recognized
EoGBBS,
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in Seibert v. McHenry, 6 Watts, 301, that when a
feme covert has no interest whatever in the subject-matter of the

action, and consequently ought not to be made a party, and
she sues either with or without her husband, the plaintiff
will be nonsuited, on the general issue. On the trial, the defendant prayed the court to instruct the jury that the husband and wife could not join in the suit, but that suit
should be brought in the name of the husband alone. The
court refused to give this direction, and of this the defendants complain. The plaintiff contends, that because the
freehold, on which the trespass was committed, waS' the
joint property of the husband and wife, the action is well
brought in their joint names. To this the defendants
answer, that the suit is not brought for an injury to the
freehold, but that the action is brought for an injury to the
personal property of the husband. Where trespass is committed on the lands of the wife during coverture, the husband may sue alone in trespass, or according to the current
of authorities, the wife may be joined. Clapp v. Slaughter,
10 Pick. 469; Com. Dig. tit. Baron & Feme.
Whether this
principle applies to the somewhat anomalous interests of
the husband and wife in the locus in quo, it is unnecessary
to decide, although the principle is undoubtedly applicable
to a wrongdoer to the freehold of a wife, when the action is
trespass quare clausv/m f regit. But here the parties have
not thought proper to adopt that remedy for the injury, but
have resorted to an action for the thing itself. By the act
of severance from the freehold, whether done by the husband himself, or a wrongdoer, the timber becomes personal
property, and eo instanti vests in the husband. The action
is therefore for taking and carrying away the property of
the husband, in which the wife cannot be joined. The wife
can acquire no personal property in her own right, and if
she obtaias any, either by gift or otherwise, it becomes immediately the property of the husband, though not in his
But the property was in the construcactual possession.
tive, if not in the actual possession of the husband from the
time of the severance, and the subsequent asportation was a
wrong done to that possession, for which an action well lies
in his name, and in his name alone. The iajury is done to
him, and the wife has no interest whatever in the subjectmatter of the action, although she was a joint owner with
her husband of the free'hold, from which the timber was
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7,

it

it,

severed. In Nethart and Wife v. Anderson, 1 Salk. 114,
trover was brougM by haron and feme, and tlie plaintiff declared quod cum possessionat fuerwnt, etc., tlie defendant
converted ad damnum ipso rum, held nought after verdict;
for the possession of the wife is the possession of the husband, and so is the property ; so that the conversion cannot
be to the damage of the wife, but of the husband only. The
same doctrine held in trespass for taking goods. 1 Salk.
115.
So baron must briag an action alone for work done by
the wife during the coverture, unless there be an express
promise to the wife. Buckley v. Collins, 1 Salk. 115. And
one of the reasons given for the judgment of the court is,
that the advantage of the wife's work shall not survive to
This
the wife, but goes to the executor of the husband.
reason applies to this case, for had the baron died after
the severance of the timber, the property would not have
survived to the wife, but would have gone to the executors
of the husband ; for, by the severance, it becomes the property of the husband. There are some causes of action accruing through the means of the wife, for which the husband
must sue alone ; while there are others for which he may
join his wife with him in a suit, or sue aJone, as he pleases.
And the criterion by which it may be judged when he must
sue alone, and when he may or may not, seems to be this :
if the cause of action will survive to the wife, then the husband may join his wife in the action for the recovery of
or sue alone; but if
will not survive, then the husband
must sue alone. Clancy's Husband and Wife,
and the
authorities there cited. • • •
Judgment reversed.

V.

BOTHWELL.

Supreme Judicial Court

of

KENT

Massaclvusetts.

1890.

152 Massachusetts, 341.

:

a

Replevin, brought by the administratrix of the estate of
Nicholas Kent, in her own name, against a deputy sheriff.
Trial in the superior court, before Dewey, J., who allowed
bill of exceptions, in substance as follows
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The defendant, on July 3, 1889, attached and took ihe
property in question upon a writ, as the property of one
White. The plaintiff, who was appointed administratrix
on June 5, 1888, contended, and offered evidence tending to
prove, that the property when attached by the defendant
belonged to the estate, and the title to the same was in her
as such administratrix ; and that she was entitled to maintain the action in her own name. The defendant asked the
judge to rule that the plaintiff could not maintain the action
by virtue of the title which vested in her as administratrix.
The judge refused so to rule, and ordered a verdict for the

plaintiff; and the defendant alleged exceptions.
, Knowlton, J. :
To maintain an action of replevin for
goods, the plaintiff must prove his general or special property in them, and a right to immediate possession.
Upon causes of action which accrued in the lifetime of the

testator or intestate, an executor or administrator must sue
in his representative capacity, but in general, upon those
founded on transactions with him, or on injuries to property
occurring after his appointment, he may sue in his own
name. The fact that he is accountable for the proceeds of
the suit as assets of the estate does not necessarily preclude
bim from maintaining an action without reference to his
official relation. The rule has generally been stated to be,
that, for injuries to property committed after the death of
the intestate, an administrator may, and properly should,
sue as an individual ; but if he choo'ses to make his claim in
his official capacity the action will lie. 2 Greenl. Ev. Par.
338; Carlisle v. Burley. 3 Greenl. 250; Foster v. Gorton,
5 Pick. 185 ; Bollard v. Spencer, 7 T. R. 358 ; Knox v. Bigelow, 15 Wis. 415. It has sometimes been held, that to maintain trover in his own name the administrator must have
had actual possession, but the great weight of authority is
now otherwise, the action being made to rest on his right
of property, which draws after it the right of possession.
Bollard v. Spencer, 7 T. R. 358; Eollis v. Smith, 10 East,
293; Gray v. Swain, 2 Hawks. 15; Garter v. Estes, 11 Rich.
C), 264.
(S. C.) 363; Kerhy v. Quinn, Rice (S.^
Upon an appointment of an administrator, the property
of his intestate immediately passes to him by relation from
While he holds en
the time of his intestate's decease.
autre droit, he has the legal title, and may at any time
make an absolute disposition of the property for which he
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is accountable on Ms official bond. He holds both the possession and the property as an individual, although he holds
them under a kind of trust. An unlawful interference with
the property to its damage is a disturbance of his possession
for which he may sue in his own name, although under his
trust he is accountable for the damages recovered. In like
manner, it should be held, when a plaintiff must establish
a title, that an administrator's right to the chattels of the
intestate is a sufficient property for the maintenance of an
action.
None of the cases which have been brought to our attention refer to any distinction between replevin and actions
for injuries to property, in reference to an administrator's
right to sue in his own name ; and his right so to bring a
suit in replevin has been sustained by direct adjudication in
New York and in Florida. People v. Judges of Mayor's
Court, 9 Wend. 486; PatcJien v. Wilson, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 57;

Branch v. Branch, 6 Fla. 314.
The property of the plaintiff, as administratrix, was
sufficient to enable her to maintain her action ; and the ruling at the trial was correct.
Exceptions overruled.^

General Sulet as to Executors and Administrators.
92. — The personal representative of the deceased
(L e., his executors
and administrators)
can sue for injuries to the property of the deceased
done during his lifetime."
"The right to sue for injuries to the testator's or intestate's personal estate
c. 2 (extended by 15 Edw.
depends upon 4 Edw.
e. 5)."
"The
right to sue for injuries done to the real estate of the deceased in his lifetime depends on 3 and 4 Will. IV, c. 42, s. 2."
"Eule 93. — The personal representatives of the deceased cannot sue for
injuries to the person, feelings or reputation of the deceased."
"The rule that an action for a personal wrong dies with the person, still
applies to those wrongs which are of a strictly personal character."
''Eule 94. — The personal representatives of the deceased can sue for injuries to his personal property committed after his death."
"Eule 95. — The real representative of the deceased cannot sue for any
wrong done to him."
"The right to sue passes, if it passes at all, to a deceased person's
personal, and not to his real t«presentative ; nor can the latter sue for
injui7 done to his property after death." Dicey on Parties, ehap. XXIV.
1.

"Eule

Ill,

Ill,
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V.

in Toet.

MUMFOBD.

Supreme Court of New York.
14

791

1817.

Johnson, 426.

'

it

'

;

a

8)

(7

is

(5

(1

(1

is

is,

The plaintiff in error brought an action in the court helow, against the defendant in error, "for keeping up a milldam on the Susquehannah river, below the lands of the
plaintiff, whereby the water of the river was set back, and
flowed the. plaintiff's land," etc. The defendants pleaded
in abatement, that the land on which the milldam was
erected, and the mills appurtenant thereto, were held in
joiol—tenaney by the defendants, together with several
other persons (naming them) who were not made parties
to the suit. The plaintiff objected to the sufficiency of the
plea, but the justice gave judgment for the defendants.
PiiATT, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The general rule on this subject is, that if several persons jointly
commit a tort, the plaiatiff has his election to sue all, or
in its nature, a separate act
any of them, because a tort
of each individual, and, therefore, in actions, in form ex
delicto, such as trespass, trover, or case for malfeasance,
against one only, for a tort committed by several he cannot
plead the nonjoinder of the others, in abatement or in bar.
a distinction, however, in
Chitty's Plead. 75.) There
mere
personal actions of tort, and such
some cases between
Chitty. Plead. 76.) In the
as concern real property.
Term. Rep. 65), Lord Kenyon
case of Mitchell v. Tarhutt
any
recognizes this distinction, and says, "where there
all
the
parties
land,
to
must
be
dispute about the title
brought before the court." A case in the year books
shows that a plea in abatement may be well
Hen. IV,
pleaded for this cause, to an action on the case, for a tort.
An action of trespass on the case was brought against the
abbot of Stratford, and the plaintiff counted that the defendant held certain land, by reason whereof he ought to
repair wall on the bank of the Thames that the plaintiff
had lands adjoining, and that for default of repairing the
wall, his meadows were drowned. To which Skrene said,
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may be that the abbot had nothing in the land, by cause
whereof he should be charged, but jointly with others, in
which case the one cannot answer without the other."
©ut in actions for torts relating to lands of the defendants, there seems to be ground for this further distinction
viz., between nuisances arising from acts of malfeasance,
and those which arise from mere omission, or nonfeasance.
The case of the abbot of Stratford was that of a nuisance,
arising from neglect of duty in not repairing a wall, which
was by law enjoined on the proprietor or proprietors of
the land on which the wall stood. The gist of the action,
therefore, was, that the defendant was such proprietor, and
had neglected a duty incident to his title. The title to the
land, on which the nuisance existed, was, therefore, directly
in question; for if the abbot was not the owner of the land,
he was not chargeable with neglect, nor lia(ble for the
nuisance. But in this case, the action is for a nuisance arising from an act of misfeasance, the " keeping up a miUdam
on a stream below the plaintiff's land." Here needs no
averment that the defendant owned the land on which the
dam was kept up. The title to that land cannot come in
question in this suit, for the maintaining such a dam is
equally a nuisance, and the defendants are equally liable for
damages, whether the defendants own the land as joint tenants with others, or whether they are sole proprietors, or
whether they have any right whatever in it." "Keeping
up" the dam implies a positive act of the defendants ; it is a
malfeasance, and therefore, the plaintiff has a right of action against all or any of the parties who keep up that dam.
,Unless
the title comes in question, there is no difference, in
■f
this respect, in cases arising ex delicto, between actions
merely personal, and those which concern the realty. The
"plaintiff in such an action is always bound to join his cotenants, because his title must come in question as the
foundation of his claim; but he may sue any or all who
have done the tortious act. The justice, therefore, erred
in deciding against the demurrer to the plea in abatement,
and the judgment must be reversed.

Judgment reversed.^
Partner* and Member* of Unineorporated Societies.
104. — One, or any, or all of the partners in a firm, or members of an
unincorporated company, may be sued jointly for a wrong committod bjr the
firm or company. ' ' Dicety on Fartiea, 467.
2.

"Bule

^^^
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V.

ECKWTJEZEL.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
42

793

1868,

Alabama, 322.

This was an action for conversion of chattels brought by

*
*
*
appellee against appellants.
The conrt below charged the jury: "That if they believed from the evidence, that the goods were the property
of the plaintiff, and were wrongfully taken by the defendant
Moore, without the knowledge, authority, or consent of the
plaintiff, and were afterwards sold by the defendant Moore,
to the defendant LarMns, without the knowledge, authority,
or consent of the plaintiff, and if this occurred before the
commencement of the suit, the defendants were jointly
liable to the plaintiff. ' '

The jury rendered a verdict against both the defendants,
on which judgment was rendered for $1,332; from which
they appealed, and assign for error the charges given as
above.
Byed, J. : The main question in, this case is, whether upon the facts shown by the record, the action is maintainable
against the appellants jointly. There can be no doubt that
under the law and the facts in evidence, that the appellants
are severally liable in trover. Lee v. Matthews, 10 Ala.
682; Conner & Johnson v. Allen & Reynolds, 33 ib. 516. No
case has been found by us, none brought to our notice by
counsel, in which a joint action in trover has been brought
agaiust the seller and buyer of a chattel, where the latter
was a purchaser bona fide.
In the elementary works, no reference is made to the joint
liability in trover of a seller and buyer, to the owner of a
chattel. The-cef erence made to the joint liability of parties
in this-ferm of action, are uniformly if not janiversaJly, to
parties who participated, in some way, in the original conv«rsipn. In this case, when Moore took possession of the
goods, under the evidence, he was liable for the conversion
to the owner, and so would all persons who participated in
that act have been, severally or jointly, liable with him,
whether they knew or had notice of the claim of the owner
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joint liability of the original tort-

feasor and a person to whom he sold the goods without
any notice of the claim of the owner, the question is more
difficult of solution.
The absence of any case in point, and the failure of the
elementary writers to make any reference to such a case,
may be looked upon as persuasive to show that in the opinion of the profession, "such an action is not maintainable.
Upon principle, it would seem unjust to subject a bona fide
purchaser from a tort-feasor, to a joint suit with him, to
the costs and damages which may be recovered in such an
action, and to have them fixed upon him as a joint liability
with his vendor.

Btkd, J.: "We have carefully examined the record, the
application for a rehearing, and the foregoing opinion; and,
in response to the application, we have come to the conclusion to adhere to that opinion. In the case of White v.
H. 546 (see, also, Powery v. Sawyer,
Demary et al., 2
46 Maine, 160; Moody v. Whitney, 34 ib. 563; Drake v.
Barrymore, 14 John. 166; 2 Scam. 448; 2 Hill on Torts, 467,
Par. 26; Laymon v. Hendrix, 1 Ala. 212); the court say,
"when an action soimds in tort, and is against more than

K

one person, judgment cannot be had tigainst more than one,
without evidence of a joint wrong.
separate wrong by
only
the
sufferer
to
separate
entitles
a
action against
each,
''
And the court further saj^ that had the action been
each.
ex contractu, a neglect of one would have subjected both.
"But being ex delicto, the defendants to be all liable, must
all have actually perpetrated the wrong, or directed it to be
''
The facts of that case are not identical with those
done.
of this, but suflSciently so for the application of the principles announced, to the facts of this case.

A

And in Eilliard on Torts, it is said that a person who

knowingly receives from another a chattel, which the latter
has wrongfully seized, and afterward, on demand refused
to give it back to the owner, does not thereby become a
joint trespasser, unless the chattel was seized for his use.
"So where A. took and converted the raule of plaintiff and
sold it to B.", it was held that the original taking by A, and
the detention by B. were separate causes of action. P. 448.
Bhit it has been held that where a consignee, with power
to sell, sells' with intent to defraud the consignor, which
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mtent is known to tlie purchaser, the seller and buyer are

jointly liable in trover.

White v. Wall, 40 Maine, 574.
Which is consistent with the doctrine held by us in the opinion heretofore delivered in this case. And these cases, with
those cited heretofore, clearly draw the line of distinction
which runs between those cases in which a joint action in
trover lies against a buyer and seller, and those iu which it
does not. In trover against several defendants, all cannot
be found guilty on the same count, without proof of a joint
conversion by all. And if they all join in an act with the
intent to deprive the owner of property, or to convert it to
the use of one or both, they are jointly liable, whether the
act be one of sale and purchase, or of any other character.
But the sale by one who has converted the property of another, to an innocent purchaser, cannot sustain a joiat
action, in form ex delicto, against the seller and buyer.
Although all the evidence is not set out, yet enough is set
out to show that the charge is erroneous. Lackett v. McCord,
23 Ala. 851; Moore v. Clay, 24 Ala. 235; Hines et ux. v.
Trautham, 27 Ala. 359.^
3.
A few torts such as slander and perhaps seduction, cannot be the act
of more than one person. Thus, in Coryton v. Lithebye (1682) 2 Wms. Saund,
117 c, it was said that "one action will not lie against several persons for

same words, as where a man brought an action against two
•
»
•
hast stolen plate,
and we do arrest thpe for that
felony,' and, there being a verdict for the defendant, it was moved in arrest
of judgment, that the action does not lie against two jointly, because the
•
•
•
words of one are not the words of the other,
and so it was
several
causes
can
no
more produce a joint
resolved by the court, for these
action than their words and tongues can be said to be one."
"Enle 100. —Each wrongdoer's separate liability to be sued for a tort
passes on his death (if it survives at all) to his personal representatives.
The joint liability of several wrongdoers passes on the death of each to
the surviTors."
Dicey on Parties, 439.
speaking

the

for saying 'thou

MADDOX

V.

BEOWX.

Supreme Jvdicial Court of Maine.
71

1880.

Maine, 432.

Appletoit, C. J.: The defendant's son, a minor of the
age of seventeen years, took his father's horse and carriage,

which he had been allowed to use without restriction, and
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drove to a store for the purpose of depositing money, which
as treasurer of a Sabbath school, he had received the day
before. Etntering the store to make the deposit, he left his
horse unfastened and unattended, and the horse so left
started, and running away, the defendant's carriage collided
with the plaintiff's team and occasioned an injury, to recover compensation for which this action is brought.
The horse and carriage were taken by the son in the
absence of the defendant, and without his knowledge.
It is not pretended that the son was an unfit person to be
entrusted with the use of the horse, or that the horse was
unsafe or misuitable. The plaintiff claims to recover, not
on the ground of the parental and filial relation, but because
the son in the management of the defendant's team was his
servant, and engaged in his business, and that the defendant was liable for his negligence.
The master is liable to third persons for all damages resulting from the negligence of his servants, acting under
his orders, or in the course of his business. Specific directions are not required. It is sufficient if the act was one
within the range of the servant's employment. The general
rule, as judicially declared in England, is that the master
is answerable for every wrong of his servant committed in
the course of the service and for the master's benefit, though
no express command or privity of the master be proved.
Wharton on Negligence, Par. 161 ; Mitchell v. Crassweller,

Eng. C. L. 236.
master is not liable for his servant's torts when not
in his employ. If a master gives his servant liberty for a
day to go to a fair and to take his horse and wagon, he is
not liable to third persons for an injury done by the servant
during the day with his horse and wagon. Bard v. Yohn,
The owner of a horse and carriage is not
26 Penn. 482.
liable for an injury caused by the negligent driving of a
borrower, to a third person, if not being used at the time in
the owner's business. Herlihy v. Smith, 116 Mass. 265. So
in Sheridan v. Chadwich, 4 Daly, 338, a coachman, after
having used his master's horse and carriage in gloiag upon
an errand for his master, instead of taking them to the
stable, used them in going upon an errand of his own, without his master's knowledge or consent, and, while so doing,
negligently ran into and injured the plaintiff's horse; it
If a servant
was held that the master was not liable.
76

A
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does a

wrongful or negligent act without the authority, and
not for the purpose of
executing the orders or doing the
work of his master, the latter is not responsible in damages

therefor. Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Allen, 49.
Tihe relation of master and servant must exist at the
time of the injury.

It

cannot be pretended, that, under the circumstances
stated, the boy was engaged in the business of his father or
acting for him. The jury could not have drawn the inference that he was so engaged or was so acting.
It would
have been unauthorized from the evidence.
The instructions given were correct, and those requested,
so far as proper and applicable, were given.
Exceptions overruled.

MAYER

V.

THO'MPSON-HUTCmSON BUILDING
COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
104

1894.

Alabama, 611.

Coleman, J. : The Thompson-Hutchison Bliilding Co., a
corporation, contracted to erect a brick building in the city
of Birmingham. Thompson, a corporator and president of
the corporation, as its agent and officer, controlled and
directed the workmen in its construction. A brick, either
without the application of force, or by force, fell from the
top of the wall, which, in falling, struck the plaintiff below
on the head, and greatly injured him. Thompson was not
present when the injury occurred, and was not otherwise
liable than asi an agent or officer of the company in charge.
The first count of the complaint charges, that the defend*
*
*
in so
ants ' ' did erect and build a certain building
careless, negligent and improper a manner, that by reason
thereof certain brick fell from said building," etc. In the
second count it is charged that the defendants "did erect
*
*
*
to
and build a certain four-story brick building,
the height of sixty feet, without any scaffold barrier and
*
* *
from brick falling
safeguard, to protect persons,
from said bnilding, when it was their duty to do so" etc.
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Tlie corporation and Thompson and the other corporators
were jointly sued. The jury, under the instruction of the
court, returned a verdict against the corporation and in
favor of Thompson. This statement of the case we deem
sufficient, to bring up the material questions involved.

The second count charges the defendants with neglect
in their failure or omission to erect scaffolds or guards,- so
as to prevent brick from falling to the ground.
On this
proposition the defendant, Thompson, invokes the doctrine
that an agent or servant is not liable for a mere omission
or nonfeasance. The rule is stated as as contended for in
Story on Agency, Par. 308, and in Story on Contracts, Par.
171 ; and there are numerous decisions which fully sustain
the text. There are courts of high authority which hold
differently. Our attention has not been called to any decision of the question in this State, and in declaring the law
which shall govern, we have carefully considered both lines
of decisions.
The principle upon which the rule is founded, as declared
by Story, is, that there is no privity between the servant
or agent and third persons, but the privity exists only between him and the master or principal. This relation of
privity is that from which arises the maxim respondeat
The liability of the principal or master to third
superior.

persons does not depend upon any privity between him and
such third persons. It is tie privity between the master
and servant that creates: the liability of the master for injuries sustained by third persons on account of the misfeasance and nonfeasance of the servant or agent. It is
difficult to apply the same principles which govern in
matters of contract between an agent and third persons to
the torts of an agent which inflict injury on third persons,
whether they be of misfeasance or nonfeasance, or to give a
sound reason, why a person, who, while acting as principal,
would be individually liable to third persons for an omission
of duty, becomes exempt from liability for the same omission of duty, because he was acting as Sicrvant or agent.
The tort is none the less a tort to a third person, whether
suffered from one acting as principal or agent, and his
rights ought to be the same against the one whose neglect
of duty has caused the injury. We think the better rule declared in Baird v. SMpmcm, 132 111. 16 (22 Amer. St. Eep.
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504), in which it is held, that "an agent of the owner of
property, who has the complete control and management of
tile premises, and who is bound to keep them in repair, is
liable to third persons for injuries resulting to the latter,
while using the premises in an ordinary and appropriate
manner, through the neglect of such agent. And the agent
cannot excuse himself on the plea that his priDcipal is
liable. It is not his contract that exposes him to liability
to third persons, but his common law obligation to so use
that which he controls as not to injure another."
See
notes to this case in 22 Amer. St. Eep. 504, supra. In Ellis
V. McNaugUon, 76 Mich. 237 (15 Am. St. Rep. 308), we find
this language: "Misfeasance may involve the omission to
do something which ought to be done; as when an agent,
engaged in the performance of his undertaking omits to do
something which it is his duty to do under the circiunstances; as that when he does not exercise that degree of
care which due regard for the rights of others requires. ' ' In
Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co., 63, Me. 552 (16 Amer. Eep.
is the actual personal negligence of
503), it is said :
the agents which constitutes the constructive negligence of
the corporation. The corporation acts through and by them,
and they act for the corporation, and when their acts or
neglects result in injury to third persons, they are equally

"It

responsible with their principal." This rule is broadly
stated in 14 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 814. We might
cite other decisions if deemed necessary. We hold, that the
more relation of agency does not exempt a person from
liability for any injury to third persons resulting from his
neglect of duty, for which he would otherwise be liable.

WHALEN

V.

PENNSYLVANIA EAILROAD COMPAI^.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
73

J.

1906.

New Jersey Law, 192.

The plaintiff in this action sued the de:
C.
fendant company and one Spencer, an employee of the company, who was a citizen of New Jersey, for injuries reGttmmeeb,
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ceived by Hm while a passenger upon one of the defendant
company's ferryboats. Plaintiff had a verdict and fadgment against both defendants.
*

*

*

The averment of the declaration was that "the
said defendants failed and neglected to use due and reasonable care to carry the plaintiff safely in the said boat under
their direction, operation and management, and so negligently and carelessly operated, managed and controlled
said boat that said boat was, through negligent and careless conduct of the said Pennsylvania Eailroad Company
and the said Spencer, its servants, employee and agents,
propelled at a high rate of speed against a certain pier or
bulkhead, so that said plaintiff, while being carried as a
passenger as aforesaid on the said boat of the said defendant company, under the direction and control of the
said Spencer, was violently thrown to the deck of said boat,
and then and there greatly injured." The negligence alleged is charged to be that of the defendants, and the statement that the boat, at the time of the accident, was under
the direction of Spencer, does not negative this allegation.
*
*
*
So far as this court is concerned, the rule is
settled that where an injury is caused by the negligence of
an agent, acting in the line of his employment, the action
may be joint against such agent and his principal, or may
be separate against either (Brokaw v. North Jersey Railroad Co., 3 Vroom, 328, 333; Newman v. Fowler, 8 id. 89, 90),
and this rule has, inferentially, received the approval of
the court of errors and appeals in the case of Peterson v.
Middlesex and Somerset Traction Co. et cH., 42 id. 296.
The second assignment of error, which is that a joint
action cannot be maintained against an employer and employee under the circumstances set out in thef declaration,
is disposed of by what has already been said.
The judgment under review must he affirmed.
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v.

THE HEIRS OF SMITH.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
5

Wmght, C.

At

J.:
•

801

1857.

Iowa, 157.

•••••••••
•

•

•

common law, infants were required to sue and defend
by guardian. By the statute of Westm., 1 C. 48 and 2 C. 15,
they were authorized to sue by prochein ami. These statutes, however, gave only an accumulative remedy; for the
infant might still sue, either by guardian or by next friend.
Co. Lit. 135, b. note, 220; Miles v. Boy den, 3 Pick. 213; 3 Bacon's Ab. 616. The Code simply recognizes this common
law rule, and provides the same cumulative remedy — it being therein declared that minors may sue and defend by
guardian; that those who have no guardian, may sue by
next friend; and that the court may appoint a guardian
ad litem, to defend for a minor, who has no other guardian.
Sections 1688, 1689. In this case, the record shows affirmatively that, at the time of the death of the father, five of
the defendants (his^ children and heirs) were minors. They
were admitted to be minors by plaintiff at the May term,
1851, when he moved that they be notified of the pendency
of said cause. They were never notified; they never appeared by guardian; nor was there even a next friend apTo say that such miaors
pointed to defend for them.
should be concluded by a trial, thus conducted, we think,
would be to establish a rule dangerous in the extreme — a
rule which would be at variance with all of our settled
notions of law, as applied to the rights of infant parties in
a legal proceeding.
We do not believe that any case can be found, where
the property of infants has been disposed of under the
circumstances herein disclosed. The infant is supposed to
be incapable of guarding his own interests, and it is the duty
of the court, before it divests him of his estate, to be satisfied that he has: had a full opportunity to have his day in
court, by a proper and suitable guardian ; and to see, notwithstanding any admission of facts, even by such guardian,
Walton v. Covlson, 1
that his rights are not sacrificed.
.

C.

L. p.

51
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McLean, 120; Greenup v. Bacon, 1 Mon. 108; Austin v.
Charlestown Female Seminary, 8 Met. 196; Bloom v. Burdick, 1 Hill, 131; The Bank of United States v. Richie, Si
Peters, 128. The minor may be sued in his own name, but
he cannot appear by attorney but only by guardian, adClarke v. Gilmanton,
mitted, or appointed by the court.
12 N. H. 515; Alderman v. Tinell, 8 Johns. 418; Valentine
V. Cooley, 1 Meigs. 613; Knapp v. Crosby, 1 Mass. 479;
Bank v. Richie, 8 Peters, 128 ; Mercer v. Watson, 1 Watts,
330; Comstock v. Carr, 6 Wend. 528; Starbird v. Moore, 21
Vermont, 530; 3 Bacon's Ab. 616; Mackey v. Gray, 2 Johns,
192.

It

is claimed by counsel, however, that there is nothing
to show that said five defendants were minors at the time
of the trial ; that they may have attained their majority before that time. In the first place it may be answered to
this that the material inquiry is what was their age at the
time they appeared and plead (if there was such appearance), and not at the time of the rendition of the judgment. And if it is claimed that a party, by appearance and
defending a cause, after attaining his full age, thereby
waives any error resulting from appearing and pleading
in the first instance by attorney, the answer in this case
is that the record does not show that these defendants had,
We
before trial and judgment, attained their majority.
cannot presume that they were of full age at the time of
the trial. By the record they appear to be minors.
We
will certainly not aUow this to be contradicted by a pre•
•
•
sumption.

WEIGHT

V.

LEONARD.

Court of Common Pleas.
80

be

1861,

Law Journal (New Series),

365,

Btles, J.: I am of opinion that our judgment should
for the defendant. The record shews that the female

defendant, a married woman, fraudulently represented to
the plaintiff that certain acceptances were the acceptances
of her husband and that the plaintiff relying on those rep-
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resentations was thereby induced to advance money on the
bills to one Salt, the drawer. The law is settled that a married woman is with her husband liable for her torts ; but
that, on the other hand, she is not liable on her contracts
made during coverture.
The law is the same as to infants.
They are liable for their torts, but not, with certain exceptions, upon their contracts.
There is a class of intermediate cases, partaking partly of the nature of contracts
and partly of the nature of torts, in which the question
arises as to which category they are here to be referred.
It is not easy to lay down any general rule upon this sub
ject; but conceive that, at all events, misrepresentations,
upon the faith of which the plaintiff has acted, and which
might have been treated by him as contracts or warranties,
are not binding on the feme covert or the infant ; for if they
were binding, then the protection which the law throws over
married women and infants woidd be in great measure withdrawn.
Thus, a misrepresentation by an infant that he is
of full age {Johnson v. Pye, 1 Keb. 913), or a false statement by a married woman that she is discovert, is no
ground of action (Cooper v. Withan, 1 Lev. 247, and Cannan V. Farmer, 3 Exch. Rep. 698). In America there has
been a great number of decisions to the effect that an infant is not liable for fraud in cases where a contract is in
substance the ground of action, or where it is contained in a
contract which he is not capable of making (Wilt v. Welsh,
6 Watts, 9 Brown v. Durham, 1 Eoot, 273; Wallace v.
Morse, 5 HUl 391 ; and Morrill v. Aden, 19 Vermont, 505) ;
and it would seem that the law is the same even in cases;
where there may be other objections to the validity of the
contract besides the disability of the infant or married
woman, such, for example, as the absence of consideration,
for otherwise an infant or married woman might be liable
where they have received no consideration, and not liable
The cases in
where they have received considerations.
liable
for
defainatory
woman
is
words are
which a married
obviously distinguishable from cases ia which she is sought
to be made liable in an action ex contractu or ex quasi contractu. In the case of defamatory words, there is not only
no contract or semblance of a contract on the part of the
married woman herself, but there is no agreement or assent,
This disexpress or implied, on the part of the plaintiff.
tinction is indicated somewhat obscurely in the case of

I
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Cooper V. Withcm, 1 Lev. 247. In tlie present case the representation on which it is sought to charge the husband and
wife seems to me to be in the nature of a warranty.*
4.

mitted

107. — A husband and wife must be sued jointly for all torts comby the Trife either before or during coverture." Dicey on Parties,

"Eule

476.

Seotion 6.

Consequences of Nonjoindeb and Misjoindeb
OF

(a)

Parties.

In Actions

SNELL

V.

on Contract.

DB LAND.

'Supreme Court of Illinois.
43

Illinois,

1867,

323.

Bbeese, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action of assumpsit brought in the Dfe Witt
Circuit Court by James De Land, Edward De Land, Jonathan Hall, Henry Magill, Robert Magill, Samuel Magill,
and William Magill, against Thomas Snell, on a contract
of sale, made July 1, 1864, by them to Snell, of thirteen
thousand pounds of wool, at eighty cents per pound, to be
delivered in a reasonable time, with an averment, that the
plaintiffs did sell and deliver to the defendant in pursuance of the contract, on the 1st day of August, 1864, thirteen
thousand nine hundred and forty-nine and one-half pounds
of wool.
The plea was non assumpsit. • • •

The errors assigned are in finding the issues for the plaintiffs and in overruling the motion for a new trial.
On this assignment of error, the first point made by appellant is, that the proof does not show a joint interest in
the plaintiffs in this contract.
The rule on this subject is well settled. If plaintiffs sue
as joint contractors, they must show a joint interest in the
contract. The appellees ' counsel admit this to be the common law principle, but insist that section 7 of the act en-.
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it,

it,

titled "Evidence and Depositions" (Scates' Comp: 256, ch.
40), has changed the common law in this respect; that the
names and number of the contractors are presumed to be
right in the absence of any plea in abatement, or, unless
the defendant proves on the trial, that the plaintiffs are
too many or too few, or that their names are different.
That section was not designed to change the rules of
pleading, but simply dispenses with certain proofs, plaintiffs suing as partners, or as joint obligees or payees, were
required to make, at common law, imder the general issue
pleaded. It is a rule as old as the science of pleading itself,
that in declaring in actions on contracts there must not be
too few or too many plaintiffs. If there be, it is fatal to a
recovery; the action must fail, and this objection can be
availed of, either by plea in abatement, or as a ground of
nonsiut on the trial upon the plea of the general issue. 1
Ch. PI. 8; Murphy v. Orr, 32 HI. 489. It is most proper
upon the plea of the general issue, for under that plea the
plaintiff is bound to prove his case as he has stated it in
his declaration. The allegations and proofs must correspond — alleging that four persons, plaintiffs, made the contract declared on, with the defendant, is not supported by
or that the four
proof that but three of them made
together with another person named. The
named made
rule is, that the nonjoinder or misjoinder of plaintiffs may
be taken advantage of under the general issue.
Ch. PI.
20.

•

•

•

it

a

is

7

of chapter 40 furnishes a rule of evidence, or
Section
rather dispenses with proof of certain facts, which previous
to the statute was required. It furnishes no rules of pleadapparent
ing, leaving them as' at the common law; this
from the proviso to the section. A defendant may show,
as at common law, that too many persons, or too few, are
joined as plaintiffs, and this under the general issue. Here
They are named as James
there are too many plaintiffs.
De Land, Edward De Land and Jonathan B. Hall, and
the four Magills. Hall, the witness, testifies that James De
Land, Edward De Land, and Jonathan R. Hall were partdistinct
ners, and that the four Magills were partners, as
—
not that the De Lands,
partnership, as we understand
inter
were
sese.
partners
Hall and the Magills
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of the drcuit court is reversed
Judgment reversedJ^

S.
The objections of nonjoinder and misjoinder of parties plaintiff may
also be raised bj demnrrer, or hj motion in arrest of judgment after verdict,
or by writ of error after judgment.
See many cases eited in Ames' Cases on
Pleading (2nd Ed.) 133-140.

INHABITANTS OF EICHMONID

v.

TOOTHAKEB.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
69

1879,

Maine, 451.

YmaTs, J.: Debt against the sureties on a town collector's bond, executed jointly, by Samuel Brown as principal, and these defendants as sureties.
The plaintiff's set out a joint, and not a joint and several, bond averring, with proper allegations of time and
venue, that the defendants, "together with one Samuel
Brown," by a certain writing obligatory, made, sealed and
delivered to the plaintiffs ' ' as the deed of the said Hagar,
Toothaker and Brown, and here in court to be produced, acknowledged themselves to be bound to the plaintiffs in the
sum of $24,000, to be paid to them on demand."
The defendants pleaded nan est factum, with brief statement of omnia performaverunt.
The case comes up on report, stipulating, among other
things, that this court, with jury powers as to the facts,
"are to render judgment, upon so much of the evidence as
is legally admissible, according to the legal rights of the
parties."
By this stipulation the pleadings must be considered.
The defendants contended at the argument that the action is not maintainable, for the reason that the bond is
joint and only two of the three obligors are made defendants.
The plaintiffs replied, that the nonjoinder should have
been pleaded in abatement, and tha,t the bankruptcy of
Brown excused the nonjoinder.
To these positions the defendants rejoined: (1) That
the plaintiffs having in their declaration informed the court
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that Brown was a joint obligor, the defendants were thereby relieved of the necessity of pleading that fact in abatement; and (2) that the debt, created by Brown's defalcation, was fiduciary, and therefore not barred by his discharge in bankruptcy.
The rule of the common law has long been well settled
that all of the joint obligors or promissors (with certain
well-known exceptions not essential to the decision of this
case) ought to be made defendants ; and that the plaintiff
may be compelled to join them, if advantage be seasonably
taken of any omission by proper plea. 1 Wm. Saund. 291,
b. n. 4; West v. Furbish, 67 Maine, 17. And the general rule
is that objection to the nonjoinder of a defendant can be
taken only by plea in abatement.
White v. Gushing, 30
Maine, 267; Reed v. Wilson, 39 Maine, 585; Richmond v.
Broivn, 67 Maine, 373.
But while there can be no doubt that, generally, in ease
of the nonjoinder of defendants unlike that of plaintiffs, it
is essential for the party defendant to plead it in abatement,
and therein give the plaintiff a better Avrit by giving the
name of whomsoever else ought to be joined; it would seem
to be equally well settled that when the plaintiff knows all
who ought to be joined, and mentions them in his declaration, then there is no necessity for giving such information
by way of plea in abatement; but that, in such case, the nonjoinder is a good ground of demurrer, or motion in arrest
of judgment ; and in case of judgment, by default at least,
it may be assigned for error, llarwood v. Roberts, 5 Maine,
381.
Gould Plead, c. 5, sec. 115; 1 Chit. Plead. (16 Am.

Ed.) 54, note K.
That the objection cannot be taken at the trial, as a
ground of nonsuit on the general issue, was decided by

Whelpdale's case, 5 Co., 119, and by South v. Tanner, 2
Taut. 254, in which the nonjoinder appeared on the face of
the declaration, but a nonsuit was set aside and a new trial
granted. Neally v. Moulton, 12 N. H. 483. And we do not
perceive any reason why it should. There is no variance,
The obligation is in law
as it was formerly understood.
regarded as the deed of the defendants, although not their
deed alone. It is none the less the defendants' obligation
because another was bound with them. Eapgood v. Watson,
"It
65 Maine, 510; Gove v. Lawrence, 24 N. H. 128.
would be very odd," said Mansfield, C. J., "if proof that
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a bond was executed by three would disapprove that it was
''
South v. Tanner, sv/pra.
executed by two of them.
The nonjoinder might have been pleaded in abatement,
notwithstanding it appeared in the declaration. Harwood
That is the
V. Roberts, supra; Neally v. Moulton, supra.
means which enables one obligor to compel a joinder of all.
Such a joinder may not be necessarily for the benefit of
the plaintiff, but of defendant. For, when all are joined,
and judgment is rendered against all, any one of them may,
have contribution against the others and the
by paying
judgment will afford him conclusive evidence of the amount
to be paid by them. If, then, a defendant omits to compel
nonjoinder, he simply waives an adjoinder by pleading
vantage which he might have obtained. He would not thereby lose his right of contribution, to be sure, but he wciuld
have no judgment which would conclude his contributors.

6

that the plaintiffs are en-

ABBOTT.

Errors

Hill,

of

Court for the Correction

V.

of

BUEGESS

is

Our conclusion, therefore,
titled to judgment.

New YorTc.

1843.

135.

it

a

is

"Walwoeth, Chancellor: The plaintiff ia error in this
judgment which
case was sued in an action of debt upon
stated in the declaration to have been recovered against him
and H. Crane, in an action of assumpsit, in the superior
does not appear by the
court of Cincinnati, Ohio. And
declaration whether Crane was alive or dead at the time of
the commencement of this suit upon the judgment.
The

it

5

it

is

question for consideration, therefore, is, whether tjie declaration
so defective in substance as to make
the duty of
the court to give judgment for the defendant upon a general
demurrer to the declaration.
It was decided, in the case of Horner v. Moor, in the court
of king's bench in England, in 1750 (see Burr. Rep. 2614),
where
appeared, on the face of the declaration, not only
that the bond upon which the defendant was sued was made

Sec.
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by him jointly with another person, but also that such other
person was still living, that the neglect to join such person
in the suit was a good ground for arresting the judgment.
And if it could be objected to in that way, the declaration
must necessarily be bad upon a general demurrer.
Sergeant Williams note to the case of Cabell v. Vaughan (1
Saund. Eep. 291, n. 4) is to the same effect; and it may
fairly be inferred from this note also, that, in his opinion,
if both of those facts did not appear from the declaration,
or some other pleading on the part of the plaintiff, the
defendant could not raise the objection of the nonjoinder of
a joint obligor in any other way than by a plea in abatement. In such a plea it is well settled that the defendant
must not only show that the contract upon which he is sued
was jointly made by him and another person, but also that
such other person is still living.
(HoUingworth v. Ascue,
Cro. EUz., 355, 494.)
have not been able to find any English case in which
it has been decided that advantage could be taken of the
nonjoinder of a co-obligor or promisor, upon general demurrer to the declaration, in an action upon the contract,

I

even where it appeared by the plaintiff's own showing that
there was originally a joint contract ; unless it also appeared
that the joint contractor was still living. On the other hand,
have not found any actual decision in England that the
objection could not be made by special demurrer, where the
fact appeared upon the face of the declaration that the contract was made jointly with another unless the plaintiff
went further and showed some excuse for not making such
joint contractor a party of the suit ; as by showing that he
was dead, or was an infant, and therefore not legally liable
upon the joint contract. The cases relied on by Mr. Justice
Story in Oilman v. Rives (10 Peters' Rep. 299), to prove
that a declaration is bad upon general demurrer, if the plaintiff shows there were other persons who contracted jointly
with the defendant, will be found upon examination not to
have been ordinary actions to recover a debt, or damages
arising upon contract ; but they were proceedings- by scire
(See
facias upon records, to obtain execution thereon.
Blackwell v. AsMon, Aleyn's Rep. 21, Style's Rep. 50, S. C. ;

I

The King v. Yoimg, 2 Anst. Eep. 448 ; The King v. Chapman, 3 id. 811.) Those cases rest upon the technical ground
that the writ of scire facias, upon a judgment or recogni-
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zance, to obtain execution thereon, must conform to tlie record, unless there is some suggestion in the writ showing a

good reason for departing from it.

*

*

*

There is no good reason why the defendant in such a
case should he permitted to raise a formal objection of this
kind by general demurrer, since the statute requiring matters of form to be specially pointed out. Where it appears
by the plaintiff's own showing that there is a joint contractor still aJive, who has not been niade a defendant in
the suit, it is evident that he ought not to be permitted to
proceed in such suit without making him a party. But
where it does not appear that the joint contractor who is not
sued is in full life, but a mere inference of law arises that
he may be, the defendant,

if

he can raise the objection by

is

it

I

if

I

a

is

if

it,

demurrer, should demur specially. For if the attention of
the plaintiff was called to the -fact by a special demurrer
that it did not appear by his declaration but that such joint
debtor was in full life and might have been joined in the
suit, he might amend his declaration, where the fact would
and cure the apparent irregularity by showing
justify
that the joint contractor was dead, or had been discharged
under the bankrupt act, or that he was an infant and therehe chose
fore would not be legally bound by the contract
to make that objection. And either of these would be a good
answer to the apparent informality appearing in the origiThe legislature having prohibited the denal declaration.
fendant from delaying the suit by a plea in abatement
where the declaration does not show a joint indebtedness,
in full life as well
unless' he shows the joint contractor
as the joint liability, by swearing to his plea, the plaintiff
ought not to be turned out of court, by a general demurrer,
upon the mere presumption that such party may be still
suit upon the joint contract.
alive and subject to
For
am inclined to think, in the abthese reasons, although
sence of any direct authority to the contrary in England,
before the revolution, or in this State since, that the objection to the declaration in the present case might have
been valid
am
specially pointed out by the demurrer,
satisfied
not an objection of which the defendant can
avail himself, in this State, either by general demurrer to
the declaration, or by a motion in arrest of judgment.
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aware that, in the case of Gilman v. Rives, before
referred to, and in the cases cited by the court below from
the reports of Virginia and of Maine (Leftwich v. Berkeley,
1 Hen. & Munf. 61, Harwood v. Roberts, 5 Greenl, Rep.
441), the objection has been held good upon general demurrer, motion in arrest of judgment, and even upon a
writ of error after a judgjnent entered by default against
the defendant.
Blit the decisions iu all of those cases appear to be based upon the English decisions in the three
scire facias cases from Aleyn, Style, and Anstruther; without adverting to the distinction between proceedings of that
kind and ordinary actions. And it has been decided by the
courts of other States that the defendant cannot avail himself of the objection of nonjoinder in any form of pleading
unless it appears that the joint contractor who is not sued
is in full life, as well as jointly liable with such defendant.
(See Mackall v. Roberts, 3 Monr. (Kent.) Bep. 130; Geddes
V. EoAJoh, 10 Serg. & Eawle (Penn.) Eep. 38.)
therefore think the decision of the superior court of the
city of New York in this case was not erroneous ; and that
the judgment of the supreme court sustaining that decision
should be affirmed.

I

Judgment affirmed.

SNELLGROVE

v.

HUNT.

Court of King's Bench.
1

Chitty's Reports,

1819,
71,

Assranpsit on a bill of exchange drawn the 16th of January 1818, payable four months after date for £100 to the
order of Bartholomew White, the bankrupt, and accepted
The declaration alleged the promises
by the defendant
to be made to the assignees of the bankrupt. At the trial
before Abbott, C. J., at the sittings after last term at
Guildhall, it appeared in evidence that the commission
issued against the bankrupt was dated on the 7th of
March, 1818; that the bill of exchange in question wa:i
due on the 19th of May following; that there were three
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assignees appointed under the commission, two only of
which joined in the present action. Under these circumstances, it was objected on the part of the defendant, that
all the assignees should have joined in the action, inasmuch as the action was founded entirely upon promises to
all. The case of Bloxam v. Hubbard, 5 East, 405, was
cited as an express authority; and the chief justice acquiescing in the^ objection, the plaintiffs were nonsuited.
F. Pollock now moved for a rule to shew cause why
the nonsuit should not be set aside, and a new trial granted.
The question in this case
whether two assignees
out of three may not lawfully sue, inasmuch as they sue in
must be adUndoubtedly
representative character.
founded enmitted that the declaration in this case
tirely upon promises made to the assignees of the bankrupt generally.
But this case may not be considered as
distinguishable from the case of executors, who may sue
without joining aU the executors named in the will. This
must be confessed, had some strong
objection however,
authorities in support of
and after looking more accuto be feared that the declararately at the pleadings,
tion cannot be; supported. It cannot be doubted that there
is a distinction between tort and assumpsit. In the former
competent for one of several perspecies of action
sons jointly interested to bring the action, and the defendant can only take advantage of the objection by
plea in
in
he
avail
the latter
himself of
on
abatement, but
may
East,
non assumpsit. In the case of Bloxam v. Hubbard,
407, which was an action of trover, in which only three out of
four assignees joined, and a similar objection being taken.
to be well
Lord Ellenbokough, C. J., said, "Assuming
has only the effect of precludso,
founded, and we think
ing the plaintiffs, who are three out of the four assignees, in
whom the property of the ship originally was vested, from
recovering more than their three-fourth parts in value of
now too well settled
the property in question. For,
court of law, that the deto be any longer disputed in
an objection of this sort,
himself
of
fendant can only avail
chattel have not
viz., that all the several part owners in
joined in an action of trespass or ofi tort brought in reUpon the same prinspect to
by plea in abatement."
ciple this case does not come within the ordinary rule
which applies where executors declare without being all
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joined in the action. The chief justice at the trial certainly asked ■whether the averment in this declaration could
be established by the evidence upon any decided authority. Expecting that it might be brought to correspond
with the principle of the case of executors, it was contended on that occasion, that the objection taken to the
declaration was not available; but upon consideration it
must be acknowledged that it does not fall within that
principle, because the implied promises would be to all the
assignees, whereas the promises averred in the declaration are only to two of them. Probably, however, the
court would think that what is said in a note of Serjeant
WUliams, in his edition of Sawnders's Reports, 1 Saund.
Bep., 4th Ed. 291, g. note 2, is not inapplicable to the
What he says is this: "With respect to
present case.
contracts not under seal, where in writing or by parol, a
distinction has been taken between actions of asswm/psit
and actions of tort; in the former case, if the one only of
several persons who ought to join bring the action, the
defendant may take advantage of it on non assumpsit, but
in the latter he must plead it in abatement. And this distinction is universally adopted. However, it may not be
improper to observe as to assumpsit by one only, that at
the time when most of the cases upon this subject were
decided, the same rule extended as well to defendants as
The rule in both cases was founded upon the
to plaintiffs.
same reason that the contract proved was not the same
with that in the declaration. But as soon as it was decided in the case or Rice v. Shute, 5 Barr. 2611, 2 Bl. R.
that leiaving
947, and the other cases which followed
out one of the joint contractors did not vary the contract,
one would have thought that the same principle would be
applied to the case of persons with whom the contract
was made. If the contract be still the same, notwithstanding one of the persons who ought to be made codefendant
that the contract
omitted, upon what principle
who
ought to be cothe
persons
one of
not the same,
may be objected, that by
plaintiff be omitted? Perhaps
this means the plaintiff and the defendant are not upon
equal terms that in an action against one only, he necessarily knows all the persons liable; but in an action by
one only, the defendant may often not know nor be able
But in answer to
to know, what persons ought to join.
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this, it should always be remembered that the rule is founded upon the supposed variance between the contract proved
and the contract laid, and not upon any inconvenience or
convenience to the parties. As to the knowing of the persons, the cases above referred to, respecting defendants,
have decided that this circumstance is immaterial; and as
to the convenience or inconvenience of the thing, it should
seem more convenient that the parties should, after issue,
joined, proceed upon the merits, than that the defendant
should be allowed to nonsuit the plaintiff upon a mere matter of form. However the settled distinction is, as
have
before mentioned, and it must he left to the operation of
time, and the same good sense as at last prevailed in Rice
V. Shute, respecting defendants, to do a/way a distinction
which seems to me to have no principle for its foundation."
It is to be feared that that period has not yet arrived, and
it is probable that this learned person did not know how
much he had to contend with.
have a great respect for that learned
Abbott, C. J. :
writer, and no man entertains more respect for his opinions
than
do, but
think that there is very great reason for
The
the distinction which he seems to contend against.
plaintiff knows or ought to know who are his own partners
in a transaction, but he may not be able to ascertain how
many persons are liable to be sued jointly; consequently,
the omission of a party who ought to have been a coplaintiff is a ground of nonsuit; but the omission to make a
party a defendant can only be taken advantage of by plea
in abatement
think this declaration is clearly bad.

I

I

I

I

I

ELIOT

V.

MORGAN.

Court of King's Bench {?).
7

1836.

Carrington and Payne, 334.

Assumpsit for work and labor as a surveyor.
Plea by the defendant WiUiam Morgan — payment of
281Z. before the action, payment into court of 500Z. more,
and that the plaintiff had not sustained damage to a greater
amount.
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Morgan—

first, non assumpsenmt modo et forma; and, second, that
bhe plaintiff's claim was on a qiumtum meruit, and that he
bad done the work so badly that the defendants had derived no benefit from his services.
CoLBBiDGE, J, : Although the defendant William Morgan
had admitted the joint contract on the record, yet, if the
other defendants
in shewing that they are not
succeed
jointly liable, the plaintiff must fail as to all; for a joint
contract must be established against all, or against none ;
and it is competent for the two defendants, under their
plea of the general issue, to avail themselves of the defence
that too many defendants had been joined in the action.

Verdict for the plaintiff.

(h)

In

Actions in Tort.

PHILLIPS

v. CUMMINGS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

1853.

11 Gushing, 469.

This was an action of tort, averring that the defendant
forcibly entered the premises of the plaintiff and took possession of the plaintiff's house and land, and converted the
same to her own use. At the trial in the court of common
pleas, before Bishop, J., it appeared that the plaintiff derived title through several mesne conveyances, from the
levy of an execution upon the premises in favor of Edwin
Jackson conveyed by
Spencer and Ephraim S. Jackson.
interest
in
the premises, and the
quitclaim all his right and
plaintiff claims through that title. There was no evidence
of -A conveyance from Spencer of his interest in the premises. The defendant objected that the plaintiff could not
maintain this action, because his cotenant Spencer was not
joined, and asked the court so to instruct the jury. But the
judge declined so to do, and the verdict being for the plaintiff, the defendant excepted.
BiGELOW, J.: The rule is fully and clearly established
that in actions of tort, such as quare clausum, or trover for
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taking goods, case for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance, and the like, if the one only of two or more joint
tenants, tenants in common, executors, assignees, and
others who ought regularly to join, bring any such actions,
the defendant must plead the nonjoinder in abatement, and
cannot rely upon it to defeat the action under the general
issue, or avail himself of it for that purpose by plea in bar,
arrest of judgment, or otherwise. 1 Saund. 291 h; 1 Chit
PI. 66; Bloxcm v. Hubbard, 5 East, 407, 420.
Exceptions overruled.

GERRY

V.

GERRY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
11

1858.

Gray, 381.

Action of tort for the conversion of a watch and chain.
At the trial in the court of common pleas, it appeared that

the watch and ch^n had been purchased in 1853 by the
female plaintiff during coverture, with money earned by
her. The defendant objected that upon this evidence the
action should have been brought in the name of the husband only; but Sangeb, J., for the purposes of the trial,
overruled the objection; a verdict was returned for the
plaintiffs, and the defendant alleged exceptions.
Metcalp, J. : This case is not affected by either of the
recent statutes of the commonwealth concerning married
women, but is to' be decided by the rules of the common
law. By that law, the watch and chain, which are the subjects of this suit, were the sole property of the husband.
No authority need be cited to this point. It follows that
the wife has wrongly joined as plaintiff. And the misjoinder of the plaintiffs is fatal, both in actions of tort and in
actions of contract When the misjoinder appears on the
declaration, it is fatal on demurrer; and before our practice act (Par. 22) took effect, it would have been fatal on
motion in arrest of judgment.
When it appears only in
evidence at the trial, it is ground of nonsuit, or requires
a verdict for the defendant. Archb. PI. 54 ; Browne on Action?, 307; Glover v. Eunnetmll, 6 Pidc 224; Ulm&r v. Cun-
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ningham, 2 Greenl. 117. These rules of law axe applied
as well to husbands and wives as to other misjoined plaintiffs. Archb. PI. 39; Broom on Parties, 229, 230. Moores
V. Carter, Hempst 64 ; Van Arsdale v. Dixon, HLU & Denio,
358 ; Rawlins v. Rovmds, 27 Vem. 17.
In actions of tort, there is a distinction between nonjoinder and misjoinder of plaintiffs. Nonjoinder is matter of abatement only. Thompson v. Hoskins, 11 Mass.
419 ; Phillips v. Cummings, 11 Cush. 469.
The verdict must be set aside, and a new trial granted.
But a new trial will be of no avail, imless the declaration
is 80 amended as to make the husband sole plaintiff.
Exceptions sitstained.

BUDDING^ON v. SHEARER.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
22

Shaw, C.

J.,

1839,

Pickering, 427.

drew up the opinion of the court.

This action was commenced against James Shearer and
Lewis Shearer, jointly, to recover double damages under the
statute, for injuries alleged to have been sustained from a
dog owned and kept by them. The statute provision is,
that every owner and keeper of any dog, shall forfeit and
pay to any person injured by such dog, double the amount
of damage sustained by him, to be recovered in an action
of trespass. Revised Stat., c. 58, sec. 13.

It

now appears that before thalastjtried,. James Shearer
hadjieceased, and the action! proceeded against Lewis. On
the trial, the admissions of James were offered in evidence,
made during his life, to prove that the dog belonged to himself and Lewis, there being other evidence to prove the
ownership of Lewis. This was objected to, but admitted;
and upon that objection the defendant now moved for a
new trial.

But we do not think it necessary to pursue the subject,

or to consider tMs objection more particularly, because the
C.

lu P.

62
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court axe of opinion, that upon this last trial, after the
death of James, it was not necessary to prove jjjat he was
part owner of the dog, which .was the only ohject of the
testimony, and therefore the evidence objected to was immaterial.
It is a familiar rule of law, that in cases of tort, where
two or more are liable to an action, they are liable jointly
and severally; and therefore if one is sued alone, it is no
ground of abatement that others, who are liable, are not
sued. And if two or more are sued, a verdict may be rendered against one and in favor of others ; and on such a verdict, judgment may be rendered against the one, (^course,
therefore, although a joint, liability is averred^ it need not
be-prov-ed^

From the application of this rule, it wiU be obvious that,
had the cause proceeded to trial against both, on a declaration, charging them in different counts as owners, and as
keepers, in order to charge Lewis, it would not have been
necessary to prove James to be an owner. Then a fortiori,
when by the death of James the suit abated as against bim
and properly proceeded against Lewis alone, it was to be
regarded in the same manner as if Lewis alone had been
sued; and the ownership of James became wholly immate-

riaL

judgment on the verdict for the plcmtiff.

PBAESON

V.

STROMAL.

Constitutional Court of South Carolina.
1

Nott

amd

1818.

McCord, 354.

CoLoooK, J. : This action was originally brought against
two defendants. At the spring court of 1811, a motion was
made by plaintiff's counsel for leaving to strike out the
name of one of the defendants, and to proceed against the
other, which was granted.
After the plaintiff had gone through his evidence to prove
a title in himself, a motion was made for a nonsuit, on the
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authority of the case of Steel v. Ward et oL., decided in the
constitutional court, at Columbia, April, 1813, which (it was
then argued, and as I then thought correctly) had determined, that where an action was brought against two or
more for a joint trespass, that the plaintiff should not be
permitted, aJfter taking issue, to strike out one defendant,
and proceed against the other. And the case, from the manuscript report, does appear to be such an one, for in that
a motion was made to strike out aU but one defendant, and
refused; the plaintiff suffered a nonsuit, with leave to move
to set it aside, which he did, and his motion was refused.
It is clear, upon the general rules of pleading, that the
plaintiff had a right to enter up a nolle prosequi as to one
defendant (1 Chitty, 546, Greeves v. Rolls, 2 Salk. 456;
Tidd's Practice, 4th Edit. 623, 2 Amer. Ed. 6^) in actions
ex delicto; for in such one might be found guilty and the
other acquitted. 1 Sellon's Prac. 336 ; 1 Chitty, 31 ; 2 Loft's
Gilb. 595; 1 Morgan's Ess. 394; Brown v. Hasdrig et al.,
2 Vent. 151.
The nonsuit must, therefore, be set aside, and a new trial
granted.
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